case
3217 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
If it was doubtful whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? Let us hear from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he fell down immediately, it is a bill of divorce; if he fell after some time it is no bill of divorce. But is “immediately” not a case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? This implies that in case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him, it is a bill of divorce.
If it was doubtful whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? Let us hear from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he fell down immediately, it is a bill of divorce; if he fell after some time it is no bill of divorce. But is “immediately” not a case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? This implies that in case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him, it is a bill of divorce.
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody had an attack of seizures”, etc. The symptoms of an insane person: One who goes out in the night, stays overnight in a graveyard, tears his clothing, and destroys what one gives to him. Rebbi Huna said, only if all of that is in him since otherwise I say that one who goes out in the night is a man-dog; he who stays overnight in a graveyard burns incense to spirits, he who tears up his clothing is [a choleric person], and he who destroys what one gives to him is a Cynic. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these symptoms is proof. Rebbi Abun said, what Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these by itself is reasonable for him who destroys what one gives to him; even the greatest idiot does not destroy all one gives to him. The one attacked by seizures does not exhibit any of these signs. What is one attacked by seizures? Rebbi Yose said, a decrepit one. There came a case before Rebbi Yose of a weaver who, when one gave him red on black he was exerting himself, black on red he was exerting himself. This is the cordiacus described by the Sages.
“If sometimes he is insane and sometimes healthy. When he is insane he is insane in all regards, when healthy he is normal in all regards.” A case came before Samuel who said, when he is of sound mind he should deliver the bill of divorce. Why? Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. It follows that Samuel acted according to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, only if he is of sound mind may he deliver the bill of divorce; (Is. 38:16) “make me healthy and let me live!”
MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce from today if I should die from this illness;” if he got up, walked on the market, fell ill again and died, one estimates whether he died from the original sickness, in which case it is a bill of divorce; otherwise it is no bill of divorce. She may not be alone with him except in the presence of witnesses, which may be even a male or a female slave except her personal slave girl since she has no shame in the presence of her personal slave girl. What is her status in those days? Rebbi Jehudah says, she is a married woman in all respects. Rebbi Yose says, she is divorced and not divorced.
It was stated: “Also the one in mortal danger.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it happened in such a case that he died during intercourse.
“Whether he died from the original sickness.” Are male or female slaves trustworthy? The witnesses know that at the time she was alone with him a male or female slave was present. “If she was alone with him with the knowledge of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him. One witness, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. One in the morning and one in the afternoon, that was a case and Rebbi Eleazar bar Thaddeus asked the Sages who said, this is not [testimony of] being alone. If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about intercourse but not about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage.” Rebbi Jeremiah explains the baraita: If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about immoral intercourse but not about preliminary marriage. If the time was not long enough for intercourse, one does not suspect anything. Rebbi Yose explains the baraita: If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about immoral intercourse but not about preliminary marriage by intercourse. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage by intercourse. If the time was not long enough for intercourse, one does not suspect preliminary marriage bymoney. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage by money. Rebbi Abin said, It turns out that the House of Shammai parallels the rabbis and the House of Hillel Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah.
Rebbi Yudan said, we deal with the case that it was lost by compulsion. They treated her like an unpaid trustee who may stipulate to be free from an oath. Rebbi Yose said, do we state here that the unpaid trustee is free from an oath? But we deal with the case that it was lost by mishandling. They treated the stole according to its value. But the rabbis say that in any case it has to be treated as a case of condition of a bill of divorce.
Rebbi Yudan said, we deal with the case that it was lost by compulsion. They treated her like an unpaid trustee who may stipulate to be free from an oath. Rebbi Yose said, do we state here that the unpaid trustee is free from an oath? But we deal with the case that it was lost by mishandling. They treated the stole according to its value. But the rabbis say that in any case it has to be treated as a case of condition of a bill of divorce.
Rebbi Yudan said, we deal with the case that it was lost by compulsion. They treated her like an unpaid trustee who may stipulate to be free from an oath. Rebbi Yose said, do we state here that the unpaid trustee is free from an oath? But we deal with the case that it was lost by mishandling. They treated the stole according to its value. But the rabbis say that in any case it has to be treated as a case of condition of a bill of divorce.
Rebbi Yudan said, we deal with the case that it was lost by compulsion. They treated her like an unpaid trustee who may stipulate to be free from an oath. Rebbi Yose said, do we state here that the unpaid trustee is free from an oath? But we deal with the case that it was lost by mishandling. They treated the stole according to its value. But the rabbis say that in any case it has to be treated as a case of condition of a bill of divorce.
A person gave money for a ship when the canal dried up. The case came before Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: There is the ship, bring the canal! Abba bar Huna in the name of Rebbi Abba was praying that the canal should dry up and he could recover his money. He said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Abba are of the same opinion as Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. If she cut off, she hindered. If her hand (?) was cut off, it is not as if she hindered.
MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within twelve months,” if he died within the twelve months it is no bill of divorce. “This is your bill of divorce from today if I should not return within twelve months,” if he died within the twelve months it is a bill of divorce. “If I should not return within twelve months from today write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife;” if they wrote a bill of divorce within twelve months and delivered it within twelve months, it is no bill of divorce. “Write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife if I should not return within twelve months from today;” if they wrote a bill of divorce within twelve months and delivered it after twelve months, it is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Yose says, this is an example of a bill of divorce. If they wrote after twelve months and delivered after twelve months but he had died, if the bill of divorce preceded the death it is a bill of divorce but if the death preceded the bill of divorce it is no bill of divorce. If it is not known, it is a case where they say, she is divorced and not divorced.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody married his sister-in-law,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” Therefore she must leave.
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote a bill to divorce his wife and then changed his mind,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: There is no problem because of the purity of the priestly line and the court will not denigrate her. There came a case before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and he acted following the House of Hillel. Rav asked him, why did you bring yourself into this great doubt? He answered, Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose was with me. He quoted about them: “Two are better than one.”
Where do we hold? If he knotted and signed it inside, everybody agrees that it can be made simple. If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple. {Rebbi objected to the statement of Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: “The body of the document.” If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple, but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple.) Rebbi objected to the statement of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: The body of the document shows whether it is simple or not simple. What is the body of the document? Rebbi Abba said, as Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But did we not state: “That is the formula of a document”? Rebbi Mana said, that is the formula of a knotted document. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say it is the same for knotted and simple, for a knotted document it is a necessity, for a simple one it is not a necessity. Rebbi Aḥa said, if one adds to practice. A simple document [is witnessed] by two persons. If common usage is to have three, one makes it with three. A knotted document is signed on its back. If common usage is to sign it inside and out, one signs it inside and out.
Where do we hold? If he knotted and signed it inside, everybody agrees that it can be made simple. If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple. {Rebbi objected to the statement of Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: “The body of the document.” If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple, but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple.) Rebbi objected to the statement of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: The body of the document shows whether it is simple or not simple. What is the body of the document? Rebbi Abba said, as Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But did we not state: “That is the formula of a document”? Rebbi Mana said, that is the formula of a knotted document. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say it is the same for knotted and simple, for a knotted document it is a necessity, for a simple one it is not a necessity. Rebbi Aḥa said, if one adds to practice. A simple document [is witnessed] by two persons. If common usage is to have three, one makes it with three. A knotted document is signed on its back. If common usage is to sign it inside and out, one signs it inside and out.
Where do we hold? If he knotted and signed it inside, everybody agrees that it can be made simple. If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple. {Rebbi objected to the statement of Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: “The body of the document.” If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple, but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple.) Rebbi objected to the statement of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: The body of the document shows whether it is simple or not simple. What is the body of the document? Rebbi Abba said, as Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But did we not state: “That is the formula of a document”? Rebbi Mana said, that is the formula of a knotted document. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say it is the same for knotted and simple, for a knotted document it is a necessity, for a simple one it is not a necessity. Rebbi Aḥa said, if one adds to practice. A simple document [is witnessed] by two persons. If common usage is to have three, one makes it with three. A knotted document is signed on its back. If common usage is to sign it inside and out, one signs it inside and out.
Where do we hold? If he knotted and signed it inside, everybody agrees that it can be made simple. If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple. {Rebbi objected to the statement of Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: “The body of the document.” If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple, but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple.) Rebbi objected to the statement of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: The body of the document shows whether it is simple or not simple. What is the body of the document? Rebbi Abba said, as Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But did we not state: “That is the formula of a document”? Rebbi Mana said, that is the formula of a knotted document. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say it is the same for knotted and simple, for a knotted document it is a necessity, for a simple one it is not a necessity. Rebbi Aḥa said, if one adds to practice. A simple document [is witnessed] by two persons. If common usage is to have three, one makes it with three. A knotted document is signed on its back. If common usage is to sign it inside and out, one signs it inside and out.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar says, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it,” etc. Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of the Sages: It is invalid. There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan about a Cohen’s wife and he wanted to act on Rebbi Yannai’s statement when it was heard that Rav and Samuel disagreed. There came before him [another case] involving an Israel, and he listened to that. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, in the opinion of everybody it is valid. But did not Rebbi Eleazar say, it is valid, and the rabbis say, it is invalid? What is their disagreement? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is valid and she can collect from encumbered property. The rabbis said, it is invalid and she can collect only from unencumbered property.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar says, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it,” etc. Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of the Sages: It is invalid. There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan about a Cohen’s wife and he wanted to act on Rebbi Yannai’s statement when it was heard that Rav and Samuel disagreed. There came before him [another case] involving an Israel, and he listened to that. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, in the opinion of everybody it is valid. But did not Rebbi Eleazar say, it is valid, and the rabbis say, it is invalid? What is their disagreement? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is valid and she can collect from encumbered property. The rabbis said, it is invalid and she can collect only from unencumbered property.
HALAKHAH: “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Just as you say that a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce is invalid in the case of two wives, similarly two bills of divorce should be invalid for two women. He answered, that is correct. He said to him, but did we not state: “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce and they became mixed up, one delivers both to both women”? There, each of the bills was written in the name of the respective wife; the mix-up caused the problem. But here, neither one was written as divorce in her name; when it was delivered, could it be considered as divorce in her name from the start?
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote two bills of divorce side by side,” etc. “It is invalid if the witnesses are separated from the text by the width of two lines; less than that it is valid”. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines in a text about one subject makes invalid in any case. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said: The Mishnah says so: “One Hebrew- and one Greek-writing witness are under each of them, reaching from one column to the other, are all invalid.” Is not Hebrew combined with Greek one item? Rebbi Mana said, if he started at the end of the second line and ended at the fourth line, it is valid. “How far from the text should the witnesses sign? That they can be read with it, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, one full line. Rebbi Dositheos ben Yannai says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting.” What kind of writing does one use to estimate? Rebbi Yasa ben Rebbi Sabbatai says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula: Corresponding to לך ולך. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does the signature of Yose ben Yannai have equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh? He said to him: For that it is needed, that the signature of Yose ben Yannai has equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh.
HALAKHAH: “That is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid”. Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies from the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalȋṣah in the case of a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him for up to 30 days shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?
HALAKHAH: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married”. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If lights are burning and people talk. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced”? Can you say that lights are burning? No, people talk. So here also, people talk. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the title was checked and found to be from the mouth of women or minors, the title is abolished. Rav said, they permitted only in case of a hearsay witness.
The word of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya implies that Gentiles have no divorce, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in this matter: A Gentile who divorced his wife, who herself then went and married another, when the latter divorced her and then both of them converted, I do not read for them: “Her first husband who had divorced her cannot return to marry her.” It was stated in this matter: A case came before Rebbi and he approved.
If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.
From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.
“She leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood; “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Could He not have mentioned only one of them? If only one of them were mentioned, would I not have said that if she leaves with indicators [of adolescence], then certainly in the days of adulthood? But in that case I would have said that they are identical with the days of adulthood. Would this not be logical? She is emancipated from the power of the father and she is emancipated from the power of the master; since she is emancipated from the power of the father by some indicators [of adulthood], she is emancipated from the power of the master by the same indicators. Therefore, it was necessary to say, “she leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood, “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Or maybe the other way around? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: “Without money.” At a place where there is money for the father, there is no money for the master.
Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.
Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.
It is written: “His master shall bring him to the judges, or he shall bring him to the door.” How is that? The one who was sold by the court, “his master shall bring him to the judges.” The one who sold himself, “or he shall bring him to the door.” Rebbi Immi asked: It is obvious that the court writes the contract for him who was sold by the court. Who is writing the contract for him who sells himself? It is written: “It shall not be hard in your eyes to send him away free from you; for twice the hire of a hireling he served you for six years.” The hired hand works during the day; he does not work in the night. The Hebrew slave works both day and night. It is written: “He shall not treat him harshly before your eyes,” and you say so? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His master marries him to a Canaanite slave; it turns out that he serves him day and night. Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked before Rebbi Immi: Think of it, if he was buying a Cohen! He answered him: Would the case of an Israel not also be permission of something prohibited following Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Abba bar Mamai here changed his mind.
A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate. A baraita states, the rules of movables. A baraita states, neither the rules of realestate nor the rules of movables. A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate, as we have stated there: “Possession of houses, cisterns, ditches, and caves, bath houses, and dovecots, olive presses, and irrigated fields, and slaves.” A baraita states, slaves do not follow the rules of movables. As it is stated: What is possession of a slave? He tied his shoe for him, or untied his shoe, carried his things to the bath. Rebbi Simeon says, if he lifted him, that is possession. If he lifted his master, there is no stronger possession than this. A statement of the rabbis says that slaves follow the rules of movables. For Rebbi Yose said in the name of rabbis, there is no lien for a gift; one does not collect from slaves as from real estate. Rebbi Mana asked Rebbi Shammai, who are those rabbis? He told him, Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Immi. A widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. Not of real estate, as it was stated: Real estate and slaves; he took possession of the real estate. If you say that slaves follow the rules of real estate, when he took possession of the real estate he would have taken possession of the slaves, since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he had two fields, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with intention to take possession also of that in Galilee, or of the one in Galilee with intention to take possession also of that in Judea, he acquired. Not of movables. If you say that slaves follow the rules of movables, when he took possession of the movables he would have taken possessionof the slaves, since we did state there: “For property that is not guaranteed will cause guaranteed properties to be objects of swearing about them.”
If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.
If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.
“For my slave girl X I want a document that she should not be enslaved.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan. He said, he has no power to enslave. What are her children? Slaves. What did he retain for her? Her earnings. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Yose both said, this follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. If he wrote all his possessions jointly to two of his slaves, both are free and both have to free one another. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Abba: Does this not imply that one slave accepts from his master for another one? He answered, what do you think? Since they acquired the properties they went free? No, simultaneously slaves and properties went free.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
“By money.” Rebbi Abba was of the opinion, by money if there was no intention to write a deed. But if money was given with the intention to write a deed for him, possession was transferred only when the deed was written. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose disagree. It follows that Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel and Rav Huna Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel. Samuel asked Rav Ḥuna: He was slaughtering sacrifices while being occupied? He answered, “for your intention,” this excludes one otherwise occupied. If one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Abba said this; Samuel did not accept it. What means “he made it ride on two shining racing horses”? They wanted to say, one brings two crazy horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; he has nothing in his hand. Rebbi Yose from Mamelia said, he doubly empowered him, for there is a title guarantee in a sale but none for a gift; the seller did not sell everything but the giver of a gift gave everything. And Rav Ḥuna parallels Rebbi Joḥanan. A person, when he lay dying, said: my property should be given to X. Afterwards he said: write and deliver. Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim brought the case before Rebbi Joḥanan who said: If he said to transfer to him, everybody agrees that he entered into possession. If the transfer was to be in writing, everybody agrees that nobody transfers rights in writing after his death. Who would notify the greatness? Explain it if witnesses know. Think of it, if no witnesses know it? Rebbi Yose said, the field remains in the hand of its proprietors; the burden of proof is on the claimant.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields were involved, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with the intent of taking possession of the one in Galilee, or the one in Galilee with the intent of taking possession of the one in Judea, he took possession. But in [the case of] property of a proselyte he did not acquire even the boundary strip between them. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting from the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North with the intent of also acquiring that in the South, or in the South with the intent of acquiring also that in the North, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he did not acquire unless he also intended to acquire the middle part. A baraita disagrees with Rav Ḥisda: If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his property, if one takes possession of the ground he is obligated for everything. If he took possession of standing grain, he is obligated for fallen stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah but freed from tithes. Does not the air separate between stalks? There, we have stated: “If he tore off anything connected to the ground, he took possession.” Samuel said, he took possession only of that leaf. But did we not state: “If it was connected to the ground and he tore off anything, he took possession”? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eudaimon the emigrant confirmed it: Samuel will agree, for proselyte’s property.
The House of Shammai say, an agent may not testify as witness. But the House of Hillel say, an agent may testify as witness. How is that? If he sent two, in the opinion of the House of Shammai there is an agent and two witnesses. In the opinion of the House of Hillel, all three can be agents and all three can be witnesses. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the matter is reasonable if the preliminary marriage was executed by document. But if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he became an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Yose said, since the Torah made him trustworthy, even if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he did not become an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Abba said, there came a case before Rav who admitted the agent as witness. A person deposited his amphoras in another’s corral; [the latter] reneged. The case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who admitted the agent as witness and made him swear [by the testimony of] the porter.
The House of Shammai say, an agent may not testify as witness. But the House of Hillel say, an agent may testify as witness. How is that? If he sent two, in the opinion of the House of Shammai there is an agent and two witnesses. In the opinion of the House of Hillel, all three can be agents and all three can be witnesses. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the matter is reasonable if the preliminary marriage was executed by document. But if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he became an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Yose said, since the Torah made him trustworthy, even if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he did not become an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Abba said, there came a case before Rav who admitted the agent as witness. A person deposited his amphoras in another’s corral; [the latter] reneged. The case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who admitted the agent as witness and made him swear [by the testimony of] the porter.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rebbi Assi: If an underage girl married herself off preliminarily with two pubic hairs, her father repudiates the marriage but not she herself. This follows neither Rebbi Joḥanan nor Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If following Rebbi Joḥanan, there is no place for repudiation. If following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the marriage is valid by biblical standards. It follows only Rebbi Joḥanan. Even though Rebbi Joḥanan says that everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself, he agrees in this case that the father repudiates on her behalf.
Rebbi Abba bar Cahana and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If she was preliminarily married with agreement but definitively married without agreement: there was such a case and the father came and removed her from the bridal chamber. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua: He had an indication that Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagreed with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But this does not disagree. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said there, she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings, so Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said here, she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi came in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If she was preliminarily married without agreement and was being definitively married without agreement: there was such a case and the father came and annulled her preliminary marriage.
Rebbi Abba bar Cahana and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If she was preliminarily married with agreement but definitively married without agreement: there was such a case and the father came and removed her from the bridal chamber. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua: He had an indication that Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagreed with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But this does not disagree. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said there, she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings, so Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said here, she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi came in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If she was preliminarily married without agreement and was being definitively married without agreement: there was such a case and the father came and annulled her preliminary marriage.
Mishnah: “Be married to me preliminarily by this date fruit,” etc. The Mishnah [presents the case] that she said, I cannot accept this one, try that one; I cannot accept this one, try that one. “By this and by that one and by that one.” Who is the Tanna of Wawim? Rebbi Jehudah. But for Rebbi Meïr, either this or this or that one.
“Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma,” and she said, “throw it into the sea or the river,” she is not married. “Give it to a poor person,” she is married. In either case nothing came into her hand; in one case you say, she is married; in the other case you say, she is not married! Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She wants to be married and be seen as benefiting the poor. Rebbi Phineas said, this can be interpreted either following Rebbi Ze‘ira or Rebbi Ila.
“Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma,” and she said, “throw it into the sea or the river,” she is not married. “Give it to a poor person,” she is married. In either case nothing came into her hand; in one case you say, she is married; in the other case you say, she is not married! Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She wants to be married and be seen as benefiting the poor. Rebbi Phineas said, this can be interpreted either following Rebbi Ze‘ira or Rebbi Ila.
“Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma,” and she said, “throw it into the sea or the river,” she is not married. “Give it to a poor person,” she is married. In either case nothing came into her hand; in one case you say, she is married; in the other case you say, she is not married! Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She wants to be married and be seen as benefiting the poor. Rebbi Phineas said, this can be interpreted either following Rebbi Ze‘ira or Rebbi Ila.
A person gave a pledge to another; the other reneged on it. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Hila, and Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa all three say it was a deal about flax seed and he had given partial payment. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said: Either he delivers the entire contract or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, either he delivers for the amount of the pledge or ome may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan in a sale which is not usually split, such as of a cow or a stole. Is a woman usually acquired split? Rebbi Ḥaggai and Rebbi Yudan both said, a sale usually may be split, the acquisition of a wife cannot be split.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed preliminary marriage with a woman etc. We have stated defects. Which vows? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoṣadaq: If she vowed not to eat meat, or not to drink wine, or not to wear dyed garments. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the fine linen garments which come from Bet She‘an have the status of dyed garments. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he said to her, “on condition that you have no obligation of vows on you.” But if he said to her, “on condition that you have no vow on you,” then even if she made a vow not to eat carob fruit it is a vow.
“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.
“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.
“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.
“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.
“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.
“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.
Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.
“With Second Tithe.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He did not intend to transgress the words of the Torah. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, in one case he did not intend, in one case she did not intend. Rebbi Jonah said, the sanctified he did not intend, Second Tithe she did not intend. Rebbi Abin said, the sanctified neither he nor she did intend; Second tithe he did intend but she did not.
“With Second Tithe.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He did not intend to transgress the words of the Torah. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, in one case he did not intend, in one case she did not intend. Rebbi Jonah said, the sanctified he did not intend, Second Tithe she did not intend. Rebbi Abin said, the sanctified neither he nor she did intend; Second tithe he did intend but she did not.
There, we have stated: “An animal that is found as from Jerusalem to Migdal-Eder in every direction.” The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, this was taught for their monetary value. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, does one say to a person, go and commit larceny with sacrifices? But in every case they followed the majority of cases: If most are male, they are elevation offerings, if most are female, well-being offerings. But do not well-being offerings come from males and females? What does he do? He redeems them as profane and then turns them into elevation offerings. This is difficult. Can a purification offering become an elevation offering? Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is a stipulation by the court that all redundant animals should be brought as elevation offerings. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Ḥama, is that not intentional [misuse]? He said to him, since it is a stipulation by the court, it is not intentional [misuse]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, as you say there, it is a stipulation by the court that lost animals should be brought as elevation offerings.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This shall be an elevation sacrifice for thirty days,” it is an elevation sacrifice for thirty days; after thirty days it automatically becomes profane. What is its status regarding larceny? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the larceny is clear. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Hila both say, the larceny is in doubt. “You are preliminarily married to me for thirty days,” she is preliminarily married. What is the difference between dedication and woman? We find that a dedication can be eliminated without redemption but we do not find that a woman could leave without a divorce document. Where do we find that a dedication can be eliminated without redemption? Following Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “they enter without paying.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it according to everybody regarding a bought field. “This is your bill of divorce for thirty days”: it is no bill of divorce. Rebbi Isaac ben R. Eleazar said, when do you say that she is preliminarily married? If he effectuated the preliminary marriage by money. But if he effectuated the preliminary marriage by a document, since marriage documents were inferred from divorce documents and in the case of a divorce she is not divorced, so in the case of a preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This shall be an elevation sacrifice for thirty days,” it is an elevation sacrifice for thirty days; after thirty days it automatically becomes profane. What is its status regarding larceny? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the larceny is clear. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Hila both say, the larceny is in doubt. “You are preliminarily married to me for thirty days,” she is preliminarily married. What is the difference between dedication and woman? We find that a dedication can be eliminated without redemption but we do not find that a woman could leave without a divorce document. Where do we find that a dedication can be eliminated without redemption? Following Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “they enter without paying.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it according to everybody regarding a bought field. “This is your bill of divorce for thirty days”: it is no bill of divorce. Rebbi Isaac ben R. Eleazar said, when do you say that she is preliminarily married? If he effectuated the preliminary marriage by money. But if he effectuated the preliminary marriage by a document, since marriage documents were inferred from divorce documents and in the case of a divorce she is not divorced, so in the case of a preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
“As daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen she may eat heave.” Some Tannaïm state: She may not eat heave. Rebbi Hila said, the one who says that she may eat heave refers to the case that the second man is a Cohen, but the one who says that she may not eat heave refers to the case that the second man is not a Cohen.
“As daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen she may eat heave.” Some Tannaïm state: She may not eat heave. Rebbi Hila said, the one who says that she may eat heave refers to the case that the second man is a Cohen, but the one who says that she may not eat heave refers to the case that the second man is not a Cohen.
“A daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel may not eat heave.” This is a necessary statement, even in case the second man is a Cohen.
If the appointed time has arrived and he says, I gave, but she says, I did not receive: Rebbi Abun said, since he tries to wrest the contract from the woman’s hand, the burden of proof is on him. Think of it, maybe there was no contract? Rebbi Yose said, since he tries to forbid her to anybody, he has to prove that they entered into the contract. A case came before Rebbi Abbahu; he said to him, go and deliver. He answered, Rabbi, I did not acquire a wife and you say to me, go and deliver! Rebbi Abbahu said, it never happened to me that one got the better of me except this one. He rephrased and said: If he changed his mind, he shall deliver. If she changed her mind, she shall deliver. Is that not his former judgment? He rephrased to give it the status of a court document.
Only if it be with his and her agreement. If it was symphōn in his opinion and preliminary marriage in her opinion, Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is symphōn, Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it is preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥanina was taking up arms against Rebbi Ḥaggai, when Rebbi Hila said to him, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man; this is what Rebbi Ze‘ira said. In the first Adar, Rebbi Hila died. In the second Adar, a case came before Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, and he wanted to rule following Rebbi Ḥaggai. Rebbi Samuel bar Immi told him, Rebbi Hila was wrong when he told you, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, a Mishnah supports him: “ ‘You married me preliminarily’, and he says, ‘I did not marry you preliminarily.’ He is permitted her relatives but she is forbidden his relatives.” Rebbi Borqai asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it the same with symphōn? He answered, a symphōn is not doubtful but the rules are identical for symphōn and preliminary marriage.
Similarly, the pedlars directed the village wax chandlers to a merchant. The merchant absconded. The case came before Rebbi Mana, who said, if it is a matter of pennies, they were negligent. If it is a matter of denars, it is the way of merchants to move around.
A person met another in the market place. He said to him, give me the linen which you hold for me. The other responded, give me the denar which you hold for me. The first said, give me the linen and deduct the denar. The case came before Rebbi Mana, who said to him, you admitted that you owe him a denar; he did not admit anything about the linen. Go and give him the denar! Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Immi will agree that this is not the law but that he obligated him lest the other deny his liability for the linen.
A person owed another one 100 denars on a document. He sent 50 with an agent and instructed him: If he does not surrender the document, do not give him anything. The case came before Rebbi Immi. He said, go and give it, for we know. Think of it, Rebbi Immi [might die]! One writes for him a proclamation of the court. If one accepts for another person, the rabbis here say, what he accepted, he accepted for the claimant.
Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they were cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he divorced her; what is the situation?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to a woman, be preliminarily married to me,” etc. Rav said, we deal with the case that he gave her a peruṭah’s worth. Rebbi Immi asked (before Rebbi): Do we not always deal with the case that he gave her a peruṭah’s worth? But so it is: “By what I shall speak for you to the government; if he did speak for her to the government for a peruṭah’s worth she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married.” “By what I shall work for you as a worker; if he did work for her as a worker for a peruṭah’s worth, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Only if she set aside a tetradrachma in her chest for him. With what did he effectuate the preliminary marriage? As we have stated there: “If anything is bartered instead of money, if one party entered in possession, the other is obligated for its trade-in.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to a woman, be preliminarily married to me,” etc. Rav said, we deal with the case that he gave her a peruṭah’s worth. Rebbi Immi asked (before Rebbi): Do we not always deal with the case that he gave her a peruṭah’s worth? But so it is: “By what I shall speak for you to the government; if he did speak for her to the government for a peruṭah’s worth she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married.” “By what I shall work for you as a worker; if he did work for her as a worker for a peruṭah’s worth, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Only if she set aside a tetradrachma in her chest for him. With what did he effectuate the preliminary marriage? As we have stated there: “If anything is bartered instead of money, if one party entered in possession, the other is obligated for its trade-in.”
HALAKHAH: “If one says, I preliminarily married off my daughter”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling. What means, one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In preliminary marriage, the same holds true. “I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I married her preliminarily,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry that woman.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “This one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betrothe her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily, and one of them jumped the gun and married her definitively. But if he said, I married her preliminarily and then married her definitively, and another one comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way.
HALAKHAH: “If one says, I preliminarily married off my daughter”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling. What means, one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In preliminary marriage, the same holds true. “I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I married her preliminarily,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry that woman.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “This one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betrothe her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily, and one of them jumped the gun and married her definitively. But if he said, I married her preliminarily and then married her definitively, and another one comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way.
So is the Mishnah: “If somebody said when dying, I have children, he is believed; I have brothers, he is not believed;” Rav said, since it is in his hand to divorce, he is to be believed. The word of Samuel agrees with this. A Persian when dying said to them: Give this man’s wife a bill of divorce. They asked him, why? Because of your wretched brother? After he died, the case came before Samuel who said, since it was in his hand to divorce, he is to be believed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is not to be believed. Ulla descended there and said this in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; they ganged up on him. Think of it, if he was a Cohen?
Rav Sheshet objected: Does not the Mishnah disagree? “You married me preliminarily but he says, I did not marry you preliminarily; he is permitted her relatives but she is forbidden his relatives.” They said, so did it happen: Simeon bar Abba brought a bill of divorce and delivered it in front of one witness. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said, a single witness in marital matters is nothing. Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Assi in the name of Assi say: a single witness in marital matters is nothing? Rav said, one who performs a preliminary marriage in front of a single witness did not do anything. Samuel said, he who performs a preliminary marriage without prior negotiation is whipped, but the preliminary marriage holds. Mar Uqba in the name of Samuel said three things: He who performs a preliminary marriage without prior negotiation is whipped; one who sleeps with his betrothed in his father-in-law’s house is whipped; one who insults the court bailiff is whipped.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to a woman,” etc. Rebbi Yossi said, it is reasonable that Rebbi Meïr not disagree in this case. Rebbi Mana said, the entire series implies that he disagrees. Since there, where they are all older and younger, you say that Rebbi Meïr disagrees, so here, where all are old compared to young or young compared to old, he certainly disagrees.
MISHNAH: In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father. Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel. And in any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part. Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a Gibeonite or a bastard. In any case where a preliminary marriage with him is impossible but with others is possible, the child is a bastard. Who is this? This is one having sexual relations with any woman forbidden in the Torah because of incest or adultery. And in any case where a preliminary marriage is impossible with anybody, the child follows the mother. Who is this? The child of a slave girl or a Gentile woman.
MISHNAH: In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father. Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel. And in any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part. Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a Gibeonite or a bastard. In any case where a preliminary marriage with him is impossible but with others is possible, the child is a bastard. Who is this? This is one having sexual relations with any woman forbidden in the Torah because of incest or adultery. And in any case where a preliminary marriage is impossible with anybody, the child follows the mother. Who is this? The child of a slave girl or a Gentile woman.
MISHNAH: In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father. Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel. And in any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part. Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a Gibeonite or a bastard. In any case where a preliminary marriage with him is impossible but with others is possible, the child is a bastard. Who is this? This is one having sexual relations with any woman forbidden in the Torah because of incest or adultery. And in any case where a preliminary marriage is impossible with anybody, the child follows the mother. Who is this? The child of a slave girl or a Gentile woman.
MISHNAH: In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father. Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel. And in any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part. Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a Gibeonite or a bastard. In any case where a preliminary marriage with him is impossible but with others is possible, the child is a bastard. Who is this? This is one having sexual relations with any woman forbidden in the Torah because of incest or adultery. And in any case where a preliminary marriage is impossible with anybody, the child follows the mother. Who is this? The child of a slave girl or a Gentile woman.
HALAKHAH: “In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel.” Rebbi Abin understood this from the second part: (In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father.) [In any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a bastard or a Gibeonite.” Could he not have objected to him: In the case of a disqualified priest married to the daughter of an Israel there is no sinful marriage but the child follows the blemished part? In the case of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried, there is (no) sinful marriage but the child is unblemished since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried is enabled for the priesthood. What is the reason? [For she is an abomination,] she is an abomination but her children are not an abomination.
HALAKHAH: “In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel.” Rebbi Abin understood this from the second part: (In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father.) [In any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a bastard or a Gibeonite.” Could he not have objected to him: In the case of a disqualified priest married to the daughter of an Israel there is no sinful marriage but the child follows the blemished part? In the case of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried, there is (no) sinful marriage but the child is unblemished since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried is enabled for the priesthood. What is the reason? [For she is an abomination,] she is an abomination but her children are not an abomination.
HALAKHAH: “In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel.” Rebbi Abin understood this from the second part: (In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father.) [In any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a bastard or a Gibeonite.” Could he not have objected to him: In the case of a disqualified priest married to the daughter of an Israel there is no sinful marriage but the child follows the blemished part? In the case of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried, there is (no) sinful marriage but the child is unblemished since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried is enabled for the priesthood. What is the reason? [For she is an abomination,] she is an abomination but her children are not an abomination.
HALAKHAH: “In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel.” Rebbi Abin understood this from the second part: (In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father.) [In any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a bastard or a Gibeonite.” Could he not have objected to him: In the case of a disqualified priest married to the daughter of an Israel there is no sinful marriage but the child follows the blemished part? In the case of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried, there is (no) sinful marriage but the child is unblemished since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried is enabled for the priesthood. What is the reason? [For she is an abomination,] she is an abomination but her children are not an abomination.
HALAKHAH: “In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel.” Rebbi Abin understood this from the second part: (In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father.) [In any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a bastard or a Gibeonite.” Could he not have objected to him: In the case of a disqualified priest married to the daughter of an Israel there is no sinful marriage but the child follows the blemished part? In the case of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried, there is (no) sinful marriage but the child is unblemished since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried is enabled for the priesthood. What is the reason? [For she is an abomination,] she is an abomination but her children are not an abomination.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba went to Tyre. When he came before Rebbi Joḥanan, he asked him, what case did you handle? He said to him, a proselyte who had been circumcised but had not immersed himself. He asked him, why did you not injure him? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi told him, leave him alone, he acted correctly not to injure him. The argument of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, in the name of Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi: The child is neither qualified nor disqualified but dirtied. And here, he says so? Did we not state: If a proselyte was circumcised but not immersed, immersed but not circumcised, everything depends on circumcision, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Joshua says, immersion also is necessary. But Rebbi Joshua ben Levi follows what Bar Qappara stated, as Bar Qappara stated: A proselyte who was circumcised but not immersed is qualified since there is no proselyte who did not immerse himself for his emission of semen. Is that not difficult? The cleansing from a minor impurity is counted for him for a major impurity? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, since either one is for the holiness of Israel, it is counted for him.
Rav Huna said that in the days of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah they tried to include them. Rebbi Abbahu inverts the wording: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar they said, who could purify the altar’s part? That implies that Joshua excluded them. He excluded them only as disqualified for marriage. If you would say, disqualified (because of sins) then the rapist of a Gibeonite girl should not have to pay the fine, but we have stated: The rapist of a Gibeonite girl has to pay the fine.” Rebbi Eleazar said, he cursed them as a snake, as it is said: “But now you are cursed.” And it is written: “The people of Israel said to the Ḥiwwite.” But were they Ḥiwwites? They acted like the snake which said, I know that the Holy One, praise to Him, did say “because on the day you eat from it, you will die a death.” I shall go and trick them so that they eat and will be punished and I shall inherit the earth for myself. So these people acted; they said, we know that the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Israel: “You shall certainly ban them, the Hittite, the Emorite, and the Perizite, as the Eternal, your God, has commanded you” And it is written: “You shall not conclude a covenant with them.” We shall go and trick them that they conclude a covenant with us. As you take it, if they kill us, they violate their oath. If they let us live, they violated the [divine] decision. In any case, they will be punished and we shall inherit the Land.