case
3217 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
One who builds an upper room on the top of two houses, and so too in the case of viaducts, they may carry underneath them on Shabbat, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages prohibit this. Rabbi Judah moreover said: an eruv may be prepared for an alley that is a thoroughfare; But the sages forbid this.
One who finds tefillin should bring them in one pair at a time. Rabban Gamaliel says: two pairs at a time. To what does this apply? To old ones but in the case of new ones he is exempt. If he found them arranged in a set or in bundles he shall wait by them until it is dark and then bring them in. In a time of danger, he should cover them and walk away.
Rabbi Shimon says: he should pass them [the tefillin] to his fellow and his fellow should pass them to his fellow, and so on, until they reach the outermost courtyard. The same is true in the case of his child: he passes him to his fellow and his fellow passes him to his fellow, and so on, even if there are a hundred. Rabbi Judah says: one may pass a jar to his fellow and his fellow may pass it to his fellow even beyond the Shabbat limit. They said to him: this must not go further than the feet of its owner.
In a place where it is the custom to sell small domesticated animals to non-Jews, such sale is permitted; but where the custom is not to sell, such sale is not permitted. In no place however is it permitted to sell large animals, calves or foals, whether whole or maimed. Rabbi Judah permits in the case of a maimed one. And Ben Bateira permits in the case of a horse.
In a place where it is the custom to sell small domesticated animals to non-Jews, such sale is permitted; but where the custom is not to sell, such sale is not permitted. In no place however is it permitted to sell large animals, calves or foals, whether whole or maimed. Rabbi Judah permits in the case of a maimed one. And Ben Bateira permits in the case of a horse.
One who slaughters the pesah with chametz [in his possession] violates a negative commandment. Rabbi Judah says: also the [evening] tamid. Rabbi Shimon says: [If he slaughters] the pesah [with chametz] on the fourteenth for its own purpose, he is liable; [if] for a different purpose, he is exempt. But [for] all other sacrifices, whether slaughtered for their own purpose or for a different purpose, he is exempt. [If he slaughters the pesah with chametz] on the festival for its own purpose, he is exempt; if for a different purpose, he is liable; But [for] all other sacrifices [slaughtered on the festival with chametz], whether for their own purpose or for another purpose, he is liable, except [in the case or] a sin-offering which he slaughtered for a different purpose.
If the flesh was defiled while the fat remained [clean], he may not sprinkle the blood but if the fat was defiled while the flesh has remained [clean], he must sprinkle the blood. But in the case of [other] dedicated sacrifices it is not so, rather even if the flesh was defiled while the fat has remained clean, he must sprinkle the blood.
A pesah whose blood has been sprinkled and then it became known that it was unclean, the frontlet propitiates. If the body of [the owner] became unclean, the frontlet does not propitiate, because they [the sages] said: [in the case of] a nazirite, and he who sacrifices the pesah-offering, the frontlet propitiates for the uncleanness of the blood, but the frontlet does not propitiate for the uncleanness of the body [of the owner]. If he was defiled with the uncleanness of the deep, the frontlet propitiates.
If part of a limb went outside, he cuts [the flesh] as far as the bone and pares it until he reaches the joint and cuts it away. But in the case of [other] sanctified meat he cuts it off with a large knife, because they are not subject to the [prohibition of] breaking a bone. From the door-stop and within it is as the inside; From the door-stop and without is as outside. The windows and the thickness of the wall are as the inside.
[As to] an onen, and one who is removing a heap [of stones], and likewise one whom they promised to take out of prison, and a sick or an old person who can eat as much as an olive, they slaughter on their behalf. [Yet in the case of] all these, they may not slaughter for them alone, lest they bring the pesah to disqualification. Therefore if a disqualification occurs to them, they are exempt from keeping the second pesah, except for one who was removing the heap, because he was unclean from the beginning.
Rabbi Shimon says: what is the difference between shekels and a sin-offering? Shekels have a fixed value, but a sin-offering has no fixed value. Rabbi Judah says: shekels also have no fixed value. For when the Israelites came up out of the diaspora they used to pay the shekel in darics, then they paid the shekel in selas, then they paid it in tibs, and finally they wanted to pay it in dinars. But Rabbi Shimon said: nevertheless they are all of the same value for everyone, whereas [in the case of] a sin-offering one man may bring it of the value of one sela, another may bring it of the value of two selas, and another in the value of three selas.
They did not have less than three treasurers. Or less than seven superintendents. Nor create positions of authority over the public in matters of money [with] less than two [officers], except [in the case] of the son of Ahiyah who was over the sickness of the bowels and Elazar who was over the veil, for these had been accepted by the majority of the public.
If one lost his seal his case they wait [to deal] with him until the evening. If they found [money left over] to the value of his lost seal, they give [it] to him and if not he gets nothing. On the seals was inscribed the name of the day because of the defrauders.
Rabbi Shimon said: there were seven things that the court decree and that was one of them. [The others were the following:]A non-Jew who sent a burnt-offering from overseas and he sent with it its libation-offerings, they are offered out of his own; But if [he did] not [send its libation-offerings], they should be offered out of public funds. So too [in the case of] a convert who had died and left sacrifices, if he had also left its libation-offerings they are offered out of his own; But if not, they should be offered out of public funds. It was also a condition laid down by the court in the case of a high priest who had died that his minhah should be offered out of public funds. Rabbi Judah says: [it was offered out] of the property of his heirs, And had to be offered of the whole [tenth].
Rabbi Shimon said: there were seven things that the court decree and that was one of them. [The others were the following:]A non-Jew who sent a burnt-offering from overseas and he sent with it its libation-offerings, they are offered out of his own; But if [he did] not [send its libation-offerings], they should be offered out of public funds. So too [in the case of] a convert who had died and left sacrifices, if he had also left its libation-offerings they are offered out of his own; But if not, they should be offered out of public funds. It was also a condition laid down by the court in the case of a high priest who had died that his minhah should be offered out of public funds. Rabbi Judah says: [it was offered out] of the property of his heirs, And had to be offered of the whole [tenth].
Seven days before Yom HaKippurim they remove the high priest from his house to the chamber of the counselors and they set up another priest to take his place lest something should occur to him to disqualify him [from being able to worship]. Rabbi Judah said: they even prepare another wife for him in case his wife should die, as it says “And he shall make atonement for himself and for his house” (Leviticus 16:6): “his house” this refers to his wife. They said to him: if so there would be no end to the matter.
If [the roof of] a house is opened, and he placed skhakh over it, if there is a distance of four cubits from the wall to the covering, it is invalid. Similarly in the case of a courtyard which is surrounded by columns. A large sukkah which was surrounded with material which is invalid for skhakh, if there is a space of four cubits beneath it, it is invalid.
One who makes his sukkah on the top of a wagon, or on the deck of a ship, it is valid and one may go up into it on the festival. If he made it on the top of a tree, or on the back of a camel, it is valid, but one may not go up into it on the festival. If the tree [formed] two [walls] and one was made by the hands of man, or if two were made by the hands of man and one was formed by the tree, it is valid, but one may not go up into it on the festival. If three walls were made by the hands of man and one was formed by the tree, it is valid and one may go up into it on the festival. This is the general rule: in any case in which if the tree was removed the [sukkah] could stand on its own, it is valid and one may go up into it on the festival.
Bet Shammai says: one may not take hallah or priestly gifts to a priest on Yom Tov, whether they were separated on the day before or on that day. But Bet Hillel permits it. Bet Shammai said to them: An analogy [supports our view]: hallah and priestly gifts go to the priest and terumah [likewise] goes to the priest; just as one may not take [to the priest] terumah so one may not take [to him] priestly gifts. Bet Hillel said to them: No! If you say in the case of terumah which he has not the right to separate, will you say [the same] with respect to priestly gifts which he is permitted to separate?
One who borrows a vessel from his neighbor on the eve of Yom Tov, [it is restricted to the same limits] as the feet of the borrower. [But if he borrowed it] on Yom Tov, it is as the feet of the lender. A woman who borrowed from her neighbor spices, water or salt for her dough, these are [restricted to the same limits] as the feet of both them. Rabbi Judah exempts in the case of water, because it is not substantial.
Atzeret (Shavuot) which fell on a Friday: Bet Shammai say: the day of the slaughter [of the wholly burnt offerings] is after Shabbat. And Bet Hillel say: the day of the slaughter is not after Shabbat. They agree, however, that if it falls on Shabbat, the day of the slaughter is after Shabbat. The high priest does not [in that case] put on his [special] garments, and mourning and fasting are permitted, in order not to confirm the view of those who say that Atzeret is after Shabbat.
Greater stringency applies to sacred things than to terumah, that they may immerse vessels within vessels [together] for terumah, but not for sacred things. The outside and inside and handle [of a vessel are regarded as separate] for terumah, but not for sacred things. One that carries anything possessing midras-uncleanness may carry [at the same time] terumah, but not sacred things. The garments of those who eat terumah posses midras-uncleanness for [those who eat] sacred things. The rule [for the immersion of garments] for [those who would eat terumah is not the same as the rule for [those who would eat] sacred things: for in the case of sacred things, he must [first] untie [any knots in the unclean garment], dry it [if it is wet, then] immerse it, and afterwards retie it; but in case of terumah, it may [first] be tied and afterwards immersed.
Greater stringency applies to sacred things than to terumah, that they may immerse vessels within vessels [together] for terumah, but not for sacred things. The outside and inside and handle [of a vessel are regarded as separate] for terumah, but not for sacred things. One that carries anything possessing midras-uncleanness may carry [at the same time] terumah, but not sacred things. The garments of those who eat terumah posses midras-uncleanness for [those who eat] sacred things. The rule [for the immersion of garments] for [those who would eat terumah is not the same as the rule for [those who would eat] sacred things: for in the case of sacred things, he must [first] untie [any knots in the unclean garment], dry it [if it is wet, then] immerse it, and afterwards retie it; but in case of terumah, it may [first] be tied and afterwards immersed.
Vessels that have been finished in purity require immersion [before they are used] for sacred things, but not [before they are used] for terumah. A vessel unites all its contents [for impurity] in the case of sacred things, but not in the case of terumah. Sacred things become invalid [by impurity] of a fourth degree, but terumah [only by impurity] of a third degree. In the case of terumah, if one hand of his hands became impure, the other remains clean, but in the case of sacred things, he must immerse both [hands], because the one hand defiles the other for sacred things but not for terumah.
Vessels that have been finished in purity require immersion [before they are used] for sacred things, but not [before they are used] for terumah. A vessel unites all its contents [for impurity] in the case of sacred things, but not in the case of terumah. Sacred things become invalid [by impurity] of a fourth degree, but terumah [only by impurity] of a third degree. In the case of terumah, if one hand of his hands became impure, the other remains clean, but in the case of sacred things, he must immerse both [hands], because the one hand defiles the other for sacred things but not for terumah.
Vessels that have been finished in purity require immersion [before they are used] for sacred things, but not [before they are used] for terumah. A vessel unites all its contents [for impurity] in the case of sacred things, but not in the case of terumah. Sacred things become invalid [by impurity] of a fourth degree, but terumah [only by impurity] of a third degree. In the case of terumah, if one hand of his hands became impure, the other remains clean, but in the case of sacred things, he must immerse both [hands], because the one hand defiles the other for sacred things but not for terumah.
Vessels that have been finished in purity require immersion [before they are used] for sacred things, but not [before they are used] for terumah. A vessel unites all its contents [for impurity] in the case of sacred things, but not in the case of terumah. Sacred things become invalid [by impurity] of a fourth degree, but terumah [only by impurity] of a third degree. In the case of terumah, if one hand of his hands became impure, the other remains clean, but in the case of sacred things, he must immerse both [hands], because the one hand defiles the other for sacred things but not for terumah.
What is the case of “the wife of his brother who died before he was born”? If there were two brothers, and one of them died, and then a third brother was born, and then the second brother had yibbum with his dead brother’s wife and then died himself, the first woman is exempt as the wife of his brother who died before he was born, and the second wife [is exempt] because she is her rival wife. If he had ma’amar with her and died, the second wife, must perform halitzah but may not have yibbum.
Three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was unmarried: When one of the sisters’ husbands died, the unmarried brother performed for her ma’amar, and then his second brother died: Beth Shammai says: his wife [remains] with him while the other is exempt because she is his wife’s sister. Beth Hillel however says that he must divorce his wife with a get and by halitzah, and his brother’s wife by halitzah. This is the case in regard to which they said: “woe to him because of his wife, and woe to him because of his brother’s wife.”
Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger: If one of the sisters’ husband died and the brother who was married to the stranger married his wife, and then the wife of the second brother died, and afterwards the brother who was married to the stranger died, behold she is forbidden to him forever, since she was forbidden to him for one moment. Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger. If one of the sisters’ husbands divorced his wife, and then the brother who was married to the stranger died, and he who had divorced his wife married her and then died,- this is a case concerning which they said: If any of them died or were divorced, their rivals are permitted.
[If in any of these cases] the betrothal or divorce was in doubt, behold, these rivals must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. What is a case of doubtful betrothal? If when he threw to her betrothal money it was uncertain whether it fell nearer to him or nearer to her – this is a case of doubtful betrothal. [What is a case of] doubtful divorce? If he wrote a get in his own handwriting and it bore no signatures of witnesses, or if it bore signatures of witnesses but was note dated, or if it was dated but had the signature of only one witness this is a case of doubtful divorce.
[If in any of these cases] the betrothal or divorce was in doubt, behold, these rivals must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. What is a case of doubtful betrothal? If when he threw to her betrothal money it was uncertain whether it fell nearer to him or nearer to her – this is a case of doubtful betrothal. [What is a case of] doubtful divorce? If he wrote a get in his own handwriting and it bore no signatures of witnesses, or if it bore signatures of witnesses but was note dated, or if it was dated but had the signature of only one witness this is a case of doubtful divorce.
[If in any of these cases] the betrothal or divorce was in doubt, behold, these rivals must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. What is a case of doubtful betrothal? If when he threw to her betrothal money it was uncertain whether it fell nearer to him or nearer to her – this is a case of doubtful betrothal. [What is a case of] doubtful divorce? If he wrote a get in his own handwriting and it bore no signatures of witnesses, or if it bore signatures of witnesses but was note dated, or if it was dated but had the signature of only one witness this is a case of doubtful divorce.
[If in any of these cases] the betrothal or divorce was in doubt, behold, these rivals must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. What is a case of doubtful betrothal? If when he threw to her betrothal money it was uncertain whether it fell nearer to him or nearer to her – this is a case of doubtful betrothal. [What is a case of] doubtful divorce? If he wrote a get in his own handwriting and it bore no signatures of witnesses, or if it bore signatures of witnesses but was note dated, or if it was dated but had the signature of only one witness this is a case of doubtful divorce.
He who performs halitzah with his yevamah, behold he is regarded as one of the other brothers in respect of inheritance. If the father was living, the estate belongs to the father. He who marries his yevamah acquires his brother’s estate. R. Judah said: in either case, if the father was living the estate belongs to the father. He who performs halitzah with his yevamah, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives: He is forbidden to marry her mother, her mother’s mother and her father’s mother; her daughter, her daughter’s daughter and her son’s daughter; and also her sister while she is alive. The other brothers are permitted. She is forbidden to marry his father and his father’s father; his son and his son’s son; his brother and his brother’s son. A man is permitted to marry the relative of the rival of his halutzah but is forbidden to marry the rival of the relative of his halutzah.
If she performed halitzah in the presence of two men or in the presence of three men and one of them was discovered to be a relative or in any other way unfit [to act as judge], her halitzah is invalid. R. Shimon and R. Yohanan Ha-Sandelar declare it valid. And it once happened that a man submitted to halitzah between himself and herself in a prison, and when the case came before R. Akiva he declared the halitzah valid.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: In the case of any hindrance that was due to the husband, she is considered to be his wife; But in the case of any hindrance that was not due to the husband she is not considered to be his wife.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: In the case of any hindrance that was due to the husband, she is considered to be his wife; But in the case of any hindrance that was not due to the husband she is not considered to be his wife.
If two brothers were married to two sisters who were minors and orphans, and the husband of one of them died, [the widow] is free since she is the [the yavam’s] wife’s sister. Similarly in the case of two deaf-mute [sisters]. [If the two brothers were married to two sisters one of whom was] of age and [the other] a minor, if the husband of the minor died, the minor is free since she is the [the yavam’s] wife’s sister. If the husband of the elder sister died: Rabbi Eliezer says the minor is to be instructed to make a declaration of refusal against him. Rabban Gamaliel says: If she made a declaration of refusal, then she did so; but if [she did] not, let her wait until she is of age and then she will be free since she is the [the yavam’s] wife's sister. Rabbi Joshua says: Woe to him because of his wife and woe to him because of his brother’s wife! He must allow his wife to go by [giving her] a get, and [he must let go] his brother’s wife through halitzah.
If a woman and her husband went to a country beyond the sea [at a time when there was] peace between him and her and [when there was also] peace in the world, and she came back and said, “My husband is dead”, she may marry again; and if she said, “My husband is dead [and he had no children]” she may contract yibbum. If there was peace between him and her, but war in the world, [or if there was] discord between him and her, but peace in the world, and she came back and said, ‘My husband is dead”, she is not believed. Rabbi Judah says: she is never believed unless she comes weeping and her garments are rent. They said to him: she may marry in either case.
Bet Hillel says: we heard [such a tradition] only in respect of a woman who came from the harvest and [whose husband died] in the same country, and in a case similar to the one that happened. Bet Shammai said to them: [the law is] the same whether the woman came from the harvest or from olive picking, or from grape picking, or from one country to another--the Sages spoke of the harvest only [because the incident to which they referred] occurred then. Bet Hillel changed their view to rule in accordance with Bet Shammai.
Even if he only heard from women saying, “so-and-so is dead”, this is enough. Rabbi Judah says: even if he only heard children saying, “behold we are going to mourn for a man named so-and-so and to bury him” [it is enough]. Whether [such statement was made] with the intention [of providing evidence] or was made with no such intention [it is valid]. Rabbi Judah ben Bava says: with an Israelite [the evidence is valid] only if the man had the intention [of acting as witness]. In the case of a non-Jew the evidence is invalid if his intention was [to act as witness].
Wherever there is the right of sale there is a fine and wherever there is a fine there is no right of sale. In the case of a minor there is the right of sale and there is no fine; In the case of a young woman there is a fine but no right of sale. In the case of a girl who has reached majority age there is no right of sale and there is no fine.
Wherever there is the right of sale there is a fine and wherever there is a fine there is no right of sale. In the case of a minor there is the right of sale and there is no fine; In the case of a young woman there is a fine but no right of sale. In the case of a girl who has reached majority age there is no right of sale and there is no fine.
Wherever there is the right of sale there is a fine and wherever there is a fine there is no right of sale. In the case of a minor there is the right of sale and there is no fine; In the case of a young woman there is a fine but no right of sale. In the case of a girl who has reached majority age there is no right of sale and there is no fine.
If a young girl was seduced [the compensation for] her embarrassment and blemish and the fine belong to her father; [and the compensation for] pain in the case of one who was raped. If the girl’s case was tried before her father died [all the forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’. If her father died before her case was tried they are hers. If her case was tried before she became of majority age [all forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’. If she became of majority age before her case was tried they are hers. Rabbi Shimon says if her father died before she could collect [the payments] they belong to her. Her handiwork and anything she finds, even if she had not collected [the proceeds] belong to her brothers if her father died.
If a young girl was seduced [the compensation for] her embarrassment and blemish and the fine belong to her father; [and the compensation for] pain in the case of one who was raped. If the girl’s case was tried before her father died [all the forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’. If her father died before her case was tried they are hers. If her case was tried before she became of majority age [all forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’. If she became of majority age before her case was tried they are hers. Rabbi Shimon says if her father died before she could collect [the payments] they belong to her. Her handiwork and anything she finds, even if she had not collected [the proceeds] belong to her brothers if her father died.
If a young girl was seduced [the compensation for] her embarrassment and blemish and the fine belong to her father; [and the compensation for] pain in the case of one who was raped. If the girl’s case was tried before her father died [all the forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’. If her father died before her case was tried they are hers. If her case was tried before she became of majority age [all forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’. If she became of majority age before her case was tried they are hers. Rabbi Shimon says if her father died before she could collect [the payments] they belong to her. Her handiwork and anything she finds, even if she had not collected [the proceeds] belong to her brothers if her father died.
If a young girl was seduced [the compensation for] her embarrassment and blemish and the fine belong to her father; [and the compensation for] pain in the case of one who was raped. If the girl’s case was tried before her father died [all the forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’. If her father died before her case was tried they are hers. If her case was tried before she became of majority age [all forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’. If she became of majority age before her case was tried they are hers. Rabbi Shimon says if her father died before she could collect [the payments] they belong to her. Her handiwork and anything she finds, even if she had not collected [the proceeds] belong to her brothers if her father died.
If a young girl was seduced [the compensation for] her embarrassment and blemish and the fine belong to her father; [and the compensation for] pain in the case of one who was raped. If the girl’s case was tried before her father died [all the forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’. If her father died before her case was tried they are hers. If her case was tried before she became of majority age [all forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’. If she became of majority age before her case was tried they are hers. Rabbi Shimon says if her father died before she could collect [the payments] they belong to her. Her handiwork and anything she finds, even if she had not collected [the proceeds] belong to her brothers if her father died.
If he did not write for her, “if you are taken captive I will ransom you and take you again as my wife”, or in the case of a priest’s wife, “I will restore you to your people”, he is liable [to carry out these obligations], because it is a condition laid down by court.
He must also give her [every week] a silver ma'ah for her [other] needs and she is to eat with him every Friday eve. If he does not give her a silver ma'ah for her other needs, her handiwork belongs to her. And what [is the quantity of work that] she must do for him? The weight of five sela’s of warp in Judea, which amounts to ten sela's in Galilee, or the weight of ten sela's of woof in Judea, which amounts to twenty sela's in Galilee. If she was nursing, her handiwork is reduced and her maintenance is increased. All this applies to a poor person in Israel, but in the case of a more respectable [husband] all is fixed according to his dignity.
If a man deposited a sum of money with an agent for his daugher, and [after she was betrothed] she says, “I trust my husband”, the trustee must act in accordance with the condition of his trust, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: were [the trust] a field and she wished to sell it, it would be as if it was sold immediately! To whom does this apply? To [a daughter] who has reached majority age, but in the case of a minor, there is no validity at all to the act of a minor.
“Konam is the one that I taste, because wine is damaging to the stomach.” They said to him, “But mature wine is beneficial to the stomach.” He is released in respect of mature wine, and not only in respect of mature wine, but of all wine. “Konam the onions that I taste, because they are damaging to the heart.” They said to him, “But village onions are good for the heart,” He is released in respect of village onions, and not only of village onions, but of all onions. Such a case happened before Rabbi Meir, and he permitted all onions.
In the case of a betrothed young woman, her father and her betrothed husband annul her vows. If her father annulled [her vow] but not the husband, or if the husband annulled [it] but not the father, it is not annulled; and it goes without saying if one of them upheld [it].
[In the case of] a girl who has reached majority age who waited twelve months, or a widow [who waited] thirty days, Rabbi Eliezer says: since her [betrothed] husband is responsible for her maintenance, he may annul [her vows]. But the Sages say: the husband cannot annul [her vows] until she enters into his domain.
[If one says], “Behold I am a nazirite, as the number of days in a solar year” he must count as many naziriteships as there are days in the solar year. Rabbi Judah said: such a case once occurred, and when the man had completed [his naziriteships], he died.
If his wife miscarries, he does not become a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: [in this case] he should say, “If it was a viable child, behold, I am a nazirite from obligation; otherwise behold, I am a voluntary nazirite.” If [his wife] later bears a child, he then becomes a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: he should say, “If the first was a viable child, the first [naziriteship] was obligatory, and this one is voluntary; otherwise, the first one was voluntary, and the present one is obligatory.”
Three things are forbidden to a nazirite: ritual defilement, shaving and products of the vine. Defilement and shaving have a stringency that products of the vine do not have, in that defilement and shaving annul [the period of naziriteship already observed], whereas [partaking of] products of the vine does not do so. Products of the vine have a stringency that defilement or shaving do not have, in that products of the vine permit of no exception from the general prohibition, whereas defilement and shaving are allowed as exception from the general prohibition in the case where shaving is a religious duty, or where there is a neglected corpse. And defilement has a stringency that shaving does not have, in that defilement annuls the whole [period of naziriteship already served], and [a nazirite who is defiled] is liable for a sacrifice, whereas shaving annuls only thirty days and he is not liable for a sacrifice.
Shaving in a case of purity: How was it done? He would bring three animals, a sin-offering, a burnt-offering, and a well-being offering, slaughter the peace-offering and shave thereafter, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Elazar says: he shaves after the sin-offering, for in all cases [the sacrifice of] the sin-offering takes precedence. But if he shaved after [the slaughter] of any one of the three he has fulfilled his obligation.
Gentiles are not subject [to the laws] of naziriteship. Women and slaves are subject [to the laws] of naziriteship. The nazirite vow is more stringent in the case of women than in the case of slaves, for a man can compel his slave [to break his vow] but he cannot compel his wife [to do so]. [The nazirite vow] is more stringent in the case of slaves than in the case of women, for he can void the vows of his wife, but he cannot void the vows of his slaves. If he voids his wife’s [vow], it is void for ever, but if he voids his slave’s vow, [if] the slave becomes free he must complete his naziriteship. When [the slave] passes from [his master's] presence: Rabbi Meir says: he may not drink [wine]. Rabbi Yose says: he may drink [wine].
Gentiles are not subject [to the laws] of naziriteship. Women and slaves are subject [to the laws] of naziriteship. The nazirite vow is more stringent in the case of women than in the case of slaves, for a man can compel his slave [to break his vow] but he cannot compel his wife [to do so]. [The nazirite vow] is more stringent in the case of slaves than in the case of women, for he can void the vows of his wife, but he cannot void the vows of his slaves. If he voids his wife’s [vow], it is void for ever, but if he voids his slave’s vow, [if] the slave becomes free he must complete his naziriteship. When [the slave] passes from [his master's] presence: Rabbi Meir says: he may not drink [wine]. Rabbi Yose says: he may drink [wine].
Gentiles are not subject [to the laws] of naziriteship. Women and slaves are subject [to the laws] of naziriteship. The nazirite vow is more stringent in the case of women than in the case of slaves, for a man can compel his slave [to break his vow] but he cannot compel his wife [to do so]. [The nazirite vow] is more stringent in the case of slaves than in the case of women, for he can void the vows of his wife, but he cannot void the vows of his slaves. If he voids his wife’s [vow], it is void for ever, but if he voids his slave’s vow, [if] the slave becomes free he must complete his naziriteship. When [the slave] passes from [his master's] presence: Rabbi Meir says: he may not drink [wine]. Rabbi Yose says: he may drink [wine].
Gentiles are not subject [to the laws] of naziriteship. Women and slaves are subject [to the laws] of naziriteship. The nazirite vow is more stringent in the case of women than in the case of slaves, for a man can compel his slave [to break his vow] but he cannot compel his wife [to do so]. [The nazirite vow] is more stringent in the case of slaves than in the case of women, for he can void the vows of his wife, but he cannot void the vows of his slaves. If he voids his wife’s [vow], it is void for ever, but if he voids his slave’s vow, [if] the slave becomes free he must complete his naziriteship. When [the slave] passes from [his master's] presence: Rabbi Meir says: he may not drink [wine]. Rabbi Yose says: he may drink [wine].
A nazirite shaves and then discovers that he was defiled: If the defilement was certain, it voids [the naziriteship], But if it is a defilement of the depth, it is not rendered void. [If he discovers that he was defiled] before shaving, in either case it voids [the naziriteship]. How is [the law regarding ‘defilement of the depth’]? If he goes down into a cavern to bathe, and a corpse is found floating at the mouth of the cavern, he is [definitely] unclean. If it is found embedded in the floor of the cavern, Then if he went in merely to cool himself off he remains clean, But if he went to purify himself after defilement through contact with the dead he remains unclean, Because the assumption concerning an unclean person is that he is unclean and the assumption concerning a clean person is that he is clean,.
Samuel was a nazirite, according to the words of Rabbi Nehorai, as it says, “And no razor [morah] shall come upon his head” (I Samuel 1:11). It says with reference to Samson, “And [no] razor [morah]” (Judges 13:5) and it says with reference to Samuel, “And [no] razor [morah]”, just as “razor [morah]” in the case of Samson [teaches that he was] a nazirite, so “razor [morah]” in the case of Samuel [teaches that he was] a nazirite. Rabbi Yose says: but does not “morah” refer to [fear] of flesh and blood? Rabbi Nehorai said to him: But does it not also say, “And Samuel said; ‘How can I go? If Saul will hear it he will kill me’” (I Samuel 16:2) [which shows] that he was afraid of flesh and blood?
Samuel was a nazirite, according to the words of Rabbi Nehorai, as it says, “And no razor [morah] shall come upon his head” (I Samuel 1:11). It says with reference to Samson, “And [no] razor [morah]” (Judges 13:5) and it says with reference to Samuel, “And [no] razor [morah]”, just as “razor [morah]” in the case of Samson [teaches that he was] a nazirite, so “razor [morah]” in the case of Samuel [teaches that he was] a nazirite. Rabbi Yose says: but does not “morah” refer to [fear] of flesh and blood? Rabbi Nehorai said to him: But does it not also say, “And Samuel said; ‘How can I go? If Saul will hear it he will kill me’” (I Samuel 16:2) [which shows] that he was afraid of flesh and blood?
Rabbi Shimon says: merit does not suspend the effect of the bitter waters, and if you say that merit does suspend the effect of the bitter waters, you discredit the water in the case of all the women who drink it and defame the pure woman who drank it, since people will say, “They were defiled”, but their merit caused suspended the effect. Rabbi says: merit suspends the effect of the bitter waters, but she never bears a child or thrives, rather she gradually becomes disfigured and finally dies through that death.
For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.
For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.
If a man says: “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, if he wants he may change his mind on either document, the words of Rabbi Meir. The Sages say: he may change his mind in the case of the get but not in the case of the writ of emancipation, since a benefit may be conferred on a person not in his presence but a disability may be imposed on him only in his presence; for if he does not want to maintain his slave he is permitted, but if he does not want to maintain his wife he is not permitted. Rabbi Meir said to them: behold, he disqualifies his slave from eating terumah [by emancipating him] in the same way that he disqualifies his wife [by divorcing her]? They said to him: [the slave is disqualified] because he is the priest’s property. If a man says, “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, and dies [before they are given], they do not give [the documents] after his death. [If he said], “Give a maneh to so-and-so” and died, the money should be given after his death.
If a man says: “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, if he wants he may change his mind on either document, the words of Rabbi Meir. The Sages say: he may change his mind in the case of the get but not in the case of the writ of emancipation, since a benefit may be conferred on a person not in his presence but a disability may be imposed on him only in his presence; for if he does not want to maintain his slave he is permitted, but if he does not want to maintain his wife he is not permitted. Rabbi Meir said to them: behold, he disqualifies his slave from eating terumah [by emancipating him] in the same way that he disqualifies his wife [by divorcing her]? They said to him: [the slave is disqualified] because he is the priest’s property. If a man says, “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, and dies [before they are given], they do not give [the documents] after his death. [If he said], “Give a maneh to so-and-so” and died, the money should be given after his death.
Three statements were made by Rabbi Elazar ben Parta before the Sages, and they upheld his words. About [people in] a besieged town; And about [people on] a ship listing at sea; And a person who has been brought to court [in a capital case] that they are presumed to be alive. [However, concerning people] in a besieged town which has been captured; Or [people in] a ship which has been lost at sea; Or a person who has been led out to execution we put upon them all of the stringencies of their being alive and all of the stringencies of their being dead. The daughter of an Israelite who has married a priest or the daughter of a priest who has married an Israelite may not eat of the terumah.
A [non-Jewish] slave [of a Jew] was taken captive and then ransomed [by a third party]: If [he is ransomed] to be a slave he goes back to slavery. If [he is ransomed] as a free man he does not go back to slavery. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: in either case he goes back to slavery. If a man makes his slave a pledge [for a debt] to another man and then he emancipates him, according to the “letter of the law” the slave is not liable to do anything. But because of tikkun olam we force his [second] master to emancipate him and he [the slave] writes a document for his purchase price. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the slave does not write the document but rather the one who emancipates him.
If a man divorces his wife because of ill-repute, he cannot remarry her. If because of a vow, he cannot remarry her. Rabbi Judah says: [if he divorces her] for vows which she made in front of many people, he may not remarry her, but if for vows which she did not make in front of many people, he may remarry her. Rabbi Meir says: [if he divorces her] for a vow which requires the investigation of a sage, he may not remarry her, but if for one which does not require the investigation of a sage, he may remarry her. Rabbi Eliezer says: they only forbid that one because of that one. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah said: a case happened in Sidon of a man who said to his wife, “Konam, if I do not divorce you”, and he did divorce her, and the Sages permitted him to remarry her because of tikkun olam.
A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid. [If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid. If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do. A get given imposed by court: in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is valid).
A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid. [If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid. If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do. A get given imposed by court: in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is valid).
If a report goes out in the town: “[A certain woman is] betrothed,” she is regarded as betrothed; [If a report goes out in the town: “A certain woman is] divorced,” she is regarded as divorced. [This is only the case] provided the report has no qualification. What is meant by a qualification? [If the report is,] “So-and-so divorced his wife with a stipulation” [or], “He threw her the betrothal money, but it is uncertain whether it landed nearer to her or nearer to him” this is a qualification.
“[Be betrothed to me] on condition that I am a priest,” and he is found to be a Levite, or “a Levite” and he is found to be a priest; “a natin,” and he is found to be a mamzer, or “a mamzer” and he is found to be a natin; “a townsman,” and he is found to be a villager, or “a villager” and he is found to be a townsman; “on condition that my house is near the bathhouse,” and it is found to be far, or “far” and it is found to be near; “on condition that I have a daughter or maidservant that braids hair” and he does not have, “or on condition that I do not have”, and he has; “on condition that I have no sons”, and he has, or “on condition that I have sons, and he does not have --in all these cases, even if she declares, “In my heart I would have agreed to be betrothed to him in any case,” she is not betrothed. Similarly if she deceives him.
Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this? When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite. And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this? When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin. And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this? One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah. And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this? The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman.
Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this? When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite. And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this? When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin. And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this? One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah. And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this? The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman.
Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this? When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite. And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this? When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin. And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this? One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah. And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this? The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman.
Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this? When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite. And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this? When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin. And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this? One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah. And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this? The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman.
He who marries a the daughter of a priest must investigate her lineage up to four mothers, which are eight: her mother and her mother’s mother, her mother’s father’s mother and her mother, her father’s mother and her mother, her father’s father’s mother and her mother. [In the case of] the daughter of a Levite or an Israelite, one more is added.
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
If an ox worth 100 gored an ox worth 200, and the carcass is not worth anything, [the owner of the gored ox] takes the [live] ox. If an ox worth 200 gored an ox worth 200 and the carcass is not worth anything, Rabbi Meir said, “If thus it was written, ‘they shall sell the live ox and divide its price, they shall also divide the dead animal’. Rabbi Judah said to him: “Such indeed is the halachah, but you have fulfilled the verse ‘they shall sell the live ox and divide its price’, and you have not fulfilled the verse ‘they shall also divide the dead animal’. What case is this? If an ox worth 200 gored an ox worth 200 and the corpse is worth 50, this one takes half of the live ox and half of the dead ox, and this one takes half of the live ox and half of the dead ox.
If a man brought his ox into the courtyard of a householder without permission and the householder’s ox gored it or the householder’s dog bit it, the householder is not liable. If it gored the householder's ox, [its owner] is liable. If [the first man’s ox] fell into [the householder’s] cistern and polluted its water, he is liable. If [the householder’s] father or son was in [the cistern and it killed them] the ox’s owner must pay the ransom price. But if he had brought his ox in by permission the owner of the courtyard is liable. Rabbi says: “In no case is [the householder] liable unless he had agreed to watch over it.
The law is more strict in the case of a man than in the case of an ox: for a man must pay for injury, pain, medical costs, loss of income and indignity, and make restitution for the value of the young; whereas the ox pays only for injury and is not liable for the value of the young.
The law is more strict in the case of a man than in the case of an ox: for a man must pay for injury, pain, medical costs, loss of income and indignity, and make restitution for the value of the young; whereas the ox pays only for injury and is not liable for the value of the young.
One is not to buy wool or milk or kids from herdsmen, not fruit from those that watch over fruit-trees. However, one may buy garments of wool from women in Judea and garments of flax from women in the Galilee or calves in the Sharon. And in all cases in which [the seller] says to hide them away, it is forbidden [to purchase the item]. One may buy eggs and fowls in any case.
If two men were riding on an animal, or one was riding and the other was leading the animal, and one of them said, “The animal is all mine”, and the other said “It is all mine.”, they each swear that they don’t own less than half of the animal and they split it. If after the case is settled, they both admit to the others claim, or if there are witnesses they can split the animal without an oath.
If a man found debt documents he should not return them [to the creditor] if they recorded a lien on the [debtor’s] property, since the court would exact repayment from the property. But if they did not record a lien on the [debtor’s] property he may return them, since the court would not exact payment from the property, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “In either case he should not return them, since [in either case] the court would exact payment from the property.”
If a man found debt documents he should not return them [to the creditor] if they recorded a lien on the [debtor’s] property, since the court would exact repayment from the property. But if they did not record a lien on the [debtor’s] property he may return them, since the court would not exact payment from the property, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “In either case he should not return them, since [in either case] the court would exact payment from the property.”
If one moved a jar from place to place and broke it, whether he is a paid guardian or an unpaid guardian, he may take an oath [that he did not break it through neglect and be exempt from liability]. Rabbi Eliezer says: “[I too have heard that] in either case he may take an oath, but I wonder whether in either case the oath is valid.”
If one moved a jar from place to place and broke it, whether he is a paid guardian or an unpaid guardian, he may take an oath [that he did not break it through neglect and be exempt from liability]. Rabbi Eliezer says: “[I too have heard that] in either case he may take an oath, but I wonder whether in either case the oath is valid.”
If one was working with figs he may not eat grapes, and if among grapes he may not eat figs. But he may refrain [from eating] until he reaches the best produce and then eat. In no case have they said [that he may eat] save during the time of his work. But because of the principle of restoring lost property to its owner they have said, “Field laborers may eat as they go from one furrow to another or as they return from the winepress. And a donkey [may eat] while it is unloading.”