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The Writings of Origen

De Principiis, Book III 3:5

Such being the case, to say that we are moved from without, and to put away the blame from ourselves, by declaring that we are like to pieces of wood and stones, which are dragged about by those causes that act upon them from without, is neither true nor in conformity with reason, but is the statement of him who wishes to destroy the conception of free-will. For if we were to ask such an one what was free-will, he would say that it consisted in this, that when purposing to do some thing, no external cause came inciting to the reverse. But to blame, on the other hand, the mere constitution of the body, is absurd; for the disciplinary reason, taking hold of those who are most intemperate and savage (if they will follow her exhortation), effects a transformation, so that the alteration and change for the better is most extensive,—the most licentious men frequently becoming better than those who formerly did not seem to be such by nature; and the most savage men passing into such a state of mildness, that those persons who never at any time were so savage as they were, appear savage in comparison, so great a degree of gentleness having been produced within them. And we see other men, most steady and respectable, driven from their state of respectability and steadiness by intercourse with evil customs, so as to fall into habits of licentiousness, often beginning their wickedness in middle age, and plunging into disorder after the period of youth has passed, which, so far as its nature is concerned, is unstable. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that external events do not depend on us, but that it is our own business to use them in this way or the opposite, having received reason as a judge and an investigator of the manner in which we ought to meet those events that come from without.

De Principiis, Book III 3:20

Still the declaration of the apostle will appear to drag us to the conclusion that we are not possessed of freedom of will, in which, objecting against himself, he says, “Therefore hath He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth He yet find fault? For who hath resisted His will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?” For it will be said: If the potter of the same lump make some vessels to honour and others to dishonour, and God thus form some men for salvation and others for ruin, then salvation or ruin does not depend upon ourselves, nor are we possessed of free-will. Now we must ask him who deals so with these passages, whether it is possible to conceive of the apostle as contradicting himself. I presume, however, that no one will venture to say so. If, then, the apostle does not utter contradictions, how can he, according to him who so understands him, reasonably find fault, censuring the individual at Corinth who had committed fornication, or those who had fallen away, and had not repented of the licentiousness and impurity of which they had been guilty? And how can he bless those whom he praises as having done well, as he does the house of Onesiphorus in these words: “The Lord give mercy to the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but, when he was in Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me. The Lord grant to him that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day.” It is not consistent for the same apostle to blame the sinner as worthy of censure, and to praise him who had done well as deserving of approval; and again, on the other hand, to say, as if nothing depended on ourselves, that the cause was in the Creator why the one vessel was formed to honour, and the other to dishonour. And how is this statement correct: “For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad,” since they who have done evil have advanced to this pitch of wickedness because they were created vessels unto dishonour, while they that have lived virtuously have done good because they were created from the beginning for this purpose, and became vessels unto honour? And again, how does not the statement made elsewhere conflict with the view which these persons draw from the words which we have quoted (that it is the fault of the Creator that one vessel is in honour and another in dishonour), viz. “that in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master’s use, and prepared unto every good work;” for if he who purges himself becomes a vessel unto honour, and he who allows himself to remain unpurged becomes a vessel unto dishonour, then, so far as these words are concerned, the Creator is not at all to blame. For the Creator makes vessels of honour and vessels of dishonour, not from the beginning according to His foreknowledge, since He does not condemn or justify beforehand according to it; but [He makes] those into vessels of honour who purged themselves, and those into vessels of dishonour who allowed themselves to remain unpurged: so that it results from older causes [which operated] in the formation of the vessels unto honour and dishonour, that one was created for the former condition, and another for the latter. But if we once admit that there were certain older causes [at work] in the forming of a vessel unto honour, and of one unto dishonour, what absurdity is there in going back to the subject of the soul, and [in supposing] that a more ancient cause for Jacob being loved and for Esau being hated existed with respect to Jacob before his assumption of a body, and with regard to Esau before he was conceived in the womb of Rebecca?

De Principiis, Book III 3:20

Still the declaration of the apostle will appear to drag us to the conclusion that we are not possessed of freedom of will, in which, objecting against himself, he says, “Therefore hath He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth He yet find fault? For who hath resisted His will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?” For it will be said: If the potter of the same lump make some vessels to honour and others to dishonour, and God thus form some men for salvation and others for ruin, then salvation or ruin does not depend upon ourselves, nor are we possessed of free-will. Now we must ask him who deals so with these passages, whether it is possible to conceive of the apostle as contradicting himself. I presume, however, that no one will venture to say so. If, then, the apostle does not utter contradictions, how can he, according to him who so understands him, reasonably find fault, censuring the individual at Corinth who had committed fornication, or those who had fallen away, and had not repented of the licentiousness and impurity of which they had been guilty? And how can he bless those whom he praises as having done well, as he does the house of Onesiphorus in these words: “The Lord give mercy to the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but, when he was in Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me. The Lord grant to him that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day.” It is not consistent for the same apostle to blame the sinner as worthy of censure, and to praise him who had done well as deserving of approval; and again, on the other hand, to say, as if nothing depended on ourselves, that the cause was in the Creator why the one vessel was formed to honour, and the other to dishonour. And how is this statement correct: “For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad,” since they who have done evil have advanced to this pitch of wickedness because they were created vessels unto dishonour, while they that have lived virtuously have done good because they were created from the beginning for this purpose, and became vessels unto honour? And again, how does not the statement made elsewhere conflict with the view which these persons draw from the words which we have quoted (that it is the fault of the Creator that one vessel is in honour and another in dishonour), viz. “that in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master’s use, and prepared unto every good work;” for if he who purges himself becomes a vessel unto honour, and he who allows himself to remain unpurged becomes a vessel unto dishonour, then, so far as these words are concerned, the Creator is not at all to blame. For the Creator makes vessels of honour and vessels of dishonour, not from the beginning according to His foreknowledge, since He does not condemn or justify beforehand according to it; but [He makes] those into vessels of honour who purged themselves, and those into vessels of dishonour who allowed themselves to remain unpurged: so that it results from older causes [which operated] in the formation of the vessels unto honour and dishonour, that one was created for the former condition, and another for the latter. But if we once admit that there were certain older causes [at work] in the forming of a vessel unto honour, and of one unto dishonour, what absurdity is there in going back to the subject of the soul, and [in supposing] that a more ancient cause for Jacob being loved and for Esau being hated existed with respect to Jacob before his assumption of a body, and with regard to Esau before he was conceived in the womb of Rebecca?

De Principiis, Book III 3:21

And at the same time, it is clearly shown that, as far as regards the underlying nature, as there is one [piece of] clay which is under the hands of the potter, from which piece vessels are formed unto honour and dishonour; so the one nature of every soul being in the hands of God, and, so to speak, there being [only] one lump of reasonable beings, certain causes of more ancient date led to some being created vessels unto honour, and others vessels unto dishonour. But if the language of the apostle convey a censure when he says, “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” it teaches us that he who has confidence before God, and is faithful, and has lived virtuously, would not hear the words, “Who art thou that repliest against God?” Such an one, e.g., as Moses was, “For Moses spake, and God answered him with a voice;” and as God answers Moses, so does a saint also answer God. But he who does not possess this confidence, manifestly, either because he has lost it, or because he investigates these matters not from a love of knowledge, but from a desire to find fault, and who therefore says, “Why does He yet find fault? for who hath resisted His will?” would merit the language of censure, which says, “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” Now to those who introduce different natures, and who make use of the declaration of the apostle [to support their view], the following must be our answer. If they maintain that those who perish and those who are saved are formed of one lump, and that the Creator of those who are saved is the Creator also of them who are lost, and if He is good who creates not only spiritual but also earthy [natures] (for this follows from their view), it is nevertheless possible that he who, in consequence of certain former acts of righteousness, had now been made a vessel of honour, but who had not [afterwards] acted in a similar manner, nor done things befitting a vessel of honour, was converted in another world into a vessel of dishonour; as, on the other hand, it is possible that he who, owing to causes more ancient than the present life, was here a vessel of dishonour, may after reformation become in the new creation “a vessel of honour, sanctified and meet for the Master’s use, prepared unto every good work.” And perhaps those who are now Israelites, not having lived worthily of their descent, will be deprived of their rank, being changed, as it were, from vessels of honour into those of dishonour; and many of the present Egyptians and Idumeans who came near to Israel, when they shall have borne fruit to a larger extent, shall enter into the church of the Lord, being no longer accounted Egyptians and Idumeans, but becoming Israelites: so that, according to this view, it is owing to their [varying] purposes that some advance from a worse to a better condition, and others fall from better to worse; while others, again, are preserved in a virtuous course, or ascend from good to better; and others, on the contrary, remain in a course of evil, or from bad become worse, as their wickedness flows on.

De Principiis, Book III 3:21

And at the same time, it is clearly shown that, as far as regards the underlying nature, as there is one [piece of] clay which is under the hands of the potter, from which piece vessels are formed unto honour and dishonour; so the one nature of every soul being in the hands of God, and, so to speak, there being [only] one lump of reasonable beings, certain causes of more ancient date led to some being created vessels unto honour, and others vessels unto dishonour. But if the language of the apostle convey a censure when he says, “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” it teaches us that he who has confidence before God, and is faithful, and has lived virtuously, would not hear the words, “Who art thou that repliest against God?” Such an one, e.g., as Moses was, “For Moses spake, and God answered him with a voice;” and as God answers Moses, so does a saint also answer God. But he who does not possess this confidence, manifestly, either because he has lost it, or because he investigates these matters not from a love of knowledge, but from a desire to find fault, and who therefore says, “Why does He yet find fault? for who hath resisted His will?” would merit the language of censure, which says, “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” Now to those who introduce different natures, and who make use of the declaration of the apostle [to support their view], the following must be our answer. If they maintain that those who perish and those who are saved are formed of one lump, and that the Creator of those who are saved is the Creator also of them who are lost, and if He is good who creates not only spiritual but also earthy [natures] (for this follows from their view), it is nevertheless possible that he who, in consequence of certain former acts of righteousness, had now been made a vessel of honour, but who had not [afterwards] acted in a similar manner, nor done things befitting a vessel of honour, was converted in another world into a vessel of dishonour; as, on the other hand, it is possible that he who, owing to causes more ancient than the present life, was here a vessel of dishonour, may after reformation become in the new creation “a vessel of honour, sanctified and meet for the Master’s use, prepared unto every good work.” And perhaps those who are now Israelites, not having lived worthily of their descent, will be deprived of their rank, being changed, as it were, from vessels of honour into those of dishonour; and many of the present Egyptians and Idumeans who came near to Israel, when they shall have borne fruit to a larger extent, shall enter into the church of the Lord, being no longer accounted Egyptians and Idumeans, but becoming Israelites: so that, according to this view, it is owing to their [varying] purposes that some advance from a worse to a better condition, and others fall from better to worse; while others, again, are preserved in a virtuous course, or ascend from good to better; and others, on the contrary, remain in a course of evil, or from bad become worse, as their wickedness flows on.

De Principiis, Book III 4:4

With respect to the thoughts which proceed from our heart, or the recollection of things which we have done, or the contemplation of any things or causes whatever, we find that they sometimes proceed from ourselves, and sometimes are originated by the opposing powers; not seldom also are they suggested by God, or by the holy angels. Now such a statement will perhaps appear incredible, unless it be confirmed by the testimony of holy Scripture. That, then, thoughts arise within ourselves, David testifies in the Psalms, saying, “The thought of a man will make confession to Thee, and the rest of the thought shall observe to Thee a festival day.” That this, however, is also brought about by the opposing powers, is shown by Solomon in the book of Ecclesiastes in the following manner: “If the spirit of the ruler rise up against thee, leave not thy place; for soundness restrains great offences.” The Apostle Paul also will bear testimony to the same point in the words: “Casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of Christ.” That it is an effect due to God, nevertheless, is declared by David, when he says in the Psalms, “Blessed is the man whose help is in Thee, O Lord, Thy ascents (are) in his heart.” And the apostle says that “God put it into the heart of Titus.” That certain thoughts are suggested to men’s hearts either by good or evil angels, is shown both by the angel that accompanied Tobias, and by the language of the prophet, where he says, “And the angel who spoke in me answered.” The book of the Shepherd declares the same, saying that each individual is attended by two angels; that whenever good thoughts arise in our hearts, they are suggested by the good angel; but when of a contrary kind, they are the instigation of the evil angel. The same is declared by Barnabas in his epistle, where he says there are two ways, one of light and one of darkness, over which he asserts that certain angels are placed,—the angels of God over the way of light, the angels of Satan over the way of darkness. We are not, however, to imagine that any other result follows from what is suggested to our heart, whether good or bad, save a [mental] commotion only, and an incitement instigating us either to good or evil. For it is quite within our reach, when a malignant power has begun to incite us to evil, to cast away from us the wicked suggestions, and to resist the vile inducements, and to do nothing that is at all deserving of blame. And, on the other hand, it is possible, when a divine power calls us to better things, not to obey the call; our freedom of will being preserved to us in either case. We said, indeed, in the foregoing pages, that certain recollections of good or evil actions were suggested to us either by the act of divine providence or by the opposing powers, as is shown in the book of Esther, when Artaxerxes had not remembered the services of that just man Mordecai, but, when wearied out with his nightly vigils, had it put into his mind by God to require that the annals of his great deeds should be read to him; whereon, being reminded of the benefits received from Mordecai, he ordered his enemy Haman to be hanged, but splendid honours to be conferred on him, and impunity from the threatened danger to be granted to the whole of the holy nation. On the other hand, however, we must suppose that it was through the hostile influence of the devil that the suggestion was introduced into the minds of the high priests and the scribes which they made to Pilate, when they came and said, “Sir, we remember that that deceiver said, while he was yet alive, After three days I will rise again.” The design of Judas, also, respecting the betrayal of our Lord and Saviour, did not originate in the wickedness of his mind alone. For Scripture testifies that the “devil had already put it into his heart to betray Him.” And therefore Solomon rightly commanded, saying, “Keep thy heart with all diligence.” And the Apostle Paul warns us: “Therefore we ought to give the more earnest heed to the things which we have heard, lest perhaps we should let them slip.” And when he says, “Neither give place to the devil,” he shows by that injunction that it is through certain acts, or a kind of mental slothfulness, that room is made for the devil, so that, if he once enter our heart, he will either gain possession of us, or at least will pollute the soul, if he has not obtained the entire mastery over it, by casting on us his fiery darts; and by these we are sometimes deeply wounded, and sometimes only set on fire. Seldom indeed, and only in a few instances, are these fiery darts quenched, so as not to find a place where they may wound, i.e. when one is covered by the strong and mighty shield of faith. The declaration, indeed, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, “We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places,” must be so understood as if “we” meant, “I Paul, and you Ephesians, and all who have not to wrestle against flesh and blood:” for such have to struggle against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, not like the Corinthians, whose struggle was as yet against flesh and blood, and who had been overtaken by no temptation but such as is common to man.

De Principiis, Book III 5:5

This too, I think, should next be inquired into, viz. what are the reasons why a human soul is acted on at one time by good [spirits], and at another by bad: the grounds of which I suspect to be older than the bodily birth of the individual, as John [the Baptist] showed by his leaping and exulting in his mother’s womb, when the voice of the salutation of Mary reached the ears of his mother Elisabeth; and as Jeremiah the prophet declares, who was known to God before he was formed in his mother’s womb, and before he was born was sanctified by Him, and while yet a boy received the grace of prophecy. And again, on the other hand, it is shown beyond a doubt, that some have been possessed by hostile spirits from the very beginning of their lives: i.e., some were born with an evil spirit; and others, according to credible histories, have practised divination from childhood. Others have been under the influence of the demon called Python, i.e. the ventriloquial spirit, from the commencement of their existence. To all which instances, those who maintain that everything in the world is under the administration of divine providence (as is also our own belief), can, as it appears to me, give no other answer, so as to show that no shadow of injustice rests upon the divine government, than by holding that there were certain causes of prior existence, in consequence of which the souls, before their birth in the body, contracted a certain amount of guilt in their sensitive nature, or in their movements, on account of which they have been judged worthy by Divine Providence of being placed in this condition. For a soul is always in possession of free-will, as well when it is in the body as when it is without it; and freedom of will is always directed either to good or evil. Nor can any rational and sentient being, i.e. a mind or soul, exist without some movement either good or bad. And it is probable that these movements furnish grounds for merit even before they do anything in this world; so that on account of these merits or grounds they are, immediately on their birth, and even before it, so to speak, assorted by Divine Providence for the endurance either of good or evil. Let such, then, be our views respecting those events which appear to befall men, either immediately after birth, or even before they enter upon the light. But as regards the suggestions which are made to the soul, i.e. to the faculty of human thought, by different spirits, and which arouse men to good actions or the contrary, even in such a case we must suppose that there sometimes existed certain causes anterior to bodily birth. For occasionally the mind, when watchful, and casting away from it what is evil, calls to itself the aid of the good; or if it be, on the contrary, negligent and slothful, it makes room through insufficient caution for these spirits, which, lying in wait secretly like robbers, contrive to rush into the minds of men when they see a lodgment made for them by sloth; as the Apostle Peter says, “that our adversary the devil goes about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour.” On which account our heart must be kept with all carefulness both by day and night, and no place be given to the devil; but every effort must be used that the ministers of God—those spirits, viz., who were sent to minister to them who are called to be heirs of salvation—may find a place within us, and be delighted to enter into the guest-chamber of our soul, and dwelling within us may guide us by their counsels; if, indeed, they shall find the habitation of our heart adorned by the practice of virtue and holiness. But let that be sufficient which we have said, as we best could, regarding those powers which are hostile to the human race.

De Principiis, Book III 5:5

This too, I think, should next be inquired into, viz. what are the reasons why a human soul is acted on at one time by good [spirits], and at another by bad: the grounds of which I suspect to be older than the bodily birth of the individual, as John [the Baptist] showed by his leaping and exulting in his mother’s womb, when the voice of the salutation of Mary reached the ears of his mother Elisabeth; and as Jeremiah the prophet declares, who was known to God before he was formed in his mother’s womb, and before he was born was sanctified by Him, and while yet a boy received the grace of prophecy. And again, on the other hand, it is shown beyond a doubt, that some have been possessed by hostile spirits from the very beginning of their lives: i.e., some were born with an evil spirit; and others, according to credible histories, have practised divination from childhood. Others have been under the influence of the demon called Python, i.e. the ventriloquial spirit, from the commencement of their existence. To all which instances, those who maintain that everything in the world is under the administration of divine providence (as is also our own belief), can, as it appears to me, give no other answer, so as to show that no shadow of injustice rests upon the divine government, than by holding that there were certain causes of prior existence, in consequence of which the souls, before their birth in the body, contracted a certain amount of guilt in their sensitive nature, or in their movements, on account of which they have been judged worthy by Divine Providence of being placed in this condition. For a soul is always in possession of free-will, as well when it is in the body as when it is without it; and freedom of will is always directed either to good or evil. Nor can any rational and sentient being, i.e. a mind or soul, exist without some movement either good or bad. And it is probable that these movements furnish grounds for merit even before they do anything in this world; so that on account of these merits or grounds they are, immediately on their birth, and even before it, so to speak, assorted by Divine Providence for the endurance either of good or evil. Let such, then, be our views respecting those events which appear to befall men, either immediately after birth, or even before they enter upon the light. But as regards the suggestions which are made to the soul, i.e. to the faculty of human thought, by different spirits, and which arouse men to good actions or the contrary, even in such a case we must suppose that there sometimes existed certain causes anterior to bodily birth. For occasionally the mind, when watchful, and casting away from it what is evil, calls to itself the aid of the good; or if it be, on the contrary, negligent and slothful, it makes room through insufficient caution for these spirits, which, lying in wait secretly like robbers, contrive to rush into the minds of men when they see a lodgment made for them by sloth; as the Apostle Peter says, “that our adversary the devil goes about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour.” On which account our heart must be kept with all carefulness both by day and night, and no place be given to the devil; but every effort must be used that the ministers of God—those spirits, viz., who were sent to minister to them who are called to be heirs of salvation—may find a place within us, and be delighted to enter into the guest-chamber of our soul, and dwelling within us may guide us by their counsels; if, indeed, they shall find the habitation of our heart adorned by the practice of virtue and holiness. But let that be sufficient which we have said, as we best could, regarding those powers which are hostile to the human race.

De Principiis, Book III 6:4

Let us now see what answer is usually returned to these statements by those who maintain that there is in us one movement, and one life, proceeding from one and the same soul, both the salvation and the destruction of which are ascribed to itself as a result of its own actions. And, in the first place, let us notice of what nature those commotions of the soul are which we suffer, when we feel ourselves inwardly drawn in different directions; when there arises a kind of contest of thoughts in our hearts, and certain probabilities are suggested us, agreeably to which we lean now to this side, now to that, and by which we are sometimes convicted of error, and sometimes approve of our acts. It is nothing remarkable, however, to say of wicked spirits, that they have a varying and conflicting judgment, and one out of harmony with itself, since such is found to be the case in all men, whenever, in deliberating upon an uncertain event, counsel is taken, and men consider and consult what is to be chosen as the better and more useful course. It is not therefore surprising that, if two probabilities meet, and suggest opposite views, they should drag the mind in contrary directions. For example, if a man be led by reflection to believe and to fear God, it cannot then be said that the flesh contends against the spirit; but, amidst the uncertainty of what may be true and advantageous, the mind is drawn in opposite directions. So, also, when it is supposed that the flesh provokes to the indulgence of lust, but better counsels oppose allurements of that kind, we are not to suppose that it is one life which is resisting another, but that it is the tendency of the nature of the body, which is eager to empty out and cleanse the places filled with seminal moisture; as, in like manner, it is not to be supposed that it is any opposing power, or the life of another soul, which excites within us the appetite of thirst, and impels us to drink, or which causes us to feel hunger, and drives us to satisfy it. But as it is by the natural movements of the body that food and drink are either desired or rejected, so also the natural seed, collected together in course of time in the various vessels, has an eager desire to be expelled and thrown away, and is so far from never being removed, save by the impulse of some exciting cause, that it is even sometimes spontaneously emitted. When, therefore, it is said that “the flesh struggles against the spirit,” these persons understand the expression to mean that habit or necessity, or the delights of the flesh, arouse a man, and withdraw him from divine and spiritual things. For, owing to the necessity of the body being drawn away, we are not allowed to have leisure for divine things, which are to be eternally advantageous. So again, the soul, devoting itself to divine and spiritual pursuits, and being united to the spirit, is said to fight against the flesh, by not permitting it to be relaxed by indulgence, and to become unsteady through the influence of those pleasures for which it feels a natural delight. In this way, also, they claim to understand the words, “The wisdom of the flesh is hostile to God,” not that the flesh really has a soul, or a wisdom of its own. But as we are accustomed to say, by an abuse of language, that the earth is thirsty, and wishes to drink in water, this use of the word “wishes” is not proper, but catachrestic,—as if we were to say again, that this house wants to be rebuilt, and many other similar expressions; so also is the wisdom of the flesh to be understood, or the expression, that “the flesh lusteth against the spirit.” They generally connect with these the expression, “The voice of thy brother’s blood crieth unto me from the ground.” For what cries unto the Lord is not properly the blood which was shed; but the blood is said improperly to cry out, vengeance being demanded upon him who had shed it. The declaration also of the apostle, “I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind,” they so understand as if he had said, That he who wishes to devote himself to the word of God is, on account of his bodily necessities and habits, which like a sort of law are ingrained in the body, distracted, and divided, and impeded, lest, by devoting himself vigorously to the study of wisdom, he should be enabled to behold the divine mysteries.

De Principiis, Book III 7:5

This arrangement of things, then, which God afterwards appointed (for He had, from the very origin of the world, clearly perceived the reasons and causes affecting those who, either owing to mental deficiencies, deserved to enter into bodies, or those who were carried away by their desire for visible things, and those also who, either willingly or unwillingly, were compelled, [by Him who subjected the same in hope], to perform certain services to such as had fallen into that condition), not being understood by some, who failed to perceive that it was owing to preceding causes, originating in free-will, that this variety of arrangement had been instituted by God, they have concluded that all things in this world are directed either by fortuitous movements or by a necessary fate, and that nothing is within the power of our own will. And, therefore, also they were unable to show that the providence of God was beyond the reach of censure.

De Principiis, Book III 7:5

This arrangement of things, then, which God afterwards appointed (for He had, from the very origin of the world, clearly perceived the reasons and causes affecting those who, either owing to mental deficiencies, deserved to enter into bodies, or those who were carried away by their desire for visible things, and those also who, either willingly or unwillingly, were compelled, [by Him who subjected the same in hope], to perform certain services to such as had fallen into that condition), not being understood by some, who failed to perceive that it was owing to preceding causes, originating in free-will, that this variety of arrangement had been instituted by God, they have concluded that all things in this world are directed either by fortuitous movements or by a necessary fate, and that nothing is within the power of our own will. And, therefore, also they were unable to show that the providence of God was beyond the reach of censure.

De Principiis, Book III 7:8

This subjection, however, will be accomplished in certain ways, and after certain training, and at certain times; for it is not to be imagined that the subjection is to be brought about by the pressure of necessity (lest the whole world should then appear to be subdued to God by force), but by word, reason, and doctrine; by a call to a better course of things, by the best systems of training, by the employment also of suitable and appropriate threatenings, which will justly impend over those who despise any care or attention to their salvation and usefulness. In a word, we men also, in training either our slaves or children, restrain them by threats and fear while they are, by reason of their tender age, incapable of using their reason; but when they have begun to understand what is good, and useful, and honourable, the fear of the lash being over, they acquiesce through the suasion of words and reason in all that is good. But how, consistently with the preservation of freedom of will in all rational creatures, each one ought to be regulated, i.e. who they are whom the word of God finds and trains, as if they were already prepared and capable of it; who they are whom it puts off to a later time; who these are from whom it is altogether concealed, and who are so situated as to be far from hearing it; who those, again, are who despise the word of God when made known and preached to them, and who are driven by a kind of correction and chastisement to salvation, and whose conversion is in a certain degree demanded and extorted; who those are to whom certain opportunities of salvation are afforded, so that sometimes, their faith being proved by an answer alone, they have unquestionably obtained salvation;—from what causes or on what occasions these results take place, or what the divine wisdom sees within them, or what movements of their will leads God so to arrange all these things, is known to Him alone, and to His only-begotten Son, through whom all things were created and restored, and to the Holy Spirit, through whom all things are sanctified, who proceedeth from the Father, to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen.

De Principiis, Book IV 1:14

This being the state of the case, we shall sketch out, as if by way of illustration and pattern, what may occur to us with regard to the manner in which Holy Scripture is to be understood on these several points, repeating in the first instance, and pointing out this fact, that the Holy Spirit, by the providence and will of God, through the power of His only-begotten Word, who was in the beginning God with God, enlightened the ministers of truth, the prophets and apostles, to understand the mysteries of those things or causes which take place among men, or with respect to men. And by “men,” I now mean souls that are placed in bodies, who, relating those mysteries that are known to them, and revealed through Christ, as if they were a kind of human transactions, or handing down certain legal observances and injunctions, described them figuratively; not that any one who pleased might view these expositions as deserving to be trampled under foot, but that he who should devote himself with all chastity, and sobriety, and watchfulness, to studies of this kind, might be able by this means to trace out the meaning of the Spirit of God, which is perhaps lying profoundly buried, and the context, which may be pointing again in another direction than the ordinary usage of speech would indicate. And in this way he might become a sharer in the knowledge of the Spirit, and a partaker in the divine counsel, because the soul cannot come to the perfection of knowledge otherwise than by inspiration of the truth of the divine wisdom. Accordingly, it is of God, i.e. of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, that these men, filled with the Divine Spirit, chiefly treat; then the mysteries relating to the Son of God—how the Word became flesh, and why He descended even to the assumption of the form of a servant—are the subject, as I have said, of explanation by those persons who are filled with the Divine Spirit. It next followed, necessarily, that they should instruct mortals by divine teaching, regarding rational creatures, both those of heaven and the happier ones of earth; and also [should explain] the differences among souls, and the origin of these differences; and then should tell what this world is, and why it was created; whence also sprung the great and terrible wickedness which extends over the earth. And whether that wickedness is found on this earth only, or in other places, is a point which it was necessary for us to learn from divine teaching. Since, then, it was the intention of the Holy Spirit to enlighten with respect to these and similar subjects, those holy souls who had devoted themselves to the service of the truth, this object was kept in view, in the second place, viz. for the sake of those who either could not or would not give themselves to this labour and toil by which they might deserve to be instructed in or to recognise things of such value and importance, to wrap up and conceal, as we said before, in ordinary language, under the covering of some history and narrative of visible things, hidden mysteries. There is therefore introduced the narrative of the visible creation, and the creation and formation of the first man; then the offspring which followed from him in succession, and some of the actions which were done by the good among his posterity, are related, and occasionally certain crimes also, which are stated to have been committed by them as being human; and afterwards certain unchaste or wicked deeds also are narrated as being the acts of the wicked. The description of battles, moreover, is given in a wonderful manner, and the alternations of victors and vanquished, by which certain ineffable mysteries are made known to those who know how to investigate statements of that kind. By an admirable discipline of wisdom, too, the law of truth, even of the prophets, is implanted in the Scriptures of the law, each of which is woven by a divine art of wisdom, as a kind of covering and veil of spiritual truths; and this is what we have called the “body” of Scripture, so that also, in this way, what we have called the covering of the letter, woven by the art of wisdom, might be capable of edifying and profiting many, when others would derive no benefit.

De Principiis, Book IV 2:14

This being the state of the case, we have to sketch what seem to us to be the marks of the [true] understanding of Scriptures. And, in the first place, this must be pointed out, that the object of the Spirit, which by the providence of God, through the Word who was in the beginning with God, illuminated the ministers of truth, the prophets and apostles, was especially [the communication] of ineffable mysteries regarding the affairs of men (now by men I mean those souls that make use of bodies), in order that he who is capable of instruction may by investigation, and by devoting himself to the study of the profundities of meaning contained in the words, become a participator of all the doctrines of his counsel. And among those matters which relate to souls (who cannot otherwise obtain perfection apart from the rich and wise truth of God), the [doctrines] belonging to God and His only-begotten Son are necessarily laid down as primary, viz. of what nature He is, and in what manner He is the Son of God, and what are the causes of His descending even to [the assumption of] human flesh, and of complete humanity; and what, also, is the operation of this [Son], and upon whom and when exercised. And it was necessary also that the subject of kindred beings, and other rational creatures, both those who are divine and those who have fallen from blessedness, together with the reasons of their fall, should be contained in the divine teaching; and also that of the diversities of souls, and of the origin of these diversities, and of the nature of the world, and the cause of its existence. We must learn also the origin of the great and terrible wickedness which overspreads the earth, and whether it is confined to this earth only, or prevails elsewhere. Now, while these and similar objects were present to the Spirit, who enlightened the souls of the holy ministers of the truth, there was a second object, for the sake of those who were unable to endure the fatigue of investigating matters so important, viz. to conceal the doctrine relating to the previously mentioned subjects, in expressions containing a narrative which conveyed an announcement regarding the things of the visible creation, the creation of man, and the successive descendants of the first men until they became numerous; and other histories relating the acts of just men, and the sins occasionally committed by these same men as being human beings, and the wicked deeds, both of unchastity and vice, committed by sinful and ungodly men. And what is most remarkable, by the history of wars, and of the victors, and the vanquished, certain mysteries are indicated to those who are able to test these statements. And more wonderful still, the laws of truth are predicted by the written legislation;—all these being described in a connected series, with a power which is truly in keeping with the wisdom of God. For it was intended that the covering also of the spiritual truths—I mean the “bodily” part of Scripture—should not be without profit in many cases, but should be capable of improving the multitude, according to their capacity.

Against Celsus: Preface 1:3

I venture, then, to say that this “apology” which you require me to compose will somewhat weaken that defence [of Christianity] which rests on facts, and that power of Jesus which is manifest to those who are not altogether devoid of perception. Notwithstanding, that we may not have the appearance of being reluctant to undertake the task which you have enjoined, we have endeavoured, to the best of our ability, to suggest, by way of answer to each of the statements advanced by Celsus, what seemed to us adapted to refute them, although his arguments have no power to shake the faith of any [true] believer. And forbid, indeed, that any one should be found who, after having been a partaker in such a love of God as was [displayed] in Christ Jesus, could be shaken in his purpose by the arguments of Celsus, or of any such as he. For Paul, when enumerating the innumerable causes which generally separate men from the love of Christ and from the love of God in Christ Jesus (to all of which, the love that was in himself rose superior), did not set down argument among the grounds of separation. For observe that he says, firstly: “Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? (as it is written, For Thy sake we are killed all the day long; we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter.) Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors through Him that loved us.” And secondly, when laying down another series of causes which naturally tend to separate those who are not firmly grounded in their religion, he says: “For I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.”

Against Celsus: Preface 1:3

I venture, then, to say that this “apology” which you require me to compose will somewhat weaken that defence [of Christianity] which rests on facts, and that power of Jesus which is manifest to those who are not altogether devoid of perception. Notwithstanding, that we may not have the appearance of being reluctant to undertake the task which you have enjoined, we have endeavoured, to the best of our ability, to suggest, by way of answer to each of the statements advanced by Celsus, what seemed to us adapted to refute them, although his arguments have no power to shake the faith of any [true] believer. And forbid, indeed, that any one should be found who, after having been a partaker in such a love of God as was [displayed] in Christ Jesus, could be shaken in his purpose by the arguments of Celsus, or of any such as he. For Paul, when enumerating the innumerable causes which generally separate men from the love of Christ and from the love of God in Christ Jesus (to all of which, the love that was in himself rose superior), did not set down argument among the grounds of separation. For observe that he says, firstly: “Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? (as it is written, For Thy sake we are killed all the day long; we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter.) Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors through Him that loved us.” And secondly, when laying down another series of causes which naturally tend to separate those who are not firmly grounded in their religion, he says: “For I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.”

Against Celsus: Preface 1:4

Now, truly, it is proper that we should feel elated because afflictions, or those other causes enumerated by Paul, do not separate us [from Christ]; but not that Paul and the other apostles, and any other resembling them, [should entertain that feeling], because they were far exalted above such things when they said, “In all these things we are more than conquerors through Him that loved us,” which is a stronger statement than that they are simply “conquerors.” But if it be proper for apostles to entertain a feeling of elation in not being separated from the love of God that is in Christ Jesus our Lord, that feeling will be entertained by them because neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor any of the things that follow, can separate them from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord. And therefore I do not congratulate that believer in Christ whose faith can be shaken by Celsus—who no longer shares the common life of men, but has long since departed—or by any apparent plausibility of argument. For I do not know in what rank to place him who has need of arguments written in books in answer to the charges of Celsus against the Christians, in order to prevent him from being shaken in his faith, and confirm him in it. But nevertheless, since in the multitude of those who are considered believers some such persons might be found as would have their faith shaken and overthrown by the writings of Celsus, but who might be preserved by a reply to them of such a nature as to refute his statements and to exhibit the truth, we have deemed it right to yield to your injunction, and to furnish an answer to the treatise which you sent us, but which I do not think that any one, although only a short way advanced in philosophy, will allow to be a “True Discourse,” as Celsus has entitled it.

Against Celsus, Book I 30:1

Now, would not any one who investigated with ordinary care the nature of these facts, be struck with amazement at this man’s victory?—with his complete success in surmounting by his reputation all causes that tended to bring him into disrepute, and with his superiority over all other illustrious individuals in the world? And yet it is a rare thing for distinguished men to succeed in acquiring a reputation for several things at once. For one man is admired on account of his wisdom, another for his military skill, and some of the barbarians for their marvellous powers of incantation, and some for one quality, and others for another; but not many have been admired and acquired a reputation for many things at the same time; whereas this man, in addition to his other merits, is an object of admiration both for his wisdom, and for his miracles, and for his power of government. For he persuaded some to withdraw themselves from their laws, and to secede to him, not as a tyrant would do, nor as a robber, who arms his followers against men; nor as a rich man, who bestows help upon those who come to him; nor as one of those who confessedly are deserving of censure; but as a teacher of the doctrine regarding the God of all things, and of the worship which belongs to Him, and of all moral precepts which are able to secure the favour of the Supreme God to him who orders his life in conformity therewith. Now, to Themistocles, or to any other man of distinction, nothing happened to prove a hindrance to their reputation; whereas to this man, besides what we have already enumerated, and which are enough to cover with dishonour the soul of a man even of the most noble nature, there was that apparently infamous death of crucifixion, which was enough to efface his previously acquired glory, and to lead those who, as they who disavow his doctrine assert, were formerly deluded by him to abandon their delusion, and to pass condemnation upon their deceiver.

Against Celsus, Book II 56:1

But since the Jew says that these histories of the alleged descent of heroes to Hades, and of their return thence, are juggling impositions, maintaining that these heroes disappeared for a certain time, and secretly withdrew themselves from the sight of all men, and gave themselves out afterwards as having returned from Hades,—for such is the meaning which his words seem to convey respecting the Odrysian Orpheus, and the Thessalian Protesilaus, and the Tænarian Hercules, and Theseus also,—let us endeavour to show that the account of Jesus being raised from the dead cannot possibly be compared to these. For each one of the heroes respectively mentioned might, had he wished, have secretly withdrawn himself from the sight of men, and returned again, if so determined, to those whom he had left; but seeing that Jesus was crucified before all the Jews, and His body slain in the presence of His nation, how can they bring themselves to say that He practised a similar deception with those heroes who are related to have gone down to Hades, and to have returned thence? But we say that the following consideration might be adduced, perhaps, as a defence of the public crucifixion of Jesus, especially in connection with the existence of those stories of heroes who are supposed to have been compelled to descend to Hades: that if we were to suppose Jesus to have died an obscure death, so that the fact of His decease was not patent to the whole nation of the Jews, and afterwards to have actually risen from the dead, there would, in such a case, have been ground for the same suspicion entertained regarding the heroes being also entertained regarding Himself. Probably, then, in addition to other causes for the crucifixion of Jesus, this also may have contributed to His dying a conspicuous death upon the cross, that no one might have it in his power to say that He voluntarily withdrew from the sight of men, and seemed only to die, without really doing so; but, appearing again, made a juggler’s trick of the resurrection from the dead. But a clear and unmistakeable proof of the fact I hold to be the undertaking of His disciples, who devoted themselves to the teaching of a doctrine which was attended with danger to human life,—a doctrine which they would not have taught with such courage had they invented the resurrection of Jesus from the dead; and who also, at the same time, not only prepared others to despise death, but were themselves the first to manifest their disregard for its terrors.

Against Celsus, Book III 14:1

After this he continues: “Their union is the more wonderful, the more it can be shown to be based on no substantial reason. And yet rebellion is a substantial reason, as well as the advantages which accrue from it, and the fear of external enemies. Such are the causes which give stability to their faith.” To this we answer, that our union does thus rest upon a reason, or rather not upon a reason, but upon the divine working, so that its commencement was God’s teaching men, in the prophetical writings, to expect the advent of Christ, who was to be the Saviour of mankind. For in so far as this point is not really refuted (although it may seem to be by unbelievers), in the same proportion is the doctrine commended as the doctrine of God, and Jesus shown to be the Son of God both before and after His incarnation. I maintain, moreover, that even after His incarnation, He is always found by those who possess the acutest spiritual vision to be most God-like, and to have really come down to us from God, and to have derived His origin or subsequent development not from human wisdom, but from the manifestation of God within Him, who by His manifold wisdom and miracles established Judaism first, and Christianity afterwards; and the assertion that rebellion, and the advantages attending it, were the originating causes of a doctrine which has converted and improved so many men was effectually refuted.

Against Celsus, Book III 14:1

After this he continues: “Their union is the more wonderful, the more it can be shown to be based on no substantial reason. And yet rebellion is a substantial reason, as well as the advantages which accrue from it, and the fear of external enemies. Such are the causes which give stability to their faith.” To this we answer, that our union does thus rest upon a reason, or rather not upon a reason, but upon the divine working, so that its commencement was God’s teaching men, in the prophetical writings, to expect the advent of Christ, who was to be the Saviour of mankind. For in so far as this point is not really refuted (although it may seem to be by unbelievers), in the same proportion is the doctrine commended as the doctrine of God, and Jesus shown to be the Son of God both before and after His incarnation. I maintain, moreover, that even after His incarnation, He is always found by those who possess the acutest spiritual vision to be most God-like, and to have really come down to us from God, and to have derived His origin or subsequent development not from human wisdom, but from the manifestation of God within Him, who by His manifold wisdom and miracles established Judaism first, and Christianity afterwards; and the assertion that rebellion, and the advantages attending it, were the originating causes of a doctrine which has converted and improved so many men was effectually refuted.

Against Celsus, Book III 38:1

The belief, then, in Antinous, or any other such person, whether among the Egyptians or the Greeks, is, so to speak, unfortunate; while the belief in Jesus would seem to be either a fortunate one, or the result of thorough investigation, having the appearance of the former to the multitude, and of the latter to exceedingly few. And when I speak of a certain belief being, as the multitude would call it, unfortunate, I in such a case refer the cause to God, who knows the reasons of the various fates allotted to each one who enters human life. The Greeks, moreover, will admit that even amongst those who are considered to be most largely endowed with wisdom, good fortune has had much to do, as in the choice of teachers of one kind rather than another, and in meeting with a better class of instructors (there being teachers who taught the most opposite doctrines), and in being brought up in better circumstances; for the bringing up of many has been amid surroundings of such a kind, that they were prevented from ever receiving any idea of better things, but constantly passed their life, from their earliest youth, either as the favourites of licentious men or of tyrants, or in some other wretched condition which forbade the soul to look upwards. And the causes of these varied fortunes, according to all probability, are to be found in the reasons of providence, though it is not easy for men to ascertain these; but I have said what I have done by way of digression from the main body of my subject, on account of the proverb, that “such is the power of faith, because it seizes that which first presents itself.” For it was necessary, owing to the different methods of education, to speak of the differences of belief among men, some of whom are more, others less fortunate in their belief; and from this to proceed to show that what is termed good or bad fortune would appear to contribute, even in the case of the most talented, to their appearing to be more fully endowed with reason, and to give their assent on grounds of reason to the majority of human opinions. But enough on these points.

Against Celsus, Book III 72:1

In the next place, speaking as in the person of a teacher of our doctrine, he expresses himself as follows: “Wise men reject what we say, being led into error, and ensnared by their wisdom.” In reply to which we say that, since wisdom is the knowledge of divine and human things and of their causes, or, as it is defined by the word of God, “the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence flowing from the glory of the Almighty, and the brightness of the everlasting light, and the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of His goodness,” no one who was really wise would reject what is said by a Christian acquainted with the principles of Christianity, or would be led into error, or ensnared by it. For true wisdom does not mislead, but ignorance does, while of existing things knowledge alone is permanent, and the truth which is derived from wisdom. But if, contrary to the definition of wisdom, you call any one whatever who dogmatizes with sophistical opinions wise, we answer that in conformity with what you call wisdom, such an one rejects the words of God, being misled and ensnared by plausible sophisms. And since, according to our doctrine, wisdom is not the knowledge of evil, but the knowledge of evil, so to speak, is in those who hold false opinions and who are deceived by them, I would therefore in such persons term it ignorance rather than wisdom.

Against Celsus, Book III 75:1

But as he afterwards says that “the teacher of Christianity acts like a person who promises to restore patients to bodily health, but who prevents them from consulting skilled physicians, by whom his ignorance would be exposed,” we shall inquire in reply, “What are the physicians to whom you refer, from whom we turn away ignorant individuals? For you do not suppose that we exhort those to embrace the gospel who are devoted to philosophy, so that you would regard the latter as the physicians from whom we keep away such as we invite to come to the word of God.” He indeed will make no answer, because he cannot name the physicians; or else he will be obliged to betake himself to those of them who are ignorant, and who of their own accord servilely yield themselves to the worship of many gods, and to whatever other opinions are entertained by ignorant individuals. In either case, then, he will be shown to have employed to no purpose in his argument the illustration of “one who keeps others away from skilled physicians.” But if, in order to preserve from the philosophy of Epicurus, and from such as are considered physicians after his system, those who are deceived by them, why should we not be acting most reasonably in keeping such away from a dangerous disease caused by the physicians of Celsus,—that, viz., which leads to the annihilation of providence, and the introduction of pleasure as a good? But let it be conceded that we do keep away those whom we encourage to become our disciples from other philosopher-physicians,—from the Peripatetics, for example, who deny the existence of providence and the relation of Deity to man,—why shall we not piously train and heal those who have been thus encouraged, persuading them to devote themselves to the God of all things, and free those who yield obedience to us from the great wounds inflicted by the words of such as are deemed to be philosophers? Nay, let it also be admitted that we turn away from physicians of the sect of the Stoics, who introduce a corruptible god, and assert that his essence consists of a body, which is capable of being changed and altered in all its parts, and who also maintain that all things will one day perish, and that God alone will be left; why shall we not even thus emancipate our subjects from evils, and bring them by pious arguments to devote themselves to the Creator, and to admire the Father of the Christian system, who has so arranged that instruction of the most benevolent kind, and fitted for the conversion of souls, should be distributed throughout the whole human race? Nay, if we should cure those who have fallen into the folly of believing in the transmigration of souls through the teaching of physicians, who will have it that the rational nature descends sometimes into all kinds of irrational animals, and sometimes into that state of being which is incapable of using the imagination, why should we not improve the souls of our subjects by means of a doctrine which does not teach that a state of insensibility or irrationalism is produced in the wicked instead of punishment, but which shows that the labours and chastisements inflicted upon the wicked by God are a kind of medicines leading to conversion? For those who are intelligent Christians, keeping this in view, deal with the simple-minded, as parents do with very young children. We do not betake ourselves then to young persons and silly rustics, saying to them, “Flee from physicians.” Nor do we say, “See that none of you lay hold of knowledge;” nor do we assert that “knowledge is an evil;” nor are we mad enough to say that “knowledge causes men to lose their soundness of mind.” We would not even say that any one ever perished through wisdom; and although we give instruction, we never say, “Give heed to me,” but “Give heed to the God of all things, and to Jesus, the giver of instruction concerning Him.” And none of us is so great a braggart as to say what Celsus put in the mouth of one of our teachers to his acquaintances, “I alone will save you.” Observe here the lies which he utters against us! Moreover, we do not assert that “true physicians destroy those whom they promise to cure.”

Against Celsus, Book IV 18:1

But Celsus, lingering over matters which he does not understand, leads us to be guilty of tautology, as we do not wish even in appearance to leave any one of his objections unexamined. He proceeds, accordingly, as follows: “God either really changes himself, as these assert, into a mortal body, and the impossibility of that has been already declared; or else he does not undergo a change, but only causes the beholders to imagine so, and thus deceives them, and is guilty of falsehood. Now deceit and falsehood are nothing but evils, and would only be employed as a medicine, either in the case of sick and lunatic friends, with a view to their cure, or in that of enemies when one is taking measures to escape danger. But no sick man or lunatic is a friend of God, nor does God fear any one to such a degree as to shun danger by leading him into error.” Now the answer to these statements might have respect partly to the nature of the Divine Word, who is God, and partly to the soul of Jesus. As respects the nature of the Word, in the same way as the quality of the food changes in the nurse into milk with reference to the nature of the child, or is arranged by the physician with a view to the good of his health in the case of a sick man, or [is specially] prepared for a stronger man, because he possesses greater vigour, so does God appropriately change, in the case of each individual, the power of the Word to which belongs the natural property of nourishing the human soul. And to one is given, as the Scripture terms it, “the sincere milk of the word;” and to another, who is weaker, as it were, “herbs;” and to another who is full-grown, “strong meat.” And the Word does not, I imagine, prove false to His own nature, in contributing nourishment to each one, according as he is capable of receiving Him. Nor does He mislead or prove false. But if one were to take the change as referring to the soul of Jesus after it had entered a body, we would inquire in what sense the term “change” is used. For if it be meant to apply to its essence, such a supposition is inadmissible, not only in relation to the soul of Jesus, but also to the rational soul of any other being. And if it be alleged that it suffers anything from the body when united with it, or from the place to which it has come, then what inconvenience can happen to the Word who, in great benevolence, brought down a Saviour to the human race?—seeing none of those who formerly professed to effect a cure could accomplish so much as that soul showed it could do, by what it performed, even by voluntarily descending to the level of human destinies for the benefit of our race. And the Divine Word, well knowing this, speaks to that effect in many passages of Scripture, although it is sufficient at present to quote one testimony of Paul to the following effect: “Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus; who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but made Himself of no reputation, and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name.”

Against Celsus, Book IV 54:1

But as in the words which I quoted from Celsus, which are a paraphrase from the Timœus, certain expressions occur, such as, “God made nothing mortal, but immortal things alone, while mortal things are the works of others, and the soul is a work of God, but the nature of the body is different, and there is no difference between the body of a man and that of a bat, or of a worm, or of a frog; for the matter is the same, and their corruptible part alike,”—let us discuss these points for a little; and let us show that Celsus either does not disclose his Epicurean opinions, or, as might be said by one person, has exchanged them for better, or, as another might say, has nothing in common save the name, with Celsus, the Epicurean. For he ought, in giving expression to such opinions, and in proposing to contradict not only us, but the by no means obscure sect of philosophers who are the adherents of Zeno of Citium, to have proved that the bodies of animals are not the work of God, and that the great skill displayed in their construction did not proceed from the highest intelligence. And he ought also, with regard to the countless diversities of plants, which are regulated by an inherent, incomprehensible nature, and which have been created for the by no means despicable use of man in general, and of the animals which minister to man, whatever other reasons may be adduced for their existence, not only to have stated his opinion, but also to have shown us that it was no perfect intelligence which impressed these qualities upon the matter of plants. And when he had once represented [various] divinities as the creators of all the bodies, the soul alone being the work of God, why did not he, who separated these great acts of creation, and apportioned them among a plurality of creators, next demonstrate by some convincing reason the existence of these diversities among divinities, some of which construct the bodies of men, and others—those, say, of beasts of burden, and others—those of wild animals? And he who saw that some divinities were the creators of dragons, and of asps, and of basilisks, and others of each plant and herb according to its species, ought to have explained the causes of these diversities. For probably, had he given himself carefully to the investigation of each particular point, he would either have observed that it was one God who was the creator of all, and who made each thing with a certain object and for a certain reason; or if he had failed to observe this, he would have discovered the answer which he ought to return to those who assert that corruptibility is a thing indifferent in its nature; and that there was no absurdity in a world which consists of diverse materials, being formed by one architect, who constructed the different kinds of things so as to secure the good of the whole. Or, finally, he ought to have expressed no opinion at all on so important a doctrine, since he did not intend to prove what he professed to demonstrate; unless, indeed, he who censures others for professing a simple faith, would have us to believe his mere assertions, although he gave out that he would not merely assert, but would prove his assertions.

Against Celsus, Book VIII 48:1

In the next place, Celsus, after referring to the enthusiasm with which men will contend unto death rather than abjure Christianity, adds strangely enough some remarks, in which he wishes to show that our doctrines are similar to those delivered by the priests at the celebration of the heathen mysteries. He says, “Just as you, good sir, believe in eternal punishments, so also do the priests who interpret and initiate into the sacred mysteries. The same punishments with which you threaten others, they threaten you. Now it is worthy of examination, which of the two is more firmly established as true; for both parties contend with equal assurance that the truth is on their side. But if we require proofs, the priests of the heathen gods produce many that are clear and convincing, partly from wonders performed by demons, and partly from the answers given by oracles, and various other modes of divination.” He would, then, have us believe that we and the interpreters of the mysteries equally teach the doctrine of eternal punishment, and that it is a matter for inquiry on which side of the two the truth lies. Now I should say that the truth lies with those who are able to induce their hearers to live as men who are convinced of the truth of what they have heard. But Jews and Christians have been thus affected by the doctrines they hold about what we speak of as the world to come, and the rewards of the righteous, and the punishments of the wicked. Let Celsus then, or any one who will, show us who have been moved in this way in regard to eternal punishments by the teaching of heathen priests and mystagogues. For surely the purpose of him who brought to light this doctrine was not only to reason upon the subject of punishments, and to strike men with terror of them, but to induce those who heard the truth to strive with all their might against those sins which are the causes of punishment. And those who study the prophecies with care, and are not content with a cursory perusal of the predictions contained in them, will find them such as to convince the intelligent and sincere reader that the Spirit of God was in those men, and that with their writings there is nothing in all the works of demons, responses of oracles, or sayings of soothsayers, for one moment to be compared.

The Book of the Bee

The Book of the Bee 56:4

That the souls of the righteous pray, and that their prayers assist those who take refuge with them, may be learned from many, especially from Mar Theodore in his account of the blessed Thecla. Therefore it is right for those who have a holy man for a friend, to rejoice when he goes to our Lord in Paradise, because their friend has the power to help them by his prayers. Like the blind disciple of one of the saints mentioned in the Book of the Paradise, who, when his master was dying, wept bitterly and said, ‘To whose care dost thou leave the poor blind man?' And his master encouraged him, and said to him, ‘I believe in God that, if I find mercy in His sight, at the end of a week thou wilt see;’ and after some days he did see. The souls of the righteous also hold spiritual conversation with each other, according to the Divine permission and command which moves them to this by necessary causes. Neither those who have departed this life in the flesh are hindered from this (intercourse), nor those who are still clad in their fleshly garments, if they live their life in them holily.

The Mishnah

Mishnah Kilayim 7:4

One who causes his vine to overhang his fellow’s grain, behold he has caused the grain to be prohibited and he is responsible for it. Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon say: a person does not prohibit [as kilayim] that which is not his own.

Mishnah Kilayim 9:8

Only that which is spun or woven is forbidden under the law of kilayim, as it says, “You shall not wear shatnez” (Deuteronomy 22:11), that which is shua (combed) tavui (spun) and nuz (woven). Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: [the word shaatnez means that] he [the transgressor] is perverted (naloz) and causes his father in heaven to avert himself [from him].

Mishnah Terumot 6:6

Rabbi Eliezer says: they may make repayment from one kind for another, provided that it is from a superior kind for an inferior kind. Rabbi Akiva says: they may make repayment only from the same kind. Hence if a man ate cucumbers grown a year before the seventh year, he must wait for those grown after the termination of the seventh year and repay with them. The same source which causes Rabbi Eliezer to be lenient causes Rabbi Akiva to be stringent, for it says: “And he shall give the priest the holy thing (hakodesh)” (Leviticus 22:14), [implying,] whatever is liable to become “kodesh,” the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But Rabbi Akiva says: “And he shall give the priest the holy thing (kodesh),” [implying] the same kind of holy thing which he ate.

Mishnah Terumot 6:6

Rabbi Eliezer says: they may make repayment from one kind for another, provided that it is from a superior kind for an inferior kind. Rabbi Akiva says: they may make repayment only from the same kind. Hence if a man ate cucumbers grown a year before the seventh year, he must wait for those grown after the termination of the seventh year and repay with them. The same source which causes Rabbi Eliezer to be lenient causes Rabbi Akiva to be stringent, for it says: “And he shall give the priest the holy thing (hakodesh)” (Leviticus 22:14), [implying,] whatever is liable to become “kodesh,” the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But Rabbi Akiva says: “And he shall give the priest the holy thing (kodesh),” [implying] the same kind of holy thing which he ate.

Mishnah Orlah 2:4

Whatever causes something to ferment, or seasons, or makes medumma with terumah, with orlah or with ‘mixed-seeds’ of the vineyard, is prohibited. Bet Shammai says: it also renders unclean. But Bet Hillel says: it never renders unclean unless it has the volume of an egg.

Mishnah Orlah 2:6

Concerning what did they say: “Anything that causes fermentation or seasons or which renders medumma we rule stringently”? [In the case of] a species [mixed] with its [like] species. [When did they say] “we rule [sometimes] leniently and [sometimes] stringently”? [In the case of] a species [mixed] with a different kind of species. How so? If leaven of wheat fell into dough of wheat and there is enough to cause fermentation, [then] whether there is enough to become neutralized in one-hundred-and-one, or there is not enough to become neutralized in one-hundred-and-one, it is prohibited. If there is not enough to become neutralized in one-hundred-and-one, [then] whether there is enough to cause fermentation, or there is not enough to cause fermentation, it is prohibited.

Mishnah Orlah 2:11

Leaven of hullin and of terumah fell into dough, and neither this was sufficient to cause fermentation nor was that sufficient to cause fermentation, but together they caused [the dough] to ferment: Rabbi Eliezer says: I go after the last. But the sages say: whether the prohibited fell in first or last, it never causes the dough to become prohibited unless there is enough to cause fermentation.

Mishnah Orlah 2:12

Yoezer, master of the temple (Ish Habirah), was one of the disciples of Bet Shammai and he said: I asked Rabban Gamaliel the elder as he was standing at the eastern gate [of the Temple], and he said: it never causes the dough to become prohibited unless there is enough to cause fermentation.

Mishnah Orlah 3:7

For Rabbi Meir used to say: anything that is normally [sold] by counting causes [a mixture] to become consecrated [in even the smallest amount]. But the sages say only six things consecrate [a mixture in even the smallest amount], and Rabbi Akiba says seven [things]. And these are they: Nuts with soft shells; badan pomegranates; stopped-up casks; beet shoots; cabbage-heads; Greek pumpkins. Rabbi Akiba says: also loaves [baked by] a householder. To those to which orlah applies [they prohibit the mixture] as orlah, [to those of which] kilayim of the vineyard apply [they prohibit the mixture as] kilayim of the vineyard.

Mishnah Bikkurim 4:2

In what ways is he like men? He causes impurity with white discharge, like men; He dresses like men; He can take a wife but not be taken as a wife, like men. [When he is born] his mother counts the blood of purification, like men; He may not be secluded with women, like men. He is not maintained with the daughters, like men; He transgresses the law of: “You shall not round” (Leviticus 19:2 and “You shall not defile for the dead,” (Leviticus 21:1) like men; And he must perform all the commandments of the Torah, like men.

Mishnah Bikkurim 4:3

And in what ways is he like women? He causes impurity with red discharge, like women; And he must not be secluded with men, like women; And he doesn’t make his brother’s wife liable for yibbum (levirate marriage); And he does not share [in the inheritance] with the sons, like women; And he cannot eat most holy sacrifices, like women. At his birth his mother counts the blood of her impurity like [they do when they give birth to a] girl; And he is disqualified from being a witness, like women. If he had illicit intercourse, he is disqualified from eating terumah, like women.

Mishnah Shabbat 9:2

How do we know that a ship is clean? Because it is said, “The way of a ship is in the midst of the sea” (Proverbs 30:19). How do we know that if a furrow is six handbreadths by six handbreadths, they may sow in it five kinds of seeds, four on the four sides, and one in the middle? Because it is said, “For as the earth brings forth her growth, and as the garden causes its seeds to spring forth” (Isaiah 61:11) not its seed, but its seeds is stated.

Mishnah Eruvin 1:7

One may make the side-posts out of anything, even something that is alive. But Rabbi Yose prohibits this. It also causes defilement as the covering of a tomb, But Rabbi Meir makes pure. One may write on them gittin, But Rabbi Yose the Galilean declares it unfit.

Mishnah Eruvin 5:3

So also three villages arranged in the shape of a triangle, if between the two outer ones there is a distance of a hundred and forty-one and a third cubits, the middle one causes all the three of them to be regarded as one.

Mishnah Pesachim 2:8

One may not put flour into haroset or into mustard; And if he did put [it], it must be eaten immediately; But Rabbi Meir forbids [it]. One may not boil the Pesah sacrifice, neither in liquids nor in fruit juice but one may baste and dip it in them. The water used by a baker must be poured out, because it causes leavening.

Mishnah Rosh Hashanah 4:9

The order of the blasts: three sets of three each. The length of a teki’ah is equal to three teru'ahs, and the length of a teru'ah is equal to three yevavot. If one prolonged the first teki'ah so that it went directly into the second, it counts only as one. One who has blessed [recited the Amidah] and then a shofar is given to him, he sounds a teki'ah teru'ah teki'ah three times. Just as the shaliah tzibbur is obligated, so every single individual is obligated. Rabban Gamaliel says: the shaliah tzibbur (communal prayer leader) causes the whole congregation to fulfill their obligation.

Mishnah Ta'anit 1:1

From when do they mention the powers of [bringing] rain? Rabbi Eliezer says: from the first day of the Festival [of Sukkot]. Rabbi Joshua says: on the last day of the Festival [of Sukkot]. Rabbi Joshua said to him: Since rain on the Festival is nothing but a sign of [God’s] curse why should he mention it? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: I also did not say to request [rain] but to make mention, “He causes the wind to blow and the rain to fall” in its due season. He replied to him: if so one should at all times make mention of it.

Mishnah Nazir 6:3

A nazirite vow of unspecified duration is for thirty days. If [the nazirite] shaved himself or bandits shaved him, it overturns thirty days. A nazirite who shaves himself, whether with scissors or a razor, or who singes [the ends of his hair], even a minimal amount, is liable. A nazirite may shampoo [his hair] and part it [with his fingers] but may not comb it. Rabbi Ishmael says: he is not to cleanse it with dirt because it causes the hair to fall out.

Mishnah Sotah 3:4

She had barely finished drinking when her face turns yellow, her eyes protrude and her veins swell. And [those who see her] exclaim, “Remove her! Remove her, so that the temple-court should not be defiled”. If she had merit, it [causes the water] to suspend its effect upon her. Some merit suspends the effect for one year, some merit suspends the effects for two years, and some merit suspends the effect for three years. Hence Ben Azzai said: a person must teach his daughter Torah, so that if she has to drink [the water of bitterness], she should know that the merit suspends its effect. Rabbi Eliezer says: whoever teaches his daughter Torah teaches her lasciviousness. Rabbi Joshua says: a woman prefers one kav (of food) and sexual indulgence to nine kav and sexual separation. He used to say, a foolish pietist, a cunning wicked person, a female separatist, and the blows of separatists bring destruction upon the world.

Mishnah Bava Kamma 1:1

There are four primary causes of injury: the ox and the pit and the crop-destroying beast and fire. [The distinctive feature of] the ox is not like [that of] the crop-destroying beast, nor is [the distinctive feature of] either of these, which are alive, like [that of] fire, which is not alive; nor is [the distinctive feature of] any of these, whose way it is to go forth and do injury, like [that of] the pit, whose way it is not to go forth and do injury. What they have in common is that it is their way to do injury and that you are responsible for caring over them; and if one of them did injury whoever [is responsible] for the injury must make restitution [to the damaged party] with the best of his land.

Mishnah Bava Kamma 2:5

“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].

Mishnah Bava Kamma 10:2

If excise collectors took his donkey and gave him another donkey, or if bandits robbed a man of his coat and gave him another coat, they are his own, since the original owners gave up hope of recovering them. If a man saved something from a flood or from marauding troops or from bandits: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the item], it belongs to him. So too with a swarm of bees: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the swarm], it belongs to him. Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka said: “A woman or child may be believed if they say, ‘The swarm of bees went away from here.’” A man may go into his fellow’s field to save his swarm and if he causes damage he must pay for the damage that he has caused; but he may not cut off a branch of the tree [to save his swarm] even on condition that he pay its value. Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka, says: “He may even cut off [the branch] and repay the value.”

Mishnah Bava Metzia 10:5

If one’s wall was near his fellow’s garden and it fell down and his fellow said to him, “Clear away your stones”, and he answered, “They have become yours”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the owner of the garden) had accepted he (the owner of the wall) said to him, “Here is your expenditures and I will take back what is mine”, they do not listen to him. If one hired a laborer to help him in his work with chopped straw and stubble, and the laborer said to him, “Give me my wages”, and he said to him, “Take as your wages that with which you have labored”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the employee) had accepted he (the employer) said to him, “Here are your wages and I will take what is mine”, they do not listen to him. One who removes his manure into the public domain: from the time he removes it another may take it to manure [his fields]. One may not soak clay or make bricks in the public domain, but clay may be kneaded in the public domain but not bricks. One who builds in the public domain: one brings the stones and another builds (immediately). And if he causes damage, he pays what he has damaged. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “He may, indeed, make preparation for his work for thirty days [in the public domain].

Mishnah Bava Batra 2:2

One may not set up an oven inside a house unless there is a space of four cubits above it. If he sets it up in the upper room, the flooring beneath it must be three handbreadths deep, or for a stove one handbreadth. And if it causes damage [to the floor] he must pay for the damage caused. Rabbi Shimon says: “They only mentioned these measurements so that if the object caused damage he would be exempt.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 7:7

He who gives of his seed to Molech is not liable unless he delivers it to Molech and causes it to pass through the fire. If he gave it to Molech but did not cause it to pass through the fire, or he caused it to pass through fire but did not give it to Molech, he incurs no penalty, unless he does both. A Ba’al Ob is the pithom who speaks from his armpit. The Yidde’oni is one who speaks from his mouth. These two are stoned; while he who inquires of them transgresses a formal prohibition.

Mishnah Eduyot 4:12

A man who was set beneath the gap: Beth Shammai says: he does not cause the impurity to pass over. But Beth Hillel says: a man is hollow, and the upper side causes the impurity to pass over.

Mishnah Eduyot 5:4

Rabbi Eliezer says: there are two instances of lenient rulings by Beth Shammai and strict rulings by Beth Hillel. The blood of a woman after childbirth who has not immersed herself, Beth Shammai says: [it is] like her spittle and her urine. But Beth Hillel says: it causes impurity whether wet or dry. However, they agree in the case of the blood of a woman who gave birth when she had non-menstrual discharge, that it causes defilement whether wet or dry.

Mishnah Eduyot 5:4

Rabbi Eliezer says: there are two instances of lenient rulings by Beth Shammai and strict rulings by Beth Hillel. The blood of a woman after childbirth who has not immersed herself, Beth Shammai says: [it is] like her spittle and her urine. But Beth Hillel says: it causes impurity whether wet or dry. However, they agree in the case of the blood of a woman who gave birth when she had non-menstrual discharge, that it causes defilement whether wet or dry.

Mishnah Eduyot 6:2

Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia ben Elinathan, a man of Kefar Habavli, testified concerning a limb [separated] from a corpse that it is impure; whereas Rabbi Eliezer says: they declared [this] only of a limb from a living [man]. They said to him: is not there an inference from the minor to the major (kal vehomer): If in the case of a living man [who is himself pure] a limb severed from him is impure, how much more in the case of a corpse [which is itself impure] should a limb severed from it be impure! He said to them: they have [nevertheless] declared it only of a limb from a living man. Another answer: The impurity of living men is greater than the impurity of corpses, because a living man causes that on which he lies and sits to become capable of making impure a man and clothing, and [he causes also] what is over him to transfer impurity to foods and liquids- which is defilement that a corpse does not cause.

Mishnah Eduyot 6:2

Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia ben Elinathan, a man of Kefar Habavli, testified concerning a limb [separated] from a corpse that it is impure; whereas Rabbi Eliezer says: they declared [this] only of a limb from a living [man]. They said to him: is not there an inference from the minor to the major (kal vehomer): If in the case of a living man [who is himself pure] a limb severed from him is impure, how much more in the case of a corpse [which is itself impure] should a limb severed from it be impure! He said to them: they have [nevertheless] declared it only of a limb from a living man. Another answer: The impurity of living men is greater than the impurity of corpses, because a living man causes that on which he lies and sits to become capable of making impure a man and clothing, and [he causes also] what is over him to transfer impurity to foods and liquids- which is defilement that a corpse does not cause.

Mishnah Eduyot 6:3

1) An olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man: 1) Rabbi Eliezer pronounces impure and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia pronounce pure. a) A barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, b) Rabbi Nehunia pronounces impure and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua pronounce pure. 2) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it? 3) They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it? 1) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! 1) He said to them: greater is the impurity of flesh than the impurity of bones, for the defilement of flesh applies both to (animal) carcasses and to creeping things, but it is not so in the case of bones. Another answer: a limb which has on it the proper quantity of flesh causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is still impure, while if the bone is diminished it is pure. They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! He said to them: greater is the impurity of bones than the impurity of flesh, for flesh severed from a living man is pure, whereas a limb severed from him, while in its natural condition, is impure. Another answer: an olive’s quantity of flesh (from a corpse) causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); and a majority of a corpse’s bones causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is pure, but if a majority of the bones is diminished, although it does not cause impurity by being under the same roof-space, it yet causes defilement by touching and by carrying. Another answer: any flesh of a corpse less than an olive’s quantity is pure, but bones forming the greater portion of the body’ build or the greater portion of the number of the corpse’s bones, even though they do not fill a quarter-kav are yet impure. They said to Rabbi Joshua: what reason have you found for pronouncing them both pure? He said to them: No! When you pronounce impure in the case of a corpse, it is because the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” apply to it. But how can you say the same of a living man, seeing that the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” do not apply to him?

Mishnah Eduyot 6:3

1) An olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man: 1) Rabbi Eliezer pronounces impure and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia pronounce pure. a) A barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, b) Rabbi Nehunia pronounces impure and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua pronounce pure. 2) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it? 3) They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it? 1) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! 1) He said to them: greater is the impurity of flesh than the impurity of bones, for the defilement of flesh applies both to (animal) carcasses and to creeping things, but it is not so in the case of bones. Another answer: a limb which has on it the proper quantity of flesh causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is still impure, while if the bone is diminished it is pure. They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! He said to them: greater is the impurity of bones than the impurity of flesh, for flesh severed from a living man is pure, whereas a limb severed from him, while in its natural condition, is impure. Another answer: an olive’s quantity of flesh (from a corpse) causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); and a majority of a corpse’s bones causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is pure, but if a majority of the bones is diminished, although it does not cause impurity by being under the same roof-space, it yet causes defilement by touching and by carrying. Another answer: any flesh of a corpse less than an olive’s quantity is pure, but bones forming the greater portion of the body’ build or the greater portion of the number of the corpse’s bones, even though they do not fill a quarter-kav are yet impure. They said to Rabbi Joshua: what reason have you found for pronouncing them both pure? He said to them: No! When you pronounce impure in the case of a corpse, it is because the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” apply to it. But how can you say the same of a living man, seeing that the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” do not apply to him?

Mishnah Eduyot 6:3

1) An olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man: 1) Rabbi Eliezer pronounces impure and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia pronounce pure. a) A barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, b) Rabbi Nehunia pronounces impure and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua pronounce pure. 2) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it? 3) They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it? 1) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! 1) He said to them: greater is the impurity of flesh than the impurity of bones, for the defilement of flesh applies both to (animal) carcasses and to creeping things, but it is not so in the case of bones. Another answer: a limb which has on it the proper quantity of flesh causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is still impure, while if the bone is diminished it is pure. They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! He said to them: greater is the impurity of bones than the impurity of flesh, for flesh severed from a living man is pure, whereas a limb severed from him, while in its natural condition, is impure. Another answer: an olive’s quantity of flesh (from a corpse) causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); and a majority of a corpse’s bones causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is pure, but if a majority of the bones is diminished, although it does not cause impurity by being under the same roof-space, it yet causes defilement by touching and by carrying. Another answer: any flesh of a corpse less than an olive’s quantity is pure, but bones forming the greater portion of the body’ build or the greater portion of the number of the corpse’s bones, even though they do not fill a quarter-kav are yet impure. They said to Rabbi Joshua: what reason have you found for pronouncing them both pure? He said to them: No! When you pronounce impure in the case of a corpse, it is because the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” apply to it. But how can you say the same of a living man, seeing that the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” do not apply to him?

Mishnah Eduyot 6:3

1) An olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man: 1) Rabbi Eliezer pronounces impure and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia pronounce pure. a) A barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, b) Rabbi Nehunia pronounces impure and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua pronounce pure. 2) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it? 3) They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it? 1) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! 1) He said to them: greater is the impurity of flesh than the impurity of bones, for the defilement of flesh applies both to (animal) carcasses and to creeping things, but it is not so in the case of bones. Another answer: a limb which has on it the proper quantity of flesh causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is still impure, while if the bone is diminished it is pure. They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! He said to them: greater is the impurity of bones than the impurity of flesh, for flesh severed from a living man is pure, whereas a limb severed from him, while in its natural condition, is impure. Another answer: an olive’s quantity of flesh (from a corpse) causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); and a majority of a corpse’s bones causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is pure, but if a majority of the bones is diminished, although it does not cause impurity by being under the same roof-space, it yet causes defilement by touching and by carrying. Another answer: any flesh of a corpse less than an olive’s quantity is pure, but bones forming the greater portion of the body’ build or the greater portion of the number of the corpse’s bones, even though they do not fill a quarter-kav are yet impure. They said to Rabbi Joshua: what reason have you found for pronouncing them both pure? He said to them: No! When you pronounce impure in the case of a corpse, it is because the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” apply to it. But how can you say the same of a living man, seeing that the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” do not apply to him?

Pirkei Avot (Mishnah Avot) 1:5

Yose ben Yochanan (a man) of Jerusalem used to say: Let thy house be wide open, and let the poor be members of thy household. Engage not in too much conversation with women. They said this with regard to one’s own wife, how much more [does the rule apply] with regard to another man’s wife. From here the Sages said: as long as a man engages in too much conversation with women, he causes evil to himself, he neglects the study of the Torah, and in the end he will inherit gehinnom.

Pirkei Avot (Mishnah Avot) 1:13

He [also] used to say: one who makes his name great causes his name to be destroyed; one who does not add [to his knowledge] causes [it] to cease; one who does not study [the Torah] deserves death; one who makes [unworthy] use of the crown [of learning] shall pass away.

Pirkei Avot (Mishnah Avot) 1:13

He [also] used to say: one who makes his name great causes his name to be destroyed; one who does not add [to his knowledge] causes [it] to cease; one who does not study [the Torah] deserves death; one who makes [unworthy] use of the crown [of learning] shall pass away.

Pirkei Avot (Mishnah Avot) 3:11

Rabbi Elazar of Modiin said: one who profanes sacred things, and one who despises the festivals, and one who causes his fellow’s face to blush in public, and one who annuls the covenant of our father Abraham, may he rest in peace, and he who is contemptuous towards the Torah, even though he has to his credit [knowledge of the] Torah and good deeds, he has not a share in the world to come.

Pirkei Avot (Mishnah Avot) 5:18

Whoever causes the multitudes to be righteous, sin will not occur on his account; And whoever causes the multitudes to sin, they do not give him the ability to repent. Moses was righteous and caused the multitudes to be righteous, [therefore] the righteousness of the multitudes is hung on him, as it is said, “He executed the Lord’s righteousness and His decisions with Israel” (Deut. 33:21). Jeroboam, sinned and caused the multitudes to sin, [therefore] the sin of the multitudes is hung on him, as it is said, “For the sins of Jeroboam which he sinned, and which he caused Israel to sin thereby” (I Kings 15:30).

Pirkei Avot (Mishnah Avot) 5:18

Whoever causes the multitudes to be righteous, sin will not occur on his account; And whoever causes the multitudes to sin, they do not give him the ability to repent. Moses was righteous and caused the multitudes to be righteous, [therefore] the righteousness of the multitudes is hung on him, as it is said, “He executed the Lord’s righteousness and His decisions with Israel” (Deut. 33:21). Jeroboam, sinned and caused the multitudes to sin, [therefore] the sin of the multitudes is hung on him, as it is said, “For the sins of Jeroboam which he sinned, and which he caused Israel to sin thereby” (I Kings 15:30).

Mishnah Keritot 3:9

Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.

Mishnah Kelim 4:1

A potsherd that cannot stand unsupported on account of its handle, or a potsherd whose bottom is pointed and that point causes it to overbalance, is clean. If the handle was removed or the point was broken off it is still clean. Rabbi Judah says that it is unclean. If a jar was broken but is still capable of holding something in its sides, or if it was split into a kind of two troughs: Rabbi Judah says it is clean But the sages say it is unclean.

Mishnah Kelim 19:4

If a zav was carried on a bed and on its mattress, the latter causes an uncleanness of two grades and an unfitness of one grade, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: if a zav was carried on a bed and on its mattress the part that is shorter than ten handbreadths causes an uncleanness of two grades and an unfitness of one grade, but that which is over the ten handbreadths causes only an uncleanness of one grade and an unfitness of one grade. If he was carried on the mattress, [on the overhanging part] that was shorter than ten handbreadths, it becomes unclean, but if on the part that was longer than ten handbreadths it remains clean.

Mishnah Kelim 19:4

If a zav was carried on a bed and on its mattress, the latter causes an uncleanness of two grades and an unfitness of one grade, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: if a zav was carried on a bed and on its mattress the part that is shorter than ten handbreadths causes an uncleanness of two grades and an unfitness of one grade, but that which is over the ten handbreadths causes only an uncleanness of one grade and an unfitness of one grade. If he was carried on the mattress, [on the overhanging part] that was shorter than ten handbreadths, it becomes unclean, but if on the part that was longer than ten handbreadths it remains clean.

Mishnah Kelim 19:4

If a zav was carried on a bed and on its mattress, the latter causes an uncleanness of two grades and an unfitness of one grade, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: if a zav was carried on a bed and on its mattress the part that is shorter than ten handbreadths causes an uncleanness of two grades and an unfitness of one grade, but that which is over the ten handbreadths causes only an uncleanness of one grade and an unfitness of one grade. If he was carried on the mattress, [on the overhanging part] that was shorter than ten handbreadths, it becomes unclean, but if on the part that was longer than ten handbreadths it remains clean.

Mishnah Kelim 26:7

Whenever no act is lacking, intention alone causes a vessel to be susceptible to uncleanness, But whenever an act is lacking, intention alone does not render it susceptible to uncleanness, except for a fur cover.

Mishnah Oholot 3:1

All objects that defile by overshadowing which were divided and then brought into a house: Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas declares clean. But the sages declare [it] unclean. What is the case? One who touches two pieces of nevelah, each the size of half an olive, or carries them, Or, in the case of a corpse, if he touches a piece the size of half an olive and overshadows [another piece] the size of half an olive, Or if he touches [a piece] the size of half an olive and [another piece] the size of half an olive overshadows him, Or if he overshadows two [pieces, each] the size of half an olive, Or if he overshadows [a piece] the size of half an olive and [another piece] the size of half an olive overshadows him: Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas declares him clean, And the sages declare him unclean. But if he touches [a piece] the size of half an olive and another object overshadows him and [another piece] the size of half an olive, Or if he overshadows [a piece] the size of half an olive and another object overshadows him and [another piece] the size of half an olive, he is clean. Rabbi Meir says: Even here Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas declares him clean and the sages declare him unclean. Every [case] is unclean except [a case of] contact [combined] with carriage or of carriage [combined] with overshadowing. This is the general principle: every object [whose defilement] proceeds from one cause is unclean, from two causes is clean.

Mishnah Negaim 4:1

There are [laws] that apply to the white hair that do not apply to the spreading, while others apply to the spreading and do not apply to the white hair. That white hair causes uncleanness at the beginning, it causes uncleanness whatever the state of its whiteness, and it is never a sign of cleanness. There are laws that apply to the spreading, for the spreading causes uncleanness however small its extent, it causes uncleanness for all negaim and even when it is outside the nega, and these laws do not apply to the white hair.

Mishnah Negaim 4:1

There are [laws] that apply to the white hair that do not apply to the spreading, while others apply to the spreading and do not apply to the white hair. That white hair causes uncleanness at the beginning, it causes uncleanness whatever the state of its whiteness, and it is never a sign of cleanness. There are laws that apply to the spreading, for the spreading causes uncleanness however small its extent, it causes uncleanness for all negaim and even when it is outside the nega, and these laws do not apply to the white hair.

Mishnah Negaim 4:1

There are [laws] that apply to the white hair that do not apply to the spreading, while others apply to the spreading and do not apply to the white hair. That white hair causes uncleanness at the beginning, it causes uncleanness whatever the state of its whiteness, and it is never a sign of cleanness. There are laws that apply to the spreading, for the spreading causes uncleanness however small its extent, it causes uncleanness for all negaim and even when it is outside the nega, and these laws do not apply to the white hair.

Mishnah Negaim 4:1

There are [laws] that apply to the white hair that do not apply to the spreading, while others apply to the spreading and do not apply to the white hair. That white hair causes uncleanness at the beginning, it causes uncleanness whatever the state of its whiteness, and it is never a sign of cleanness. There are laws that apply to the spreading, for the spreading causes uncleanness however small its extent, it causes uncleanness for all negaim and even when it is outside the nega, and these laws do not apply to the white hair.

Mishnah Negaim 4:2

There are [laws] that apply to the quick flesh that do not apply to the spreading, while other restrictions apply to the spreading and do not apply to the quick flesh. That quick flesh causes uncleanness at the beginning, it causes uncleanness whatever its color, and it is never a sign of cleanness. There are [laws] that apply to the spreading, for the spreading causes uncleanness however small its extent, it causes uncleanness in all forms of negaim and also where it is outside the leprosy sign, and these laws do not apply to the quick flesh.

Mishnah Negaim 4:2

There are [laws] that apply to the quick flesh that do not apply to the spreading, while other restrictions apply to the spreading and do not apply to the quick flesh. That quick flesh causes uncleanness at the beginning, it causes uncleanness whatever its color, and it is never a sign of cleanness. There are [laws] that apply to the spreading, for the spreading causes uncleanness however small its extent, it causes uncleanness in all forms of negaim and also where it is outside the leprosy sign, and these laws do not apply to the quick flesh.

Mishnah Negaim 4:2

There are [laws] that apply to the quick flesh that do not apply to the spreading, while other restrictions apply to the spreading and do not apply to the quick flesh. That quick flesh causes uncleanness at the beginning, it causes uncleanness whatever its color, and it is never a sign of cleanness. There are [laws] that apply to the spreading, for the spreading causes uncleanness however small its extent, it causes uncleanness in all forms of negaim and also where it is outside the leprosy sign, and these laws do not apply to the quick flesh.

Mishnah Negaim 4:2

There are [laws] that apply to the quick flesh that do not apply to the spreading, while other restrictions apply to the spreading and do not apply to the quick flesh. That quick flesh causes uncleanness at the beginning, it causes uncleanness whatever its color, and it is never a sign of cleanness. There are [laws] that apply to the spreading, for the spreading causes uncleanness however small its extent, it causes uncleanness in all forms of negaim and also where it is outside the leprosy sign, and these laws do not apply to the quick flesh.

Mishnah Negaim 4:3

There are [laws] that apply to white hair that do not apply to quick flesh, while others apply to quick flesh and not to white hair. White hair causes uncleanness in a boil and in a burn, whether growing together or dispersed, and whether encompassed or unencompassed. There are [laws] that apply to quick flesh, for quick flesh causes uncleanness in scalp baldness and in forehead baldness, whether it was turned or was not turned, it prevents the cleanness of one who is turned all white, and causes uncleanness whatever its color, and these do not apply to white hair.

Mishnah Negaim 4:3

There are [laws] that apply to white hair that do not apply to quick flesh, while others apply to quick flesh and not to white hair. White hair causes uncleanness in a boil and in a burn, whether growing together or dispersed, and whether encompassed or unencompassed. There are [laws] that apply to quick flesh, for quick flesh causes uncleanness in scalp baldness and in forehead baldness, whether it was turned or was not turned, it prevents the cleanness of one who is turned all white, and causes uncleanness whatever its color, and these do not apply to white hair.

Mishnah Negaim 4:3

There are [laws] that apply to white hair that do not apply to quick flesh, while others apply to quick flesh and not to white hair. White hair causes uncleanness in a boil and in a burn, whether growing together or dispersed, and whether encompassed or unencompassed. There are [laws] that apply to quick flesh, for quick flesh causes uncleanness in scalp baldness and in forehead baldness, whether it was turned or was not turned, it prevents the cleanness of one who is turned all white, and causes uncleanness whatever its color, and these do not apply to white hair.

Mishnah Negaim 10:2

Yellow thin hair causes uncleanness whether it is clustered together or dispersed, whether it is encompassed or unencompassed, or whether it came after the scall or before it, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: it causes uncleanness only when it came after the scall. Rabbi Shimon said: Is it not logical: if white hair, against which other hair affords no protection, causes uncleanness only when it comes after the nega, how much more should yellow thin hair, against which other hair does afford protection, cause uncleanness only when it comes after the scall? Rabbi Judah says: Whenever it was necessary to say, "it turns" Scripture says, "it turns." But the scall, since about it Scripture says, "there is no yellow hair in it," it causes uncleanness whether it came before or after it.

Mishnah Negaim 10:2

Yellow thin hair causes uncleanness whether it is clustered together or dispersed, whether it is encompassed or unencompassed, or whether it came after the scall or before it, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: it causes uncleanness only when it came after the scall. Rabbi Shimon said: Is it not logical: if white hair, against which other hair affords no protection, causes uncleanness only when it comes after the nega, how much more should yellow thin hair, against which other hair does afford protection, cause uncleanness only when it comes after the scall? Rabbi Judah says: Whenever it was necessary to say, "it turns" Scripture says, "it turns." But the scall, since about it Scripture says, "there is no yellow hair in it," it causes uncleanness whether it came before or after it.

Mishnah Negaim 10:2

Yellow thin hair causes uncleanness whether it is clustered together or dispersed, whether it is encompassed or unencompassed, or whether it came after the scall or before it, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: it causes uncleanness only when it came after the scall. Rabbi Shimon said: Is it not logical: if white hair, against which other hair affords no protection, causes uncleanness only when it comes after the nega, how much more should yellow thin hair, against which other hair does afford protection, cause uncleanness only when it comes after the scall? Rabbi Judah says: Whenever it was necessary to say, "it turns" Scripture says, "it turns." But the scall, since about it Scripture says, "there is no yellow hair in it," it causes uncleanness whether it came before or after it.

Mishnah Negaim 10:2

Yellow thin hair causes uncleanness whether it is clustered together or dispersed, whether it is encompassed or unencompassed, or whether it came after the scall or before it, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: it causes uncleanness only when it came after the scall. Rabbi Shimon said: Is it not logical: if white hair, against which other hair affords no protection, causes uncleanness only when it comes after the nega, how much more should yellow thin hair, against which other hair does afford protection, cause uncleanness only when it comes after the scall? Rabbi Judah says: Whenever it was necessary to say, "it turns" Scripture says, "it turns." But the scall, since about it Scripture says, "there is no yellow hair in it," it causes uncleanness whether it came before or after it.

Mishnah Negaim 10:4

Yellow hair that preceded a scall is clean. Rabbi Judah says that it is unclean. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: it neither causes uncleanness nor does it afford protection. Rabbi Shimon says: anything in a scall that is not a sign of uncleanness is a sign of cleanness.

Mishnah Negaim 13:6

If a house overshadowed a house with a nega and so also if a tree overshadowed a house with a nega, anyone who enters the outer [of the two] remains clean, the words of Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah. Rabbi Elazar said: if one stone of it causes uncleanness by entering, should not the house itself cause uncleanness by entering?

Mishnah Negaim 13:8

If a person who was clean put his head and the greater part of his body inside an unclean house, he becomes unclean. And if an unclean man put his head and the greater part of his body inside a clean house he causes it to be unclean. If he put three fingerbreadths square of a clean cloak into an unclean house, the cloak becomes unclean; And if he put even the size of an olive of an unclean [cloak] into a clean house, the house becomes unclean.

Mishnah Parah 4:4

All who are occupied with the preparation of the [red] cow from the beginning until the end, defile their clothing, and they also render it invalid by [doing other] work. If some invalidity occurred while it was being slaughtered, it does not defile clothing. If it occurred while the blood was being sprinkled, for all who were occupied with it before the invalidity occurred, it defiles their clothing, but for those who were occupied with it after it had become invalid it does not defile their clothing unclean. Thus it follows that the stringency turns into a leniency. It is always subject to the rules of trespassing. Wood may be added to the fire. The service must be performed by day and by a priest. Work renders it invalid. [All of this is only] until it becomes ashes And work causes the water to be invalid until the ashes are put into it.

Mishnah Parah 7:2

One who filled the water with one hand and did some other work with the other hand, or filled the water for himself and for another man, or filled two jars at the same time, the water of both is invalid, for work causes invalidity whether one acts for oneself or for another person.

Mishnah Parah 8:4

One that eats of the carrion of a clean bird, while it is yet in his throat, causes garments to be unclean; But the carrion itself does not cause garments to be unclean. Behold [the garment] would say [to the person], "That which defiled you did not defile me, but you did defile me.

Mishnah Parah 8:7

Whatever causes terumah to be invalid causes liquid to become unclean in the first grade so that it can convey uncleanness at one remove, and render unfit at one other remove, except for a tevul yom. Behold [the food] would say [to the liquid], "That which defiled you did not defile me, but you did defile me."

Mishnah Parah 8:7

Whatever causes terumah to be invalid causes liquid to become unclean in the first grade so that it can convey uncleanness at one remove, and render unfit at one other remove, except for a tevul yom. Behold [the food] would say [to the liquid], "That which defiled you did not defile me, but you did defile me."

Mishnah Parah 9:2

If insects or creeping things fell into it, and they burst apart or the color [of the water] changed, the contents become invalid. A beetle causes invalidity in any case, because it is like a tube. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob ruled: a maggot or a weevil of the grain causes no invalidity, because they contain no moisture.

Mishnah Parah 9:2

If insects or creeping things fell into it, and they burst apart or the color [of the water] changed, the contents become invalid. A beetle causes invalidity in any case, because it is like a tube. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob ruled: a maggot or a weevil of the grain causes no invalidity, because they contain no moisture.