1539 occurrences across the corpus

The Mishnah

Mishnah Megillah 4:5

The one who concludes with the haftarah also leads the responsive reading of the Shema and he passes before the ark and he lifts up his hands. If he is a child, his father or his teacher passes before the ark in his place.

Mishnah Megillah 4:6

A child may read in the Torah and translate, but he may not pass before the ark or lift up his hands. A person in rags may lead the responsive reading of the Shema and translate, but he may not read in the Torah, pass before the ark, or lift up his hands. A blind man may lead the responsive reading of the Shema and translate. Rabbi Judah says: one who has never seen the light from his birth may not lead the responsive reading of the Shema.

Mishnah Yevamot 4:1

A yavam performs halitzah for his yevamah, and she is subsequently found to be pregnant and she gives birth: If the child is viable, he is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to marry his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest. If the child is not viable, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives, and he disqualifies her from marrying a priest.

Mishnah Yevamot 4:1

A yavam performs halitzah for his yevamah, and she is subsequently found to be pregnant and she gives birth: If the child is viable, he is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to marry his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest. If the child is not viable, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives, and he disqualifies her from marrying a priest.

Mishnah Yevamot 4:2

A yavam marries his yevamah and she is subsequently found to be pregnant, and she gives birth: If the child is viable, he must divorce her and both are obligated to bring a sacrifice; If the child is not viable, he may retain her [as a wife]. If it is doubtful whether it is a nine-months child of the first [husband] or a seven-months child of the second [husband] he must divorce her, and the child is legitimate, and they must bring an asham talui.

Mishnah Yevamot 4:2

A yavam marries his yevamah and she is subsequently found to be pregnant, and she gives birth: If the child is viable, he must divorce her and both are obligated to bring a sacrifice; If the child is not viable, he may retain her [as a wife]. If it is doubtful whether it is a nine-months child of the first [husband] or a seven-months child of the second [husband] he must divorce her, and the child is legitimate, and they must bring an asham talui.

Mishnah Yevamot 4:2

A yavam marries his yevamah and she is subsequently found to be pregnant, and she gives birth: If the child is viable, he must divorce her and both are obligated to bring a sacrifice; If the child is not viable, he may retain her [as a wife]. If it is doubtful whether it is a nine-months child of the first [husband] or a seven-months child of the second [husband] he must divorce her, and the child is legitimate, and they must bring an asham talui.

Mishnah Yevamot 4:2

A yavam marries his yevamah and she is subsequently found to be pregnant, and she gives birth: If the child is viable, he must divorce her and both are obligated to bring a sacrifice; If the child is not viable, he may retain her [as a wife]. If it is doubtful whether it is a nine-months child of the first [husband] or a seven-months child of the second [husband] he must divorce her, and the child is legitimate, and they must bring an asham talui.

Mishnah Yevamot 4:2

A yavam marries his yevamah and she is subsequently found to be pregnant, and she gives birth: If the child is viable, he must divorce her and both are obligated to bring a sacrifice; If the child is not viable, he may retain her [as a wife]. If it is doubtful whether it is a nine-months child of the first [husband] or a seven-months child of the second [husband] he must divorce her, and the child is legitimate, and they must bring an asham talui.

Mishnah Yevamot 4:12

A man who remarried his divorced wife, or married his halutzah, or married the relative of his halutzah must divorce her, and the child is a mamzer; the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages say: the child is not a mamzer. They agree that where a man married the relative of his divorcee the child is a mamzer.

Mishnah Yevamot 4:12

A man who remarried his divorced wife, or married his halutzah, or married the relative of his halutzah must divorce her, and the child is a mamzer; the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages say: the child is not a mamzer. They agree that where a man married the relative of his divorcee the child is a mamzer.

Mishnah Yevamot 4:12

A man who remarried his divorced wife, or married his halutzah, or married the relative of his halutzah must divorce her, and the child is a mamzer; the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages say: the child is not a mamzer. They agree that where a man married the relative of his divorcee the child is a mamzer.

Mishnah Yevamot 6:6

A man shall not abstain from procreation unless he already has children. Beth Shammai says: two males, And Beth Hillel says: male and a female, for it says, “Male and female created he them” (Genesis 5:2). If a man married a woman and lived with her for ten years and she bore no child, he may not abstain [any longer from the duty of propagation]. If he divorced her she is permitted to marry another, and the second husband may also live with her for ten years. If she miscarried [the period of ten years] is counted from the time of her miscarriage. A man is commanded concerning the duty of propagation but not a woman. Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: Concerning both of them it is said, “And God blessed them; and said to them… “Be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 1:28).

Mishnah Yevamot 9:3

[Concerning] relatives of the second degree [of incest laws who are forbidden] by the words of the scribes: [A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the husband but not a second degree of kinship to the yavam, is forbidden to the husband and permitted to the yavam; [A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the yavam but not a second degree of kinship to the husband is forbidden to the yavam and permitted to the husband; [A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the one and to the other is forbidden to the one as well as to the other. She cannot claim her ketubah or usufruct or support money, or her worn clothes. The child is fit [to marry a priest], but the husband is compelled to divorce her. A widow who was married to a high priest, a divorcee or halutzah who was married to an ordinary priest, a mamzer or a netinah who was married to an Israelite, or the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a natin or a mamzer is entitled to her ketubah.

Mishnah Yevamot 10:1

A woman whose husband had gone to a country beyond the sea and they came and told her, “Your husband died”, married, and then her husband returned: She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum. Rabbi Yose said: her ketubah remains a charge upon the estate of her first husband. Rabbi Elazar said: the first husband is entitled to whatever she may find, and what she makes with her hands, and also has the right to invalidate her vows. Rabbi Shimon said: intercourse or halitzah with the brother of the first husband exempts her rival, and the child from him is not a bastard. If she married without an authorization, she may return to him.

Mishnah Yevamot 10:1

A woman whose husband had gone to a country beyond the sea and they came and told her, “Your husband died”, married, and then her husband returned: She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum. Rabbi Yose said: her ketubah remains a charge upon the estate of her first husband. Rabbi Elazar said: the first husband is entitled to whatever she may find, and what she makes with her hands, and also has the right to invalidate her vows. Rabbi Shimon said: intercourse or halitzah with the brother of the first husband exempts her rival, and the child from him is not a bastard. If she married without an authorization, she may return to him.

Mishnah Yevamot 10:3

If a woman whose husband and son went to a country beyond the sea was told, “Your husband died and your son died afterwards”, and she married again, and later she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer. If she was told “Your son died and your husband died afterwards”, and she had yibbum, and afterwards she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer. If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she married, and afterwards she was told, “He was alive but is now dead”, she must leave, and any child born before [the death of her first husband] is a mamzer, but one born after it is not a mamzer. If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she was betrothed, and afterwards her husband appeared, she is permitted to return to him. Although the second one gave her a get he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying a priest. This Rabbi Elazar ben Mathia expounded: “A woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7) not from a man who is not her husband.

Mishnah Yevamot 10:3

If a woman whose husband and son went to a country beyond the sea was told, “Your husband died and your son died afterwards”, and she married again, and later she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer. If she was told “Your son died and your husband died afterwards”, and she had yibbum, and afterwards she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer. If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she married, and afterwards she was told, “He was alive but is now dead”, she must leave, and any child born before [the death of her first husband] is a mamzer, but one born after it is not a mamzer. If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she was betrothed, and afterwards her husband appeared, she is permitted to return to him. Although the second one gave her a get he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying a priest. This Rabbi Elazar ben Mathia expounded: “A woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7) not from a man who is not her husband.

Mishnah Yevamot 10:3

If a woman whose husband and son went to a country beyond the sea was told, “Your husband died and your son died afterwards”, and she married again, and later she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer. If she was told “Your son died and your husband died afterwards”, and she had yibbum, and afterwards she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer. If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she married, and afterwards she was told, “He was alive but is now dead”, she must leave, and any child born before [the death of her first husband] is a mamzer, but one born after it is not a mamzer. If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she was betrothed, and afterwards her husband appeared, she is permitted to return to him. Although the second one gave her a get he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying a priest. This Rabbi Elazar ben Mathia expounded: “A woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7) not from a man who is not her husband.

Mishnah Yevamot 10:4

If a man’s wife had gone to a country beyond the sea and he was told, “Your wife is dead”, and he married her sister, and afterwards his wife came back, [the latter] is permitted to return to him. He is permitted to marry the relatives of the second woman, and the second woman is permitted to marry his relatives. If the first wife died he is permitted to marry the second. If he was told that his wife was dead, and he married her sister, and then he was told that she was then alive but had since died, any child born before [his first wife’s death] is a mamzer, but anyone born after [her death] is not a mamzer. Rabbi Yose says: whoever disqualifies for others disqualifies for himself and whoever does not disqualify for others does not disqualify for himself.

Mishnah Yevamot 11:4

If the child of a woman was mixed up with the child of her daughter-in-law and the mixed-up children grew up and married women and then died, the [other] sons of the daughter-in-law perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum, for it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother. The [other] sons of the older woman either perform halitzah or yibbum, since the only doubt is whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his brother’s son. If the not-mixed-up sons died then [with respect to the widows of the sons of the older woman] the mixed-up sons perform halitzah and may not have yibbum, since it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother; [With respect to the widows] of the sons of the daughter-in-law one performs halitzah and the other [may] have yibbum.

Mishnah Yevamot 11:4

If the child of a woman was mixed up with the child of her daughter-in-law and the mixed-up children grew up and married women and then died, the [other] sons of the daughter-in-law perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum, for it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother. The [other] sons of the older woman either perform halitzah or yibbum, since the only doubt is whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his brother’s son. If the not-mixed-up sons died then [with respect to the widows of the sons of the older woman] the mixed-up sons perform halitzah and may not have yibbum, since it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother; [With respect to the widows] of the sons of the daughter-in-law one performs halitzah and the other [may] have yibbum.

Mishnah Yevamot 11:5

If the child of a priest’s wife was mixed-up with the child of her female slave, behold both may eat terumah and [together] they receive one share at the threshing-floor. They may not defile themselves for the dead nor may they marry any women whether these are eligible [for marriage with a priest] or ineligible. If when they grew up, the mixed-up children freed one another they may marry women who are eligible for marriage with a priest and they may not defile themselves for the dead. If they defiled themselves, they do not receive the penalty of forty lashes. They may not eat terumah, but if they did eat they need not pay compensation either for the principal or [the additional] fifth. They are not to receive a share at the threshing-floor, but they may sell [their own] terumah and the proceeds are theirs. They receive no share in the holy things of the temple, and no holy things are given to them but others do not take their holy things from them. They are exempt from [giving to any priest] the shoulder, the cheeks and the maw, while the firstling of either of them should remain in the pasture until it contracts a blemish. The restrictions relating to priests and the restrictions relating to Israelites are both imposed upon them.

Mishnah Yevamot 11:5

If the child of a priest’s wife was mixed-up with the child of her female slave, behold both may eat terumah and [together] they receive one share at the threshing-floor. They may not defile themselves for the dead nor may they marry any women whether these are eligible [for marriage with a priest] or ineligible. If when they grew up, the mixed-up children freed one another they may marry women who are eligible for marriage with a priest and they may not defile themselves for the dead. If they defiled themselves, they do not receive the penalty of forty lashes. They may not eat terumah, but if they did eat they need not pay compensation either for the principal or [the additional] fifth. They are not to receive a share at the threshing-floor, but they may sell [their own] terumah and the proceeds are theirs. They receive no share in the holy things of the temple, and no holy things are given to them but others do not take their holy things from them. They are exempt from [giving to any priest] the shoulder, the cheeks and the maw, while the firstling of either of them should remain in the pasture until it contracts a blemish. The restrictions relating to priests and the restrictions relating to Israelites are both imposed upon them.

Mishnah Yevamot 11:6

If a woman did not wait three months after [separation from] her husband, and married again and gave birth [to a son], and it is unknown whether it is a nine-months child by the first husband or a seven-months child by the second, if she had other sons by the first husband and other sons by the second, these must perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum. So too he, with their widows performs halitzah but may not contract yibbum. If he had brothers by the first and also brothers by the second, but not by the same mother, he may either perform halitzah or contract yibbum, But as for them, one performs halitzah and the other may [then] contract yibbum.

Mishnah Yevamot 11:6

If a woman did not wait three months after [separation from] her husband, and married again and gave birth [to a son], and it is unknown whether it is a nine-months child by the first husband or a seven-months child by the second, if she had other sons by the first husband and other sons by the second, these must perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum. So too he, with their widows performs halitzah but may not contract yibbum. If he had brothers by the first and also brothers by the second, but not by the same mother, he may either perform halitzah or contract yibbum, But as for them, one performs halitzah and the other may [then] contract yibbum.

Mishnah Yevamot 13:2

Which minor must make the declaration of refusal? Any whose mother or brothers have given her in marriage with her consent. If they gave her in marriage without her consent she need not make any declaration of refusal. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: Any child who is unable to take care of her token of betrothal need not make any declaration of refusal. Rabbi Eliezer says: The act of a minor has no validity at all, rather [she is to be regarded] as one seduced. The daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest may not eat terumah, and the daughter of a priest [who was married] to an Israelite may eat terumah.

Mishnah Ketubot 5:5

The following are the kinds of work which a woman must perform for her husband: Grinding, Baking, Washing, Cooking, Nursing her child, Preparing his bed, And working in wool. If she brought one slave-woman into the marriage she need not grind or bake or wash. [If she brought] two slave-women, she need not cook or nurse her child. If three, she need not prepare his bed or work in wool. If four, she may lounge in an easy chair. Rabbi Eliezer says: even if she brought him a hundred slave-women he may compel her to work in wool; for idleness leads to unchastity. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: if a man forbade his wife under a vow to do any work he must divorce her and give her kethubah to her for idleness leads to insanity.

Mishnah Ketubot 5:5

The following are the kinds of work which a woman must perform for her husband: Grinding, Baking, Washing, Cooking, Nursing her child, Preparing his bed, And working in wool. If she brought one slave-woman into the marriage she need not grind or bake or wash. [If she brought] two slave-women, she need not cook or nurse her child. If three, she need not prepare his bed or work in wool. If four, she may lounge in an easy chair. Rabbi Eliezer says: even if she brought him a hundred slave-women he may compel her to work in wool; for idleness leads to unchastity. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: if a man forbade his wife under a vow to do any work he must divorce her and give her kethubah to her for idleness leads to insanity.

Mishnah Nedarim 3:2

Vows of exaggeration: If one says, “Konam if I did not see on this road as many as departed from Egypt”; “If I did not see a snake [as thick as the] the beam of an olive press. Vows in error: [If one says, “Konam,] if I ate or drank”, and then remembered that he had; “If I eat or drink” and then forgot [his vow] and ate or drank; “Konam be any benefit which my wife has from me, because she stole my purse or beat my child, and it was subsequently learnt that she had not beaten him nor stolen”; If one saw people eating [his] figs and said to them, “Let the figs be a korban to you,” and then discovered the people to be his father or his brothers. If others were with them: Beth Shammai says: his father and brothers are permitted, but the rest are forbidden. Beth Hillel says: all are permitted.

Mishnah Nazir 2:7

[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite when I shall have a son,” and son is born to him, he becomes a nazirite. If the child is a daughter, or a tumtum, or an hermaphrodite, he does not become a nazirite. If he said, “When I shall have a child,” then even if it is a daughter, or a tumtum, or an hermaphrodite, he becomes a nazirite.

Mishnah Nazir 2:7

[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite when I shall have a son,” and son is born to him, he becomes a nazirite. If the child is a daughter, or a tumtum, or an hermaphrodite, he does not become a nazirite. If he said, “When I shall have a child,” then even if it is a daughter, or a tumtum, or an hermaphrodite, he becomes a nazirite.

Mishnah Nazir 2:8

If his wife miscarries, he does not become a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: [in this case] he should say, “If it was a viable child, behold, I am a nazirite from obligation; otherwise behold, I am a voluntary nazirite.” If [his wife] later bears a child, he then becomes a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: he should say, “If the first was a viable child, the first [naziriteship] was obligatory, and this one is voluntary; otherwise, the first one was voluntary, and the present one is obligatory.”

Mishnah Nazir 2:8

If his wife miscarries, he does not become a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: [in this case] he should say, “If it was a viable child, behold, I am a nazirite from obligation; otherwise behold, I am a voluntary nazirite.” If [his wife] later bears a child, he then becomes a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: he should say, “If the first was a viable child, the first [naziriteship] was obligatory, and this one is voluntary; otherwise, the first one was voluntary, and the present one is obligatory.”

Mishnah Nazir 2:8

If his wife miscarries, he does not become a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: [in this case] he should say, “If it was a viable child, behold, I am a nazirite from obligation; otherwise behold, I am a voluntary nazirite.” If [his wife] later bears a child, he then becomes a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: he should say, “If the first was a viable child, the first [naziriteship] was obligatory, and this one is voluntary; otherwise, the first one was voluntary, and the present one is obligatory.”

Mishnah Sotah 3:5

Rabbi Shimon says: merit does not suspend the effect of the bitter waters, and if you say that merit does suspend the effect of the bitter waters, you discredit the water in the case of all the women who drink it and defame the pure woman who drank it, since people will say, “They were defiled”, but their merit caused suspended the effect. Rabbi says: merit suspends the effect of the bitter waters, but she never bears a child or thrives, rather she gradually becomes disfigured and finally dies through that death.

Mishnah Sotah 4:3

[A wife] who was pregnant by a former husband or was nursing a child by a former husband does not drink and does not receive the ketubah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages says: he may separate her [from himself] and take her back after the period [of two years]. An aylonit [who is incapable of giving birth], an old woman, and one who is unfit to bear children do not drink and do not receive the ketubah. Rabbi Eliezer says: he may marry another wife and be fruitful and multiply with her. All other women either drink or do not receive the ketubah.

Mishnah Sotah 9:14

During the war with Vespasian they [the rabbis] decreed against [the use of] crowns worn by bridegrooms and against [the use of] the bell. During the war with Quietus they decreed against [the use of] crowns worn by brides and that nobody should teach their child Greek. During the final war they decreed that a bride should not go out in a palanquin inside the city, but our rabbis decreed that a bride may go out in a palanquin inside the city.

Mishnah Gittin 7:6

[If a husband says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child” How long must she nurse? Two years. Rabbi Judah says, eighteen months. If the child dies or the father dies, the get is valid. [If he says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father for two years”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child for two years”, if the child dies or if the father says, “I don’t want you to look after me”, even though she has not caused him to complain, the get is invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: something like this is a get. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said a general rule: wherever the obstacle does not arise from her side, the get is valid.

Mishnah Gittin 7:6

[If a husband says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child” How long must she nurse? Two years. Rabbi Judah says, eighteen months. If the child dies or the father dies, the get is valid. [If he says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father for two years”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child for two years”, if the child dies or if the father says, “I don’t want you to look after me”, even though she has not caused him to complain, the get is invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: something like this is a get. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said a general rule: wherever the obstacle does not arise from her side, the get is valid.

Mishnah Gittin 7:6

[If a husband says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child” How long must she nurse? Two years. Rabbi Judah says, eighteen months. If the child dies or the father dies, the get is valid. [If he says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father for two years”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child for two years”, if the child dies or if the father says, “I don’t want you to look after me”, even though she has not caused him to complain, the get is invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: something like this is a get. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said a general rule: wherever the obstacle does not arise from her side, the get is valid.

Mishnah Gittin 7:6

[If a husband says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child” How long must she nurse? Two years. Rabbi Judah says, eighteen months. If the child dies or the father dies, the get is valid. [If he says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father for two years”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child for two years”, if the child dies or if the father says, “I don’t want you to look after me”, even though she has not caused him to complain, the get is invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: something like this is a get. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said a general rule: wherever the obstacle does not arise from her side, the get is valid.

Mishnah Gittin 8:5

If the get was dated by an unfit kingship, by the empire of Medea, by the empire of Greece, by the building of the Temple or by the destruction of the Temple, Or if being in the east he wrote “in the west”, or being in the west he wrote “in the east”, She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum. If his name or her name or the name of his town or the name of her town was wrongly given, she must leave both husbands and all the above consequences apply to her.

Mishnah Gittin 9:4

There are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit: If the husband wrote it with his own hand but there are no witnesses on it. If there are witnesses on it but no date. If it has a date but only one witness. These are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit. Rabbi Elazar says even though there are no witnesses on it, as long as he gave it to her in the presence of witnesses it is valid, [and on the strength of it] she may collect her ketubah [even] from mortgaged property, since the witnesses only sign on the get because of tikkun olam.

Mishnah Gittin 9:4

There are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit: If the husband wrote it with his own hand but there are no witnesses on it. If there are witnesses on it but no date. If it has a date but only one witness. These are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit. Rabbi Elazar says even though there are no witnesses on it, as long as he gave it to her in the presence of witnesses it is valid, [and on the strength of it] she may collect her ketubah [even] from mortgaged property, since the witnesses only sign on the get because of tikkun olam.

Mishnah Kiddushin 3:12

Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this? When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite. And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this? When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin. And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this? One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah. And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this? The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman.

Mishnah Kiddushin 3:12

Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this? When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite. And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this? When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin. And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this? One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah. And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this? The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman.

Mishnah Kiddushin 3:12

Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this? When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite. And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this? When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin. And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this? One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah. And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this? The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman.

Mishnah Kiddushin 3:12

Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this? When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite. And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this? When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin. And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this? One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah. And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this? The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman.

Mishnah Kiddushin 3:12

Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this? When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite. And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this? When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin. And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this? One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah. And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this? The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman.

Mishnah Bava Kamma 10:2

If excise collectors took his donkey and gave him another donkey, or if bandits robbed a man of his coat and gave him another coat, they are his own, since the original owners gave up hope of recovering them. If a man saved something from a flood or from marauding troops or from bandits: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the item], it belongs to him. So too with a swarm of bees: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the swarm], it belongs to him. Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka said: “A woman or child may be believed if they say, ‘The swarm of bees went away from here.’” A man may go into his fellow’s field to save his swarm and if he causes damage he must pay for the damage that he has caused; but he may not cut off a branch of the tree [to save his swarm] even on condition that he pay its value. Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka, says: “He may even cut off [the branch] and repay the value.”

Mishnah Bava Batra 5:9

If a man sent his child to a shopkeeper with a pondion (a coin) in his hand and he measured him out an issar’s (a coin worth half a pondion) worth of oil and gave him an issar in change and the child broke the flask and lost the issar, the shopkeeper is liable. Rabbi Judah declares him exempt, since the father sent the child for this purpose. And the Sages agree with Rabbi Judah that if the flask was in the child’s hand, and the shopkeeper measured the oil into it, the shopkeeper is exempt.

Mishnah Bava Batra 5:9

If a man sent his child to a shopkeeper with a pondion (a coin) in his hand and he measured him out an issar’s (a coin worth half a pondion) worth of oil and gave him an issar in change and the child broke the flask and lost the issar, the shopkeeper is liable. Rabbi Judah declares him exempt, since the father sent the child for this purpose. And the Sages agree with Rabbi Judah that if the flask was in the child’s hand, and the shopkeeper measured the oil into it, the shopkeeper is exempt.

Mishnah Bava Batra 5:9

If a man sent his child to a shopkeeper with a pondion (a coin) in his hand and he measured him out an issar’s (a coin worth half a pondion) worth of oil and gave him an issar in change and the child broke the flask and lost the issar, the shopkeeper is liable. Rabbi Judah declares him exempt, since the father sent the child for this purpose. And the Sages agree with Rabbi Judah that if the flask was in the child’s hand, and the shopkeeper measured the oil into it, the shopkeeper is exempt.

Mishnah Bava Batra 5:9

If a man sent his child to a shopkeeper with a pondion (a coin) in his hand and he measured him out an issar’s (a coin worth half a pondion) worth of oil and gave him an issar in change and the child broke the flask and lost the issar, the shopkeeper is liable. Rabbi Judah declares him exempt, since the father sent the child for this purpose. And the Sages agree with Rabbi Judah that if the flask was in the child’s hand, and the shopkeeper measured the oil into it, the shopkeeper is exempt.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 9:2

If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 9:2

If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 9:2

If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 9:2

If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 9:2

If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 9:2

If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”

Mishnah Avodah Zarah 2:1

One should not place animals in inns of non-Jews, because they are suspected of bestiality. A woman should not be alone with them, because they are suspected of licentiousness; Nor should a man be alone with them, because they are suspected of shedding blood. A Jewish woman should not act as midwife to a non-Jewish woman, because she would be delivering a child for idolatry. But a non-Jewish woman may act as midwife to a Jewish woman. A Jewish woman should not suckle the child of a non-Jewish woman, But a non-Jewish woman may suckle the child of a Jewish woman in her premises.

Mishnah Avodah Zarah 2:1

One should not place animals in inns of non-Jews, because they are suspected of bestiality. A woman should not be alone with them, because they are suspected of licentiousness; Nor should a man be alone with them, because they are suspected of shedding blood. A Jewish woman should not act as midwife to a non-Jewish woman, because she would be delivering a child for idolatry. But a non-Jewish woman may act as midwife to a Jewish woman. A Jewish woman should not suckle the child of a non-Jewish woman, But a non-Jewish woman may suckle the child of a Jewish woman in her premises.

Mishnah Avodah Zarah 2:1

One should not place animals in inns of non-Jews, because they are suspected of bestiality. A woman should not be alone with them, because they are suspected of licentiousness; Nor should a man be alone with them, because they are suspected of shedding blood. A Jewish woman should not act as midwife to a non-Jewish woman, because she would be delivering a child for idolatry. But a non-Jewish woman may act as midwife to a Jewish woman. A Jewish woman should not suckle the child of a non-Jewish woman, But a non-Jewish woman may suckle the child of a Jewish woman in her premises.

Pirkei Avot (Mishnah Avot) 4:20

Elisha ben Abuyah said: He who learns when a child, to what is he compared? To ink written upon a new writing sheet. And he who learns when an old man, to what is he compared? To ink written on a rubbed writing sheet. Rabbi Yose ben Judah a man of Kfar Ha-babli said: He who learns from the young, to what is he compared? To one who eats unripe grapes, and drinks wine from his vat; And he who learns from the old, to what is he compared? To one who eats ripe grapes, and drinks old wine. Rabbi said: don’t look at the container but at that which is in it: there is a new container full of old wine, and an old [container] in which there is not even new [wine].

Mishnah Arakhin 4:4

“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.

Mishnah Arakhin 4:4

“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.

Mishnah Arakhin 4:4

“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.

Mishnah Kinnim 3:6

If a woman says: "I vow a pair of birds if I give birth to a male child," and she does give birth to a male child, then she must offer up two pairs one for her vow and one for her obligation. If [before she assigned them] she gave them to the priest, and the priest who ought to offer three birds above and one below does not do so, but offers two above and two below, and does not seek guidance, she must she bring another bird and offer that above. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring two others. If she had expressly defined her vow, then must she bring three other birds. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring four others. If she made a definite fixture at the time of her vow, then must she bring another five birds. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring six others. If she gave them to the priest and it is not known what she gave, and the priest performed the sacrifice, but it is not known how he performed it, then she must bring four other birds for her vow, and two for her obligation and one for her hatat. Ben Azzai says: [she must bring] two hatats. Rabbi Joshua said: This is what it meant when they said: "When [the beast] is alive it possesses one sound, but when it is dead its sound is sevenfold." In what way is its sound sevenfold? Its two horns [are made into] two trumpets, its two leg-bones into two flutes, its hide into a drum, its entrails for lyres and its large intestines for harp strings; and there are some who add that its wool is used for the blue [pomegranates.] Rabbi Shimon ben Akashiah says: ignorant old people, the older they become, the more their intellect gets befuddled, as it is said: "He removes the speech of men of trust and takes away the sense of the elders." But when it comes to aged scholars, it is not so. On the contrary, the older they get, the more their mind becomes composed, as it is said: "With aged men comes wisdom, and understanding in length of days."

Mishnah Kinnim 3:6

If a woman says: "I vow a pair of birds if I give birth to a male child," and she does give birth to a male child, then she must offer up two pairs one for her vow and one for her obligation. If [before she assigned them] she gave them to the priest, and the priest who ought to offer three birds above and one below does not do so, but offers two above and two below, and does not seek guidance, she must she bring another bird and offer that above. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring two others. If she had expressly defined her vow, then must she bring three other birds. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring four others. If she made a definite fixture at the time of her vow, then must she bring another five birds. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring six others. If she gave them to the priest and it is not known what she gave, and the priest performed the sacrifice, but it is not known how he performed it, then she must bring four other birds for her vow, and two for her obligation and one for her hatat. Ben Azzai says: [she must bring] two hatats. Rabbi Joshua said: This is what it meant when they said: "When [the beast] is alive it possesses one sound, but when it is dead its sound is sevenfold." In what way is its sound sevenfold? Its two horns [are made into] two trumpets, its two leg-bones into two flutes, its hide into a drum, its entrails for lyres and its large intestines for harp strings; and there are some who add that its wool is used for the blue [pomegranates.] Rabbi Shimon ben Akashiah says: ignorant old people, the older they become, the more their intellect gets befuddled, as it is said: "He removes the speech of men of trust and takes away the sense of the elders." But when it comes to aged scholars, it is not so. On the contrary, the older they get, the more their mind becomes composed, as it is said: "With aged men comes wisdom, and understanding in length of days."

Mishnah Kelim 2:2

As regards the smallest earthen vessels, and the bottoms and sides [of the larger but broken vessels] that can stand unsupported: The prescribed size is a capacity to hold oil sufficient for the anointing of a little finger of a child [if their former capacity] was that of a log. If [their former capacity] was from one log to a se'ah [their present capacity] must be a quarter of a log. If it was from a se'ah to two se'ah it must be half a log. If from two se'ah to three se'ah or as much as five se'ah it must be a log, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: I do not prescribe any size for the unbroken vessels, rather: as regards the smallest earthen vessels, and the bottoms and sides [of larger but broken ones] that can stand unsupported: The prescribed size is a capacity to hold enough oil to anoint the little finger of a child. [This size is prescribed for pots] that are not bigger than the small cooking-pots. For small cooking-pots and for those between these and the jars from Lydda the prescribed capacity is a quarter of a log. For those which have a size between that of Lydda jars and Bethlehem jars the capacity must be that of half a log. For those between Bethlehem jars and large stone jars the capacity must be that of a log. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai says: [the prescribed capacity for the fragments] of large stone jars is two logs, and that for the bottoms of broken Galilean flasks and small jars is any whatsoever, but the fragments of their sides are not susceptible to impurity

Mishnah Kelim 2:2

As regards the smallest earthen vessels, and the bottoms and sides [of the larger but broken vessels] that can stand unsupported: The prescribed size is a capacity to hold oil sufficient for the anointing of a little finger of a child [if their former capacity] was that of a log. If [their former capacity] was from one log to a se'ah [their present capacity] must be a quarter of a log. If it was from a se'ah to two se'ah it must be half a log. If from two se'ah to three se'ah or as much as five se'ah it must be a log, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: I do not prescribe any size for the unbroken vessels, rather: as regards the smallest earthen vessels, and the bottoms and sides [of larger but broken ones] that can stand unsupported: The prescribed size is a capacity to hold enough oil to anoint the little finger of a child. [This size is prescribed for pots] that are not bigger than the small cooking-pots. For small cooking-pots and for those between these and the jars from Lydda the prescribed capacity is a quarter of a log. For those which have a size between that of Lydda jars and Bethlehem jars the capacity must be that of half a log. For those between Bethlehem jars and large stone jars the capacity must be that of a log. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai says: [the prescribed capacity for the fragments] of large stone jars is two logs, and that for the bottoms of broken Galilean flasks and small jars is any whatsoever, but the fragments of their sides are not susceptible to impurity

Mishnah Oholot 2:2

[The following likewise defile:]A quarter [of a log] of blood, A quarter [of a log] of mixed blood from one corpse. Rabbi Akiva says: [even] from two corpses. [With regard to] the blood of a child that has completely flowed forth: Rabbi Akiva says: [it defiles] in even the smallest quantity, But the sages say: [there must be] a quarter [of a log]. [With regard to] an olive-sized [portion] of [corpse] worms whether alive or dead: Rabbi Eliezer declares [it] unclean, like the flesh, But the sages declare [it] clean. [With regard to] the ashes of burnt persons: Rabbi Eliezer says: the [minimum] quantity [for defilement is] a quarter [of a kav]. But the sages declare [them to be] clean. A ladleful and [a little] more of grave-dust is unclean. Rabbi Shimon declares [it to be] clean. A ladleful of corpse-mold mixed with water is not [regarded as] joined [into one mass] for [the purposes of] defilement.

Mishnah Oholot 7:5

If [at the birth of twins] the first came out dead and the second came out alive, the [live one] is clean. If the first was alive and the second dead, the [live child] is unclean. Rabbi Meir says: if they were in one sac, [the live child] is unclean, but if there were two sacs, it remains clean.

Mishnah Oholot 7:5

If [at the birth of twins] the first came out dead and the second came out alive, the [live one] is clean. If the first was alive and the second dead, the [live child] is unclean. Rabbi Meir says: if they were in one sac, [the live child] is unclean, but if there were two sacs, it remains clean.

Mishnah Oholot 7:6

If a woman is having trouble giving birth, they cut up the child in her womb and brings it forth limb by limb, because her life comes before the life of [the child]. But if the greater part has come out, one may not touch it, for one may not set aside one person's life for that of another.

Mishnah Oholot 7:6

If a woman is having trouble giving birth, they cut up the child in her womb and brings it forth limb by limb, because her life comes before the life of [the child]. But if the greater part has come out, one may not touch it, for one may not set aside one person's life for that of another.

Mishnah Negaim 2:4

What is [the posture] of examining negaim? A man is inspected in the posture of one that hoes or one that gathers olives. And a woman [is inspected in the posture] of one who is arranging dough and one who nurses her child, and one that weaves at an upright loom if the nega was in the right armpit. Rabbi Judah says: also in the posture of one that spins flax if it was within the left armpit. Just as [is the posture] for examining for the nega, so too [is the posture] for shaving hair.

Mishnah Negaim 7:1

The following bright spots are clean: Those that one had before the Torah was given, Those that a non-Jew had when he converted; Or a child when it was born, Or those that were in a crease and were subsequently uncovered. If they were on the head or the beard, on a boil, a burn or a blister that is festering, and subsequently the head or the beard became bald, and the boil, burn or blister turned into a scar, they are clean. If they were on the head or the beard before they grew hair, and they then grew hair and subsequently became bald, or if they were on the body before the boil, burn or blister before they were festering and then these formed a scar or were healed: Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said that they are unclean since at the beginning and at the end they were unclean, But the sages say: they are clean.

Mishnah Negaim 14:3

On the seventh day he shaves off his hair a second time in the manner of the first shaving, he washes his garments and immerses himself. He is clean in so far as not to convey uncleanness as a sheretz, but he was still like a tevul yom. He may eat second tithe. After sunset he may eat terumah. After he had brought his offering of atonement, he may also eat sacred things. Thus there are three grades in the purification of a metzora and three grades in the purification of a woman after child birth.

Mishnah Parah 3:2

Courtyards were built in Jerusalem over rock, and beneath them there was a hollow which served as a protection against a grave in the depths. And they used to bring there pregnant women, and there they gave birth to their children and there they raised them. And they brought oxen, upon whose backs were placed doors, and the children sat upon them with stone cups in their hands. When they reached the Shiloah spring they got down and filled the cups with water and then they ascended and sat again on the doors. Rabbi Yose said: each child used to let down his cup and fill it from his place.

Mishnah Parah 3:3

They arrived at the Temple Mount and got down. Beneath the Temple Mount and the courts was a hollow which served as a protection against a grave in the depths. And at the entrance of the courtyard there was the jar of the ashes of the sin-offerings. They would bring a male from among the sheep and tie a rope between its horns, and a stick or a bushy twig was tied at the other end of the rope, and this was thrown into the jar. They then struck the male [sheep] was so that it started backwards. And [a child] took the ashes and put it [enough] so that it could be seen upon the water. Rabbi Yose said: do not give the Sadducees an opportunity to rule! Rather, [a child] himself took it and mixed it.

Mishnah Parah 3:3

They arrived at the Temple Mount and got down. Beneath the Temple Mount and the courts was a hollow which served as a protection against a grave in the depths. And at the entrance of the courtyard there was the jar of the ashes of the sin-offerings. They would bring a male from among the sheep and tie a rope between its horns, and a stick or a bushy twig was tied at the other end of the rope, and this was thrown into the jar. They then struck the male [sheep] was so that it started backwards. And [a child] took the ashes and put it [enough] so that it could be seen upon the water. Rabbi Yose said: do not give the Sadducees an opportunity to rule! Rather, [a child] himself took it and mixed it.

Mishnah Parah 3:4

One may not bring a sin-offering by virtue of [the purifications made for] another sin-offering, nor one child by virtue of [the preparations made for] another. The children had to sprinkle on each other, the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. Rabbi Akiva says: they did not need to sprinkle.

Mishnah Parah 12:10

The lid of a kettle which is joined to a chain: Bet Shammai say: these are regarded as connected in respect of uncleanness but not in respect of sprinkling. Bet Hillel say: if he sprinkled on the kettle, it is the same as if the lid also was sprinkled upon; but if he sprinkled on the lid only it is not the same as if the kettle also was sprinkled upon. All are eligible to sprinkle, except a tumtum, a hermaphrodite, a woman, and a child that is without understanding. A woman may assist [a man] while he sprinkles, and hold the water for him while he dips and sprinkles. If she held his hand, even if only at the time of sprinkling, it is invalid.

Mishnah Tahorot 3:7

A child who was found at the side of a graveyard with lilies in his hand, and the lilies grew only in a place of uncleanness, he is nevertheless clean, for I could say that another person gathered them and gave them to him. So also a donkey that was in a graveyard, his harness remains clean.

Mishnah Tahorot 3:8

A child was found next to dough with a piece of dough in his hand: Rabbi Meir says that the dough is clean; But the sages say that it is unclean, since it is the nature of a child to slap dough. Dough that bears traces of hens’ pickings and there is unclean liquid in the same house: if there was distance enough between the liquid and the loaves for the hens to dry their mouths on the ground, the dough is clean. And in the case of a cow or a dog, if there was distance enough for it to lick its tongue. And in the case of all other beasts, if there was distance enough for their tongue to dry. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob holds the dough to be clean in the case of a dog who is smart; for it is not its habit to leave food and go after the water.

Mishnah Tahorot 3:8

A child was found next to dough with a piece of dough in his hand: Rabbi Meir says that the dough is clean; But the sages say that it is unclean, since it is the nature of a child to slap dough. Dough that bears traces of hens’ pickings and there is unclean liquid in the same house: if there was distance enough between the liquid and the loaves for the hens to dry their mouths on the ground, the dough is clean. And in the case of a cow or a dog, if there was distance enough for it to lick its tongue. And in the case of all other beasts, if there was distance enough for their tongue to dry. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob holds the dough to be clean in the case of a dog who is smart; for it is not its habit to leave food and go after the water.

Mishnah Mikvaot 9:4

Pus within the eye, hardened pus within a wound, juice that is moist, moist excrement on the body, excrement inside the finger nail, and a dangling finger nail and the downy hair of a child. [These] are not liable to uncleanness and do not cause uncleanness. The membrane which forms over a wound is liable to uncleanness and causes uncleanness.

Mishnah Niddah 1:4

Who is regarded as "virgin"? Any woman who has never yet observed a blood flow, even if she is married. "A woman in pregnancy"? One whose fetus is notice. "A nursing woman"? Until she has weaned her child. If she gave her child to a nursing woman, if she weaned him, or if he died: Rabbi Meir says: she conveys uncleanness retroactively for twenty-four hours; But the sages say: it suffices for her [to reckon her period of uncleanness from] the time of her [observation of the flow].

Mishnah Niddah 1:4

Who is regarded as "virgin"? Any woman who has never yet observed a blood flow, even if she is married. "A woman in pregnancy"? One whose fetus is notice. "A nursing woman"? Until she has weaned her child. If she gave her child to a nursing woman, if she weaned him, or if he died: Rabbi Meir says: she conveys uncleanness retroactively for twenty-four hours; But the sages say: it suffices for her [to reckon her period of uncleanness from] the time of her [observation of the flow].

Mishnah Niddah 3:2

If a woman miscarried an object that was like a rind, like a hair, like earth, like red flies, let her put it in water: If it dissolves she is unclean, But if it does not she is clean. If she miscarried an object in the shape of fishes, locusts, or any forbidden things or creeping things: If there was blood with them she is unclean, If not, she is clean. If she miscarried an object in the shape of a beast, a wild animal or a bird, whether clean or unclean: If it was a male she sits in uncleanness as she would for a male; And if it was a female she sits in uncleanness as she would for a female. But if the sex is unknown she sits in uncleanness for both male and female, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: anything that has not the shape of a human being cannot be regarded as a human child.

Mishnah Niddah 3:4

If she aborted a sandal or a placenta she sits in uncleanness for both male and female. If a placenta is in a house, the house is unclean, not because a placenta is a fetus but because generally there can be no placenta without a fetus. Rabbi Shimon says: the child might have been mashed before it came out.

Mishnah Niddah 3:6

If a woman miscarried and it is unknown what it was, she sits for both a male child and a female child. If it is unknown whether it was a child or not, she sits for both a male and a female and as a menstruant.

Mishnah Niddah 3:6

If a woman miscarried and it is unknown what it was, she sits for both a male child and a female child. If it is unknown whether it was a child or not, she sits for both a male and a female and as a menstruant.

Mishnah Niddah 3:6

If a woman miscarried and it is unknown what it was, she sits for both a male child and a female child. If it is unknown whether it was a child or not, she sits for both a male and a female and as a menstruant.

Mishnah Niddah 5:7

The sages spoke of [the physical development of] a woman in a parable: an unripe fig, a fig in its early ripening stage and a ripe fig. "An unripe fig": while she is yet a child; "A fig in its early ripening stage": when she is in her youth (naarut). In both ages her father is entitled to anything she finds and to her handiwork and to the right of invalidating her vows. "A ripe fig" as soon as she becomes of majority age (bogeret), her father has no longer any right over her.

Mishnah Makhshirin 2:7

If one found [an abandoned] child there: If the majority [of the inhabitants] were non-Jews, it is considered a non-Jew; If the majority were Israelites, it is considered an Israelite; If they were half and half, it is also considered an Israelite. Rabbi Judah says: we must consider the majority of those who abandon their children.

Mishnah Makhshirin 6:7

The following cause neither uncleanness nor susceptibility to uncleanness: Sweat, rotten secretion, excrement, blood issuing with any of these, liquid [issuing from a child born in the] eight month. Rabbi Yose says: except its blood. [The discharge from the bowels of] one who drinks the water of Tiberias even though it comes out clean. Blood from the slaughtering of cattle and wild animals and birds that are unclean, and blood from bloodletting for healing. Rabbi Eliezer declares these unclean. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: the milk of a male is clean.

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 3:43

It is stated: In truth, they said a woman may say Grace for her husband, a slave for his master, and a minor for his father. Did not Rebbi Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Nahoraï: All they said about a minor is for the latter’s education? Explain it that he recites after him, as we stated there: “He for whom a slave, a woman, or a minor were reading it, repeats after them what they are saying, and may it be a curse for him. In truth, they said there should be a curse on the man of twenty years who needs the child of ten.”