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The Works of Flavius Josephus
Now each of these had handmaids, by their father's donation. Zilpha was handmaid to Lea, and Bilha to Rachel; by no means slaves, but however subject to their mistresses. Now Lea was sorely troubled at her husband's love to her sister; and she expected she should be better esteemed if she bare him children: so she entreated God perpetually; and when she had borne a son, and her husband was on that account better reconciled to her, she named her son Reubel, because God had had mercy upon her, in giving her a son, for that is the signification of this name. After some time she bare three more sons; Simeon, which name signifies that God had hearkened to her prayer. Then she bare Levi, the confirmer of their friendship. After him was born Judah, which denotes thanksgiving. But Rachel, fearing lest the fruitfulness of her sister should make herself enjoy a lesser share of Jacob's affections, put to bed to him her handmaid Bilha; by whom Jacob had Dan: one may interpret that name into the Greek tongue, a divine judgment. And after him Nephthalim, as it were, unconquerable in stratagems, since Rachel tried to conquer the fruitfulness of her sister by this stratagem. Accordingly, Lea took the same method, and used a counter-stratagem to that of her sister; for she put to bed to him her own handmaid. Jacob therefore had by Zilpha a son, whose name was Gad, which may be interpreted fortune; and after him Asher, which may be called a happy man, because he added glory to Lea. Now Reubel, the eldest son of Lea, brought apples of mandrakes to his mother. When Rachel saw them, she desired that she would give her the apples, for she longed to eat them; but when she refused, and bid her be content that she had deprived her of the benevolence she ought to have had from her husband, Rachel, in order to mitigate her sister's anger, said she would yield her husband to her; and he should lie with her that evening. She accepted of the favor, and Jacob slept with Lea, by the favor of Rachel. She bare then these sons: Issachar, denoting one born by hire: and Zabulon, one born as a pledge of benevolence towards her; and a daughter, Dina. After some time Rachel had a son, named Joseph, which signified there should be another added to him.
The Writings of Origen
Celsus proceeds as follows: “With regard to the origin of the world and its destruction, whether it is to be regarded as uncreated and indestructible, or as created indeed, but not destructible, or the reverse, I at present say nothing.” For this reason we too say nothing on these points, as the work in hand does not require it. Nor do we allege that the Spirit of the universal God mingled itself in things here below as in things alien to itself, as might appear from the expression, “The Spirit of God moved upon the water;” nor do we assert that certain wicked devices directed against His Spirit, as if by a different creator from the great God, and which were tolerated by the Supreme Divinity, needed to be completely frustrated. And, accordingly, I have nothing further to say to those who utter such absurdities; nor to Celsus, who does not refute them with ability. For he ought either not to have mentioned such matters at all, or else, in keeping with that character for philanthropy which he assumes, have carefully set them forth, and then endeavoured to rebut these impious assertions. Nor have we ever heard that the great God, after giving his spirit to the creator, demands it back again. Proceeding next foolishly to assail these impious assertions, he asks: “What god gives anything with the intention of demanding it back? For it is the mark of a needy person to demand back [what he has given], whereas God stands in need of nothing.” To this he adds, as if saying something clever against certain parties: “Why, when he lent [his spirit], was he ignorant that he was lending it to an evil being?” He asks, further: “Why does he pass without notice a wicked creator who was counter-working his purposes?”
Celsus adds: “Will they not besides make this reflection? If the prophets of the God of the Jews foretold that he who should come into the world would be the Son of this same God, how could he command them through Moses to gather wealth, to extend their dominion, to fill the earth, to put their enemies of every age to the sword, and to destroy them utterly, which indeed he himself did—as Moses says—threatening them, moreover, that if they did not obey his commands, he would treat them as his avowed enemies; whilst, on the other hand, his Son, the man of Nazareth, promulgated laws quite opposed to these, declaring that no one can come to the Father who loves power, or riches, or glory; that men ought not to be more careful in providing food than the ravens; that they were to be less concerned about their raiment than the lilies; that to him who has given them one blow, they should offer to receive another? Whether is it Moses or Jesus who teaches falsely? Did the Father, when he sent Jesus, forget the commands which he had given to Moses? Or did he change his mind, condemn his own laws, and send forth a messenger with counter instructions?” Celsus, with all his boasts of universal knowledge, has here fallen into the most vulgar of errors, in supposing that in the law and the prophets there is not a meaning deeper than that afforded by a literal rendering of the words. He does not see how manifestly incredible it is that worldly riches should be promised to those who lead upright lives, when it is a matter of common observation that the best of men have lived in extreme poverty. Indeed, the prophets themselves, who for the purity of their lives received the Divine Spirit, “wandered about in sheepskins and goatskins; being destitute, afflicted, tormented: they wandered in deserts, and in mountains, and in dens and caves of the earth.” For, as the Psalmist says, “many are the afflictions of the righteous.” If Celsus had read the writings of Moses, he would, I daresay, have supposed that when it is said to him who kept the law, “Thou shalt lend unto many nations, and thou thyself shalt not borrow,” the promise is made to the just man, that his temporal riches should be so abundant, that he would be able to lend not only to the Jews, not only to two or three nations, but “to many nations.” What, then, must have been the wealth which the just man received according to the law for his righteousness, if he could lend to many nations? And must we not suppose also, in accordance with this interpretation, that the just man would never borrow anything? For it is written, “and thou shalt thyself borrow nothing.” Did then that nation remain for so long a period attached to the religion which was taught by Moses, whilst, according to the supposition of Celsus, they saw themselves so grievously deceived by that lawgiver? For nowhere is it said of any one that he was so rich as to lend to many nations. It is not to be believed that they would have fought so zealously in defence of a law whose promises had proved glaringly false, if they understood them in the sense which Celsus gives to them. And if any one should say that the sins which are recorded to have been committed by the people are a proof that they despised the law, doubtless from the feeling that they had been deceived by it, we may reply that we have only to read the history of the times in order to find it shown that the whole people, after having done that which was evil in the sight of the Lord, returned afterwards to their duty, and to the religion prescribed by the law.
Celsus then extracts from the Gospel the precept, “To him who strikes thee once, thou shalt offer thyself to be struck again,” although without giving any passage from the Old Testament which he considers opposed to it. On the one hand, we know that “it was said to them in old time, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth;” and on the other, we have read, “I say unto you, Whoever shall smite thee on the one cheek, turn to him the other also.” But as there is reason to believe that Celsus produces the objections which he has heard from those who wish to make a difference between the God of the gospel and the God of the law, we must say in reply, that this precept, “Whosoever shall strike thee on the one cheek, turn to him the other,” is not unknown to the older Scriptures. For thus, in the Lamentations of Jeremiah, it is said, “It is good for a man that he beareth the yoke in his youth: he sitteth alone, and keepeth silence, because he hath borne it upon him: he giveth his cheek to him that smiteth him; he is filled full with reproach.” There is no discrepancy, then, between the God of the gospel and the God of the law, even when we take literally the precept regarding the blow on the face. So, then, we infer that neither “Jesus nor Moses has taught falsely.” The Father in sending Jesus did not “forget the commands which He had given to Moses:” He did not “change His mind, condemn His own laws, and send by His messenger counter instructions.”
The Mishnah
If he found [something] in a shop, it belongs to him. But if he found it between the counter and the shopkeeper it belongs to the shopkeeper. If he found it in front of the money-changer it belongs to him. But if between the stool and the money-changer it belongs to the money-changer. If a man bought fruit from his fellow or if his fellow sent him fruit and he found coins therein, they belong to him. But if they were tied up he must take them and proclaim them.
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer said, if slaughter which is work pushes the Sabbath aside, should not these, which are because of Sabbath rest, push the Sabbath aside? Rebbi Joshua said to him, holiday is a counter example, where He permitted the work but forbade because of Sabbath rest. Rebbi Eliezer answered whim, what is this, Joshua? What proof is option for obligation?
MISHNAH: Rebbi Aqiba answered, sprinkling is a counter example, for it is a commandment and because of Sabbath rest does not push aside the Sabbath. So you should not wonder about these, even though they are commandments and because of Sabbath rest but shall not push aside the Sabbath. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, about this I am arguing. Since slaughter, which is work, pushes the Sabbath aside, sprinkling, which is because of Sabbath rest, shall push aside the Sabbath. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, or the other way. Since sprinkling, which is because of Sabbath rest, does not push aside the Sabbath, slaughter, which is work, shall not push the Sabbath aside. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, Aqiba! You uprooted what is written in the Torah, between the evenings, at its fixed time, whether on weekdays or on the Sabbath. He answered him, Rabbi, bring me a fixed time for these similar to the fixed time for slaughter. Rebbi Aqiba formulated a principle: Anything which can be done on Friday does not push the Sabbath aside. Slaughter which cannot be done on Friday pushes the Sabbath aside.
There, we have stated: “What is ‘far away’? From Modiin and farther away, and in the same distance in every direction, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Eliezer says, from the doorstep of the Temple courtyard and farther away.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eliezer said this only not to make him liable for extirpation. Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah implies this: “Rebbi Aqiba answered him, sprinkling is a counter example, for it is a commandment.” Is it a commandment to sprinkle? Explain it that his seventh day happened to be the Fourteenth which fell on a Sabbath. If it had been a weekday, one would have sprinkled on him, then he would have come, slaughtered his Pesaḥ, and entered and eaten it in the evening. Because it is a Sabbath and one does not sprinkle on him, it results that he his prevented from fulfilling the commandment. Rav Hoshaia said, explain it that his seventh day happened to be the Thirteenth which fell on a Sabbath. If it had been a weekday, one would have sprinkled on him, then the next day he would have come, slaughtered his Pesaḥ, and entered and eaten it in the evening. Because it is a Sabbath and one does not sprinkle on him, it results that he is prevented from fulfilling the commandment. It was found stated following the first [explanation].
Rebbi Aḥa said, for Ezra the priest, the counter. But just as he was counting in the Torah so he was counting in the words of the Sages.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose says, one does not cover the Koy’s blood because it is a doubtful case.” Since circumcision whose certainty pushes aside the Sabbath, in doubt does not push aside the holiday, then for covering the blood which in case of certainty does not push aside the Sabbath it only is logical that in a case of doubt it not push aside the holiday. But is it permitted to slaughter on a Sabbath? Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he slaughtered for a sick person. They told him, does not the shofar in the countryside disprove it? For in case of certainty it does not push aside the Sabbath, but in a case of doubt it pushes aside the holiday. What kind of doubt is there? If it is a weekday, he may blow, if it is a holiday, he may blow. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: In case of a hermaphrodite who blew. And it was stated so: “The hermaphrodite frees his own kind [but does not free persons not of his own kind.] The sexless frees neither his kind nor not his kind.” Rebbi Yose asked, if in the case of a hermaphrodite who blew, is that where we stated, it has no counter argument? Rebbi (Abbaye) [Abbin] said, that is one of four cases when the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya said, there is no counter-argument. But Rebbi Eleazar the son of Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower found a counter-argument. Since circumcision which in a case of doubt does not push aside the holiday, in a case of certainty pushes aside holiday night, you can say about covering the blood where in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, since in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, in a case of doubt it should push aside the holiday. This establishes that what was problematic to the earlier rabbis and was difficult for them, so it is problematic to the later rabbis and is a difficulty for them. In the opinion of Rebbi Aḥa, the hermaphrodite frees his own kind a priori, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, a posteriori.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose says, one does not cover the Koy’s blood because it is a doubtful case.” Since circumcision whose certainty pushes aside the Sabbath, in doubt does not push aside the holiday, then for covering the blood which in case of certainty does not push aside the Sabbath it only is logical that in a case of doubt it not push aside the holiday. But is it permitted to slaughter on a Sabbath? Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he slaughtered for a sick person. They told him, does not the shofar in the countryside disprove it? For in case of certainty it does not push aside the Sabbath, but in a case of doubt it pushes aside the holiday. What kind of doubt is there? If it is a weekday, he may blow, if it is a holiday, he may blow. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: In case of a hermaphrodite who blew. And it was stated so: “The hermaphrodite frees his own kind [but does not free persons not of his own kind.] The sexless frees neither his kind nor not his kind.” Rebbi Yose asked, if in the case of a hermaphrodite who blew, is that where we stated, it has no counter argument? Rebbi (Abbaye) [Abbin] said, that is one of four cases when the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya said, there is no counter-argument. But Rebbi Eleazar the son of Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower found a counter-argument. Since circumcision which in a case of doubt does not push aside the holiday, in a case of certainty pushes aside holiday night, you can say about covering the blood where in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, since in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, in a case of doubt it should push aside the holiday. This establishes that what was problematic to the earlier rabbis and was difficult for them, so it is problematic to the later rabbis and is a difficulty for them. In the opinion of Rebbi Aḥa, the hermaphrodite frees his own kind a priori, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, a posteriori.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose says, one does not cover the Koy’s blood because it is a doubtful case.” Since circumcision whose certainty pushes aside the Sabbath, in doubt does not push aside the holiday, then for covering the blood which in case of certainty does not push aside the Sabbath it only is logical that in a case of doubt it not push aside the holiday. But is it permitted to slaughter on a Sabbath? Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he slaughtered for a sick person. They told him, does not the shofar in the countryside disprove it? For in case of certainty it does not push aside the Sabbath, but in a case of doubt it pushes aside the holiday. What kind of doubt is there? If it is a weekday, he may blow, if it is a holiday, he may blow. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: In case of a hermaphrodite who blew. And it was stated so: “The hermaphrodite frees his own kind [but does not free persons not of his own kind.] The sexless frees neither his kind nor not his kind.” Rebbi Yose asked, if in the case of a hermaphrodite who blew, is that where we stated, it has no counter argument? Rebbi (Abbaye) [Abbin] said, that is one of four cases when the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya said, there is no counter-argument. But Rebbi Eleazar the son of Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower found a counter-argument. Since circumcision which in a case of doubt does not push aside the holiday, in a case of certainty pushes aside holiday night, you can say about covering the blood where in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, since in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, in a case of doubt it should push aside the holiday. This establishes that what was problematic to the earlier rabbis and was difficult for them, so it is problematic to the later rabbis and is a difficulty for them. In the opinion of Rebbi Aḥa, the hermaphrodite frees his own kind a priori, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, a posteriori.
“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.
MISHNAH: Ammonites and Moabites are eternally forbidden but their females are immediately permitted. Egyptians and Edomites are forbidden only for three generations, both males and females. Rebbi Simeon said, is it not an argument de minore ad majus? If He permitted the females immediately in a case where the males are eternally forbidden, should we not permit the females in a case where He forbade the males only for three generations? They said to him: If it is practice, we shall accept this; if it is a logical argument, there is a counter-argument. He said to them, in fact, I am declaring practice. Bastards and Gibeonites are eternally forbidden, both males and females.
“They said to him: If it is practice, we shall accept this; if it is a logical argument, there is a counter-argument.” What could they have argued? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: Are not his grandchildren forbidden for three generations, both male and female? Rebbi Abbahu said that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish questioned, does one argue a matter concerning bastardy in a matter not concerning bastardy? Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Abbahu questioned, does one argue a matter concerning extirpation in a matter not concerning extirpation? He said to them, in fact, I am declaring practice and a verse supports me. “Sons,” not daughters.
“‘A Cohen’s daughter is desecrated, a Cohen is not desecrated.’ For it is written: ‘He shall not desecrate his seed in his clan.’ Not only that he desecrates his seed; from where [that he desecrates] herself? It is a conclusion of an argument. Since the seed who did not commit any sin is desecrated, she, who committed a sin, is it not logical that she should be desecrated? He himself gives a counter-argument since he sinned and is not desecrated. No. If you talk about the man who is not otherwise desecrated, what can you say about a woman who can be otherwise desecrated? Since she can be otherwise desecrated, it is an argument that she should be desecrated! If you wish, you can say, he shall not desecrate - “he shall not repeatedly desecrate,’” even to desecrate one who is enabled.
MISHNAH: What one found in a store is his. Between the counter and the storekeeper it is the storekeeper’s. Before the moneychanger it is his. Between the chair and the moneychanger it is the moneychanger’s. If one bought produce from another person or another person sent him produce and he found coins in it, they are his. But if they were bundled, he takes them and makes it public. The garment was subsumed under “anything”; why was it mentioned separately? To bracket with it and tell you, just as a garment is special in that it has distinguishing marks and claimants, so about everything which has distinguishing marks and claimants you have to give public notice.
HALAKHAH: “What one found in a store is his,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, so is the Mishnah: On his chair, on his counter.
It is written: He shall not desecrate his issue in his people. Not only his issue will be desecrated; from where also she? Is this not a logical inference? Since the issue, which did not sin, is desecrated, should she, who committed a sin, not logically be desecrated? He himself is a counter example, since he committed a sin but was not desecrated. No. If you argue about a man who is not desecrated in any circumstance, what can you say about a woman who is desecrated in many circumstances? Since she is desecrated in many circumstances, it is logical that she should be desecrated. If you wish you can say “not to desecrate”, not to desecrate, about somebody who was qualified and became desecrated.