court
1506 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: A blurted oath applies to men and women, relatives and unrelated persons, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional [to bring] a variable sacrifice. A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and unrelated persons, to qualified and disqualified ones, in court and out of court, and by his own words. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional he is not prosecutable. In both cases, one who is sworn to by another person can be liable. How is this? One said, “I did not eat today, I did not put on phylacteries today.” “I want you to swear to it,” if he said “Amen” he is liable.
MISHNAH: A blurted oath applies to men and women, relatives and unrelated persons, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional [to bring] a variable sacrifice. A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and unrelated persons, to qualified and disqualified ones, in court and out of court, and by his own words. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional he is not prosecutable. In both cases, one who is sworn to by another person can be liable. How is this? One said, “I did not eat today, I did not put on phylacteries today.” “I want you to swear to it,” if he said “Amen” he is liable.
MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.
MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.
MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.
MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.
From where following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: The congregation shall judge between the beater, etc. The congregation be neither relatives of the murderer nor relatives of the murdered. Rebbi Yose said, otherwise you would say that the court is engaged in vendetta. This implies that the judges may not be related to the accused. And from where that the witnesses may not be related to the accused? The Torah said, kill on the testimony of witnesses, kill on the sentence of those who vote. Since judges may not be related to the accused, neither may witnesses be related to the accused. From where that witnesses may not be relatives of one another? Think of it, if they be found perjured, would they not be killed by each other’s testimony?
“Before the court.” To exclude a single witness. If they told him that they would accept his word as if there were two witnesses, from where? The verse says, if he was a witness, had seen or known; if he does not tell he shall bear his punishment. One who is qualified to testify according to biblical standards; this excludes a single witness who is not qualified to testify.
“Outside of court.” If he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, one would have to pay money. This excludes outside of court where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
“Outside of court.” If he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, one would have to pay money. This excludes outside of court where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
Rebbi Ismael stated: He has to bear his punishment, a sacrifice. From where that one needs a court? “Telling, telling”. Since telling mentioned there is before a court, also telling here is before a court.
Rebbi Ismael stated: He has to bear his punishment, a sacrifice. From where that one needs a court? “Telling, telling”. Since telling mentioned there is before a court, also telling here is before a court.
Rebbi Ismael stated: He has to bear his punishment, a sacrifice. From where that one needs a court? “Telling, telling”. Since telling mentioned there is before a court, also telling here is before a court.
MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.
MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.
MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
Rebbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by his own formulation before the court: would he not be liable for each instance separately? Rebbi Yose said, is this not the Mishnah: “Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit?” But here, since they can come back and admit, they are liable for each single instance.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what? Since Rebbi Meїr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecation. Only one who hears an imprecation. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines? From his own mouth would he be liable for a variable value sacrifice?
HALAKHAH: “If both of them disavowed simultaneously,” etc. If they dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to disavowe in court. This is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, his sacrifice for the Eternal for his vow of nazir; that his vow of nazir precede his sacrifice, not that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. If they were sworn to out of court, dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to renege in court, how do you treat this? As if his sin did precede his sacrifice or since the are liable only in court as if their sacrifice did precede their sin?
HALAKHAH: “If both of them disavowed simultaneously,” etc. If they dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to disavowe in court. This is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, his sacrifice for the Eternal for his vow of nazir; that his vow of nazir precede his sacrifice, not that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. If they were sworn to out of court, dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to renege in court, how do you treat this? As if his sin did precede his sacrifice or since the are liable only in court as if their sacrifice did precede their sin?
HALAKHAH: “If both of them disavowed simultaneously,” etc. If they dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to disavowe in court. This is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, his sacrifice for the Eternal for his vow of nazir; that his vow of nazir precede his sacrifice, not that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. If they were sworn to out of court, dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to renege in court, how do you treat this? As if his sin did precede his sacrifice or since the are liable only in court as if their sacrifice did precede their sin?
HALAKHAH: “If both of them disavowed simultaneously,” etc. If they dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to disavowe in court. This is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, his sacrifice for the Eternal for his vow of nazir; that his vow of nazir precede his sacrifice, not that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. If they were sworn to out of court, dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to renege in court, how do you treat this? As if his sin did precede his sacrifice or since the are liable only in court as if their sacrifice did precede their sin?
MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.
MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.
MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.
HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.
MISHNAH: What is an oath about a deposit? He said to him, “give me the deposit which you hold for me.” “An oath that I am holding nothing of yours;” or that he said to him, “I am holding nothing of yours;” “I am putting an oath upon you” and he said “Amen”; this one is liable. If he made him swear five times whether in court or out of court and he denied, he is liable for each single one. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because he may return and admit.
MISHNAH: What is an oath about a deposit? He said to him, “give me the deposit which you hold for me.” “An oath that I am holding nothing of yours;” or that he said to him, “I am holding nothing of yours;” “I am putting an oath upon you” and he said “Amen”; this one is liable. If he made him swear five times whether in court or out of court and he denied, he is liable for each single one. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because he may return and admit.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
Rebbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by the formulation of others out of the court: would he not be liable only once? Rebbi Yose said, is this not the Mishnah: “Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they can come back and admit?” But here, since they cannot come back and admit, they are liable only once.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times, since Rebbi Meїr considered “by his own words” as in court, would this determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. He pays the value plus a fifth and brings a reparation sacrifice for two tetradrachmas, in distinction from an oath about testimony.”
The following is obvious: If her husband did not dissolve [the vow] for the first woman and she (remained) in her vow, she is whipped. Can the second he whipped? Rebbi Yose said, since one is whipped, the other also is whipped. Rebbi Yudan said, is this a stipulation of the court? Should not the second be treated as one who said, “a shall be a nezirah[after] thirty days”? Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, for he said, it depends on the collection.
Does one tell him, be in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: “It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out a tooth of his slave Tabi. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to manumit my slave Tabi. He told him, you have nothing in your hand; fines only are imposed through witnesses and in court.” This implies that one does not tell him, be in the clear with Heaven. Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi Illai asked before Rebbi Mana, does Rabban Gamliel hold with him who says, one is permitted to manumit? He told him, in itself it says that it is forbidden to manumit, for otherwise he should have manumitted him immediately.
The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person give to his neighbor, etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Or vessels; since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels? Following what Rebbi Nathan stated, or vessels, including clay vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot, that the claim should be about a peruṭah’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi’s worth.
Rebbi Marinus was guarantor for his daughter-in-law. They went to court before Rebbi Ḥama the father of Bat Qappara and Rebbi Hoshaia. After he had admitted he said to him, I gave. They asked the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya; Rebbi Ḥiyya asked Rebbi: One who became liable in court cannot be trusted. What is the meaning of “he cannot be trusted”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he pays on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I gave. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, also for oaths it is the same. What is the meaning of “also for oaths it is the same”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he swears on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I swore. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted.
Rebbi Marinus was guarantor for his daughter-in-law. They went to court before Rebbi Ḥama the father of Bat Qappara and Rebbi Hoshaia. After he had admitted he said to him, I gave. They asked the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya; Rebbi Ḥiyya asked Rebbi: One who became liable in court cannot be trusted. What is the meaning of “he cannot be trusted”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he pays on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I gave. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, also for oaths it is the same. What is the meaning of “also for oaths it is the same”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he swears on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I swore. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted.
HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.
HALAKHAH: “About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rebbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath; Rebbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rebbi Johanan answer Rebbi Eleazar. No. If you pronounced about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath; here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.
HALAKHAH: “About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rebbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath; Rebbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rebbi Johanan answer Rebbi Eleazar. No. If you pronounced about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath; here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.
Some want to understand it from here: An ox, or a donkey, or a sheep. Since these are particular in that they are subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying, this excludes real estate which is not subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying. I shall exclude real estate but shall not exclude slaves. Since these are particular in that they are subject to a fine, this excludes slaves which are not subject to a fine. I shall exclude slaves but shall not exclude documents since they are subject to fines. Since these are particular in that they are subject to overcharging, this excludes documents which are not subject to overcharging. From here they say, if somebody sells documents to the spice trader, it is subject to claims of overcharging. Rebbi Ismael explained: Or a person, if he would swear, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a repeat general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is about monetary claims, [originating] from himself, which can be collected by court order, having monetary value, which is a fixed value, and are movables, and one is not liable for punishment and fines. Monetary claims, excluding one who said to another, give me the 200 denar which you promised me but never gave. [Originating] from himself, excluding one who said to another, you cursed me and shamed me, who is not liable. Which can be collected by court order, excluding one who said to another, you raped or seduced X’s daughter. It has monetary value, excluding documents. Which is a fixed value, excluding slaves. Movables, excluding real estate. One is not liable for punishment, excluding one who said to another, you set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath; who is not liable. One is not liable for fines, excluding double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution which are fines.
Some want to understand it from here: An ox, or a donkey, or a sheep. Since these are particular in that they are subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying, this excludes real estate which is not subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying. I shall exclude real estate but shall not exclude slaves. Since these are particular in that they are subject to a fine, this excludes slaves which are not subject to a fine. I shall exclude slaves but shall not exclude documents since they are subject to fines. Since these are particular in that they are subject to overcharging, this excludes documents which are not subject to overcharging. From here they say, if somebody sells documents to the spice trader, it is subject to claims of overcharging. Rebbi Ismael explained: Or a person, if he would swear, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a repeat general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is about monetary claims, [originating] from himself, which can be collected by court order, having monetary value, which is a fixed value, and are movables, and one is not liable for punishment and fines. Monetary claims, excluding one who said to another, give me the 200 denar which you promised me but never gave. [Originating] from himself, excluding one who said to another, you cursed me and shamed me, who is not liable. Which can be collected by court order, excluding one who said to another, you raped or seduced X’s daughter. It has monetary value, excluding documents. Which is a fixed value, excluding slaves. Movables, excluding real estate. One is not liable for punishment, excluding one who said to another, you set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath; who is not liable. One is not liable for fines, excluding double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution which are fines.
Rebbi Immi said, those who write, “on condition that I have the right to seize movables,” cannot collect. Rebbi Mana said, if he writes and declares, “even though the Court will not enforce,” he collects.
If he paid him in advance; in that case he swears and collects. If a pledge was in his hand; in that case he collects without swearing. If he was a slave. Would the court admit a slave to an oath? If he was suspect? Would the court admit a suspect person to an oath? If both were suspect, it is the dispute between Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Yose: “If both were suspect, the oath returns to its origin, the words of Rebbi Yose; Rebbi Meїr says, they shall split the difference.”
If he paid him in advance; in that case he swears and collects. If a pledge was in his hand; in that case he collects without swearing. If he was a slave. Would the court admit a slave to an oath? If he was suspect? Would the court admit a suspect person to an oath? If both were suspect, it is the dispute between Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Yose: “If both were suspect, the oath returns to its origin, the words of Rebbi Yose; Rebbi Meїr says, they shall split the difference.”
May one claim extraordinary things? One may, following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, a person may be rich on the market place and poor in his house; rich in his house and poor in the market place. There is one who poses as richand has nothing, poses as poor and has great wealth. Rebbi Abba told: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. Would one not say that all that Bar Ziza’s sharecropper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza’s sons came. He said, the adult ones should take half and when the underage grow up they should take half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing since there are people who do not advertise themselves. It should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underage ones is only comparable to a gift given to them.
May one claim extraordinary things? One may, following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, a person may be rich on the market place and poor in his house; rich in his house and poor in the market place. There is one who poses as richand has nothing, poses as poor and has great wealth. Rebbi Abba told: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. Would one not say that all that Bar Ziza’s sharecropper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza’s sons came. He said, the adult ones should take half and when the underage grow up they should take half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing since there are people who do not advertise themselves. It should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underage ones is only comparable to a gift given to them.
May one claim extraordinary things? One may, following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, a person may be rich on the market place and poor in his house; rich in his house and poor in the market place. There is one who poses as richand has nothing, poses as poor and has great wealth. Rebbi Abba told: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. Would one not say that all that Bar Ziza’s sharecropper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza’s sons came. He said, the adult ones should take half and when the underage grow up they should take half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing since there are people who do not advertise themselves. It should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underage ones is only comparable to a gift given to them.
When does one accept one who is suspect in matters of oaths? From when he comes to the court and says, I am suspect. Where do we hold? If one who stands here and is obligated to swear for another, does the court deliver an oath to a suspect person? But we must hold about one who has a suit at a court where he is unknown and tells them, this man is suspect. Also about one who stands and another owes him an oath and he forgives it.
When does one accept one who is suspect in matters of oaths? From when he comes to the court and says, I am suspect. Where do we hold? If one who stands here and is obligated to swear for another, does the court deliver an oath to a suspect person? But we must hold about one who has a suit at a court where he is unknown and tells them, this man is suspect. Also about one who stands and another owes him an oath and he forgives it.
When does one accept one who is suspect in matters of oaths? From when he comes to the court and says, I am suspect. Where do we hold? If one who stands here and is obligated to swear for another, does the court deliver an oath to a suspect person? But we must hold about one who has a suit at a court where he is unknown and tells them, this man is suspect. Also about one who stands and another owes him an oath and he forgives it.
There, we have stated: “If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. How is this? If her ketubah was a thousand denars and he says to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received only one mina, she cannot collect without an oath.” It was stated, one who had compromised, not one who had diminished. Rav Ḥisda said, because he went two steps … Because he compromised it in court you say, he cannot collect?
Here you say, “one does not swear on the claim of a deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor.” But there you say, “one swears for a minor and the Temple.” If one pays from the minor’s property. But can one collect from a person in his absence? Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it about a contract for which interest is due. Would the court collect interest? Explain it that it was guaranteed for a Gentile.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
MISHNAH: The following matters of Gentiles are forbidden but their prohibition is not of usufruct: Milk which the Gentile milked when no Jew was seeing him, bread, their oil, and anything preserved by cooking. Rebbi and his court permitted oil. Preserves in which usually wine is used, and vinegar, and pieces of triton, and fish sauce not containing a whole fish, and hallec, and a lump of asa foetida, and salqonarit salt; these are forbidden but their prohibition is not of usufruct:
And who permitted it? Rebbi permitted it and his court. At three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers,” in divorce documents, oil, and a sole. They called him “the court which permitted oil.” Any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan said, his court disagreed with him about the bills of divorce. May she be allowed to remarry? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, she is allowed to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, she is forbidden to remarry.
And who permitted it? Rebbi permitted it and his court. At three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers,” in divorce documents, oil, and a sole. They called him “the court which permitted oil.” Any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan said, his court disagreed with him about the bills of divorce. May she be allowed to remarry? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, she is allowed to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, she is forbidden to remarry.
And who permitted it? Rebbi permitted it and his court. At three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers,” in divorce documents, oil, and a sole. They called him “the court which permitted oil.” Any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan said, his court disagreed with him about the bills of divorce. May she be allowed to remarry? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, she is allowed to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, she is forbidden to remarry.
And who permitted it? Rebbi permitted it and his court. At three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers,” in divorce documents, oil, and a sole. They called him “the court which permitted oil.” Any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan said, his court disagreed with him about the bills of divorce. May she be allowed to remarry? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, she is allowed to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, she is forbidden to remarry.
And who permitted it? Rebbi permitted it and his court. At three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers,” in divorce documents, oil, and a sole. They called him “the court which permitted oil.” Any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan said, his court disagreed with him about the bills of divorce. May she be allowed to remarry? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, she is allowed to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, she is forbidden to remarry.
Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina, but some say in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: They were climbing up King’s Mountain and were killed about it. Isaac bar Samuel bar Martha went down to Nisibis. He met Simlai the Southerner who sat and expounded: Rebbi and his court permitted the oil. Samuel said, true! Rav did not accept on himself to eat. Samuel told him, eat! Otherwise I shall declare you a rebellious Elder. He answered him, when I still was there I knew who complained about it, Simlai the Southerner. He told him, he said it in the name of himself, not in the name of Rebbi Jehudah the Prince. He bothered him and he ate.
Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Did we not state, “for no court may invalidate the words of another court unless it be greater in wisdom and numbers”? And Rebbi and his court permit what Daniel and his companions forbade? Rebbi Joḥanan follows his own opinion: Rebbi Joḥanan said, I have a tradition in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ṣadoq that any restrictive edict passed by a court which is not accepted by the majority of the public is not an edict. They checked and found in the matter of the edict about oil and did not find that a majority of the public followed it.
Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Did we not state, “for no court may invalidate the words of another court unless it be greater in wisdom and numbers”? And Rebbi and his court permit what Daniel and his companions forbade? Rebbi Joḥanan follows his own opinion: Rebbi Joḥanan said, I have a tradition in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ṣadoq that any restrictive edict passed by a court which is not accepted by the majority of the public is not an edict. They checked and found in the matter of the edict about oil and did not find that a majority of the public followed it.
Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Did we not state, “for no court may invalidate the words of another court unless it be greater in wisdom and numbers”? And Rebbi and his court permit what Daniel and his companions forbade? Rebbi Joḥanan follows his own opinion: Rebbi Joḥanan said, I have a tradition in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ṣadoq that any restrictive edict passed by a court which is not accepted by the majority of the public is not an edict. They checked and found in the matter of the edict about oil and did not find that a majority of the public followed it.
Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Did we not state, “for no court may invalidate the words of another court unless it be greater in wisdom and numbers”? And Rebbi and his court permit what Daniel and his companions forbade? Rebbi Joḥanan follows his own opinion: Rebbi Joḥanan said, I have a tradition in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ṣadoq that any restrictive edict passed by a court which is not accepted by the majority of the public is not an edict. They checked and found in the matter of the edict about oil and did not find that a majority of the public followed it.
One of the Patriarch’s court expired. The burial cave received him but people’s lives were endangered. Rebbi Yose came and held a funeral oration, “happy the man who leaves the world in peace.” When Rebbi Yasa died, the sacred fountain of Tiberias fell down and those of the Patriarch’s court were happy. Rebbi Zeˋira told them, it is not comparable. There people were in danger, here nobody was in danger. There no pagan worship was uprooted, here pagan worship was uprooted.
One of the Patriarch’s court expired. The burial cave received him but people’s lives were endangered. Rebbi Yose came and held a funeral oration, “happy the man who leaves the world in peace.” When Rebbi Yasa died, the sacred fountain of Tiberias fell down and those of the Patriarch’s court were happy. Rebbi Zeˋira told them, it is not comparable. There people were in danger, here nobody was in danger. There no pagan worship was uprooted, here pagan worship was uprooted.
Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, if two alternatives are presented to the court, one chooses one of them. This excludes matters in the Power of Heaven.
HALAKHAH: “Plotting witnesses cannot be”. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that a plotting witness is not disqualified by the court but is disqualified by himself. Explain it by warning, as it was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said? For two testimonies with two warnings. But for one testimony and one warning any testimony which is partially disqualified is totally disqualified.” What does it mean, “if it is partially disqualified it is totally disqualified”? If they were standing and testifying against him on the tenth of Nisan that he had stolen an ox on the first of Nisan, and slaughtered or sold it on the fifth of Nisan. They were shown to be plotting on the eleventh of Nisan. Any testimony which they delivered between the second and the fifth of Nisan is retroactively disqualified. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, explain it if they deliver their testimony in one group and you cannot infer anything, as we have stated: “They were the first and they were the later [witnesses]. If they were shown to be plotting at first, there is nothing. At the second time, there is one testimony. At the third time, there are two testimonies. How? If they testify on one occasion, you could not infer anything. It only comes based on multiple testimonies. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that a plotting witness is not disqualified by the court but is disqualified by himself.
HALAKHAH: “Plotting witnesses cannot be”. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that a plotting witness is not disqualified by the court but is disqualified by himself. Explain it by warning, as it was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said? For two testimonies with two warnings. But for one testimony and one warning any testimony which is partially disqualified is totally disqualified.” What does it mean, “if it is partially disqualified it is totally disqualified”? If they were standing and testifying against him on the tenth of Nisan that he had stolen an ox on the first of Nisan, and slaughtered or sold it on the fifth of Nisan. They were shown to be plotting on the eleventh of Nisan. Any testimony which they delivered between the second and the fifth of Nisan is retroactively disqualified. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, explain it if they deliver their testimony in one group and you cannot infer anything, as we have stated: “They were the first and they were the later [witnesses]. If they were shown to be plotting at first, there is nothing. At the second time, there is one testimony. At the third time, there are two testimonies. How? If they testify on one occasion, you could not infer anything. It only comes based on multiple testimonies. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that a plotting witness is not disqualified by the court but is disqualified by himself.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, nobody can be executed unless his two witnesses warned him, as it is said: By the mouth of two witnesses. Another explanation: By the mouth of two witnesses, that the court may not hear from the mouth of an interpreter.
MISHNAH: If somebody escaped after sentence was passed, if he is returned to the same court, his case is not reopened. Anywhere two [people] will come forward and say, we testify against this man that he was condemned in court X on the testimony of Y and Z, he shall be executed. Criminal courts apply in the Land and outside the Land. A criminal court which hands out a death sentence once in a Sabbatical period is called terrorist. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah said, once in seventy years. Rebbi Tarphon and Rebbi Aqiba say, if we had been members of a criminal court, nobody ever would have been condemned to death there. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, they would have increased the number of murderers in Israel.
MISHNAH: If somebody escaped after sentence was passed, if he is returned to the same court, his case is not reopened. Anywhere two [people] will come forward and say, we testify against this man that he was condemned in court X on the testimony of Y and Z, he shall be executed. Criminal courts apply in the Land and outside the Land. A criminal court which hands out a death sentence once in a Sabbatical period is called terrorist. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah said, once in seventy years. Rebbi Tarphon and Rebbi Aqiba say, if we had been members of a criminal court, nobody ever would have been condemned to death there. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, they would have increased the number of murderers in Israel.
MISHNAH: If somebody escaped after sentence was passed, if he is returned to the same court, his case is not reopened. Anywhere two [people] will come forward and say, we testify against this man that he was condemned in court X on the testimony of Y and Z, he shall be executed. Criminal courts apply in the Land and outside the Land. A criminal court which hands out a death sentence once in a Sabbatical period is called terrorist. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah said, once in seventy years. Rebbi Tarphon and Rebbi Aqiba say, if we had been members of a criminal court, nobody ever would have been condemned to death there. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, they would have increased the number of murderers in Israel.
MISHNAH: If somebody escaped after sentence was passed, if he is returned to the same court, his case is not reopened. Anywhere two [people] will come forward and say, we testify against this man that he was condemned in court X on the testimony of Y and Z, he shall be executed. Criminal courts apply in the Land and outside the Land. A criminal court which hands out a death sentence once in a Sabbatical period is called terrorist. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah said, once in seventy years. Rebbi Tarphon and Rebbi Aqiba say, if we had been members of a criminal court, nobody ever would have been condemned to death there. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, they would have increased the number of murderers in Israel.
MISHNAH: If he threw the stone into his own courtyard and it killed, if the person damaged had the right to enter there, he is exiled, but if not, he is not exiled, as it is said, if somebody goes with another to a forest. Since the forest is a place where the person injured and the one causing the injury both may enter, this excludes a private courtyard where the person injured and the one causing the injury may not enter together. Abba Shaul says, since cutting down trees is a voluntary act, this excludes a father who hits his son, a teacher who disciplines his student, and the court bailiff.
MISHNAH: Where are they exiled to? To the cities of refuge. To the three in Transjordan and the three in the Land of Canaan, as it is said: Three cities you shall designate in Transjordan, etc. As long as those in the Land of Israel had not been selected, those in Transjordan were not receiving, as it is said, there shall be six cities of refuge, not until all six were receiving together. Roads were maintained from one to the other, as it is said: Maintain the road for yourselves, and divide the domain of your Land into three parts. One sends with them two scholars lest he kill him on the road, to argue with him. Rebbi Meïr says, he may argue for himself as it is said, this is the word of the homicide. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, at the start both the involuntary and the voluntary [homicide] go to the city of refuge; the court sends and brings them back from there. If one is found guilty by a death sentence, they execute him. If he is found not guilty in a capital case, he is freed. If he is found guilty to be exiled they return him to his place as it is said, the community shall return him to his city of refuge. Not only a [High Priest] anointed with the anointing oil, but also one wearing the many vestments, and one deposed from his office. Rebbi Jehudah says, also the one anointed for war returns the homicide. Therefore, the mothers of the [High] Priests support them with food and clothing, so they should not pray for the death of their sons. If sentence had been passed when the High Priest died, he is not exiled. If sentence had not yet been passed when the High Priest died, and sentence was passed after a successor had been appointed, he returns after the death of the second. If sentence was passed when there was no High Priest, or one who killed a High Priest, or a High Priest who killed, can never leave from there. He cannot leave from there, neither for a testimony of obligation, nor a testimony in a civil suit, nor a testimony in a criminal suit, not even if Israel needs him like Joab ben Ṣeruya, he cannot ever leave from there, as it is said there. There shall be his dwelling, there he shall die, there he shall be buried. Just as the city grants asylum, so does its domain grant asylum. If a murderer left the domain and was found by the avenger of the blood, Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, it is the obligation of the avenger of the blood and the right of everybody. Rebbi Aqiba says, it is the right of the avenger of the blood and nobody would be liable because of him. If a tree stands inside the domain but its crown is outside the domain, or the tree stands outside the domain but its crown is inside the domain, everything follows the crown. If somebody killed in one of these cities, he is exiled from quarter to quarter; but a Levite who killed is exiled from one city to another. Similarly, a homicide exiled to a city of refuge whom the citizens of the town wanted to honor, should say to them, I am a homicide. If they tell him, anyway, he should accept, for it is said, this is the word of a homicide.
Also you say that Joab was of the opinion that the horns of an altar give asylum but only its top gives asylum; in fact only the top of the one in Shilo gives asylum, but that of the Temple does not give asylum. But I am saying that neither the altar gives asylum, nor does its top give asylum, nor the one in Shilo gives asylum, nor that of the Temple gives asylum. Nothing except the six cities of refuge give asylum. Is it possible that Joab, about whom it is written, the most wise, head of the third should err in this matter? Rebbi Tanḥuma said, he fled to the Sanhedrin, because it is stated: The property of people executed by the court goes to their heirs; the property of people executed by the government goes to the government. Joab said, it is better that I should be executed by the court and my sons will inherit from me than that the king should execute me and inherit from me. When Solomon heard this he said, do I need his money? Immediately, I shall remove the blood for free, but his money is not free. He sent through Benaiahu who smote him and killed him; they buried him in his house in the wilderness. Was his house a wilderness? But to tell you that when Joab the commander of Israel’s army died, Israel was turned into a wilderness. If you say that he collected booty to build public baths and baths, this is worthy of praise. But if you say that he collected booty to support Sages and their students, it is worthy of the highest praise. And from where that the Supreme Sanhedrin is near the altar? Do not ascend on my altar by stairs. What is written next? These are the rules of law you shall put before them.
Also you say that Joab was of the opinion that the horns of an altar give asylum but only its top gives asylum; in fact only the top of the one in Shilo gives asylum, but that of the Temple does not give asylum. But I am saying that neither the altar gives asylum, nor does its top give asylum, nor the one in Shilo gives asylum, nor that of the Temple gives asylum. Nothing except the six cities of refuge give asylum. Is it possible that Joab, about whom it is written, the most wise, head of the third should err in this matter? Rebbi Tanḥuma said, he fled to the Sanhedrin, because it is stated: The property of people executed by the court goes to their heirs; the property of people executed by the government goes to the government. Joab said, it is better that I should be executed by the court and my sons will inherit from me than that the king should execute me and inherit from me. When Solomon heard this he said, do I need his money? Immediately, I shall remove the blood for free, but his money is not free. He sent through Benaiahu who smote him and killed him; they buried him in his house in the wilderness. Was his house a wilderness? But to tell you that when Joab the commander of Israel’s army died, Israel was turned into a wilderness. If you say that he collected booty to build public baths and baths, this is worthy of praise. But if you say that he collected booty to support Sages and their students, it is worthy of the highest praise. And from where that the Supreme Sanhedrin is near the altar? Do not ascend on my altar by stairs. What is written next? These are the rules of law you shall put before them.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled.” etc. A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable. Everywhere it is said that a restriction after a restriction is an addition, but here it is said, a restriction after a restriction is to reduce? Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is different here since there is written a restriction after a restriction after a restriction.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled.” etc. A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable. Everywhere it is said that a restriction after a restriction is an addition, but here it is said, a restriction after a restriction is to reduce? Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is different here since there is written a restriction after a restriction after a restriction.
Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath, who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden, who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.
In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael, who does not refer this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, it is understandable. But what is the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, who refers this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, as we have stated: From where that those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, are obligated to bring them after the Day of Atonement, but those obligated for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable? The verse says, or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring, even after the Day of Atonement. From the following: A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, {but one dependent} on the Court is not liable.
“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left. What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable.
The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.
The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.
The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.
The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.
The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.
Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah by instruction from the Court. If the Court ruled to eliminate the entire body, since the Court has to bring a bull a private person does not have to bring a female sheep or goat. If they ruled to confirm part and to eliminate part, since the Court does not bring a bull a private person has to bring a female sheep or goat.
Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah by instruction from the Court. If the Court ruled to eliminate the entire body, since the Court has to bring a bull a private person does not have to bring a female sheep or goat. If they ruled to confirm part and to eliminate part, since the Court does not bring a bull a private person has to bring a female sheep or goat.
Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah by instruction from the Court. If the Court ruled to eliminate the entire body, since the Court has to bring a bull a private person does not have to bring a female sheep or goat. If they ruled to confirm part and to eliminate part, since the Court does not bring a bull a private person has to bring a female sheep or goat.