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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:5

You say that the father decides for his daughter; even if she is an adult? Let us hear from the following: The father decides for his daughter, but the mother does not decide for her daughter, nor the brother for his sister. Is there a difference about his sister whether she is an adolescent or an adult? So here, there is no difference whether she is an adolescent or an adult. Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, even a third party? They said, even if she be an adult? A third party, let us hear from the following: The father decides for his daughter, but the mother does not decide for her daughter, nor the brother for his sister. So much more for the adult. Also in money matters it is so: Give your daughter to X and I shall give you so-and-so much. Buy this field and I shall give you so-and-so much.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:5

You say that the father decides for his daughter; even if she is an adult? Let us hear from the following: The father decides for his daughter, but the mother does not decide for her daughter, nor the brother for his sister. Is there a difference about his sister whether she is an adolescent or an adult? So here, there is no difference whether she is an adolescent or an adult. Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, even a third party? They said, even if she be an adult? A third party, let us hear from the following: The father decides for his daughter, but the mother does not decide for her daughter, nor the brother for his sister. So much more for the adult. Also in money matters it is so: Give your daughter to X and I shall give you so-and-so much. Buy this field and I shall give you so-and-so much.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:5

You say that the father decides for his daughter; even if she is an adult? Let us hear from the following: The father decides for his daughter, but the mother does not decide for her daughter, nor the brother for his sister. Is there a difference about his sister whether she is an adolescent or an adult? So here, there is no difference whether she is an adolescent or an adult. Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, even a third party? They said, even if she be an adult? A third party, let us hear from the following: The father decides for his daughter, but the mother does not decide for her daughter, nor the brother for his sister. So much more for the adult. Also in money matters it is so: Give your daughter to X and I shall give you so-and-so much. Buy this field and I shall give you so-and-so much.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:16

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:16

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:25

“If she brought”. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, not only if she brought but even if she could have brought. As it was stated: His wife ascends with him but does not descend with him; a widow and her children descend but do not ascend; workers ascend but do not descend. The daughter neither ascends nor descends. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Jehudah said, because one cares for the slave girl. Rebbi Abun said, Because these labors are degrading, they are referred to as the slave girl’s. Rebbi Judah ben Rebbi Abun said, because usually a woman does not sit aimlessly in her house. Rav Huna said, even if she brought him 100 slave girls, he can force her to serve him with particular attention. What are services with particular attention? She rubs his body, washes his feet, and mixes him the cup. Why? Because she is obligated to do that, or because it is not appropriate to use a slave girl for these? If you say because it is not appropriate to use a slave girl for these, here she brought him slaves! It must be because she is obligated to do that. Rebbi Eudaimon in Sepphoris asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it not reasonable because she is obligated to do that? He said to him, that is what I am always thinking.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:45

She has no claim to wine since poor Jewish women do not drink wine. Do rich women drink? Did we not state: It happened that the Sages assigned to Martha bat Boethos two se‘ah of wine every day. How can the court assign wine? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, because of “Whoring, wine, and cider will destroy the mind.” But did we not state: ”If she was nursing, one reduces the amount of her work and increases her food”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said wine, for it increases the milk. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Also they assigned it for cooking. Nevertheless, she cursed them and said to them, so you should give to your daughters. Rebbi Aḥa said, and we answered her, Amen. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ẓadoq said, I should not see consolation if I did not see her collecting barley grains between horses’ hooves at Acco. I quoted about her the verse: “The dainty one among you and the pampered, …” “If you have no experience, most beautiful of women, go following the flock …”. But did we not state: It happened that the Sages assigned to Miryam, the daughter of Simeon ben Gorion, a daily supply of perfume for 500 denar, when she was only waiting for her levir. Nevertheless, she cursed them and said to them, so you should give to your daughters. Rebbi Aḥa said, and we answered her, Amen. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ẓadoq said, I should not see consolation if I did not see her bound with her hair to a horse’s tail at Acco. I quoted about her the verse: “The dainty one among you and the pampered, …”.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:3

For whom is it needed? For Rebbi Meïr! Even though for Rebbi Meïr the hand of the slave is his master’s hand and if the wife acquired title the husband should have acquired it; he agrees that his rights over it are restricted to the use of the yield. There, we have stated: “The finds of his underage son and daughter or of his Canaanite slave or slave-girl as well as his wife’s find belong to him,” for he can direct them to do other work. Why do we say: “The finds of his adult son and daughter or of his Hebrew slave or slave-girl belong to them,” because he cannot direct them to do other work. But his wife he cannot direct to do other work and you say that her find belongs to him! Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is another reason for his wife. What is the other reason for his wife? Rebbi Ḥaggai says, because of quarrel. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but that she should not smuggle away any of her husband’s property and say, I found it. Think of it, if another person gave it to her as a gift! A gift is public knowledge, a find is not public knowledge. Think of it, if she found it in the presence of witnesses! This because of that. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, if they are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:3

For whom is it needed? For Rebbi Meïr! Even though for Rebbi Meïr the hand of the slave is his master’s hand and if the wife acquired title the husband should have acquired it; he agrees that his rights over it are restricted to the use of the yield. There, we have stated: “The finds of his underage son and daughter or of his Canaanite slave or slave-girl as well as his wife’s find belong to him,” for he can direct them to do other work. Why do we say: “The finds of his adult son and daughter or of his Hebrew slave or slave-girl belong to them,” because he cannot direct them to do other work. But his wife he cannot direct to do other work and you say that her find belongs to him! Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is another reason for his wife. What is the other reason for his wife? Rebbi Ḥaggai says, because of quarrel. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but that she should not smuggle away any of her husband’s property and say, I found it. Think of it, if another person gave it to her as a gift! A gift is public knowledge, a find is not public knowledge. Think of it, if she found it in the presence of witnesses! This because of that. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, if they are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:7

HALAKHAH: “If somebody decided on money for his son-in-law and the son-in-law died,” etc. Are these not the things that are acquired by speech? Bar Qappara stated: He promised the dowry on condition there be a marriage. And it is so: If somebody decided on money for his underage daughter, one forces him to give. But not for the adult one? Rebbi Abun said, one forces [the groom] to give a bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:9

HALAKHAH: “If she decided to bring him 1’000 denars,” etc. Why did they say for money, one and one half times, and for estimations less one fifth? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, one estimates the will of the woman that she wants to use her vessels and depreciates them by a fifth. One estimates the will of the man to use it in trade and to make them one and one half. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that nobody has the right to sell his wife’s vessels. Example: Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi went to appraise for Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina’s daughter. They said to [the groom]: Deduct a fifth and double. He said to them, he deducts a fifth and does not double.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:14

MISHNAH: If somebody marries off his daughter without mentioning particulars he should not give her less than 50 zuz If he had decided to take her in naked the husband should not say, if she comes to my house I shall clothe her in my garment, but he covers her when she still is in her father’s house. Similarly, those who marry off an orphan girl should not give her less that 50 zuz, and if money is available one provides for her according to her social standing.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:15

HALAKHAH: “If somebody marries off his daughter,” etc. Rebbi Abba Mari, Rebbi Yose’s brother, asked: Did we not state: From where that even if he said, I shall go naked but clothe her, one does not tell him to be naked and to clothe her but he clothes her according to her social standing? There, it is the way of people to say, it is better for me to stand naked if only I cover my wife; but here it was a prior condition.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:17

MISHNAH: If an orphan girl was married off by her mother or her brothers and they wrote her 100 or 50 zuz, after she becomes an adult she can claim from them what is appropriate to be given to her. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he married off his first daughter, the second should be given in the way the first had been given. But the Sages say, sometimes it happens that a person was poor and became rich, or was rich and became poor. But one appraises the property and gives to her

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:18

HALAKHAH: “If an orphan girl was married off by her mother or her brothers,” etc. So is the Mishnah: If they married off the first one there should be given. The words of the Sages: ”Sometimes a man marries off his daughter and spends money on her, and sometimes a man marries off his daughter and collects money for her.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:18

HALAKHAH: “If an orphan girl was married off by her mother or her brothers,” etc. So is the Mishnah: If they married off the first one there should be given. The words of the Sages: ”Sometimes a man marries off his daughter and spends money on her, and sometimes a man marries off his daughter and collects money for her.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:21

MISHNAH: If somebody gives money in trust for his daughter and she says, I am trusting my husband, the trustee should execute what he was entrusted with, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, is it not only about a field? If she wants to sell it, can she not sell it now? When has this been said? If she is an adult. But about a minor, no legal act of a minor is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:22

HALAKHAH: “If somebody gives money in trust for his daughter and she says, I am trusting my husband,” etc. The Mishnah speaks of the case that he gave at the time of the preliminary marriage. But if he gave at the definitive marriage even Rebbi Meïr agrees If he established the trust after the definitive marriage, that is the disagreement.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:8

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. That refers to what Rebbi Immi said, that a man should be induced to give generously to his daughter. If that is so, then even if there is no excess denar? Rebbi Abun said, in case you can uphold their words with the words of the Torah, you uphold their words with the words of the Torah. But in case you cannot uphold their words with the words of the Torah, you disregard their words and uphold the words of the Torah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:1

MISHNAH: If somebody marries a woman and contracts with her to sustain her daughter for five years, he is obligated to sustain her for five years. If [the mother] was married to another man who contracted with her to sustain her daughter for five years, he is obligated to sustain her for five years. The first one cannot say, if she will come to live with me I shall sustain her, but he has to bring her support to her place. Similarly, the two cannot say we shall support her in common, but one of them sustains her and the other gives the money equivalent to her sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:1

MISHNAH: If somebody marries a woman and contracts with her to sustain her daughter for five years, he is obligated to sustain her for five years. If [the mother] was married to another man who contracted with her to sustain her daughter for five years, he is obligated to sustain her for five years. The first one cannot say, if she will come to live with me I shall sustain her, but he has to bring her support to her place. Similarly, the two cannot say we shall support her in common, but one of them sustains her and the other gives the money equivalent to her sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:3

It was stated: He supports her the first five years, whether in inflation or in deflation. If [living expenses] were high and became low, if he was the cause, he pays the high rate, if she was the cause, he pays the low rate. If they were low and became high, whether he was the cause or she was the cause, he pays the low rate. That is, “the daughter neither ascends nor descends.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:4

There, we have stated: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate,” and it was stated about this: They will be clothed with garments supplied by me. For whom does the daughter work? Let us hear from the following: “The husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance.” This means, he feeds her but she works for her husband. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody had agreed to sustain his daughter-in-law, he has to sustain her, but she works for his son. If he wants her to be with him but she does not want to, the law is with her, as we have stated: “They pay the cost of her sustenance.” If she fell ill, it is as if she had married. If she died, is it as if she had married? If she died, she already is dead.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:4

There, we have stated: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate,” and it was stated about this: They will be clothed with garments supplied by me. For whom does the daughter work? Let us hear from the following: “The husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance.” This means, he feeds her but she works for her husband. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody had agreed to sustain his daughter-in-law, he has to sustain her, but she works for his son. If he wants her to be with him but she does not want to, the law is with her, as we have stated: “They pay the cost of her sustenance.” If she fell ill, it is as if she had married. If she died, is it as if she had married? If she died, she already is dead.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:5

MISHNAH: If the daughter married, the husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance. If they died, their daughters are supported from unincumbered property but she is supported from mortgaged property since her status is that of a creditor. The intelligent ones did write: On condition that I support your daughter for five years the entire time you are with me.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:5

MISHNAH: If the daughter married, the husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance. If they died, their daughters are supported from unincumbered property but she is supported from mortgaged property since her status is that of a creditor. The intelligent ones did write: On condition that I support your daughter for five years the entire time you are with me.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:6

HALAKHAH: “If the daughter married, the husband has to sustain her,” etc. What is the status of the ketubah stipulations if he wrote them in the document? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he wrote them for emphasis; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he wrote them to collect from encumbered property. Rebbi Jeremiah switched the traditions. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah supports him who said, he wrote them for emphasis, since we stated there: “One does not foreclose from mortgaged property to indemnify for produce or investment, or sustenance of widow and daughters, in order not to impede the economy.” Are [the first categories] not based on a document? Here also based on the document. Rebbi Ḥanania said, “since her status is that of a creditor”! Is that not based on a document? Here also based on the document.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:7

If she dies she is not with him. If she was divorced she is not with him. If he took her back? One says, this was stated for the ketubah but not for the stipulations; one says, both for the ketubah and the stipulations, which opinion is valid? “The intelligent ones did write: On condition that I support your daughter for five years the entire time you are with me;” on that it was stated: Only for the first marriage. This parallels what Rebbi Ḥanina said, if somebody marries off his son in a house, the latter acquires the house, but only for a first marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:10

“Vain” and “untruth” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Remember” and “keep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Its desecrator shall be put to death” and “two unblemished one year old sheep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “The nakedness of your brother’s wife you shall not uncover”, “her brother-in-law shall come to her”, both were said together. “You shall not move real property from one tribe to another,” “any daughter inheriting real property,” both together. “Fringes you shall make for yourself,” “do not wear sha‘ṭnez”, both were said together. And so it says, “God spoke once, two I heard from this.” And it is written: “Is not my word like fire, says the Eternal, and like a hammer which shatters a rock.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:10

“This, your house,” because of what do you catch him? Because of “your house,” “this”? If it collapsed and he himself rebuilt it, is it not “this”? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody said to his heirs, give a wedding house to my son or a widow’s house to my daughter, if it collapsed, the heirs are required to rebuild it.” There, we have stated: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, [the son] inherits. ‘During my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, [the son] does not inherit.” [Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, [the son] inherits; ‘after my death’, [the son] inherits?] What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose [ben Ḥanina] both say, ‘a qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade to him during his lifetime and after his death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Nedarim what we did not state in S̄ebuot: “A qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is forbidden.” Because he said “this”. Therefore, if he had not said “this”, he would have forbidden to him both during his lifetime and after his death.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:26

MISHNAH: If they were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter and he said, a qônām if she ever has any usufruct from me, and similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife and said, a qônām if my wife ever has any usufruct from me, they may have usufruct from him since he intended only about matters of marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:27

HALAKHAH: “If they were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.” “And similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife.” Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:24

HALAKHAH: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, one finds an opening for a man exclusively about his own honor. As the following? A woman vowed [not to have benefit] from her daughter. She came to Rebbi Joḥanan who said to her, if you had known that your daughter gets a bad reputation, would you have made the vow? She said, no, and he permitted her. Is that not the Mishnah: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor and that of his children”? That you should not think one follows Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:24

HALAKHAH: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, one finds an opening for a man exclusively about his own honor. As the following? A woman vowed [not to have benefit] from her daughter. She came to Rebbi Joḥanan who said to her, if you had known that your daughter gets a bad reputation, would you have made the vow? She said, no, and he permitted her. Is that not the Mishnah: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor and that of his children”? That you should not think one follows Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:25

MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not marry the ugly Miss X, and she is beautiful, black and she is white, short and she is tall, he is permitted. Not because she was ugly and became beautiful, black and she became white, short and she became tall, but because the vow was erroneous. It happened that one made a vow renouncing benefit from his sister’s daughter. They brought her to Rebbi Ismael’s house and gave her a beauty treatment. Rebbi Ismael asked him, did you make your vow about this one? He said no, and Rebbi Ismael dissolved it. At that moment, Rebbi Ismael cried and said, the daughters of Israel are beautiful, but poverty disfigures them.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:3

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:3

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:3

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:7

HALAKHAH: “If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband,” etc. They wanted to say that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. Let us hear from the following: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’.” This implies that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:13

MISHNAH: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’. Similarly, the husband tells her before she enters his domain: ‘Any vows which you had vowed before you enter my domain are dissolved,’ for after she enters his domain he cannot dissolve. An adult girl and one who had waited twelve months and a widow 30 days, Rebbi Eliezer says, since her husband is responsible for her upkeep he may dissolve but the Sages say that the husband dissolves only after she enters his domain.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:15

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me, they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me, let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “An Israel can say to another Israel, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two [Cohanim] and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:15

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me, they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me, let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “An Israel can say to another Israel, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two [Cohanim] and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:15

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me, they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me, let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “An Israel can say to another Israel, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two [Cohanim] and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:22

MISHNAH: If his wife made a vow and he was under the impression that it was his daughter, or his daughter made a vow and he was under this impression that it was his wife. If she vowed to be a nazir and he was under the impression that she vowed a sacrifice, or if she vowed a sacrifice and he was under the impression that she vowed to be a nazir. If she woved to abstain from figs and he was under the impression that it was from grapes, or if from grapes and he was under the impression that it was from figs, he shall dissolve a second time.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:22

MISHNAH: If his wife made a vow and he was under the impression that it was his daughter, or his daughter made a vow and he was under this impression that it was his wife. If she vowed to be a nazir and he was under the impression that she vowed a sacrifice, or if she vowed a sacrifice and he was under the impression that she vowed to be a nazir. If she woved to abstain from figs and he was under the impression that it was from grapes, or if from grapes and he was under the impression that it was from figs, he shall dissolve a second time.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:28

MISHNAH: If a person is by a vow prevented to benefit his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband shall have no claim to them, except what you trade for your needs.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:32

MISHNAH: The vows of nine young women are confirmed: An adult who is an orphan, an adolescent who became an adult and is an orphan, an adolescent who did not become an adult but is an orphan. An adult whose father died, an adolescent who became an adult and her father died, an adolescent who did not become an adult and her father died. An adolescent whose father died and afterwards she became an adult, an adult whose father lives, an adolescent girl whose father lives. Rebbi Jehudah says, also if somebody marries off his underage daughter and she becomes widowed or divorced and returns to him, she still is an adolescent.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:22

MISHNAH: “I shall be a nazir if I have a son,” when a son is born to him, he is a nazir; if a daughter, a sexless, or a hermaphrodite, he is not a nazir. If he said, “when I see a child of mine,” even if a daughter, a sexless, or a hermaphrodite were born to him he is a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:22

MISHNAH: “I shall be a nazir if I have a son,” when a son is born to him, he is a nazir; if a daughter, a sexless, or a hermaphrodite, he is not a nazir. If he said, “when I see a child of mine,” even if a daughter, a sexless, or a hermaphrodite were born to him he is a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:23

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir if I have a son,” etc. A daughter counts for nothing, a sexless or a hermaphrodite are questionable.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:8

A “torn” [creature] that was turned into a carcass. Rebbi Yasa, the son of Rebbi Yasa’s daughter, in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he is guilty twice; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is guilty only once. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose, the following supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “ ‘Any person who would eat any carcass meat,’ why does the verse say ‘and torn’? If a ‘torn’ animal can survive, was ‘carcass meat’ mentioned before? If a ‘torn’ animal must die, is it not included in ‘carcass meat’ ”? Should he not say, it is carcass meat? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: The reason of Rebbi Yose: “Do not defile yourself by animals and birds,” but only the Eight Reptiles impart impurity! But the measure of their impurities is the measure of their uses as food. Rebbi Eleazar objected: May not the limbs of pure animals impart impurity in the most minute amount but as food only in the volume of an olive? He accepted it. What is meant by “he accepted it”? Like a person who said, the opponent accepted it. Ḥiyya bar Abba said: “You shall not [eat] any carcass meat.” The Torah identified all eating together. Rebbi Ḥanina objected: Is not the impurity of the Eight Reptiles in the size of a lentil, but as food in the volume of an olive, whether for blood or for meat?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:57

MISHNAH: If one of the bloods had been sprinkled for him when he became impure, Rebbi Eliezer says, he has to repeat everything. But the Sages say, he shall bring his remaining sacrifices once he became pure again. They told him, it happened with Miriam the Palmyrene, that one of the bloods had been sprinkled for her when she was informed that her daughter was dying; she went and found her dead; then the Sages said, she shall bring her remaining sacrifices once she becomes pure again.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:26

MISHNAH: Even women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died are trustworthy to bring her bill of divorce: Her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her sister-in-law, and her husband’s daughter. What is the difference between divorce and death? The writing is the proof. A woman may herself bring her own bill of divorce, but she still is required to say that it was written and signed before her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:26

MISHNAH: Even women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died are trustworthy to bring her bill of divorce: Her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her sister-in-law, and her husband’s daughter. What is the difference between divorce and death? The writing is the proof. A woman may herself bring her own bill of divorce, but she still is required to say that it was written and signed before her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:11

MISHNAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it, if he finds it on the spot it is valid, otherwise it is invalid. If he finds it in a small bag or in a box, if he recognizes it, it is valid. If somebody transports a bill of divorce from an old or sick man, he delivers it to her under the presumption that the man is alive. The daughter of an Israel who is married to a Cohen and whose husband went overseas, may eat heave under the presumption that he is alive. If somebody sends his purification offering from overseas, it is sacrificed under the presumption that he is alive.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:15

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar ben Parṭa said three things before the Sages and they confirmed his words: [People in] a city which was surrounded by palisades, on a ship in emergency at sea, or a person about to be judged, are presumed to be alive. But on [people in] a city conquered from palisades, a ship lost at sea, or a person led to execution, one puts the restrictions of the living and the dead: neither an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen nor a Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel may eat heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:15

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar ben Parṭa said three things before the Sages and they confirmed his words: [People in] a city which was surrounded by palisades, on a ship in emergency at sea, or a person about to be judged, are presumed to be alive. But on [people in] a city conquered from palisades, a ship lost at sea, or a person led to execution, one puts the restrictions of the living and the dead: neither an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen nor a Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel may eat heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:17

They added three additional cases: One who was dragged away by a wild animal, one who was swept away by a river, and one buried by a collapse. One puts the restrictions of the living and the dead on her: neither an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen nor a Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel may eat heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:17

They added three additional cases: One who was dragged away by a wild animal, one who was swept away by a river, and one buried by a collapse. One puts the restrictions of the living and the dead on her: neither an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen nor a Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel may eat heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow can be paid from the orphans’ property only,” etc. Earlier they swore falsely and buried their children, since it is written: “For vain [vows] I smote your children.” In addition, they fear vows more than oaths. If she transgressed and swore? Rav Huna said, if she swore, she swore. Rav said to his daughter-in-law: If I were not a person readily making concessions, even the cover on your head would be my property. Samuel said, she acquires the garments which she is wearing. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “Neither his wife’s garments nor his children’s are his property.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:12

Rav Huna said, why did they require a date on the bill of divorce? Because of an actual case. It so happened that a man was married to his sister’s daughter who committed adultery when she was still married. He predated the bill of divorce and said, it is better she should be judged as single rather than as a married woman.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:52

Following the opinion of the rabbis there it is acceptable since there, they say in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what is found in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what is robbed from him is robbed because of communal peace; a nut or a pebble he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “If a man give.” The gift of a man is a gift, but the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, robbing from him is not clear unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that is, to recover from him by a law suit, but to have to bring a sacrifice for [a false] oath only if he grew two pubic hairs. But following the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “A man to his neighbor”, until he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac explained it by the method of the artless. As we have stated there: “For underage children, their buying is buying and their selling selling, for movables.” But did we not state there: “He cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:8

If [the husband] said to [another person]: Bring my wife’s bill of divorce, or her daughter’s, or her sister’s, then he went and delivered it to her, it is no divorce. But if [the other] said: Give a bill of divorce to his wife, and [the husband] said, here is my wife’s bill of divorce, or her daughter’s, or her sister’s, and he went and gave it to her, it is a divorce. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Avin in the name of Rebbi Shammai: These are Rebbi’s words. But the Sages say, only if she says, it should be mine in your hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:8

If [the husband] said to [another person]: Bring my wife’s bill of divorce, or her daughter’s, or her sister’s, then he went and delivered it to her, it is no divorce. But if [the other] said: Give a bill of divorce to his wife, and [the husband] said, here is my wife’s bill of divorce, or her daughter’s, or her sister’s, and he went and gave it to her, it is a divorce. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Avin in the name of Rebbi Shammai: These are Rebbi’s words. But the Sages say, only if she says, it should be mine in your hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:10

MISHNAH: A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me, needs two groups of witnesses; two who say that she appointed in their presence and two who say that in their presence he received it and tore it up, even if the first ones are the latter ones, or one of the first together with one of the latter and a third person is associated with them. A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah says, no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce. Any female who cannot take care of her bill of divorce cannot be divorced. If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand. Therefore, if the husband wants to retract he can retract since an underage person cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:12

“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:12

“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:22

Rebbi Mana said, not only a neck-iron of mortal danger but also a neck-iron of money. For every neck-iron is a mortal danger. Rebbi Eleazar asked: Does his gift follow the rules of the gift of a sick person? Rebbi Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jacob the Armenian: That which is a problem for Rebbi Simeon is obvious for Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina, as we have stated there: “One may have use for the hair of a woman who was executed but an animal which was executed is forbidden for all use.” Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, if she said, my bonnet should be given to my daughter.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:10

But only if it is intermittent. Shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife? And he says, yes. For your mother, and he says, no. For your wife? And he says, yes. For your daughter, and he says, no. For your wife? And he says, yes. For your sister, and he says, no. Is it the same for testimony? Rebbi Abbahu came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is the same for testimony, since a person may testify while sitting. The same holds for vows. Rav Sheshet stated: Just as one checks three times for bills of divorce, so one checks for inheritance, commercial transactions, and gifts.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:33

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:3

But are her garden and her courtyard not subject to her husband’s having the usufruct? Rebbi Joshua in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqulah in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: Even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It turns out that Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis and Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis, for the rabbis say, even though the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, he can acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand. But her garden and her courtyard are subject to her husband’s having the usufruct unless he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It is difficult for the rabbis: since the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, how can he acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand? Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr, for Rebbi Meїr said since the wife’s hand is not her husband’s hand, she can acquire her bill of divorce from her husband. Her garden and her courtyard will not be subject to her husband, even if he has the usufruct, even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” If he inherited properties together with her, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write; [for example] if he had married his brother’s daughter, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write. If another person gave her a gift and told her, on condition that your husband have no rights to it, but it is for you to trade on your own account, then even if he did not write it is as if he wrote.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:21

MISHNAH: If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media or the government of Greece, from the construction of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple; if he was in the West and wrote “in the East” or in the East and wrote “in the West”, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥaliṣah but not levirate. If he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Referring to all the close relatives about whom they said that their co-wives are permitted, if any of the co-wives went and married otherwise but the relatives turned out to be she-rams, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the aforementioned consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:21

MISHNAH: If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media or the government of Greece, from the construction of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple; if he was in the West and wrote “in the East” or in the East and wrote “in the West”, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥaliṣah but not levirate. If he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Referring to all the close relatives about whom they said that their co-wives are permitted, if any of the co-wives went and married otherwise but the relatives turned out to be she-rams, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the aforementioned consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:21

MISHNAH: If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media or the government of Greece, from the construction of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple; if he was in the West and wrote “in the East” or in the East and wrote “in the West”, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥaliṣah but not levirate. If he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Referring to all the close relatives about whom they said that their co-wives are permitted, if any of the co-wives went and married otherwise but the relatives turned out to be she-rams, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the aforementioned consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3

After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8

MISHNAH: “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with, it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalȋṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful, it is invalid. The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:13

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ḥalaphta from Haifa: Any who were married on the basis of such a document should not leave in order not to give a bad reputation to her children. His daughter who was married outside on the basis of such a document should not leave in order to damage her co-wife to her father. Her co-wife who was married outside on the basis of such a document has to leave. His daughter who married his brother [on the basis of such a document has to leave. Her co-wife who was married to his brother] on the basis of such a document, or even to her father, should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:13

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ḥalaphta from Haifa: Any who were married on the basis of such a document should not leave in order not to give a bad reputation to her children. His daughter who was married outside on the basis of such a document should not leave in order to damage her co-wife to her father. Her co-wife who was married outside on the basis of such a document has to leave. His daughter who married his brother [on the basis of such a document has to leave. Her co-wife who was married to his brother] on the basis of such a document, or even to her father, should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:38

The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:38

The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:38

The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:38

The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:75

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:77

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:127

The words of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba disagree, for Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rebbi Yudan, son of Rebbi Simeon bar Ioḥai’s daughter, stated that Rebbi Simeon bar Ioḥai stated: Honoring father and mother is great because the Holy One, praise to Him, preferred it over His own honor. It is said (Ex. 20:12): “Honor your father and your mother,” and it is said (Prov. 3:9): “Honor the Eternal with your property.” How do you honor Him? From your property! One gives gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah, one gives terumah, the First and Second Tithes and the tithe for the poor, ḥallah, one makes a sukkah, and lulav,shofar, and tefillin, and ẓiẓit, one feeds the hungry and gives to drink to the thirsty. If you have the wherewhithal, you are obliged for all of these; if you have nothing, you are not obliged even for one of them. But when it comes to honoring father and mother, whether you own property or you do not, you must honor father and mother, even if you are a beggar at people’s doors.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:1

MISHNAH: A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent, and a woman may be taken in preliminary marriage either in person or through an agent. A man may give away his adolescent daughter in preliminary marriage himself or through his agent. If a man say to a woman: Be married to me preliminarily by this date fruit, be preliminarily married by that one, she is preliminarily married if one of them was worth a peruṭah, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. By this and by that one, she is preliminarily married if together they are worth a peruṭah, but if she was eating immediately what she received, she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:8

If she was preliminarily married with agreement but definitively married without agreement, may she eat heave? Rav said, she does eat; but Samuel said, she may not eat. Rebbi Mana said, Rav’s reason is that if she was preliminarily married with agreement, the permanence of the status quo implies the assumption that he definitively married her with agreement. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav’s reason is that by the earlier Mishnah, a preliminarily married daughter of an Israel may eat heave. What is the difference between them? Her earnings. According to Rebbi Mana, for Rav her earnings belong to her husband; according to Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, for Rav her earnings belong to her father. If she should die, who inherits from her? According to Rebbi Mana, for Rav her husband inherits; according to Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, for Rav her father inherits if she dies. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun stated, for Rav her husband inherits if she dies. If she was preliminarily married without agreement and definitively married without agreement, may she eat heave? Samuel said, she does eat. Come and see: If she was preliminarily married with agreement and definitively married without agreement, Samuel says that she may not eat; here he says she may eat? Samuel treats her as an orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:20

MISHNAH: “Be preliminarily married to me by this cup of wine,” but it turned out to be honey; “of honey” but it turned out to be wine; “by this silver denar,” but it turned out to be of gold, “gold denar” but it turned out to be of silver; “on condition that I be poor”, but he turned out to be rich; “rich” but he turned out to be poor; she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Simeon said, if he tricked her by understatement she is preliminarily married. “On condition that I be a Cohen,” and he turned out to be a Levite; “a Levite” and he turned out to be a Cohen; “a Gibeonite” and he turned out to be a bastard, “a bastard” and he turned out to be a Gibeonite; “a villager” and he turned out to be from a walled city; “from a walled city” and he turned out to be from a village; “on condition that my house be close to the public baths” and it turned out to be far, “far” and it turned out to be close; “on condition that I have a grown-up daughter or slave-girl” and it turned out that he had none, “on condition that I have not” and it turned out that he did have; “on condition that I have children” and it turned out that he had none, “on condition that I not have children” and it turned out that he did have. Il all these cases she is not preliminarily married even if she says, I had the intention to be preliminarily married to him regardless. The same holds if she misinformed him.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:23

One understands “Cohen and he turns out to be a Levite.” “Levite and he turns out to be a Cohen”? She may say, I do not want one who is haughty towards me. One understands “from a walled city” and he turned out to be a villager; “from a village” and he turned out to be from a walled city? She may say, I want to be in a quiet place. “On condition that my house be close to the public baths” and it turned out to be far. One understands “close and it turned out to be far.” “Far and it turned out to be close”? She can say, I want to take a walk going and returning. “On condition that I have a daughter or slave-girl hairdresser” and it turned out that he had none, that one understands. “On condition that I have” and it turned out that he did not have? Think of it, if he had one at the end of the world! Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, so is the Mishnah: “A daughter to dress your hair, and a slave-girl to serve you.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:23

One understands “Cohen and he turns out to be a Levite.” “Levite and he turns out to be a Cohen”? She may say, I do not want one who is haughty towards me. One understands “from a walled city” and he turned out to be a villager; “from a village” and he turned out to be from a walled city? She may say, I want to be in a quiet place. “On condition that my house be close to the public baths” and it turned out to be far. One understands “close and it turned out to be far.” “Far and it turned out to be close”? She can say, I want to take a walk going and returning. “On condition that I have a daughter or slave-girl hairdresser” and it turned out that he had none, that one understands. “On condition that I have” and it turned out that he did not have? Think of it, if he had one at the end of the world! Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, so is the Mishnah: “A daughter to dress your hair, and a slave-girl to serve you.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:34

MISHNAH: If somebody preliminarily marries a woman and her daughter or two sisters simultaneously, they are not preliminarily married. It happened to five women, among them two sisters, that a man collected a bag of figs from their own property in the Sabbatical year and said: All of you are preliminarily married to me by this bag, and one of them accepted for all of them. Then the Sages said, the sisters are not preliminarily married.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:35

HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries a woman and her daughter,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, one understands from this five rules: One understands that five women can be preliminarily married simultaneously. That a woman may receive her own wedding gift and that of her companion. And one may use the spoils of robbery for a preliminary marriage. And one may preliminarily marry using produce acquired by a prohibited act. And preliminary marriage is impossible in incest situations.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:52

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me: they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me; let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One may say, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two Cohanim and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:52

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me: they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me; let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One may say, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two Cohanim and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:52

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me: they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me; let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One may say, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two Cohanim and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.