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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:9

Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah: Three lectured their teachings in front of their teachers: Rebbi Joshua in front of Rabban Joḥana ben Zakkai, Rebbi Aqiba in front of Rebbi Joshua, Ḥananiah ben Ḥakhinai in front of Rebbi Aqiba. From there on their mind was not pure. Four entered the Garden, One peeked and was hurt; one peeked and died; one peeked and cut saplings, one entered in peace and left in peace. Ben Azzai peeked and was hurt; about him the verse says, if you found honey, eat your fill. Ben Zoma peeked and died, about him the verse says, dear in the Eternal’s eyes is the death of his pious. Aḥer peeked and cut saplings. Who is Aḥer? Elisha ben Abuya, who killed the children of Torah. They said, if he saw a student excelling in Torah he killed him. Not only this, but he went to the school house and saw children in front of their Bible teacher. He said, what are these sitting doing here? The profession of this one is builder, the profession of this one is carpenter, the profession of this one is hunter, the profession of this one is tailor. When they heard this, they left him and went away. About him the verse says, do not let your mouth make your flesh sin, etc.; for he destroyed the deeds of himself. Also in the time of religious persecution they made them carry loads. They intended that two together should carry one load, because of two persons who performed one work. He said, make them carry singly. They went and made them carry singly. They intended to unload in karmelit, in order not to carry from a private to a public domain. He said to them, let them carry flasks; they made them carry flasks. Rebbi Aqiba entered in peace and left in peace; about him the verse says, draw me, I shall run after you, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:37

There, we have stated: [“For heave and First Fruits one incurs the penalty of death or a fine of a fifth; they are forbidden to lay persons, are property of the Cohen, may be lifted by one in 100, need washing of the hands and sundown.] This applies to heave and First Fruits but not to tithe.” There, you are saying tithe does not need washing, but here, you are saying that tithe needs washing. When you are saying that tithe needs washing, following the rabbis; but when you are saying that tithe does not need washing, following Rebbi Meïr. As we have stated there, “anything which requires immersion by the words of the Sopherim makes sancta impure and disqualifies heave but is permitted for profane food and tithe, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages forbid for tithe.” He did not understand that Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: What means, “but the Sages forbid for tithe”? His body became disqualified from consuming tithe. How it that? If you are saying, tithe needs washing, [for one who intends to eat. If you are saying, tithe does not need washing,] if he intends to touch. But does not one who wants to eat also want to touch? Only because of [handwashing as discipline. But did we not state “heave”? For heave is there] handwashing as discipline? Therefore about profane food prepared in the purity of sancta. But is profane food prepared in the purity of sancta not profane food? Explain either following Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar or Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ṣadoq. Either following Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, hands are first degree impure for profane food and second degree impure for heave. Or Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, as we have stated there: “profane food prepared in the purity of sancta is profane food. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ṣadoq says, it is like heave, to be impure in two stages and disqualified in the third.”

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:10

There, we have stated: “Whom did they excommunicate? Eleazar ben Hannad who questioned the purity of hands.” This implies that one who questions even one of the words of the Sopherim needs excommunication. There, we have stated: “They let her drink dikma.” What is dikma? An imitation. “They excommunicated him, he died in his excommunication, and the Court stoned his coffin. To teach you that one stones the coffin of anybody dying in his excommunication.” This implies that anybody insulting an Elder, even after his death, needs to be excommunicated. In the days of Rebbi Ze`ira they were excommunicating and readmitting. (He said to them, no.) [Rebbi La said to them:] Now one excommunicates and now one readmits? They took up the matter and voted, when he changes his opinion one readmits them.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:43

If he was informed on the holiday about the death of a relative but the Thirty were completed before the end of the holiday. The colleagues are saying, since he was informed within the Thirty, he counts Seven after the Thirty. Rebbi Yose said to them, since he heard at a moment where he could not mourn it is as if he was informed after Thirty(;) [and] he observes only one day. Rabbi Idi of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he received recent information on the Sabbath, he tears {his garment} the next day and mourns. Rebbi Ḥanania said, he does not mourn. Rebbi Mana said to him, is there tearing without mourning? Since for his father or his mother even after a length of time he is obligated to tear. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even as derivative of a derivative he is forbidden to shave. As the following: Rebbi Mana was in Caesarea. He heard that his grandson had died, and he went and eulogized. They said to him, did the Rabbi not teach us, even as derivative of a derivative he is forbidden to shave? He said to them, those who were with him. We were not there. Rebbi Eudaimon bar Tobi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: even as derivative of a derivative he is obligated to tear, as Rebbi Abbahu said, groan silently, from here that he has to cry. Do not arrange mourning for the dead, from here that he has to mourn. Your splendor put on yourself, some want to say, these are tefillin. Some want to say, this is pressing. He who says these are tefillin; just as tefillin refer to two days, also mourning two days? He who says this is pressing; just as pressing is for thirty days, also mourning thirty days? Put your shoes on your feet, from here that he is forbidden wearing shoes. And do not cover your mustache, from here that he has to cover his mouth. Could he cover it from below? Rav Ḥisda said, so they should not say, he has a mouth-ache. And do not eat men’s bread, from here that the smaller ones go to the greater ones. And from where that the greater ones go to the smaller ones? Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, it is written: For so says the Eternal, do not go to a funeral repast, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:60

HALAKHAH: “Only the relatives of the deceased tear their clothes, or take them off, or are brought the first meal. Rebbi Jeremiah said, only relatives who have to mourn. As this which was stated: If a Sage dies [all] are his relatives, even relatives who do not have to mourn. As the following: Rebbi Abun died on a holiday and Rebbi Mana did not participate in mourning. The Sepphoreans said, he hates him even in death. After the holiday he eulogized him. He preached and said in front of them, as was stated: If a Sage dies all are his relatives, referring to those who were present. We were not present.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:70

Rebbi Berekhia, Rebbi Ḥelbo, Ulla from Bireh, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: In the future the Holy One, praise to Him, will lead a circular dance for the Just ones. What is the reason? Put your hearts to the walls, it is written “to its circular dance.” And the Just one will point with their finger and say, Truly, He is GOD, our Power, Forever; He will lead us beyond death! Almut, in strength; almut, in agility. Almut, like these girls. Akilas translated ’αθανασία, a world without death. And the Just one will point with their finger and say, Truly, He is GOD, our Power, Forever; He will lead us beyond death! He will lead us in this world, He will lead us in the future.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:70

Rebbi Berekhia, Rebbi Ḥelbo, Ulla from Bireh, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: In the future the Holy One, praise to Him, will lead a circular dance for the Just ones. What is the reason? Put your hearts to the walls, it is written “to its circular dance.” And the Just one will point with their finger and say, Truly, He is GOD, our Power, Forever; He will lead us beyond death! Almut, in strength; almut, in agility. Almut, like these girls. Akilas translated ’αθανασία, a world without death. And the Just one will point with their finger and say, Truly, He is GOD, our Power, Forever; He will lead us beyond death! He will lead us in this world, He will lead us in the future.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:70

Rebbi Berekhia, Rebbi Ḥelbo, Ulla from Bireh, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: In the future the Holy One, praise to Him, will lead a circular dance for the Just ones. What is the reason? Put your hearts to the walls, it is written “to its circular dance.” And the Just one will point with their finger and say, Truly, He is GOD, our Power, Forever; He will lead us beyond death! Almut, in strength; almut, in agility. Almut, like these girls. Akilas translated ’αθανασία, a world without death. And the Just one will point with their finger and say, Truly, He is GOD, our Power, Forever; He will lead us beyond death! He will lead us in this world, He will lead us in the future.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:89

MISHNAH: On New Moons, Ḥanukkah and Purim they wail in chorus and clap their hands, but in neither case they recite dirges. After the deceased was buried they neither wail in chorus nor clap their hands. What is wailing in chorus? They all recite together. A dirge, if one speaks and all repeat after her, as it is said, and teach your daughters wailing and a woman her friend dirge. But in the Future World what does it say? He swallowed up Death forever, and the Eternal, God, wiped tears from all faces, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:28

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:54

In this matter, it was stated: “About anybody who wants to take upon himself the stringencies both of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel it was said: ‘The silly one walks in darkness’. The leniencies of both of them, he is called wicked. Only either following the words of the House of Shammai in their leniencies and stringencies, or following the words of the House of Hillel in their leniencies and stringencies.” That is, before there came the disembodied voice. But after the disembodied voice was heard, “practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” And any who transgresses the words of the House of Hillel is deserving of death. It was stated: There came the disembodied voice and said: Both of them are the words of the Living God, but practice follows the House of Hillel forever. Where was the disembodied voice heard? Rav Bebai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The disembodied voice was heard at Yabneh.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:8

If the first [sister] had a co-wife, he can marry the co-wife, keep his wife, but the second [sister] is forbidden to him. That is “the sister of the co-wife of one for whom he performed ḥalîah is permitted to a person.” Should the co-wife not be forbidden to him as co-wife of the sister of one for whom he performed ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Yudan said, if he wanted to have intercourse with the co-wife before he married, would he not have been permitted? At the start, he is permitted; at the end, he is prohibited? If you say so, you are making a co-wife after death and there can be no co-wife after death.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:8

If the first [sister] had a co-wife, he can marry the co-wife, keep his wife, but the second [sister] is forbidden to him. That is “the sister of the co-wife of one for whom he performed ḥalîah is permitted to a person.” Should the co-wife not be forbidden to him as co-wife of the sister of one for whom he performed ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Yudan said, if he wanted to have intercourse with the co-wife before he married, would he not have been permitted? At the start, he is permitted; at the end, he is prohibited? If you say so, you are making a co-wife after death and there can be no co-wife after death.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:16

If the first [sister] had a co-wife, he can marry the co-wife, keep his wife, but the second [sister] is forbidden to him. That is “the sister of the co-wife of one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah is permitted to a person.” Should the co-wife not be forbidden to him as co-wife of a relative of one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Yudan said, if he wanted to have intercourse with the co-wife before he married, would he not have been permitted? At the start, he is permitted; at the end, he is prohibited? If you say so, you are creating a co-wife after death and there can be no co-wife after death.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:16

If the first [sister] had a co-wife, he can marry the co-wife, keep his wife, but the second [sister] is forbidden to him. That is “the sister of the co-wife of one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah is permitted to a person.” Should the co-wife not be forbidden to him as co-wife of a relative of one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Yudan said, if he wanted to have intercourse with the co-wife before he married, would he not have been permitted? At the start, he is permitted; at the end, he is prohibited? If you say so, you are creating a co-wife after death and there can be no co-wife after death.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:29

Rebbi Yudan said, even Rebbi Eliezer agrees. Rebbi Yose said, that is correct. Because, if somebody had children but they died before he died, is his widow not a candidate for levirate? There, if he had children at the moment of death. Here, if they were co-wives after his death.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:29

Rebbi Yudan said, even Rebbi Eliezer agrees. Rebbi Yose said, that is correct. Because, if somebody had children but they died before he died, is his widow not a candidate for levirate? There, if he had children at the moment of death. Here, if they were co-wives after his death.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:10

How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:25

Rebbi Isaac ben Tevele in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “ The first-born whom she will bear shall be”; He compared it to a first-born. Since the first-born does not inherit during his father’s lifetime, so this one does not inherit during his father’s lifetime. But since the first-born inherits after his father’s death, does this one inherit after his father’s death? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, since the first-born does not inherit when it was time to inherit, so this one does not inherit when it was time to inherit. Afterwards he cannot inherit. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, practice follows Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, many times I sat before Rebbi Hoshaia and never heard that from him. He said to him, does nobody exist who heard something his partner did not hear?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:25

Rebbi Isaac ben Tevele in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “ The first-born whom she will bear shall be”; He compared it to a first-born. Since the first-born does not inherit during his father’s lifetime, so this one does not inherit during his father’s lifetime. But since the first-born inherits after his father’s death, does this one inherit after his father’s death? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, since the first-born does not inherit when it was time to inherit, so this one does not inherit when it was time to inherit. Afterwards he cannot inherit. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, practice follows Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, many times I sat before Rebbi Hoshaia and never heard that from him. He said to him, does nobody exist who heard something his partner did not hear?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:42

The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:53

HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:53

HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:55

Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:55

Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:55

Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:29

If she had children but they died, she counts from the time of death. She can say, a spirit strangled the children of this woman and made me sterile.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:29

MISHNAH: A man’s wife went overseas, they came and told him: your wife died, and he married her sister. If after that his wife returned, she is permitted to return to him. He is permitted [to marry] the relatives of the second, the second is permitted his relatives. If the first [sister] died, the second one is permitted to him. They said to him, your wife died, and he married her sister; if afterwards they said to him that she was still alive but died later, the first child is a bastard, the last is not a bastard. If they said to him “your wife died,” and he married her paternal sister, “she died” and he married her maternal sister, “she died” and he married her paternal sister, “she died” and he married her maternal sister, but it turned out that all were alive, the first, third, and fifth are permitted to him and they would release their co-wives; the second and fourth are prohibited to him and intercourse of any one of these does not release the co-wife. If he has intercourse with the second one after the death of the first, the second and fourth are permitted to him and they would release their co-wives; the third and fifth are prohibited to him and intercourse of any one of these does not release the co-wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:5

It is written: “If a man takes a woman and her mother, it is taboo.” Everywhere is written “lying with” but here is written “taking”, to teach you that he cannot be guilty for the second [woman] unless the first one is prepared for him. Or maybe only by marriage? We already said that there is no incestuous marriage. But is it not written: “Nobody may marry his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s garment’s corner”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his father married her. But is it not written: “If a man take his brother’s wife, it is despicable”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his brother married her. This is confirmed by levirate. But is it not written: “You should not take a woman in addition to her sister to make her a co-wife”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before he married her sister. This is confirmed after her sister’s death. But is it not written: “A man who would take his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter; he sees her genitals and she sees his genitals, it is ḥesed.” Rebbi Avin said, that you should not say that Kain married his sister, Abel married his sister, “it is charitable”, I was charitable with the first generations so the world could be inhabited; “I said, the world was built on ḥesed.” But is it not written: “Widow, divorcee, and desecrated, these he shall not take”? This comes to tell you that if he became betrothed to her that the betrothal is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:34

MISHNAH: [A woman] did not wait three months after [the death of] her husband, married, and gave birth, and it is not known whether it is a nine months’ child of the first or a seven months’ child of the second. If she had sons from the first and the second, they perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he had brothers from the first or from the second not from the same mother, he may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate and they may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate. If one was an Israel and the other a priest, he may marry a woman appropriate for the priesthood, may not defile himself for the dead, but if he became defiled he does not suffer forty lashes. He may not eat heave but if he ate, he does not have to pay its value and additional fifth. He cannot attend distributions on the threshing floor. He has to sell his heave but the money is his. He has no part in the Temple sacrifices, one does not give him sacrifices but one cannot take his from him. He is exempt from the foreleg, the chin, and the first stomach. His firstborn animal should graze until it develops a blemish. One charges him with the disabilities of an Israel and those of Cohanim. If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them and they for him. He may not defile himself for them, they may not defile themselves for him. He does not inherit from them but they inherit from him. He is not prosecutable if he injures or curses either one of them. He may serve on the watch of either one but does not participate in distributions. If both were of the same watch, he takes one part.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:35

HALAKHAH: “[A woman] did not wait three months,” etc. “If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them,” etc. Where do we hold? It is impossible after death [of the first] since we have stated: “He has to mourn intensely for them and they for him.” One understands that he does not defile himself for the second [husband], I say that he is the son of the first. But why does he not defile himself for the first one? It must be that he divorced. Then, as you take it, if he is his son, he should defile himself for him. If he is not his son, he is desecrated, and what happens if he defiles himself? It must be that he raped. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah that a rape victim does not have to wait three months? Should we say, following the rabbis, but we follow Rebbi Yose!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:5

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:52

MISHNAH: If an underage levir had intercourse with an underage sister-in-law, they should grow up together. If he had intercourse with an adult sister-in-law, she should raise him. If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṣah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah with her. But if he confesses, one forces him to perform ḥalîṣah with her even after twelve months. If a woman made a vow during her husband’s lifetime forbidding herself any usufruct from her levir, one coerces him until he performs ḥalîṣah with her. After her husband’s death, one begs him that he should perform ḥalîṣah with her. If she had [ḥalîṣah] in mind even during her husband’s lifetime, one begs him that he should perform ḥalîṣah with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:2

HALAKHAH: “A woman went with her husband,” etc. Just as you say, “if there are witnesses that she is a married woman and she says, I was divorced, she is not trustworthy;” would I say it is the same here? There is a difference for witnesses of death since if he comes he disproves [the testimony]. Then she should be trustworthy to say: “my levir died”! That is impossible since we have stated: “A woman is not trustworthy if she says ‘my levir died’ to remarry, or ‘my sister died’ to enter her house.” Rebbi Abba said, she is trustworthy for her husband whom she married out of her free will; she is not trustworthy about her levir on whom she was thrown against her will. Rebbi Hoshaia asked, think of it, then she should not be trustworthy if she was forced to marry him!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:13

Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah insisted on interpreting the ketubah. “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah explained: ‘The sons shall inherit and the daughters shall be supported.’ Since the sons can only inherit after their father’s death, so the daughters can claim support only after their father’s death.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:13

Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah insisted on interpreting the ketubah. “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah explained: ‘The sons shall inherit and the daughters shall be supported.’ Since the sons can only inherit after their father’s death, so the daughters can claim support only after their father’s death.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:19

MISHNAH: Everybody is accepted to be a witness for her except her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her levir’s wife, and her husband’s daughter. What is the difference between a bill of divorce and death? The document is the proof. If one witness says that he died and she remarried, then another comes and says that he is not dead, she shall not leave. If one witness says that he died but two say that he did not die, even if she remarried she must leave. If two say that he died but one said that he did not die, even if she has not yet remarried she may remarry.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:23

Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: Practice does not follow Rebbi Jehudah ben Baba in the case of an Israel. The words of the Rabbis say the same since Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi (Aqiba) [Jacob] bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Yasa, one does not subject witnesses to a death to cross-examination. It happened that somebody came before Rebbi Tarphon about a woman who wanted to remarry. He said to him, my son, how can you testify for the woman that she can remarry? He said to him, Rabbi, he was with us in a caravan when we were attacked by an armed gang. He hung himself at a branch of an olive tree, tore it off, ran after the armed gang and returned. I said to him, my son, I am praising you as a lion. He said to me, you got my name well; in my city I am called Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. I said to him, my son, you said very well Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. He said to me, no, what I said was Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. I said to him, did you not say Jonathan ben Joḥanan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla? He said to me, no, what I said was Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. After some time he became sick and died; Rebbi Tarphon checked out his testimony and let his widow remarry. It was found stated: “One does not subject witnesses to a death to cross-examination, against Rebbi Tarphon, since Rebbi Tarphon said, one subjects witnesses to a death to cross-examination.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:23

Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: Practice does not follow Rebbi Jehudah ben Baba in the case of an Israel. The words of the Rabbis say the same since Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi (Aqiba) [Jacob] bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Yasa, one does not subject witnesses to a death to cross-examination. It happened that somebody came before Rebbi Tarphon about a woman who wanted to remarry. He said to him, my son, how can you testify for the woman that she can remarry? He said to him, Rabbi, he was with us in a caravan when we were attacked by an armed gang. He hung himself at a branch of an olive tree, tore it off, ran after the armed gang and returned. I said to him, my son, I am praising you as a lion. He said to me, you got my name well; in my city I am called Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. I said to him, my son, you said very well Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. He said to me, no, what I said was Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. I said to him, did you not say Jonathan ben Joḥanan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla? He said to me, no, what I said was Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. After some time he became sick and died; Rebbi Tarphon checked out his testimony and let his widow remarry. It was found stated: “One does not subject witnesses to a death to cross-examination, against Rebbi Tarphon, since Rebbi Tarphon said, one subjects witnesses to a death to cross-examination.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:23

Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: Practice does not follow Rebbi Jehudah ben Baba in the case of an Israel. The words of the Rabbis say the same since Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi (Aqiba) [Jacob] bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Yasa, one does not subject witnesses to a death to cross-examination. It happened that somebody came before Rebbi Tarphon about a woman who wanted to remarry. He said to him, my son, how can you testify for the woman that she can remarry? He said to him, Rabbi, he was with us in a caravan when we were attacked by an armed gang. He hung himself at a branch of an olive tree, tore it off, ran after the armed gang and returned. I said to him, my son, I am praising you as a lion. He said to me, you got my name well; in my city I am called Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. I said to him, my son, you said very well Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. He said to me, no, what I said was Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. I said to him, did you not say Jonathan ben Joḥanan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla? He said to me, no, what I said was Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. After some time he became sick and died; Rebbi Tarphon checked out his testimony and let his widow remarry. It was found stated: “One does not subject witnesses to a death to cross-examination, against Rebbi Tarphon, since Rebbi Tarphon said, one subjects witnesses to a death to cross-examination.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:35

The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There, he says: “One covers a man in front and a woman front and back.” And here, he says so? There, she goes to her death anyhow, but here, maybe she will be found to be pure and the young priests would attack her. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There, they say: “A man is stoned naked but no woman is stoned naked.” And here, they say so? There, “you shall love your neighbor as yourself,” choose for him the easiest death. But here, “all women should be taught and not do as your whoring.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:35

The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There, he says: “One covers a man in front and a woman front and back.” And here, he says so? There, she goes to her death anyhow, but here, maybe she will be found to be pure and the young priests would attack her. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There, they say: “A man is stoned naked but no woman is stoned naked.” And here, they say so? There, “you shall love your neighbor as yourself,” choose for him the easiest death. But here, “all women should be taught and not do as your whoring.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:40

HALAKHAH: “By the measure a person measures one measures him,” etc. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr: By the measure a person measures one measures him. What is the reason? בְּסַאסְּאָה., seah for seah. Not only a seah, from where a three-qab, half a three-qab, half a qab, a quarter [qab], a toman, half a toman, or an ukla? The verse says, “for all that is in a seah, breaks the seah noisily;” he added many seot here. Not only things that can be measured, from where that small coins add up to a large bill? The verse says, “one to one, to find the bill.” It happens in the world that a person stumbles in a sin for which one would be punished by death by the hands of Heaven. His ox dies, his hen is lost, his flask breaks, and he hurts his finger, by that the bill is paid in full. Another explanation: One is filled into the next and the bill is established. And what is the fulfillment of the bill? Once.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:48

It is written: “The spirit of the Eternal started to ring in him in the encampment of Dan, between Ṣor‘a and Eshtaol.” Two Amoraïm. One said, when the holy spirit was resting on him, his steps were as from Ṣor‘a to Eshtaol. The other said, when the holy spirit was resting on him, his hairs were tolling like a bell and their sound went as from Ṣor‘a to Eshtaol. “The Eternal blessed him”. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Yose: That his sex life was that of anybody. “I shall revenge one revenge of my two eyes from the Philistines.” Rebbi Aḥa said, he said before Him: Master of the Universe! Give me the reward of one of my eyes in this world and the reward of the other eye be prepared for me in the World to Come. One verse says: “He judged Israel for forty years.” And another verse says: “He had judged Israel for twenty years.” Rebbi Aḥa said, this teaches that the Philistines were afraid of him twenty years after his death as they were afraid of him during his lifetime.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:19

A lady asked Rebbi Eliezer, why did one sin of the golden calf lead to three different kinds of death? He said to her, the wisdom of a woman is only in her spinning rod, as is written: “All wise women span with their hands.” His son Hyrkanos said to him, in order not to give her an answer you made me lose 300 kor of tithes every year. He answered him: May the words of the Torah be burned and not be delivered to women! After she had left, his students said to him, rabbi, this one you pushed away with a stick, what do you explain to us? Rebbi Berekhiah, Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: Anybody against whom there were witnesses and warning was executed in court. Anybody against whom there were witnesses but no warning was checked similar to a suspected wife. Anybody against whom there were neither witnesses nor warning died from a plague. Rav and Levi bar Sissi both say: One who sacrificed, burned, and poured out a libation was executed in court. He who clapped his hands, danced, laughed, was checked similar to a suspected wife. If he enjoyed himself silently, he died from a plague.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:21

“A sly wicked man.” Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rav Huna: That is one who chooses leniencies for himself and teaches restrictions to others. In this matter, it was stated: “About anybody who wants to take upon himself the stringencies both of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel it was said: ‘The silly one walks in darkness’. The leniencies of both of them, he is called wicked. Only either following the words of the House of Shammai in their leniencies and stringencies, or following the words of the House of Hillel in their leniencies and stringencies.” That is, before there came the disembodied voice. But after the disembodied voice was heard, “practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” And any who transgresses the words of the House of Hillel is deserving of death. It was stated: There came the disembodied voice and said: “Both of them are the words of the Living God, but practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” Where was the disembodied voice heard? Rav Bebai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The disembodied voice was heard at Yabneh.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:26

MISHNAH: Rebbi Simeon says, merit does not suspend in the case of the bitter water. If you say that merit suspends in the case of the curse water, you weaken the water in the eyes of all women who drink it and you smear the reputation of the pure women who drank because one would say that they are impure but that merit suspended for them. Rebbi says, merit suspends in the case of the curse water, but she does not have children, does not get better, but degenerates and in the end she dies that death.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:33

We have stated there: “Rebbi Simeon says, a fistful is taken from the sinner’s flour offering of a Cohen. The fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest is sacrificed separately.” Both of them explained the same verse: “It shall be the Cohen’s as a flour offering.” The rabbis say, it is like his voluntary flour offering. Since his voluntary flour offering is brought entire, that one also is brought entire. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” The rest, under which category is it brought, under the rules of a fistful or under the rules of remainders? If you want to say, under the rules of a fistful, one cannot bring them during the night, one cannot bring them after death, and he is forbidden to think about them. If you want to say, under the rules of a remainder, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death. Is he forbidden to think about them? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, the fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest dispersed over the ashes. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, where are we holding? If the upper ashes, Rebbi Simeon already said it. If it cannot refer to the upper ashes, let it refer to the lower ashes. That means, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death, and he can think about them. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is forbidden to think about them since they are not qualified as food either for humans or for the altar. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: Does Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follow the rules of his father or the rules of the rabbis? According to the rules of his father, it should be brought on top [of the altar]. According to the rules of the rabbis, why should he take a fistful? He follows his father’s rules. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” Then it should be burned totally! You bound it to “it shall not be eaten”; you did not bind it to “it has to be sacrificed in its entirety.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:33

We have stated there: “Rebbi Simeon says, a fistful is taken from the sinner’s flour offering of a Cohen. The fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest is sacrificed separately.” Both of them explained the same verse: “It shall be the Cohen’s as a flour offering.” The rabbis say, it is like his voluntary flour offering. Since his voluntary flour offering is brought entire, that one also is brought entire. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” The rest, under which category is it brought, under the rules of a fistful or under the rules of remainders? If you want to say, under the rules of a fistful, one cannot bring them during the night, one cannot bring them after death, and he is forbidden to think about them. If you want to say, under the rules of a remainder, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death. Is he forbidden to think about them? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, the fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest dispersed over the ashes. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, where are we holding? If the upper ashes, Rebbi Simeon already said it. If it cannot refer to the upper ashes, let it refer to the lower ashes. That means, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death, and he can think about them. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is forbidden to think about them since they are not qualified as food either for humans or for the altar. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: Does Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follow the rules of his father or the rules of the rabbis? According to the rules of his father, it should be brought on top [of the altar]. According to the rules of the rabbis, why should he take a fistful? He follows his father’s rules. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” Then it should be burned totally! You bound it to “it shall not be eaten”; you did not bind it to “it has to be sacrificed in its entirety.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:33

We have stated there: “Rebbi Simeon says, a fistful is taken from the sinner’s flour offering of a Cohen. The fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest is sacrificed separately.” Both of them explained the same verse: “It shall be the Cohen’s as a flour offering.” The rabbis say, it is like his voluntary flour offering. Since his voluntary flour offering is brought entire, that one also is brought entire. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” The rest, under which category is it brought, under the rules of a fistful or under the rules of remainders? If you want to say, under the rules of a fistful, one cannot bring them during the night, one cannot bring them after death, and he is forbidden to think about them. If you want to say, under the rules of a remainder, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death. Is he forbidden to think about them? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, the fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest dispersed over the ashes. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, where are we holding? If the upper ashes, Rebbi Simeon already said it. If it cannot refer to the upper ashes, let it refer to the lower ashes. That means, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death, and he can think about them. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is forbidden to think about them since they are not qualified as food either for humans or for the altar. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: Does Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follow the rules of his father or the rules of the rabbis? According to the rules of his father, it should be brought on top [of the altar]. According to the rules of the rabbis, why should he take a fistful? He follows his father’s rules. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” Then it should be burned totally! You bound it to “it shall not be eaten”; you did not bind it to “it has to be sacrificed in its entirety.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 7:26

HALAKHAH: It was stated: It was written on the stones of the dwelling place, the words of Rebbi Jehudah; Rebbi Yose says, it was written on the stones of the altar. He who says, it was written on the stones of the dwelling place, every day the peoples of the world were sending their stenographers and they carried away the Torah which had been written in seventy languages. He who says, it was written on the stones of the altar, were they not only for a short time and then were hidden? That was another wonder, that the Holy One, praise to Him, gave insight to every people and they carried away the Torah which had been written in seventy languages. For him who says, it was written on the stones of the dwelling place, it is understandable that “you shall whitewash them with lime.” But he who says, it was written on the stones of the altar, how does he uphold “ “you shall whitewash them with lime”? Between the stones. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥmani in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: “The peoples will be lime incinerators”, from the lime they took their death sentence. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “But the Gentiles will be totally destroyed,” from Ḥoreb they took their death sentence.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 7:26

HALAKHAH: It was stated: It was written on the stones of the dwelling place, the words of Rebbi Jehudah; Rebbi Yose says, it was written on the stones of the altar. He who says, it was written on the stones of the dwelling place, every day the peoples of the world were sending their stenographers and they carried away the Torah which had been written in seventy languages. He who says, it was written on the stones of the altar, were they not only for a short time and then were hidden? That was another wonder, that the Holy One, praise to Him, gave insight to every people and they carried away the Torah which had been written in seventy languages. For him who says, it was written on the stones of the dwelling place, it is understandable that “you shall whitewash them with lime.” But he who says, it was written on the stones of the altar, how does he uphold “ “you shall whitewash them with lime”? Between the stones. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥmani in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: “The peoples will be lime incinerators”, from the lime they took their death sentence. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “But the Gentiles will be totally destroyed,” from Ḥoreb they took their death sentence.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 7:31

MISHNAH: How is the priestly blessing? In the countryside they recited it as three blessings, but in the Temple as one blessing. In the Temple one says the Name as it is written, but in the countryside by its circumlocution. In the countryside the Cohanim lift their hands to the height of their shoulders but in the Temple over their heads except for the High Priest who does not lift his hands over the diadem. Rebbi Jehudah says, the High Priest also lifts his hands over his head, as it is said: “Aaron lifted his hands towards the people and blessed them.” How are the blessings of the High Priest? The organizer of the synagogue takes a Torah scroll and gives it to the president of the synagogue; the president of the synagogue gives it to the Second; the Second gives it to the High Priest. The High priest receives it standing, he stands and reads “after the death” and “but on the tenth”; he rolls the Torah tight, puts it in his bosom and says: More than what I read before you is written here. “And on the tenth” in Numbers he recites by heart, and recites eight benedictions: For the Torah, for the Temple service, for thanksgiving, for forgiveness of sins, for the Temple, for Israel, for the Cohanim, and the remainder of the prayer.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 7:33

There, we have stated: “One winds in Prophets but one does not wind in the Pentateuch.” One winds in one prophet, but not from one prophet to another, but among prophets of the Twelve it is permitted. But one does not wind in the Pentateuch; Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Because one does not wind the Torah in public. Rebbi Yose asked, think of it, if it was a small portion? But that Israel should hear it in its order. But did we not state: “He reads ‘after the death’ and ‘but on the tenth’ ”? It is different here, because that is the order of the day. Know that it is so since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not recite by heart, and here he recites by heart. Rebbi Yose commanded Bar Ulla, the organizer of the congregation of Babylonians: When the Torah has been brought back, wind it behind the curtain. If there are two, return one and bring the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:4

Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: “A slain one”, not one in convulsions; “a slain one”, not one in death-throes. If one saw him in convulsions and after some time he came back and did not find him, I say that a miracle occurred and he survived. If one saw him in death-throes here and then found him at another place, one measures from the place where he was found. “Which the Eternal, your God, is giving to you,” this excludes places outside the Land. “To inherit it,” this excludes Jerusalem which belongs to all tribes, and following Rebbi Ismael. For Rebbi Ismael said, any “comings” which were said in the Torah mean after fourteen years, seven during which they conquered and seven during which they distributed. Rebbi Phineas ben Rebbi Abun said, we may say that all these fourteen years they were not breaking the neck, for it is written “if there be found,” not in a time when they are frequent. And all these fourteen years they were frequent.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:4

Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: “A slain one”, not one in convulsions; “a slain one”, not one in death-throes. If one saw him in convulsions and after some time he came back and did not find him, I say that a miracle occurred and he survived. If one saw him in death-throes here and then found him at another place, one measures from the place where he was found. “Which the Eternal, your God, is giving to you,” this excludes places outside the Land. “To inherit it,” this excludes Jerusalem which belongs to all tribes, and following Rebbi Ismael. For Rebbi Ismael said, any “comings” which were said in the Torah mean after fourteen years, seven during which they conquered and seven during which they distributed. Rebbi Phineas ben Rebbi Abun said, we may say that all these fourteen years they were not breaking the neck, for it is written “if there be found,” not in a time when they are frequent. And all these fourteen years they were frequent.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:49

It was stated: It is possible to raise questions about all couples from the time that Moses died until Yose ben Yoezer from Ṣereda and Joseph ben Joḥanan from Jerusalem. It is possible to raise questions about all couples from the time that Yose ben Yoezer from Ṣereda and Joseph ben Joḥanan from Jerusalem died until Rebbi Jehudah ben Baba arose. They said about Rebbi Jehudah ben Baba that all he did was in the name of Heaven except that he raised an animal of the flock. This happened the following way. Once he fell sick and the medical men went to visit him. They told him: there is no healing for you except freshly warm milk, because he had angina pectoris. What did he do? He bought a goat and bound it to the legs of his bed and when he had an attack of angina he sucked from it freshly warm milk. But when the Sages wanted to visit him, they said how could we enter when the robber dwells with him in the house? When he died, he said: I did never sin except that in this case I disregarded the words of my colleagues. After his death they checked all he had done and did not find any sin except that goat alone.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:64

In earlier times they required payment only from a person alone. But now they require payment from him and his family. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥuna: In earlier times, for every trouble that came over the community they have a joyous occasion to make up for it. But after the Synhedrion was abolished, song disappeared from wedding feasts. After both disappeared, “our heart’s joy stopped, our dance turned into mourning.” But what was the high court good for? But because it was said “if the people of the Land consistently turn away their eyes from that man when he is giving of his seed to the Moloch, not to kill him,” in any death they would choose. They gave a parable, to what can this be compared? To one who was a criminal in a town. They delivered him to the one wielding reeds, who jailed him, but he turned out to be stronger than the one wielding reeds. They delivered him to the one wielding sticks who hit him, but he turned out to be stronger than the one wielding sticks. They delivered him to the wielder of leather straps who whipped him, but he turned out to be stronger than the wielder of leather straps. They delivered him to the ruler who hung him in the kiln. So the later troubles cause the earlier ones to be forgotten.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:39

“If because of criminal matters she is prohibited.” Rebbi Yudan the son of Rav Ḥama from Kefar Teḥumim in the name of Ḥizqiah: Only if she was sentenced to death. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if she was not sentenced to death. They said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A robber’s wife is like a robber’.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:39

“If because of criminal matters she is prohibited.” Rebbi Yudan the son of Rav Ḥama from Kefar Teḥumim in the name of Ḥizqiah: Only if she was sentenced to death. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if she was not sentenced to death. They said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A robber’s wife is like a robber’.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:8

Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:13

Did we not state: The Sages admit to Rebbi Meïr that one who stole his neighbor’s heave is flogged and has to pay since whoever eats heave is flogged. Did we not state: The Sages admit to Rebbi Meïr that one who stole his neighbor’s fat is flogged and has to pay since whoever eats fat is flogged. Did we not state: The Sages admit to Rebbi Meïr that one who muzzled his neighbor’s cow is flogged and has to pay six qab per cow and four qab for a donkey since whoever muzzles his cow is flogged. Rebbi Yose said, the same holds if death is the penalty. If he stole Temple heave and ate it, he is whipped and has to pay since in any case he caused monetary loss.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:14

Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: If it is so, he who sleeps with his minor sister should be flogged and have to pay since if he sleeps with his adult sister he is flogged. He reversed himself and said, there death and payment fall on him simultaneously. But here, when he muzzled he is subject to flogging but only later for payment. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Mana: He who sets fire to his neighbor’s grain stack on the Sabbath is subject to capital punishment from the first ear but only later for payment! One cannot say that because for every single ear there is cautioning for the death penalty. Here also, for every moment of muzzling there is cautioning for flogging. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, two Amoraïm. One said, if he muzzled for heave which is Temple property. The other one said, if he muzzled through an agent. Then the agent is flogged and he is free (Lev. 17:4): “As a blood guilt it will be charged on this man,” not on his employers.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:14

Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: If it is so, he who sleeps with his minor sister should be flogged and have to pay since if he sleeps with his adult sister he is flogged. He reversed himself and said, there death and payment fall on him simultaneously. But here, when he muzzled he is subject to flogging but only later for payment. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Mana: He who sets fire to his neighbor’s grain stack on the Sabbath is subject to capital punishment from the first ear but only later for payment! One cannot say that because for every single ear there is cautioning for the death penalty. Here also, for every moment of muzzling there is cautioning for flogging. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, two Amoraïm. One said, if he muzzled for heave which is Temple property. The other one said, if he muzzled through an agent. Then the agent is flogged and he is free (Lev. 17:4): “As a blood guilt it will be charged on this man,” not on his employers.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:17

Rebbi Judah bar Pazi asked: What say these Tannaïm about whipping and extirpation? Rebbi Yose said, that is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah said, why can we not understand it from what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated? As Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Rebbi Ṭarphon says, extirpation was mentioned for the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement. Since for extirpation mentioned for the Sabbath there is no payment in a case involving the death penalty, so for extirpation mentioned for the Day of Atonement there is no payment in a case involving extirpation.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: When do we need this? Not for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? But for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he admits flogging in death penalty cases, certainly flogging in extirpation cases, since they disagreed: If somebody slaughters [an animal] and its young for idolatrous purposes. Rebbi Joḥanan says, if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is flogged, about idolatry, he is stoned to death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is not flogged since he would be stoned to death had he been cautioned about idolatry. He said to him, we need it even for Rebbi Joḥanan! Here are two cases, there it is one case.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:17

Rebbi Judah bar Pazi asked: What say these Tannaïm about whipping and extirpation? Rebbi Yose said, that is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah said, why can we not understand it from what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated? As Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Rebbi Ṭarphon says, extirpation was mentioned for the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement. Since for extirpation mentioned for the Sabbath there is no payment in a case involving the death penalty, so for extirpation mentioned for the Day of Atonement there is no payment in a case involving extirpation.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: When do we need this? Not for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? But for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he admits flogging in death penalty cases, certainly flogging in extirpation cases, since they disagreed: If somebody slaughters [an animal] and its young for idolatrous purposes. Rebbi Joḥanan says, if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is flogged, about idolatry, he is stoned to death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is not flogged since he would be stoned to death had he been cautioned about idolatry. He said to him, we need it even for Rebbi Joḥanan! Here are two cases, there it is one case.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:17

Rebbi Judah bar Pazi asked: What say these Tannaïm about whipping and extirpation? Rebbi Yose said, that is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah said, why can we not understand it from what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated? As Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Rebbi Ṭarphon says, extirpation was mentioned for the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement. Since for extirpation mentioned for the Sabbath there is no payment in a case involving the death penalty, so for extirpation mentioned for the Day of Atonement there is no payment in a case involving extirpation.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: When do we need this? Not for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? But for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he admits flogging in death penalty cases, certainly flogging in extirpation cases, since they disagreed: If somebody slaughters [an animal] and its young for idolatrous purposes. Rebbi Joḥanan says, if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is flogged, about idolatry, he is stoned to death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is not flogged since he would be stoned to death had he been cautioned about idolatry. He said to him, we need it even for Rebbi Joḥanan! Here are two cases, there it is one case.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:17

Rebbi Judah bar Pazi asked: What say these Tannaïm about whipping and extirpation? Rebbi Yose said, that is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah said, why can we not understand it from what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated? As Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Rebbi Ṭarphon says, extirpation was mentioned for the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement. Since for extirpation mentioned for the Sabbath there is no payment in a case involving the death penalty, so for extirpation mentioned for the Day of Atonement there is no payment in a case involving extirpation.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: When do we need this? Not for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? But for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he admits flogging in death penalty cases, certainly flogging in extirpation cases, since they disagreed: If somebody slaughters [an animal] and its young for idolatrous purposes. Rebbi Joḥanan says, if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is flogged, about idolatry, he is stoned to death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is not flogged since he would be stoned to death had he been cautioned about idolatry. He said to him, we need it even for Rebbi Joḥanan! Here are two cases, there it is one case.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:24

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: We understand that, since it said “if there is no case of murder, a fine shall be imposed”, that if it is a case of murder, you shall take life for life? Why does the verse say, it is a case of murder? To add the case of premeditation and warning. Rebbi Yose said, is that not a Mishnah, “for anybody committing a capital crime does not pay cash”, that it deals not only with cases of error. Ḥizqiah said, one states a baraita: “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:1

MISHNAH: Payments for shame, diminution of value, and fine of a seduced adolescent girl belong to her father, as are payments for suffering for the victim of an attack. If she appeared in court during her father’s lifetime, they are the father’s; after the father’s death they are the brothers’. If she did not appear in court until after the father’s death, they belong to herself.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:1

MISHNAH: Payments for shame, diminution of value, and fine of a seduced adolescent girl belong to her father, as are payments for suffering for the victim of an attack. If she appeared in court during her father’s lifetime, they are the father’s; after the father’s death they are the brothers’. If she did not appear in court until after the father’s death, they belong to herself.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:6

From where comes this? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “You shall give them as inheritance to your sons to inherit property,” those to your sons and not your daughters to your sons; the verse speaks about the fine. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: They have no right to the fines of the daughter nor to payments for seduction or injuries. When does the fine become due? Rebbi Jonah said, from the first moment; Rebbi Yose said, at the end. Rebbi Yose objected to Rebbi Jonah: Since you say, from the first moment, did we not state: “If there were court proceedings during her father’s lifetime, [the payments] are the father’s; after the father’s death they are the brothers’”? He said to him, that refers to what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated, “He shall give to the girl; he shall give to the girl’s father.” Rebbi Jonah objected to Rebbi Yose. In your opinion, since you say, at the end, did we not state: “If there were court proceedings before she became an adult, they are the father’s; after she became an adult they belong to herself.” Does an adult have a claim to a fine? He said to him, that refers to what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Because he mistreated her,” that includes if she was an adolescent and became an adult. Does it turn out that this disagreement parallels another disagreement, as we have stated there: “If he stole from his father, slaughtered or sold, and afterwards [his father] died, …, he pays fourfold or fivefold”? Rebbi Yose objected to Rebbi Ḥaggai: In your opinion, since you say that it depends on the court proceedings, should one not state: If he stole from his father, slaughtered or sold during his father’s lifetime but did not appear in court until after his father’s death, he pays twofold? But it says fourfold or fivefold! But here, everybody agrees that they belong to herself. The only problem is whether he has to pay to her or to her father.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:6

From where comes this? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “You shall give them as inheritance to your sons to inherit property,” those to your sons and not your daughters to your sons; the verse speaks about the fine. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: They have no right to the fines of the daughter nor to payments for seduction or injuries. When does the fine become due? Rebbi Jonah said, from the first moment; Rebbi Yose said, at the end. Rebbi Yose objected to Rebbi Jonah: Since you say, from the first moment, did we not state: “If there were court proceedings during her father’s lifetime, [the payments] are the father’s; after the father’s death they are the brothers’”? He said to him, that refers to what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated, “He shall give to the girl; he shall give to the girl’s father.” Rebbi Jonah objected to Rebbi Yose. In your opinion, since you say, at the end, did we not state: “If there were court proceedings before she became an adult, they are the father’s; after she became an adult they belong to herself.” Does an adult have a claim to a fine? He said to him, that refers to what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Because he mistreated her,” that includes if she was an adolescent and became an adult. Does it turn out that this disagreement parallels another disagreement, as we have stated there: “If he stole from his father, slaughtered or sold, and afterwards [his father] died, …, he pays fourfold or fivefold”? Rebbi Yose objected to Rebbi Ḥaggai: In your opinion, since you say that it depends on the court proceedings, should one not state: If he stole from his father, slaughtered or sold during his father’s lifetime but did not appear in court until after his father’s death, he pays twofold? But it says fourfold or fivefold! But here, everybody agrees that they belong to herself. The only problem is whether he has to pay to her or to her father.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:7

MISHNAH: If she did appear in court before she became an adult, [the payments] belong to her father, after the father’s death, they belong to the brothers. If she did not appear in court before she became an adult, they belong to herself. Rebbi Simeon says, if she did not collect before the father died, they belong to herself. Her earnings and what she finds, even if she had not collected [by the time] the father died, belong to the brothers.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:9

Rebbi Ze‘ira sent to Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rebbi Immi bar Pappai: Who owns the earnings of the daughter? They said to him, the diligent said, herself. Who is the diligent? Samuel! Rebbi Mattanah said, it was said in the name of Rebbi as explanation of a verse: “You shall give them as inheritance to your sons to inherit property,” those to your sons and not your daughters to your sons; the verse speaks about the earnings of the daughter. Rebbi Yudan said, the Mishnah says so: “Her earnings and what she finds, even if she had not collected when the father died, belong to the brothers.” Anything she earned during her father’s lifetime. But what she earned after her father’s death according to everybody is hers.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:31

MISHNAH: The father is not obligated to support his daughter. This inference did Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah explain in the vineyard of Jabneh: “The sons shall inherit and the daughters be supported.” Since the sons do not inherit before their father’s death, neither are the daughters supported before their father’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:31

MISHNAH: The father is not obligated to support his daughter. This inference did Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah explain in the vineyard of Jabneh: “The sons shall inherit and the daughters be supported.” Since the sons do not inherit before their father’s death, neither are the daughters supported before their father’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:38

Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah insisted on interpreting the ketubah: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah explained: ‘The sons shall inherit and the daughters shall be supported.’ Since the sons can only inherit after their father’s death, so the daughters can claim support only after their father’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:38

Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah insisted on interpreting the ketubah: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah explained: ‘The sons shall inherit and the daughters shall be supported.’ Since the sons can only inherit after their father’s death, so the daughters can claim support only after their father’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:49

HALAKHAH: “If he did not write her “if you are kidnapped I shall ransom you,” etc. “If she was kidnapped he is obligated to ransom her,” etc. It was stated: If a sister-in-law was kidnapped, the heirs do not have to ransom her. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: Not only if she was kidnapped when her husband was still alive but even if she was kidnapped after the husband’s death, the heirs do not have to ransom her. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Aḥa: The Mishnah supports Rav: “And bring you back as wife;” there is no “wife”.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:18

HALAKHAH: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s earnings,” etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is sanctified as his property. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian says, it is profane as his property. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, what one states there supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “When was this said? If he does not feed her. But if he feeds her, everybody agrees that it was sanctified.” But is not everything a wife has subject to the husband’s claim to its yield?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:12

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Simeon says, in the circumstances where he was empowered,” etc. You say, at her entrance they are his: If she sold them they are not sold, if she gave them to a sharecropper he has the reward from it, if she dedicated them as First Fruits they are not dedicated You say, at her exit they are hers, if he sold them they are not sold, if he gave them to a sharecropper she has the reward from it, if he dedicated them as First Fruits, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since they disagreed: (Deut. 26:11): ‘You shall enjoy all the good things that the Eternal, your God, gave to you and your house.’ This teaches that a person brings First Fruits from his wife’s property.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after her death but not during her lifetime. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no difference, during her lifetime and after her death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion since he said, a person does not inherit from his wife as a biblical rule. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it never was dedicated. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan it is dedicated and the holiness is removed.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:12

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Simeon says, in the circumstances where he was empowered,” etc. You say, at her entrance they are his: If she sold them they are not sold, if she gave them to a sharecropper he has the reward from it, if she dedicated them as First Fruits they are not dedicated You say, at her exit they are hers, if he sold them they are not sold, if he gave them to a sharecropper she has the reward from it, if he dedicated them as First Fruits, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since they disagreed: (Deut. 26:11): ‘You shall enjoy all the good things that the Eternal, your God, gave to you and your house.’ This teaches that a person brings First Fruits from his wife’s property.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after her death but not during her lifetime. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no difference, during her lifetime and after her death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion since he said, a person does not inherit from his wife as a biblical rule. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it never was dedicated. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan it is dedicated and the holiness is removed.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:1

MISHNAH: If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” he receives their revenues and if she should die, he inherits from her. In this case, why did he write “I shall have nothing to do with your properties”? If she sold or gave away, it is valid. If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues,” he does not receive their revenues during her lifetime but if she should die, he inherits from her. Rebbi Jehudah says, he continues to receive the investment results of her revenues unless he writes: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues, without limits.” If he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not receive the revenues during her lifetime and does not inherit from her after her death. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:1

MISHNAH: If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” he receives their revenues and if she should die, he inherits from her. In this case, why did he write “I shall have nothing to do with your properties”? If she sold or gave away, it is valid. If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues,” he does not receive their revenues during her lifetime but if she should die, he inherits from her. Rebbi Jehudah says, he continues to receive the investment results of her revenues unless he writes: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues, without limits.” If he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not receive the revenues during her lifetime and does not inherit from her after her death. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid.