12251 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:30

“If somebody says, I freed my slave Ṭabi, I shall free him, he is free, he acquired.” Rebbi Inaia in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But only by a document. “He should be freed, Rebbi says, he acquired, but for the Sages he did not acquire. Give this document of manumission, and he died, Rebbi says, he did not acquire but the Sages say, he did acquire; one forces the heirs to fulfill the instructions of the deceased.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he said, “free him”, Rebbi will agree. If he said, “write and deliver,” the Sages will agree. But we deal with the case that he said “give”. Rebbi says, one who says “give” is like one who said “write and deliver,” but the Sages say, one who says “give” is like one who said “free him”.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:31

“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he accepted at the first moment, Rabban Gamliel will agree. If he did refuse at the first moment, the rabbis will agree. But we deal with the case that he did not specify. Rebbi says, nobody says ‘it is impossible’ unless he had accepted. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible’, the end is proof for the start.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:31

“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he accepted at the first moment, Rabban Gamliel will agree. If he did refuse at the first moment, the rabbis will agree. But we deal with the case that he did not specify. Rebbi says, nobody says ‘it is impossible’ unless he had accepted. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible’, the end is proof for the start.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:31

“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he accepted at the first moment, Rabban Gamliel will agree. If he did refuse at the first moment, the rabbis will agree. But we deal with the case that he did not specify. Rebbi says, nobody says ‘it is impossible’ unless he had accepted. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible’, the end is proof for the start.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:33

Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for a colleague when they were slandered. They came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:33

Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for a colleague when they were slandered. They came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:33

Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for a colleague when they were slandered. They came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:35

“ ‘Give this mina to X,’ then he died. If the heirs want to hinder [the delivery] they are powerless. It is unnecessary to say that it is so if he said, acquire for him, if he said, accept by my orders.” Rebbi Abba barMamal said, this baraita refers to a sick person. If he is sick, does he not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him? Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this by what Rebbi Abba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: They treated verbal instructions by a sick person as if they were written and delivered. But only if he died from that sickness, not if he recovered, he did not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:4

Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abun asked: If he said “it was written and one witness signed before me,” and two testify about the signature of the second witness. Rebbi Immi the Babylonian said, nothing can be more valid than this. Rebbi Abba did not say so but: If he said “it was written and one witness signed before me, and I am the second witness.” He is like a party interested in his testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:12

HALAKHAH: “One writes with anything,” etc. “He shall write”, not engrave. “He shall write”, not dropping points. “He shall write”, not pouring. “He shall write”, not engrave; some Tannaïm state, he even may engrave. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says not to engrave, if the writing stands out as on a denar. He who says even to engrave, as on a writing tablet. “He shall write”, not dropping points; Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom and Rebbi Mattaniah: One said, if he did not connect the points; the other said, even if he connected the points. “He shall write”, not pouring. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, those Orientals are very sophisticated. If one of them wants to write a secret letter to another, he writes with juice of gall-nuts. The recipient pours ink without gall over it, which is absorbed at the place of the writing. If one did that on the Sabbath, what? There, we have stated: “Writing on top of writing is not prosecutable.” Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, only if he wrote ink on ink or vermilion on vermilion. But if he wrote ink on vermilion or vermilion on ink, he is guilty. Rebbi Isaac bar Mesharshia in the name of the rabbis from there: He is doubly guilty, once for erasing and once for writing.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:12

HALAKHAH: “One writes with anything,” etc. “He shall write”, not engrave. “He shall write”, not dropping points. “He shall write”, not pouring. “He shall write”, not engrave; some Tannaïm state, he even may engrave. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says not to engrave, if the writing stands out as on a denar. He who says even to engrave, as on a writing tablet. “He shall write”, not dropping points; Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom and Rebbi Mattaniah: One said, if he did not connect the points; the other said, even if he connected the points. “He shall write”, not pouring. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, those Orientals are very sophisticated. If one of them wants to write a secret letter to another, he writes with juice of gall-nuts. The recipient pours ink without gall over it, which is absorbed at the place of the writing. If one did that on the Sabbath, what? There, we have stated: “Writing on top of writing is not prosecutable.” Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, only if he wrote ink on ink or vermilion on vermilion. But if he wrote ink on vermilion or vermilion on ink, he is guilty. Rebbi Isaac bar Mesharshia in the name of the rabbis from there: He is doubly guilty, once for erasing and once for writing.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:16

“On a leaf of the olive tree.” Is that not like torn? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Bina bar Shila stated: Even if he only wrote: “I X am divorcing my wife,” it is valid. This follows what Rebbi Ila said, if he detailed it is invalid, if he did not detail it is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:25

HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:25

HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:25

HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:27

HALAKHAH: “Also those women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died,” etc. Would you believe her if it was written but not signed [in her presence]? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests, his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:3

Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:3

Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:4

Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Concerning what you say that one bill of divorce is invalid for two women, should not two bills of divorce be invalid for two women? He asked him, what is the question? He answered, did we not state: “If two people sent two [identical] bills of divorce which were intermingled, he gives both documents to both women.” There, it is a divorce for this one and a divorce for the other one; the mix-up caused [the problem]. But here, neither this one is divorced in her name nor is that one divorced in her name.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:6

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:8

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time.” He explains it, with the essential text. It is difficult for Rebbi Joḥanan: Do the Sages declare valid in case he wrote the essential text with the formulaic text? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: From its invalidity you learn its validity. If he wrote everything in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names not in her name, would that be valid? Similarly, if he wrote everything not in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names in her name, it is valid. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Jeremiah: Think of it, if it was paired? He said, so said his teacher Rebbi Ze‘ira to him: Since pairing is infrequent, even if there was pairing it is as if there was no pairing. Then it is difficult for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even if he did not write the essential text in the formula, Rebbi Jehudah declares invalid! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Jehudah refers to something else; it follows what Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines about one subject is invalid in any case.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:12

HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:12

HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:12

HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:12

HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:14

But did we not state: From where that “if somebody says to his wife, this is your bill of divorce one hour before my death, or he says to his slave girl, this is the document of your manumission one hour before my death, each would be immediately forbidden to eat heave?” There, she is disabled immediately, but here she will only be disabled when he has died.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:19

HALAKHAH: “If somebody is transporting a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel when he falls sick,” etc. Because he falls sick; therefore not if he did not fall sick.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:26

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:26

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:26

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:26

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:33

For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:33

For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:33

For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. This disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates the agent appointed by him by a declaration. He explains it by the stringency of the rules of incest. If he appointed an agent to deliver the bill of divorce, the latter has to deliver it in the presence of two [witnesses]; the agent is not counted as one of the two. If another agent went to invalidate the bill of divorce, he has to invalidate it in the presence of two [witnesses] and the agent is counted as one of the two. If he met him on the road and asked him, what about the bill of divorce I gave you? He answered, I delivered it to her. While they were talking there, he dropped it. He said, did you not tell me that you delivered it to her? He explained, I delivered it to her and she said, keep it for me. What? Can he be believed since it is in his power to divorce, or can he not be believed because it is in his hand? If the agent fell sick, how do you treat this? By the rules of divorces or the rules of preliminary marriages? By the rules of divorces one can divorce through the agency of anybody. By the rules of preliminary marriages one cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:5

“Because of the public good.” They say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not risk bastardy. Some say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not remain anchored. He who said, that she should not remain anchored, [is afraid that] she turns out to be anchored if she thought that he annulled when he did not annul. He who said, that she should not risk bastardy, [is afraid that] her children will be bastards if she thought that he did not annul when he annulled, she goes and marries without a bill of divorce. If she thought that he annulled when he did not annul, another man comes and marries her preliminarily; the preliminary marriage is valid but she thinks it is invalid. She waits until her first husband dies, then she goes and marries [another man]; the result is that her children will be bastards. Rebbi Mana said, I went with a caravan and heard Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa and Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not risk bastardy. Rav Huna said, even the one who said that she should not remain anchored also agrees that she should not risk bastardy.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:5

“Because of the public good.” They say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not risk bastardy. Some say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not remain anchored. He who said, that she should not remain anchored, [is afraid that] she turns out to be anchored if she thought that he annulled when he did not annul. He who said, that she should not risk bastardy, [is afraid that] her children will be bastards if she thought that he did not annul when he annulled, she goes and marries without a bill of divorce. If she thought that he annulled when he did not annul, another man comes and marries her preliminarily; the preliminary marriage is valid but she thinks it is invalid. She waits until her first husband dies, then she goes and marries [another man]; the result is that her children will be bastards. Rebbi Mana said, I went with a caravan and heard Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa and Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not risk bastardy. Rav Huna said, even the one who said that she should not remain anchored also agrees that she should not risk bastardy.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:5

“Because of the public good.” They say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not risk bastardy. Some say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not remain anchored. He who said, that she should not remain anchored, [is afraid that] she turns out to be anchored if she thought that he annulled when he did not annul. He who said, that she should not risk bastardy, [is afraid that] her children will be bastards if she thought that he did not annul when he annulled, she goes and marries without a bill of divorce. If she thought that he annulled when he did not annul, another man comes and marries her preliminarily; the preliminary marriage is valid but she thinks it is invalid. She waits until her first husband dies, then she goes and marries [another man]; the result is that her children will be bastards. Rebbi Mana said, I went with a caravan and heard Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa and Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not risk bastardy. Rav Huna said, even the one who said that she should not remain anchored also agrees that she should not risk bastardy.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:7

“Mr. X and all his names.” Think of it, if his name was Reuben and he went away under the name of Simeon. But: “I am X and every other name which I have.” “In addition, they said if he had two wives, one in Judea and one in Galilee, and he is known by two names, one in Judea and one in Galilee. He used [his name] in Judea to divorce the one in Galilee and [his name] in Galilee to divorce the one in Judea. Neither one is divorced.” This baraita if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Galilee or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Judea. But if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Judea, or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Galilee, she is divorced. Rebbi Ilai said, according to the rules he has to say: “I am X with every other name which I have in Galilee.” If he was at another place, he can divorce either one he wishes. Rebbi Yose said, one says that if he did it. But to start out he has to follow Rebbi Ilai. Rebbi Abin said, if he is known by (another) name at another place, he has to mention all three.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:8

There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:8

There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:9

For example Doso, Dodo’s brother, divorced his wife. The case came before the rabbis who said that she should pay the fee. But did we not state: “the husband pays the fee”? Rebbi Ilai in the name of Samuel: If she forgives him her ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:12

Rav Huna said, why did they require a date on the bill of divorce? Because of an actual case. It so happened that a man was married to his sister’s daughter who committed adultery when she was still married. He predated the bill of divorce and said, it is better she should be judged as single rather than as a married woman.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:13

Rav Huna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes are from their words. But following him who says tithes are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment is followed in the Land as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed in the Land as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There, they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “For all its inhabitants.” In the time when they lived on it, not when they went from it into exile. If they lived on it but did (not) intermingle, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee was operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:13

Rav Huna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes are from their words. But following him who says tithes are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment is followed in the Land as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed in the Land as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There, they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “For all its inhabitants.” In the time when they lived on it, not when they went from it into exile. If they lived on it but did (not) intermingle, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee was operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:15

HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:15

HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:16

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Yossi ben Shaul said in the name of Rebbi: A person who had given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him but has to write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Joḥanan heard this and said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly. Did they not infer the rules of a bill of manumission from women? Just as a woman is not freed if [the husband] has given up hope, but she needs a bill of divorce from him, so a slave is not freed if [the master] has given up hope, but he needs a bill of manumission.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:18

If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him? Not only does this apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap, or הרנירק טיאונוס, or the king’s freedom? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:19

If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:19

If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:19

If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:19

If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:21

MISHNAH: A person who is half slave and half free works for his master one day and for himself one day, the words of the House of Hillel. The House of Shammai say, you provided for his master but you did not provide for him. He can marry neither a slave woman nor a free woman: shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase, as it is said: “He did not create it to be empty, He formed it to be settled.” For the public good one forces his master to manumit him and he writes a bond for half his value. The House of Hillel changed and instructed following the House of Shammai.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:21

MISHNAH: A person who is half slave and half free works for his master one day and for himself one day, the words of the House of Hillel. The House of Shammai say, you provided for his master but you did not provide for him. He can marry neither a slave woman nor a free woman: shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase, as it is said: “He did not create it to be empty, He formed it to be settled.” For the public good one forces his master to manumit him and he writes a bond for half his value. The House of Hillel changed and instructed following the House of Shammai.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:22

HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:25

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles,” etc. To a Gentile even in the Land. Who frees him? His original owner pays for him and the second frees him. “Or outside the Land,” even to a Jew. Let us say that if the second owner knew, both of them split the price; otherwise the first pays for him and the second frees him. “I X ben Y sold my slave Z to Antiochia”, he gains his freedom. But if he is in Lydda, he did not gain his freedom. It was stated: A slave goes outside the Land with his master. Therefore, if he sold him there, he is sold. If he came from outside the Land to the Land with the intention to return, one forces him to return. With the intention not to return, one does not force him to return. If he fled from outside the Land to the Land, he may return him. If he fled from the Land to outside the Land, Rebbi Joshia in the name of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, it is permigtted. The great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is permitted. Rebbi Marinos, the son of the great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is forbidden. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he is used to flee there. But he who says, it is forbidden, if he is not used to flee there. Rebbi Yose said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he can return him from there; but he who says, it is forbidden, if he cannot return him from there.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:30

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:31

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:31

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:33

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife as a she-ram cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife as a she-ram, when she went, married another man, and bore him children, and he said, if I had known that she can have children, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since there are women she-rams who are married and since [their husbands] are satisfied with them they keep them.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:36

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells himself and his children to Gentiles,” etc. The Mishnah, if he sold himself repeatedly. But if he sold himself once, one buys him back, but if he sold himself to the games, one does not buy him back. There was a case of one who sold himself to the games; the case came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said, what can we do? He did it for his livelihood.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:39

If somebody bought a field during a Jubilee period. Rebbi Ila said, he acquired ownership of the ground, Abba bar Mamal said, he did not acquire ownership of the ground. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to Rebbi Ila: In your opinion, since you say that he acquired ownership of the ground, why can he not dig cisterns, ditches, and caves? He said to him, the Torah said, “he shall return to his inheritance,” as it was. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa brought this topic before them and did not know that they still disagreed: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not bring and recite. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose: Everybody agrees that he brings. Where do they disagree? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he brings but does not recite.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:39

If somebody bought a field during a Jubilee period. Rebbi Ila said, he acquired ownership of the ground, Abba bar Mamal said, he did not acquire ownership of the ground. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to Rebbi Ila: In your opinion, since you say that he acquired ownership of the ground, why can he not dig cisterns, ditches, and caves? He said to him, the Torah said, “he shall return to his inheritance,” as it was. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa brought this topic before them and did not know that they still disagreed: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not bring and recite. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose: Everybody agrees that he brings. Where do they disagree? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he brings but does not recite.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:2

HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:3

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Full and partial damages are collected from encumbered property.” One understands full damages. Are partial damages not collected from the animal’s body? Rebbi Yose said, explain it when it was a docile ox which did damage and then his owner went and sold it. Its body already was encumbered to the injured party. The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he converted it into a loan. Then it should be foreclosed only by average quality land! Since the debt originated in a damage claim, he may collect from best quality.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:5

“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:5

“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:6

“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. “Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:16

If [Reuben] robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi, then Simeon came and foreclosed it from Levi; then Levi collects from Reuben’s encumbered property and Simeon collects the usufruct from Levi’s free property. If Levi in the meantime improved [the property], Levi collects the capital from Reuben’s encumbered property and the improvement from Simeon’s free property. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said, only if a third party’s buying preceded the improvement by this one. But if the improvement by this one preceded a third party’s buying, Levi can collect the capital even from Simeon’s encumbered property. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said: With usufruct one proceeds in the same way. If he spent four denars and the improvement is worth six, Levi collects four denars from Reuben’s encumbered property and another two from Simeon’s free property. Rebbi Abin in the name of the rabbis there: Since he did not enter with permission, his hand is weak against Simeon. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of the rabbis there: Since he entered with permission, his hand is strong against Reuben.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:17

Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi; Levi went and gave it to Jehudah as a gift. Then Simeon foreclosed it from Jehudah. Jehudah has no regress on Levi since it was a gift. Levi has regress on Reuben since it was a sale. Did he not give it away as a gift? He can say to him, it was my intention to give it to him so he would return me favors. Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and gave it to Levi as a gift; Levi sold it to Jehudah. Jehudah has regress on Levi since he sold it; Levi has no regress on Reuben since it was a gift; as Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: No easement is created by a gift.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:18

Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi, and he did not have time to write the foreclosure document before he died: whose is it? Rav Huna and Ḥiyya the son of Rav: One said, if he wrote the foreclosure document, it is Reuben’s, if not, it is Levi’s. The other one said, whether he wrote or did not write, it belongs to Levi. Rebbi Mana said, it is reasonable that it does not belong to Reuben since he can say to him, I sold you something which was not mine. Rebbi Yose said, it is not reasonable that it should not be Levi’s, since Reuben can tell him, is this not before you? You are good to confirm the sale.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:18

Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi, and he did not have time to write the foreclosure document before he died: whose is it? Rav Huna and Ḥiyya the son of Rav: One said, if he wrote the foreclosure document, it is Reuben’s, if not, it is Levi’s. The other one said, whether he wrote or did not write, it belongs to Levi. Rebbi Mana said, it is reasonable that it does not belong to Reuben since he can say to him, I sold you something which was not mine. Rebbi Yose said, it is not reasonable that it should not be Levi’s, since Reuben can tell him, is this not before you? You are good to confirm the sale.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:23

There, we have stated: “You have in your hand a mina of my father’s; you have to get from me only 50 denars. He does not have to swear since he is like a person who returns a find.” Rebbi Eleazar said, in this case they instituted a regulation as they instituted for a find, as we have stated: “The finder of a lost object shall not swear because of the public good.” Rebbi Abba said, this Mishnah [applies] when he said to him, you found my two oxen. But if he said, I found your two oxen and returned both of them, but the other said, you returned only one, in that case they did not institute the rule. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In this case they did institute. But in the first case, it is a word of the Torah, as it was stated: I could think that if he said to him, you found my two oxen, but the other said, I found only one, should he be obligated [to swear]? The verse says, “or if he found a find and disowned it;” that excludes this one who did not disown. But if he said to him, I was standing on my roof when I saw you dragging away two tied oxen, two tied oxen you dragged away from me, and he says, only one I dragged away; in that case they made no regulation. Similarly: “I was standing with my father when he was dying and he claimed from you a mina and you agreed to it,” and the other says, “I agreed only for 50;” in that case they made no regulation.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:23

There, we have stated: “You have in your hand a mina of my father’s; you have to get from me only 50 denars. He does not have to swear since he is like a person who returns a find.” Rebbi Eleazar said, in this case they instituted a regulation as they instituted for a find, as we have stated: “The finder of a lost object shall not swear because of the public good.” Rebbi Abba said, this Mishnah [applies] when he said to him, you found my two oxen. But if he said, I found your two oxen and returned both of them, but the other said, you returned only one, in that case they did not institute the rule. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In this case they did institute. But in the first case, it is a word of the Torah, as it was stated: I could think that if he said to him, you found my two oxen, but the other said, I found only one, should he be obligated [to swear]? The verse says, “or if he found a find and disowned it;” that excludes this one who did not disown. But if he said to him, I was standing on my roof when I saw you dragging away two tied oxen, two tied oxen you dragged away from me, and he says, only one I dragged away; in that case they made no regulation. Similarly: “I was standing with my father when he was dying and he claimed from you a mina and you agreed to it,” and the other says, “I agreed only for 50;” in that case they made no regulation.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:23

There, we have stated: “You have in your hand a mina of my father’s; you have to get from me only 50 denars. He does not have to swear since he is like a person who returns a find.” Rebbi Eleazar said, in this case they instituted a regulation as they instituted for a find, as we have stated: “The finder of a lost object shall not swear because of the public good.” Rebbi Abba said, this Mishnah [applies] when he said to him, you found my two oxen. But if he said, I found your two oxen and returned both of them, but the other said, you returned only one, in that case they did not institute the rule. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In this case they did institute. But in the first case, it is a word of the Torah, as it was stated: I could think that if he said to him, you found my two oxen, but the other said, I found only one, should he be obligated [to swear]? The verse says, “or if he found a find and disowned it;” that excludes this one who did not disown. But if he said to him, I was standing on my roof when I saw you dragging away two tied oxen, two tied oxen you dragged away from me, and he says, only one I dragged away; in that case they made no regulation. Similarly: “I was standing with my father when he was dying and he claimed from you a mina and you agreed to it,” and the other says, “I agreed only for 50;” in that case they made no regulation.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:25

HALAKHAH: “If orphans rely on a property owner, etc.” (Num. 18:28) “you” excludes partners, “you” excludes guardians, “you” excludes one who gives heave from what is not his. Did we not state (Terumot 3:3): “Partners who gave heave one after the other?” But one must be for Great Heave, the other for heave of the tithe. Did we not infer the laws of the Great Heave from heave of the tithe? But one is for practice, the other for action. “You” excludes guardians; but did we not state: “Orphans dependent on a home owner, or for whom the father had appointed a guardian, must tithe their produce.” The colleagues say, here for a permanent guardian, there for a temporary guardian. Rebbi Yose asked, does that apply to: “he may sell slaves but not real estate?” But here one deals with an adult orphan, there with an underage orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:25

HALAKHAH: “If orphans rely on a property owner, etc.” (Num. 18:28) “you” excludes partners, “you” excludes guardians, “you” excludes one who gives heave from what is not his. Did we not state (Terumot 3:3): “Partners who gave heave one after the other?” But one must be for Great Heave, the other for heave of the tithe. Did we not infer the laws of the Great Heave from heave of the tithe? But one is for practice, the other for action. “You” excludes guardians; but did we not state: “Orphans dependent on a home owner, or for whom the father had appointed a guardian, must tithe their produce.” The colleagues say, here for a permanent guardian, there for a temporary guardian. Rebbi Yose asked, does that apply to: “he may sell slaves but not real estate?” But here one deals with an adult orphan, there with an underage orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:25

HALAKHAH: “If orphans rely on a property owner, etc.” (Num. 18:28) “you” excludes partners, “you” excludes guardians, “you” excludes one who gives heave from what is not his. Did we not state (Terumot 3:3): “Partners who gave heave one after the other?” But one must be for Great Heave, the other for heave of the tithe. Did we not infer the laws of the Great Heave from heave of the tithe? But one is for practice, the other for action. “You” excludes guardians; but did we not state: “Orphans dependent on a home owner, or for whom the father had appointed a guardian, must tithe their produce.” The colleagues say, here for a permanent guardian, there for a temporary guardian. Rebbi Yose asked, does that apply to: “he may sell slaves but not real estate?” But here one deals with an adult orphan, there with an underage orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:26

Rebbi Joḥanan said, as a matter of principle one does not appoint guardians for orphans to their detriment, only to their profit; but if they are detrimental, they are detrimental. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, neither as a matter of principle nor as a reaction, neither for profit not for detriment. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: “One appoints a guardian for them” There is a difference about an ox, lest it continue to cause damage. If it did do damage, from whom does one take payment? Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the orphans. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, from the guardian. And even if Rebbi Joḥanan never taught this, does not his word imply it since he said if in the end they are detrimental, they are detrimental?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:29

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:29

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:29

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:34

Rebbi Joḥanan said, why did they say “an Israel underage girl eats heave,” that all should be eager to marry her for her attractiveness. Rebbi Shammai said, only if she knows how to keep her [valuables given for] preliminary marriage. Rebbi Immi said, a Mishnah said so, “married to a Cohen she eats heave.” Rebbi Ḥananiah said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, for her attractiveness, that means, even if she does not know how to keep her [valuables given for] preliminary marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:37

Ulla bar Ismael: By law, it should not atone even if it was [not] known in public. Why did they say that it atones? Not to let the altar be deserted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, by law, it should atone even if it was known in public. Why did they say that it does not atone? Not to let the altar accept robberies. How many are “public”? Rebbi Gorion in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Three people. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “You brought robbed goods with the lame and the sick.” Since lame and sick are obvious, so everything must be obvious.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:37

Ulla bar Ismael: By law, it should not atone even if it was [not] known in public. Why did they say that it atones? Not to let the altar be deserted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, by law, it should atone even if it was known in public. Why did they say that it does not atone? Not to let the altar accept robberies. How many are “public”? Rebbi Gorion in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Three people. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “You brought robbed goods with the lame and the sick.” Since lame and sick are obvious, so everything must be obvious.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:48

HALAKHAH: “The following was said for communal peace,” etc. The saying of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai implies that it is of the words of the Torah, for Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Moses wrote this Torah and gave it to the Cohanim, the Levites (etc.)” and afterwards “to all the Elders of Israel.” The saying of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Joshua said, never did I recite the benediction before a Cohen and I did not allow an Israel to do it before him. The saying of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, in a city of only Cohanim, an Israel reads first because of communal peace.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:48

HALAKHAH: “The following was said for communal peace,” etc. The saying of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai implies that it is of the words of the Torah, for Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Moses wrote this Torah and gave it to the Cohanim, the Levites (etc.)” and afterwards “to all the Elders of Israel.” The saying of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Joshua said, never did I recite the benediction before a Cohen and I did not allow an Israel to do it before him. The saying of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, in a city of only Cohanim, an Israel reads first because of communal peace.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:52

Following the opinion of the rabbis there it is acceptable since there, they say in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what is found in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what is robbed from him is robbed because of communal peace; a nut or a pebble he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “If a man give.” The gift of a man is a gift, but the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, robbing from him is not clear unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that is, to recover from him by a law suit, but to have to bring a sacrifice for [a false] oath only if he grew two pubic hairs. But following the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “A man to his neighbor”, until he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac explained it by the method of the artless. As we have stated there: “For underage children, their buying is buying and their selling selling, for movables.” But did we not state there: “He cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:56

A weaver asked Rebbi Immi, what about a Gentile wedding feast? He wanted to permit it to them from this: “Because of peaceful coexistence.” Rebbi Abba told them, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that the holiday of a Gentile wedding feast is forbidden? Rebbi Immi said, if it had not been for Rebbi Abba, we would have come to permit their strange worship; praised be He Who separated us from them.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:59

Rebbi Phineas asked: For what did they impose a fine? At a place where they sow and eat or at a place where they sow but do not eat? What is the difference? If one saw him buying from Saracens. It is forbidden; if you say at a place where they sow and eat, if one saw him buying from Saracens it is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:62

Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ammi. One said: “Plough it well then, I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical.” The other one said: “May you succeed” For him who says, plough it well, then I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical, what means “one greets them” in a Jewish way? “May you succeed.” For him who says to the Gentile “may you succeed”? Explanation: Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa and Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman passed by one of the ploughmen in the Sabbatical. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said to him, are you not Jewish? Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa said to him, did not Rebbi teach us (Ps. 129:8): “The passers-by did not say, the blessing of the Eternal be on you,” these are the nations of the world who pass out of the world, they did not say to Israel “the blessing of the Eternal is on you.” What does Israel say to them, “we bless you in the Name of the Eternal.” All blessings that come into the world because of us are not enough for you; not only do you not say, come and take from these blessings for yourselves, but you roll over us pro-rated contributions and fines, head taxes and annonae.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:62

Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ammi. One said: “Plough it well then, I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical.” The other one said: “May you succeed” For him who says, plough it well, then I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical, what means “one greets them” in a Jewish way? “May you succeed.” For him who says to the Gentile “may you succeed”? Explanation: Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa and Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman passed by one of the ploughmen in the Sabbatical. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said to him, are you not Jewish? Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa said to him, did not Rebbi teach us (Ps. 129:8): “The passers-by did not say, the blessing of the Eternal be on you,” these are the nations of the world who pass out of the world, they did not say to Israel “the blessing of the Eternal is on you.” What does Israel say to them, “we bless you in the Name of the Eternal.” All blessings that come into the world because of us are not enough for you; not only do you not say, come and take from these blessings for yourselves, but you roll over us pro-rated contributions and fines, head taxes and annonae.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:62

Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ammi. One said: “Plough it well then, I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical.” The other one said: “May you succeed” For him who says, plough it well, then I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical, what means “one greets them” in a Jewish way? “May you succeed.” For him who says to the Gentile “may you succeed”? Explanation: Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa and Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman passed by one of the ploughmen in the Sabbatical. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said to him, are you not Jewish? Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa said to him, did not Rebbi teach us (Ps. 129:8): “The passers-by did not say, the blessing of the Eternal be on you,” these are the nations of the world who pass out of the world, they did not say to Israel “the blessing of the Eternal is on you.” What does Israel say to them, “we bless you in the Name of the Eternal.” All blessings that come into the world because of us are not enough for you; not only do you not say, come and take from these blessings for yourselves, but you roll over us pro-rated contributions and fines, head taxes and annonae.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:2

HALAKHAH: “Somebody who says, accept this bill of divorce for my wife,” etc. Everywhere you say that “accept” is the equivalent of “obtain,” but here you say that “accept” is the equivalent of “bring”? There is a difference, for one can obtain something for a person without him being present. Rebbi Shammai objected: Think of it, if she was shouting to obtain a divorce? I say, maybe she changed her mind. But did we not state: “A woman herself may bring her bill of divorce”? Could you say that she may have changed her mind? There, she is damaging herself; here it is to her detriment.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:3

Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:3

Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:5

Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: So far if she said, bring me, but [the agent] said [to the husband] “receive for me”. If she said, receive for me but [the agent] said [to the husband] “bring me”? If was found stated in both cases, this is a bill of divorce and if he wants to retract he cannot retract. But did we not state: “He shall deliver into her hand,” that includes not only her hand, from where through his agent’s hand, into her agent’s hand, from his agent to her agent, and from her agent to his agent; the verse says, “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Who said, “it is impossible for me”? Rebbi! As it was stated: “If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he said to him, your wife said, accept my bill of divorce for me: If he brought it to her, gave it to her, he acquired it for her, it was received for her; if he wants to retract, he may not retract, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Nathan says, ‘bring it to her, give it to her,’ [if he wants to retract, he may retract; ‘acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to retract, he may not retract. Rebbi says, in any of these cases] he may not retract except if he says, ‘It is impossible for me that you accept it for her, but give it to her.’” It is difficult for Rebbi, “here you have it from my word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract. It is difficult for Rebbi Nathan, “here you have it from her word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract! Rav Ḥuna said, he becomes his and her agent. Assi said, everywhere we have stated “his and her agent”, she is both divorced and not divorced.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:6

Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Is not this disagreement the same as that disagreement, as we have stated there: “If a man was talking with a woman about her bill of divorce or her preliminary marriage and gave her the bill of divorce or [some valuable for] preliminary marriage and did not spell it out, Rebbi Yose says it is sufficient; Rebbi Jehudah says he has to be explicit.” Then Rebbi follows Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Nathan Rebbi Jehudah. He said to him, what do you have in your hand, did not Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abin, Abba bar Taḥlifa, say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? [If they thought about] other things but if he still was on the same subject, it is a bill of divorce. But here, even if they are still on the same subject there is disagreement.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:6

Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Is not this disagreement the same as that disagreement, as we have stated there: “If a man was talking with a woman about her bill of divorce or her preliminary marriage and gave her the bill of divorce or [some valuable for] preliminary marriage and did not spell it out, Rebbi Yose says it is sufficient; Rebbi Jehudah says he has to be explicit.” Then Rebbi follows Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Nathan Rebbi Jehudah. He said to him, what do you have in your hand, did not Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abin, Abba bar Taḥlifa, say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? [If they thought about] other things but if he still was on the same subject, it is a bill of divorce. But here, even if they are still on the same subject there is disagreement.