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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:8

Somebody became impure through a corpse and knew it; by a crawling animal and did not know it. The minor impurity is not mentioned with the severe impurity. Somebody became impure through a corpse and did not know it; by a crawling animal and did not know it. Then it became known to him about the crawling animal, and after that it became known to him about the corpse. Since it first became known to him about the crawling animal, is there minor impurity together with the severe one, or since the impurity of the corpse preceded, should the impurity of the crawling animal and the knowledge about it be pushed aside so that the minor impurity not be mentioned with the severe impurity? Somebody became impure through a corpse and knew it; by a crawling animal and did not know it, and entered the Sanctuary. When he was oblivious of the corpse he is liable; when he was oblivious of the crawling animal he is not liable. If he went to immerse himself for the severe impurity and the minor impurity was additional, it is counted also for the minor impurity. In which respect? If he immersed himself and then entered the Sanctuary he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:8

Somebody became impure through a corpse and knew it; by a crawling animal and did not know it. The minor impurity is not mentioned with the severe impurity. Somebody became impure through a corpse and did not know it; by a crawling animal and did not know it. Then it became known to him about the crawling animal, and after that it became known to him about the corpse. Since it first became known to him about the crawling animal, is there minor impurity together with the severe one, or since the impurity of the corpse preceded, should the impurity of the crawling animal and the knowledge about it be pushed aside so that the minor impurity not be mentioned with the severe impurity? Somebody became impure through a corpse and knew it; by a crawling animal and did not know it, and entered the Sanctuary. When he was oblivious of the corpse he is liable; when he was oblivious of the crawling animal he is not liable. If he went to immerse himself for the severe impurity and the minor impurity was additional, it is counted also for the minor impurity. In which respect? If he immersed himself and then entered the Sanctuary he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:11

Rav Ḥisda asked: What is the situation if he entered the Sanctuary thinking it was a synagogue? Rebbi Yose said, the following is what we are saying: One knew that there exists impurity in the world but he did not know whether one is liable for a sacrifice because of it, that certainly is awareness. But the following is where we hold, if it was clear to him that he was impure but he was oblivious of the Sanctuary, and he entered the Sanctuary. And so if it was clear to him that this was the Sanctuary, he was oblivious of the impurity and entered the Sanctuary.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:1

MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds: An oath that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat; that I ate, or that I did not eat. An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate the most minute amount, he is liable, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, where do we find that one who eats the most minute amount should be liable, that this one be liable? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice; but this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice!

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:10

Rebbi Ḥinena understood all this from the following: I did not eat from it in my mourning, but I drank?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:16

Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who said that comprehensive oaths fall on prohibitions, should we not state “an oath that I shall not eat; when he ate”? Rebbi Ze`ira said, in the whole lifetime of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal we did not find an answer; after he had died, we found an answer. Where do we stand? If one said, an oath that I shall not eat meat, including Passover; that I shall not eat during these ten days, including the Day of Atonement, then the oath falls on prohibitions. Rebbi Yose said, one may infer from here if in front of him were olive-sized pieces of slaughtered [meat] and one of carcass meat and he said, [an oath] that I shall eat these ten olive-sized pieces, since he is not liable for the carcass meat, he neither is liable for the remainder.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:17

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Why did he not say, “an oath that I shall eat of the slaughter of X”? Is there not fat? If he slaughters deer. Is there not the hip sinew? About fowl. Is there not blood?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:18

Rebbi Ḥinena asked: Why did he not say, “an oath if I would eat of X” without detail? Because of Rebbi Simeon. But if following Rebbi Simeon, how could we state the Day of Atonement, since Rebbi Simeon stated, you shall deprive yourselves, of what is (forbidden) to you, not of what is (permitted) to you. Only one has a fixed rate sacrifice, the other a variable one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:19

They objected, is there not impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta which need a variable rate [sacrifice] and did the Tanna not state it? We come to state only things carrying a liability to extirpation; there is no extirpation for oaths.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:23

MISHNAH: Whether matters of himself, or matters of others, or material matters, or immaterial matters. How is this? An oath that I shall give to X, or that I shall not give, that I gave, or that I did not give, that I shall sleep, or that I shall not sleep, that I slept, or that I did not sleep, that I shall throw a pebble into the sea, or that I shall not throw, that I threw, or that I did not throw. Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only for the future, for it is said to cause evil or cause good. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, if it is so then this refers only to matters of causing evil or good; from where matters which do not refer to causing evil or good? He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the additional text of the verse is for this, the additional text of the verse is for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:23

MISHNAH: Whether matters of himself, or matters of others, or material matters, or immaterial matters. How is this? An oath that I shall give to X, or that I shall not give, that I gave, or that I did not give, that I shall sleep, or that I shall not sleep, that I slept, or that I did not sleep, that I shall throw a pebble into the sea, or that I shall not throw, that I threw, or that I did not throw. Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only for the future, for it is said to cause evil or cause good. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, if it is so then this refers only to matters of causing evil or good; from where matters which do not refer to causing evil or good? He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the additional text of the verse is for this, the additional text of the verse is for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:23

MISHNAH: Whether matters of himself, or matters of others, or material matters, or immaterial matters. How is this? An oath that I shall give to X, or that I shall not give, that I gave, or that I did not give, that I shall sleep, or that I shall not sleep, that I slept, or that I did not sleep, that I shall throw a pebble into the sea, or that I shall not throw, that I threw, or that I did not throw. Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only for the future, for it is said to cause evil or cause good. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, if it is so then this refers only to matters of causing evil or good; from where matters which do not refer to causing evil or good? He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the additional text of the verse is for this, the additional text of the verse is for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:24

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:25

How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:27

HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:27

HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:32

Rebbi Yose asked, “an oath, an oath, an oath, that I shall not eat,” and he ate. What is the rule? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, let us hear from the following: “'An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;' he is liable once.” Because he mentioned this. Therefore, if he did not mention this, he would be liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:36

MISHNAH: For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged; if in error one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is known to man, about a stone pillar that it is of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we shall not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries; these are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution of unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:36

MISHNAH: For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged; if in error one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is known to man, about a stone pillar that it is of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we shall not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries; these are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution of unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:37

HALAKHAH: “For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged,” etc. There, we have stated: “If I did not see on this road [crowds] like those who left Egypt.” Is it impossible that crowds like those who left Egypt went by? But we are dealing with one look. Was it not the case that when Diocletian went there, 1’200’000 [men] went with him? But we must be dealing with one look.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:38

“If I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press.” Did not the snake of king Sapor swallow camels and carts? When they wanted to kill it, they filled camel bags with straw and put glowing coals inside; it swallowed them and died. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, I saw the hide of a snake made over eight spaces between pillars. Rebbi Samuel ben Jacob said, I saw the hide of a snake covering a state coach. Samuel said, square. If square one could state even a small one. Rebbi Yudan the father of Rebbi Mattaniah said, so it is. It is the way of this Tanna to use only big words, as we have stated: “A flying camel.” Could he not have stated, “a flying rat”?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:38

“If I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press.” Did not the snake of king Sapor swallow camels and carts? When they wanted to kill it, they filled camel bags with straw and put glowing coals inside; it swallowed them and died. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, I saw the hide of a snake made over eight spaces between pillars. Rebbi Samuel ben Jacob said, I saw the hide of a snake covering a state coach. Samuel said, square. If square one could state even a small one. Rebbi Yudan the father of Rebbi Mattaniah said, so it is. It is the way of this Tanna to use only big words, as we have stated: “A flying camel.” Could he not have stated, “a flying rat”?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:39

It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, there is nothing square from the six Days of Creation. Rebbi Berekhiah objected: Did we not state: “The body of baheret is like a square Cilician grit. The place for a grit is nine lentils. The space for a lentil is four hairwidths; in all 36 hairwidths.” Rebbi (Yosna) said, that in itself says that there is no square. Why was it stated “squared”? That he should square it. And כגעה? It is full of knots. But there is the bunch of pila! It is round below. Some wanted to say, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said this only about creatures, There is square in foods, there is no square in creatures.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:44

Ḥizqiah said: he who swears that two are two is flogged for a vain oath. Rebbi Menahem in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He who saw rain falling and said Κύριε πόλυ βρέξον is flogged for a vain oath. Rebbi Onias, Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Naḥman: 24 city councils were in Judea and they all were destroyed because of true vain oaths, as it is written: For the vain did I hit your sons.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:45

MISHNAH: “An oath that I shall eat this loaf; an oath that I shall not eat it.” The first one is a blurted oath, the second a vain oath. If he ate it he violated a vain oath, if he did not eat it he violated a blurted oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:46

HALAKHAH: “A blurted oath,” etc. “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it’, he is liable only once”. Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on this was it said but on the following: “Whether matters of himself, or matters of others,” as Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: ‘An oath that X gave a mina to Y.’ If it turns out that he had not given, since it is not in his hand for the future it is not in his hand for the past. It was found stated on both cases: This is more stringent for the past than for the future: If he says “I shall not eat, I shall not eat,” he is liable only once. “I did not eat, I did not eat,” he is liable for each single time.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:46

HALAKHAH: “A blurted oath,” etc. “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it’, he is liable only once”. Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on this was it said but on the following: “Whether matters of himself, or matters of others,” as Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: ‘An oath that X gave a mina to Y.’ If it turns out that he had not given, since it is not in his hand for the future it is not in his hand for the past. It was found stated on both cases: This is more stringent for the past than for the future: If he says “I shall not eat, I shall not eat,” he is liable only once. “I did not eat, I did not eat,” he is liable for each single time.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:49

“An oath that I shall eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall not eat it today.” Then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he kept the first oath and invalidated the second. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he invalidated the first one and did not keep the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:53

MISHNAH: A blurted oath applies to men and women, relatives and unrelated persons, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional [to bring] a variable sacrifice. A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and unrelated persons, to qualified and disqualified ones, in court and out of court, and by his own words. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional he is not prosecutable. In both cases, one who is sworn to by another person can be liable. How is this? One said, “I did not eat today, I did not put on phylacteries today.” “I want you to swear to it,” if he said “Amen” he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:53

MISHNAH: A blurted oath applies to men and women, relatives and unrelated persons, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional [to bring] a variable sacrifice. A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and unrelated persons, to qualified and disqualified ones, in court and out of court, and by his own words. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional he is not prosecutable. In both cases, one who is sworn to by another person can be liable. How is this? One said, “I did not eat today, I did not put on phylacteries today.” “I want you to swear to it,” if he said “Amen” he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:28

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what? Since Rebbi Meїr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecation. Only one who hears an imprecation. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines? From his own mouth would he be liable for a variable value sacrifice?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:31

HALAKHAH: “If both of them disavowed simultaneously,” etc. If they dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to disavowe in court. This is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, his sacrifice for the Eternal for his vow of nazir; that his vow of nazir precede his sacrifice, not that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. If they were sworn to out of court, dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to renege in court, how do you treat this? As if his sin did precede his sacrifice or since the are liable only in court as if their sacrifice did precede their sin?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:31

HALAKHAH: “If both of them disavowed simultaneously,” etc. If they dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to disavowe in court. This is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, his sacrifice for the Eternal for his vow of nazir; that his vow of nazir precede his sacrifice, not that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. If they were sworn to out of court, dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to renege in court, how do you treat this? As if his sin did precede his sacrifice or since the are liable only in court as if their sacrifice did precede their sin?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:37

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:37

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:37

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:37

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:37

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:40

“I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, there is no money when there is flogging. He explains it following Rebbi Meїr who said, he is flogged and he pays. In any case he did not make him lose money. Is it not that since he wanted to give him but did not give to him; it is as if he made him lose money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:40

“I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, there is no money when there is flogging. He explains it following Rebbi Meїr who said, he is flogged and he pays. In any case he did not make him lose money. Is it not that since he wanted to give him but did not give to him; it is as if he made him lose money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:41

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that Mr. X promised to give me 200 zuz but did not give them to me.” These are not liable since one is liable only for an (oath about) money similar to a deposit. “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me when you know testimony for me.” These are not liable since the oath preceded the testimony. If he stood in the synagogue and said, “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me.” These are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:42

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody wanted to change his mind after he had promised a gift to another person, he may change his mind. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Did He not say “a true yes”? At the moment when he said it, it was a true yes.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:45

HALAKHAH: “If he said to two persons, I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Rebbi Mana understood it from the following, “or one of them was a relative or disqualified.” Therefore, unless one of them was a relative or disqualified, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them. Rebbi Yose understood it from the preceding, “since the oath preceded the testimony.” Therefore, if the oath did not precede the testimony, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:2

HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:12

HALAKHAH: “If five people were claiming from him,” etc. I could think that also for an oath about a deposit He did not make one assenting to an oath like making an oath? Rebbi Eleazar said, this is not so. But also for an oath about a deposit we are treating one assenting to an oath like one formulating an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:13

Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Eleazar, only if he mentioned “oath” at the start and at the end. The words of the Sages, if he mentioned “oath” at the start but not at the end. Or if he mentioned it at the end but not at the start in the opinion of the rabbis he brings a sacrifice for each single one, in Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one sacrifice for everything. If he mentions “oath” at the start but did not mention it at the end, does the oath fall on the middle ones? Come and see: If he had mentioned it at the start and the end, did he mention it for the middle ones? But you are saying that it is valid; so here it is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:13

Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Eleazar, only if he mentioned “oath” at the start and at the end. The words of the Sages, if he mentioned “oath” at the start but not at the end. Or if he mentioned it at the end but not at the start in the opinion of the rabbis he brings a sacrifice for each single one, in Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one sacrifice for everything. If he mentions “oath” at the start but did not mention it at the end, does the oath fall on the middle ones? Come and see: If he had mentioned it at the start and the end, did he mention it for the middle ones? But you are saying that it is valid; so here it is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:14

Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:14

Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:20

The following is obvious: If her husband did not dissolve [the vow] for the first woman and she (remained) in her vow, she is whipped. Can the second he whipped? Rebbi Yose said, since one is whipped, the other also is whipped. Rebbi Yudan said, is this a stipulation of the court? Should not the second be treated as one who said, “a shall be a nezirah[after] thirty days”? Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, for he said, it depends on the collection.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:23

MISHNAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” and he says “I did not rape, I did not seduce.” “I am asking you to swear,” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. Rebbi Simeon frees him from liability since he would not pay the fine by his own admission. They told him, even though he does not pay the fine by his own admission, he pays for shame and diminution by his own admission.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:23

MISHNAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” and he says “I did not rape, I did not seduce.” “I am asking you to swear,” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. Rebbi Simeon frees him from liability since he would not pay the fine by his own admission. They told him, even though he does not pay the fine by his own admission, he pays for shame and diminution by his own admission.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:24

HALAKHAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” etc. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The words of Rebbi Simeon [imply that] the main claim is for the fine, which is not so for the words of the Sages. Rebbi Illa said, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he claims the fine, shame and diminution; the words of the Sages if he claims shame, diminution, and fine. The rabbis say, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances three claims; the words of the Sages if he advances one claim. Rebbi Ze`ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, did you hear explicitly from Rebbi Joḥanan, or from his word? Rebbi Yasa said, for he is of the rabbis’ opinion. Rebbi Mana said, even if he is of Rebbi Illa’s opinion, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances one claim; the words of the Sages if he advances three claims. “Not only matters for which he has to pay the capital, from where double payment, quadruple and quintuple payment, the rapist, and the seducer, and the calumniator? The verse says, everything about which one would swear falsely.” Is the calumniator’s not a fine? Rebbi Jeremiah says, this is Rebbi Simeon’s who said, all depends on the collection.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:25

MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:25

MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:25

MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:25

MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:25

MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:25

MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:25

MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:26

HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:26

HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:7

“ ‘You are holding a mina for me’, ‘I am not holding anything for you’, he is not liable.” Even “you are holding a lot for me,” “I am not holding anything for you”, he is not liable? But the following: “You are holding a mina for me.” “I am holding only a peruṭah for you.” He is liable. Rav and Rebbi Joḥanan both are saying: Only if he made the loan in the presence of witnesses. But if he made the loan not in the presence of witnesses, he could tell him, you gave me a loan but I returned half of it. Rebbi Yudan said, in money matters one does not argue “because.” Because he could have told him, you did not give me a loan, he could tell him, you gave me a loan but I returned half of it? The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ ‘You are holding a mina for me;’ he said ‘yes’. The next day he said, ‘return it to me,’ ‘I returned it to you;’ he is not liable. ‘I am not holding anything for you,’ he is liable.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:12

If somebody produced both a document and ḥazaqah. Rebbi says, it should be judged by the document. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, it should be judged by ḥazaqah. Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A case came before Rebbi Jehudah following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: How? Did Rebbi switch his opinion? There he said, it should be judged by the document. But here he said it should be judged by ḥazaqah. Would we say, before he changed his opinion? Even if you say, after he changed his opinion. Rebbi only wanted to determine the truth of the matter. “If somebody occupied real estate on the basis of a document of sale and it was found invalid, this is not ḥazaqah.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, in dispute. Rebbi Samuel said, Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abinna: it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Yose said, there if one produced both a document and ḥazaqah. Here if he came with a document. Rebbi Yudan said, there if he presented two groups of witnesses; here one who contradicts his own proofs.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:21

Between both of them it will never move from between them. If the one forcing the oath forces the oath lying, at the end it will come over him. If the one swearing swears lying, at the end it will come over him. What is the reason? I shall take it out, oracle of the Eternal Sabaot, and it will come into the house of the thief and the house of him who swears falsely in My Name, etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, destructive angels have no joints. What is the reason? From roving about the Earth and walking there. But here, it will destroy its wood and its stones. Come and see, things which the fire will not burn, a vain oath will destroy. Rebbi Jonah said, about falsehood. Rebbi Yose said, even on truth. Ḥaggai was preaching following Rebbi Yose. There was a case about a woman who went to knead dough with another and had two denarii bound into the seam of her head cover. These fell out and were rolled into a loaf. She went back to he house, wanted them and did not find them. She returned to her and said to her, give me the two denarii which fell from me in your house. She told her, I do not know. If she would know of it, she should bury her son. She buried him. When they returned from his grave, she heard a voice saying, if she had not known about them she would not have buried him. She said, if this woman knows about them, she should bury her other son. She buried him. They came to console her and cut one loaf and found two denarii rolled into the loaf. This says, whether innocent or guilty, never swear an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:22

MISHNAH: About the following one does not swear: slaves, and documents, and real estate, and gifts to the Temple. Not about double restitution, nor quadruple or quintuple; the unpaid trustee does not swear, the paid trustee does not pay. Rebbi Simeon says, one swears about things for which he is responsible if they be alienated, but does not swear if he is not responsible if they be alienated. Rebbi Meїr says, there are things which are like real estate and they are not like real estate but the Sages do not agree with him. How is this? “Ten bearing vines did I hand over to you,” but the other says, “they are only five.” Rebbi Meїr declares liable for an oath but the Sages say, anything connected to the ground is like ground.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:2

HALAKHAH: “All who must swear by Torah standards,” etc. One understands from what is said, an oath before the Eternal shall be between them, would we not know that if he does not swear, he has to pay? Why does the verse say, its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay? But from the moment the owner accepted his oath, he does not have to pay. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this only following Rebbi Meїr or even following the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Assi say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meїr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive? Its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay, therefore if he does not swear, he has to pay. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The unpaid and the paid trustees may stipulate to be like a borrower. Rebbi Ḥanina said, everybody agrees that in the language of the Torah out of a negative one understands a positive; where do they disagree? In everyday speech.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:3

Rebbi Abin said, since the householder has many occupations they instituted that the journeyman should swear and collect. [Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there they instituted that the journeyman should swear and collect;] similarly they instituted for the householder that if its deadline had elapsed, he cannot swear and collect. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if there are witnesses that he claimed it in time, he swears and collects even after a year. Rebbi Yose said, he has only that single day. Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. One said, if he claimed from him during daytime, he has only that day; if in the night he has only that night. But the other said, if he claimed from him and he said, I gave. But if he said, I shall give, the presumption is that he gave. We do not know who said what. Since Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: if he claimed from him during daytime, he has only that day; if in the night he has only that night, therefore Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina is the one who said, if he claimed from him and he said, I gave. But if he said, I shall give, the presumption is that he gave. Rebbi Mana said, sometimes he claims after its time and it is considered as in time. How is this? He claimed from him and he said to him, did I not say to you that I gave at that date? That date becomes as if it were yesterday; one gives him one measure.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:5

It is obvious: If the householder dies, the journeyman swears to his heirs. Even if the journeyman dies, do his heirs swear to the householder’s heirs? They made this ordinance only for the journeyman. Maybe for his heirs? Rebbi Eleazar said, if he claimed before witnesses. [But if he claimed without witnesses, he can tell him,] I paid your wages. Rebbi Joḥanan said, does one not in money matters argue “because?” Because he can say to him, I did not hire you, he can tell him, I hired you and paid your wages. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: “When was this said? If he said, I gave, but the other said, I did not take; I gave you your wages, but he says, I did not take. You hired me, but he says, I did not hire you. The burden of proof is on the claimant.” It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar, if he hired him before witnesses, how can this one say, I did not hire you?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:5

It is obvious: If the householder dies, the journeyman swears to his heirs. Even if the journeyman dies, do his heirs swear to the householder’s heirs? They made this ordinance only for the journeyman. Maybe for his heirs? Rebbi Eleazar said, if he claimed before witnesses. [But if he claimed without witnesses, he can tell him,] I paid your wages. Rebbi Joḥanan said, does one not in money matters argue “because?” Because he can say to him, I did not hire you, he can tell him, I hired you and paid your wages. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: “When was this said? If he said, I gave, but the other said, I did not take; I gave you your wages, but he says, I did not take. You hired me, but he says, I did not hire you. The burden of proof is on the claimant.” It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar, if he hired him before witnesses, how can this one say, I did not hire you?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:5

It is obvious: If the householder dies, the journeyman swears to his heirs. Even if the journeyman dies, do his heirs swear to the householder’s heirs? They made this ordinance only for the journeyman. Maybe for his heirs? Rebbi Eleazar said, if he claimed before witnesses. [But if he claimed without witnesses, he can tell him,] I paid your wages. Rebbi Joḥanan said, does one not in money matters argue “because?” Because he can say to him, I did not hire you, he can tell him, I hired you and paid your wages. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: “When was this said? If he said, I gave, but the other said, I did not take; I gave you your wages, but he says, I did not take. You hired me, but he says, I did not hire you. The burden of proof is on the claimant.” It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar, if he hired him before witnesses, how can this one say, I did not hire you?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:5

It is obvious: If the householder dies, the journeyman swears to his heirs. Even if the journeyman dies, do his heirs swear to the householder’s heirs? They made this ordinance only for the journeyman. Maybe for his heirs? Rebbi Eleazar said, if he claimed before witnesses. [But if he claimed without witnesses, he can tell him,] I paid your wages. Rebbi Joḥanan said, does one not in money matters argue “because?” Because he can say to him, I did not hire you, he can tell him, I hired you and paid your wages. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: “When was this said? If he said, I gave, but the other said, I did not take; I gave you your wages, but he says, I did not take. You hired me, but he says, I did not hire you. The burden of proof is on the claimant.” It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar, if he hired him before witnesses, how can this one say, I did not hire you?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:5

It is obvious: If the householder dies, the journeyman swears to his heirs. Even if the journeyman dies, do his heirs swear to the householder’s heirs? They made this ordinance only for the journeyman. Maybe for his heirs? Rebbi Eleazar said, if he claimed before witnesses. [But if he claimed without witnesses, he can tell him,] I paid your wages. Rebbi Joḥanan said, does one not in money matters argue “because?” Because he can say to him, I did not hire you, he can tell him, I hired you and paid your wages. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: “When was this said? If he said, I gave, but the other said, I did not take; I gave you your wages, but he says, I did not take. You hired me, but he says, I did not hire you. The burden of proof is on the claimant.” It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar, if he hired him before witnesses, how can this one say, I did not hire you?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:6

Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked: “You worked for me one day and I paid you.” But the other says, “I worked for you for two days and you did not give anything to me.” It is obvious that he takes for the first day without oath. The second is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar. “I hired you for a tetradrachma and gave it to you.” But the other says, “you hired me for two tetradrachmas and did not give me anything.” It is obvious that he takes the first tetradrachma without an oath. The second is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:6

Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked: “You worked for me one day and I paid you.” But the other says, “I worked for you for two days and you did not give anything to me.” It is obvious that he takes for the first day without oath. The second is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar. “I hired you for a tetradrachma and gave it to you.” But the other says, “you hired me for two tetradrachmas and did not give me anything.” It is obvious that he takes the first tetradrachma without an oath. The second is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:10

MISHNAH: How about a person robbed? There were witnesses that he entered another’s house to take a pledge without authorization. He said to him, give me my vessels which you took but he answers I did not take; this one swears and takes. Rebbi Jehudah says, only if there is partial admission. How is this? He tells him, you took two of my vessels but he says, I took only one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:14

MISHNAH: The injured one, how? They were testifying against him that one came to his hand whole and left injured. He says, you injured me, but the other says, I did not injure; this one swears and collects. Rebbi Jehudah says, only if there was a partial admission. How is this? He said to him, you injured me twice but the other says, I injured you only once.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:15

HALAKHAH: “The injured one, how,” etc. “Rebbi Jehudah was calling them beaters. Any time they are rubbing one another, he swears and collects. If he was bitten at a place where he could not bite himself, he collects without oath. At a later time if one says, you injured me, but the other says, I did not injure, this is like any other claim.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:23

MISHNAH: The grocer on his account book, how? Not that he says to him, it is written in my account book that you owe me 200 denars, but he said to him, give my son two se’ah of wheat, or my worker small change for a tetradrachma. He says, I gave, but they say, we did not take. He swears and collects, and they swear and collect. Ben Nannas said, how? Both are induced to swear falsely! But he takes without an oath and they take without an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:26

That is to say, only if he did not introduce them. But if he introduced them, the householder has no liability, following what Rebbi Jehudah bar Shalom said: One did introduce the porters to the food merchants. They came, but they sent them away without giving them anything. The case came before Rebbi Shammai. Since if the food merchants had said that they took, would at the end not these and those collect? Therefore, they shall collect immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:26

That is to say, only if he did not introduce them. But if he introduced them, the householder has no liability, following what Rebbi Jehudah bar Shalom said: One did introduce the porters to the food merchants. They came, but they sent them away without giving them anything. The case came before Rebbi Shammai. Since if the food merchants had said that they took, would at the end not these and those collect? Therefore, they shall collect immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:30

MISHNAH: If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From encumbered property, or from orphans’ property, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. If she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Similarly, the orphans can collect only by an oath; “an oath that our father did not instruct us, our father did not tell us, and we found nothing in our father’s documents that this note of indebtedness was paid.” Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa testified that even if the son was born after the father’s death he swears and collects. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, if there are witnesses that the father said on his death bed that this note of indebtedness was not paid, he collects without oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:30

MISHNAH: If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From encumbered property, or from orphans’ property, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. If she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Similarly, the orphans can collect only by an oath; “an oath that our father did not instruct us, our father did not tell us, and we found nothing in our father’s documents that this note of indebtedness was paid.” Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa testified that even if the son was born after the father’s death he swears and collects. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, if there are witnesses that the father said on his death bed that this note of indebtedness was not paid, he collects without oath.