difference
1069 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: [“The only difference between a public altar and a private altar, etc.”] Rebbi Joḥanan spent three years that he did not visit the house of assembly because of pain. At the end Rebbi Eleazar saw in his dream: Tomorrow Sinai will come down and bring a new insight. He came and said before them, from where is this truth verified that divine service is by firstborns? From this verse, for Mine is every firstborn; on the day when I smote every firstborn in the Land of Egypt, etc. And it is written, and on all gods of Egypt I shall pass judgment, etc. Before that what were they doing? Rebecca took the desirable garments of her older son Esaw, which were with her in the house. What are “the desirable”? That he was acting as High Priest. Rebbi Levi said, the Eternal broke the staff of the evildoers, these are the firstborn who were the first to sacrifice to the Calf.
Where are burned oxen and burned goats burned? On a grave. Since we have stated, the only difference between a public altar and a private altar was the Pesaḥ sacrifice? So in the Mishnah: The only difference between a public altar and a private altar was the Pesaḥ sacrifice exclusively; not following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, purification sacrifice and Pesaḥ for the individual on the public altar, no purification sacrifice and Pesaḥ for the individual on a private altar. It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah said, anything the community sacrifices at the Tent of Meeting in the desert it sacrifices at the Tent of Meeting at Gilgal. What is the difference between the Tent of Meeting in the desert and the Tent of Meeting at Gilgal? At the Tent of Meeting in the desert was no permission of a private altar; at the Tent of Meeting at Gilgal was permission of a private altar. His altar may be on his roof, but he may sacrifice there only elevation and well-being sacrifices. But the Sages are saying, everything which community or private person sacrifice at the Tent of Meeting in the desert they sacrifice at the Tent of Meeting at Gilgal.” What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Do not do at Gilgal everything which we are doing here today. What may you do there? Anything straight-forward. What is that? That are elevation and well-being sacrifices. What is the rabbis’ reason? At a place where any man may do what is right in his eyes. Do not do everything which we are doing here today. What may you do there? Anything straight-forward. What is that? That are elevation and well-being sacrifices. Rebbi Jehudah says, the individual was warned and the individual was permitted. He was warned, and his private altar is on his roof, and he is permitted elevation and well-being sacrifices. The rabbis are saying, also community and individuals were warned. The community was comprehensively permitted. The individual stays in his prohibition.
Where are burned oxen and burned goats burned? On a grave. Since we have stated, the only difference between a public altar and a private altar was the Pesaḥ sacrifice? So in the Mishnah: The only difference between a public altar and a private altar was the Pesaḥ sacrifice exclusively; not following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, purification sacrifice and Pesaḥ for the individual on the public altar, no purification sacrifice and Pesaḥ for the individual on a private altar. It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah said, anything the community sacrifices at the Tent of Meeting in the desert it sacrifices at the Tent of Meeting at Gilgal. What is the difference between the Tent of Meeting in the desert and the Tent of Meeting at Gilgal? At the Tent of Meeting in the desert was no permission of a private altar; at the Tent of Meeting at Gilgal was permission of a private altar. His altar may be on his roof, but he may sacrifice there only elevation and well-being sacrifices. But the Sages are saying, everything which community or private person sacrifice at the Tent of Meeting in the desert they sacrifice at the Tent of Meeting at Gilgal.” What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Do not do at Gilgal everything which we are doing here today. What may you do there? Anything straight-forward. What is that? That are elevation and well-being sacrifices. What is the rabbis’ reason? At a place where any man may do what is right in his eyes. Do not do everything which we are doing here today. What may you do there? Anything straight-forward. What is that? That are elevation and well-being sacrifices. Rebbi Jehudah says, the individual was warned and the individual was permitted. He was warned, and his private altar is on his roof, and he is permitted elevation and well-being sacrifices. The rabbis are saying, also community and individuals were warned. The community was comprehensively permitted. The individual stays in his prohibition.
Where are burned oxen and burned goats burned? On a grave. Since we have stated, the only difference between a public altar and a private altar was the Pesaḥ sacrifice? So in the Mishnah: The only difference between a public altar and a private altar was the Pesaḥ sacrifice exclusively; not following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, purification sacrifice and Pesaḥ for the individual on the public altar, no purification sacrifice and Pesaḥ for the individual on a private altar. It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah said, anything the community sacrifices at the Tent of Meeting in the desert it sacrifices at the Tent of Meeting at Gilgal. What is the difference between the Tent of Meeting in the desert and the Tent of Meeting at Gilgal? At the Tent of Meeting in the desert was no permission of a private altar; at the Tent of Meeting at Gilgal was permission of a private altar. His altar may be on his roof, but he may sacrifice there only elevation and well-being sacrifices. But the Sages are saying, everything which community or private person sacrifice at the Tent of Meeting in the desert they sacrifice at the Tent of Meeting at Gilgal.” What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Do not do at Gilgal everything which we are doing here today. What may you do there? Anything straight-forward. What is that? That are elevation and well-being sacrifices. What is the rabbis’ reason? At a place where any man may do what is right in his eyes. Do not do everything which we are doing here today. What may you do there? Anything straight-forward. What is that? That are elevation and well-being sacrifices. Rebbi Jehudah says, the individual was warned and the individual was permitted. He was warned, and his private altar is on his roof, and he is permitted elevation and well-being sacrifices. The rabbis are saying, also community and individuals were warned. The community was comprehensively permitted. The individual stays in his prohibition.
MISHNAH: The only difference between Shilo and Jerusalem was that at Shilo one ate simple sacrifices and Second Tithe at sight and in Jerusalem inside the wall. In both cases most holy sacrifices are eaten inside the curtains. After the holiness of Shilo {temporary altars} were permitted but after Jerusalem {temporary altars} are not permitted.
Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Only if it was written in Greek. Where do we hold? If it was written in square script and he translated it into Greek, that is what we have stated “in any language.” If it was written in Greek and he translated it into {the language of} square script, that is what was stated, which is the difference between Torah scrolls and the Esther scroll? Only that Torah scrolls may be written in any language but the Esther scroll may only be written in square script. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if it was written gignton. Samuel stated: If in error he omitted one verse but the translator translated it, he fulfilled his obligation. We are saying “in any language,” and you are saying so? Samuel follows his opinion [since] Samuel said, if it was written according to its rules the Greek speaker fulfills his obligation in Greek. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If he knows the language of square script and he knows Greek, he fulfills his obligation [in Greek or] in the language of square script. Greek, he fulfills his obligation in Greek. If he knows the language of square script and he knows Greek, may he absolve the public from their obligation in Greek? This shall come following: anybody who is not obligated in a matter cannot not absolve the public of their obligation.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked, does cutting the `omer during daytime push aside the Sabbath? Rebbi Abbai objected, did we not state, “its obligation is to harvest during nighttime. If it was cut during daytime it is qualified and pushes the Sabbath aside.” But he did not accept it. Rebbi Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish changed his opinion because of this: “After nightfall he says to them, did the sun set? They say, yes. Did the sun set? They say, yes.” Where do we hold? If about nighttime, that already was said. But if it does not refer to nighttime, let it refer to daytime; it is a matter that pushes aside the Sabbath during daytime. Do the preparations push aside the Sabbath during nighttime? Did we not state, “they made the maker of pan-baked breads make pan-baked breads.” Explain it, on a weekday. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada stated, “this is the daily order of service of our God’s Temple,” whether on a weekday or a Sabbath. But did we not state, “they harvested it and put it in boxes, brought it to the Temple courtyard, and were parching it in fire to fulfill the commandment of roasting. Rebbi Yose said, since he started the meritorious work, one tells him to complete it.” Rebbi Judah from Kappadokia objected before Rebbi Yose: Think of it, if it came from storage. Since he did not start the meritorious work, there is no reason to tell him to complete it. Rebbi Jacob bar Sosai objected before Rebbi Yose, did we not state, “for on a distance of walking a night and a day one desecrates the Sabbath and goes for testimony of the new moon”? He said to them, since the daytime needs the nighttime and the nighttime needs the daytime, it is as if it were all daytime. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, is it not sanctified retroactively? Since it is sanctified retroactively there is no difference between day and night.
HALAKHAH: Rav Ḥuna said, three people reading in the Torah shall not do less than ten verses. Ḥizqiah said, corresponding to the Ten Commandments [But did we not state, “on Sunday, In the Beginning and there shall be a spread”? And these are only eight! Rebbi Idi said, Cahana and Assi disagreed. One said, he repeats. But the other said, he splits. He who says that he repeats, he repeats two verses. He who says he splits, he splits it was evening, it was morning, as a separate verse. But did we not state, “on Monday, there shall be a spread and the waters shall come together”? He who says that he repeats, he repeats two verses. He who says he splits, he could not split. Rebbi Philippos ben Protos objected before Rebbi Jonah, is there not the paragraph about Amalek? He said to him, there is a difference since this is the topic of the day.] Rebbi Eleazar from Merom asked, was it not stated, the one who reads the conclusion from Prophets should not do less than 21 verses. Should there not be 23? Three for ten, three for ten, and one three.
“One does not skip in the Torah.” Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Because one does not scroll the book of the Torah in public. Rebbi Yose asked, think of it, if it was a small paragraph? But so that Israel should hear the Torah in due order. But did we not state: “he reads after the death and but on the tenth day”? There is a difference since this is the order of the day. You should know this, as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one never recites from memory but here he recites. Rebbi Yose ordered Bar Ulla, the beadle of the synagogue of the Babylonians: If there is one Torah, scroll it behind a curtain. If there are two, take away one and bring the other.
If he separated his festival offering and died, do the heirs have to bring it? Rebbi Ila said, shall be seen, has to be seen. He who can come brings, he who cannot come does not bring. Rebbi Ze`ira said, following Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jonathan who both said, you have to redeem any first born of your sons, even after death, and here, they shall not appear before My Presence empty-handed, even after death. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, there is a disagreement between Samuel and Rebbi Joḥanan, regarding what we have stated there, “A woman who brought her purification sacrifice and died, the heirs have to bring her elevation sacrifice. Her elevation sacrifice and she died, the heirs shall not bring her purification sacrifice.” Samuel said, if it was separated. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if it was not separated. Where do we hold? If they inherited real estate, does Samuel say if it was separated? If they inherited movables, does Rebbi Joḥanan say, even if it was not separated? What is the difference between them? If they inherited real estate, in Samuel’s opinion one does neither claim it nor taking pledges for it; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion one even takes pledges. If they inherited movables, in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion one claims it (and is) [but is not] taking pledges for it. In Samuel’s opinion one does not claim it.
Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: I wrote down for him most of My teaching. But was most of the Torah written down? Rather, more things are derived from what is written than what is derived from oral tradition. Is that so? But things derived from what is supported by a verse are preferred over those supported by oral tradition. Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said: I wrote down for him most of My teaching, these are the admonitions. Nevertheless, is it not that they were considered foreign? Rebbi Abun said: If I had written down for you most of my teaching, would it not be considered Gentile? What would be the difference between us and the Gentiles? These produce their books and those produce their books. These produce their parchments and those produce their parchments.
“And for the Red Cow if his hands became impure so became his body.” Rebbi Ḥanina said, not that they introduced new impurities for the Red Cow but they said, he who becomes impure in an easy impurity is like one who became impure in severe impurity. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: And it shall be collected by a man, why does the verse say, pure? Think of it. Even if you collect it by a shovel, the Torah requires pure. Where do we hold? If a metal shovel, but also flat metal implements are subject to impurity. If a wooden shovel, is it not held together because of something subject to impurity? Rav Hoshaia said, explain it if he collects it with a plank. Then it is impossible that he should not carry it. Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said, explain it if he collects it with a coarse cross-beam. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Immi: what is the difference between a person pure for the Red Cow and an empty vessel pure for the Red Cow? He answered him, And it shall be collected by a pure, why does the the verse say, man? Only to prescribe extraordinary purity to the man to handle the water for ashes of the Red Cow and the ashes of the Red Cow. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The moving which I declared pure for you for crawling animals I declared impure for you here.
There we have stated: “If he ate a fig cake with dirty hands, put his hand into his mouth to remove a pebble, …” Ḥizqiah said, one stated this only for a fig cake where he desires the fluid remaining on his finger, therefore not for anything else. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no difference, equally a fig cake where he desires the fluid remaining on his finger or anything other. The Mishnah disagrees with Ḥizqiah: “Touching by a person impure in the impurity of the dead who had food or drink in his mouth: if he put his head inside a pure stove he made it impure. If a pure person with food or drink in his mouth put his head inside the impure stove he became impure.” One understands drinks. From where was the food susceptible to impurity? Not from his saliva! Explain it either from a moist fig cake or as food which already outside were susceptible to impurity. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One eats dry food with dirty hands with heave but not with sancta.” Explain it if he throws. If he throws then even for sancta. Maybe he will forget and touch. If maybe he will forget and touch then it should be forbidden also for heave. Eaters of heave are vigilant and he will not forget but eaters of sancta are not vigilant and he forgets.
One understands pumped water. Rain water? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they decided about rain water because it is like pumped water. Rebbi Bisna in the name of Rebbi La: They stated this only on a holiday; therefore in the Sabbatical it is permitted. What is the difference between Sabbatical and holiday? In the Sabbatical when work is permitted they permitted both activities requiring effort and activities not requiring effort. On a holiday when work is forbidden they only permitted to avoid loss and only activities not requiring effort. Some want to understand it from the following: In the Sabbatical which is extended they permitted, on a holiday which is short they forbade. Then these last seven days should be compared to the seven days of a holiday and be forbidden.
HALAKHAH: There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids unless he raises or lowers by three {hand-breadths} or puts it on a rock.” One may give two explanations. If he had a small amount{of manure} in his house from before the Sabbatical and he wants to transport it to his field during the Sabbatical, he may continuously add to it after the sinning sinners stopped. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah parallels Rebbi Yose. Just as Rebbi Yose says, manure is not easily found, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, manure is not easily found. One may give another explanation: If he had a small amount{of manure} in his house from before the Sabbatical and he wants to transport it to his field during the Sabbatical, he may continuously add to it after the sinning sinners stopped. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place. Is it not already fertilized from before the Sabbatical? Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: because of the bad impression, unless he transports ten boxes together. Do the rabbis not care about bad impressions? Rebbi Idi said his stick, his basket, and his shovel prove that he intends to make a dungheap. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun applied these traditions from here, as we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, one does not make new water canals on the holiday or in the Sabbatical year.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, because he would prepare its banks to be sown. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: because of the bad impression. They wanted to say, the one who says there “because of the bad impression” also here “because of the bad impression”. The one who says there “because he would prepare its banks to be sown”, what would you have here? The only answer would be, “maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place.” What is the difference between them? If he dug a water canal for a building. They wanted to say that the one who said there “because of the bad impression” also here “because of the bad impression”. The one who says here “because he would prepare its banks to be sown”, clearly here its banks will not be prepared to be sown. Everybody agrees that if he assembled there stones, pebbles, lime, or cement it is permitted.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Mana said it anonymously, Rebbi Abun in the name of Samuel. They disagree anonymously. Where are we holding? If they are widely spaced everybody agrees that it is forbidden. If they are tightly planted everybody agrees that it is permitted. But we deal with the case that they are planted ten to a bet seah. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob treats it as widely spaced, the rabbis treat it as tightly planted. So the rabbis said, if widely spaced it is forbidden to irrigate; may one continue? Let us learn the opinion of the rabbis from that of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob. Just as Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, it is forbidden to irrigate but permitted to continue, so the rabbis say that it is forbidden to irrigate but permitted to continue. Did we not think that according to everybody if they are widely spaced it is forbidden; but is white dust not as if widely spaced? But here it is the Sabbatical, there the holiday. What is the difference between Sabbatical and holiday? In the Sabbatical when work is permitted they permitted both activities requiring effort and activities not requiring effort. On a holiday when work is forbidden they only permitted to avoid loss and only activities not requiring effort. Some want to understand it from the following: In the Sabbatical which is extended they permitted, on a holiday which is short they forbade. Then these last seven days should be compared to the seven days of a holiday and be forbidden. It was found stated: “One may sprinkle with water on white dust during the Sabbatical year but not during the holiday, <the words of Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Eliezer Ben Jacob forbids.>”
HALAKHAH: There, we have stated: “A white spot in the size of a grit and it spread in the size of a grit [and in the spread appeared a healthy spot or a white hair] but the original disappeared. Rebbi Aqiba declares him impure, but the Sages are saying, it should be seen as a new case.” Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba declares him impure absolutely. But the rabbis are saying, it should be seen as a new case as absolutely {impure}. What is the difference between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, holiday eve is between them. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and you do not deal with him neither to alleviate nor to restrict. But the rabbis are saying that this is a new case and you free him from the first one. And this is “not to restrict” that you should not deal with the second case neither to alleviate nor to restrict. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, it turns out that the single opinion here parallels the anonymous opinion there and the single opinion there parallels the anonymous opinion here. The single opinion here parallels the anonymous opinion there: Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and you do not deal with him neither to alleviate nor to restrict. And the single opinion there parallels the anonymous opinion here: The rabbis are saying that this is a new case and you free him from the first one. And we have stated here, “Rebbi Meïr says, one inspects skin-disease to alleviate but not to restrict” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Either following the single opinion here or the rabbis here the rabbis there agree to alleviate but not to restrict. There, if the original disappeared, but here, if the indications {of impurity} disappeared and the original remains. “Rebbi said, the opinion of Rebbi Yose is reasonable for one in quarantine and the opinion of Rebbi Meïr if he is absolutely {impure}.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, they disagree about the holiday itself. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case; could he enter the Temple courtyard? But the rabbis are saying, this is a new case; could he not enter the Temple courtyard? Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba declares him impure absolutely. But the rabbis are saying, it should be seen as a new case to become absolute. What is between them? (It will be sweet for him to hear a temporary release from the mouth of the Cohen.) Samuel said, they disagree about expansion. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and the expansion of impurity is pure. But the rabbis are saying that this is a new case and the expansion of purity is impure. One said in Samuel’s name, expansion and treatment-resistant scabies is between them. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and the expansion of impurity is pure. But the rabbis are saying that this is a new case and the expansion of purity is impure. Because it is another case. Therefore otherwise it would be pure. It parallels what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said when they differed, if it developed treatment-resistant scabies, Rebbi Joḥanan said pure, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said impure.
Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Just as they differ here they differ in the rules of mourning. As it was stated: The following things one does for the mourner in his mourning period. One presses his vat, and stirs his wine, and plugs his amphoras, and his repeatedly turned olives one grinds as usual, and one waters his irrigated fields if it is time for them to be irrigated, and one sows his field flax at the start of the rainy season, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. They told him, if it is not sown with flax it can be sown with another kind; if it was not sown in this week it can be sown in another week. Who is “they told him”? Rebbi Yose. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he said, small amounts may be lost so large amounts not be lost, and here he says so? There is a difference since there he is wont to be tricky. So much more the argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted, since there where he is wont to be tricky he says it is permitted, here where he is not wont to be tricky, not so much more? Rebbi Ḥinnena said, who is “they told him”? The Sages following Rebbi Jehudah’s argument for the holiday.
Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis said, merchandize is foreclosed from the property of orphans. They wanted to say, if there are witnesses; therefore not if there are no witnesses. The Rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi La: It is necessary that witnesses know since if there are no witnesses who know it is treated as a deposit. [So we are saying,] a deposit is not forclosed from the property of minor orphans. What is the difference from a loan? A loan is given to be spent, but this was not given to be spent.
Something happened to Rebbi Immi and he shaved on the 30th day. Something happened [to one rabbi] and he shaved on the 31st day. Rebbi Zeriqan said, Rebbi Immi learned this from our Mishnah, as we have stated there: “If somebody vowed two neziriot, he shaves for the first on the 31st day, for the second on the 61st day.” Rebbi Yose said, there after it happened, here from the start. Rebbi Jeremiah instructed Rebbi Isaac from Aṭoshia, and some say, Rav Ḥiyya ben Rebbi Isaac from Aṭoshia, to shave on the 30th day, following the Mishnah: “Eight days, the decree of 30 days is waived for him.” The eighth has the same status as the 30th day. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference; there they permitted in order to honor the holiday. You should know this, since Rebbi Ḥelbo, Rav Ḥuna said in the name of Rav: If his eighth day fell on the Sabbath, he shaves Friday. If you say that they did permit not in order to honor the holiday, then even if his 30th day falls on the Sabbath, he should shave Sabbath eve. In addition, from what was stated: “For all deceased he stitches together after seven days and mends after 30.” Why should he not stitch on the seventh day and mend on the 30th day? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, this has been transmitted in this way and that has been transmitted in that way.
It was stated: These are the words of Abba Shaul. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Abba Shaul. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The word of Abba Shaul: both days and decrees are cancelled. But the words of the Sages: the days are cancelled but the decrees are not cancelled. What is the difference between them? Rav Ḥuna said, the eve of a holiday is between them. If he shaved before the holiday he may shave after the holiday. If he did not shave before the holiday he may not shave after the holiday. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he did not shave before the holiday he may shave after the holiday. Rebbi Eleazar instructed Rebbi Simeon bar Abba to shave after the holiday, but we do not know whether following Abba Shaul or following the consensus of the rabbis.
It was stated: One makes no consolation visits on New Year’s Day and the Day of Atonement. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, one makes consolation visits on the Day of Atonement which falls on a Sabbath. As the following: Something happened to Rebbi Ḥizqiah. The rabbis came to pay him a consolation visit on the Day of Atonement. He said to them, did they not say that one makes no consolation visits on New Year’s Day and the Day of Atonement? Not because of prayer? There is a difference, concerning the Day of Atonement which falls on a Sabbath; there is a difference, concerning the Day of Atonement which falls on a weekday.
It was stated: One makes no consolation visits on New Year’s Day and the Day of Atonement. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, one makes consolation visits on the Day of Atonement which falls on a Sabbath. As the following: Something happened to Rebbi Ḥizqiah. The rabbis came to pay him a consolation visit on the Day of Atonement. He said to them, did they not say that one makes no consolation visits on New Year’s Day and the Day of Atonement? Not because of prayer? There is a difference, concerning the Day of Atonement which falls on a Sabbath; there is a difference, concerning the Day of Atonement which falls on a weekday.
What is the difference between them? A widow for the High Priest. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition which may be lifted after being imposed, this one, not being permitted after being prohibited, should be barred from the levirate. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition for which one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, is barred from the levirate, in this case since one is not sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation of a purification offering, should be permitted for the levirate.
The words of the rabbis mean that ḥalîṣah is freeing. Simeon bar Abba asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between having ḥalîṣah and divorcing? He said to him: You think that ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, but it is only freeing. The brothers are not guilty for her under the category of “wife of the one acting in ḥalîṣah” but they are guilty under the category of “wife of the deceased.”
Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who says, neither he nor the brothers are guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah but are guilty for the co-wife. It is fine that he is not guilty about the woman who got ḥalîṣah since he was cleared to have her freely. He is guilty about the co-wife since he was never cleared to have her freely. What is the difference for one of the brothers between the woman who got ḥalîṣah and the co-wife? He turned around and said, you do not know under which head to declare him guilty, whether as wife of the one performing ḥalîṣah or wife of the deceased. Rebbi Yose said, do you think ḥalîṣah is acquisiton? But it is only freeing. The brothers are not guilty for her under the category of “wife of the one acting in ḥalîṣah” but they are guilty under the category of “wife of the deceased”.
Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon agree to the following. According to the rabbis, the aspect which “bespeaking” acquires is forbidden in the co-wife, the aspect which “bespeaking” does not acquire is permitted in the co-wife; therefore, the latter has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. According to Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second one permitted. Out of doubt, she has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. What is the difference between them? If he slept with the second one. In the opinion of the rabbis, an incestuous intercourse because he had “bespoken”. Therefore, if he had not “bespoken” she may have levirate and there is no candidacy at all. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained that following what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon agrees in the first case. It was found stated, that also is in disagreement. What is the difference between the first and second cases? In the first case he came and found her forbidden, in the second he came and found her permitted. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, if he found his father’s wife married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked: His maternal halfbrother’s wife which he found married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Yudan asked, a co-wife of his maternal aunt which he found married to an outsider? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Abin asked, if a divorcee became a widow? You have to say that Rebbi Simeon referred to the first case.
What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.
HALAKHAH: “Any person who has a child anywhere”, etc. Rebbi Avin asked: “His child in every respect”, even for being fruitful and multiplying? Is there no difference between a Gentile who came to a Jewish woman and she gave birth and a Jew who came to a Gentile woman and she gave birth? “When she became Jewish and gave birth it is a first-born for inheritance but not a first-born for the Cohen.”
HALAKHAH: “Four brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. If there were four brothers, two of whom are married to unrelatedwomen, would they not be subject to levirate? There is a difference, since here there is the prohibition of sisters. In that case, they should not need ḥalîṣah from them! Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is because of candidacy and the prohibition of sisters is not clear.
If there were five brothers of whom three married three sisters and died: Rav said, each one [of the remaining brothers] performs ḥalîṣah for one of them, and the third [sister] performs ḥalîṣah with whom she wants. Samuel says, each one [of the remaining brothers] performs ḥalîṣah for one of them, and the third performs ḥalîṣah with both of them. Rav said that ḥalîṣah is acquisition. Samuel said that ḥalîṣah is freeing. Rebbi Ze‘ira said that ḥalîṣah is acquisition. Rebbi Hila said that ḥalîṣah is freeing. The words of the rabbis mean that ḥalîṣah is freeing. Simeon bar Abba asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between having ḥalîṣah and divorcing? He said to him: You think that ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, but it is only freeing. The brothers are not guilty for her under the category of “wife of the one acting in ḥalîṣah” but they are guilty under the category of “wife of the deceased”. Levi said, candidacy is acquisition and each [sister] has to perform ḥalîṣah with both [brothers].
A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.
A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters,” etc. Ulla bar Ismael said, so explained Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah: Rebbi Simeon frees the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the group asked, would anybody think that a man could acquire two sisters together? Rebbi Ḥanina said before Rebbi Mana and disagreed: Why does Rebbi Simeon free the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate? He said to him, because nobody thinks that a man could acquire two sisters together. There they said, the words of Rebbi Simeon imply that no candidacy can come after another candidacy. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Only if he sinned and had intercourse. What is the difference? If somebody from the market gave qiddushin to the second sister. Following the rabbis, perfect qiddushin. Following Rebbi Eleazar, suspended qiddushin. When he has intercourse with the first, the qiddushin become valid for the second. If he had intercourse with the second, following the rabbis it is an incestuous act. Following Rebbi Eleazar, it is not an incestuous act. If the first one died, following the rabbis the second is permitted to him.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” etc. If he transgressed, but not from the start. That follows the Mishnah: “The widow should not perform ḥalîṣah or have levirate until after three months.” Why can she not have ḥalîṣah immediately? As you take it, if she has a live birth, ḥalîṣah did not affect her. If she has a still birth, she holds ḥalîṣah in her hand. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: “My levir refuses.” To the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him one says: perform ḥalîṣah; but to the one to whom one cannot say: perform levirate, to him one cannot say: perform ḥalîṣah! What is the difference between them? If she had been acceptable and was desecrated, e. g., a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. According to him who says that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood; that one, who does not need a proclamation for the priesthood, should have ḥalîṣah. According to him who says that to the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him does one say: perform ḥalîṣah?
Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife,” etc. Simeon bar Abba asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between having ḥalîṣah and divorcing? He said to him: You think that ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, but it is only freeing. The brothers are not guilty for her under the category of “wife of the one acting in ḥalîṣah” but they are guilty under the category of “wife of the deceased”.
HALAKHAH: “No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah,” etc. How long is it until a pregnancy is recognized? Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meїr: After three months. Even though it is no proof, there is a hint: “It was after about three months.” Rebbi Yudan said, even for a phantom pregnancy, “we were pregnant, we were sick, as if we gave birth to wind,” “get pregnant with dry grass, give birth to straw.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra said, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Even most of the first, most of the last, and the middle one complete. Rav Assi said, a full 90 days. Samuel said, they in their fulness. A case came before the rabbis there; we do not know if thirteen of the first and seventeen of the last or seventeen of the first and thirteen of the last, and five complete ones in the middle; they wanted to touch the child because of a doubt of bastardy. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob told them, such a case came before Abba bar Abba and he declared it acceptable. Does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Abba said, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth. A pregnancy is recognized after full months, a birth can happen after fractional months. There, we have stated: “How long can labor be? Rebbi Meїr said, even 40 to 50 days. Rebbi Jehudah said, her month is sufficient. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, no labor is longer than two weeks”. “Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after fractional months. Since otherwise one should have stated “thirty days”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after full months. Since we have stated: “Her month is sufficient.”
Rebbi Mana said, I heard in the name of Samuel that there is no difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, but I do not remember from whom I heard this. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Jeremiah said this. Rebbi Ḥizqyah said to him, Rebbi Jeremiah did not say this; Rebbi Yose was offended by him. He said to him: Even Joshua who was bound to Moses would not have said so, but you said so! He checked himself and said, it is true that he said that but as a person who quotes something and questions it; does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Berekhiah in the name of Samuel: A woman gives birth only either after 271, 272, 273, or 274, days. Rebbi Mana said to him, from whom did the rabbi hear this? He said to him, from Rebbi Abba. The position of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, he says, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, and here, he says so? Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra in the name of Samuel: {If with ה Rabba, with א Rava.} Everything which is “many” is 208.
Rebbi Mana said, I heard in the name of Samuel that there is no difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, but I do not remember from whom I heard this. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Jeremiah said this. Rebbi Ḥizqyah said to him, Rebbi Jeremiah did not say this; Rebbi Yose was offended by him. He said to him: Even Joshua who was bound to Moses would not have said so, but you said so! He checked himself and said, it is true that he said that but as a person who quotes something and questions it; does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Berekhiah in the name of Samuel: A woman gives birth only either after 271, 272, 273, or 274, days. Rebbi Mana said to him, from whom did the rabbi hear this? He said to him, from Rebbi Abba. The position of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, he says, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, and here, he says so? Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra in the name of Samuel: {If with ה Rabba, with א Rava.} Everything which is “many” is 208.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥalîṣah, “bespoke” her, gave a bill of divorce, and cohabited, or cohabited, “bespoke”, gave a bill of divorce, and performed ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah. There is no difference between one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law.
HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
MISHNAH: If somebody comes to his sister-in-law, whether in error, or criminally, or under duress, or willingly, even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error, or he is under duress but she is not, or she is under duress but he is not, whether he touched or completed, he acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.
“He acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.” What did he acquire? Samuel said, he acquired only the things spelled out in the paragraph: To inherit the deceased’s property, (to be betrothed by a brother), and to permit her co-wife to the outside. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired everything. Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, when do they disagree? If he touched her. But if he completed the intercourse, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Mattaniah said, when do they disagree? If he had intercourse with her still in her father’s house. But if he had intercourse with her still in her husband’s house, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said: If he married her, she is his wife in every respect.
MISHNAH: Similarly, anybody who comes upon any of the incest-prohibited women specified in the Torah, or of the disqualified ones, [i. e.,] a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had participated in ḥalîṣah for a private Cohen, a bastard or Gibeonite female for an Israel, or an Israel woman for a male bastard or Gibeonite, disqualified her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.
“He shall not marry an adult; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable the adult.” They agree that he shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood. What is the difference between the adult and the one injured by a piece of wood? The hymen of an adult dissolved in her body. The hymen of one injured by a piece of wood came outside. Some switch: He shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable one injured by a piece of wood.” They agree that he shall not marry an adult. What is the difference between the adult and the one injured by a piece of wood? An adult is no longer young. The one injured by a piece of wood is still young.
“He shall not marry an adult; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable the adult.” They agree that he shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood. What is the difference between the adult and the one injured by a piece of wood? The hymen of an adult dissolved in her body. The hymen of one injured by a piece of wood came outside. Some switch: He shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable one injured by a piece of wood.” They agree that he shall not marry an adult. What is the difference between the adult and the one injured by a piece of wood? An adult is no longer young. The one injured by a piece of wood is still young.
Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Joḥanan says, because of a fine. What is the difference between them? If an uncircumcised slave buys slaves. If you say, it is a fine, here there is no fine. If you say the one who may eat enables to eat, this one, since he is not able to eat, cannot enable to eat.
HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?
HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?
The one drawn [circumcised], the one born circumcised, and the circumcised before he converted may not eat heave. Rebbi Zeriqan, Rebbi Yannay ben Rebbi Ismael, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: As a fine. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav: They instituted a fence. What is the difference between them? If another person drew it, or that it regrew by itself. If you want to say, it is a fine, there is no place for a fine. If you say they instituted a fence, nevertheless they instituted a fence.
“If he did not know her carnally after he was injured in his testicles or his penis was cut off, they may eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Eleazar’s and Rebbi Simeon’s. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion; there is a difference since he did not add an acquisition to disable. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the other disagreement, since they disagreed: A priestly woman waiting for her levir who became eligible to two priestly levirs. If one of them “bespoke” her but did not have occasion to bring her to the marriage chamber before he became injured in his testicles or his penis was damaged, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since she is a candidate for disabling intercourse, she is disabled. Rebbi Joḥanan said, when he will copulate. If one of them was qualified but the other disqualified, even Rebbi Joḥanan agrees. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada asked before Rebbi Mana, if the qualified one “bespoke” her? He said to him, the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
“The one whose urethra is cut off, anyone whose penis is cut, but he is qualified if there is a thread’s [breath] left of the corona,” etc. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Of the upper side of the corona. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Of the lower side of the corona. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, of the lower side of the corona. There, they said, if it has the shape of a drainpipe, he is qualified. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it has the shape of a writing reed, he is qualified, of an inverted writing reed, he is disqualified. If it is punctured, from the inside he is disqualified, from the outside he is qualified. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, “inside” [means] from the corona towards the body; “outside” [means] from the corona away from the body. If it is punctured, he is disqualified; if it became blocked, he is qualified. If [the urethra] is punctured, he is disqualified, because it pours out; if it became blocked, he is qualified because he can be fertile. That is a disqualification which can revert to a qualification. The only difference between one injured in his lower parts and one whose testicles are injured are medical rules since an injured testicle may heal, an injured urethra does not heal. What can he do? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Jehudah: He brings ants, lets them bite, and cuts them off.
Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, only from the place of masculinity. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: even from the female place. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi retracted this, from the following verse: “And with a male you should not lie in the way of a woman’s beddings”, one who may lie in two ways, including the female. Who is that? That is the hermaphrodite. Rebbi said, I looked for but did not find words of Ben Shamua about the hermaphrodite, for the entire group ganged up on me. Why? Not to make it public or because he was not worth it? What difference does it make? He usually made public. If you say, it was not to make it public, the publicity is already in his hand. The reason must be that he was not worth it. What could he made public? He inherits, he testifies, his grain offering is burnt completely, one says grace with him as with a male.
What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah do not need support, therefore they have Ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have Ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have Ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have Ketubah What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has Ketubah. For those who want to say since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no Ketubah.
What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah do not need support, therefore they have Ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have Ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have Ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have Ketubah What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has Ketubah. For those who want to say since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no Ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.
HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.
So far if she knows that she is a married woman. What if she did not know that she was a married woman? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father. She was divorced and went and married on her own. About this Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife. Is there a difference? There, whether she knows or does not know, here also whether she knows or does not know.
“Any child from either of the men is a bastard.” One understands that the child is a bastard from the second [husband]. Is it a bastard from the first? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, this follows Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says if a man copulates with his wife whom he accuses of infidelity the child is a bastard, if a man takes back his divorcee after she had remarried the child is a bastard. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable; the status of her bill of divorce is the status of her bastardy. What is the difference between them? If the second one gave her a bill of divorce and then the first one copulated with her. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the child is a bastard following Rebbi Aqiba; in the opinion of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.
It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that one who copulates with his mother-in-law disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his wife’s sister; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “In fire they should burn him and them.” Where do we hold? If it is about burning, only one of them is burned. So if it cannot be relevant for burning, let it be relevant for prohibition. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “In fire they should burn him and them,” him and the second one. And the House of Shammai was arguing: Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person the cause of the prohibition became forbidden, if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition is forbidden. Which rule is slight? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the beginning of the chapter. But this is very strong! There is a difference since she was permitted to be married to him.
MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he married a woman and died, she is free. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other. It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.
The following is obvious: If a person younger than twenty years of age developed two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively. Older than twenty years of age, he becomes a man from that point into the future. Where do they disagree? If he is twenty. Samuel said, he becomes a man retroactively. Rav said, he becomes a man from that point into the future. A baraita disagrees with both of them: The castrate cannot become a rebellious son since he has no pubic hair. Should one not warn him, maybe he will develop two pubic hairs within the next three months? Following him who says, one does not accept conditional warnings. Our Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: Does it make no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twelve years and one day old, if by then he did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively? Could you say: If he did grow two pubic hairs between the ages of nine years and one day until twelve years and one day, he becomes a man retroactively? Similarly, if he is older than twenty years of age and did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man from that point into the future. How does Samuel handle this? He explains it: soon after he turns twenty.
Rebbi Yannai said, if he took off [his shoe] and she put it on again, or she took it off but he had untied, the ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back, he may not go back on it. Why? Is it since the two actions are not there together or because they are not in the right order? What is the difference? If she afterwards untied [the shoestrings]. If you say, because the two actions are not there together? They are there together! The reason therefore must be that they are not in the right order.
So is the Mishnah: “If he ties lower than the knee, it is valid, above the knee it is invalid.” It is written: “Aaron and his sons shall wash their hands and feet from it.” It was stated about this: The hand up to the wrist, the foot up to the calf; and here you say so? There is a difference, since it is written “from above his foot”. In that case, even higher than the knee should be valid! There is a difference, since it is written “from above his foot”, and not from higher than above his foot. Cahana objected: Is it not written, “and the afterbirth which comes out from between her feet;” does it come out from between her feet? It looks as if it was between her feet; as we have stated there: “The water pit was between the Temple hall and the alter drawn towards the South.” Was it put between the hall and the altar? Only it looked as if between hall and altar.
So is the Mishnah: “If he ties lower than the knee, it is valid, above the knee it is invalid.” It is written: “Aaron and his sons shall wash their hands and feet from it.” It was stated about this: The hand up to the wrist, the foot up to the calf; and here you say so? There is a difference, since it is written “from above his foot”. In that case, even higher than the knee should be valid! There is a difference, since it is written “from above his foot”, and not from higher than above his foot. Cahana objected: Is it not written, “and the afterbirth which comes out from between her feet;” does it come out from between her feet? It looks as if it was between her feet; as we have stated there: “The water pit was between the Temple hall and the alter drawn towards the South.” Was it put between the hall and the altar? Only it looked as if between hall and altar.
HALAKHAH: “If she performed ḥalîṣah with a sandal that was not his,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar says, a ram’s horn belonging to idolatry or to a “seduced city” is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, it is valid. Rebbi Hoshaia stated, it is invalid. Everybody agrees that such a palmbranch is invalid. What is the difference between a ram’s horn and a palmbranch? Rebbi Yose said, for a palmbranch it is written: “You shall take for yourselves,” from your own money. But here, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source. Rebbi Eleazar said, there he fulfills his obligation with the article itself, but here with its sound. Is any sound forbidden usufruct? Everybody agrees that a sandal from a “seduced city” is valid. For it is written “stripped of shoe,” from any source. Rebbi Mana said, as you say there, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source, so you say here, “stripped of shoe,” from any source.
Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose asked before Rebbi: What is the difference between underage males and females? He said to him, “a man” is written in the paragraph. But about her, “his sister-in-law shall come before him,” in any case.
HALAKHAH: “A woman went with her husband,” etc. Just as you say, “if there are witnesses that she is a married woman and she says, I was divorced, she is not trustworthy;” would I say it is the same here? There is a difference for witnesses of death since if he comes he disproves [the testimony]. Then she should be trustworthy to say: “my levir died”! That is impossible since we have stated: “A woman is not trustworthy if she says ‘my levir died’ to remarry, or ‘my sister died’ to enter her house.” Rebbi Abba said, she is trustworthy for her husband whom she married out of her free will; she is not trustworthy about her levir on whom she was thrown against her will. Rebbi Hoshaia asked, think of it, then she should not be trustworthy if she was forced to marry him!
Not only according to the current Mishnah that a single witness can permit her, but even according to the earlier Mishnah that a single witness cannot permit her, she permits herself. What is the difference between herself and a single witness? A single witness is suspected to want to cause trouble to her; she is not suspected to want to cause trouble to herself.
What is the difference whether peace is in the world or war is in the world? If war is in the world, she might think that he died although he is not dead. So far if war was in the North and she came from the North, in the South and she came from the South. If there was war in the North and she came from the South; she says I am coming from the North, but I am arguing that you came from the South. If she says, I am coming from the South, it is because she thinks to free herself. If she says, he died on his bed, I am arguing that he went to war; it is because she thinks to free herself.
MISHNAH: The House of Hillel say, we heard only about one who came from the grain harvest. The House of Shammai said to them, it makes no difference whether she comes from the grain harvest, or from the olive harvest, or from overseas. The Sages spoke about the grain harvest only because of what happened. The House of Hillel reversed themselves and taught following the House of Shammai.
“If somebody who works his wife’s property has the intention of divorcing her and goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. If somebody who works the property of prisoners heard that they prepare to return, goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. These are properties of prisoners: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, he heard that they died, and he went to work the inheritance. But property of abandoning persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of abandoning persons: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, he did not hear that they died, but he went to work the inheritance. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I heard that there is no difference between prisoners and abandoning persons. But property of broken persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of smashed persons: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, and his whereabouts are not known.” Samuel says, the prisoner is one who left involuntarily. If he had left voluntarily he would have given him instructions. The abandoning person is one who left voluntarily. You should know that he had the intention of keeping [the relative] off his property since he left voluntarily and did not give him instructions. Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Movables do not fall under the rules of smashed people. RebbiJacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Jehudah: Standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested are movables. Rav Sheshet asked: Those date palms of Babylonia which do not need grafting, is it not reasonable that we should treat them like standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested?
MISHNAH: Everybody is accepted to be a witness for her except her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her levir’s wife, and her husband’s daughter. What is the difference between a bill of divorce and death? The document is the proof. If one witness says that he died and she remarried, then another comes and says that he is not dead, she shall not leave. If one witness says that he died but two say that he did not die, even if she remarried she must leave. If two say that he died but one said that he did not die, even if she has not yet remarried she may remarry.
HALAKHAH: “A woman who went overseas with her husband,” etc. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Rebbi Meïr agrees in the first case. It was found stated: That is also in dispute. What is the difference between the second and the first cases? In the first case, did they not consider her word as nonexistent for her companion? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.
HALAKHAH: “A woman who went overseas with her husband,” etc. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Rebbi Meïr agrees in the first case. It was found stated: That is also in dispute. What is the difference between the second and the first cases? In the first case, did they not consider her word as nonexistent for her companion? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.
Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
“He robbed one of five people.” Rebbi Assi said, there is a Mishnah which follows Rebbi Aqiba against Rebbi Tarphon. As we have stated there: “If he said to two people, I robbed a mina from one of you but I do not know who of you it was; I received a deposit of a mina from the father of one of you but I do not know who of you it was; he gives to each of them a mina because he confessed himself.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This is everybody’s opinion. One says, to be clean before Heaven. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Here, if witnesses know; there, if no witnesses know. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Here if they are silent; there if they are talking. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Here if he swore; there if he did not swear. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he swore, he should have appointed an officer of the court and hand it over to him. Rebbi Joḥanan seems to say, a court which determined that one was a robber, not a court which determined that one was robbed. Rav said, a court which determined that one was robbed, not a court which determined that one was a robber. The strength of Rav is from the following, that Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, a court which determined that one was robbed, not a court which determined that one was a robber. Otherwise he should have kept silent. Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, he should have kept silent and not confessed. Rebbi Yose wanted to say, he should have kept silent and not have sworn. Rebbi Yudan said, even following those who say that there is no difference between keeping silent and talking in matters of a robbery, for a deposit they agree that he who keeps silent is rewarded and he who talks loses. He who keeps silent is rewarded from the following: “Two people deposited with the same person, one a mina and one 200 [tetradrachmas]. This one says, the 200 belong to me, and that one says, the 200 belong to me. He gives each one a mina and the rest shall lie with him until Elijah comes.” He who talks loses, from this: “If he said to two people, I robbed a mina from one of you but I do not know which one of you.”
HALAKHAH: “I had a son overseas.” Rebbi Ḥanania asked before Rebbi Hila: Who is the one who stated that one takes her words into account and she performs ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Tarphon, but not Rebbi Aqibah! He said to him, it is the opinion of everybody and even Rebbi Aqiba agrees to it. What is the difference betweeen this statement and the first one? There, you say that she is not to be believed. But here, you say that she is believed! (When she left as included in the permission of levirate. But) where you say that she is not believed, when she left and was not included in the permission of levirate.
“Even though there are [marks] on his body and his clothing.” Did one not state: From where that if your fellow man is lost, you return him both body and property? There is a difference, because marks are apt to change.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Eliezer, he declares his jealousy by the testimony of one witness or his own testimony; he takes her to drink on the testimony of two witnesses.” It is said here: “For he found in her a word of nakedness”; “finding” anywhere has to be validated by witnesses. How does Rebbi Eliezer explain “a word”? A circumstance that brings into the habit of nakedness. May a single witness let him take her to drink? His own testimony can never obligate him to swear in money matters but it will let him take her to drink, a single witness who will obligate him to swear in money matters not so much more? May a relative bring her to drink? Who is a closer relative than her husband? May a hearsay witness bring her to drink? What is the difference between him and a relative? A relative may be disabled today but he might be enabled later, a hearsay witness is not acceptable either today or later.
There, we have stated: “In all matters of incest, He made him who touches equal to him who completes and one is guilty for each single intercourse. He was more stringent with the slave girl since in her case He treated the intentional as unintentional.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abba bar Mamai in the name of Rav: “Flow of semen,” until he ejaculates. Here is written “flow of semen”, and here is written “flow of semen.” Here, you say “flow of semen” until he ejaculates. And here, you say so? Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for it is written: “She was hidden and became impure.” From the moment she was hidden, the Torah calls her “impure”. But here, “flow of semen,” until he ejaculates. For what reason is written “flow of semen”? For measures, as it is stated: “She was hidden and became impure”; what is counted as hiding? Time to become impure. What is the time for impurity? Time for intercourse. What is the time for intercourse? Time for ‘touching’.
HALAKHAH: “He gives her to drink and after that he sacrifices her offering,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall come into her.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “After that he shall give to the woman to drink.” How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “they shall come into her”? All of them, not part only How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “after that he shall give the water to the woman to drink”? Against her will, without her agreement. Rebbi Simeon agrees with the rabbis that if he gave her to drink and after that presented her offering, it is valid. The rabbis agree with Rebbi Simeon that if he presented her offering and after that gave her to drink, it is valid. What is the difference between them? The commandment. The rabbis say that the flour offering checks her out but Rebbi Simeon says, the water is what checks her out. What is the reason of the Sages? “A flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “They shall come into her.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “they shall come into her”? This teaches that it shakes all her limbs. How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “a flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity”? This teaches that all iniquities she has committed are remembered at that time.
MISHNAH: The offering of an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen is burned, the offering of a Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel is not burned. What is the difference between a Cohen and a Cohen’s daughter? The flour offering of a Cohen’s daughter is eaten, that of a Cohen is not eaten. A Cohen’s daughter is desecrated, a Cohen is not desecrated. A Cohen’s daughter may defile herself for the dead, a Cohen may not defile himself for the dead. A Cohen eats most holy [food] a Cohen’s daughter may not eat most holy [food].
HALAKHAH: “The offering of an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen,” etc. What is the difference between a Cohen and a Cohen’s daughter? “The flour offering of a Cohen’s daughter is eaten, that of a Cohen is not eaten.” For it is written, “any flour offering of a Cohen shall be total, it should not be eaten;” not the Cohen’s daugher’s. Rebbi Abbahu asked before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Is it not written: “If a Cohen acquire a person with his money,” should that apply to a Cohen but not ro a Cohen’s daughter? How is that? “The Cohen anointed in his stead, one of his sons;” one whose son fills his place, that excludes her whose son does not fill her place.
MISHNAH: What is the difference between a man and a woman? A man is dishevelled and with open seams, no woman is dishevelled and with open seams. A man can make his son a nazir, no woman can make her son a nazir. A man can shave using his father’s vow of nazir, no woman can shave using her father’s vow of nazir. A man can betrothe his daughter, no woman can betrothe her daughter. A man can sell his daughter, no woman can sell her daughter. A man is stoned naked, no woman is stoned naked. A man is hanged, no woman is hanged. A man is sold for his theft, no woman is sold for her theft.
HALAKHAH: “What is the difference between a man and a woman? A man is dishevelled and with open seams,” etc. “A man”. This refers not only to a man; from where for a woman? The verse says, “afflicted with skin disease,” whether man, or woman, or minor. If it is so, why is “a man” written? For the next theme, “a man is dishevelled and with open seams, no woman is dishevelled and with open seams.”
There, we have stated: “A she-ram, an old woman, or a sterile one neither drinks nor collects her ketubah,” as it is said: “She will be declared innocent and bear seed,” [this refers to] one able to bear seed; it excludes one who is unable to bear seed. They objected, is there not the widow [married to] the High Priest, is she not able to bear seed? There is a difference, since it is written: “He may not desecrate his seed among his people.” There, we have stated: “A bastard disables and enables to eat. How is this?” And here he says so? Rebbi Tanḥuma said, there, “she has no issue” of any kind, but here one requires enabled seed, not disabled seed. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the water only serves to permit her to her house; but about this one one tells him to divorce once she went to a secluded place.
HALAKHAH: “On the same day, Rebbi Aqiba explained,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel. One said, Rebbi Aqiba referred to both heave and profane food, but the other referred to heave but not to profane food. But one does not know who said what. Since Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Jonah, they said, Rav in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: The tertiary comes because of the reptile. This implies that he said that Rebbi Aqiba referred to both heave and profane food. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If tithe food was prepared [for impurity] by a fluid and a ṭevul yom or unclean hands touched it, one may take from it the heave of the tithe in purity because it is tertiary, and the tertiary is pure for profane food.” He explains that it is a leniency about hands [whose impurity] is rabbinical. But did we not state: “A ṭevul yom”? Explain it by a ṭevul yom from [the impurity] of a broken field. Rebbi Zeïra said, you may even say a biblical tevul yom. There is a difference since it is written “pure, impure”. Pure for profane food during daytime and for heave when it gets dark. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: May we not say: Pure for touch and impure for eating? He answered him, vessels are mentioned in the paragraph! Can you say about vessels that they are pure for touch and impure for eating?
There, they say: The prophet Haggai asked two questions; one they answered correctly and one incorrectly. “Assume a man carries holy meat in the corner of his garment.” The corner is of primary impurity, the holy meat of second degree, bread and soup of third degree, wine, oil, and food of the fourth. Does there exist a fourth degree of impurity for sanctified food? “The Cohanim answered, and said: No.” They did not answer correctly, since there is a fourth degree of impurity for sanctified food. “Ḥaggai said, if a person impure by the impurity of the dead would touch all of these, would they be impure?” If the corner would be impure by the impurity of the dead and touched these. Would it be impure? “The Cohanim answered and said, it would be impure.” They answered correctly. But Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He asked them before they decided about fourth degree [impurity] for sanctified food. Then why did he curse them? As a person who looks for a pretext against his neighbor. What difference does it make for the House? Is that not what he said: “What they are sacrificing there is impure”? That is what Rebbi Simon bar Zavdi said, they found the skull of Oman the Jebusite under the altar.
Rebbi Tanḥuma, Rebbi Phineas, in the name of Rebbi Levi: He asked them about the fifth degree of sanctified food. “Assume a man carries holy meat in the corner of his garment.” The corner is of primary impurity, the holy meat of second degree, bread and soup third, wine and oil fourth, and the food of the fifth degree. Does there exist fifth degree impurity for sanctified food? “The Cohanim answered, and said: No.” They did answer correctly, since there is no fifth degree impurity for sanctified food. Then why did he curse them? As a person who looks for a pretext against his neighbor. What difference does it make for the House? Is that not what Rebbi Simon bar Zavdi said, they found the skull of Ornan the Jebusite under the altar.