difference
1069 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
“On a cow’s horn.” The Mishnah in case he says to her, here is your bill of divorce. But if he says to her, here is your bill of divorce and the remainder is for your ketubah, her bill of divorce and the payment of her ketubah were received together. If he said to her, here is your bill of divorce and the payment of your ketubah together? Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: If he delivered the halter to her, what? In commercial law, the buy is acquired, do you say so here? Or is it a difference since it is written: “he shall deliver into her hand,” until it is completely in her hand!
What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.
What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.
Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? About bills of divorce. But for contracts even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it makes no difference; they disagree both about bills of divorce and contracts. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: If the witnesses [sign] on the erasure, do the Sages declare it valid? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: The Sages follow the argument of Rebbi Eleazar, for he explains that the document is on the erasure and the witnesses on a smooth surface. Samuel said, everything is on the erasure. Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? Rebbi Abba said, it is recognizable whether there was an erasure once or twice.
MISHNAH: Even women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died are trustworthy to bring her bill of divorce: Her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her sister-in-law, and her husband’s daughter. What is the difference between divorce and death? The writing is the proof. A woman may herself bring her own bill of divorce, but she still is required to say that it was written and signed before her.
This does not disagree with what Rebbi Joḥanan said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if an agent handed over to another agent, the first one is responsible. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya: Because of a condition of the divorce. What is the difference between them? If the husband came earlier and took it. If you say, because of a condition of the divorce, that is understandable. If you say, because I do not want to see my valuables in somebody else’s hand, his valuables are not in somebody else’s hand. Is it the same for preliminary marriages? What is the difference between divorces and preliminary marriages? One can divorce through the agency of anybody. One cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.
This does not disagree with what Rebbi Joḥanan said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if an agent handed over to another agent, the first one is responsible. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya: Because of a condition of the divorce. What is the difference between them? If the husband came earlier and took it. If you say, because of a condition of the divorce, that is understandable. If you say, because I do not want to see my valuables in somebody else’s hand, his valuables are not in somebody else’s hand. Is it the same for preliminary marriages? What is the difference between divorces and preliminary marriages? One can divorce through the agency of anybody. One cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, as a matter of principle one does not appoint guardians for orphans to their detriment, only to their profit; but if they are detrimental, they are detrimental. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, neither as a matter of principle nor as a reaction, neither for profit not for detriment. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: “One appoints a guardian for them” There is a difference about an ox, lest it continue to cause damage. If it did do damage, from whom does one take payment? Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the orphans. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, from the guardian. And even if Rebbi Joḥanan never taught this, does not his word imply it since he said if in the end they are detrimental, they are detrimental?
“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.
Rav said, I was of the voters. There is no difference between a quarter in real estate or a quarter in money. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, real estate for a denar a γραμμάριον, in money a quarter is a tremis.
Rebbi Phineas asked: For what did they impose a fine? At a place where they sow and eat or at a place where they sow but do not eat? What is the difference? If one saw him buying from Saracens. It is forbidden; if you say at a place where they sow and eat, if one saw him buying from Saracens it is permitted.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who says, accept this bill of divorce for my wife,” etc. Everywhere you say that “accept” is the equivalent of “obtain,” but here you say that “accept” is the equivalent of “bring”? There is a difference, for one can obtain something for a person without him being present. Rebbi Shammai objected: Think of it, if she was shouting to obtain a divorce? I say, maybe she changed her mind. But did we not state: “A woman herself may bring her bill of divorce”? Could you say that she may have changed her mind? There, she is damaging herself; here it is to her detriment.
Rebbi Ḥanina said, practice follows Rabban Gamliel: if she said “take for me, it should be mine in your hand.” A man sent a bill of divorce to his wife. She told [the agent]: “It should be mine in your hand.” The casecame before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract. Does he disagree? There is a difference between “it should be in your hand” and “it should be mine in your hand.” Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the beginning and the end. A woman appointed an agent to accept her bill of divorce from the husband’s agents. The case came before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract. Rav’s opinion has switched! There, Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman cannot appoint an agent to accept her bill of divorce from her husband’s agent, and here, he says so? I say, he was standing behind the door and heard her voice.
It was stated: Also the sick person. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Shezur about the dangerously ill. What is the difference between a dangerously ill and a sick person? A sick person is a normal case; any who gets sick suddenly is dangerously ill. In a normal case, the relatives visit him immediately; unrelated persons visit him after three days. If he falls ill suddenly, everybody visits him immediately. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yose after three days. He said to them: Do you want to sustain the baraita in my case?
Rebbi Hillel ben Valens asked before Rebbi: What reason did they have to say that practice follows Rebbi Yose? He said to him, because I never met him. If somebody questioned statements of Rebbi Yose, Rebbi said, we miserable ones asked against Rebbi Yose, for as there is a difference between the most holy and the most profane, so is there a difference between Rebbi Yose’s generation and ours. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, the difference between my father’s generation and ours is like that between gold and dust.
Rebbi Hillel ben Valens asked before Rebbi: What reason did they have to say that practice follows Rebbi Yose? He said to him, because I never met him. If somebody questioned statements of Rebbi Yose, Rebbi said, we miserable ones asked against Rebbi Yose, for as there is a difference between the most holy and the most profane, so is there a difference between Rebbi Yose’s generation and ours. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, the difference between my father’s generation and ours is like that between gold and dust.
Rebbi Hillel ben Valens asked before Rebbi: What reason did they have to say that practice follows Rebbi Yose? He said to him, because I never met him. If somebody questioned statements of Rebbi Yose, Rebbi said, we miserable ones asked against Rebbi Yose, for as there is a difference between the most holy and the most profane, so is there a difference between Rebbi Yose’s generation and ours. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, the difference between my father’s generation and ours is like that between gold and dust.
HALAKHAH: “If they said to him, shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife,” etc. If he said to two people, say to X that he shall write and to Y and Z that they shall sign. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, this happened in the days of Rebbi, and he said, such a thing should not be done in Israel. Samuel said, it certainly should be done. Rav Jeremiah asked Samuel: If he said to two people, say to X that he write and you sign. He said to him, that is a bill of divorce but it needs study. The opinion of Samuel seems inverted. There, he said, it certainly should be done, and here, he says so? There is a difference, because they changed their testimony.
Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah speaks of a roof with a parapet when it descended lower than the parapet, or one without a parapet when it descended lower than within three handbreadths of the roof, since anything within three handbreadths of the roof is as if it were part of the roof. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: This refers to the rules of the Sabbath, where anything within three handbreadths of a partition is considered part of the partition. Rebbi Yasa said, they are not comparable, for bills of divorce are about the top, the rules of the Sabbath about the below. For bills of divorce even if it never came to rest, for the Sabbath only if it rested. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only if it descended to within the partitions. Rebbi Immi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi, since Rebbi considers partitions as solidly filled up? He said to him, here in the matter of bills of divorce it is everybody’s opinion. Could one not object that Rebbi said, if it is roofed? And you say, it is not roofed? What is the difference between bills of divorce and the Sabbath? Rebbi Abba said, about the Sabbath it is written: “You shall not do any work;” it may make itself automatically. But here “he shall deliver into her hand,” into her domain.
If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.
“By money”. “The money of his sale price shall be;” he can be redeemed by money, not by produce nor by vessels. Everywhere you treat money’s worth like money, but here you do not treat money’s worth like money. Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, because the verse repeated “money, of money”. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, but if he wants to reduce, he can leave for the reduced amount even for produce, even for vessels. Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said that this is only if he did not give them their money’s worth. But if he gave them their money’s worth, it is like money.
The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.
Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: There it is written “he computes” and here it is written “he computes”. Here you compute months and years so he may leave, there you do not compute months and years so he may leave. He said to him, the difference is that the Torah compared him to the hireling. Since the latter computes months and years and leaves, so this one computes months and years and leaves.
Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”
“By money.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, from another person to his master, therefore not from his master to another person. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even from his master to another person. What brings this? From his master to himself. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Here you have money that your field shall be unencumbered.” He answered, it is unencumbered. “That it be ownerless”? He answered, it is not ownerless. What is the difference between the cases? Here he advantaged a thinking person, there he did not advantage any thinking person. Think of it, if he was deaf-mute? He said to him, “a man.” Think of it, if he was underage? He said to him, one usually grows up. Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Ze‘ira follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Even with a contract through others, not by himself. Does not his master deliver a document to others that his slave regain his freedom? Here also, his master gives money to others that his field become ownerless.
Rebbi Abun said, it follows Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave. But do the rabbis not hold that a person can free half of his slave? They admit it for a slave held in partnership. But there is a difference for a slave who entirely belongs to him, for it is as if he gave something from his right into his left hand. Does Rebbi hold that it is not as if he gave something from his right into his left hand? He admits it if he gave to him through a third party. Do the rabbis not hold that he may give to him through a third party? The rabbis hold that one who can acquire by himself can acquire through a third party; one who cannot acquire by himself cannot acquire through a third party. Rebbi says, even though he cannot acquire by himself, he can acquire through third parties.
If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.
Rav Jehudah sent asking from Rebbi Eleazar: If brothers split [the estate] and then one of them entered a levirate marriage? He answered, the property of the deceased is like common property. Ulla bar Ismael said, it is found that in Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion there is no difference whether they split and then one of them entered a levirate marriage or one of them entered a levirate marriage and then they split, but all of them share in the property of the deceased. Why did he not say so? He answered what was asked of him. And why did he not ask? Because of what Rebbi Abinna said in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a first-born shared as a common son, it is prima facie evidence that he renounced his prerogative.
From where that non-guaranteed property may be acquired together with guaranteed property, by money, document, or by possession? Rebbi Yose in the name of Ḥizqiah; Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ḥanina Tortaya in the name of Ḥizqiah, it is written (2Chr. 21:3): “Their father gave them many gifts, silver and gold and delicacies, with fortified cities in Jehudah.” So far real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem, who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages and they upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Is not the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer like the sick person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
If she was preliminarily married with agreement but definitively married without agreement, may she eat heave? Rav said, she does eat; but Samuel said, she may not eat. Rebbi Mana said, Rav’s reason is that if she was preliminarily married with agreement, the permanence of the status quo implies the assumption that he definitively married her with agreement. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav’s reason is that by the earlier Mishnah, a preliminarily married daughter of an Israel may eat heave. What is the difference between them? Her earnings. According to Rebbi Mana, for Rav her earnings belong to her husband; according to Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, for Rav her earnings belong to her father. If she should die, who inherits from her? According to Rebbi Mana, for Rav her husband inherits; according to Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, for Rav her father inherits if she dies. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun stated, for Rav her husband inherits if she dies. If she was preliminarily married without agreement and definitively married without agreement, may she eat heave? Samuel said, she does eat. Come and see: If she was preliminarily married with agreement and definitively married without agreement, Samuel says that she may not eat; here he says she may eat? Samuel treats her as an orphan.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The baraita if he said to her, by the deposit you are holding for me. But if he said, by everything which I deposited with you, she is not preliminarily married unless all of it is available. What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was given to be spent; this was not given to be spent. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah.” Then even if a peruṭah’ s worth was left, she should not be preliminarily married unless all of them were available! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Abun said, were we not of the opinion to say, who is the Tanna of Wawim? Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Jehudah imply comprehensive one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Just as he says there, comprehensive one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices, so he says here, comprehensive one preliminary marriage, in detail three preliminary marriages.
What is the difference between them? If the grocer was deaf-mute. According to Rebbi Ze‘ira, he does not have to worry because a deaf-mute cannot become an agent; according to Rebbi Hila, he does have to worry.
“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This shall be an elevation sacrifice for thirty days,” it is an elevation sacrifice for thirty days; after thirty days it automatically becomes profane. What is its status regarding larceny? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the larceny is clear. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Hila both say, the larceny is in doubt. “You are preliminarily married to me for thirty days,” she is preliminarily married. What is the difference between dedication and woman? We find that a dedication can be eliminated without redemption but we do not find that a woman could leave without a divorce document. Where do we find that a dedication can be eliminated without redemption? Following Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “they enter without paying.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it according to everybody regarding a bought field. “This is your bill of divorce for thirty days”: it is no bill of divorce. Rebbi Isaac ben R. Eleazar said, when do you say that she is preliminarily married? If he effectuated the preliminary marriage by money. But if he effectuated the preliminary marriage by a document, since marriage documents were inferred from divorce documents and in the case of a divorce she is not divorced, so in the case of a preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This animal shall be an elevation sacrifice after thirty days;” if he sold it during the thirty days, it is not sold; its dedication does not sanctify. For which purpose did he say: “after thirty”? To reserve for himself shearing and work. “Pick from this field that it should be acquired by you after thirty days;” if he sold it within thirty days it is not sold, if he dedicated it it is not sanctified. Why did he say, after thirty days? To reserve usufruct for himself. “Here you have this tetradrachma that your field should be mine after thirty days,” if he sold it within thirty days it is not sold, if he dedicated it it is not sanctified. What is the difference between this and a woman? But if he sold it, it is sold.
HALAKHAH: “On condition that I possess a bet kor of arable land,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah the son of Rebbi Hillel asked: If somebody said, my son A should perform action X and receive property Y, and the rest of my sons shall inherit my properties; if he performs, he takes, but if he does not perform, he does not take. Or maybe it is a difference since it is written: “To give to Nine and a half tribes.” It is as if he said, my son A should perform action X and receive property Y, and the rest of my sons shall inherit my properties; if he performs, he takes, but if he does not perform, he does not take from here or from there.
There, we have stated: “A person can impose a condition of his ‘eruv.” So is the Mishnah: “A person can impose a condition of his‘eruvin.” Rebbi Eleazar said, who is the Tanna of “if they came”, “if they did not come”? Rebbi Meïr! Which Rebbi Meïr? The colleagues say, Rebbi Meïr of Qiddušin. As it was stated: If somebody say to a woman: You are preliminarily married to me on condition that there will be rain. If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Meïr says, she is preliminarily married whether or not rain fell unless he doubled his condition. Everybody agrees that if he said, after rainfall, if it rained she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Yose said, it follows Rebbi Meïr in Eruvin, as we have stated there: “If it be in doubt, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say, he is a camel-donkey driver.” Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Meïr said this only as a restriction. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct. He cannot acquire his ‘eruv since he is not able to enjoy it. [Why not] like the people of his place? If he had decided to leave his place. And here, she is not preliminarily married to the first, since no rain came. She is not preliminarily married to the second, since [the first] did not double his condition. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this “if” not a reaction? He answered, there is a difference since the land was in their hand and he wanted to take it away from them.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody say to a woman,” etc. They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between this and one who says, “this shall be heave for this standing produce after it has been cut”? He said to them, there, it is in his power to cut; but here, it is not in his power to be freed. Rebbi Ephes asked, think of it, if she was his slave girl? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, “after you are freed”, she is made dependent on another person’s will.
HALAKHAH: “The daughter of a desecrated priest,” etc. Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rav: Daughter, daughter’s daughter, forever. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “In his clans.” Since by “in his clans” said there males are forbidden and females permitted, so by “in his clans” said here males are forbidden and females permitted. What is the difference between them? A Cohen who came to a divorcee and fathered a son; the son went and fathered a son and a daughter. In the opinion of Rav the son, the son’s daughter, the daughter’s son, and the daughter are forbidden. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan the son’s daughter is forbidden, the daughter’s son is permitted. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “The daughter of an Israel who married a desecrated woman is qualified for the priesthood.” He explains it, a broomstick desecrated one. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah says, the daughter of a male proselyte is like the daughter of a desecrated priest.” He explains that Rebbi Jehudah only comes to add. If he had said that the daughter of a desecrated priest is like the daughter of a male proselyte, you would have had a point.
MISHNAH: The wolf and the lion, the bear, and the tiger, and the panther, and the snake, are notorious. Rebbi Eliezer says, when they are trained they are not notorious; except for the snake which always is notorious. What is the difference between tame and notorious? The tame pays half the damages from its body and the notorious pays full damages from the storage room.
HALAKHAH: “How is the foot notorious,” etc. Does not an animal usually make pebbles ricochet? Rebbi Immi said, if the vessel was held by a human. But if it was lying in the public domain, since it was rightfully lying there and [the animal] was rightfully walking there, he is free. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, if there were two roads. On one there are grasses and pebbles, on the other there are no grasses or pebbles. It disregarded the one with no grasses or pebbles and went on that with grasses and pebbles; even though it was in the public domain he is free. Rebbi Eleazar said, in anything not concerning its body, the Sages made no difference between private and public domain in the matter of half damages.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, as a matter of principle one does not appoint guardians for orphans to their detriment, but only to their profit; but if they are detrimental, they are detrimental. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, neither as a matter of principle nor as a reaction, neither for profit nor for detriment. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: “One appoints a guardian for them” There is a difference about an ox, lest it continue to cause damage.
And Rebbi Yannai said, so is the Mishnah: He pays half of the damage from the cow and the owner of the calves returns a quarter to the owner of the cow. Rebbi Yose said, each of them gives half. What is the difference between them? If the calves died. According to him who said, he pays half of the damage from the cow and a quarter of the damage from the calf, each one pays his part of the damage. According to him who said, he pays half of the damage from the cow and the owner of the calves returns a quarter to the owner of the cow, one pays the damage, but the other one says, I did not want these, here they are before you.
HALAKHAH: “If a bull intended,” etc. A bull which intended [to attack] another; therefore, if it intended to hit the woman is he liable? Does it make a difference whether it intended to hit the woman or intended to hit another [bull]? Then why was it stated here? Abba bar Rav Ḥana said, because he had to state the next clause: “But if a human intended [to hurt] another human but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he pays for the children.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to his son: A qônām that you cannot enjoy anything from me,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, look what we did state here: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, the son inherits; ‘during my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, he cannot inherit.” Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, he inherits; ‘after my death’, he inherits, ‘during my lifetime and after my death’, he cannot inherit? What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say, ‘a qônām that I shall not enter this house during my lifetime and after my death’, since he said “this house”, he forbade it on himself during lifetime and after death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Neziqin what we did not state in Nedarim: ‘A qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade them to himself during his lifetime and after his death.
What is the difference between his Hebrew male and female slaves and his Canaanite male and female slaves? Rebbi Joḥanan said, since he is not empowered to change the employment of his male or female Hebrew slave, that one’s find belongs to himself. Since he is empowered to change the employment of his male or female Canaanite slave, their find belongs to their master. They objected: He is not empowered to change the employment of his wife, but her find belongs to him. As we have stated there: “He forces her to work with wool,” he cannot force her to work any other material. Rebbi Abba bar Mina and Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: there is another reason in the case of the wife. What is another reason in the case of the wife? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, because of quarrel. Rebbi Yose said, lest she smuggle away her husband’s property and say: it is a find. They objected: before witnesses? They forbade one because of the other.
HALAKHAH: “What is a lost animal,” etc. “If one found it in the cowshed, he has no obligation; in the public domain he is obligated. Between graves, he may not defile himself. If his father told him to defile himself, or told him not to return it, he should not listen to him.” Everywhere you say that a positive commandment has precedence over a prohibition, but here, you say that a positive commandment does not have precedence over a prohibition? There is a difference since both he and his father are required to honor the Omnipresent.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody deposits an amphora with another person,” etc. Did not Rebbi Eleazar say, to what can the situation be compared? One who steals an amphora from another person’s wine cellar. Even if the owner does not realize the theft, it is necessary that he know of its return. He said, there is a difference because [the trustee] has authority over it. Rebbi Eleazar said, some say because the trustee has authority over it. What means “for its needs”? If the owner insisted on a specified place, at another place, whether it is for his needs or its needs, he is (not) liable. There are those who say that the trustee is not authorized; there is no difference whether at this place or at another place; for his needs he is liable, for its needs he is not liable.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody deposits an amphora with another person,” etc. Did not Rebbi Eleazar say, to what can the situation be compared? One who steals an amphora from another person’s wine cellar. Even if the owner does not realize the theft, it is necessary that he know of its return. He said, there is a difference because [the trustee] has authority over it. Rebbi Eleazar said, some say because the trustee has authority over it. What means “for its needs”? If the owner insisted on a specified place, at another place, whether it is for his needs or its needs, he is (not) liable. There are those who say that the trustee is not authorized; there is no difference whether at this place or at another place; for his needs he is liable, for its needs he is not liable.
Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: A person who gave ten denars to another and told him, I have to get from you 100 (denars) [barrels] from that house, is permitted; from that vineyard, is prohibited. What is the difference between house and vineyard? A house is not expected to collapse, a vineyard occasionally collapses. Rebbi Yose said, you understand from this that if a person gave ten denars to another and told him, I have to get 100 barrels from you, once he used them he is required to deliver the merchandise.
HALAKHAH: “How much time does one have to return it,” etc. Ḥizqiah said, to add it for Jerusalem, he adds it as good coin. If he uses it to redeem in the countryside, he redeems with the underweight coin. But did we not state: “He chooses the better one of the two and exchanges it for them”? Why can he not take the worse [coin] and treat it [as a good one]. He said, there is a difference here because it already was shown to be Second Tithe.
It was stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, one invests in improving a field and does not worry about interest. How is this? One leased a field for ten kor of wheat and said to him, give me a tetradrachma and I shall give you twelve kor at threshing time, it is permitted.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because the field may bring an extraordinary yield. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is as if he increased the rent for the field. What is the difference between them? A store or a ship. According to him who said, because the field may bring an extraordinary yield, one invests in a store or a ship. According to him who said, it is as if he increased the rent for the field, one may not invest in a store or a ship. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Joḥanan said, one invests in a store or a ship. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one may not invest in a store or a ship, nor in anything which is not invested in the object itself.
A wall between two partitions which was breached. Rav and Samuel, one said, half belongs to one party, the other half to the other party. The other said, both own it entirely. What is the difference between them? If one found a find. For him who said that half belongs to one party, the other half to the other party, if it was on one side it belongs to this party, one the other side it belongs to the other party. For him who said that both own it entirely, the finder acquired it.
HALAKHAH: “One distances a tree from a town,” etc.. אֲפִילוּ בְתוֹךְ שֶׁלּוֹ אָסוּר Because it creates shadow where it stands or because its falling leaves are dangerous? What is the difference between them? If it stands on one’s own property. If you say, because it creates shadow where it stands, on his property it is permitted. But it you say, because its motion is dangerous, even on his property it is forbidden.
HALAKHAH: “A person may not open windows,” etc. Here you say, a door opposite a door is permitted, and there you say, a door opposite a door is forbidden. Where you say it is permitted, in an alley. And where you say it is forbidden, in a condominium courtyard. But did we not state: “Just as the inhabitants of a courtyard may object to one another, so the inhabitants of an alley may object to one another”? Rebbi La said, here when permission was given, there when permission was not given. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is a difference because gardens are usually dug into. Rebbi Nasa said, are ruins not to be rebuilt?
“When has this been said? For the seller. But one who gives a gift gives everything.” What is the difference between a seller and the giver of a gift? Rebbi Abba bar Ṭebelai in the name of Rav: Because the giver of a gift usually is magnanimous. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because buyers care about minutiae. What is the difference between these opinions? A dedication to the Temple. He who says, because the giver of a gift usually is magnanimous, also the person vowing to the Temple usually is magnanimous. But he who says, because buyers care about minutiae, what does he say about a dedication to the Temple? Let us hear from the following: “Brothers who divided [an inheritance], if one acquired a field he acquired everything. Somebody taking possession of the property of a convert aquired it; if he took possession of a field, he took possession of everything. If somebody dedicated a field to the Temple, he dedicated everything. Rebbi Simeon says that he who dedicated a field to the Temple, only dedicated a grafted carob tree and an old sycamore tree.” Because they nurse from Temple property. Because he reserved access to himself? If he had not reserved access for himself, would they not feed from Temple property?
“When has this been said? For the seller. But one who gives a gift gives everything.” What is the difference between a seller and the giver of a gift? Rebbi Abba bar Ṭebelai in the name of Rav: Because the giver of a gift usually is magnanimous. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because buyers care about minutiae. What is the difference between these opinions? A dedication to the Temple. He who says, because the giver of a gift usually is magnanimous, also the person vowing to the Temple usually is magnanimous. But he who says, because buyers care about minutiae, what does he say about a dedication to the Temple? Let us hear from the following: “Brothers who divided [an inheritance], if one acquired a field he acquired everything. Somebody taking possession of the property of a convert aquired it; if he took possession of a field, he took possession of everything. If somebody dedicated a field to the Temple, he dedicated everything. Rebbi Simeon says that he who dedicated a field to the Temple, only dedicated a grafted carob tree and an old sycamore tree.” Because they nurse from Temple property. Because he reserved access to himself? If he had not reserved access for himself, would they not feed from Temple property?
HALAKHAH: So far if real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred sheep and a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages, who upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Would the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer be like the healthy person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.
HALAKHAH: “If at the start there was written a mina,” etc. It was stated: Always in a knotted document the bottom should be instructed by the top for one letter (or) [but not] for two letters. One confirms between Ḥanan and Ḥanani, or Anan and Anani, a difference of one letter; of two letters one does not confirm. Rebbi Isaac asked: At the top it was written Ḥanan, at the bottom Nani. May the top learn from the bottom for Ḥanan and the bottom from the top for Nani?
Why cannot always one stand up and one sit down? There is a difference because a witness cannot be a judge. Rav Huna knew testimony for somebody. He came and wanted to have the suit judged before Rav Huna, and denied all. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac told him, because you know that (Rebbi) [Rav] Huna is an important person you deny everything. What if Rav Huna went and testified against you in another court? Rav Huna asked him, does one do that? He answered, yes. Rav Huna recused himself from that suit, went, and testified before another court.
“One intercalates neither in a Sabbatical year nor the year following a Sabbatical; but if it was intercalated it is intercalated. When does one usually intercalate? The year preceding a Sabbatical.” Rebbi Zeˋira said in the name of Rebbi Abbahu, that is before Rebbi permitted to import produce from outside the Land into the Land. But since Rebbi permitted to import produce from outside the Land into the Land, there is no difference between a Sabbatical and the remaining years of the Sabbatical cycle.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody redeemed Temple dedications for more than their worth, it is redeemed. But if somebody redeemed Second Tithe for more than its worth, it is not redeemed. What is the difference between dedications and Second Tithe? Rebbi La said, dedications have claimants, Second Tithe has no claimant. Rebbi Jonah asked, that is following him who says that it is not his property. But for him who says it is his property, what is the difference between dedications and Second Tithe? Rebbi Yose said, the reason has already been explained: dedications have claimants, Second Tithe has no claimant.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody redeemed Temple dedications for more than their worth, it is redeemed. But if somebody redeemed Second Tithe for more than its worth, it is not redeemed. What is the difference between dedications and Second Tithe? Rebbi La said, dedications have claimants, Second Tithe has no claimant. Rebbi Jonah asked, that is following him who says that it is not his property. But for him who says it is his property, what is the difference between dedications and Second Tithe? Rebbi Yose said, the reason has already been explained: dedications have claimants, Second Tithe has no claimant.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody redeemed Temple dedications without adding its fifth it is redeemed. But if somebody redeemed Second Tithe dedications without adding its fifth, it is not redeemed. What is the difference between dedications and Second Tithe? Rebbi La said, because a person usually adds to his dedications. Rebbi Jonah asked, that is following him who says that it is not his property. But for him who says it is his property, what is the difference between Second Tithe and dedications? Rebbi Yose said, did you not already give the reason? Because a person usually adds to his dedications.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody redeemed Temple dedications without adding its fifth it is redeemed. But if somebody redeemed Second Tithe dedications without adding its fifth, it is not redeemed. What is the difference between dedications and Second Tithe? Rebbi La said, because a person usually adds to his dedications. Rebbi Jonah asked, that is following him who says that it is not his property. But for him who says it is his property, what is the difference between Second Tithe and dedications? Rebbi Yose said, did you not already give the reason? Because a person usually adds to his dedications.
“The High Priest sacrifices while in deep sorrow but does not eat, the words of Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Jehudah says, the entire day. Rebbi Simeon says, he completely finishes the service he is engaged in and then leaves.” Between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon there is one [difference], between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon there is one [difference]. Between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah is entering. Rebbi Jacob ben Dositheos: interruption is between them. Rebbi Meïr says, if he was inside, he leaves; if he was outside, he did [not] enter. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he was inside, he enters; if he was outside, he did not enter. Rebbi Simeon says, he completely finishes the service he is engaged in and then leaves. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Huna: a baraita is from Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The Sanctuary he shall not leave, he may not leave with them, but he may leave after them. If they are unseen he can be seen; he leaves with them up to the city gate, the words of Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Jehudah said, he does not leave the Temple since it is said: The Sanctuary he shall not leave. If he left, he may not return.”
“The High Priest sacrifices while in deep sorrow but does not eat, the words of Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Jehudah says, the entire day. Rebbi Simeon says, he completely finishes the service he is engaged in and then leaves.” Between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon there is one [difference], between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon there is one [difference]. Between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah is entering. Rebbi Jacob ben Dositheos: interruption is between them. Rebbi Meïr says, if he was inside, he leaves; if he was outside, he did [not] enter. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he was inside, he enters; if he was outside, he did not enter. Rebbi Simeon says, he completely finishes the service he is engaged in and then leaves. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Huna: a baraita is from Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The Sanctuary he shall not leave, he may not leave with them, but he may leave after them. If they are unseen he can be seen; he leaves with them up to the city gate, the words of Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Jehudah said, he does not leave the Temple since it is said: The Sanctuary he shall not leave. If he left, he may not return.”
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “Deep sorrow” is only for the dead, for it is written: Its gates are in deep sorrow and mourning. Ḥiyya bar Ada objected: Is it not written: the fishermen are in deep sorrow? Rebbi Ḥanina said, so is the baraita: there is no deep sorrow in impurity except for the dead. It was stated: “What is deep sorrow? From the moment of death until the moment of burial, the word of Rebbi. But the Sages say, the entire day.” It turns out that one describes leniencies and stringencies following Rebbi, leniencies and stringencies following the rabbis. What is the difference between them? If he died and was buried within the hour. Following the rabbis, he is forbidden the entire day; following Rebbi he is forbidden only that hour. If he died and was buried after three days. Following the rabbis, he is forbidden the entire day; following Rebbi he is forbidden up to three days. There came Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, and Rav Ḥisda, both of whom said that Rebbi agrees with the Sages that he is forbidden only during the first day, as it was stated: Rebbi said, you know that deep mourning in the night is not biblical, since they said, “the deep mourner immerses himself and eats his Passover sacrifice in the evening.” But they said, deep mourning [during daytime] is biblical. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Explain it that he was buried close to sundown [and one cannot infer anything.]
MISHNAH: Both civil suits and criminal suits require cross-examination and investigation, as it is said: One set of rules shall be for you. What is the difference between civil suits and criminal suits? Civil suits are tried before three judges, criminal suits before 23. In civil suits one starts with arguments either for acquittal or conviction; in criminal courts one starts with arguments for acquittal but not for conviction.
HALAKHAH: “Civil suits can be retried both for credit and for debit,” etc. If he left the court being acquitted, and they found reasons for conviction, could I understand that one returned him? The verse says, do not slay the acquitted. If he left the court being convicted, and they found reasons for acquittal, could I understand that one should not return him? The verse says, but do not slay the innocent. I could think that if he is acquitted in your court, he is acquitted in My court; the verse says, I shall not acquit the wicked. Rebbi Isaac said, Rebbi Yose told me: There is no difference; if the acquittal was in error, one retries him.
MISHNAH: Anybody who adds inquiries is praiseworthy. It happened that Ben Zakkai cross-examined about fig stalks. What is the difference between investigations and cross-examinations? In investigations, if one said “I do not know”, their testimony is worthless. In cross-examinations, if one said “I do not know”, or even two say “we do not know,” their testimony remains valid. Both in investigations and cross-examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is worthless.
Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony is contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent with what Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet, and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he counted from a wallet and the other says he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony: the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One said, he counted into his bosom, but the other said, he counted into his money-belt: everybody agrees that this contradicts the essence of the testimony but the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he killed him with a sword and the other says, he killed him with a mace. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One says, he turned to the North and one says, he ran away to the South, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, and the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can be remarried.” He did not hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to those of her companion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he said it because he had heard it from me. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and cross-examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is worthless.” What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain it as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: Justice, justice you shall pursue.
Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony is contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent with what Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet, and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he counted from a wallet and the other says he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony: the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One said, he counted into his bosom, but the other said, he counted into his money-belt: everybody agrees that this contradicts the essence of the testimony but the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he killed him with a sword and the other says, he killed him with a mace. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One says, he turned to the North and one says, he ran away to the South, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, and the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can be remarried.” He did not hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to those of her companion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he said it because he had heard it from me. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and cross-examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is worthless.” What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain it as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: Justice, justice you shall pursue.
If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.
Rebbi Zeˋira, Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Cahana: He who is planting on the Sabbath is guilty because of sowing. Rebbi Ze`ura said, he who prunes is like one who plants. If he planted and pruned on the Sabbath, according to Cahana he is guilty on two counts, according to Rebbi Ze`ura only on one count. Did not Rebbi Ze`ura say the pruner is like the planter, did perhaps he say the planter is like the pruner? All was included in the category of sowing; pruning was singled out for particular stringency. Because pruning was singled out for particular stringency you want to exempt it because of sowing? This means, there is no difference. If he planted and pruned on the Sabbath, according to both Cahana and Rebbi Ze`ura he is guilty on two counts
There, we have stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, if his mother was not fit for his father, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. Therefore, if his mother was fit for his father, he is liable for two. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference. Whether his mother was fit for his father or unfit for his father, he is liable only once. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan: Your mother is she, you find him guilty because of his mother; this directs the entire chapter towards his mother. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: What caused Rebbi Joḥanan to concentrate on the mother and to leave the father’s wife aside? He told him, for he argues with Rebbi Ismael, as Rebbi Ismael explained: Your father’s wife’s nakedness; the verse refers to the male. Is not his father included in the category of the male? Only to make him liable twice, as we have stated: A person having sexual relations with his father is doubly liable about him. Then should we not state “thirty-seven extirpations in the Torah”? Rebbi Mana said, all denotations of males are one. Your father’s wife’s nakedness; the verse refers to the father’s wife. Your mother’s nakedness, that is his mother who is his father’s wife. From where his mother who is not his father’s wife? Your mother is she; do not uncover her nakedness. How does Rebbi Ismael treat this? He explains it to apply after [the father’s] death. Does Rebbi Aqiba not explain she is your father’s nakedness? There is no difference whether during lifetime or after death. Rebbi Aqiba explains: Your father’s wife’s nakedness, the verse refers to the father’s wife. Your mother’s nakedness, that is his mother who is his father’s wife. From where his mother who is not his father’s wife? Your mother is she; do not uncover her nakedness. How does Rebbi Ismael treat this? He explains it to apply after [the father’s] death. Does not Rebbi Aqiba treat your father’s nakedness, your mother’s nakedness? Since your father refers to your father in any capacity both for punishment and warning, so also your mother refers to one’s mother in any capacity both for punishment and warning. Is it not reasonable to explain that verse except following Rebbi Jehudah who because he does not accept “his mother who is his father’s wife” must explain that your father’s nakedness, your mother’s nakedness refers to your father in any capacity both for punishment and warning, so also your mother refers to your mother in any capacity both for punishment and warning. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that one infers from parallel language even if it is free only from one side. Rebbi Yudan said to him, this is obvious for Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba infers from parallel language even if it is not free.
There, we have stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, if his mother was not fit for his father, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. Therefore, if his mother was fit for his father, he is liable for two. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference. Whether his mother was fit for his father or unfit for his father, he is liable only once. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan: Your mother is she, you find him guilty because of his mother; this directs the entire chapter towards his mother. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: What caused Rebbi Joḥanan to concentrate on the mother and to leave the father’s wife aside? He told him, for he argues with Rebbi Ismael, as Rebbi Ismael explained: Your father’s wife’s nakedness; the verse refers to the male. Is not his father included in the category of the male? Only to make him liable twice, as we have stated: A person having sexual relations with his father is doubly liable about him. Then should we not state “thirty-seven extirpations in the Torah”? Rebbi Mana said, all denotations of males are one. Your father’s wife’s nakedness; the verse refers to the father’s wife. Your mother’s nakedness, that is his mother who is his father’s wife. From where his mother who is not his father’s wife? Your mother is she; do not uncover her nakedness. How does Rebbi Ismael treat this? He explains it to apply after [the father’s] death. Does Rebbi Aqiba not explain she is your father’s nakedness? There is no difference whether during lifetime or after death. Rebbi Aqiba explains: Your father’s wife’s nakedness, the verse refers to the father’s wife. Your mother’s nakedness, that is his mother who is his father’s wife. From where his mother who is not his father’s wife? Your mother is she; do not uncover her nakedness. How does Rebbi Ismael treat this? He explains it to apply after [the father’s] death. Does not Rebbi Aqiba treat your father’s nakedness, your mother’s nakedness? Since your father refers to your father in any capacity both for punishment and warning, so also your mother refers to one’s mother in any capacity both for punishment and warning. Is it not reasonable to explain that verse except following Rebbi Jehudah who because he does not accept “his mother who is his father’s wife” must explain that your father’s nakedness, your mother’s nakedness refers to your father in any capacity both for punishment and warning, so also your mother refers to your mother in any capacity both for punishment and warning. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that one infers from parallel language even if it is free only from one side. Rebbi Yudan said to him, this is obvious for Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba infers from parallel language even if it is not free.
From where the warning for a person having sexual relations with an animal? Do not give your emission into an animal to defile yourself by it. From where extirpation? For anybody who would commit any of these abominations will be extirpated, etc. Punishment from where? A man who would sleep with a animal shall be put to death. You infer their blood be on them from their blood be on them. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael from his source and Rebbi Aqiba from his source. Extirpation for a male passive partner is not found for Rebbi Ismael. Punishment for a male passive partner is not found for Rebbi Ismael or Rebbi Aqiba, but it is written: One who sacrifices to the forces of nature shall be banned. Since this one is in for stoning and extirpation, also that one is in for stoning and extirpation. What is the difference between them? If one had active homosexual relations followed by passive ones, in Rebbi Ismael’s opinion he is liable only once; in Rebbi Aqiba’s opinion he is liable twice. If one had active relations with an animal followed by passive ones. Both in Rebbi Aqiba’s as in Rebbi Ismael’s opinions he is liable twice. If he had active homosexual relations with both a male and an animal he is liable twice. If he had passive homosexual relations with both a male and an animal he is liable twice. If he had simultaneous active sexual relations with two males, since both of them became guilty because of him, he is liable twice. If he had simultaneous passive sexual relations with two males, since both of them became guilty because of him, he is liable twice. It was stated: For males, an underage boy does not have the status of an adult; a young animal has the status of a fully grown one. Rebbi Eleazar said, he cannot become liable because of it unless it be three years and one day of age.
Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥmani in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If one says to it, you are my god, there is disagreement between Rebbi and the Sages. If he (prostrated himself), what is the rule? Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees that if he lowered his body, he is guilty. What is the difference between raising and lowering his body, and raising and lowering his lips? Rebbi Joḥanan said, following disagreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, following the distinction. Rebbi Zeˋira said, a verse supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: One rule should be for you, for the one acting in error. This only refers to what represents an action. The one who embraces (and who prostrates himself), which are not action, from where?
“The necromancer is the πύθων and one who speaks from his armpit. The medium speaks through his mouth. These are stoned but one who consults them is forewarned. And one who asks the dead. Some Tannaïm state: this is one who interrogates a skull. Some Tannaïm state: this is one who interrogates his masculinity. What is the difference between one interrogated by his skull or one raised by his masculinity? The one interrogated by his skull rises normally, rises on the Sabbath, and a commoner can raise a king. But one raised by his masculinity does not rise normally, does not rise on the Sabbath, and a commoner cannot raise a king.
He is guilty only it he ate it rare. If he ate it raw, he is a dog. If he ate it cooked, he is a human. If he ate cartilage, what is the rule? What is the rule about soft sinews? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one subscribes to them; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not subscribe to them. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed about what is stated there: “The following have their hides treated like their flesh.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, this was only said as prohibition and regarding impurity, but not for flogging. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, Rebbi stated a complete Mishnah, not only for prohibition and regarding impurity. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, he treats it as flesh, but here, he does not treat it as meat. Rebbi Judah bar Pazi said, there is a difference, since there one refers to skin which in the end will become hard. This emphasizes that the reasoning of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted! Since there, where in the end it will harden, he treats it as flesh, here where in the end it will not harden, not so much more? Rebbi Abbahu said, the reason of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi is: they shall eat the meat in that night, not sinews.
There, we stated: “If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath.” It was stated “compromised”, not that she reduced [her ketubah]. How? If her ketubah was 200 but she claims a mina, she is paid without an oath. What is the difference between one who did compromise and one who claims less? Rebbi Ḥanina said, if she compromises there was a transaction between them; if she claims less there was no transaction between them.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Ismael, and Rebbi Aqiba. But the words of the Sages are that the sent-away ram pardons. How does it pardon? Rebbi Zeˋira said, by and by. Rebbi Ḥanina said, at the end. What is the difference between them? If somebody died in-between. In the opinion of Rebbi Zeˋira, he already was pardoned. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥanina, he was not pardoned. Rebbi Ḥanina said, a baraita supports Rebbi Zeˋira: There is strength in the ram which is not in the Day of Atonement, and in the Day of Atonement which is not in the ram, for the Day of Atonement pardons without a ram, but the ram does not atone except on the Day of Atonement. There is strength in the ram, for it pardons immediately but the Day of Atonement only at nightfall. Rebbi Huna said, the question was raised before Rebbi Jeremiah and he said, explain it if they intended to bring another ram but they did not bring it. Rebbi Yose ben Yose said, but does the Holy One, praise to Him, not see into the future? Then He should pardon immediately.
MISHNAH: Together Israel, Cohanim, and the Anointed Priest. What is the difference between Israel and a Cohen or the Anointed Priest? Only that the blood of the bull atones for Cohanim in matters of the Sanctuary and its sancta. Rebbi Simeon says, just as the blood of the he-goat which is brought inside atones for Israel, so the blood of the bull atones for the Cohanim. Just as the confession of the scapegoat atones for Israel, so the confession of the bull atones for Cohanim.
Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?
HALAKHAH: “If one became impure in the Temple courtyard,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: One verse says, he defiled the dwelling place of the Eternal, another verse says, he defiled the Sanctuary of the Eternal. Why is this? To state a difference between one who became inside and one who became outside. If he became impure (inside) not unless he bring his head and most of his body inside; if he became impure (outside) not unless he stay for prostrating. If he became impure inside and entered further inside? Let us hear from the following: “If he prostrated himself, or tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” If he tarried, is that not as if he brought his head and most of his body inside, but you are saying, “he tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” And here, not unless he tarried that he could have prostrated himself. How is that? About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the first. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, leave, and you say about the first? But we must hold about the last.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,” etc. “An oath that I shall eat this loaf today,” the day passed and then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, he is not liable; not for the same reason. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan, because he cannot be duly warned. The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because it is a prohibition without action. What is the difference between them? He burned it or threw it into the sea. If you say, because he cannot be duly warned, he is not liable. If you say, because it is a prohibition without action, there is an action.
A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears to substitute. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: anything known to two persons is a (vain) oath, to three it is (false). Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the world, it is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath; in the opinion of R. Joḥanan he is not flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not flogged. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, even an egg and a pearl. What means “even”? But, for example, an egg and a pearl.
This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.
Why? Because he does not know them, or because he does not intend to ask them? What is the difference between them? If he obligated them in pairs of two. If you would say because he does not know them, he knows them. Therefore the reason only can be that he does not intend to ask them.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meïr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive. “May He not punish you if you come and testify for me.” Therefore, if you do not come and testify for me He shall punish you. There is not only an imprecation accompanied by an oath. From where one not accompanied by an oath be like one which is accompanied by an oath? The verse says, and heard an imprecation, and heard a voice, to make one without imprecation like one with an imprecation. Therefore not an imprecation without an oath. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference; an imprecation without oath is the same as an oath without an imprecation.