64 occurrences across the corpus

OT Pseudepigrapha

The Sibylline Oracles 2:115

When he to judgment comes. Disable not

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 10:41

There, we have stated: “The following disable and do not fill: Water, whether pure or impure, pickling water, cooking water, afterwine before it became vinegar.” Here, you treat it as food, there as fluid. Rebbi Mana said, here when it is thick, there when it is thin. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, you may even say in both cases thick or thin. Taste counts for heave but not for a miqweh.

Jerusalem Talmud Challah 3:11

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Jonah said: The elder Rebbi Ḥiyya stated two contradictory things, that ṭevel is counted with profane food and that every doubt invalidates heave and disables profane food from becoming heave. This is difficult; if ṭevel is counted with profane food why should it disable profane food from becoming heave? That means, it is counted with heave! Rebbi Jonah said, we also have stated both statements! We have stated there: “If tithe food was prepared with a fluid and a ṭevul yom or unwashed hands touched it, one still may in purity take heave of the tithe from it because it is of the third degree.” This implies that ṭevel is counted with profane food. But every doubt invalidates heave and disables profane food from becoming heave, as we have stated there: “If a doubt of impurity arose before it was rolled it may be processed in impurity but after it was rolled it must be processed in purity.” Rav Sheshet said, this follows Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba said, he should make it in impurity and not make it single qab. Rebbi Zeïra said, it is the opinion of everybody that in a case of doubt he should make single qabim. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abun objected before Rebbi Zeïra, did we not state: “This applies also to other kinds”? Can you say she should make single qabim in cases of doubt? Rebbi Zabida said, I asked that. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: It is the law that a person may make his ṭevel impure by biblical standards as it is written (Num. 18:8): “I put on you the watch over my heaves.” Heave has to be watched, ṭevel does not have to be watched. How do I confirm (Num. 18:28): “You should give from it the Eternal’s heave to Aaron the priest?” You have to give it to Aaron in his quality of priest, but here, since you cannot give it to a Cohen in his quality of priest, you may make it impure.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:11

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Eleazar said, so is the Mishnah: Her slaves may eat, his slaves may not eat. For if it were not so, she would eat but her slaves would not eat! Rebbi Josia in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it is from this, she also should not eat. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Not that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees, he only said, for if it were not so, she would eat but her slaves would not eat. There came a case before Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. He said, go out and look how the public behaves. Rebbi Abin said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, not only this practice, but in any practical question which is weak in court and you do not know how to decide, go out and see how the public acts, and act accordingly. And we see that they do not eat. Rebbi Yose said, this means that [the fetus] does not disable anybody able to eat and does not enable anybody unable to eat.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:15

MISHNAH: The fetus, the levir, the betrothal, the deaf-and-dumb, and the male nine years and one day old disable but do not enable to eat. If there was a doubt whether or not he had reached nine years and one dayt; whether or not he had grown two pubic hairs; when the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:16

HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:16

HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:16

HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:16

HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:18

“Whether he had reached nine years and one day or not”, he is as if he were nine years and one day old to disable; “whether he had grown two pubic hairs or not”, he is as if he had grown two pubic hairs to make her eat.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:20

MISHNAH: The rapist, the seducer, and the insane do neither disable nor enable to eat, but if they are unable to marry in Israel they disable. How is that? If an Israel came upon the daughter of a Cohen, she may eat heave, if she became pregnant she may not eat. If the fetus was cut into pieces in her body she may eat. If a Cohen came upon the daughter of an Israel, she may not eat heave, if she became pregnant she may not eat, if she gave birth she may eat. It turns out that the son’s power is greater than the father’s.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:20

MISHNAH: The rapist, the seducer, and the insane do neither disable nor enable to eat, but if they are unable to marry in Israel they disable. How is that? If an Israel came upon the daughter of a Cohen, she may eat heave, if she became pregnant she may not eat. If the fetus was cut into pieces in her body she may eat. If a Cohen came upon the daughter of an Israel, she may not eat heave, if she became pregnant she may not eat, if she gave birth she may eat. It turns out that the son’s power is greater than the father’s.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:21

HALAKHAH: “The rapist, the seducer,” etc. This means that rape does not disable an unmarried priestly woman.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:24

“If they are unable to marry in Israel they disable.” These are: “A child of nine years and one day, an Ammonite, Moabite, or Egyptian proselyte, or a bastard, desecrated, Gibeonite, Samaritan, and Gentile who had intercourse with the daughter of an Israel, a Cohen, or a Levite, disqualified her for the priesthood. Rebbi Yose said, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified; his intercourse does not disqualify those whose descendant would not be disqualified. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in all cases, if his daughter is permitted to you, so is his widow; if his daughter is not permitted to you, neither is his widow.” In what do they differ? Rebbi Joḥanan says, an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte is between them. For him who says, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified, here since his descendant would be disqualified, his intercourse disqualifies. For him who says, if you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow, here since you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of [the rabbis], Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. Rebbi Zakkai: Rebbi Alexander sent to ask [about] the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte and the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian. Rebbi Yose said to him, did you not hear that Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of the rabbis, Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. And everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified. Do we not need it when her mother was from Israel? That you should not say that since her mother was desecrated so her daughter was desecrated. In addition, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed, the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, they disagree about the old women: Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:19

“If he did not know her carnally after he was injured in his testicles or his penis was cut off, they may eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Eleazar’s and Rebbi Simeon’s. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion; there is a difference since he did not add an acquisition to disable. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the other disagreement, since they disagreed: A priestly woman waiting for her levir who became eligible to two priestly levirs. If one of them “bespoke” her but did not have occasion to bring her to the marriage chamber before he became injured in his testicles or his penis was damaged, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since she is a candidate for disabling intercourse, she is disabled. Rebbi Joḥanan said, when he will copulate. If one of them was qualified but the other disqualified, even Rebbi Joḥanan agrees. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada asked before Rebbi Mana, if the qualified one “bespoke” her? He said to him, the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:44

MISHNAH: The castrate does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate; similarly, the she-ram does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate. The castrate who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her he disabled her because it is incestuous. Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram, they did not disable her; if they copulated with her they disabled her because it is incestuous.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:44

MISHNAH: The castrate does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate; similarly, the she-ram does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate. The castrate who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her he disabled her because it is incestuous. Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram, they did not disable her; if they copulated with her they disabled her because it is incestuous.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:47

Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: These are the words of Rebbi Eliezer, Rebbi Aqiba, and Rebbi Joshua. But the words of the Sages are that neither the castrate by human action nor the congenital castrate is able to perform ḥalîṣah nor does one perform ḥalîṣah for his wife. He cannot perform levirate, nor does one marry his wife in levirate. That is the Mishnah: “The castrate who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her, he disabled her because it is incestuous.” The hermaphrodite who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her, he disabled her because it is incestuous. “Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram, they did not disable her; if they copulated with her, they disabled her because it is incestuous.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:47

Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: These are the words of Rebbi Eliezer, Rebbi Aqiba, and Rebbi Joshua. But the words of the Sages are that neither the castrate by human action nor the congenital castrate is able to perform ḥalîṣah nor does one perform ḥalîṣah for his wife. He cannot perform levirate, nor does one marry his wife in levirate. That is the Mishnah: “The castrate who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her, he disabled her because it is incestuous.” The hermaphrodite who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her, he disabled her because it is incestuous. “Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram, they did not disable her; if they copulated with her, they disabled her because it is incestuous.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:47

Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: These are the words of Rebbi Eliezer, Rebbi Aqiba, and Rebbi Joshua. But the words of the Sages are that neither the castrate by human action nor the congenital castrate is able to perform ḥalîṣah nor does one perform ḥalîṣah for his wife. He cannot perform levirate, nor does one marry his wife in levirate. That is the Mishnah: “The castrate who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her, he disabled her because it is incestuous.” The hermaphrodite who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her, he disabled her because it is incestuous. “Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram, they did not disable her; if they copulated with her, they disabled her because it is incestuous.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:9

Rebbi Jeremiah said, the promiscuous levitic woman still eats tithe. One has stated thus: If a levitic woman was kidnapped or if any one barred for her copulated with her, he is not empowered to disable her. One does not suspect even a hint of disability for Levites who were compromised from their mother’s side. But did we not state: “the daughter of a Levite from tithe”? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that an Israel came upon her and she bore him a son.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:14

HALAKHAH: “If she married by a decision of the court,” etc. Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. This means that Rebbi Yose does not disagree about the other matters.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:14

HALAKHAH: “If she married by a decision of the court,” etc. Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. This means that Rebbi Yose does not disagree about the other matters.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:25

MISHNAH: If they told her, your husband died, and she remarried, and then they told her, he was alive but died, she must leave and the first child is a bastard, but the last is not a bastard. If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed and after that her husband returned, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the second [husband] gave her a bill of divorce he did not disable her from priesthood. This Rebbi Eleazar ben Matthew explained, “a woman divorced from her husband,” and not a woman divorced from a non-husband.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:32

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that one who copulates with his mother-in-law disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his wife’s sister; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “In fire they should burn him and them.” Where do we hold? If it is about burning, only one of them is burned. So if it cannot be relevant for burning, let it be relevant for prohibition. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “In fire they should burn him and them,” him and the second one. And the House of Shammai was arguing: Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person the cause of the prohibition became forbidden, if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition is forbidden. Which rule is slight? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the beginning of the chapter. But this is very strong! There is a difference since she was permitted to be married to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:35

Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:35

Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:36

“Rebbi Yose says, anything which disables,” etc. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If his wife’s sister was married, since he disables her for others, he disables her for himself. But his wife’s unmarried sister which he does not disable for others, he does not disable for himself. As Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she needs a bill of divorce from him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:36

“Rebbi Yose says, anything which disables,” etc. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If his wife’s sister was married, since he disables her for others, he disables her for himself. But his wife’s unmarried sister which he does not disable for others, he does not disable for himself. As Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she needs a bill of divorce from him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:38

MISHNAH: [A male] nine years and one day old disables for the brothers and the brothers disable for him; only that he disables at the beginning and the brothers disable at beginning and end. How is that? [A male] nine years and one day old who copulated with his sister-in-law disabled her for the brothers. If [any one of] the brothers copulated with her, “bespoke” her, divorced her, or performed ḥalîṣah with her, they disabled her for him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:38

MISHNAH: [A male] nine years and one day old disables for the brothers and the brothers disable for him; only that he disables at the beginning and the brothers disable at beginning and end. How is that? [A male] nine years and one day old who copulated with his sister-in-law disabled her for the brothers. If [any one of] the brothers copulated with her, “bespoke” her, divorced her, or performed ḥalîṣah with her, they disabled her for him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:39

HALAKHAH: “[A male] nine years and one day old disables,” etc. At the end he does not disable after his “bespeaking”, but after his intercourse he disables. However he can disable only by one act but they may disable by four acts.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:39

HALAKHAH: “[A male] nine years and one day old disables,” etc. At the end he does not disable after his “bespeaking”, but after his intercourse he disables. However he can disable only by one act but they may disable by four acts.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:39

HALAKHAH: “[A male] nine years and one day old disables,” etc. At the end he does not disable after his “bespeaking”, but after his intercourse he disables. However he can disable only by one act but they may disable by four acts.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:46

MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he married a woman and died, she is free. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other. It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:46

MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he married a woman and died, she is free. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other. It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:27

MISHNAH: If [a girl] repudiates a man, he is permitted [to marry] her relatives and she is permitted [to marry] his relatives; he did not disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, he is forbidden [to marry] her relatives and she is forbidden [to marry] his relatives; he did disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce and later took her back, then she repudiated him and married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is permitted to return to him. If she repudiated him and he took her back, then he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is prohibited to return to him. That is the principle: By divorce after repudiation she is prohibited to return to him; by repudiation after divorce she is permitted to return to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:27

MISHNAH: If [a girl] repudiates a man, he is permitted [to marry] her relatives and she is permitted [to marry] his relatives; he did not disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, he is forbidden [to marry] her relatives and she is forbidden [to marry] his relatives; he did disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce and later took her back, then she repudiated him and married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is permitted to return to him. If she repudiated him and he took her back, then he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is prohibited to return to him. That is the principle: By divorce after repudiation she is prohibited to return to him; by repudiation after divorce she is permitted to return to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:8

They answered on the words of Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah: If so, there is no end to it. If he is believed, he declares his jealousy (before two) [by himself], brings witnesses that she was in a secluded place and disables her from receiving the ketubah. Rebbi Yose said, what business did she have in a secluded place? But it refers to the statement in the Mishnah. Is he believed to declare formally his jealousy and then say that she was in a secluded place and disable her from receiving her ketubah? Rebbi Mana said, even for that other Tanna it is [a] valid [objection], following him who says that he may declare his jealousy in respect to her father or her son. Is he believed to declare his jealousy with respect to her father and her son, can he then bring witnesses that she was in a secluded place with them and disable her from receiving her ketubah? If you ask, what business did she have in a secluded place? The Torah permitted her to be in a secluded place, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai, it is written: “If your brother, your mother’s son, incites you, etc.,” Your daughter, in secret; your mother, in secret; a man may be alone with his mother and dwell with her, with his daughter and dwell with her, with his sister but may not dwell with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:8

They answered on the words of Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah: If so, there is no end to it. If he is believed, he declares his jealousy (before two) [by himself], brings witnesses that she was in a secluded place and disables her from receiving the ketubah. Rebbi Yose said, what business did she have in a secluded place? But it refers to the statement in the Mishnah. Is he believed to declare formally his jealousy and then say that she was in a secluded place and disable her from receiving her ketubah? Rebbi Mana said, even for that other Tanna it is [a] valid [objection], following him who says that he may declare his jealousy in respect to her father or her son. Is he believed to declare his jealousy with respect to her father and her son, can he then bring witnesses that she was in a secluded place with them and disable her from receiving her ketubah? If you ask, what business did she have in a secluded place? The Torah permitted her to be in a secluded place, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai, it is written: “If your brother, your mother’s son, incites you, etc.,” Your daughter, in secret; your mother, in secret; a man may be alone with his mother and dwell with her, with his daughter and dwell with her, with his sister but may not dwell with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:14

There, we have stated: “A hyssop which was used to sprinkle is acceptable [to be used] to purify the sufferer from skin disease.” Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That [was stated] to exclude the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer, as it was stated: If he sprinkled with it for purifying, it is disqualified for the sufferer from skin disease. If he sprinkled with it for the sufferer from skin disease, it is disqualified for purifying. Rebbi Yose said, would that not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since for the sufferer from skin disease, for whose ceremony use does not disable, if he sprinkled with it for purifying, it is disqualified for the sufferer from skin disease; purifying, for whose ceremony use does disable, if he sprinkled with it for purifying, is it not logical that it should be disqualified for purifying?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:14

There, we have stated: “A hyssop which was used to sprinkle is acceptable [to be used] to purify the sufferer from skin disease.” Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That [was stated] to exclude the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer, as it was stated: If he sprinkled with it for purifying, it is disqualified for the sufferer from skin disease. If he sprinkled with it for the sufferer from skin disease, it is disqualified for purifying. Rebbi Yose said, would that not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since for the sufferer from skin disease, for whose ceremony use does not disable, if he sprinkled with it for purifying, it is disqualified for the sufferer from skin disease; purifying, for whose ceremony use does disable, if he sprinkled with it for purifying, is it not logical that it should be disqualified for purifying?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:15

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, from where that the fourth degree is disabled in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disabled for heave but disabled for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disable for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a ṭevul yom is a counterexample, because it is disabled in the case of heave but not disabled in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: “Any meat which would touch”, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; “anything impure”, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; “shall not be eaten”, the endstage of impurity cannot be eaten.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:16

So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:16

So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:16

So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:27

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “One which never had been used for work,” a general statement, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a detail, the general does not contain more than the detail. He said to him, if it were written “which never had worked, which never had drawn,” you would be justified; but it is written “one which never had been used for work.” This does not describe general and detail, but the additional reference to “yoke” for an equal cut. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf He treated all work as a yoke, so for the “yoke” said for the cow we have to treat all work as a yoke. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf work disables whether intentional or unintentional, so for the “yoke” said for the cow work disables whether intentional or unintentional. Since relative to “yoke” said for the cow, the yoke disables, also for the “yoke” said for the calf the yoke disables. Then since for the “yoke” said for the cow blemishes disable, so also for the “yoke” said for the calf blemishes disable? The verse says, “where this one has no blemish.” Blemishes disable the cow, blemishes do not disable the calf. Then it also says “one which never had been used for work,” for this one work disables, does for the cow work not disable? Can you say there, “where this one has no blemish,” this one is disabled by blemishes, sacrifices are not disabled by blemishes?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:27

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “One which never had been used for work,” a general statement, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a detail, the general does not contain more than the detail. He said to him, if it were written “which never had worked, which never had drawn,” you would be justified; but it is written “one which never had been used for work.” This does not describe general and detail, but the additional reference to “yoke” for an equal cut. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf He treated all work as a yoke, so for the “yoke” said for the cow we have to treat all work as a yoke. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf work disables whether intentional or unintentional, so for the “yoke” said for the cow work disables whether intentional or unintentional. Since relative to “yoke” said for the cow, the yoke disables, also for the “yoke” said for the calf the yoke disables. Then since for the “yoke” said for the cow blemishes disable, so also for the “yoke” said for the calf blemishes disable? The verse says, “where this one has no blemish.” Blemishes disable the cow, blemishes do not disable the calf. Then it also says “one which never had been used for work,” for this one work disables, does for the cow work not disable? Can you say there, “where this one has no blemish,” this one is disabled by blemishes, sacrifices are not disabled by blemishes?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:27

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “One which never had been used for work,” a general statement, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a detail, the general does not contain more than the detail. He said to him, if it were written “which never had worked, which never had drawn,” you would be justified; but it is written “one which never had been used for work.” This does not describe general and detail, but the additional reference to “yoke” for an equal cut. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf He treated all work as a yoke, so for the “yoke” said for the cow we have to treat all work as a yoke. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf work disables whether intentional or unintentional, so for the “yoke” said for the cow work disables whether intentional or unintentional. Since relative to “yoke” said for the cow, the yoke disables, also for the “yoke” said for the calf the yoke disables. Then since for the “yoke” said for the cow blemishes disable, so also for the “yoke” said for the calf blemishes disable? The verse says, “where this one has no blemish.” Blemishes disable the cow, blemishes do not disable the calf. Then it also says “one which never had been used for work,” for this one work disables, does for the cow work not disable? Can you say there, “where this one has no blemish,” this one is disabled by blemishes, sacrifices are not disabled by blemishes?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:27

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “One which never had been used for work,” a general statement, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a detail, the general does not contain more than the detail. He said to him, if it were written “which never had worked, which never had drawn,” you would be justified; but it is written “one which never had been used for work.” This does not describe general and detail, but the additional reference to “yoke” for an equal cut. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf He treated all work as a yoke, so for the “yoke” said for the cow we have to treat all work as a yoke. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf work disables whether intentional or unintentional, so for the “yoke” said for the cow work disables whether intentional or unintentional. Since relative to “yoke” said for the cow, the yoke disables, also for the “yoke” said for the calf the yoke disables. Then since for the “yoke” said for the cow blemishes disable, so also for the “yoke” said for the calf blemishes disable? The verse says, “where this one has no blemish.” Blemishes disable the cow, blemishes do not disable the calf. Then it also says “one which never had been used for work,” for this one work disables, does for the cow work not disable? Can you say there, “where this one has no blemish,” this one is disabled by blemishes, sacrifices are not disabled by blemishes?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:27

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “One which never had been used for work,” a general statement, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a detail, the general does not contain more than the detail. He said to him, if it were written “which never had worked, which never had drawn,” you would be justified; but it is written “one which never had been used for work.” This does not describe general and detail, but the additional reference to “yoke” for an equal cut. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf He treated all work as a yoke, so for the “yoke” said for the cow we have to treat all work as a yoke. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf work disables whether intentional or unintentional, so for the “yoke” said for the cow work disables whether intentional or unintentional. Since relative to “yoke” said for the cow, the yoke disables, also for the “yoke” said for the calf the yoke disables. Then since for the “yoke” said for the cow blemishes disable, so also for the “yoke” said for the calf blemishes disable? The verse says, “where this one has no blemish.” Blemishes disable the cow, blemishes do not disable the calf. Then it also says “one which never had been used for work,” for this one work disables, does for the cow work not disable? Can you say there, “where this one has no blemish,” this one is disabled by blemishes, sacrifices are not disabled by blemishes?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:28

Would missing limbs disable it? That would not be even like sacrifices of the descendants of Noah! Did not Rebbi Yasa say that Rebbi Eleazar explained to the colleagues: “From all living, from all flesh,” that they should be complete in their limbs? There, some were for the altar, but here, the altar has no part. Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Since you say, purgation is written there as for sacrifices, it is as if some of it were for the altar. Does ṭerefa disable it? Since you say, it is as if some of it were for the altar, in that it should be clear to you that ṭerefa disables it. If its foot was undeveloped, as a donkey’s foot, how do you treat that? If you treat it as if missing a limb, can it be enabled? If you treat it as a bodily defect, can it be disabled? Does its blood prepare? Since Rebbi Ḥiyya stated that its blood is impure, its blood prepares.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:28

Would missing limbs disable it? That would not be even like sacrifices of the descendants of Noah! Did not Rebbi Yasa say that Rebbi Eleazar explained to the colleagues: “From all living, from all flesh,” that they should be complete in their limbs? There, some were for the altar, but here, the altar has no part. Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Since you say, purgation is written there as for sacrifices, it is as if some of it were for the altar. Does ṭerefa disable it? Since you say, it is as if some of it were for the altar, in that it should be clear to you that ṭerefa disables it. If its foot was undeveloped, as a donkey’s foot, how do you treat that? If you treat it as if missing a limb, can it be enabled? If you treat it as a bodily defect, can it be disabled? Does its blood prepare? Since Rebbi Ḥiyya stated that its blood is impure, its blood prepares.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:28

MISHNAH: If he wrote a bill to divorce his wife and then changed his mind, the House of Shammai say, he disabled her from the priesthood. But the House of Hillel say, even if he handed her [the bill of divorce] and attached a condition, if the condition was not satisfied he did not disable her from the priesthood.