disprove
18 occurrences across the corpus
The Works of Flavius Josephus
Jacob, encouraged by this dream, went on more cheerfully for Egypt with his sons, and all belonging to them. Now they were in all seventy. I once, indeed, thought it best not to set down the names of this family, especially because of their difficult pronunciation [by the Greeks]; but, upon the whole, I think it necessary to mention those names, that I may disprove such as believe that we came not originally from Mesopotamia, but are Egyptians. Now Jacob had twelve sons; of these Joseph was come thither before. We will therefore set down the names of Jacob's children and grandchildren. Reuben had four sons--Anoch, Phallu, Assaron, Charmi. Simeon had six--Jamuel, Jamin, Avod, Jachin, Soar, Saul. Levi had three sons--Gersom, Caath, Merari. Judas had three sons-- Sala, Phares, Zerah; and by Phares two grandchildren, Esrom and Amar. Issachar had four sons--Thola, Phua, Jasob, Samaron. Zabulon had with him three sons--Sarad, Helon, Jalel. So far is the posterity of Lea; with whom went her daughter Dinah. These are thirty-three. Rachel had two sons, the one of whom, Joseph, had two sons also, Manasses and Ephraim. The other, Benjamin, had ten sons—Bolau, Bacchar, Asabel, Geras, Naaman, Jes, Ros, Momphis, Opphis, Arad. These fourteen added to the thirty-three before enumerated, amount to the number forty-seven. And this was the legitimate posterity of Jacob. He had besides by Bilhah, the handmaid of Rachel, Dan and Nephtliali; which last had four sons that followed him— Jesel, Guni, Issari, and Sellim. Dan had an only begotten son, Usi. If these be added to those before mentioned, they complete the number fifty-four. Gad and Aser were the sons of Zilpha, who was the handmaid of Lea. These had with them, Gad seven— Saphoniah, Augis, Sunis, Azabon, Aerin, Erocd, Ariel. Aser had a daughter, Sarah, and six male children, whose names were Jomne, Isus, Isoui, Baris, Abar and Melchiel. If we add these, which are sixteen, to the fifty-four, the forementioned number is completed Jacob not being himself included in that number.
Then did Ahab, and Jehoshaphat the king of Jerusalem, take their forces, and marched to Ramoth a city of Gilead; and when the king of Syria heard of this expedition, he brought out his army to oppose them, and pitched his camp not far from Ramoth. Now Ahab and Jehoshaphat had agreed that Ahab should lay aside his royal robes, but that the king of Jerusalem should put on his [Ahab's] proper habit, and stand before the army, in order to disprove, by this artifice, what Micaiah had foretold. But Ahab's fate found him out without his robes; for Benhadad, the king of Assyria, had charged his army, by the means of their commanders, to kill nobody else but only the king of Israel. So when the Syrians, upon their joining battle with the Israelites, saw Jehoshaphat stand before the army, and conjectured that he was Ahab, they fell violently upon him, and encompassed him round; but when they were near, and knew that it was not he, they all returned back; and while the fight lasted from the morning till late in the evening, and the Syrians were conquerors, they killed nobody, as their king had commanded them. And when they sought to kill Ahab alone, but could not find him, there was a young nobleman belonging to king Benhadad, whose name was Naaman; he drew his bow against the enemy, and wounded the king through his breastplate, in his lungs. Upon this Ahab resolved not to make his mischance known to his army, lest they should run away; but he bid the driver of his chariot to turn it back, and carry him out of the battle, because he was sorely and mortally wounded. However, he sat in his chariot and endured the pain till sunset, and then he fainted away and died.
Nicolaus added further what belonged to Antipater's mother, and whatsoever she had prattled like a woman; as also about the predictions and the sacrifices relating to the king; and whatsoever Antipater had done lasciviously in his cups and his amours among Pheroras's women; the examination upon torture; and whatsoever concerned the testimonies of the witnesses, which were many, and of various kinds; some prepared beforehand, and others were sudden answers, which further declared and confirmed the foregoing evidence. For those men who were not acquainted with Antipater's practices, but had concealed them out of fear, when they saw that he was exposed to the accusations of the former witnesses, and that his great good fortune, which had supported him hitherto, had now evidently betrayed him into the hands of his enemies, who were now insatiable in their hatred to him, told all they knew of him. And his ruin was now hastened, not so much by the enmity of those that were his accusers, as by his gross, and impudent, and wicked contrivances, and by his ill-will to his father and his brethren; while he had filled their house with disturbance, and caused them to murder one another; and was neither fair in his hatred, nor kind in his friendship, but just so far as served his own turn. Now there were a great number who for a long time beforehand had seen all this, and especially such as were naturally disposed to judge of matters by the rules of virtue, because they were used to determine about affairs without passion, but had been restrained from making any open complaints before; these, upon the leave now given them, produced all that they knew before the public. The demonstrations also of these wicked facts could no way be disproved, because the many witnesses there were did neither speak out of favor to Herod, nor were they obliged to keep what they had to say silent, out of suspicion of any danger they were in; but they spake what they knew, because they thought such actions very wicked, and that Antipater deserved the greatest punishment; and indeed not so much for Herod's safety, as on account of the man's own wickedness. Many things were also said, and those by a great number of persons, who were no way obliged to say them, insomuch that Antipater, who used generally to be very shrewd in his lies and impudence, was not able to say one word to the contrary. When Nicolaus had left off speaking, and had produced the evidence, Varus bid Antipater to betake himself to the making his defense, if he had prepared any thing whereby it might appear that he was not guilty of the crimes he was accused of; for that, as he was himself desirous, so did he know that his father was in like manner desirous also, to have him found entirely innocent. But Antipater fell down on his face, and appealed to God and to all men for testimonials of his innocency, desiring that God would declare, by some evident signals, that he had not laid any plot against his father. This being the usual method of all men destitute of virtue, that when they set about any wicked undertakings, they fall to work according to their own inclinations, as if they believed that God was unconcerned in human affairs; but when once they are found out, and are in danger of undergoing the punishment due to their crimes, they endeavor to overthrow all the evidence against them by appealing to God; which was the very thing which Antipater now did; for whereas he had done everything as if there were no God in the world, when he was on all sides distressed by justice, and when he had no other advantage to expect from any legal proofs, by which he might disprove the accusations laid against him, he impudently abused the majesty of God, and ascribed it to his power that he had been preserved hitherto; and produced before them all what difficulties he had ever undergone in his bold acting for his father's preservation.
This is Manetho's account. And evident it is from the number of years by him set down belonging to this interval, if they be summed up together, that these shepherds, as they are here called, who were no other than our forefathers, were delivered out of Egypt, and came thence, and inhabited this country, three hundred and ninety-three years before Danaus came to Argos; although the Argives look upon him as their most ancient king Manetho, therefore, hears this testimony to two points of the greatest consequence to our purpose, and those from the Egyptian records themselves. In the first place, that we came out of another country into Egypt; and that withal our deliverance out of it was so ancient in time as to have preceded the siege of Troy almost a thousand years; but then, as to those things which Manetbo adds, not from the Egyptian records, but, as he confesses himself, from some stories of an uncertain original, I will disprove them hereafter particularly, and shall demonstrate that they are no better than incredible fables.
The Jerusalem Talmud
The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: So did Rebbi Jehudah disprove Rebbi Meїr[’s argument]: Do you not concede to me that one who gives to his son is free? What is the difference between gathering and giving to his son or gathering and giving to another person? Rebbi Yudan asked: What did you see to say ‘if he gathers and delivers,’ can we not say ‘if he gathers and eats’? Rebbi Mana said, there cannot be “if he gathers and eats”, only “if he gathers and delivers,” because of that rose garden. Can you say the rose garden [is a case of] gathering and eating? No, gathering and delivering! There also, he gathers and delivers because he would say to him, if you enter you will damage its roses! A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Mana’s argument: “ ‘I am selling you the vineyard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no vines since he sells him [the real estate] by description. ‘I am selling you the orchard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no trees since he sells him [the real estate] by description.’ ”
Rebbi Jehudah came back and presented another argument: Leavened matter is forbidden as food and leftover is forbidden as food. Since the latter is to be burned, the former is to be burned. They told him, carcass meat disproves since it is forbidden as food and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food and for usufruct and leftover is forbidden as food and for usufruct; carcass meat does not disprove since it is not forbidden for usufruct. They told him, the stoned ox disproves which is forbidden as food and for usufruct and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, [and leftover is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation]; the stoned ox does not disprove since it does not make liable for extirpation. They told him, the fat of the stoned ox disproves which is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time, and leftover is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time; the fat of the stoned ox does not disprove since it does not depend on time. They told him, a suspended sacrifice following your opinion does disprove since it is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time, [but is not to be burned]. Rebbi Jehudah remained silent.
Rebbi Jehudah came back and presented another argument: Leavened matter is forbidden as food and leftover is forbidden as food. Since the latter is to be burned, the former is to be burned. They told him, carcass meat disproves since it is forbidden as food and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food and for usufruct and leftover is forbidden as food and for usufruct; carcass meat does not disprove since it is not forbidden for usufruct. They told him, the stoned ox disproves which is forbidden as food and for usufruct and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, [and leftover is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation]; the stoned ox does not disprove since it does not make liable for extirpation. They told him, the fat of the stoned ox disproves which is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time, and leftover is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time; the fat of the stoned ox does not disprove since it does not depend on time. They told him, a suspended sacrifice following your opinion does disprove since it is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time, [but is not to be burned]. Rebbi Jehudah remained silent.
Rebbi Jehudah came back and presented another argument: Leavened matter is forbidden as food and leftover is forbidden as food. Since the latter is to be burned, the former is to be burned. They told him, carcass meat disproves since it is forbidden as food and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food and for usufruct and leftover is forbidden as food and for usufruct; carcass meat does not disprove since it is not forbidden for usufruct. They told him, the stoned ox disproves which is forbidden as food and for usufruct and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, [and leftover is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation]; the stoned ox does not disprove since it does not make liable for extirpation. They told him, the fat of the stoned ox disproves which is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time, and leftover is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time; the fat of the stoned ox does not disprove since it does not depend on time. They told him, a suspended sacrifice following your opinion does disprove since it is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time, [but is not to be burned]. Rebbi Jehudah remained silent.
Rebbi Jehudah came back and presented another argument: Leavened matter is forbidden as food and leftover is forbidden as food. Since the latter is to be burned, the former is to be burned. They told him, carcass meat disproves since it is forbidden as food and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food and for usufruct and leftover is forbidden as food and for usufruct; carcass meat does not disprove since it is not forbidden for usufruct. They told him, the stoned ox disproves which is forbidden as food and for usufruct and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, [and leftover is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation]; the stoned ox does not disprove since it does not make liable for extirpation. They told him, the fat of the stoned ox disproves which is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is not to be burned. He said to them, leavened matter is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time, and leftover is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time; the fat of the stoned ox does not disprove since it does not depend on time. They told him, a suspended sacrifice following your opinion does disprove since it is forbidden as food, and for usufruct, and makes liable for extirpation, and is dependent on time, [but is not to be burned]. Rebbi Jehudah remained silent.
Rebbi Yose said, so should Rebbi Eliezer have embarrassed Rebbi Joshua. Does not the festival offering disprove according to your system, where they permitted the category of work but prohibited the category of Sabbath rest? He should have answered, no. If you are saying this about the festival offering about which one is not liable for extirpation, what can you say about Pesaḥ where one is liable for extirpation? He also could have objected as in the Mishnah: No, if you are saying this about the holiday about which one is not liable for extirpation, what can you say about Pesaḥ where one is liable for extirpation? It is as Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answers. Or it may be as Rebbi Nassa said, like a man who has two arguments but he moves one of them.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose says, one does not cover the Koy’s blood because it is a doubtful case.” Since circumcision whose certainty pushes aside the Sabbath, in doubt does not push aside the holiday, then for covering the blood which in case of certainty does not push aside the Sabbath it only is logical that in a case of doubt it not push aside the holiday. But is it permitted to slaughter on a Sabbath? Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he slaughtered for a sick person. They told him, does not the shofar in the countryside disprove it? For in case of certainty it does not push aside the Sabbath, but in a case of doubt it pushes aside the holiday. What kind of doubt is there? If it is a weekday, he may blow, if it is a holiday, he may blow. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: In case of a hermaphrodite who blew. And it was stated so: “The hermaphrodite frees his own kind [but does not free persons not of his own kind.] The sexless frees neither his kind nor not his kind.” Rebbi Yose asked, if in the case of a hermaphrodite who blew, is that where we stated, it has no counter argument? Rebbi (Abbaye) [Abbin] said, that is one of four cases when the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya said, there is no counter-argument. But Rebbi Eleazar the son of Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower found a counter-argument. Since circumcision which in a case of doubt does not push aside the holiday, in a case of certainty pushes aside holiday night, you can say about covering the blood where in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, since in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, in a case of doubt it should push aside the holiday. This establishes that what was problematic to the earlier rabbis and was difficult for them, so it is problematic to the later rabbis and is a difficulty for them. In the opinion of Rebbi Aḥa, the hermaphrodite frees his own kind a priori, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, a posteriori.
If it spread while in quarantine, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he needs birds. Rebbi Eleazar said, he does not need birds. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “From the sufferer from skin disease; to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds. Is that not a logical argument? If a person became pure and the signs of what made him impure are not on him shall need birds, (should not) [is it not logical that] one who became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him [shall] need birds? [But] the one on whom it was stable for two weeks shall disprove it, since he became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him, but he does not need birds. So do not wonder if one on whom it spread while in quarantine and the signs of what made him impure are on him does not need birds. The verse says, from the sufferer of skin disease to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds.” If you would say that one becoming pure in quarantine does not need birds, should he not have objected that it would have been better to argue spreading against spreadings and not staying stable against spreadings? Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis: the baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan since the Tanna answers his colleague, no. If you are saying about this one who never was up to be declared absolute, what can you say about the one who was to be declared absolute? Because he was to be declared absolute, he needs birds. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the closing statement supports Rebbi Eleazar. The one becoming pure in quarantine is not liable for torn clothing, and untended hair, and shaving, and birds. All of this is what we are considering here, about spreadings. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, all they are disagreeing is about bringing birds. But in the matter of bringing a sacrifice everybody agrees that he does not bring a sacrifice. It was stated thus: On the seventh he has to shave, on the eighth he shall bring; one who needs shaving brings a sacrifice, one who does not need shaving does not bring a sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: All days on which the skin disease is on him he will be impure, one whose impurity is caused by his skin disease. This excludes him whose (purity) [impurity] depends on the count of his days. So far torn clothing and unkempt hair. From where shaving and birds? Rebbi Eleazar the Southerner in the name of Rebbi Shammai: This shall be the doctrine of the sufferer from skin disease on the day. One who may become impure and pure on one day; this excludes one who cannot become impure and pure on one day.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.