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12645 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Jeremiah intercalated outside the Land. Ezechiel intercalated outside the Land. Baruch intercalated outside the Land. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua intercalated outside the Land. Rebbi sent him three letters through Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan. In one he wrote, to His holiness Ḥanania. And in one he wrote, the kid goats you left behind became rams. And in one he wrote, if you do not accept, go to the thistle desert, do slaughter and let Onias sprinkle. After the first [letter], he honored them. After the second, he honored them. After the third, he wanted to disgrace them. They said to him, you cannot do that since you already did honor us. Rebbi Isaac rose and quoted, it is written in the Torah: These are the holidays of Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. They said to him, “the holdays of the Eternal”. He said to them, that is with us. Rebbi Nathan rose and finished: “For from Babylonia will go Torah forth and the Eternal’s word from Nahar-Peqod.” They said to him, “for from Zion will Torah go forth and the Eternal’s word from Jerusalem”. He said to them, that is with us. He went to complain about them to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis. He said to him, follow them, follow them. He said to him, I do not know whom I left there. Who would tell me that they are wise to the computations as I am? If he had said, they are not wise, they should listen to him. Since they are wise to the computations as he is, he has to listen to them. He got up and rode on a horse. Where he reached, he reached. Where he did not reach, they continued following the corrupt [calendar].
Everybody agrees that a person who vows to forbid gourd to himself is permitted vegetables, as it was stated: A person who makes a vow to abstain from a main object is forbidden the peripherals; if he vows from the peripherals, he is permitted the main object. One who vows to abstain from meat is forbidden sinews, he who vows to abstain from sinews is permitted meat. Where do they disagree? About Egyptian gourd. But everybody agrees that Greek gourds are vegetables. Rebbi Crispus in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All sorts of gourd and cabbage which we eat are Greek gourds. Rebbi Jehudah bar Ṣeradia says, qarmals are vegetables. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose asked, are qarmals subject to tithes? Bar Qappara stated, qarmals are free from tithes. That is, as long as they did not form gourds; but when they formed gourds they are like vegetables. Rebbi Yose instructed that it is forbidden to sip water from colocasia leaves because they are food for deer.
He who makes a vow not to use bread or produce is forbidden them, the words of Rebbi Meїr. Therefore, is he who makes a vow not to use bread or produce forbidden everything according to the rabbis? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is the Mishnah: “He who makes a vow not to use flour is only forbidden these.” How do we hold? If he uses “bread” in the biblical sense, then also if he says “produce” it is meant in the biblical sense. He should be forbidden everything since it is written (Deut. 22:9): “The produce of the vineyard.” If he simply says “bread”; only from wheat or barley is it simply called “bread”. Rebbi Yose said, I confirmed it, at a place where one eats bread from all [kinds], only from the five kinds it is simply called “bread”.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘Until Passover’, he is forbidden,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: The opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted. There, he says “until all the elder possibilities are exhausted, until all the younger possibilities are exhausted,” and here, he says so? He said to him: Since Ben Azai and Ben Zoma died, the perseverers disappeared; no perseverer was there until Jeremiah appeared. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said, why does he needle him? Did not Rebbi Eleazar already ask before Rebbi Joḥanan, the opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted? He said to him, it is not inverted, the Mishnah is inverted, for in the House of Rebbi they stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meїr says, until it passed, Rebbi Yose says, until it comes.” We ask “until before”, and you say so? He said to him, this is a Nabatean expression, “much before Passover”. Rebbi Abin said, everybody agrees that he is permitted on Passover. Where do they disagree? The day before Passover. One of them says, until it comes, the other until it passed.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Jehudah says, if one said ‘a qônām that I shall not taste wine until Passover has come’, he is forbidden only until the night of Passover since he intended only until the time everybody drinks wine. If one said, “a qônām that I shall not taste meat until the fast,’ he is forbidden only until the evening before the fast since he intended only until the time everybody eats meat. His son Rebbi Yose said, if one said ‘a qônām that I shall not taste garlic until the Sabbath,’ he is forbidden only until Friday evening, since he intended only until the time everybody eats garlic. If one says to his friend: A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you if you do not come and take for your children a kor of wheat and two amphoras of wine, he can undo his vow without referring to a Sage by saying, you did that only to honor me, that is my honor. Similarly, if one says to his friend: A qônām that you shall not have any usufruct from me if you do not come and give to my child a kor of wheat and two amphoras of wine. Rebbi Meïr says, he is forbidden until he gives, but the Sages say, this one also can undo his vow without referring to a Sage by saying, it is as if I received it.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Jehudah says, if one said ‘a qônām that I shall not taste wine until Passover has come’, he is forbidden only until the night of Passover since he intended only until the time everybody drinks wine. If one said, “a qônām that I shall not taste meat until the fast,’ he is forbidden only until the evening before the fast since he intended only until the time everybody eats meat. His son Rebbi Yose said, if one said ‘a qônām that I shall not taste garlic until the Sabbath,’ he is forbidden only until Friday evening, since he intended only until the time everybody eats garlic. If one says to his friend: A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you if you do not come and take for your children a kor of wheat and two amphoras of wine, he can undo his vow without referring to a Sage by saying, you did that only to honor me, that is my honor. Similarly, if one says to his friend: A qônām that you shall not have any usufruct from me if you do not come and give to my child a kor of wheat and two amphoras of wine. Rebbi Meïr says, he is forbidden until he gives, but the Sages say, this one also can undo his vow without referring to a Sage by saying, it is as if I received it.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The first case also is in dispute. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree when it was undetermined. Where do we hold? If each one of them said, because of my honor, everybody agrees that he is forbidden. If one of them said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor, everybody agrees he is permitted. But we hold if it is undetermined. Rebbi says, undetermined is as if [every] one said, because of my honor. But the Sages say, undetermined is as if one said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor.
Rebbi Yasa asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Is our Mishnah from Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, since Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, any obstacle that is not from her side does not invalidate the bill of divorce? He said to him, here it is different because of opening the vow. Rebbi Yose said, but do we not deal with vows which do not need dissolution by a Sage? Rebbi Jonah said, we deal not only with one who made his vow dependent on something. So far it is if he wants to give him something. But in the case that he does not want to give to him, he can say, I wanted only to examine you; but since I saw that it gives you pain, it is as if I had received.
Rebbi Yasa asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Is our Mishnah from Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, since Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, any obstacle that is not from her side does not invalidate the bill of divorce? He said to him, here it is different because of opening the vow. Rebbi Yose said, but do we not deal with vows which do not need dissolution by a Sage? Rebbi Jonah said, we deal not only with one who made his vow dependent on something. So far it is if he wants to give him something. But in the case that he does not want to give to him, he can say, I wanted only to examine you; but since I saw that it gives you pain, it is as if I had received.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Since you say, one opens for him by the honor of his father and mother; in things between him and the Omnipresent, one does not open for him by the honor of the Omnipresent. But since in matters between him and his father and mother one opens for him by the honor of his father and mother; similarly, in things between him and the Omnipresent should one not open for him by the honor of the Omnipresent? What is the honor of the Omnipresent? For example, that I shall not make a tabernacle, that I shall not take a lulab, that I shall not put on phylacteries. One understands that he does it for his own benefit. As in the following: “If you are just, what are you giving Him?” “If you sinned, what would you do to Him?” Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. What is the reason? “In yourself there shall be no alien force; do not bow down to a foreign god.”
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Since you say, one opens for him by the honor of his father and mother; in things between him and the Omnipresent, one does not open for him by the honor of the Omnipresent. But since in matters between him and his father and mother one opens for him by the honor of his father and mother; similarly, in things between him and the Omnipresent should one not open for him by the honor of the Omnipresent? What is the honor of the Omnipresent? For example, that I shall not make a tabernacle, that I shall not take a lulab, that I shall not put on phylacteries. One understands that he does it for his own benefit. As in the following: “If you are just, what are you giving Him?” “If you sinned, what would you do to Him?” Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. What is the reason? “In yourself there shall be no alien force; do not bow down to a foreign god.”
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is as if he put a neck-iron on his neck, would you have made the vow? It is as if a gang of prisoners was passing by, he saw that there was one unused neck-iron and put his head into it! “To bind a prohibition onto himself”, as you say, “he was bound with chains.” Rebbi Jonathan provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who builds an idolatrous altar and one who continues in it is like one who sacrifices there, would you have made the vow? That is difficult to understand. Idolatry is a capital crime but vows are a simple prohibition; how can you say that? You have only what Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. Rebbi Isaac provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who takes a sword and sticks it in his heart, would you have made the vow? “Some talk bluntly like sword piercings.” Rebbi Ḥanina from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Phineas: It does not say “piercing” but “sword piercings”. For example, one who made a vow not to eat a loaf. Woe if he eats, woe if he does not eat. If he eats he transgresses his vow. If he does not eat he sins against himself. What can he do? He goes to a Sage who will dissolve his vow, “but the speech of Sages is healing. Rebbi Eudaimon in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Is it not enough what the Torah forbade you that you want to forbid other things for yourself? “To forbid a prohibition”.
Rebbi Joḥanan provided an opening by having second thoughts: “If it were not for that, would he have come?” Are second thoughts not something new? Rebbi Hila said, second thoughts are a common occurrence. In this kind, Rebbi Simeon did not find an opening for his own vow until one of the Galilean Elders came; some say, that one was Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. He took him from here and put him there; he took him from here and put him there, until finally he put him into the sun and told him to check his garments for fleas. They said to him, if you had known that this old man would treat you in such a way, would you have made the vow? He said, No. He permitted him. They asked, from where do you have this? He said to them, I was Meïr’s servant both times when he fled, but some say, Rebbi Meïr’s walking stick was in my hand and it teaches me knowledge.
Rebbi Jeremiah had his vow dissolved but kept it. Whether it was because he did not trust him who dissolved it, we do not know. Whether it was because one has urges only for things forbidden to oneself, we do not know. When Rebbi Jeremiah was not in the mood to judge, he said, my eyes are weak. “Following their pronouncements shall be all quarrels and all disfiguration.” This compares quarrels to disfigurations. Since disfigurations are “for all the Cohen sees”, so also quarrels are “for all the Cohen sees”.
Rebbi Jeremiah had his vow dissolved but kept it. Whether it was because he did not trust him who dissolved it, we do not know. Whether it was because one has urges only for things forbidden to oneself, we do not know. When Rebbi Jeremiah was not in the mood to judge, he said, my eyes are weak. “Following their pronouncements shall be all quarrels and all disfiguration.” This compares quarrels to disfigurations. Since disfigurations are “for all the Cohen sees”, so also quarrels are “for all the Cohen sees”.
Rebbi Mana made a vow away from his father’s wine. His father came to him and said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that I am hurt by it? He said, no. He dissolved for him. Where do we hold? If he said, my benefit [is forbidden] to my father; is that not what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: One forces the son to support his father. But we must hold that he said, my father’s benefit [is forbidden] to me. Rebbi Mana made a vow and came to Rebbi Shammai, who said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that people do not want to deal with you since you are a vower? He said, no, and he dissolved for him.
Rebbi Mana made a vow away from his father’s wine. His father came to him and said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that I am hurt by it? He said, no. He dissolved for him. Where do we hold? If he said, my benefit [is forbidden] to my father; is that not what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: One forces the son to support his father. But we must hold that he said, my father’s benefit [is forbidden] to me. Rebbi Mana made a vow and came to Rebbi Shammai, who said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that people do not want to deal with you since you are a vower? He said, no, and he dissolved for him.
HALAKHAH: “One creates an opening for a man with his wife’s ketubah” etc. Does one collect from movables? Rebbi Abba said, even if one could say, one collects from movables, one tells him to pay. Rebbi Manisha asked, could one tell the heirs to collect from pledged property? Rebbi Abba Mari said, the Mishnah says that one does not say so, as we have stated there: “It should be given to the heirs since everybody has to swear but the heirs do not have to swear.” What does one make her swear? There, they say, from straw I did not collect, from his person I did collect.
MISHNAH: One finds an opening for a man with his own honor and that of his children. One tells him, if you had known that tomorrow one will say of you, it is the habit of this man to divorce his wife, and about your daughters one will say, they are daughters of a divorcee, what did the mother of these do to get herself divorced? If he said, if I had known that it is so I would not have made the vow, then it is dissolved.
It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.
It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.
“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say, the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night. How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night, he became paralyzed, and then his power of speech returned. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day. If he became paralyzed, and later his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.
There, we have stated: “One dissolves vows on the Sabbath.” It was stated: Both vows that intrude on the Sabbath and vows that do not intrude on the Sabbath. “And one asks about vows that intrude on the Sabbath,” therefore not if there is no need for the Sabbath. The Elder can dissolve the next day. Then for Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon who say that the dissolution of vows is from time to time, he should not dissolve even vows that intrude on the Sabbath! Explain it according to everybody, if she made the vow at the start of Friday night.
It was stated: One is asked about vows only while sitting and wrapped. The one who is asked must be sitting and the one who is asking is standing; from the following: “And the two people who have the dispute shall stand.” “Standing” means only “being judged”. That is for asking legal rules. Asking about sermons from where? The verse says “shall stand, and shall stand”. Rebbi Aḥa bar Pappus went to permit the vow of Rebbi Immi. He remained standing to say “there is no vow”. Rebbi Mana went to permit the vow of the older Gamliel. He remained standing to say “there is no vow, there is no oath”. Rebbi Mana went to permit the vow of Gamliel the grandson. He said to him, do not treat me as you treated my grandfather, but sit down and I shall remain standing.
MISHNAH: These are the vows which he may dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], “if I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.” Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification.
MISHNAH: These are the vows which he may dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], “if I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.” Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification.
Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”
Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”
Rebbi Hila explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ ” What means “Rebbi Yose said, these vows are not vows of mortification”? They are vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” is everybody’s opinion.
Rebbi Hila explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ ” What means “Rebbi Yose said, these vows are not vows of mortification”? They are vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” is everybody’s opinion.
“If I wash, if I do not wash.” It was stated: “If I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels”, these are vows of mortification. Both according to Rebbi Ze‘ira or according to Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose seems to contradict his own opinion, as it was stated: “A water source belonging to the townspeople, between them and outsiders, they have precedence over outsiders. Between outsiders and their animals, the outsiders have precedence over their animals. Their washing and the lives of outsiders, their washing has precedence over the lives of outsiders.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, who is the Tanna who said that washing is a necessity for survival? Rebbi Yose! As it was stated: “One may use it neither for steeping nor for washing. But Rebbi Yose permits it for washing.” The opinions of Rebbi Yose are contradictory. There he says, washing oneself is not a necessity of life. And here, he says washing one’s garments is a necessity of life! Rebbi Mana said, a person might put off washing himself but nobody puts off washing his clothes.
“If I wash, if I do not wash.” It was stated: “If I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels”, these are vows of mortification. Both according to Rebbi Ze‘ira or according to Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose seems to contradict his own opinion, as it was stated: “A water source belonging to the townspeople, between them and outsiders, they have precedence over outsiders. Between outsiders and their animals, the outsiders have precedence over their animals. Their washing and the lives of outsiders, their washing has precedence over the lives of outsiders.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, who is the Tanna who said that washing is a necessity for survival? Rebbi Yose! As it was stated: “One may use it neither for steeping nor for washing. But Rebbi Yose permits it for washing.” The opinions of Rebbi Yose are contradictory. There he says, washing oneself is not a necessity of life. And here, he says washing one’s garments is a necessity of life! Rebbi Mana said, a person might put off washing himself but nobody puts off washing his clothes.
“If I wash, if I do not wash.” It was stated: “If I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels”, these are vows of mortification. Both according to Rebbi Ze‘ira or according to Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose seems to contradict his own opinion, as it was stated: “A water source belonging to the townspeople, between them and outsiders, they have precedence over outsiders. Between outsiders and their animals, the outsiders have precedence over their animals. Their washing and the lives of outsiders, their washing has precedence over the lives of outsiders.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, who is the Tanna who said that washing is a necessity for survival? Rebbi Yose! As it was stated: “One may use it neither for steeping nor for washing. But Rebbi Yose permits it for washing.” The opinions of Rebbi Yose are contradictory. There he says, washing oneself is not a necessity of life. And here, he says washing one’s garments is a necessity of life! Rebbi Mana said, a person might put off washing himself but nobody puts off washing his clothes.
We understand “if I wash”. “If I do not wash”? Let her wash! Rebbi Mana said, if she said: “Any benefit from me shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself, if I ever wash myself.” Why should he not dissolve for her? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, only when she said, “any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself.” Why can he not force? Did not Rebbi Huna say, [if she vowed] any benefit from me [shall be forbidden] to you, he forces her and sleeps with her. Any benefit from you [shall be forbidden] to me, he has to dissolve. There is a difference because it is a benefit for him and her. Rebbi Abba Mari said, If I wash [today], I shall not wash forever. If I wear jewellery [today], I shall not wear jewellery forever. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Nasa: If I wash I shall not wear jewellery; if I wear jewellery I shall not wash.
HALAKHAH: “If a person is by a vow prevented to benefit his son-in-law,” etc. It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meĩr, for Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. Because he said “neither do you.” If he had not said “neither do you”, if the wife acquired, the husband would have acquired.
HALAKHAH: “If a person is by a vow prevented to benefit his son-in-law,” etc. It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meĩr, for Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. Because he said “neither do you.” If he had not said “neither do you”, if the wife acquired, the husband would have acquired.
HALAKHAH: “If a person is by a vow prevented to benefit his son-in-law,” etc. It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meĩr, for Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. Because he said “neither do you.” If he had not said “neither do you”, if the wife acquired, the husband would have acquired.
HALAKHAH: “If a person is by a vow prevented to benefit his son-in-law,” etc. It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meĩr, for Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. Because he said “neither do you.” If he had not said “neither do you”, if the wife acquired, the husband would have acquired.
MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not take any benefit from my father, or your father, if I shall do anything for you.’ ‘[A qônām] that I shall not have any benefit from you if I shall do anything for my father, or for your father.’ These he can dissolve.
MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not take any benefit from my father, or your father, if I shall do anything for you.’ ‘[A qônām] that I shall not have any benefit from you if I shall do anything for my father, or for your father.’ These he can dissolve.
It was stated: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows, and one whips because of them.” Even though Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions, he agrees in this case that he is whipped. Even though Rebbi Simeon said, he does not bring a sacrifice, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Even though Rebbi Jehudah said, a questionable nazir vow is permitted, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Where do we hold? If he has the intention of becoming a nazir, even if he only said, I shall be a nazir if I mention bread, he is a nazir. Similarly, if he had no intention of becoming a nazir, even if he mentioned nazir, he is no nazir; for example if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq. But we hold about one who says, I declared my vow of nazir by any of these expressions. If one of them is a valid expression of a vow of nazir, it will fall on him, otherwise, will the vow of nazir not fall on him? One tells him: keep the discipline.
“Or I shall be beautiful”. Where do we hold? If he said “beautiful”, is that not the previous case? When he grabs his hair, is that not what we have stated: “I shall be like this one”, following Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina who holds that “I shall be like this one” refers to the case that he is grabbing his hair. But we must hold that he says, “there is nothing more beautiful than this”.
“Naziq,naziaḥ,paziq”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are expressions chosen by earlier generations and nobody has the right to add to them. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: raziaḥ,haziaḥ? Rebbi Shila said, also to expressions chosen by earlier secondary ones nobody has the right to add. But did not Bar Qappara state ḥeres? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is a name relating to the High One: “If He commands the sun: would it not shine?”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, these are Gentile words, like those Nabateans who say khaspa for ḥaspa. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable in other places, but in a place where the nazir is called naziq, do I say that a nazir of people with speech defects should not be a nazir?
“I am” is a handle for nezirut, “I am obligated” is a handle for qorban. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: one catches him because of a handle for qorbān. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, if he said, I shall not eat from you, does one catch him because of a handle of an oath? Rebbi Yose said, people usually say “an oath that I shall not eat from yours;” do they ever say “that I shall not eat from yours, an oath”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, people usually say “handle of an axe”; do they ever say “axe of a handle”?
“I am” is a handle for nezirut, “I am obligated” is a handle for qorban. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: one catches him because of a handle for qorbān. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, if he said, I shall not eat from you, does one catch him because of a handle of an oath? Rebbi Yose said, people usually say “an oath that I shall not eat from yours;” do they ever say “that I shall not eat from yours, an oath”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, people usually say “handle of an axe”; do they ever say “axe of a handle”?
From here, “if his hair became heavy”: Rebbi. For Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Immi: The words of Rebbi: A nazir in perpetuity shaves once in twelve months. The words of the Sages: A nazir in perpetuity sometimes shaves every thirty days, sometimes once in twelve months. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Assi: It says so: “I am a nazir like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea. He is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days. Rebbi says, this one does not shave every thirty days,” but once in twelve months. “Who is one who shaves every thirty days? If he says, I am obligated for nezirut like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they differ if it was not made explicit. Where do we hold? If he says, “the fullness of my hair”, everybody agrees that he shaves once every thirty days. If he says, “the number of the hairs on my head,” everybody agrees that he shaves after twelve months. But we must hold that he says “like hair”. Rebbi says, “the fullness of my hair”. But the rabbis say, he means “the number of the hairs on my head.” And here, why? Why did the man not make the vow? He only encourages himself to avoid prohibitions. In addition, from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah added: If he said, like that which is collected in the fig harvest, or like sheaves in a Sabbatical year, or like stars in the sky, he is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days.” Could you say that Rebbi Jehudah follows the rabbis? He holds with Rebbi, as Rebbi Jehudah added: “Absalom was a nazir in perpetuity and shaved every twelve months.” What is the reason? Because of nezirut. But that would mean for the rabbis that he shaved every thirty days; that is what we have stated: “I am a nazir the house full, or a chest full. One checks him out.” It was stated on that: He shaves every thirty days. But here he said, he shaved every twelve months.
Rav said: “I am a nazir for 30 days and one day,” he is a nazir twice since he could have said “31 days”. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “I shall be a nazir [and] one day, I shall be a nazir [and] one hour, I shall be a nazir one and a half times, he is a nazir two times.” What could he have said, “30, and an hour”? A baraita disagrees with the rabbis: Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba did not disagree about one who said, “I am a nazir 30 days and one day,” that he is a nazir only once. Where do they disagree? About one who said, “I am a nazir 30 days and in addition one day,” where Rebbi Ismael said, he is a nazir twice, but Rebbi Aqiba said, he is a nazir only once.
HALAKHAH: “ “I am a nazir from here to place X,” etc. Where do we hold? If in the count of a solar year, 365 neziriot following the count of a solar year. If in the count of a lunar year, 354 neziriot following the count of a lunar year. But “the count of the days of a year” is problematic.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: If he said “I am obligated for the sacrifices of a nazir,” might he make the vow of nazir in the future?If he made the vow without explaining, he may shave any nazir, whether he already made the vow or whether he would make it in the future. If he explained? It can be compared to the following, as Rebbi Levi ben Ḥayyata asked: If he wrote to her, “I shall have nothing to do with the properties which you might inherit in the future.” May a person make a condition on things not yet in existence?
HALAKHAH: “If his wife had a miscarriage,” etc. Should one not be afraid that he might have been viable? Rebbi Joḥanan said, [the Mishnah] is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, any doubt of nezirut is permitted. It was said to him that Rebbi Jehudah said so only for the end; but for the start even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. What is beginning and what is end? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbu Abun said: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac disagreed: Everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Where do they disagree? If it was once or twice. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba considered it the end, Rebbi Samuel considered it the beginning. Rebbi Mana: The problem for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac about one or two times is whether it is the beginning or the end.
HALAKHAH: “If his wife had a miscarriage,” etc. Should one not be afraid that he might have been viable? Rebbi Joḥanan said, [the Mishnah] is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, any doubt of nezirut is permitted. It was said to him that Rebbi Jehudah said so only for the end; but for the start even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. What is beginning and what is end? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbu Abun said: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac disagreed: Everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Where do they disagree? If it was once or twice. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba considered it the end, Rebbi Samuel considered it the beginning. Rebbi Mana: The problem for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac about one or two times is whether it is the beginning or the end.
HALAKHAH: “If his wife had a miscarriage,” etc. Should one not be afraid that he might have been viable? Rebbi Joḥanan said, [the Mishnah] is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, any doubt of nezirut is permitted. It was said to him that Rebbi Jehudah said so only for the end; but for the start even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. What is beginning and what is end? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbu Abun said: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac disagreed: Everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Where do they disagree? If it was once or twice. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba considered it the end, Rebbi Samuel considered it the beginning. Rebbi Mana: The problem for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac about one or two times is whether it is the beginning or the end.
If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody vowed two neziriot,” etc. If he finished his first period of nezirut and started to lean on the second, when they did not find an opening for the first while they found an opening for the second, the second can be used for the first. Where do we hold? If he said, “I am a nazir twice,” a vow which is partially annulled is totally annulled. If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. But we must hold that he said, “I am a nazir and nazir.” If he said, “these are for nezirut.” But if he said, “these are for my nezirut; those are for the other nezirut,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. Rebbi Eleazar said, if he finished the first nezirut, as soon as he brought a sacrifice and shaved, the first is credited for the second. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa commanded the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees: not unless he brings all his sacrifices, following the rabbis; but following Rebbi Simeon even if he brings only one sacrifice. If he dedicated both together, he has only one in his hand. If he dedicated each of them separately or brought each of them for the other, he did not acquit himself [of his obligation]. This means that as far as holiness goes, they became holy. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “His sacrifice to the Eternal for his nezirut,” i. e., that his vow of nazir should precede his sacrifice, rather than that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. It is different, because he still is in nezirut. One understands the second for the first. The first for the second? Rebbi Jehudah said, this supports Rebbi Eleazar. But did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa command the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees; not unless he brings all his sacrifices. They wanted to say, following the rabbis. But here, we hold with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Explain it for his nezirut and the nezirut he pledged for his son. In that, the second can be used for the first. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, did we not argue about one who said, “I am a nazir”? He really should be a nazir only once. You were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice. Is it not enough that you were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice, that now you say, he has nothing in his hands?
If he is still there, Rebbi Joḥanan said, one warns him about everything for every possible leaving, and he is whipped. Rebbi Eleazar said, he does not accept [warning] unless he leaves and returns. Rebbi Abba said: So did Rebbi Joḥanan answer Rebbi Eleazar: Is it not written, “he shall not come” and “he may not defile himself”? He said to him, if they warned him because of “he shall not come”, he is whipped; because of “he shall not defile himself” he is not whipped. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned from prostrating, as we have stated there: “If he prostrated himself or stayed there long enough to prostrate himself.” Rebbi Mattaniah said, we thought that was where they do disagree? About lashes, but not about a sacrifice. Since Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned from prostrating, that means that lashes and sacrifices are one and the same. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A nazir who drank wine the entire day is guilty only once.” He explains it, that his throat was never empty. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he was defiling himself for the dead the entire day, he is guilty only once.” He explains it about one who waits before every leaving, who is whipped. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If a Cohen was standing in a cemetery and they were handing another corpse to him, could he accept? The verse says, “the husband shall be defiled for his family.” If he accepted it, I could think that he was guilty. The verse says, “to be profaned”. One who adds impurity to the impurity; that excludes him who does not add impurity to his impurity. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Neḥemiah said, “to be profaned”, that excludes him who does not add impurity to his impurity, lest he say, because I became defiled for my father I may go and collect the bones of X. “To be profaned”, at the time of death; Rebbi said, also “in their death.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree. It follows that Rebbi Simeon bar Abba follows Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. When Simeon bar Abba was dying, he said, this should be taken out here, that should be taken out there.
Ulla bar Ismael said, what is his problem? Of an impure nazir. But for a pure nazir, even Rebbi Eliezer agrees if he has nothing to omit. Samuel bar Abba asked: May one day of his nezirut and one day of nezirut for his son be combined? Where do we hold? If his son was born today and tomorrow he enters, he has two days for his nezirut. If his son was born the next day and he enters the next day, he has two days for his son’s nezirut! Rebbi Mana said, explain it at twilight. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say in the middle of the day, did we not intend to say that the start of the day is counted for him, the end of the day is counted for his son?
HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
It was stated: “Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba do not disagree about a person about whom two groups of witnesses testify, that he should be nazir according to the minimal testimony. Where do they disagree? About two witnesses, where the House of Shammai say, the testimony is split and there is no nezirut, but the House of Hillel say, five contains two and he shall be a nazir twice.”
It was stated: “Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba do not disagree about a person about whom two groups of witnesses testify, that he should be nazir according to the minimal testimony. Where do they disagree? About two witnesses, where the House of Shammai say, the testimony is split and there is no nezirut, but the House of Hillel say, five contains two and he shall be a nazir twice.”
What about, “and so am I,” how do you treat this? As “amen, it is confirmed for you,” or “you did well”? The elder [Rebbi] Ḥiyya and the elder Rebbi Hoshaia. It is stated: If a woman made a vow to be anazir; her husband heard and said to her, “why did you make a vow of nazir? What did you do to make a vow of nazir? I would not like that you made a vow of nazir! There is neither vow nor oath here;” he did not say anything. But if he said, “you did well that you did make a vow of nazir; I liked that you did make a vow of nazir; if you had not made a vow of nazir I would have told you to make one”, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated on this, in all of these cases he cannot dissolve. But Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In all these cases, he can dissolve unless he said “amen” or “it is confirmed for you”, then he can no longer dissolve.
What about, “and so am I,” how do you treat this? As “amen, it is confirmed for you,” or “you did well”? The elder [Rebbi] Ḥiyya and the elder Rebbi Hoshaia. It is stated: If a woman made a vow to be anazir; her husband heard and said to her, “why did you make a vow of nazir? What did you do to make a vow of nazir? I would not like that you made a vow of nazir! There is neither vow nor oath here;” he did not say anything. But if he said, “you did well that you did make a vow of nazir; I liked that you did make a vow of nazir; if you had not made a vow of nazir I would have told you to make one”, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated on this, in all of these cases he cannot dissolve. But Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In all these cases, he can dissolve unless he said “amen” or “it is confirmed for you”, then he can no longer dissolve.
It was stated: They need neither bread nor foreleg. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Do well-being sacrifices which are brought after death need bread? He turned around and said, is it not the same during his lifetime, do they not come for nothing? You say, they need bread, and here they need bread. Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya that well-being sacrifices which are brought after dissolution do not need bread. What is the difference between death and dissolution? In the case of death, they already were prepared to need bread; In the case of dissolution, they never were prepared to need bread. It was stated: There is a reparation sacrifice after dissolution; there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If she died, her reparation sacrifice is not offered, since there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If he dissolved for her, her reparation sacrifice is offered since that reparation sacrifice does not come for nothing.
It was stated: They need neither bread nor foreleg. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Do well-being sacrifices which are brought after death need bread? He turned around and said, is it not the same during his lifetime, do they not come for nothing? You say, they need bread, and here they need bread. Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya that well-being sacrifices which are brought after dissolution do not need bread. What is the difference between death and dissolution? In the case of death, they already were prepared to need bread; In the case of dissolution, they never were prepared to need bread. It was stated: There is a reparation sacrifice after dissolution; there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If she died, her reparation sacrifice is not offered, since there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If he dissolved for her, her reparation sacrifice is offered since that reparation sacrifice does not come for nothing.
It was stated: They need neither bread nor foreleg. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Do well-being sacrifices which are brought after death need bread? He turned around and said, is it not the same during his lifetime, do they not come for nothing? You say, they need bread, and here they need bread. Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya that well-being sacrifices which are brought after dissolution do not need bread. What is the difference between death and dissolution? In the case of death, they already were prepared to need bread; In the case of dissolution, they never were prepared to need bread. It was stated: There is a reparation sacrifice after dissolution; there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If she died, her reparation sacrifice is not offered, since there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If he dissolved for her, her reparation sacrifice is offered since that reparation sacrifice does not come for nothing.
Rebbi Aḥa: Rebbi Immi said that Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked: May his bird be eaten when its neck was broken? Instead of asking about a bird whose neck was broken, why do you not ask about a slaughtered bird? There is one doubt, here are two doubts. Rebbi Mani said, here also it is one doubt, as it was stated: One who perforates or tears out is not guilty because of profane slaughter in the Temple courtyard. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: There is not even one doubt, following him who says that slaughtering birds is not clear from the Torah: “They spread them a spread,” they spread out slaughtered [birds].
There, we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation, but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane. ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane. ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount.” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. But we are considering one who says “these.” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation. How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little, following the House of Hillel.
There, we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation, but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane. ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane. ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount.” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. But we are considering one who says “these.” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation. How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little, following the House of Hillel.
There, we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation, but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane. ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane. ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount.” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. But we are considering one who says “these.” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation. How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little, following the House of Hillel.
There, we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation, but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane. ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane. ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount.” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. But we are considering one who says “these.” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation. How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little, following the House of Hillel.
If somebody put aside his Temple tax in the belief that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, it was not dedicated. If he put aside two in the belief that he owed twice and it turned out that he owed only once, how do you treat the second? If he believed that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, [or as] if he said: “these”? If somebody put aside a purification sacrifice in the belief that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, it was not dedicated. If he put aside two in the belief that he owed two and it turned out that he owed only one, how do you treat the second? As if he believed that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, or as if he had said “these”?
If somebody put aside his Temple tax in the belief that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, it was not dedicated. If he put aside two in the belief that he owed twice and it turned out that he owed only once, how do you treat the second? If he believed that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, [or as] if he said: “these”? If somebody put aside a purification sacrifice in the belief that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, it was not dedicated. If he put aside two in the belief that he owed two and it turned out that he owed only one, how do you treat the second? As if he believed that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, or as if he had said “these”?
There, we have stated: “If somebody says, ‘I undertake [to bring] on a pan’ and he brought in a deep vessel, in a deep vessel and he brought on a pan.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This is the House of Shammai’s, since the House of Shammai say, “dedication in error is dedication.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yose: Why do we not explain it according to everybody, if he said, “I said, on a pan”? But if he said, “I undertake [to bring] on a pan,” and then he changed his mind and said, “in a deep vessel”, he fulfilled his duty. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said, “I undertake [to bring] on a pan or in a deep vessel,” turned around and said, “on a pan”, and turned around and said, “in a deep vessel”? Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Hama in the name of Rebbi Yose: He determines even orally. They thought to say, even holidays determine, even vessels determine.
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah follows his father’s method: If somebody dedicated unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple, he violates a positive commandment. Why also a prohibition? The verse says: “The Eternal spoke to Moses לאמר”: a prohibition was pronounced, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi was sitting and studying the rule that “a firstling cannot be substituted” when Bar Pedaiah’s father was passing by. Rebbi saw him, and said, do I know what I should say here, “the Eternal spoke to Moses לאמר,” could one explain the words of Rebbi Jehudah? Is it written thus? It follows what Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For interpretation, one removes from its beginning to its end. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Even a middle word. “You have to pour oil on.” You have to pour oil on a flour offering, to subject all flour offerings to pouring.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Aḥa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Everybody agrees that nobody can ask about his substitution. Where do they disagree? About his dedication; for the House of Shammai say, since a person cannot ask about his substitution, he cannot ask about his dedication, but the House of Hillel say, a person can ask about his dedication but not about his substitution.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Bar Qappara: You catch him at the mention of “ox”, at the mention of “first”. “The black ox which comes out of my house first,” if a white one came out and the black followed him, you catch him because he is the leader of the black ones. “The white ox which comes out of my house first,” if a black one came out and the white followed him, you catch him because he is the leader of the white ones. “The ox which stands at the manger” and it was lying down, “lying down” and it was standing, should be like what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he wanted to give heave from wheat and he gave from barley, during nighttime he did not do anything, during daytime, what he did is done. Brown grain and it turned out to be white, even during daytime he did not do anything. “A ram” is nothing. “A calf” yes, since it is written: “A calf of cattle as purification offering.” “A sheep” is nothing. “Tetradrachmas” is nothing. “Change” is nothing. “A gold denar” was sanctified.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Bar Qappara: You catch him at the mention of “ox”, at the mention of “first”. “The black ox which comes out of my house first,” if a white one came out and the black followed him, you catch him because he is the leader of the black ones. “The white ox which comes out of my house first,” if a black one came out and the white followed him, you catch him because he is the leader of the white ones. “The ox which stands at the manger” and it was lying down, “lying down” and it was standing, should be like what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he wanted to give heave from wheat and he gave from barley, during nighttime he did not do anything, during daytime, what he did is done. Brown grain and it turned out to be white, even during daytime he did not do anything. “A ram” is nothing. “A calf” yes, since it is written: “A calf of cattle as purification offering.” “A sheep” is nothing. “Tetradrachmas” is nothing. “Change” is nothing. “A gold denar” was sanctified.
MISHNAH: A person who made a vow of nazir, asked the Sages and they forbade, counts from the moment of his vow. If he asked the Sages and they permitted, if he had an animal designated, it leaves and grazes with the herd. The house of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that this is dedication in error, it leaves and grazes in the herd? The House of Shammai anwered, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified? The House of Hillel anwered, not the staff sanctified it, for if he erred and put his staff on the eighth or the twelth, did he do anything? But the verse which sanctified the tenth sanctified the ninth and the eleventh.
MISHNAH: A person who made a vow of nazir, asked the Sages and they forbade, counts from the moment of his vow. If he asked the Sages and they permitted, if he had an animal designated, it leaves and grazes with the herd. The house of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that this is dedication in error, it leaves and grazes in the herd? The House of Shammai anwered, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified? The House of Hillel anwered, not the staff sanctified it, for if he erred and put his staff on the eighth or the twelth, did he do anything? But the verse which sanctified the tenth sanctified the ninth and the eleventh.
MISHNAH: A person who made a vow of nazir, asked the Sages and they forbade, counts from the moment of his vow. If he asked the Sages and they permitted, if he had an animal designated, it leaves and grazes with the herd. The house of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that this is dedication in error, it leaves and grazes in the herd? The House of Shammai anwered, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified? The House of Hillel anwered, not the staff sanctified it, for if he erred and put his staff on the eighth or the twelth, did he do anything? But the verse which sanctified the tenth sanctified the ninth and the eleventh.
HALAKHAH: “A person who made a vow of nazir,” etc. It was stated: The House of Shammai say, from the moment he asked; but the House of Hillel say, from the moment he vowed. Where do we hold? If he scoffed at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he asked. If he did not scoff at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he vowed. But we have to deal with one who is going to ask. The House of Shammai say, since he decided to ask, he is now scoffing. But the House of Hillel say, if he were scoffing, he would not ask. If he made a vow of nazir and scoffed at his vow, one does not let him ask about it unless he kept its prohibitions for the number of days he did not keep the prohibitions, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yasa said, when has this been said? If he vowed a lengthy period. But if he vowed a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. What is the difference between a lengthy and a short period? But it must be: When has this been said? If he scoffed at his vow for a lengthy period. But if he scoffed at his vow for a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. Where are we holding? If he scoffed in impurity, everybody agrees that he invalidated everything. If he scoffed in shaving, everybody agrees that he invalidated only 30 days. But we must deal with the case that he scoffed with wine. That is, if he is still within his period of nazir. But after his period of nazir, he invalidated everything.
There, we have stated: “If he called the ninth tenth, and the tenth ninth, and the eleventh tenth, all three are sanctified. The ninth may be eaten when it develops a defect, the tenth is tithe, the eleventh is brought as well-being sacrifice.” “It shall be holy”, this teaches that holiness falls on the ninth and the eleventh. I could think that both of them should be sacrificed, the verse says “cattle”, “cattle” to include the eleventh. “From the cattle”, to exclude the ninth. What reason do you have to include the eleventh and to exclude the ninth? After the verse included, it excluded. You can argue, when are sanctified [animals] subject to substitution? Before or after? One has to say, afterwards. I am including the eleventh which is after sanctification and I am excluding the ninth which is before sanctification.
So far, if he thought that it was the tenth which he called “tenth”. If he knew that it was the ninth and called it “tenth”? The colleagues say, it is sanctified. Rebbi Yudan said, it is not sanctified. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that it leaves and grazes with the herd? The House of Shammai anwered them, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified.” And they do not accept it! Otherwise, they could have answered: Why do you answer us from something which is sanctified only if not in [willful] error about something which will be sanctified both in error and not in error! As Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answer, or as Rebbi Nasa said, like somebody who has two reasons and he responds by giving one of them.
So far, if he thought that it was the tenth which he called “tenth”. If he knew that it was the ninth and called it “tenth”? The colleagues say, it is sanctified. Rebbi Yudan said, it is not sanctified. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that it leaves and grazes with the herd? The House of Shammai anwered them, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified.” And they do not accept it! Otherwise, they could have answered: Why do you answer us from something which is sanctified only if not in [willful] error about something which will be sanctified both in error and not in error! As Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answer, or as Rebbi Nasa said, like somebody who has two reasons and he responds by giving one of them.
So far, if he thought that it was the tenth which he called “tenth”. If he knew that it was the ninth and called it “tenth”? The colleagues say, it is sanctified. Rebbi Yudan said, it is not sanctified. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that it leaves and grazes with the herd? The House of Shammai anwered them, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified.” And they do not accept it! Otherwise, they could have answered: Why do you answer us from something which is sanctified only if not in [willful] error about something which will be sanctified both in error and not in error! As Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answer, or as Rebbi Nasa said, like somebody who has two reasons and he responds by giving one of them.
So far, if he thought that it was the tenth which he called “tenth”. If he knew that it was the ninth and called it “tenth”? The colleagues say, it is sanctified. Rebbi Yudan said, it is not sanctified. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that it leaves and grazes with the herd? The House of Shammai anwered them, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified.” And they do not accept it! Otherwise, they could have answered: Why do you answer us from something which is sanctified only if not in [willful] error about something which will be sanctified both in error and not in error! As Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answer, or as Rebbi Nasa said, like somebody who has two reasons and he responds by giving one of them.
HALAKHAH: “If a person vowed to be a nazir and went to bring his animal,” etc. Where do we hold? If he saw an animal passing on the market and said, I am a nazir on that animal which passed by, he is a nazir even if the animal was stolen. If he thought that he had one and it turned out that he did not, would we say if he was rich and became poor, the nezirut would be invalidated? But we must hold that he said, I am a nazir on the animal I have at home, then went and found it stolen. If he vowed before the animal was stolen he is a nazir, after the animal was stolen he is not a nazir. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say: Rebbi Jehudah asked: If the thieves returned it in the night, did his nezirut return to him retroactively or for the future?
Where do we hold? If one says, Reuben, and the other says, Simeon, as you take it, if he is Reuben, one is a nazir, if he is Simeon, one is anazir. But we must hold that one says, Reuben, and the other says, Simeon. He suddenly disappeared, he was neither Reuben nor Simeon; nobody is a nazir.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Rebbi [Yose] said to the colleagues: You should know that Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: If somebody split a limb from a living animal and ate it, everybody agrees that he is free from prosecution. Where do they disagree? If he split it in his mouth before he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan considers his mouth as inside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish considers his mouth as outside. They asked him, what do you say? He answered them, I informed you that mighty mountains disagree, and you ask this? If it is so, even if he split it outside and then ate, he should be guilty! Why? That is how one eats. If somebody split an ant in his mouth and ate it, that is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Maisha asked Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he split a grape in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered, there it is something for which there is a prohibition and impurity. In a circumstance in which its impurity disappeard, its prohibition disappeared. But here is a prohibition and no impurity. Rebbi Abba ben Rebbi Mamal asked: If he split an olive-sized bit of mazzah in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in the other cases, his palate did not enjoy an olive sized bit. The rabbis of Caesarea said that Rebbi Nisa asked: If he split in his mouth pomegranate berries which are ‘orlah and ate them, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Where do we hold? If because of fluids, we already did state: “Nothing makes impure as a drink except what comes from olives and grapes.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he swallowed them.
Rebbi [Yose] said to the colleagues: You should know that Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: If somebody split a limb from a living animal and ate it, everybody agrees that he is free from prosecution. Where do they disagree? If he split it in his mouth before he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan considers his mouth as inside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish considers his mouth as outside. They asked him, what do you say? He answered them, I informed you that mighty mountains disagree, and you ask this? If it is so, even if he split it outside and then ate, he should be guilty! Why? That is how one eats. If somebody split an ant in his mouth and ate it, that is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Maisha asked Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he split a grape in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered, there it is something for which there is a prohibition and impurity. In a circumstance in which its impurity disappeard, its prohibition disappeared. But here is a prohibition and no impurity. Rebbi Abba ben Rebbi Mamal asked: If he split an olive-sized bit of mazzah in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in the other cases, his palate did not enjoy an olive sized bit. The rabbis of Caesarea said that Rebbi Nisa asked: If he split in his mouth pomegranate berries which are ‘orlah and ate them, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Where do we hold? If because of fluids, we already did state: “Nothing makes impure as a drink except what comes from olives and grapes.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he swallowed them.