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12645 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.
Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.
Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles,” etc. To a Gentile even in the Land. Who frees him? His original owner pays for him and the second frees him. “Or outside the Land,” even to a Jew. Let us say that if the second owner knew, both of them split the price; otherwise the first pays for him and the second frees him. “I X ben Y sold my slave Z to Antiochia”, he gains his freedom. But if he is in Lydda, he did not gain his freedom. It was stated: A slave goes outside the Land with his master. Therefore, if he sold him there, he is sold. If he came from outside the Land to the Land with the intention to return, one forces him to return. With the intention not to return, one does not force him to return. If he fled from outside the Land to the Land, he may return him. If he fled from the Land to outside the Land, Rebbi Joshia in the name of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, it is permigtted. The great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is permitted. Rebbi Marinos, the son of the great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is forbidden. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he is used to flee there. But he who says, it is forbidden, if he is not used to flee there. Rebbi Yose said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he can return him from there; but he who says, it is forbidden, if he cannot return him from there.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles,” etc. To a Gentile even in the Land. Who frees him? His original owner pays for him and the second frees him. “Or outside the Land,” even to a Jew. Let us say that if the second owner knew, both of them split the price; otherwise the first pays for him and the second frees him. “I X ben Y sold my slave Z to Antiochia”, he gains his freedom. But if he is in Lydda, he did not gain his freedom. It was stated: A slave goes outside the Land with his master. Therefore, if he sold him there, he is sold. If he came from outside the Land to the Land with the intention to return, one forces him to return. With the intention not to return, one does not force him to return. If he fled from outside the Land to the Land, he may return him. If he fled from the Land to outside the Land, Rebbi Joshia in the name of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, it is permigtted. The great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is permitted. Rebbi Marinos, the son of the great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is forbidden. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he is used to flee there. But he who says, it is forbidden, if he is not used to flee there. Rebbi Yose said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he can return him from there; but he who says, it is forbidden, if he cannot return him from there.
MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells himself and his children to Gentiles,” etc. The Mishnah, if he sold himself repeatedly. But if he sold himself once, one buys him back, but if he sold himself to the games, one does not buy him back. There was a case of one who sold himself to the games; the case came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said, what can we do? He did it for his livelihood.
If somebody bought a field during a Jubilee period. Rebbi Ila said, he acquired ownership of the ground, Abba bar Mamal said, he did not acquire ownership of the ground. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to Rebbi Ila: In your opinion, since you say that he acquired ownership of the ground, why can he not dig cisterns, ditches, and caves? He said to him, the Torah said, “he shall return to his inheritance,” as it was. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa brought this topic before them and did not know that they still disagreed: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not bring and recite. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose: Everybody agrees that he brings. Where do they disagree? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he brings and recites; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he brings but does not recite.
HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”
“His field”, except if it was mortgaged. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property.
“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.
Rav wrote to Rebbi, who transferred it to the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Ḥiyya wrote between the lines. If the orphans sold against the rules, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. If they accepted a lien. I do not know what this lien is. Levi stated: Both for a lien made by the father and for a lien made by the son, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. Rebbi Abba said, there is no mention of a lien made by the father, only a lien made by the son. If one cannot collect during the father’s lifetime, not so much less after the father’s death? Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If the daughters are married, the widow is sustained by them. Rebbi Abba follows his own [opinion] and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own [opinion]. For the sister of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaggai: Even if they died, the widow is sustained by them.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, as a matter of principle one does not appoint guardians for orphans to their detriment, only to their profit; but if they are detrimental, they are detrimental. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, neither as a matter of principle nor as a reaction, neither for profit not for detriment. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: “One appoints a guardian for them” There is a difference about an ox, lest it continue to cause damage. If it did do damage, from whom does one take payment? Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the orphans. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, from the guardian. And even if Rebbi Joḥanan never taught this, does not his word imply it since he said if in the end they are detrimental, they are detrimental?
“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.
“The law of siqariqon always applies in Galilee.” The law of siqariqon does not apply to movables. It was stated: “The law of siqariqon does not apply to foreclosures for a debt and for tenant fees. [A foreclosure for nonpayment of] tenant fees waits twelve months for the owners.” Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said, after twelve months one announces on four consecutive Sabbaths. He explained it in two ways. If he took it from a tenant and gave it to a tenant and the first wants to foreclose, he says to him, are you not a tenant? Leave it for me and what you cut, you cut. If he took it from the owner and gave it to a tenant, the [owner] wants to foreclose, he tells him, what use do you have if you take it from me and he will take it from you, but what I can afford I shall give to you.
HALAKHAH: “The following was said for communal peace,” etc. The saying of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai implies that it is of the words of the Torah, for Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Moses wrote this Torah and gave it to the Cohanim, the Levites (etc.)” and afterwards “to all the Elders of Israel.” The saying of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Joshua said, never did I recite the benediction before a Cohen and I did not allow an Israel to do it before him. The saying of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, in a city of only Cohanim, an Israel reads first because of communal peace.
Rebbi Aḥa and Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Simai: In a city of only Cohanim, all of them lift their hands. For whom do they recite the blessing? For their brothers to the North and South. Who answers after them? Women and children. Abbaie bar Benjamin stated: People who stand behind the Cohanim are not included in the blessing. For those in front of them, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that even an iron wall does not interrupt. Those who stand to their side? Let us hear from the following: “If he intended to sprinkle before himself but sprinkled behind himself, behind himself but sprinkled before himself; his sprinkling is invalid. Before himself but sprinkled sideways, his sprinkling is valid.” This implies that those who stand to their side are included in the blessing. Rav Ḥisda said, it is necessary that the organizer be an Israel. Rav Ḥisda said, if there was one Cohen, he says “Cohen.” For two, he says “Cohanim.” But Rav Huna said, even for one he says “Cohanim” since he only calls the tribe, lest you say, probably person X is an adulterer or a murderer, and he shall bless us? The Holy, praise to Him, said: Who blesses you? Am not I blessing you? As it was said: “They shall put My name over the Children of Israel and I shall bless them.”
Rebbi Phineas asked: For what did they impose a fine? At a place where they sow and eat or at a place where they sow but do not eat? What is the difference? If one saw him buying from Saracens. It is forbidden; if you say at a place where they sow and eat, if one saw him buying from Saracens it is permitted.
Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ammi. One said: “Plough it well then, I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical.” The other one said: “May you succeed” For him who says, plough it well, then I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical, what means “one greets them” in a Jewish way? “May you succeed.” For him who says to the Gentile “may you succeed”? Explanation: Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa and Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman passed by one of the ploughmen in the Sabbatical. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said to him, are you not Jewish? Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa said to him, did not Rebbi teach us (Ps. 129:8): “The passers-by did not say, the blessing of the Eternal be on you,” these are the nations of the world who pass out of the world, they did not say to Israel “the blessing of the Eternal is on you.” What does Israel say to them, “we bless you in the Name of the Eternal.” All blessings that come into the world because of us are not enough for you; not only do you not say, come and take from these blessings for yourselves, but you roll over us pro-rated contributions and fines, head taxes and annonae.
Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Is not this disagreement the same as that disagreement, as we have stated there: “If a man was talking with a woman about her bill of divorce or her preliminary marriage and gave her the bill of divorce or [some valuable for] preliminary marriage and did not spell it out, Rebbi Yose says it is sufficient; Rebbi Jehudah says he has to be explicit.” Then Rebbi follows Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Nathan Rebbi Jehudah. He said to him, what do you have in your hand, did not Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abin, Abba bar Taḥlifa, say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? [If they thought about] other things but if he still was on the same subject, it is a bill of divorce. But here, even if they are still on the same subject there is disagreement.
Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Is not this disagreement the same as that disagreement, as we have stated there: “If a man was talking with a woman about her bill of divorce or her preliminary marriage and gave her the bill of divorce or [some valuable for] preliminary marriage and did not spell it out, Rebbi Yose says it is sufficient; Rebbi Jehudah says he has to be explicit.” Then Rebbi follows Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Nathan Rebbi Jehudah. He said to him, what do you have in your hand, did not Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abin, Abba bar Taḥlifa, say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? [If they thought about] other things but if he still was on the same subject, it is a bill of divorce. But here, even if they are still on the same subject there is disagreement.
HALAKHAH: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me,” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is (not) divorced unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not divorce her except at place X. “If he said, she is at place X and he delivered it at another place,” Rebbi Eleazar agrees that he only indicates a place; the rabbis agree that he only indicates a place.
HALAKHAH: : “If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. There, we have stated: “If someone tells a person who is not trustworthy, buy for me from somebody who is trustworthy, or from somebody who tithes, he is not trustworthy. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar (ben Rebbi Yose.) [Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar;] does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him.
MISHNAH: If somebody says: “Write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife, divorce her, write a letter and deliver to her”, they should write and deliver. “Discharge her, provide for her, treat her according to the law, do what is necessary;” he did not say anything. Earlier, they said that if somebody was led away in a neck-iron when he said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, they should write and deliver. They reconsidered and said, also one who leaves on a ship or in a caravan. Rebbi Simeon from Shezur said, also the dangerously sick.
“ ‘Discharge her, provide for her, treat her according to the law, do what is necessary;’ he did not say anything.” I say, he meant sustenance.
It was stated: Also the sick person. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Shezur about the dangerously ill. What is the difference between a dangerously ill and a sick person? A sick person is a normal case; any who gets sick suddenly is dangerously ill. In a normal case, the relatives visit him immediately; unrelated persons visit him after three days. If he falls ill suddenly, everybody visits him immediately. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yose after three days. He said to them: Do you want to sustain the baraita in my case?
MISHNAH: If somebody had an attack of seizures and said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, he did not say anything. If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are nothing. If somebody became paralyzed, one asks him, shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife, and he nods his head, one checks him out three times. If he answers no for no, yes for yes, they shall write and deliver.
The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are disregarded.” He explains it: After he regains his sanity, his later words are disregarded. If he gave her a bill of divorce saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If he threw her bill of divorce to her saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Eleazar said that Rebbi Abin asked: If he separated heave from his grain heap and said, it shall be heave only tomorrow but the next day he suffered an attack of seizures, is this the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it: If somebody had been crucified or mortally wounded when he signalled to write a bill of divorce to his wife, one writes and delivers on the assumption that his soul hangs on in him. Is it not impossible that his mind should not have been disturbed for an hour? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it.
Rebbi Yudan said, there, if he said I did such and such, here, if he says do such and such. Rebbi Benjamin ben Levi inquired: He should have understanding for the future if he has understanding for the past; (if he has no understanding for the past,) he would not have understanding for the future! Rebbi Abba Mari said, here we deal with a mute; there is no agency for a mute. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we deal with a sane person. Why is there no divorce? Because I say, he was occupied with his documents. We also stated thus: “When was this said? When he was paralyzed while being healthy. But if he was paralyzed by a prior sickness, once is enough.”
“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”
“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”
There, we have stated: “If somebody writes his property over to his sons, he has to write: From today and after death. Rebbi Yose says, this is unnecessary.” What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? The date of the document is its proof. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This is no condition. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It applies neither to bills of divorce nor to gifts. Rebbi Ila said, for a gift; since he said “from today”, the gift is irrevocable. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve the yield to himself. But in bills of divorce, since he wrote “from today” in the bill, it would be a separation. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve her body to himself. Rebbi Bibon bar Cahana said before Rebbi Ilai, not to reserve her earnings for himself? He answered, we do not find a woman married to one man and her earnings belonging to another. Rebbi Ze‘ira praised him for this and called him “son of the Torah.”
Rebbi Yudan said, we deal with the case that it was lost by compulsion. They treated her like an unpaid trustee who may stipulate to be free from an oath. Rebbi Yose said, do we state here that the unpaid trustee is free from an oath? But we deal with the case that it was lost by mishandling. They treated the stole according to its value. But the rabbis say that in any case it has to be treated as a case of condition of a bill of divorce.
But are her garden and her courtyard not subject to her husband’s having the usufruct? Rebbi Joshua in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqulah in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: Even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It turns out that Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis and Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis, for the rabbis say, even though the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, he can acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand. But her garden and her courtyard are subject to her husband’s having the usufruct unless he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It is difficult for the rabbis: since the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, how can he acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand? Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr, for Rebbi Meїr said since the wife’s hand is not her husband’s hand, she can acquire her bill of divorce from her husband. Her garden and her courtyard will not be subject to her husband, even if he has the usufruct, even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” If he inherited properties together with her, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write; [for example] if he had married his brother’s daughter, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write. If another person gave her a gift and told her, on condition that your husband have no rights to it, but it is for you to trade on your own account, then even if he did not write it is as if he wrote.
But are her garden and her courtyard not subject to her husband’s having the usufruct? Rebbi Joshua in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqulah in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: Even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It turns out that Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis and Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis, for the rabbis say, even though the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, he can acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand. But her garden and her courtyard are subject to her husband’s having the usufruct unless he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It is difficult for the rabbis: since the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, how can he acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand? Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr, for Rebbi Meїr said since the wife’s hand is not her husband’s hand, she can acquire her bill of divorce from her husband. Her garden and her courtyard will not be subject to her husband, even if he has the usufruct, even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” If he inherited properties together with her, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write; [for example] if he had married his brother’s daughter, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write. If another person gave her a gift and told her, on condition that your husband have no rights to it, but it is for you to trade on your own account, then even if he did not write it is as if he wrote.
But are her garden and her courtyard not subject to her husband’s having the usufruct? Rebbi Joshua in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqulah in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: Even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It turns out that Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis and Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis, for the rabbis say, even though the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, he can acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand. But her garden and her courtyard are subject to her husband’s having the usufruct unless he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It is difficult for the rabbis: since the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, how can he acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand? Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr, for Rebbi Meїr said since the wife’s hand is not her husband’s hand, she can acquire her bill of divorce from her husband. Her garden and her courtyard will not be subject to her husband, even if he has the usufruct, even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” If he inherited properties together with her, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write; [for example] if he had married his brother’s daughter, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write. If another person gave her a gift and told her, on condition that your husband have no rights to it, but it is for you to trade on your own account, then even if he did not write it is as if he wrote.
But are her garden and her courtyard not subject to her husband’s having the usufruct? Rebbi Joshua in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqulah in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: Even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It turns out that Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis and Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis, for the rabbis say, even though the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, he can acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand. But her garden and her courtyard are subject to her husband’s having the usufruct unless he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It is difficult for the rabbis: since the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, how can he acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand? Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr, for Rebbi Meїr said since the wife’s hand is not her husband’s hand, she can acquire her bill of divorce from her husband. Her garden and her courtyard will not be subject to her husband, even if he has the usufruct, even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” If he inherited properties together with her, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write; [for example] if he had married his brother’s daughter, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write. If another person gave her a gift and told her, on condition that your husband have no rights to it, but it is for you to trade on your own account, then even if he did not write it is as if he wrote.
Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah speaks of a roof with a parapet when it descended lower than the parapet, or one without a parapet when it descended lower than within three handbreadths of the roof, since anything within three handbreadths of the roof is as if it were part of the roof. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: This refers to the rules of the Sabbath, where anything within three handbreadths of a partition is considered part of the partition. Rebbi Yasa said, they are not comparable, for bills of divorce are about the top, the rules of the Sabbath about the below. For bills of divorce even if it never came to rest, for the Sabbath only if it rested. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only if it descended to within the partitions. Rebbi Immi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi, since Rebbi considers partitions as solidly filled up? He said to him, here in the matter of bills of divorce it is everybody’s opinion. Could one not object that Rebbi said, if it is roofed? And you say, it is not roofed? What is the difference between bills of divorce and the Sabbath? Rebbi Abba said, about the Sabbath it is written: “You shall not do any work;” it may make itself automatically. But here “he shall deliver into her hand,” into her domain.
HALAKHAH: “If the scribe wrote,” etc. Where do we hold? If he made a mistake, even Rebbi Eleazar agrees. If he made no error, even the rabbis agree. But we must hold that it was unexplained. Rebbi Eleazar suspects that possibly he made no mistake; the rabbis suspect that possibly he did make a mistake.
Where do we hold? If he knotted and signed it inside, everybody agrees that it can be made simple. If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple. {Rebbi objected to the statement of Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: “The body of the document.” If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple, but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple.) Rebbi objected to the statement of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: The body of the document shows whether it is simple or not simple. What is the body of the document? Rebbi Abba said, as Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But did we not state: “That is the formula of a document”? Rebbi Mana said, that is the formula of a knotted document. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say it is the same for knotted and simple, for a knotted document it is a necessity, for a simple one it is not a necessity. Rebbi Aḥa said, if one adds to practice. A simple document [is witnessed] by two persons. If common usage is to have three, one makes it with three. A knotted document is signed on its back. If common usage is to sign it inside and out, one signs it inside and out.
MISHNAH: If somebody in divorcing his wife says to her: Herewith you are permitted to any man except Mr. X, Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit. What should he do? He should take the document back from her and deliver it again while saying, herewith you are permitted to any man. If he had written the condition in the document it would be invalid even if he had later erased it.
Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.
Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.
“Three kinds of bills of divorce are invalid,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: All in handwriting. Rebbi Eleazar asked: There are witnesses; why do I need handwriting? Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: All in handwriting except if its witnesses are with it. Rav Hamnuna said, they testified to their own sin since they agreed to lie by signing on an undated bill of divorce.
A document which has an erasure or insertion in its main part is invalid; in the routine matter it is valid; but if it was mentioned later it is valid even in the main part. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, one has to mention it at least in the second line before the end of the text. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav: One has to mention the essence of the document with it. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If one did not mention the essence of the document with it. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, Rebbi Ba said in the name of Rav Jeremiah: Disqualified witnesses do not constitute remote testimony since they came only to support the document’s validity. And here, he says so? There, in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, here in the name of Rav.
MISHNAH: A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid; but the Gentiles may whip him and tell him, do what the Jews tell you.
Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Jews who forced in the manner of Gentiles make invalid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Gentiles who forced in the manner of Jews are valid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says this: “Gentiles may tell him, whip him, and tell him, do what the Jews tell you to do.” Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Issy: If somebody says: “I shall not feed nor provide”, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Does one force? He said to him, do you still have doubts? If one forces because of a foul smell, so much more because of sustenance! Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody says: “I shall not feed and I shall not provide”, one tells him: Either feed and provide, or divorce.
Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Jews who forced in the manner of Gentiles make invalid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Gentiles who forced in the manner of Jews are valid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says this: “Gentiles may tell him, whip him, and tell him, do what the Jews tell you to do.” Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Issy: If somebody says: “I shall not feed nor provide”, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Does one force? He said to him, do you still have doubts? If one forces because of a foul smell, so much more because of sustenance! Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody says: “I shall not feed and I shall not provide”, one tells him: Either feed and provide, or divorce.
Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Jews who forced in the manner of Gentiles make invalid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Gentiles who forced in the manner of Jews are valid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says this: “Gentiles may tell him, whip him, and tell him, do what the Jews tell you to do.” Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Issy: If somebody says: “I shall not feed nor provide”, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Does one force? He said to him, do you still have doubts? If one forces because of a foul smell, so much more because of sustenance! Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody says: “I shall not feed and I shall not provide”, one tells him: Either feed and provide, or divorce.
HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.
“And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money, can be acquired by intercourse, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by money, should be acquired by intercourse? The Hebrew slave girl proves, who cannot be acquired by intercourse but is acquired by money. You likewise do not wonder that this one, who may be acquired by money, might not be acquired by intercourse. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money; “and has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse.
So we have established that Gentiles have no preliminary marriage. Do they have divorce? Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi and Rebbi Ḥanin in the name of the great Rebbi Ḥuna of Sepphoris: Either they have no divorce, or either of them may divorce the other. Rebbi Joḥanan from Sepphoris, Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena, in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman: “For the divorcer is hateful, says the Eternal, Israel’s God.” In Israel I gave divorce, I did not give divorce among the nations of the world. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Phineas: In the entire paragraph it is written “the Eternal, Sabaot”; only here it is written “Israel’s God.” To teach you that the Holy One, praise to Him, did lend his name only to Jewish divorce.
The word of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya implies that Gentiles have no divorce, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in this matter: A Gentile who divorced his wife, who herself then went and married another, when the latter divorced her and then both of them converted, I do not read for them: “Her first husband who had divorced her cannot return to marry her.” It was stated in this matter: A case came before Rebbi and he approved.
If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.
The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.
The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
Rebbi Isaac asked: Why do we not say: “either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife?” He turned around and said: Did we state “by her own ḥalîṣah”? Not “by her own ḥalîṣah”! But here either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife. But did we not state, “by intercourse”? Can you say, either by her own intercourse or the intercourse of her cowife? The Mishnah speaks of one sister-in-law; the problem arises for two sisters-in-law.
“By money”. “The money of his sale price shall be;” he can be redeemed by money, not by produce nor by vessels. Everywhere you treat money’s worth like money, but here you do not treat money’s worth like money. Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, because the verse repeated “money, of money”. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, but if he wants to reduce, he can leave for the reduced amount even for produce, even for vessels. Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said that this is only if he did not give them their money’s worth. But if he gave them their money’s worth, it is like money.
The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.
It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.
From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.
“Or the Jubilee,” as it is written, “in the Jubilee he shall leave.” “Or reduction of the amount,” as it is written: “If there still are many years.” Do we not know that if there are many there are not few, and if there are few there are not many? Rebbi Hila said, sometimes the years are worth more than the wages, sometimes the wages are worth more than the years. How do you explain the following? If he was sold for a mina each and improved so that now he is worth 200 each, from where that one computes for him only by a mina each? The verse says, “according to the years he shall compute his redemption.” We learned that one sold to a Gentile is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed. From where that one sold to an Israel is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed? “Hireling, hireling” for an equal cut. Since the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to a Gentile, so too the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to an Israel. Rebbi says, why does the verse say “he shall be redeemed, he shall be redeemed,” three times? To add all redemptions that they have to follow this order.
“Or the Jubilee,” as it is written, “in the Jubilee he shall leave.” “Or reduction of the amount,” as it is written: “If there still are many years.” Do we not know that if there are many there are not few, and if there are few there are not many? Rebbi Hila said, sometimes the years are worth more than the wages, sometimes the wages are worth more than the years. How do you explain the following? If he was sold for a mina each and improved so that now he is worth 200 each, from where that one computes for him only by a mina each? The verse says, “according to the years he shall compute his redemption.” We learned that one sold to a Gentile is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed. From where that one sold to an Israel is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed? “Hireling, hireling” for an equal cut. Since the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to a Gentile, so too the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to an Israel. Rebbi says, why does the verse say “he shall be redeemed, he shall be redeemed,” three times? To add all redemptions that they have to follow this order.
Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: There it is written “he computes” and here it is written “he computes”. Here you compute months and years so he may leave, there you do not compute months and years so he may leave. He said to him, the difference is that the Torah compared him to the hireling. Since the latter computes months and years and leaves, so this one computes months and years and leaves.
“If he allots her to his son;” but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you recognize the grandson like a son but here you do not recognize the grandson like a son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Naḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of a son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of a son. But here, where neither the brother nor any other relative can take the place of a son, the grandson cannot take the place of a son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider a brother like a son and all [near] relatives like a son but not a grandson like a son. They said, there went the spiced wine.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated: Just as he cannot sell her into servitude after marriage, so not into servitude after servitude. What is Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai’s reason? “By his being unfaithful to her.” Once he can be unfaithful to her, he cannot be unfaithful to her a second time. How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai’s reason? “She being in his garment;” from the moment that [her master] spread his garment on her, her father no longer has any power over her.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.
A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate. A baraita states, the rules of movables. A baraita states, neither the rules of realestate nor the rules of movables. A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate, as we have stated there: “Possession of houses, cisterns, ditches, and caves, bath houses, and dovecots, olive presses, and irrigated fields, and slaves.” A baraita states, slaves do not follow the rules of movables. As it is stated: What is possession of a slave? He tied his shoe for him, or untied his shoe, carried his things to the bath. Rebbi Simeon says, if he lifted him, that is possession. If he lifted his master, there is no stronger possession than this. A statement of the rabbis says that slaves follow the rules of movables. For Rebbi Yose said in the name of rabbis, there is no lien for a gift; one does not collect from slaves as from real estate. Rebbi Mana asked Rebbi Shammai, who are those rabbis? He told him, Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Immi. A widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. Not of real estate, as it was stated: Real estate and slaves; he took possession of the real estate. If you say that slaves follow the rules of real estate, when he took possession of the real estate he would have taken possession of the slaves, since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he had two fields, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with intention to take possession also of that in Galilee, or of the one in Galilee with intention to take possession also of that in Judea, he acquired. Not of movables. If you say that slaves follow the rules of movables, when he took possession of the movables he would have taken possessionof the slaves, since we did state there: “For property that is not guaranteed will cause guaranteed properties to be objects of swearing about them.”
Rebbi Abun said, it follows Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave. But do the rabbis not hold that a person can free half of his slave? They admit it for a slave held in partnership. But there is a difference for a slave who entirely belongs to him, for it is as if he gave something from his right into his left hand. Does Rebbi hold that it is not as if he gave something from his right into his left hand? He admits it if he gave to him through a third party. Do the rabbis not hold that he may give to him through a third party? The rabbis hold that one who can acquire by himself can acquire through a third party; one who cannot acquire by himself cannot acquire through a third party. Rebbi says, even though he cannot acquire by himself, he can acquire through third parties.
Rebbi Abun said, it follows Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave. But do the rabbis not hold that a person can free half of his slave? They admit it for a slave held in partnership. But there is a difference for a slave who entirely belongs to him, for it is as if he gave something from his right into his left hand. Does Rebbi hold that it is not as if he gave something from his right into his left hand? He admits it if he gave to him through a third party. Do the rabbis not hold that he may give to him through a third party? The rabbis hold that one who can acquire by himself can acquire through a third party; one who cannot acquire by himself cannot acquire through a third party. Rebbi says, even though he cannot acquire by himself, he can acquire through third parties.
If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.
If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.
If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.
Why did we not state: By important limbs that do not regenerate? Rebbi Joḥanan ben Marius said, because of the disagreement. Some Tannaīm state that he needs a bill of manumission; some Tannaīm state that he does not need a bill of manumission.
“For my slave girl X I want a document that she should not be enslaved.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan. He said, he has no power to enslave. What are her children? Slaves. What did he retain for her? Her earnings. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Yose both said, this follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. If he wrote all his possessions jointly to two of his slaves, both are free and both have to free one another. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Abba: Does this not imply that one slave accepts from his master for another one? He answered, what do you think? Since they acquired the properties they went free? No, simultaneously slaves and properties went free.
“You are free but your child will be a slave,” her child is like her, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, it is understandable; there is a disagreement. What is the disagreement following Rebbi Eleazar? But it must be so: His words stand, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. What means “he did not do anything”? Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. Following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave.
“You are free but your child will be a slave,” her child is like her, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, it is understandable; there is a disagreement. What is the disagreement following Rebbi Eleazar? But it must be so: His words stand, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. What means “he did not do anything”? Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. Following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave.
“You are free but your child will be a slave,” her child is like her, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, it is understandable; there is a disagreement. What is the disagreement following Rebbi Eleazar? But it must be so: His words stand, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. What means “he did not do anything”? Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. Following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave.
“Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He who sells the tithes of his field to another person did not do anything; the future children of his slave girl to another person, he did not do anything; the fetus of his animal to another person, he did not do anything; the airspace of his dry land to another person, he did not do anything. But he may sell him a field and reserve the tithes for himself; a slave girl and reserve her children for himself; an animal and reserve her fetus for himself. Is it not impossible for a person to sell the airspace of his dry land to another person? Explain it if he tells him, tear out some grasses from that dry land to acquire its airspace. And here there is real estate before him and he says, pluck something from the ground so that one tenth of it be acquired by you.
“Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He who sells the tithes of his field to another person did not do anything; the future children of his slave girl to another person, he did not do anything; the fetus of his animal to another person, he did not do anything; the airspace of his dry land to another person, he did not do anything. But he may sell him a field and reserve the tithes for himself; a slave girl and reserve her children for himself; an animal and reserve her fetus for himself. Is it not impossible for a person to sell the airspace of his dry land to another person? Explain it if he tells him, tear out some grasses from that dry land to acquire its airspace. And here there is real estate before him and he says, pluck something from the ground so that one tenth of it be acquired by you.
“Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He who sells the tithes of his field to another person did not do anything; the future children of his slave girl to another person, he did not do anything; the fetus of his animal to another person, he did not do anything; the airspace of his dry land to another person, he did not do anything. But he may sell him a field and reserve the tithes for himself; a slave girl and reserve her children for himself; an animal and reserve her fetus for himself. Is it not impossible for a person to sell the airspace of his dry land to another person? Explain it if he tells him, tear out some grasses from that dry land to acquire its airspace. And here there is real estate before him and he says, pluck something from the ground so that one tenth of it be acquired by you.
“Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He who sells the tithes of his field to another person did not do anything; the future children of his slave girl to another person, he did not do anything; the fetus of his animal to another person, he did not do anything; the airspace of his dry land to another person, he did not do anything. But he may sell him a field and reserve the tithes for himself; a slave girl and reserve her children for himself; an animal and reserve her fetus for himself. Is it not impossible for a person to sell the airspace of his dry land to another person? Explain it if he tells him, tear out some grasses from that dry land to acquire its airspace. And here there is real estate before him and he says, pluck something from the ground so that one tenth of it be acquired by you.
Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: The extortionist, and the robber, and the thief? He answered, it is assumed that the owners do not deal with the dead animal. From where that the owners do not deal with the dead animal? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, “alive, he shall pay double,” but not dead animals. That refers to theft; for robbery? Rebbi Abun said, “he shall return the robbed object which he robbed,” as it was.
Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: The extortionist, and the robber, and the thief? He answered, it is assumed that the owners do not deal with the dead animal. From where that the owners do not deal with the dead animal? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, “alive, he shall pay double,” but not dead animals. That refers to theft; for robbery? Rebbi Abun said, “he shall return the robbed object which he robbed,” as it was.
From where that non-guaranteed property may be acquired together with guaranteed property, by money, document, or by possession? Rebbi Yose in the name of Ḥizqiah; Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ḥanina Tortaya in the name of Ḥizqiah, it is written (2Chr. 21:3): “Their father gave them many gifts, silver and gold and delicacies, with fortified cities in Jehudah.” So far real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem, who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages and they upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Is not the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer like the sick person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.
From where that non-guaranteed property may be acquired together with guaranteed property, by money, document, or by possession? Rebbi Yose in the name of Ḥizqiah; Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ḥanina Tortaya in the name of Ḥizqiah, it is written (2Chr. 21:3): “Their father gave them many gifts, silver and gold and delicacies, with fortified cities in Jehudah.” So far real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem, who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages and they upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Is not the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer like the sick person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.
Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Can movables be taken into possession by dragging? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, what is his problem? With hard hides. But soft hides are not taken into posession until lifted. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: If somebody steals another person’s pouch and removes it on the Sabbath, he is obligated since he already is obligated for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. But if he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution fall on him simultaneously. Therefore, if the obligations of capital crime and restitution do not fall on him simultaneously he is obligated. Rebbi Mattania said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.
Rebbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa in the name of Rav: If he sold a cow for money, then grabbed him and said, give me that money. He answered, for what do you need it? He said, to buy a donkey for him[self]. If the owner of the cow took possession of the donkey, the cow was not taken into possession. Was the donkey taken into possession? Rebbi Abba said, it was taken into possession. Rebbi Yose said, it was not taken into possession. Rebbi Abba thought that this was barter, but it was not barter. Rebbi Mana in the name of Rebbi Yose: Sometimes it is a new deal for one party and a new deal for the other party. How is that? He sold him a cow for money; he left the money standing with him. The next day, he found him standing there and said, what are you doing here? He said, I want to collect the money. He answered, for what do you want it? He said, to buy myself a donkey. He answered, there is a donkey before you. If either one of them drew, the other one did not enter into possession; each one has to take possession separately.
Rebbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa in the name of Rav: If he sold a cow for money, then grabbed him and said, give me that money. He answered, for what do you need it? He said, to buy a donkey for him[self]. If the owner of the cow took possession of the donkey, the cow was not taken into possession. Was the donkey taken into possession? Rebbi Abba said, it was taken into possession. Rebbi Yose said, it was not taken into possession. Rebbi Abba thought that this was barter, but it was not barter. Rebbi Mana in the name of Rebbi Yose: Sometimes it is a new deal for one party and a new deal for the other party. How is that? He sold him a cow for money; he left the money standing with him. The next day, he found him standing there and said, what are you doing here? He said, I want to collect the money. He answered, for what do you want it? He said, to buy myself a donkey. He answered, there is a donkey before you. If either one of them drew, the other one did not enter into possession; each one has to take possession separately.
MISHNAH: For any commandment a father has to fulfill towards his son, men are obligated but women are free. For any commandment the son has to fulfill towards his father, men and women are equally obligated. For any positive commandment activated by time, men are obligated but women are free. For any positive commandment not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated. For any prohibition, whether or not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated except for “do not destroy”, “do not shear,” and “do not become impure for the dead.” Leanings and weavings, presentations, taking of fistfuls, burnings and neck breakings, sprinklings and receptions apply to men but not to women except for the flour offerings of the suspected wife and the nezirah; those do weave.
MISHNAH: For any commandment a father has to fulfill towards his son, men are obligated but women are free. For any commandment the son has to fulfill towards his father, men and women are equally obligated. For any positive commandment activated by time, men are obligated but women are free. For any positive commandment not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated. For any prohibition, whether or not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated except for “do not destroy”, “do not shear,” and “do not become impure for the dead.” Leanings and weavings, presentations, taking of fistfuls, burnings and neck breakings, sprinklings and receptions apply to men but not to women except for the flour offerings of the suspected wife and the nezirah; those do weave.
MISHNAH: For any commandment a father has to fulfill towards his son, men are obligated but women are free. For any commandment the son has to fulfill towards his father, men and women are equally obligated. For any positive commandment activated by time, men are obligated but women are free. For any positive commandment not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated. For any prohibition, whether or not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated except for “do not destroy”, “do not shear,” and “do not become impure for the dead.” Leanings and weavings, presentations, taking of fistfuls, burnings and neck breakings, sprinklings and receptions apply to men but not to women except for the flour offerings of the suspected wife and the nezirah; those do weave.
MISHNAH: For any commandment a father has to fulfill towards his son, men are obligated but women are free. For any commandment the son has to fulfill towards his father, men and women are equally obligated. For any positive commandment activated by time, men are obligated but women are free. For any positive commandment not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated. For any prohibition, whether or not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated except for “do not destroy”, “do not shear,” and “do not become impure for the dead.” Leanings and weavings, presentations, taking of fistfuls, burnings and neck breakings, sprinklings and receptions apply to men but not to women except for the flour offerings of the suspected wife and the nezirah; those do weave.
HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”
HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”
HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”