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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:55

“And everything found is judged by a majority.” In difficult cases the rabbis compare this to crawling things, as it was stated: “Nine frogs and one crawling thing in a private domain, if somebody touched one of them and it is not known which one he touched, in doubt he is impure. If he transferred to the public domain and touched, in doubt he is pure. If he returned to the private domain and touched, in doubt he is impure. And for what is found one follows the majority.” Rav Ḥisda said, no valiant person can find his hands. Rebbi Immi said, praise to Him Who chose them and their words; do not compare this to a private domain but to the public domain! As it was stated: “Nine crawling things and one frog between them in the public domain, if somebody touched one of them and it is not known which one he touched, in doubt he is pure. If he transferred to a private domain and touched, in doubt he is impure. If he returned to the public domain and touched, in doubt he is pure. And for what is found one follows the majority.” Rav Ḥisda said, no valiant person can find his hands. Rebbi Immi said, praise to Him Who chose them and their words; is the spring of Sepphoris not public domain? Rebbi Yose said, since the two could be alone together it is treated as private domain.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:3

Should one follow the majority, and most women are married as virgins. Say then that she was married as a virgin! This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. There, we have stated: “If an ox gored a cow and one finds her fetus beside her.” Do most cows have miscarriages? Say therefore that the goring induced the miscarriage. Rebbi Abbahu said, this implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Abun said, in one case they applied a majority argument, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that the one in heat bit it.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:16

Rav Huna in the name of Rav: The witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. But Rav said, it is forbidden to sign a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. Does this contradict what they say in the name of Rav, the witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust? One word of Rav contradicts a word of Rav! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, Rav did not say it is forbidden to sign but it is forbidden to keep. As the following, “if evil is in your hand, remove it,” that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust, “do not let injustice dwell in your house,” that is a document of indebtedness which was paid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:26

Rebbi Yudan asked: “I had been married but I was divorced at place X”; if two [witnesses] come and say, no woman was divorced at place X, do they contradict her? Rebbi Yose asked, if she said, I had been married but I was divorced at place X at a certain date,” and two came and said, a woman was divorced at that place, but two [others] came and said, no woman was divorced at that place? That is a contradiction of the essence of the testimony; we live off her mouth.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:30

Women were kidnapped and brought there. The case came before Abba bar Abba, and Samuel. They ordered and gave them over to chaperones who were to return them to the Land of Israel. He said to him: What did we do for the earlier times when they were alone with them? Abba bar Abba said to him, would you say so if they were your daughters? Samuel’s daughters were kidnapped, “like an error which comes from the ruler”. When they were brought here, their kidnappers came with them. They came before Rebbi Ḥanina and left their kidnappers outside. They said to him, we were kidnapped but we are pure. He permitted them. After they left, their kidnappers sent after them. He said, it is obvious that these are the daughters of a Sage. When they came to know who they were, they said to Simeon bar Abba, take care of your relatives. He married the first one, but she died. The second one and she died. Why? Because they lied? God forbid, they did not lie. But because of the sin of Ḥanania, Rebbi Joshua’s nephew, who intercalated the year outside the Land.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:34

Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, I never testified except once, when I raised a slave to priestly status. Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father; one to the priesthood, the other to levitic status. A person came before Rebbi Hila; he said to him, this is my son and he is a Cohen. He answered him, he is your son but he is no Cohen. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder said to him, if you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is his son, do not believe him that he is a Cohen. He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Abin said, so he said to him: If you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is a Cohen, do not believe him that he is his son. In that case, he would be unrelated and trustworthy in his testimony! He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Did they not say, Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father? Let us say that Rebbi elevated a brother on the testimony of his brother. You may even say, a son on the testimony of his father, to levitic status.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:34

Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, I never testified except once, when I raised a slave to priestly status. Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father; one to the priesthood, the other to levitic status. A person came before Rebbi Hila; he said to him, this is my son and he is a Cohen. He answered him, he is your son but he is no Cohen. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder said to him, if you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is his son, do not believe him that he is a Cohen. He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Abin said, so he said to him: If you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is a Cohen, do not believe him that he is his son. In that case, he would be unrelated and trustworthy in his testimony! He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Did they not say, Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father? Let us say that Rebbi elevated a brother on the testimony of his brother. You may even say, a son on the testimony of his father, to levitic status.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:34

Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, I never testified except once, when I raised a slave to priestly status. Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father; one to the priesthood, the other to levitic status. A person came before Rebbi Hila; he said to him, this is my son and he is a Cohen. He answered him, he is your son but he is no Cohen. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder said to him, if you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is his son, do not believe him that he is a Cohen. He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Abin said, so he said to him: If you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is a Cohen, do not believe him that he is his son. In that case, he would be unrelated and trustworthy in his testimony! He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Did they not say, Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father? Let us say that Rebbi elevated a brother on the testimony of his brother. You may even say, a son on the testimony of his father, to levitic status.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:34

Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, I never testified except once, when I raised a slave to priestly status. Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father; one to the priesthood, the other to levitic status. A person came before Rebbi Hila; he said to him, this is my son and he is a Cohen. He answered him, he is your son but he is no Cohen. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder said to him, if you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is his son, do not believe him that he is a Cohen. He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Abin said, so he said to him: If you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is a Cohen, do not believe him that he is his son. In that case, he would be unrelated and trustworthy in his testimony! He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Did they not say, Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father? Let us say that Rebbi elevated a brother on the testimony of his brother. You may even say, a son on the testimony of his father, to levitic status.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:36

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, one does not elevate,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A complaint needs at least two [plaintiffs]. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, how do we hold? If they elevated him on the testimony of one person, they should demote him on the testimony of one person. If they elevated him on the testimony of two persons, even if there are many [opposed] they should not demote him! Rebbi Ḥuna said, it follows the rabbis there. But following the rabbis here and Rav Naḥman bar Jacob, just as one elevates him on the testimony of two persons, one demotes him on the testimony of two persons.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:48

Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel asked: If they were proven to be false witnesses, do they have to pay? Or it might be, following what Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah, said in the name of Samuel: One does not infer one thing from another in the matter of false witnesses. And here it is so.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:8

Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:12

Rebbi Ḥinena said before Rebbi Mana: Even if Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish thought the entire Mishnaiot were Rebbi Meïr’s, does the verse agree with Rebbi Meïr? Is it not written (Lev. 22:14): “If a person ate consecrated food in error”? But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish must hold that the fifth is a sacrifice. But even if he holds that the fifth is a sacrifice, can the principal be a sacrifice? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, the Mishnah declares that the principal is a fine, as we have stated: “He does not pay in heave but in totally profane food which is turned into heave.” If he had to pay from what he ate, it would be fine. And it was stated: “If he ate impure heave, he has to pay in pure profane food, but if he paid in impure profane, he discharged his obligation.” Does he not owe him the price of wood? That shows that the principal is a fine and since the principal is a fine, the fifth also is a fine. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there, everybody was under the obligation of (Ex. 20:16) “Do not become a false witness against your neighbor”, but this one was treated separately, (Deut. 19:19) “do to him what he intended to do to his brother”, to pay money; also here, everybody was under the obligation of (Lev. 22:10) “no outsider shall eat holy [food],” but this one was treated separately, (Lev. 22:14) “if somebody should eat holy [food] in error,” to pay money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:12

Rebbi Ḥinena said before Rebbi Mana: Even if Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish thought the entire Mishnaiot were Rebbi Meïr’s, does the verse agree with Rebbi Meïr? Is it not written (Lev. 22:14): “If a person ate consecrated food in error”? But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish must hold that the fifth is a sacrifice. But even if he holds that the fifth is a sacrifice, can the principal be a sacrifice? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, the Mishnah declares that the principal is a fine, as we have stated: “He does not pay in heave but in totally profane food which is turned into heave.” If he had to pay from what he ate, it would be fine. And it was stated: “If he ate impure heave, he has to pay in pure profane food, but if he paid in impure profane, he discharged his obligation.” Does he not owe him the price of wood? That shows that the principal is a fine and since the principal is a fine, the fifth also is a fine. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there, everybody was under the obligation of (Ex. 20:16) “Do not become a false witness against your neighbor”, but this one was treated separately, (Deut. 19:19) “do to him what he intended to do to his brother”, to pay money; also here, everybody was under the obligation of (Lev. 22:10) “no outsider shall eat holy [food],” but this one was treated separately, (Lev. 22:14) “if somebody should eat holy [food] in error,” to pay money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:12

Rebbi Ḥinena said before Rebbi Mana: Even if Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish thought the entire Mishnaiot were Rebbi Meïr’s, does the verse agree with Rebbi Meïr? Is it not written (Lev. 22:14): “If a person ate consecrated food in error”? But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish must hold that the fifth is a sacrifice. But even if he holds that the fifth is a sacrifice, can the principal be a sacrifice? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, the Mishnah declares that the principal is a fine, as we have stated: “He does not pay in heave but in totally profane food which is turned into heave.” If he had to pay from what he ate, it would be fine. And it was stated: “If he ate impure heave, he has to pay in pure profane food, but if he paid in impure profane, he discharged his obligation.” Does he not owe him the price of wood? That shows that the principal is a fine and since the principal is a fine, the fifth also is a fine. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there, everybody was under the obligation of (Ex. 20:16) “Do not become a false witness against your neighbor”, but this one was treated separately, (Deut. 19:19) “do to him what he intended to do to his brother”, to pay money; also here, everybody was under the obligation of (Lev. 22:10) “no outsider shall eat holy [food],” but this one was treated separately, (Lev. 22:14) “if somebody should eat holy [food] in error,” to pay money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:17

Rebbi Judah bar Pazi asked: What say these Tannaïm about whipping and extirpation? Rebbi Yose said, that is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah said, why can we not understand it from what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated? As Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Rebbi Ṭarphon says, extirpation was mentioned for the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement. Since for extirpation mentioned for the Sabbath there is no payment in a case involving the death penalty, so for extirpation mentioned for the Day of Atonement there is no payment in a case involving extirpation.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: When do we need this? Not for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? But for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he admits flogging in death penalty cases, certainly flogging in extirpation cases, since they disagreed: If somebody slaughters [an animal] and its young for idolatrous purposes. Rebbi Joḥanan says, if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is flogged, about idolatry, he is stoned to death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is not flogged since he would be stoned to death had he been cautioned about idolatry. He said to him, we need it even for Rebbi Joḥanan! Here are two cases, there it is one case.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:32

Rebbi Eleazar asked: Do the daughters of the rape victim have the rights given by the ketubah stipulations? It is clear to me that the rape victim has no [ketubah] of the male children, and that the seduced victim has no [ketubah] of the male children. If you say that he questions in both cases, we could ask, do the daughters of the rape victim and the daughters of the seduced girl have the rights given by the ketubah stipulations? That is a problem following the rabbis, but it is obvious following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah; as it was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, the rapist gives a mina as ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:32

Rebbi Eleazar asked: Do the daughters of the rape victim have the rights given by the ketubah stipulations? It is clear to me that the rape victim has no [ketubah] of the male children, and that the seduced victim has no [ketubah] of the male children. If you say that he questions in both cases, we could ask, do the daughters of the rape victim and the daughters of the seduced girl have the rights given by the ketubah stipulations? That is a problem following the rabbis, but it is obvious following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah; as it was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, the rapist gives a mina as ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:42

There, we have stated: “He who comes to a preliminarily married adolescent is guilty only if she was an adolescent, virgin, preliminarily married, in her father’s house. If two came upon her, the first is stoned and the second strangled.” Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That is Rebbi Meïr’s. But following the rabbis even if she is a minor. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? “A lad” is written in the paragraph. How do the rabbis explain “a lad”? Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Once in the paragraph it is written “a young woman”; this teaches that in the entire paragraph she is an adult. Rebbi Meïr objected to the rabbis: In the matter of the calumniator, “a lad” is written and she is an adult since a minor is not stoned! What do the rabbis with this? Rebbi Abin said, explain it if he came to her as to a male.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:42

There, we have stated: “He who comes to a preliminarily married adolescent is guilty only if she was an adolescent, virgin, preliminarily married, in her father’s house. If two came upon her, the first is stoned and the second strangled.” Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That is Rebbi Meïr’s. But following the rabbis even if she is a minor. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? “A lad” is written in the paragraph. How do the rabbis explain “a lad”? Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Once in the paragraph it is written “a young woman”; this teaches that in the entire paragraph she is an adult. Rebbi Meïr objected to the rabbis: In the matter of the calumniator, “a lad” is written and she is an adult since a minor is not stoned! What do the rabbis with this? Rebbi Abin said, explain it if he came to her as to a male.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:43

Jacob bar Abba asked before Rav: What is the law for him who comes to a minor? He said to him, by stoning. What is the law for him who comes to an adult? He said to him, I am reading “an adolescent”, not an adult. Read “an adolescent”, not a minor! “‘Because he mistreated her’, that includes a minor for a fine”, read ‘because he mistreaded her’, that includes an adult for a fine! Rav said, even though Jacob won the logical argument, practice is that he who comes to a minor is [punished] by stoning but she is free. Rebbi Abin in the name of Samuel: Why? He understood it from the following: “The man who had lain with her alone should die.” Did we not know that “the girl has not committed a capital crime”? Then why does the verse say: “Do not do anything to the girl, the girl has not committed a capital crime”? That includes him who comes to a preliminarily married underage girl that he is stoned and she is free.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:43

Jacob bar Abba asked before Rav: What is the law for him who comes to a minor? He said to him, by stoning. What is the law for him who comes to an adult? He said to him, I am reading “an adolescent”, not an adult. Read “an adolescent”, not a minor! “‘Because he mistreated her’, that includes a minor for a fine”, read ‘because he mistreaded her’, that includes an adult for a fine! Rav said, even though Jacob won the logical argument, practice is that he who comes to a minor is [punished] by stoning but she is free. Rebbi Abin in the name of Samuel: Why? He understood it from the following: “The man who had lain with her alone should die.” Did we not know that “the girl has not committed a capital crime”? Then why does the verse say: “Do not do anything to the girl, the girl has not committed a capital crime”? That includes him who comes to a preliminarily married underage girl that he is stoned and she is free.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:45

HALAKHAH: “One who says, I seduced X’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: Would he have to pay the slave’s value on his own testimony? What is his problem? Are the entire 30 [šeqel] a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, the entire 30 [šeqel] are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “‘Your ox killed my slave’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is free.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it if he killed a slave afflicted with boils. He said to him, what does it say afterwards? “‘Your ox killed my son’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is obligated.” Why do you not explain it that he was afflicted with boils, then he would be free. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage. He said to him, if following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage, everything is a fine. Can one say to him, be also in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out his slave Tebi’s tooth. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to free my slave Tebi. He said to him, what do you have in your hand? Fines can be imposed only by witnesses! Could they not say to him, do your duty before Heaven? That means one does not tell him, do your duty before Heaven! Rebbi Gamliel ben Avina asked before Rebbi Mana: Does Rabban Gamliel follow him who said, it is permitted to manumit? He said to him, the story in itself implies that it is forbidden to manumit since, otherwise, he could have freed him immediately!

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:45

HALAKHAH: “One who says, I seduced X’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: Would he have to pay the slave’s value on his own testimony? What is his problem? Are the entire 30 [šeqel] a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, the entire 30 [šeqel] are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “‘Your ox killed my slave’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is free.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it if he killed a slave afflicted with boils. He said to him, what does it say afterwards? “‘Your ox killed my son’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is obligated.” Why do you not explain it that he was afflicted with boils, then he would be free. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage. He said to him, if following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage, everything is a fine. Can one say to him, be also in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out his slave Tebi’s tooth. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to free my slave Tebi. He said to him, what do you have in your hand? Fines can be imposed only by witnesses! Could they not say to him, do your duty before Heaven? That means one does not tell him, do your duty before Heaven! Rebbi Gamliel ben Avina asked before Rebbi Mana: Does Rabban Gamliel follow him who said, it is permitted to manumit? He said to him, the story in itself implies that it is forbidden to manumit since, otherwise, he could have freed him immediately!

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:45

HALAKHAH: “One who says, I seduced X’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: Would he have to pay the slave’s value on his own testimony? What is his problem? Are the entire 30 [šeqel] a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, the entire 30 [šeqel] are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “‘Your ox killed my slave’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is free.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it if he killed a slave afflicted with boils. He said to him, what does it say afterwards? “‘Your ox killed my son’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is obligated.” Why do you not explain it that he was afflicted with boils, then he would be free. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage. He said to him, if following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage, everything is a fine. Can one say to him, be also in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out his slave Tebi’s tooth. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to free my slave Tebi. He said to him, what do you have in your hand? Fines can be imposed only by witnesses! Could they not say to him, do your duty before Heaven? That means one does not tell him, do your duty before Heaven! Rebbi Gamliel ben Avina asked before Rebbi Mana: Does Rabban Gamliel follow him who said, it is permitted to manumit? He said to him, the story in itself implies that it is forbidden to manumit since, otherwise, he could have freed him immediately!

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:45

HALAKHAH: “One who says, I seduced X’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: Would he have to pay the slave’s value on his own testimony? What is his problem? Are the entire 30 [šeqel] a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, the entire 30 [šeqel] are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “‘Your ox killed my slave’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is free.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it if he killed a slave afflicted with boils. He said to him, what does it say afterwards? “‘Your ox killed my son’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is obligated.” Why do you not explain it that he was afflicted with boils, then he would be free. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage. He said to him, if following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage, everything is a fine. Can one say to him, be also in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out his slave Tebi’s tooth. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to free my slave Tebi. He said to him, what do you have in your hand? Fines can be imposed only by witnesses! Could they not say to him, do your duty before Heaven? That means one does not tell him, do your duty before Heaven! Rebbi Gamliel ben Avina asked before Rebbi Mana: Does Rabban Gamliel follow him who said, it is permitted to manumit? He said to him, the story in itself implies that it is forbidden to manumit since, otherwise, he could have freed him immediately!

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:13

HALAKHAH: “If a proselyte woman converted,” etc. It is written: “For he calumniated a virgin of Israel”. That excludes this one who is not from Israel. “For he calumniated a virgin,” to include the proselyte whose conception was not in holiness but her birth was in holiness, that she should be stoned. Why does one not add her for the fine? You cannot do that; as Ḥizqiah stated: We understand that it was said “they shall stone her,” does that not imply that she dies? Why does the verse say, “and she shall die”? But there must be another one who is stoned but (she) [he] is free; who is that? That is the proselyte whose conception was not in holiness but who was born in holiness.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:26

“He has the right to what she finds.” Rebbi Zakkai from Alexandria asked: How do you treat what she found on [her] field, as a find or as her usufruct? If you treat it as usufruct it is hers..

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:31

MISHNAH: The father is not obligated to support his daughter. This inference did Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah explain in the vineyard of Jabneh: “The sons shall inherit and the daughters be supported.” Since the sons do not inherit before their father’s death, neither are the daughters supported before their father’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:41

Rebbi Meïr insists on interpreting the contract text. Rebbi Meïr explained, if somebody accepts a field as a contractor, at the moment [he] accepts, one estimates how much it is expected to yield and he gives to [the owner]. Because the standard contract reads: “If I let it lie fallow and do not work on it, I shall pay as if from the best.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:45

“If somebody who works his wife’s property has the intention of divorcing her and goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. If somebody who works the property of prisoners heard that they prepare to return, goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. These are properties of prisoners: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas; it was heard that they died, and he went to work the inheritance. But property of abandoning persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of abandoning persons: In any case where his father or any person from whom he might inherit went overseas, he did not hear that they died, but he went to work the inheritance. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I heard that there is no difference between prisoners and abandoning persons. But property of broken persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of broken persons: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, and his whereabouts are not known. Samuel says, the prisoner is one who left involuntarily. If he had left voluntarily he would have given him instructions. The abandoning person is one who left voluntarily. You should know that he had the intention of keeping [the relative] off his property since he left voluntarily and did not give him instructions. Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Movables do not fall under the rules of broken people. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: Those date palms of Babylonia which do not need grafting, is it not reasonable that we should treat them like standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:45

“If somebody who works his wife’s property has the intention of divorcing her and goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. If somebody who works the property of prisoners heard that they prepare to return, goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. These are properties of prisoners: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas; it was heard that they died, and he went to work the inheritance. But property of abandoning persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of abandoning persons: In any case where his father or any person from whom he might inherit went overseas, he did not hear that they died, but he went to work the inheritance. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I heard that there is no difference between prisoners and abandoning persons. But property of broken persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of broken persons: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, and his whereabouts are not known. Samuel says, the prisoner is one who left involuntarily. If he had left voluntarily he would have given him instructions. The abandoning person is one who left voluntarily. You should know that he had the intention of keeping [the relative] off his property since he left voluntarily and did not give him instructions. Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Movables do not fall under the rules of broken people. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: Those date palms of Babylonia which do not need grafting, is it not reasonable that we should treat them like standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:48

MISHNAH: If he did not write her “if you are kidnapped I shall ransom you and bring you back as my wife,” or for Cohens’ wives “I shall return you to your country,” he is obligated, for this is a stipulation enforced by the court. If she was kidnapped he is obligated to ransom her. If he said, here is her divorce document and her ketubah, let her redeem herself; he is not allowed to do that. If she was smitten, he is obligated to heal her. If he said, here is her divorce document and her ketubah, let her redeem herself; he is allowed to do that.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:48

MISHNAH: If he did not write her “if you are kidnapped I shall ransom you and bring you back as my wife,” or for Cohens’ wives “I shall return you to your country,” he is obligated, for this is a stipulation enforced by the court. If she was kidnapped he is obligated to ransom her. If he said, here is her divorce document and her ketubah, let her redeem herself; he is not allowed to do that. If she was smitten, he is obligated to heal her. If he said, here is her divorce document and her ketubah, let her redeem herself; he is allowed to do that.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:49

HALAKHAH: “If he did not write her “if you are kidnapped I shall ransom you,” etc. “If she was kidnapped he is obligated to ransom her,” etc. It was stated: If a sister-in-law was kidnapped, the heirs do not have to ransom her. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: Not only if she was kidnapped when her husband was still alive but even if she was kidnapped after the husband’s death, the heirs do not have to ransom her. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Aḥa: The Mishnah supports Rav: “And bring you back as wife;” there is no “wife”.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:49

HALAKHAH: “If he did not write her “if you are kidnapped I shall ransom you,” etc. “If she was kidnapped he is obligated to ransom her,” etc. It was stated: If a sister-in-law was kidnapped, the heirs do not have to ransom her. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: Not only if she was kidnapped when her husband was still alive but even if she was kidnapped after the husband’s death, the heirs do not have to ransom her. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Aḥa: The Mishnah supports Rav: “And bring you back as wife;” there is no “wife”.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:51

Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated: For any hurt which has a fixed medical fee, she is healed from her ketubah. If it does not have a fixed medical fee, she is healed from the estate. As the following: A woman came to Rebbi Joḥanan. He asked her: Did your doctor give a fixed price? She said, no. Did not Rebbi Ḥaggai say in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: “Do not turn yourself into an pleader,” that one shall not disclose the judgment to a party? He knew her to be honest.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:54

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, if he speaks about somebody who is a legal heir, his statements are valid, but about somebody who is not a legal heir, his statements are invalid.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Ben Beroqa spoke only about a son among sons or a (daughter) son among daughters, not about a daughter and brother or a brother among daughters. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There was a case and Rebbi decided following Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did they say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the reason? He asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did the Sages say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Are you not the one who stated “shall inherit”? (He said to him, you stated “shall take”; he came to him). He said to him, there is no “shall inherit” but “shall take”. When he came to his father, he said to him: you disadvantaged Nathan the Bablylonian; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is what he told him: I made an error in what I taught you; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is one of the leniencies of the ketubah stipulations. In general, a person can transfer rights only by a document; here even verbally. In general, a person cannot transfer rights to somebody not yet existing; here to the non-existing. Rebbi Jeremiah said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: I am wondering how the rabbis can compare ketubah to inheritance, for inheritance is a biblical law but ketubah is from their words; how can one argue this? Even if you say that ketubah is a biblical law, do they not agree that the stipulations of the ketubah are from their words?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:62

A man said when he was dying: “This man’s wife should be paid her ketubah.” The case came before Rebbi Mana, who said, let the words of the deceased be confirmed. Rebbi Ḥanina said to him: Can a person do away verbally with a ketubah stipulation? He answered, since you are saying that, what is your reason? He said to him, are we not living in Galilee? And we are taught to say that the people of Galilee prefer their honor over their money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:2

HALAKHAH: “Even though they said that a virgin collects 200,” etc. How does he become indebted to her? Do not Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, if somebody writes a debenture for another person under the assumption that he owes him and it turns out that he does not owe, [he does not have] to give to him! He wants to give much to be called X’s son-in-law. That is, if he decided this at the time of the preliminary marriage. What if he decided this at the time of the definitive marriage? He wants to give much for sexual relations with her, which are sweet. That is if he slept with her. If he did not sleep with her? He wants to give much for the acquisition he made. If he had decided at the preliminary marriage, at the definitive marriage, he already is called X’s son-in-law, sexual relations are nothing new, there is no new acquisition; from thereon he wants to give much that she should not change her mind. But can she? Was it not stated that “a man divorces only by his own will”? Rebbi Abin said, she makes his life miserable and he frees her.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:4

Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. How much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters and the son among the sons,” but only if it is a first marriage. This follows what Rebbi Ḥanania said: If somebody definitively married off his son in a house, the latter acquired the house, but only if it is a first marriage. Rebbi Hoshaia said, she acquired movables but did not acquire the house. Do they disagree? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Explain it that his father used it for storage. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It is needed in case what was stored was borrowed from the market. Rebbi Abbahu said, if he said it is loaned, he did not acquire it. There came a case before Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun and he instructed following Rebbi Abbahu. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, essentialy this has no basis but the rabbis build and add to it!

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:12

When the time came and they were not definitively married, they eat from his property and [do not] eat heave. If the husbands died, they eat from his property and eat heave. Samuel, the brother of Rebbi Berekhiah, said: Only if the time was up on a Wednesday. What if the time was up on Tuesday or Thursday? Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina and Levi: Both say that he is as if the Sages had jailed him. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, if the delay is his fault, she is fed from his property.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:16

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:16

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:19

Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, [the status] of her earnings is between them. Rebbi Meïr says, the earnings are susceptible to be dedicated from the first moment; Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian says, the earnings are not susceptible to be dedicated from the first moment. “What I shall inherit from my father (today) is sold to you, what I shall catch today in my trap is sold to you; his words are valid.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he takes out a loan for his father’s burial shrouds, if his father was sick or in mortal danger. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only if the trap was set. And Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But as a dedication it would not be sanctified. Why? Because of the disagreement of Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. One could say, there is a difference about the dedication, because the trap is not usually successful. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Do you remember that both you and Rebbi Jeremiah were saying in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Who stated about the dedication, because the trap is not usually successful? The disagreement of Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian! Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish has many a thought.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:25

“If she brought”. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, not only if she brought but even if she could have brought. As it was stated: His wife ascends with him but does not descend with him; a widow and her children descend but do not ascend; workers ascend but do not descend. The daughter neither ascends nor descends. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Jehudah said, because one cares for the slave girl. Rebbi Abun said, Because these labors are degrading, they are referred to as the slave girl’s. Rebbi Judah ben Rebbi Abun said, because usually a woman does not sit aimlessly in her house. Rav Huna said, even if she brought him 100 slave girls, he can force her to serve him with particular attention. What are services with particular attention? She rubs his body, washes his feet, and mixes him the cup. Why? Because she is obligated to do that, or because it is not appropriate to use a slave girl for these? If you say because it is not appropriate to use a slave girl for these, here she brought him slaves! It must be because she is obligated to do that. Rebbi Eudaimon in Sepphoris asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it not reasonable because she is obligated to do that? He said to him, that is what I am always thinking.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:25

“If she brought”. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, not only if she brought but even if she could have brought. As it was stated: His wife ascends with him but does not descend with him; a widow and her children descend but do not ascend; workers ascend but do not descend. The daughter neither ascends nor descends. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Jehudah said, because one cares for the slave girl. Rebbi Abun said, Because these labors are degrading, they are referred to as the slave girl’s. Rebbi Judah ben Rebbi Abun said, because usually a woman does not sit aimlessly in her house. Rav Huna said, even if she brought him 100 slave girls, he can force her to serve him with particular attention. What are services with particular attention? She rubs his body, washes his feet, and mixes him the cup. Why? Because she is obligated to do that, or because it is not appropriate to use a slave girl for these? If you say because it is not appropriate to use a slave girl for these, here she brought him slaves! It must be because she is obligated to do that. Rebbi Eudaimon in Sepphoris asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it not reasonable because she is obligated to do that? He said to him, that is what I am always thinking.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:25

“If she brought”. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, not only if she brought but even if she could have brought. As it was stated: His wife ascends with him but does not descend with him; a widow and her children descend but do not ascend; workers ascend but do not descend. The daughter neither ascends nor descends. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Jehudah said, because one cares for the slave girl. Rebbi Abun said, Because these labors are degrading, they are referred to as the slave girl’s. Rebbi Judah ben Rebbi Abun said, because usually a woman does not sit aimlessly in her house. Rav Huna said, even if she brought him 100 slave girls, he can force her to serve him with particular attention. What are services with particular attention? She rubs his body, washes his feet, and mixes him the cup. Why? Because she is obligated to do that, or because it is not appropriate to use a slave girl for these? If you say because it is not appropriate to use a slave girl for these, here she brought him slaves! It must be because she is obligated to do that. Rebbi Eudaimon in Sepphoris asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it not reasonable because she is obligated to do that? He said to him, that is what I am always thinking.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:25

“If she brought”. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, not only if she brought but even if she could have brought. As it was stated: His wife ascends with him but does not descend with him; a widow and her children descend but do not ascend; workers ascend but do not descend. The daughter neither ascends nor descends. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Jehudah said, because one cares for the slave girl. Rebbi Abun said, Because these labors are degrading, they are referred to as the slave girl’s. Rebbi Judah ben Rebbi Abun said, because usually a woman does not sit aimlessly in her house. Rav Huna said, even if she brought him 100 slave girls, he can force her to serve him with particular attention. What are services with particular attention? She rubs his body, washes his feet, and mixes him the cup. Why? Because she is obligated to do that, or because it is not appropriate to use a slave girl for these? If you say because it is not appropriate to use a slave girl for these, here she brought him slaves! It must be because she is obligated to do that. Rebbi Eudaimon in Sepphoris asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it not reasonable because she is obligated to do that? He said to him, that is what I am always thinking.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:25

“If she brought”. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, not only if she brought but even if she could have brought. As it was stated: His wife ascends with him but does not descend with him; a widow and her children descend but do not ascend; workers ascend but do not descend. The daughter neither ascends nor descends. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Jehudah said, because one cares for the slave girl. Rebbi Abun said, Because these labors are degrading, they are referred to as the slave girl’s. Rebbi Judah ben Rebbi Abun said, because usually a woman does not sit aimlessly in her house. Rav Huna said, even if she brought him 100 slave girls, he can force her to serve him with particular attention. What are services with particular attention? She rubs his body, washes his feet, and mixes him the cup. Why? Because she is obligated to do that, or because it is not appropriate to use a slave girl for these? If you say because it is not appropriate to use a slave girl for these, here she brought him slaves! It must be because she is obligated to do that. Rebbi Eudaimon in Sepphoris asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it not reasonable because she is obligated to do that? He said to him, that is what I am always thinking.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:27

MISHNAH: If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse, the House of Shammai say two weeks, the House of Hillel say one week. Students can go to study Torah for thirty days without permission; journeymen one week. The period mentioned in the Torah: People who do not have to work every day, journeymen twice a week, donkey drivers once a week, camel drivers once in thirty days, sailors once in three months, the words of Rebbi Eliezer.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:31

”The period mentioned in the Torah.” Some Tannaïm state: שְׁאֵר that is intercourse; עוֹנָה that is food. Some Tannaïm state: עוֹנָה that is intercourse; שְׁאֵר that is food. He who said שְׁאֵר is intercourse: “No person to the שְׁאֵר of his flesh;” עוֹנָה is food: “He fed you and made you hunger”. He who said שְׁאֵר is food: “He let rain on them שְׁאֵר like dust”; עוֹנָה that is intercourse, “that you should not deprive my daughters,” that refers to intercourse. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob explains the verse, “her flesh her garment”, that her garment should fit her flesh, that he should not give a young woman clothes of an old woman nor an old woman clothes of a young one. “Her garment her season”, that he should not give summer clothing for the rainy season nor that for the rainy season in summer. From where does he get food? Since he is not permitted to withhold from her things that are not necessities of life, not so much more things that are necessities of life! From where does he get the obligation of periodic intercourse? Since he may not withhold from her things which do not constitute the main reason for marriage, so certainly he may not withhold the things which constitute the main reason for marriage!

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:33

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is it reasonable to consider scholars like those who do not work? Rebbi Mana said, would it not be more reasonable to compare them to sailors since they exert themselves harder? Rav said, “she eats with him every Friday night”, in clean language.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:36

Following Rebbi Eliezer, how far can he deduct? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion for the husband of a preliminarily married woman, or a sick one, a menstruating woman or one who is waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him when she was having her period, the Torah made her rebel against him! But we must hold that she rebelled against him before she had her period and now she has it. At that moment she would not be able to rebel but you say one writes, therefore one also deducts. From where does one deduct? From the additions to her ketubah. Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose says, he continues to reduce, for maybe an inheritance will come to her from outside and he would be able to collect from it.” He mentioned only inheritance, which is infrequent. That means he deducts from the additions to he ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: One writes a bill of rebellion for a preliminarily married woman, but one does not write a bill of rebellion for one who is waiting for her levir. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that one writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married woman or one who is waiting for her levir? There, according to the first Mishnah, here according to the later Mishnah. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even if you say according to the later Mishnah, ”the later Court [instituted that] one warns her for four weeks, then she writes a receipt for her ketubah and leaves.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:42

HALAKHAH: “One gives her half a qab of legumes and half a qab of oil,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, a mina, i. e. four riṭl. He gives her a pillow, a light and wick, and an amphora, and a pot. Rebbi Yose said, she has no right to a pillow since the wives of poor men do not sleep on a pillow. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If she left over from her food, it is hers, if she left over rags they are his - if she left over rags they are hers. That is, of a married woman. But for a widow, both her leftover food and her leftover rags are hers.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:45

She has no claim to wine since poor Jewish women do not drink wine. Do rich women drink? Did we not state: It happened that the Sages assigned to Martha bat Boethos two se‘ah of wine every day. How can the court assign wine? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, because of “Whoring, wine, and cider will destroy the mind.” But did we not state: ”If she was nursing, one reduces the amount of her work and increases her food”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said wine, for it increases the milk. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Also they assigned it for cooking. Nevertheless, she cursed them and said to them, so you should give to your daughters. Rebbi Aḥa said, and we answered her, Amen. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ẓadoq said, I should not see consolation if I did not see her collecting barley grains between horses’ hooves at Acco. I quoted about her the verse: “The dainty one among you and the pampered, …” “If you have no experience, most beautiful of women, go following the flock …”. But did we not state: It happened that the Sages assigned to Miryam, the daughter of Simeon ben Gorion, a daily supply of perfume for 500 denar, when she was only waiting for her levir. Nevertheless, she cursed them and said to them, so you should give to your daughters. Rebbi Aḥa said, and we answered her, Amen. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ẓadoq said, I should not see consolation if I did not see her bound with her hair to a horse’s tail at Acco. I quoted about her the verse: “The dainty one among you and the pampered, …”.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:45

She has no claim to wine since poor Jewish women do not drink wine. Do rich women drink? Did we not state: It happened that the Sages assigned to Martha bat Boethos two se‘ah of wine every day. How can the court assign wine? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, because of “Whoring, wine, and cider will destroy the mind.” But did we not state: ”If she was nursing, one reduces the amount of her work and increases her food”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said wine, for it increases the milk. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Also they assigned it for cooking. Nevertheless, she cursed them and said to them, so you should give to your daughters. Rebbi Aḥa said, and we answered her, Amen. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ẓadoq said, I should not see consolation if I did not see her collecting barley grains between horses’ hooves at Acco. I quoted about her the verse: “The dainty one among you and the pampered, …” “If you have no experience, most beautiful of women, go following the flock …”. But did we not state: It happened that the Sages assigned to Miryam, the daughter of Simeon ben Gorion, a daily supply of perfume for 500 denar, when she was only waiting for her levir. Nevertheless, she cursed them and said to them, so you should give to your daughters. Rebbi Aḥa said, and we answered her, Amen. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ẓadoq said, I should not see consolation if I did not see her bound with her hair to a horse’s tail at Acco. I quoted about her the verse: “The dainty one among you and the pampered, …”.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:2

HALAKHAH: “What a woman finds or makes with her hands belongs to her husband,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: One said, this is everybody’s opinion, the other said it is in dispute. We do not know who said what. It is reasonable that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish should be the one who said it is in dispute since he explained that [the husband] provides her with food but does not give her a silver obolus as pocket money, and we did state: “If he does not give her a silver obolus as pocket money, what she makes with her hands is hers.” The work of her hands is parallel to what she finds. Rebbi Jacob bar Immi came in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is everybody’s opinion. That means that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish varies in his opinions.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:3

For whom is it needed? For Rebbi Meïr! Even though for Rebbi Meïr the hand of the slave is his master’s hand and if the wife acquired title the husband should have acquired it; he agrees that his rights over it are restricted to the use of the yield. There, we have stated: “The finds of his underage son and daughter or of his Canaanite slave or slave-girl as well as his wife’s find belong to him,” for he can direct them to do other work. Why do we say: “The finds of his adult son and daughter or of his Hebrew slave or slave-girl belong to them,” because he cannot direct them to do other work. But his wife he cannot direct to do other work and you say that her find belongs to him! Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is another reason for his wife. What is the other reason for his wife? Rebbi Ḥaggai says, because of quarrel. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but that she should not smuggle away any of her husband’s property and say, I found it. Think of it, if another person gave it to her as a gift! A gift is public knowledge, a find is not public knowledge. Think of it, if she found it in the presence of witnesses! This because of that. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, if they are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:3

For whom is it needed? For Rebbi Meïr! Even though for Rebbi Meïr the hand of the slave is his master’s hand and if the wife acquired title the husband should have acquired it; he agrees that his rights over it are restricted to the use of the yield. There, we have stated: “The finds of his underage son and daughter or of his Canaanite slave or slave-girl as well as his wife’s find belong to him,” for he can direct them to do other work. Why do we say: “The finds of his adult son and daughter or of his Hebrew slave or slave-girl belong to them,” because he cannot direct them to do other work. But his wife he cannot direct to do other work and you say that her find belongs to him! Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is another reason for his wife. What is the other reason for his wife? Rebbi Ḥaggai says, because of quarrel. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but that she should not smuggle away any of her husband’s property and say, I found it. Think of it, if another person gave it to her as a gift! A gift is public knowledge, a find is not public knowledge. Think of it, if she found it in the presence of witnesses! This because of that. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, if they are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:3

For whom is it needed? For Rebbi Meïr! Even though for Rebbi Meïr the hand of the slave is his master’s hand and if the wife acquired title the husband should have acquired it; he agrees that his rights over it are restricted to the use of the yield. There, we have stated: “The finds of his underage son and daughter or of his Canaanite slave or slave-girl as well as his wife’s find belong to him,” for he can direct them to do other work. Why do we say: “The finds of his adult son and daughter or of his Hebrew slave or slave-girl belong to them,” because he cannot direct them to do other work. But his wife he cannot direct to do other work and you say that her find belongs to him! Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is another reason for his wife. What is the other reason for his wife? Rebbi Ḥaggai says, because of quarrel. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but that she should not smuggle away any of her husband’s property and say, I found it. Think of it, if another person gave it to her as a gift! A gift is public knowledge, a find is not public knowledge. Think of it, if she found it in the presence of witnesses! This because of that. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, if they are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:3

For whom is it needed? For Rebbi Meïr! Even though for Rebbi Meïr the hand of the slave is his master’s hand and if the wife acquired title the husband should have acquired it; he agrees that his rights over it are restricted to the use of the yield. There, we have stated: “The finds of his underage son and daughter or of his Canaanite slave or slave-girl as well as his wife’s find belong to him,” for he can direct them to do other work. Why do we say: “The finds of his adult son and daughter or of his Hebrew slave or slave-girl belong to them,” because he cannot direct them to do other work. But his wife he cannot direct to do other work and you say that her find belongs to him! Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is another reason for his wife. What is the other reason for his wife? Rebbi Ḥaggai says, because of quarrel. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but that she should not smuggle away any of her husband’s property and say, I found it. Think of it, if another person gave it to her as a gift! A gift is public knowledge, a find is not public knowledge. Think of it, if she found it in the presence of witnesses! This because of that. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, if they are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:12

HALAKHAH: “If she decided to bring him money,” etc. “If she decided to bring him 500 denars by appraisal, he makes it 400. If he did not do that but made it 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts five denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 500 denars in coin, he makes it 750. If he did not do that but made them 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts six denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 1’000 zuz, he must turn them into fifteen minas. If he did not do that but wrote over to her a field worth 12 minas in place of the 1’000 zuz. If she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, one does not decrease for a virgin to less than 200 and for a widow to less than a mina.” Here, you say, he deducts. But there, you say, he does not deduct. Here, if she invalidated part of it, there if she did not invalidate part of it. Here, you say, he touches the addition but there, you say, he does not touch the addition. Here, he added but did not subtract; there, he subtracted but did not add. It was stated: Both for appraisal and for coin. Why for appraisal? Corresponding to what he subtracts, corresponding to what what he adds, corresponding to what she brings.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:12

HALAKHAH: “If she decided to bring him money,” etc. “If she decided to bring him 500 denars by appraisal, he makes it 400. If he did not do that but made it 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts five denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 500 denars in coin, he makes it 750. If he did not do that but made them 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts six denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 1’000 zuz, he must turn them into fifteen minas. If he did not do that but wrote over to her a field worth 12 minas in place of the 1’000 zuz. If she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, one does not decrease for a virgin to less than 200 and for a widow to less than a mina.” Here, you say, he deducts. But there, you say, he does not deduct. Here, if she invalidated part of it, there if she did not invalidate part of it. Here, you say, he touches the addition but there, you say, he does not touch the addition. Here, he added but did not subtract; there, he subtracted but did not add. It was stated: Both for appraisal and for coin. Why for appraisal? Corresponding to what he subtracts, corresponding to what what he adds, corresponding to what she brings.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:12

HALAKHAH: “If she decided to bring him money,” etc. “If she decided to bring him 500 denars by appraisal, he makes it 400. If he did not do that but made it 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts five denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 500 denars in coin, he makes it 750. If he did not do that but made them 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts six denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 1’000 zuz, he must turn them into fifteen minas. If he did not do that but wrote over to her a field worth 12 minas in place of the 1’000 zuz. If she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, one does not decrease for a virgin to less than 200 and for a widow to less than a mina.” Here, you say, he deducts. But there, you say, he does not deduct. Here, if she invalidated part of it, there if she did not invalidate part of it. Here, you say, he touches the addition but there, you say, he does not touch the addition. Here, he added but did not subtract; there, he subtracted but did not add. It was stated: Both for appraisal and for coin. Why for appraisal? Corresponding to what he subtracts, corresponding to what what he adds, corresponding to what she brings.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:20

If there were two daughters and one son; the first one took a tenth of the estate, but the son died before the second could take her tenth. Rebbi Ḥanina was of the opinion that the second takes a tenth of the estate and the rest they divide equally among themselves. Rebbi Joḥanan told him that in this case there was nothing else to provide for her, but here she may sell from the remainder and provide for herself! Rebbi Tebi in the name of Rebbi Joshia: The reason of Rebbi Ḥanina: If she can collect from encumbered real estate, from what lies before her not so much more? Rebbi Joḥanan sticks to his opinion, since Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina [and Rebbi Hila] collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked to be provided for. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans get up and complain, I would give it to them. Even so, they saw and did not complain. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yose: How do you decide in practical cases? He said to him, following Rebbi Ḥanina. And so an actual case was decided following Rebbi Ḥanina. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Hila: One considers the estate as if it were dry.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:23

”If somebody says, give my sons one šeqel per week and they need a tetradrachma, one gives them a tetradrachma. Do not give them more than one šeqel per week, one gives them a šeqel. But for the support of the wife and the daughters, whether he says give or do not give, one gives them a šeqel. It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, Meïr used to say, if somebody says, give my sons one šeqel per week and they need a tetradrachma, one gives them a šeqel, and for the remainder they should be provided for by charity. But the Sages say, one takes continuously until the property is used up and after that they should be provided by charity.” Rebbi Yose said, that gives a simple example for Ḥilfai’s question. He said, I shall sit on the river bank and if I cannot extract the teachings of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya from the Mishnah, throw me into the river. What could he say? “The trustee should execute what he was entrusted with.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:23

”If somebody says, give my sons one šeqel per week and they need a tetradrachma, one gives them a tetradrachma. Do not give them more than one šeqel per week, one gives them a šeqel. But for the support of the wife and the daughters, whether he says give or do not give, one gives them a šeqel. It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, Meïr used to say, if somebody says, give my sons one šeqel per week and they need a tetradrachma, one gives them a šeqel, and for the remainder they should be provided for by charity. But the Sages say, one takes continuously until the property is used up and after that they should be provided by charity.” Rebbi Yose said, that gives a simple example for Ḥilfai’s question. He said, I shall sit on the river bank and if I cannot extract the teachings of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya from the Mishnah, throw me into the river. What could he say? “The trustee should execute what he was entrusted with.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:24

”If they died, others should inherit.” Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person can transfer property rights in any language except with an expression of inheritance? One does not have here “they shall inherit” but “they shall take”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Do they not differ here in matters of a gift? If somebody signed over all his property to two persons at the same time; to one he wrote in the language of gift but to the other in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Eleazar said, since the one acquired in the language of gift, the other one acquired in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it seems that one did acquire in the language of gift but the other did not acquire in the language of inheritance Rebbi Phineas said, there came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar since Rebbi Eleazar stated a docrine but Rebbi Joḥanan said only “it seems”. Rebbi Samuel said, but did not Rebbi Meïr say that and it does not seem reasonable; is that nothing? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Assi: Carded firstling wool becomes insignificant in a plurality. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Sepphorean brought before Rebbi Ammi a pound in eight but the latter refused to rule since had not Rebbi Assi said, is that not a Mishnah? “If somebody weaves the length of a sîṭ of firstling’s wool in a cloth, the cloth must be burned, of hair of a nazir or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned”? The following Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote any expression of gift either at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his instructions are valid.” There, to one person in an expression of gift and to one an expression of inheritance. But here to each one both in the language of gift and the language of inheritance Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: But does he not prejudice the rights of others? He said to him, if there are no brothers. But does he not prejudice the rights of his paternal uncles? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel: A person prefers the good of his house over his relatives.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:3

He could appoint a provider, as the following: “X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do.” Let him appoint a provider! A woman has the right to say, it is impossible for me to be provided for by anybody other than my husband. But did we not state: “If somebody provides for his wife through a third party.” There, if she accepted it; here, if she did not accept it. If she did not accept it then he should not appoint even for one day! She continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow. Samuel says, if he vowed for thirty days. But if he vowed forever, he shall divorce immediately and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Avina in the name of Rav: Even if he vowed forever, she continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:3

He could appoint a provider, as the following: “X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do.” Let him appoint a provider! A woman has the right to say, it is impossible for me to be provided for by anybody other than my husband. But did we not state: “If somebody provides for his wife through a third party.” There, if she accepted it; here, if she did not accept it. If she did not accept it then he should not appoint even for one day! She continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow. Samuel says, if he vowed for thirty days. But if he vowed forever, he shall divorce immediately and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Avina in the name of Rav: Even if he vowed forever, she continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:14

HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits,” etc. ”If he made her vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since he gives her a bad reputation among her [female] neighbors. And so if she made a vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, she should leave without ketubah since she gives him a bad reputation among his [male] neighbors.” ”If he made her vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since tomorrow a relative of hers will die and nobody will take notice of her. And so if she made a vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, she should leave without ketubah since tomorrow a relative of his will die and nobody will take notice of him.” ”Rebbi Meïr is saying in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba: ‘It is better to pay condolence visits than to go to a wedding since the former is the end of every human, and the living should take notice.’ Why does the verse say, ‘and the living should take notice’? But do so they shall: eulogize so they should eulogize, bury so they should bury, accompany so they should accompany.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:27

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:27

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:29

The Mishnah deals with defects which do not spontaneously appear. But about defects which spontaneously appear, the husband has to bring proof and say that he stipulated about them.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:14

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited male and female slaves,” etc. The Mishnah speaks of those who do not work enough for their upkeep. But if they work enough for their upkeep, she does not have to sell because the glory of her father’s house still exists.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:20

HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid.” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:20

HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid.” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:21

Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Her heirs, those who inherit her ketubah are obliged to bury her. Rebbi Yose said, if Rebbi Hoshaia had not stated this, we would have had a problem. If she had no ketubah, do they not have to bury her? This is difficult. If a woman has no ketubah, does she not have to be buried? A wife, even if she has no ketubah, must be buried. This one, if she has a ketubah, is entitled to burial costs. But here, if she does not have a ketubah, she is not entitled to burial costs.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:26

HALAKHAH: “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:29

Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ decreed three things: That a person should use his wife’s ketubah in his business dealings. And that children have to go to school. Also, he decreed impurity for glass ware. But did not Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna say in the name of Rav Jeremiah: Yose ben Yo‘ezer from Ṣereda and Yose ben Joḥanan from Jerusalem decreed impurity for Gentile lands and glass ware; Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Jehudah bar Ṭabbai? Rebbi Jonah said, Jehudah bar Ṭabbai and Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ decreed on metal vessels; Hillel and Shammai decreed on the purity of hands. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Levi: That was the current practice; they forgot it, but the later ones got up and agreed to the opinion of the earlier ones to teach you that everything the Court insists on will come to be in the end just as Moses was told on Sinai; as Rebbi Mana said (Deut. 32:47): “For it is not an empty word, from you,” if it is empty it is from you because you do not exert yourself about it. “Because it is your life,” when is it your life? At the time that you exert yourself!

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:1

MISHNAH: If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” he receives their revenues and if she should die, he inherits from her. In this case, why did he write “I shall have nothing to do with your properties”? If she sold or gave away, it is valid. If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues,” he does not receive their revenues during her lifetime but if she should die, he inherits from her. Rebbi Jehudah says, he continues to receive the investment results of her revenues unless he writes: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues, without limits.” If he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not receive the revenues during her lifetime and does not inherit from her after her death. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:1

MISHNAH: If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” he receives their revenues and if she should die, he inherits from her. In this case, why did he write “I shall have nothing to do with your properties”? If she sold or gave away, it is valid. If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues,” he does not receive their revenues during her lifetime but if she should die, he inherits from her. Rebbi Jehudah says, he continues to receive the investment results of her revenues unless he writes: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues, without limits.” If he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not receive the revenues during her lifetime and does not inherit from her after her death. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:1

MISHNAH: If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” he receives their revenues and if she should die, he inherits from her. In this case, why did he write “I shall have nothing to do with your properties”? If she sold or gave away, it is valid. If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues,” he does not receive their revenues during her lifetime but if she should die, he inherits from her. Rebbi Jehudah says, he continues to receive the investment results of her revenues unless he writes: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues, without limits.” If he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not receive the revenues during her lifetime and does not inherit from her after her death. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:1

MISHNAH: If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” he receives their revenues and if she should die, he inherits from her. In this case, why did he write “I shall have nothing to do with your properties”? If she sold or gave away, it is valid. If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues,” he does not receive their revenues during her lifetime but if she should die, he inherits from her. Rebbi Jehudah says, he continues to receive the investment results of her revenues unless he writes: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues, without limits.” If he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not receive the revenues during her lifetime and does not inherit from her after her death. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:1

MISHNAH: If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” he receives their revenues and if she should die, he inherits from her. In this case, why did he write “I shall have nothing to do with your properties”? If she sold or gave away, it is valid. If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues,” he does not receive their revenues during her lifetime but if she should die, he inherits from her. Rebbi Jehudah says, he continues to receive the investment results of her revenues unless he writes: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues, without limits.” If he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not receive the revenues during her lifetime and does not inherit from her after her death. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:4

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:4

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.