does
8640 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “In any case where there is knowledge at the start,” etc. From where that we require knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between? The verse says, it was forgotten, it was forgotten two times; this implies that he had knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between. So far for Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? For Rebbi Ismael [argues] like Rebbi. As Rebbi said, it was forgotten by him, this implies that he knows. “But he knew,” there is knowledge two times. Hence Rebbi Ismael [argues] like Rebbi, and Rebbi like Rebbi Ismael. This comes even according to Rebbi Aqiba; it is the same for knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of the Sanctuary as for knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of sancta. But some want to understand it from the following: He knew and felt guilty. Was it not already said, he became impure and felt guilty? But if it does not refer to knowledge at the beginning, let it refer to knowledge at the end.
Rebbi Bun asked, if he did not know at the end, how could be bring a sacrifice? But if it does not refer to knowledge at the end, let it refer to knowledge at the beginning. They objected: Is it not written, or his transgression came to his knowledge, he has to bring? Then if it does not refer to knowledge at the beginning, let it refer to knowledge at the end! Explain it as referring to those who are obligated for certain purification and reparation offerings for which the Day of Atonement has passed who have to bring after the day of Atonement, while those obligated for suspended reparation sacrifices are no longer liable. The verse says, or his transgression came to his knowledge, he has to bring even after the Day of Atonement.
Rebbi Bun asked, if he did not know at the end, how could be bring a sacrifice? But if it does not refer to knowledge at the end, let it refer to knowledge at the beginning. They objected: Is it not written, or his transgression came to his knowledge, he has to bring? Then if it does not refer to knowledge at the beginning, let it refer to knowledge at the end! Explain it as referring to those who are obligated for certain purification and reparation offerings for which the Day of Atonement has passed who have to bring after the day of Atonement, while those obligated for suspended reparation sacrifices are no longer liable. The verse says, or his transgression came to his knowledge, he has to bring even after the Day of Atonement.
Rebbi Ḥanina said before Rebbi Mana: Did you learn this from foreign worship? Then one should learn from foreign worship that for everything one needs one knowledge! He told him, foreign worship requires a fixed value [sacrifice] but the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta an increasing or decreasing one. One cannot infer about a fixed value [sacrifice] from an increasing and decreasing one, nor for an increasing or decreasing from a fixed value one. How did you understand to say that the verse speaks about impurity of Sanctuary sancta? It is said here an impure animal and it is said further on an impure animal. Since an impure animal mentioned there is about impurity of Sanctuary sancta, so an impure animal mentioned here is about impurity of Sanctuary sancta. Not only Sanctuary sancta; from where the impurity of the Sanctuary? “The verse says: his impurity is on him. How did you understand to explain it? About an impure person who ate pure [meat], or a pure person who ate impure [meat]? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi says, he ate, his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi Ḥiyya says, sancta are mentioned in the plural but impurity is mentioned in the singular. How can I uphold his impurity is on him? Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi Meїr says, the verse only speaks of one from whom impurity separates. This excludes meat from which impurity does not separate.”
If it is so, what does the Day of Atonement help him? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, the Day of Atonement acts for him as a suspended reparation sacrifice. In he died before the day of Atonement, the sin is in her. After the day of Atonement it already was atoned for.
HALAKHAH: “If there is no knowledge at the start,” etc. What can you see to say? Does the one inside suspend and the one outside atone, or the one outside suspend and the one inside atone, or both of them suspend, or both of them atone? What about it? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, I saw something. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish was asking before Rebbi Joḥanan and asked him, what are the differences in atoning? I do not know what he answered him. Rebbi Ze`ira said to him, maybe it is the following: How did you understand to explain it? About an impure person who ate pure [meat], or a pure person who ate impure [meat]? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Or both of them atone? What about it? He should over it confess sins, these are intentional sins, their crimes, these are rebellions, their mistakes, these are unintentional sins. Then He said, he will atone. Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the he-goat will carry all their sins, he grabbed intentional sins and left out unintentional sins, to indicate that just as intentional sins do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice, so those unintentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. And why did they come here? Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa, for suspension. Would it be understood to suspend for those who eat abominations and crawling things? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: Their mistakes, their mistakes. Since their mistakes mentioned there are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice, also their mistakes mentioned here are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice. This excludes intentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. What is left out by the he-goat brought inside the Day of Atonement suspends. What did it leave out? If there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end.
HALAKHAH: “But about where there is no knowledge,” etc. Halakhah 5: “Rebbi Simeon used to say,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah is and one goat’s he-goat sin offering for the Eternal. This he-goat atones for a sin known only to the Eternal. I have not only the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon; from where the he-goats of the holidays? Rebbi Ze`ira said, and a he-goat, the copula adds to the prior subject. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He gave it to you to lift the sins of the congregation. Where do we hold? If about Naḥshon’s he-goat, it atoned for his tribe. If about the he-goat of the Day of (Atonement), there is nothing similar in later generations. But we must deal with the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon. What about it? It is said here “lifting sin” and it is said there “lifting sin”, Aaron shall lift the sin of the sancta”. Since there it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers, also here it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers. What did you see to say, “for the pure person who ate impure”, maybe we should say for the impure person who ate pure? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, Rebbi Jehudah splits the argument of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Simeon splits the argument of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that the he-goat brought inside does not atone; rather it suspends. This parallels Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, he shall make it a purification offering. He fixed it for suspension, that it could not be changed.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: The one who stands before the Ark on New Year’s holiday does not have to mention the New Moon. Rebbi Aḥa bar Pappus said, it was stated thus: “The one who stands before the Ark on New Year’s holiday in the morning, the House of Shammai say, he prays eight [benedictions], but the House of Hillel say seven. For musaf, the House of Shammai say ten, but the House of Hillel say nine.” Should he not say eleven? Rebbi Yose said, where do they disagree? In a matter which needs a separate benediction. But here even on a weekday he simply includes it. So he should mention it in “Service”. Rebbi Yose asked, since the two he-goats of New Year’s day come because of the New Moon, why do you say that he does not have to mention the New Moon? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, does Rebbi Abba bar Mamal not ask correctly? As it was stated: “The two lambs of Pentecost and the two he-goats of New Year’s Day.” If the first atoned, what does the second atone for? For impurity that happened between them. Is that not Rebbi Simeon’s? And Rebbi Simeon splits atoning. But if both of them were for the New Moon? Rebbi Abba Mari said, you cannot do that, since it is written, in addition to the elevation offering of the month. In addition, from what we have stated, “twelve for the twelve months of the year.” A patrician stood before the Ark and did not mention the New Moon; they praised him. Rav Hoshaia asked: think of it, if they slaughtered both of them simultaneously? What impurity happened between them? Rebbi Bun said, if all of Israel are proper, would they not bring what the Torah prescribed for them?
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: The one who stands before the Ark on New Year’s holiday does not have to mention the New Moon. Rebbi Aḥa bar Pappus said, it was stated thus: “The one who stands before the Ark on New Year’s holiday in the morning, the House of Shammai say, he prays eight [benedictions], but the House of Hillel say seven. For musaf, the House of Shammai say ten, but the House of Hillel say nine.” Should he not say eleven? Rebbi Yose said, where do they disagree? In a matter which needs a separate benediction. But here even on a weekday he simply includes it. So he should mention it in “Service”. Rebbi Yose asked, since the two he-goats of New Year’s day come because of the New Moon, why do you say that he does not have to mention the New Moon? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, does Rebbi Abba bar Mamal not ask correctly? As it was stated: “The two lambs of Pentecost and the two he-goats of New Year’s Day.” If the first atoned, what does the second atone for? For impurity that happened between them. Is that not Rebbi Simeon’s? And Rebbi Simeon splits atoning. But if both of them were for the New Moon? Rebbi Abba Mari said, you cannot do that, since it is written, in addition to the elevation offering of the month. In addition, from what we have stated, “twelve for the twelve months of the year.” A patrician stood before the Ark and did not mention the New Moon; they praised him. Rav Hoshaia asked: think of it, if they slaughtered both of them simultaneously? What impurity happened between them? Rebbi Bun said, if all of Israel are proper, would they not bring what the Torah prescribed for them?
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: The one who stands before the Ark on New Year’s holiday does not have to mention the New Moon. Rebbi Aḥa bar Pappus said, it was stated thus: “The one who stands before the Ark on New Year’s holiday in the morning, the House of Shammai say, he prays eight [benedictions], but the House of Hillel say seven. For musaf, the House of Shammai say ten, but the House of Hillel say nine.” Should he not say eleven? Rebbi Yose said, where do they disagree? In a matter which needs a separate benediction. But here even on a weekday he simply includes it. So he should mention it in “Service”. Rebbi Yose asked, since the two he-goats of New Year’s day come because of the New Moon, why do you say that he does not have to mention the New Moon? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, does Rebbi Abba bar Mamal not ask correctly? As it was stated: “The two lambs of Pentecost and the two he-goats of New Year’s Day.” If the first atoned, what does the second atone for? For impurity that happened between them. Is that not Rebbi Simeon’s? And Rebbi Simeon splits atoning. But if both of them were for the New Moon? Rebbi Abba Mari said, you cannot do that, since it is written, in addition to the elevation offering of the month. In addition, from what we have stated, “twelve for the twelve months of the year.” A patrician stood before the Ark and did not mention the New Moon; they praised him. Rav Hoshaia asked: think of it, if they slaughtered both of them simultaneously? What impurity happened between them? Rebbi Bun said, if all of Israel are proper, would they not bring what the Torah prescribed for them?
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: The one who stands before the Ark on New Year’s holiday does not have to mention the New Moon. Rebbi Aḥa bar Pappus said, it was stated thus: “The one who stands before the Ark on New Year’s holiday in the morning, the House of Shammai say, he prays eight [benedictions], but the House of Hillel say seven. For musaf, the House of Shammai say ten, but the House of Hillel say nine.” Should he not say eleven? Rebbi Yose said, where do they disagree? In a matter which needs a separate benediction. But here even on a weekday he simply includes it. So he should mention it in “Service”. Rebbi Yose asked, since the two he-goats of New Year’s day come because of the New Moon, why do you say that he does not have to mention the New Moon? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, does Rebbi Abba bar Mamal not ask correctly? As it was stated: “The two lambs of Pentecost and the two he-goats of New Year’s Day.” If the first atoned, what does the second atone for? For impurity that happened between them. Is that not Rebbi Simeon’s? And Rebbi Simeon splits atoning. But if both of them were for the New Moon? Rebbi Abba Mari said, you cannot do that, since it is written, in addition to the elevation offering of the month. In addition, from what we have stated, “twelve for the twelve months of the year.” A patrician stood before the Ark and did not mention the New Moon; they praised him. Rav Hoshaia asked: think of it, if they slaughtered both of them simultaneously? What impurity happened between them? Rebbi Bun said, if all of Israel are proper, would they not bring what the Torah prescribed for them?
HALAKHAH: “They said to him, did not the teacher use to say,” etc. Rebbi Yose the Southerner said before Rebbi Jonah: Would it not have been necessary to state, if it is so then those of the Days of the New Moon could be brought on the Day of Atonement since one increases holiness but one does not diminish; but those of the Day of Atonement cannot be brought on the Days of the New Moon since one does not diminish holiness. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Bun explained it by another explanation: if it is so then those of the Day of Atonement could be brought on the Days of the New Moon, for included in their atoning is the atoning of the Days of the New Moon, but those of the days of the New Moon cannot be brought on the Day of Atonement, for they atone only their atonement. For if anybody ate five olive-sized pieces of fat and dedicated four sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated five, did he atone? Or if he ate four olive sized pieces of fat, dedicated five sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated four, not so much more? And so “Rebbi Simeon used to say, thirty-two rams are brought for the public every year. Thirty one outside, they are eaten. One inside which is not eaten. And the scapegoat. Twelve for the twelve months of the year. Eight on Tabernacles, seven on Passover, two on Pentecost, one for the day and one for the bread. One on New Year’s Day and one on the Day of Atonement.” When Moses heard this he said, it follows that anybody for whom the doubt of a transgression arises should bring all these sacrifices! Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: When the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Moses, he shall confess on it etc., he started and said, A Song of confession, inspired by he shall confess on it.
HALAKHAH: “They said to him, did not the teacher use to say,” etc. Rebbi Yose the Southerner said before Rebbi Jonah: Would it not have been necessary to state, if it is so then those of the Days of the New Moon could be brought on the Day of Atonement since one increases holiness but one does not diminish; but those of the Day of Atonement cannot be brought on the Days of the New Moon since one does not diminish holiness. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Bun explained it by another explanation: if it is so then those of the Day of Atonement could be brought on the Days of the New Moon, for included in their atoning is the atoning of the Days of the New Moon, but those of the days of the New Moon cannot be brought on the Day of Atonement, for they atone only their atonement. For if anybody ate five olive-sized pieces of fat and dedicated four sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated five, did he atone? Or if he ate four olive sized pieces of fat, dedicated five sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated four, not so much more? And so “Rebbi Simeon used to say, thirty-two rams are brought for the public every year. Thirty one outside, they are eaten. One inside which is not eaten. And the scapegoat. Twelve for the twelve months of the year. Eight on Tabernacles, seven on Passover, two on Pentecost, one for the day and one for the bread. One on New Year’s Day and one on the Day of Atonement.” When Moses heard this he said, it follows that anybody for whom the doubt of a transgression arises should bring all these sacrifices! Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: When the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Moses, he shall confess on it etc., he started and said, A Song of confession, inspired by he shall confess on it.
A positive commandment, even if he did not repent. A prohibition? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, only if he repented. If one said, “the elevation offering does not atone,” does the elevation offering not atone? It atones even against his will. If one said, “the Day of Atonement does not atone,” does the Day of Atonement not atone? It atones even against his will. “I cannot accept that it atone for me,” it does not atone against his will. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Hillel said, the opposite is reasonable. It is not up to a person to tell the King, “you do not reign.”
A positive commandment, even if he did not repent. A prohibition? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, only if he repented. If one said, “the elevation offering does not atone,” does the elevation offering not atone? It atones even against his will. If one said, “the Day of Atonement does not atone,” does the Day of Atonement not atone? It atones even against his will. “I cannot accept that it atone for me,” it does not atone against his will. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Hillel said, the opposite is reasonable. It is not up to a person to tell the King, “you do not reign.”
A positive commandment, even if he did not repent. A prohibition? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, only if he repented. If one said, “the elevation offering does not atone,” does the elevation offering not atone? It atones even against his will. If one said, “the Day of Atonement does not atone,” does the Day of Atonement not atone? It atones even against his will. “I cannot accept that it atone for me,” it does not atone against his will. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Hillel said, the opposite is reasonable. It is not up to a person to tell the King, “you do not reign.”
A positive commandment, even if he did not repent. A prohibition? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, only if he repented. If one said, “the elevation offering does not atone,” does the elevation offering not atone? It atones even against his will. If one said, “the Day of Atonement does not atone,” does the Day of Atonement not atone? It atones even against his will. “I cannot accept that it atone for me,” it does not atone against his will. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Hillel said, the opposite is reasonable. It is not up to a person to tell the King, “you do not reign.”
A positive commandment, even if he did not repent. A prohibition? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, only if he repented. If one said, “the elevation offering does not atone,” does the elevation offering not atone? It atones even against his will. If one said, “the Day of Atonement does not atone,” does the Day of Atonement not atone? It atones even against his will. “I cannot accept that it atone for me,” it does not atone against his will. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Hillel said, the opposite is reasonable. It is not up to a person to tell the King, “you do not reign.”
Rebbi says, the Day of Atonement atones for all sins against the Torah except for him who tears away the yoke, or who breaks the Covenant, or who finds aspects in the Torah, where it atones if he repented but does not atone otherwise. Rebbi Zebida said: Rebbi Yasa asked: Does Rebbi think that the Day of Atonement atones without repentance? There came Rebbi Ashian, Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Day of Atonement atones without repentance, and death cleanses without repentance. We have stated thus: The day of death equals repentance. Who stated this? Rebbi! Then what we stated, “death and the Day of Atonement atone with repentance,” does not follow Rebbi.
Rebbi says, the Day of Atonement atones for all sins against the Torah except for him who tears away the yoke, or who breaks the Covenant, or who finds aspects in the Torah, where it atones if he repented but does not atone otherwise. Rebbi Zebida said: Rebbi Yasa asked: Does Rebbi think that the Day of Atonement atones without repentance? There came Rebbi Ashian, Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Day of Atonement atones without repentance, and death cleanses without repentance. We have stated thus: The day of death equals repentance. Who stated this? Rebbi! Then what we stated, “death and the Day of Atonement atone with repentance,” does not follow Rebbi.
Rebbi says, the Day of Atonement atones for all sins against the Torah except for him who tears away the yoke, or who breaks the Covenant, or who finds aspects in the Torah, where it atones if he repented but does not atone otherwise. Rebbi Zebida said: Rebbi Yasa asked: Does Rebbi think that the Day of Atonement atones without repentance? There came Rebbi Ashian, Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Day of Atonement atones without repentance, and death cleanses without repentance. We have stated thus: The day of death equals repentance. Who stated this? Rebbi! Then what we stated, “death and the Day of Atonement atone with repentance,” does not follow Rebbi.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Ismael, and Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say that the scapegoat pardons. How does it pardon? Rebbi Ze`ira said, by and by. Rebbi Ḥanania said, at the end. What is between them? If somebody died in-between. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira, he already was pardoned. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥanina, he was not pardoned. Rebbi Ze`ira said, a baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina: There is strength in the he-goat which is not in the Day of Atonement, and in the Day of Atonement which is not in the he-goat: The Day of Atonement pardons without a he-goat, but the he-goat does not atone without the Day of Atonement. The he-goat pardons immediately but the Day of Atonement only at nightfall. Rebbi Huna said, the question was raised before Rebbi Jeremiah and he said, explain it if they intended to bring another he-goat but they did not bring it. Rebbi Yose said, but does the Holy One, praise to Him, not see into the future? Then He should pardon immediately.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Ismael, and Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say that the scapegoat pardons. How does it pardon? Rebbi Ze`ira said, by and by. Rebbi Ḥanania said, at the end. What is between them? If somebody died in-between. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira, he already was pardoned. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥanina, he was not pardoned. Rebbi Ze`ira said, a baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina: There is strength in the he-goat which is not in the Day of Atonement, and in the Day of Atonement which is not in the he-goat: The Day of Atonement pardons without a he-goat, but the he-goat does not atone without the Day of Atonement. The he-goat pardons immediately but the Day of Atonement only at nightfall. Rebbi Huna said, the question was raised before Rebbi Jeremiah and he said, explain it if they intended to bring another he-goat but they did not bring it. Rebbi Yose said, but does the Holy One, praise to Him, not see into the future? Then He should pardon immediately.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Ismael, and Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say that the scapegoat pardons. How does it pardon? Rebbi Ze`ira said, by and by. Rebbi Ḥanania said, at the end. What is between them? If somebody died in-between. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira, he already was pardoned. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥanina, he was not pardoned. Rebbi Ze`ira said, a baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina: There is strength in the he-goat which is not in the Day of Atonement, and in the Day of Atonement which is not in the he-goat: The Day of Atonement pardons without a he-goat, but the he-goat does not atone without the Day of Atonement. The he-goat pardons immediately but the Day of Atonement only at nightfall. Rebbi Huna said, the question was raised before Rebbi Jeremiah and he said, explain it if they intended to bring another he-goat but they did not bring it. Rebbi Yose said, but does the Holy One, praise to Him, not see into the future? Then He should pardon immediately.
Rebbi Jeremiah said that Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: Justice protects the one on the straight path. Evil deeds will pursue the sinner. He will watch over the feet of His pious ones. While He makes scoffers targets of scoffing. Fences are made fences and doors doors. Is it so that fences make fences and doors doors? But so it is: Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: If a person is careful the first, second, and third times not to commit a sin, then the Holy One, praise to Him, will watch over him, as it is said, all this God will do twice, three times with a man. Rebbi Ze`ira said, but only if the person does not revert [to sin]. What is the reason? It does not say the triple thread “will never snap” but rather will not quickly snap. If you work on it, it will split.
Rebbi Jeremiah said that Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: Justice protects the one on the straight path. Evil deeds will pursue the sinner. He will watch over the feet of His pious ones. While He makes scoffers targets of scoffing. Fences are made fences and doors doors. Is it so that fences make fences and doors doors? But so it is: Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: If a person is careful the first, second, and third times not to commit a sin, then the Holy One, praise to Him, will watch over him, as it is said, all this God will do twice, three times with a man. Rebbi Ze`ira said, but only if the person does not revert [to sin]. What is the reason? It does not say the triple thread “will never snap” but rather will not quickly snap. If you work on it, it will split.
Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?
Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?
Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?
HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.
HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.
One ate five times the volume of an olive; he separately realized a doubt about each one. Afterwards it became known to him as a certainty. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that for the Anointed Priest the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of purification sacrifice. What is the reason? Like purification offering, like reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt determines the transgression for one who brings a suspended reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt does not determine the transgression for one who does not bring a suspended reparation offering.
One ate five times the volume of an olive; he separately realized a doubt about each one. Afterwards it became known to him as a certainty. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that for the Anointed Priest the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of purification sacrifice. What is the reason? Like purification offering, like reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt determines the transgression for one who brings a suspended reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt does not determine the transgression for one who does not bring a suspended reparation offering.
One ate five times the volume of an olive; he separately realized a doubt about each one. Afterwards it became known to him as a certainty. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that for the Anointed Priest the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of purification sacrifice. What is the reason? Like purification offering, like reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt determines the transgression for one who brings a suspended reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt does not determine the transgression for one who does not bring a suspended reparation offering.
One ate five times the volume of an olive; he separately realized a doubt about each one. Afterwards it became known to him as a certainty. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that for the Anointed Priest the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of purification sacrifice. What is the reason? Like purification offering, like reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt determines the transgression for one who brings a suspended reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt does not determine the transgression for one who does not bring a suspended reparation offering.
The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted. There he says, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression. But here he says, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression. There, his reparation offering determines it. Here what do you have?
The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There, he said, if part of the sin was atoned, all of the sin was atoned. And here he says so? Rebbi Joḥanan said this only for the last realization which does not require any sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.
Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.
If he went to immerse himself for a minor impurity and a severe impurity was additional, it does not count for him for the severe impurity. In which respect? If he immersed himself and then entered the Sanctuary he is liable. Therefore not for a severe impurity and a severe impurity was additional. Therefore not for a minor impurity and a minor impurity was additional. If he went to immerse himself for severe impurity and tree limbs and wall extensions were additional are these like severe impurity since Rebbi Joḥanan said that for heave all of them are [impure] from the Torah, or are they like minor impurity since the nazir does not shave because of them?
If he went to immerse himself for a minor impurity and a severe impurity was additional, it does not count for him for the severe impurity. In which respect? If he immersed himself and then entered the Sanctuary he is liable. Therefore not for a severe impurity and a severe impurity was additional. Therefore not for a minor impurity and a minor impurity was additional. If he went to immerse himself for severe impurity and tree limbs and wall extensions were additional are these like severe impurity since Rebbi Joḥanan said that for heave all of them are [impure] from the Torah, or are they like minor impurity since the nazir does not shave because of them?
HALAKHAH: “If one became impure in the Temple courtyard,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: One verse says, he defiled the dwelling place of the Eternal, another verse says, he defiled the Sanctuary of the Eternal. Why is this? To state a difference between one who became inside and one who became outside. If he became impure (inside) not unless he bring his head and most of his body inside; if he became impure (outside) not unless he stay for prostrating. If he became impure inside and entered further inside? Let us hear from the following: “If he prostrated himself, or tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” If he tarried, is that not as if he brought his head and most of his body inside, but you are saying, “he tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” And here, not unless he tarried that he could have prostrated himself. How is that? About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the first. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, leave, and you say about the first? But we must hold about the last.
There, we have stated: “They removed the cup and the censer for him”. About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the last. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, enter, and you say about the last? But we must hold about the first.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.
Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.
Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.
Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.
Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.
Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not drink,” etc. In this case, Rebbi Simeon declares not liable. Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, as we have stated there: “How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats an ant is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does Rebbi Simeon declare not liable? Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: You shall deprive yourselves, of what is permitted to you, not of what is forbidden to you.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not drink,” etc. In this case, Rebbi Simeon declares not liable. Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, as we have stated there: “How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats an ant is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does Rebbi Simeon declare not liable? Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: You shall deprive yourselves, of what is permitted to you, not of what is forbidden to you.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
“An oath that I shall eat this loaf; an oath that I shall not eat it.” The first one is a blurted oath, the second a vain oath. How does one deal with him? One tells him to eat; it is better to break a vain oath than a blurted one.
“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf; an oath that I shall eat it.” The first one is a blurted oath, the second a vain oath. How does one deal with him? One tells him not to eat; it is better to break a vain oath than to break a vain and a blurted one.
This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.
This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.
This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.
This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.
HALAKHAH: “An oath about testimony,” etc. Rams, the minimum of rams are two. Why does the verse say two? That they be equal.
Sheep, the minimum of sheep are two. Then why does the verse say two? That both be equal.
The minimum of birds are two. Then why does the verse say two? that both be equal.
The minimum of trumpets are two. Then why does the verse say two? that both be equal.
Rebbi Ḥaggai objected to Rebbi Yose. Is there not written: The two men shall stand? Now, is not two the minimum of “men”? Why does the verse say two? That both be equal? But it is written: Do not bend the lawsuit of the proselyte, the orphan, … That means that a proselyte can have a lawsuit against one who is not a proselyte, an orphan may have a lawsuit against one who is not an orphan, a widow against a married woman. Then why is there written two? It is free to be combined and to infer from it an equal cut. It is said here two and it is said there two men were left. Since there one speaks of men but not women nor underaged, also here men but not women nor underaged. From this we learn that a woman may not be a judge; consequently a woman may not be a witness.
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Yose. It is said here two and it is said there by the mouth of two witnesses. Since there it must be by the testimony of two witnesses, also here by the testimony of two witnesses. Then why does the verse say two? Lest one of them be standing while the other be sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. With one he puts up, to the other he is unfriendly.
It is written: Fathers shall not be killed because of sons. Is it not already written, each one should be killed for his own crime? Why does the verse say, fathers shall not be killed because of sons? Fathers shall not be killed on the testimony of sons, and sons shall not be killed on testimony of fathers. From here that witnesses shall not be relatives of the accused.
“To qualified but not to disqualified ones.” For it is said, if he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, the other would have to pay money. This excludes one where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
“Before the court.” To exclude a single witness. If they told him that they would accept his word as if there were two witnesses, from where? The verse says, if he was a witness, had seen or known; if he does not tell he shall bear his punishment. One who is qualified to testify according to biblical standards; this excludes a single witness who is not qualified to testify.
“Outside of court.” If he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, one would have to pay money. This excludes outside of court where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “Where is my ox?” He responded, “I do not know what you are referring to.” Rebbi declares him not liable for a keeper’s oath but liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In the rabbis’ opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: in error, a sacrifice; intentional, a sacrifice. But if he said, I was of the opinion that this oath does not exist, he is free. Ḥizqiah stated: At any place where the Torah mentions sin without attribute you include intentional equally with unintentional unless Scripture inform you that it is unintentional.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.
“I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, there is no money when there is flogging. He explains it following Rebbi Meїr who said, he is flogged and he pays. In any case he did not make him lose money. Is it not that since he wanted to give him but did not give to him; it is as if he made him lose money.
Why? Because he does not know them, or because he does not intend to ask them? What is the difference between them? If he obligated them in pairs of two. If you would say because he does not know them, he knows them. Therefore the reason only can be that he does not intend to ask them.
Why? Because he does not know them, or because he does not intend to ask them? What is the difference between them? If he obligated them in pairs of two. If you would say because he does not know them, he knows them. Therefore the reason only can be that he does not intend to ask them.
Why? Because he does not know them, or because he does not intend to ask them? What is the difference between them? If he obligated them in pairs of two. If you would say because he does not know them, he knows them. Therefore the reason only can be that he does not intend to ask them.
Why? Because he does not know them, or because he does not intend to ask them? What is the difference between them? If he obligated them in pairs of two. If you would say because he does not know them, he knows them. Therefore the reason only can be that he does not intend to ask them.
HALAKHAH: “If he said to two persons, I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Rebbi Mana understood it from the following, “or one of them was a relative or disqualified.” Therefore, unless one of them was a relative or disqualified, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them. Rebbi Yose understood it from the preceding, “since the oath preceded the testimony.” Therefore, if the oath did not precede the testimony, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them.
HALAKHAH: “If he said to two persons, I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Rebbi Mana understood it from the following, “or one of them was a relative or disqualified.” Therefore, unless one of them was a relative or disqualified, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them. Rebbi Yose understood it from the preceding, “since the oath preceded the testimony.” Therefore, if the oath did not precede the testimony, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them.
HALAKHAH: “If he sent through his slave,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, why does the verse say, if he does not tell, he has to carry his iniquity? Not, from the mouth of the claimant. Our Mishnah needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, and what Rebbi Eleazar said needs our Mishnah. If we had stated but Rebbi Eleazar had not stated, we would have said that they are liable if they had heard from the claimant but had sworn to the defendant. Therefore what Rebbi Eleazar said is necessary. If Rebbi Eleazar had stated but we had not stated, we would have instructed that they are liable if they heard it from the defendant but had sworn to the claimant. Therefore one needs our Mishnah and needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they heard from the claimant and swore to the claimant.
HALAKHAH: “If he sent through his slave,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, why does the verse say, if he does not tell, he has to carry his iniquity? Not, from the mouth of the claimant. Our Mishnah needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, and what Rebbi Eleazar said needs our Mishnah. If we had stated but Rebbi Eleazar had not stated, we would have said that they are liable if they had heard from the claimant but had sworn to the defendant. Therefore what Rebbi Eleazar said is necessary. If Rebbi Eleazar had stated but we had not stated, we would have instructed that they are liable if they heard it from the defendant but had sworn to the claimant. Therefore one needs our Mishnah and needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they heard from the claimant and swore to the claimant.
HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.
HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.
HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.
Rebbi La: Both Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying, there is no ”witnesses “here. Why? Because they might die. But might not a document be lost? Therefore, the reason can only be that they might forget their testimony. There, we have stated: “Where is my ox? He told him, it is lost. I want you to swear, he said, Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed himself, he has to pay the value, and the fifth, and the reparation sacrifice.” The Mishnah [applies] if he does not know that there are witnesses. He comes to tell you, even if he knows that there are witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group reneged and after this the second, both are liable.” One understands that the first group becomes liable. Why the second? Not because they might forget their testimony? [Here also, because they (are commanded) to forget their testimony.]
Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Eleazar, only if he mentioned “oath” at the start and at the end. The words of the Sages, if he mentioned “oath” at the start but not at the end. Or if he mentioned it at the end but not at the start in the opinion of the rabbis he brings a sacrifice for each single one, in Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one sacrifice for everything. If he mentions “oath” at the start but did not mention it at the end, does the oath fall on the middle ones? Come and see: If he had mentioned it at the start and the end, did he mention it for the middle ones? But you are saying that it is valid; so here it is valid.
Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).
HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
MISHNAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” and he says “I did not rape, I did not seduce.” “I am asking you to swear,” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. Rebbi Simeon frees him from liability since he would not pay the fine by his own admission. They told him, even though he does not pay the fine by his own admission, he pays for shame and diminution by his own admission.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine
Does one tell him, be in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: “It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out a tooth of his slave Tabi. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to manumit my slave Tabi. He told him, you have nothing in your hand; fines only are imposed through witnesses and in court.” This implies that one does not tell him, be in the clear with Heaven. Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi Illai asked before Rebbi Mana, does Rabban Gamliel hold with him who says, one is permitted to manumit? He told him, in itself it says that it is forbidden to manumit, for otherwise he should have manumitted him immediately.
Does one tell him, be in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: “It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out a tooth of his slave Tabi. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to manumit my slave Tabi. He told him, you have nothing in your hand; fines only are imposed through witnesses and in court.” This implies that one does not tell him, be in the clear with Heaven. Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi Illai asked before Rebbi Mana, does Rabban Gamliel hold with him who says, one is permitted to manumit? He told him, in itself it says that it is forbidden to manumit, for otherwise he should have manumitted him immediately.
Does one tell him, be in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: “It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out a tooth of his slave Tabi. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to manumit my slave Tabi. He told him, you have nothing in your hand; fines only are imposed through witnesses and in court.” This implies that one does not tell him, be in the clear with Heaven. Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi Illai asked before Rebbi Mana, does Rabban Gamliel hold with him who says, one is permitted to manumit? He told him, in itself it says that it is forbidden to manumit, for otherwise he should have manumitted him immediately.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.