either
1551 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
“One tightens.” Rebbi Yasa said, Ḥizqiah and Rebbi Joḥanan disagree. Ḥisqiah said: making a lattice, warp and woof; tightening, either warp or woof. Rebbi Joḥanan said: making a lattice, either warp or woof; tightening, if it is loose he tightens it. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, everybody agrees that making a lattice means warp and woof. Where do they disagree? About tightening. Ḥisqiah said: either warp or woof; Rebbi Joḥanan said: if it is loose he tightens it. Rebbi Yasa instructed Samuel bar Ḥanina that “making a lattice” means warp and woof. We do not know whether this follows Ḥizqiah or it follows Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze`ira: a Mishnah says so that making a lattice means warp and woof, as we have stated there, “when is the rope connected to the bed? If he plaited three boxes.” Could you say warp without woof or woof without warp? Could one pitch woof and make a lattice?
“One tightens.” Rebbi Yasa said, Ḥizqiah and Rebbi Joḥanan disagree. Ḥisqiah said: making a lattice, warp and woof; tightening, either warp or woof. Rebbi Joḥanan said: making a lattice, either warp or woof; tightening, if it is loose he tightens it. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, everybody agrees that making a lattice means warp and woof. Where do they disagree? About tightening. Ḥisqiah said: either warp or woof; Rebbi Joḥanan said: if it is loose he tightens it. Rebbi Yasa instructed Samuel bar Ḥanina that “making a lattice” means warp and woof. We do not know whether this follows Ḥizqiah or it follows Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze`ira: a Mishnah says so that making a lattice means warp and woof, as we have stated there, “when is the rope connected to the bed? If he plaited three boxes.” Could you say warp without woof or woof without warp? Could one pitch woof and make a lattice?
“One tightens.” Rebbi Yasa said, Ḥizqiah and Rebbi Joḥanan disagree. Ḥisqiah said: making a lattice, warp and woof; tightening, either warp or woof. Rebbi Joḥanan said: making a lattice, either warp or woof; tightening, if it is loose he tightens it. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, everybody agrees that making a lattice means warp and woof. Where do they disagree? About tightening. Ḥisqiah said: either warp or woof; Rebbi Joḥanan said: if it is loose he tightens it. Rebbi Yasa instructed Samuel bar Ḥanina that “making a lattice” means warp and woof. We do not know whether this follows Ḥizqiah or it follows Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze`ira: a Mishnah says so that making a lattice means warp and woof, as we have stated there, “when is the rope connected to the bed? If he plaited three boxes.” Could you say warp without woof or woof without warp? Could one pitch woof and make a lattice?
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, since the Temple was destroyed Pentecost is like Sabbath. Rabban Gamliel says, New Year’s Day and the Day of Atonement are like holidays. But the Sages are saying not like the words of either one but Pentecost is like holidays, New Year’s Day and the Day of Atonement are like Sabbath.
Levi bar Sisi asked before Rebbi: Should we not state “sixteen women”? One’s mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. He said to him, it is evident that this person has no brain in his head. And why? He said to him, because of Rebbi Jehudah, because Rebbi Jehudah forbids the one who was raped or seduced by his father. Does Rebbi Jehudah not agree that if [the halfbrother] gave her qiddushin, the preliminary marriage is legally recognized? But because we have stated: “Six incest prohibitions more severe than these; because they are married to others their co-wives are free.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thereupon: “If they may marry his brother without sin their co-wives are freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate.” And among all of them there is only his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. Why did we not state this? Because Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it, should we not state it? Certainly we should state it! But because we have stated: “Her sister who also is her sister-in-law either takes ḥalîṣah or accepts the levirate.” We find in all cases that her sister who also is her sister-in-law accepts the levirate except for his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother.
In this matter, it was stated: “About anybody who wants to take upon himself the stringencies both of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel it was said: ‘The silly one walks in darkness’. The leniencies of both of them, he is called wicked. Only either following the words of the House of Shammai in their leniencies and stringencies, or following the words of the House of Hillel in their leniencies and stringencies.” That is, before there came the disembodied voice. But after the disembodied voice was heard, “practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” And any who transgresses the words of the House of Hillel is deserving of death. It was stated: There came the disembodied voice and said: Both of them are the words of the Living God, but practice follows the House of Hillel forever. Where was the disembodied voice heard? Rav Bebai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The disembodied voice was heard at Yabneh.
Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.
HALAKHAH: “If there were two brothers, one of them died”, etc. Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, and you say so? May one permit levirate with the “bespoken” woman? One should suspect that “bespeaking” does not acquire; then he would be guilty because of “wife of his brother who did not live in his world.” Can the “bespoken” one perform ḥalîṣah? Should one not suspect that “bespeaking” does acquire; then the second {widow] is a candidate for [the third brother]. It must be that Rebbi Simeon refers to the first case.
MISHNAH: They formulated a principle about a sister-in-law: Any woman forbidden by an incest prohibition has neither ḥalîṣah nor levirate. If she is forbidden by a commandment prohibition or one of sanctity, she has ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Her sister who is also her sister-in-law has either ḥalîṣah or levirate.
“ “And all who had wives who [subsequently] died may marry them.” It only says “who died”; therefore, not if they were divorced. “And to all who were married to others and were divorced or widowed, they can be married”, since usually nobody sins for an uncertain future. “All are permitted to their sons or brothers,” since usually nobody sins for the benefit of either his son ot his brother.
If the first [sister] had a co-wife, one [of the brothers] performs ḥalîṣah, the co-wife is freed. If then he had intercourse with her, this is forbidden intercourse and the co-wife is not freed. If he performed ḥalîṣah and then had intercourse with her, as you look at it, either ḥalîṣah should free or intercourse should free! Rebbi Yudan said, I confirmed it following “If somebody married his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant”, as you say there, the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through the fetus or through intercourse; so here also the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through ḥalîṣah or through intercourse.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.
How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.
How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.
MISHNAH: The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother]. If he refuses, one goes to all the other brothers. If they refuse, one returns to the oldest and tells him, the obligation is yours, either give ḥalîṣah or marry in levirate.
MISHNAH: If he made it dependent on a minor until he grows up, or on the oldest when he returns from overseas, or on a deaf-mute or on an insane [brother], one does not listen to him but tells him, the obligation is yours, either give ḥalîṣah or marry in levirate.
Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.
Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.
Rebbi Mana said, I heard in the name of Samuel that there is no difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, but I do not remember from whom I heard this. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Jeremiah said this. Rebbi Ḥizqyah said to him, Rebbi Jeremiah did not say this; Rebbi Yose was offended by him. He said to him: Even Joshua who was bound to Moses would not have said so, but you said so! He checked himself and said, it is true that he said that but as a person who quotes something and questions it; does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Berekhiah in the name of Samuel: A woman gives birth only either after 271, 272, 273, or 274, days. Rebbi Mana said to him, from whom did the rabbi hear this? He said to him, from Rebbi Abba. The position of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, he says, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, and here, he says so? Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra in the name of Samuel: {If with ה Rabba, with א Rava.} Everything which is “many” is 208.
Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.
Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
May she eat heave? Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: It is reasonable that she should eat if she was eating during her husband’s lifetime; otherwise she may not eat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she eats even if she did not eat before. Rebbi Yose said, even if she was only able to eat. There is a baraita in support of either one. There is a baraita supporting Samuel: A hearing daughter of an Israel who married a deaf-mute Cohen does not eat heave. If he died and she came before the levir, if he is hearing, she eats, deaf-mute does not eat. There is a baraita supporting Rebbi Joḥanan: A hearing daughter of an Israel who became engaged to a hearing Cohen, who did not manage to bring her to the bridal chamber before he became deaf-mute or before she became deaf-mute, does not eat heave. If he died and she came before a levir she eats even if he is deaf-mute. In this He increased the power of the levir over that of the husband since the deaf-mute levir enables her to eat, but the deaf-mute husband does not enable her to eat.
MISHNAH: The castrate does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate; similarly, the she-ram does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate. The castrate who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her he disabled her because it is incestuous. Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram, they did not disable her; if they copulated with her they disabled her because it is incestuous.
MISHNAH: The castrate does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate; similarly, the she-ram does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate. The castrate who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her he disabled her because it is incestuous. Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram, they did not disable her; if they copulated with her they disabled her because it is incestuous.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joshua said, I heard,” etc. “That the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah” etc. “Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram,” etc. What is a sun-castrate? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, anybody whom the sun did not see qualified even for one hour. If somebody stretched out his hand and castrated [the not yet born baby] in the womb, everybody agrees that [when born] he is prohibited from marrying into the congregation and he cannot perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate. One imposes upon him the restrictions of both castrate by human action and sun-castrate in this disagreement.
MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.
MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
“Any child from either of the men is a bastard.” One understands that the child is a bastard from the second [husband]. Is it a bastard from the first? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, this follows Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says if a man copulates with his wife whom he accuses of infidelity the child is a bastard, if a man takes back his divorcee after she had remarried the child is a bastard. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable; the status of her bill of divorce is the status of her bastardy. What is the difference between them? If the second one gave her a bill of divorce and then the first one copulated with her. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the child is a bastard following Rebbi Aqiba; in the opinion of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable.
MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he married a woman and died, she is free. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other. It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.
Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one dead [husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, “any one who cannot marry me in levirate, cannot marry my co-wife in levirate.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eleazar formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis.
A convert who converted while married to a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her sister, marries one and separates from the other. When has this been said? If he did not live with either of them. But if he lived with one of them after he converted, the one he lived with is his wife. If he lived with both of them, since he lived with them, he lived with them.
MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.
MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.
MISHNAH: [A woman] did not wait three months after [the death of] her husband, married, and gave birth, and it is not known whether it is a nine months’ child of the first or a seven months’ child of the second. If she had sons from the first and the second, they perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he had brothers from the first or from the second not from the same mother, he may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate and they may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate. If one was an Israel and the other a priest, he may marry a woman appropriate for the priesthood, may not defile himself for the dead, but if he became defiled he does not suffer forty lashes. He may not eat heave but if he ate, he does not have to pay its value and additional fifth. He cannot attend distributions on the threshing floor. He has to sell his heave but the money is his. He has no part in the Temple sacrifices, one does not give him sacrifices but one cannot take his from him. He is exempt from the foreleg, the chin, and the first stomach. His firstborn animal should graze until it develops a blemish. One charges him with the disabilities of an Israel and those of Cohanim. If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them and they for him. He may not defile himself for them, they may not defile themselves for him. He does not inherit from them but they inherit from him. He is not prosecutable if he injures or curses either one of them. He may serve on the watch of either one but does not participate in distributions. If both were of the same watch, he takes one part.
MISHNAH: [A woman] did not wait three months after [the death of] her husband, married, and gave birth, and it is not known whether it is a nine months’ child of the first or a seven months’ child of the second. If she had sons from the first and the second, they perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he had brothers from the first or from the second not from the same mother, he may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate and they may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate. If one was an Israel and the other a priest, he may marry a woman appropriate for the priesthood, may not defile himself for the dead, but if he became defiled he does not suffer forty lashes. He may not eat heave but if he ate, he does not have to pay its value and additional fifth. He cannot attend distributions on the threshing floor. He has to sell his heave but the money is his. He has no part in the Temple sacrifices, one does not give him sacrifices but one cannot take his from him. He is exempt from the foreleg, the chin, and the first stomach. His firstborn animal should graze until it develops a blemish. One charges him with the disabilities of an Israel and those of Cohanim. If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them and they for him. He may not defile himself for them, they may not defile themselves for him. He does not inherit from them but they inherit from him. He is not prosecutable if he injures or curses either one of them. He may serve on the watch of either one but does not participate in distributions. If both were of the same watch, he takes one part.
“He may serve in the watch of either one”. He should not serve. Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Yasa, because of the damage to the family.
MISHNAH: Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two unrelated hearing women. If the deaf-mute [brother] married to a hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to a hearing wife do? He performs either ḥalîṣah or levirate. If the hearing [brother] married to a hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute [brother] married to a hearing wife do? He marries [the widow] and never can divorce her.
MISHNAH: Two hearing brothers, married to two unrelated women, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to a hearing wife do? He marries [the widow], and if he wants to divorce, he divorces. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He performs either ḥalîṣah or levirate. Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two unrelated women, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife do? He marries, and if he wants to divorce, he divorces. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He marries and can never divorce.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Eliezer, he declares his jealousy by the testimony of one witness or his own testimony; he takes her to drink on the testimony of two witnesses.” It is said here: “For he found in her a word of nakedness”; “finding” anywhere has to be validated by witnesses. How does Rebbi Eliezer explain “a word”? A circumstance that brings into the habit of nakedness. May a single witness let him take her to drink? His own testimony can never obligate him to swear in money matters but it will let him take her to drink, a single witness who will obligate him to swear in money matters not so much more? May a relative bring her to drink? Who is a closer relative than her husband? May a hearsay witness bring her to drink? What is the difference between him and a relative? A relative may be disabled today but he might be enabled later, a hearsay witness is not acceptable either today or later.
“A sly wicked man.” Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rav Huna: That is one who chooses leniencies for himself and teaches restrictions to others. In this matter, it was stated: “About anybody who wants to take upon himself the stringencies both of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel it was said: ‘The silly one walks in darkness’. The leniencies of both of them, he is called wicked. Only either following the words of the House of Shammai in their leniencies and stringencies, or following the words of the House of Hillel in their leniencies and stringencies.” That is, before there came the disembodied voice. But after the disembodied voice was heard, “practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” And any who transgresses the words of the House of Hillel is deserving of death. It was stated: There came the disembodied voice and said: “Both of them are the words of the Living God, but practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” Where was the disembodied voice heard? Rav Bebai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The disembodied voice was heard at Yabneh.
We have stated there: “Rebbi Simeon says, a fistful is taken from the sinner’s flour offering of a Cohen. The fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest is sacrificed separately.” Both of them explained the same verse: “It shall be the Cohen’s as a flour offering.” The rabbis say, it is like his voluntary flour offering. Since his voluntary flour offering is brought entire, that one also is brought entire. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” The rest, under which category is it brought, under the rules of a fistful or under the rules of remainders? If you want to say, under the rules of a fistful, one cannot bring them during the night, one cannot bring them after death, and he is forbidden to think about them. If you want to say, under the rules of a remainder, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death. Is he forbidden to think about them? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, the fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest dispersed over the ashes. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, where are we holding? If the upper ashes, Rebbi Simeon already said it. If it cannot refer to the upper ashes, let it refer to the lower ashes. That means, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death, and he can think about them. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is forbidden to think about them since they are not qualified as food either for humans or for the altar. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: Does Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follow the rules of his father or the rules of the rabbis? According to the rules of his father, it should be brought on top [of the altar]. According to the rules of the rabbis, why should he take a fistful? He follows his father’s rules. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” Then it should be burned totally! You bound it to “it shall not be eaten”; you did not bind it to “it has to be sacrificed in its entirety.”
MISHNAH: A woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child] may neither drink nor collect her ketubah, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, he may separate from her and take her back later. A she-ram, an old woman, or a sterile one, neither drinks nor collects her ketubah; Rebbi Eleazar says, he may marry another wife and be fruitful and multiply with her. All other women either drink or cannot collect their ketubah.
Rebbi Aqiba was tortured before the evil Tineius Rufus. There came the time for reciting the Shema‘. He started to read and laughed. He said to him: Old man, you are either a sorcerer or one contemptuous of suffering. He said to him: The spirit of this man should be blown away; I am neither a sorcerer nor contemptuous of sufferings. But all my life I read this verse (Deut. 6:5): “You must love the Eternal, your God, with all your heart, all your soul, and all your force.” I loved Him with all my heart. I loved Him with all my money. But whether with all my soul I could not test. But now, when “with all your soul” came, the time of reciting the Shema‘ has arrived and my mind has not wavered, therefore I am reciting and laughing.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Ark was made using a cubit of five handbreadths. Who stated “a cubit of five handbreadths”? This is Rebbi Jehudah. As we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah says, the builders’ cubit was of six handbreadths, but that of vessels five handbeadths.” And the Ark is a vessel. According to Rebbi Jehudah who says that the Ark was made with a cubit of five handbreadths, the length of the Ark was twelve and one half cubits, as it is written: “Its length two cubits and a half.” Each cubit was five and half a cubit two and one half. Four tablets were in it, two whole ones and two broken ones, as it is written: “Which you broke and put into the Ark.” Each of the tablets was six handbreadths in length and three in width. If the widths of the tablets were in the length of the Ark, there was half a handbreadth left. One finger’s thickness for the wall on either side. The width of the Ark was seven and one half handbreadths, as it is written: “A cubit and half a cubit.” A cubit five and half a cubit two and one half. Four tablets were in it, two whole ones and two broken ones, as it is written: “Which you broke and put into the Ark.”. Each of the tablets was six handbreadths in length and three in width. If the lengths of the tablets were in the width of the Ark, there were one and a half handbreadths left. One finger’s thickness for the wall on either side, and on each side half a handbreadth to have a handle.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Ark was made using a cubit of five handbreadths. Who stated “a cubit of five handbreadths”? This is Rebbi Jehudah. As we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah says, the builders’ cubit was of six handbreadths, but that of vessels five handbeadths.” And the Ark is a vessel. According to Rebbi Jehudah who says that the Ark was made with a cubit of five handbreadths, the length of the Ark was twelve and one half cubits, as it is written: “Its length two cubits and a half.” Each cubit was five and half a cubit two and one half. Four tablets were in it, two whole ones and two broken ones, as it is written: “Which you broke and put into the Ark.” Each of the tablets was six handbreadths in length and three in width. If the widths of the tablets were in the length of the Ark, there was half a handbreadth left. One finger’s thickness for the wall on either side. The width of the Ark was seven and one half handbreadths, as it is written: “A cubit and half a cubit.” A cubit five and half a cubit two and one half. Four tablets were in it, two whole ones and two broken ones, as it is written: “Which you broke and put into the Ark.”. Each of the tablets was six handbreadths in length and three in width. If the lengths of the tablets were in the width of the Ark, there were one and a half handbreadths left. One finger’s thickness for the wall on either side, and on each side half a handbreadth to have a handle.
One agrees that she should not be married either Friday or Saturday night. Not on Friday, for the honor of the Sabbath. Not Saturday night: The colleagues say, because of the exertion; Rebbi Yose says, for the honor of the Sabbath. A baraita supports the colleagues: Why did they say, a virgin is married on Wednesday? That a man should prepare for his needs three consecutive days.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was not cautioned should he not pay since when cautioned he would be flogged? A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody eats heave in error, he pays principal and fifth,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as we have stated: “The following adolescent girls can claim a fine,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Meïr learned from the calumniator. (Deut. 22:18) “They shall punish him,” flogging; (Deut. 22:19) “and they shall fine him”, money. But the rabbis say, [the law of] the calumniator is separate because of its novelty; one cannot learn from a novelty! Because nowhere else will a person become guilty by speech, but here he becomes guilty by speech; therefore, nothing can be inferred. Another explanation: one cannot transfer the rules of either payment or flogging. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he [eats] fat in error but is intentional about the sacrifice, if he was cautioned he will be flogged and has to bring a sacrifice? So here, he is flogged and he pays. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” If two possibilities are given to the court, one chooses one of them. This excludes matters in the power of Heaven.
So far payments that are consequences of sexual relations. If somebody injured her, blinded one of her eyes, cut off one of her hands, broke one of her legs? To whom does he pay, to her or to her father? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays to her father; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he pays to her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is of the opinion that her earnings belong to her even before she becomes an adult. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only after she comes of age. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: They disagree before she comes of age, but after she is an adult everybody agrees that all belongs to her. A baraita supports either one of them. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody injures somebody else’s daughter or son, the payments for the son must be given immediately; those for the daughter shall be held as property value. Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Judah the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said that some state it so that beginning and end support Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If somebody injures his own underage daughter, diminution of value belong to her and he is free from paying for shame and diminution of value. If others injure her, diminution of values belong to her, the rest shall be transformed into property value, but payments for shame and diminution of value belong to her father.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody gives his daughter in preliminary marriage,” etc. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the reason of Rebbi Jehudah is to encourage a man to give an ample dowry to his daughter. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Rebbi (Meïr) learned from the calumniator. Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: If she whored while in her father’s house and he calumniated her after she became an adult, he is not flogged nor does he pay 100 tetradrachmas but either she or the false witnesses are executed by stoning? Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yose: Think of it, if he calumniated her when she was an adolescent and now she is an adult? He said to him, we heard that he pays to her father. Rebbi Jeremiah said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: I am wondering how could the rabbis compare a ketubah to a fine when they are not comparable! For the ketubah is an obligation from the first hour but the fine is only at the end; and you say so? He said to him, who says that to you? Even the [obligation of the] fine is from the first moment. It turns out that Rebbi Mana is like Rebbi Jeremiah and (like Rebbi Yose ben Ze‘ira).
It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, the words should be said as they are written. What means “the words should be said as they are written”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is not guilty unless he marries her definitively, has intercourse, and accuses her not to be a virgin. “They spread the cloth”. Not that “they spread the cloth” but until the things become clear like a cloth. Assi said, “they spread the cloth”, the witnesses are not stoned, nor is the husband flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas, until they say: you were with us at a certain place, and the husband hired them to testify falsely. If they said, you were with us at a certain place, but they did not say, the husband hired them to testify falsely? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is said here “putting”, it is said there “putting”. Since “putting” there means money, also “putting” here must mean money. But did we not state: He did not say to the witnesses, come and testify in my case, but they came on their own, he is not flogged nor does he pay 100 tetradrachmas but either she or the false witnesses would be stoned’? Because he did not say. But if he said, even if he did not hire them it is as if he hired them. If the father brought two groups of witnesses. One side say, you were with us at a certain place. The other side say, the husband hired them to testify falsely. It is obvious that those who said, you were with us at a certain place, are stoned, and those who said, the husband hired them to testify falsely, are flogged and pay 100 tetradrachmas. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, neither by these not by those are they flogged and pay 100 tetradrachmas, but they are flogged because of “you shall not testify as a false witness against your fellow man.”
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: She cannot be executed unless she is an adolescent at the time of the execution. What is the reason? “They shall execute the adolescent at her father’s door.” But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: If she whored in her father’s house and [the husband] calumniated her after she became an adult, he is not flogged nor does he pay 100 tetradrachmas but either she or the witnesses are executed by stoning. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: “If he escaped after being sentenced and then his pubic hair grew fully.” There, you can say “they shall execute the adolescent” who whored; can you say here “they shall execute him”, the son?
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and (Rebbi) Abime bar Pappai: What if there was no house? They said to him, the heirs rent a house for her. One concludes that if she says real estate and they say money, the law sides with the heirs. As the following: A woman’s ketubah was twenty denars, and there was a house worth at most ten denars. The case came before Rebbi Ḥanina who said, either they give her a house or they give her twenty denars. Rebbi Mana said, since the house is not worth more than 20 it is as if her ketubah was only twenty. One concludes that if she says real estate and they say money, the law sides with the heirs.
HALAKHAH: “For how long does one reduce? Up to the amount of her ketubah”, etc. Here you say seven, and there you say three? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, since she is obligated for seven, he deducts seven; he, since he is obligated for three, has to add three. Think of it, if she brought him slaves, she is not obligated for anything! Think of it, if he stipulated [that he is not obligated for] either šĕ‘ēr, or dress, or ‘onāh, he is not obligated for anything! What is it? Following Rebbi Joḥanan, that the suffering of the male is greater than that of the female. That is what is written: “It was when she had nagged him day after day and pressured him.” What means “and pressured him”? Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, that she slipped away from under him. “He felt badly, to die”. He felt badly, ready to die, but she did not feel badly, to die. But some say that she fulfilled her needs with others. So much more she should have wanted, since Rebbi Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Naḥman: This human limb, if you starved it you satisfied it, if you satisfied it you starved it.
”If they died, others should inherit.” Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person can transfer property rights in any language except with an expression of inheritance? One does not have here “they shall inherit” but “they shall take”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Do they not differ here in matters of a gift? If somebody signed over all his property to two persons at the same time; to one he wrote in the language of gift but to the other in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Eleazar said, since the one acquired in the language of gift, the other one acquired in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it seems that one did acquire in the language of gift but the other did not acquire in the language of inheritance Rebbi Phineas said, there came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar since Rebbi Eleazar stated a docrine but Rebbi Joḥanan said only “it seems”. Rebbi Samuel said, but did not Rebbi Meïr say that and it does not seem reasonable; is that nothing? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Assi: Carded firstling wool becomes insignificant in a plurality. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Sepphorean brought before Rebbi Ammi a pound in eight but the latter refused to rule since had not Rebbi Assi said, is that not a Mishnah? “If somebody weaves the length of a sîṭ of firstling’s wool in a cloth, the cloth must be burned, of hair of a nazir or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned”? The following Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote any expression of gift either at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his instructions are valid.” There, to one person in an expression of gift and to one an expression of inheritance. But here to each one both in the language of gift and the language of inheritance Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: But does he not prejudice the rights of others? He said to him, if there are no brothers. But does he not prejudice the rights of his paternal uncles? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel: A person prefers the good of his house over his relatives.
Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not say “his” but [ ]. In which respect? In case the heir took it, one removes it from his hand. Does one have the same rule for the creditor? Was it not stated: If either the heir or the creditor took it, one takes it from their hands? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said, let us hear from the following: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas, [the creditor] adds another denar and redeems these properties.” Not necessarily a denar, but anything, that a dedication should not be seen to be profanated without redemption. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One would be guilty of complete larceny. That is difficult. If one would be guilty of complete larceny, should if not be redeemed for its full value? If it can be redeemed for less than its full value, one should not be guilty of complete larceny! What are we talking about? If it is connected to the ground, can there be larceny about real estate? But we talk about standing grain. Since if the administrator misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand; the administrator and the heir follow the same rule. Also if the heir misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The same rule holds for an ox. Can you say that an ox is real estate? Rebbi Tanḥum bar Mari in the name of Rebbi Yose: They made the rules for an ox parallel those of dedications that lost their value. Here, you say one takes it from his hand, but there you say, one does not take it from his hand. Since you diminished the woman’s power in that her ketubah is a lien only on the properties of her first husband, you strengthened her power in this matter that if the heir came and took it, one removes it from his hand. It was stated thus: Trees and cutting, old or young, one removes from their hands.
That widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. A similar case: The father of the sons of Shammai died and bequeathed a goat to them. The creditor came and took it. The case came before Rebbi Abbahu who said, he took his own property. Did we not state that if either an heir or a creditor came and took, one does [not] remove from his hand; for they thought they were theirs but they were not theirs. Rebbi Jacob bar Zabdi said, Rebbi Abbahu agrees that if they sold it, or gave it as a pledge, or moved it to another place, if then the creditor came and took it one removes it from his possession.
Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”
MISHNAH: If a widow’s ketubah was 200 and she sold either the worth of a mina for 200 or the worth of 200 for a mina, her ketubah was paid. If her ketubah was for a mina and she sold the worth of a mina and a denar for a mina, her sale is void. Even if she says, I shall return the denar to the heirs, her sale is void.
MISHNAH: If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much, their sale is invalid. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, their sale is valid; otherwise, what is the court’s power worth? But if they offered public tender, even if they sold either the worth of a mina for 200 or the worth of 200 for a mina, their sale is valid.
“As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath.” Samuel said, the Mishnah speaks about several cases, either as nazir, or a sacrifice, or an oath. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he is a nazir in all three of them. Rebbi Abin said, if somebody wants to explain that of Rebbi Ze‘ira, it is such: There was before him a bunch of grapes and another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, that is qorbān for me, it is qorbān for him. Another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, what these three said is on me, does it not turn out that this one is obligated for qorbān and oath?
Fife, the fife, with a fife, either ‘that I shall eat with you’ or ‘that I shall not eat with you’, is permitted. No profane food that I would eat with you, forbidden. Profane food I would eat with you, permitted.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.
So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?
So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?
HALAKHAH: “If anyone from outside was,” etc. And we did not state “one forces”! Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If he was a frequent maker of vows, one forces him,” because the other [partner] can say to him, one came to me and you did such and such to him; a second person and you did such and such to him; the third time he tells him either you undo your vow or sell your part.
“A person who makes a vow ‘to forbid himself the people of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is permitted to deal with him. ‘From the inhabitants of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is prohibited from dealing with him.” ‘A qônām that the people of my town cannot have any usufruct from me,’ he cannot ask the local rabbi. ‘The usufruct of the people of my town [is forbidden] to me’, he can ask the local rabbi. Some Tannaïm state, even in the first case he can ask, for it does not mean that [the rabbi] would dissolve his own vow. A vow of the community cannot be dissolved. A vow made in public cannot be dissolved. “If somebody made a vow that another should not have usufruct from him, if the vow was made in the other’s presence, he can request the vow to be dissolved only in the other’s presence; if the vow was not made in the other’s presence, he can request the dissolution either in the other’s presence or in his absence.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of the shame; Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because of the suspicion.
MISHNAH: What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, the courtyards, and the cistern in the middle of the road. What are the institutions of that town? For example, the town square, the bathhouse, the synagogue with the ark and the scrolls. And he writes his part to the Patriarch. Rebbi Jehudah says, one of them writes to the Patriarch and the other to a private person. What is the difference between him who writes to the Patriarch and him who writes to a private person? The one who writes to the Patriarch does not have to perform an act of delivery, the one who writes to a private person has to perform an act of delivery. But the Sages say, in either case one has to perform an act of delivery. Rebbi Jehudah says, the people of Galilee do not have to write since their forefathers already wrote for them.
MISHNAH: ‘From the salted’ he is forbidden only salted fish. ‘That I shall not taste anything salted’, he is forbidden everything salted. ‘That I shall not taste fish, fishes’, he is forbidden them either large or small, either salted or unsalted, either raw or cooked. But he is permitted fish cake and fish fluid. If somebody vows not to eat anchovy he is forbidden fish cake and permitted fish fluid and brine. If somebody vows not to eat fish cake he is permitted fish fluid and brine.
MISHNAH: ‘From the salted’ he is forbidden only salted fish. ‘That I shall not taste anything salted’, he is forbidden everything salted. ‘That I shall not taste fish, fishes’, he is forbidden them either large or small, either salted or unsalted, either raw or cooked. But he is permitted fish cake and fish fluid. If somebody vows not to eat anchovy he is forbidden fish cake and permitted fish fluid and brine. If somebody vows not to eat fish cake he is permitted fish fluid and brine.
MISHNAH: ‘From the salted’ he is forbidden only salted fish. ‘That I shall not taste anything salted’, he is forbidden everything salted. ‘That I shall not taste fish, fishes’, he is forbidden them either large or small, either salted or unsalted, either raw or cooked. But he is permitted fish cake and fish fluid. If somebody vows not to eat anchovy he is forbidden fish cake and permitted fish fluid and brine. If somebody vows not to eat fish cake he is permitted fish fluid and brine.
They asked before Rebbi Zeїra: a Cohen to an Israel, Rebbi forbids. What does Rebbi Yose say? Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa said, so he responded to them: In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, why is a Cohen to an Israel forbidden, not because it looks badly? Also Rebbi Joḥanan holds that from an Israel to an Israel it is forbidden because it looks badly. In addition, because of the following, as it was stated: “Cohanim and Levites who help at the threshing floor have no right either to heave or to tithe, and if the farmer gave, it is desecrated, as it is said (Lev. 22:15): ‘They should not desecrate the sanctified things of the Children of Israel,’ but they desecrate them! In addition, they said that their heave is no heave, their tithes are no tithes, their dedications are no dedications, and about them the verse says (Micha 3:11): ‘Their heads judge for bribes, [their priests are for hire].’ The Omnipresent brings over them three catastrophies; that is what is written (Micha 3:12): ‘Therefore, because of you Zion will be ploughed over as a field, Jerusalem will be desolate, and the Temple Mount a wooded hill.’
HALAKHAH: “I am a nazir off grape kernels,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “either off grape kernels,” or “off grape skin,” or “off hair shaving,” or “off impurity”. If he mentioned nazir with any one of them, following Rebbi Jehudah only if he mentioned “and”, but following Rebbi Meïr even if he did not mention “and”.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody made a vow of nazir while he was in a cemetery,” etc. If he made the vow while he was among grave sites, Rebbi Joḥanan said, one warns him about wine and shaving. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since one cannot warn him because of impurity, one does not warn him about wine and shaving. The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems inverted. There, he says, one warns him about wine, impurity, and shaving. And here, he says so? The rabbis from Caesarea: They disagree about the whole, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, one warns him about wine and shaving. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since one cannot warn him because of impurity, one does not warn him either about wine or about shaving.
HALAKHAH: “One is guilty for wine separately, for grapes separately,” etc. It is written: “Also grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” One understands, since it said “grapes”, do we not know that they are fresh? Why does the verse say, “grapes, fresh or dried”? To declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Ḥizqiah stated: Since at a place where He did not treat the waste of fruits like fruits, He treated fresh and dried equally, here, where He treated the waste of fruits like fruits, would it not be logical that we treat fresh and dried equally? The verse said, “fresh or dried”, to declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Rebbi Hila said: “One may not impound the movable and the fixed part of a flour-mill. “One understands, since it said “the fixed part”, do we not know that the entire mill is understood? Why does the verse say, “the movable and the fixed part”? To declare guilty for either part separately.
HALAKHAH: “One is guilty for wine separately, for grapes separately,” etc. It is written: “Also grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” One understands, since it said “grapes”, do we not know that they are fresh? Why does the verse say, “grapes, fresh or dried”? To declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Ḥizqiah stated: Since at a place where He did not treat the waste of fruits like fruits, He treated fresh and dried equally, here, where He treated the waste of fruits like fruits, would it not be logical that we treat fresh and dried equally? The verse said, “fresh or dried”, to declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Rebbi Hila said: “One may not impound the movable and the fixed part of a flour-mill. “One understands, since it said “the fixed part”, do we not know that the entire mill is understood? Why does the verse say, “the movable and the fixed part”? To declare guilty for either part separately.
HALAKHAH: “One is guilty for wine separately, for grapes separately,” etc. It is written: “Also grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” One understands, since it said “grapes”, do we not know that they are fresh? Why does the verse say, “grapes, fresh or dried”? To declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Ḥizqiah stated: Since at a place where He did not treat the waste of fruits like fruits, He treated fresh and dried equally, here, where He treated the waste of fruits like fruits, would it not be logical that we treat fresh and dried equally? The verse said, “fresh or dried”, to declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Rebbi Hila said: “One may not impound the movable and the fixed part of a flour-mill. “One understands, since it said “the fixed part”, do we not know that the entire mill is understood? Why does the verse say, “the movable and the fixed part”? To declare guilty for either part separately.
May a Cohen defile himself for the study of Torah? Rebbi Yose was sitting and teaching when a dead body was brought in. He did not say anything either to those who remained sitting or to those who left.
The corpse of obligation acquired its place, four cubits even in a field of saffron, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land to Israel. When is this? If he found it in the field. But if he found it on the road, he buries it either to the right or to the left of the road. A fallow and a ploughed field, he buries it in the fallow field. A ploughed and a sown field, he buries it in the ploughed field. A vineyard and a sown field, he buries it in the sown field. A vineyard and an orchard, some Tannaïm state, he buries it in the vineyard; some Tannaïm state, he buries it in the orchard. He who says, he buries it in the vineyard but not in the orchard, because of a tent over the corpse. He who says, he buries it in the orchard but not in the vineyard because of the preparation of the grape harvest. If he switched, Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He transgressed “do not defile your land.” If both were fallow, or ploughed, or sown, he buries in the one he chooses.
If he drank wine within the first 30 days, he is (not) whipped; within the last 30 days, he is [] whipped. The one coming from the general population cannot be whipped, either for the (second) or the last period. So far, if he was warned separately for each period. If they warned him for both together this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who disagreed about the two days of holiday in the diaspora. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one accepts warning in case of a doubt; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not accept warning in case of a doubt.
“Rebbi Yose said, if a slave said, ‘I shall be a nazir when manumitted,’ his master forces him in matters of nezirut. [The master] can force a slave in matters of nezirut; he does not have to force him in matters either of vows or of oaths.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If his master forced him and he became impure, is he to be whipped? Or is that only practice? Where do we hold? If his nezirut has biblical status and by practice one may force, he is whipped. If both are rabbinical, he is not whipped. Rebbi Mana said, does one whip for practice? But it must be the following: If his nezirut is practice and by practice one may force, he is whipped. If both are rabbinical, he is not whipped.
MISHNAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife or this document of manumission to my slave,” if he wants to change his mind in either case he can retract, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, only for women’s bills of divorce but not for slaves’ documents of manumission because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on him only in his presence; for if one chooses not to sustain his slave, he has the right not to do so, but not to sustain his wife he has no right. He said to them, but he disqualifies his slave for heave the same way he disqualifies his wife! They answered him, because he is his property. If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife or this document of manumission to my slave” and dies, they shall not be delivered after his death; “give this mina to Mr. X” and dies, they shall deliver it after his death.
HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.
MISHNAH: Every bill of divorce which was not written for a particular wife is invalid. How? If one was walking in the market and heard the scribes dictating “Mr. X divorces his wife Y from place Z” and said, these are mine and my wife’s names, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce by. In addition, if he wrote [a bill] to divorce his wife but had second thoughts, and a fellow townsman came and said to him, my name is identical with yours and my wife’s name is identical with your wife’s, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce by. In addition, if he had two wives with identical names and wrote a document to divorce the older one by, he cannot use it to divorce the younger. In addition, if he said to the scribe: write that I may divorce either one I wish, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce either one.
MISHNAH: Every bill of divorce which was not written for a particular wife is invalid. How? If one was walking in the market and heard the scribes dictating “Mr. X divorces his wife Y from place Z” and said, these are mine and my wife’s names, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce by. In addition, if he wrote [a bill] to divorce his wife but had second thoughts, and a fellow townsman came and said to him, my name is identical with yours and my wife’s name is identical with your wife’s, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce by. In addition, if he had two wives with identical names and wrote a document to divorce the older one by, he cannot use it to divorce the younger. In addition, if he said to the scribe: write that I may divorce either one I wish, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce either one.
“Mr. X and all his names.” Think of it, if his name was Reuben and he went away under the name of Simeon. But: “I am X and every other name which I have.” “In addition, they said if he had two wives, one in Judea and one in Galilee, and he is known by two names, one in Judea and one in Galilee. He used [his name] in Judea to divorce the one in Galilee and [his name] in Galilee to divorce the one in Judea. Neither one is divorced.” This baraita if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Galilee or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Judea. But if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Judea, or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Galilee, she is divorced. Rebbi Ilai said, according to the rules he has to say: “I am X with every other name which I have in Galilee.” If he was at another place, he can divorce either one he wishes. Rebbi Yose said, one says that if he did it. But to start out he has to follow Rebbi Ilai. Rebbi Abin said, if he is known by (another) name at another place, he has to mention all three.
If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.
Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he threw it to her in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them, what is the rule? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Abin said, it is a disagreement between Rav and the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya, for Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Drawing close does not acquire in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in disagreement: “Under which circumstances did they say that movables are acquired by drawing close? In the public domain or in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But in the buyer’s domain he acquired the moment he accepted it. In the seller’s domain he does not acquire unless either he lifts it up or moves it out of its prior owner’s domain. In a domain where it was deposited he does not acquire unless he either is explicitly empowered or he leases its place.”
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he threw it to her in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them, what is the rule? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Abin said, it is a disagreement between Rav and the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya, for Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Drawing close does not acquire in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in disagreement: “Under which circumstances did they say that movables are acquired by drawing close? In the public domain or in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But in the buyer’s domain he acquired the moment he accepted it. In the seller’s domain he does not acquire unless either he lifts it up or moves it out of its prior owner’s domain. In a domain where it was deposited he does not acquire unless he either is explicitly empowered or he leases its place.”
MISHNAH: If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media or the government of Greece, from the construction of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple; if he was in the West and wrote “in the East” or in the East and wrote “in the West”, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥaliṣah but not levirate. If he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Referring to all the close relatives about whom they said that their co-wives are permitted, if any of the co-wives went and married otherwise but the relatives turned out to be she-rams, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the aforementioned consequences apply to her.
MISHNAH: If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media or the government of Greece, from the construction of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple; if he was in the West and wrote “in the East” or in the East and wrote “in the West”, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥaliṣah but not levirate. If he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Referring to all the close relatives about whom they said that their co-wives are permitted, if any of the co-wives went and married otherwise but the relatives turned out to be she-rams, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the aforementioned consequences apply to her.