etc
2275 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “If somebody said ‘I am a nazir’ and another person heard it and said, ‘and so am I’,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “and so am I”, “and so am I”. Who is the Tanna of conjunctions? Rebbi Jehudah. But following Rebbi Meïr, “I am,” “I am”. Does the Mishnah require that all of them follow immediately after the speaking of the first? It was stated: If the middle one was permitted, all following him are permitted, all preceding him are forbidden. The Mishnah applies even if not all of them follow immediately after the speaking of the first, but each one follows immediately after the speaking of the preceding person. What means “to follow immediately after the speaking”? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The time needed for greeting between two people. Abba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The time needed for greeting between teacher and student, that he say to him, “peace upon you, my master.”
“ “I am a nazir, and you,” etc. If he was permitted, she is permitted. If she was permitted, he is not permitted.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman had made a vow of nazir,” etc. Biblical whippings are 39 lashes. One evaluates him; if he can stand it, one whips him, if not, one does not whip him. Blows of rebelliousness: one strikes him until he accepts or until he dies.
HALAKHAH: “A woman who had made a vow of nazir,” etc. Does this mean it became holy by dedication? But if a third person gave her a gift and said, on condition that your husband have no right of disposition over it, then it is hers. Rebbi Mattaniah said, if he gave her power over his properties. If he comes to protest, it did not become holy; otherwise, it became holy.
HALAKHAH: “If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her,” etc. He dissolves for her because of her hair. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is a decision of Scripture: “He dissolved her vows,” he dissolves what is on her. Whenever he dissolves her vow, he dissolves what is on her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, after she was transferred from the prohibition to the positive commandment. The rabbis say, “afterwards, the nazir shall drink wine,” after all these actions. Rebbi Simeon says, even after a single action. Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi (Bevai). “When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity, he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife.” Therefore, shaving in purity does not make her unseemly. Who holds that shaving does not make unseemly? Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even Rebbi thinks so: “Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves [in purity], since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife.” Should he not say, I cannot stand an unseemly and shorn wife? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi (Jehudah) said that only for the purification sacrifice, since a purification sacrifice would be invalid if not in her name. That means, as long as it is alive it is surrendered to Heaven only by slaughter.
HALAKHAH: “A man can declare his son a nazir,” etc. “A man”. This refers not only to a man; from where for a woman? The verse says, “afflicted with skin disease,” whether man, woman, or minor. If it is so, why is “a man” written? For the next theme, “a man is dishevelled and has open seams, no woman is dishevelled and has open seams.”
HALAKHAH: “A person who made a vow of nazir,” etc. It was stated: The House of Shammai say, from the moment he asked; but the House of Hillel say, from the moment he vowed. Where do we hold? If he scoffed at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he asked. If he did not scoff at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he vowed. But we have to deal with one who is going to ask. The House of Shammai say, since he decided to ask, he is now scoffing. But the House of Hillel say, if he were scoffing, he would not ask. If he made a vow of nazir and scoffed at his vow, one does not let him ask about it unless he kept its prohibitions for the number of days he did not keep the prohibitions, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yasa said, when has this been said? If he vowed a lengthy period. But if he vowed a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. What is the difference between a lengthy and a short period? But it must be: When has this been said? If he scoffed at his vow for a lengthy period. But if he scoffed at his vow for a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. Where are we holding? If he scoffed in impurity, everybody agrees that he invalidated everything. If he scoffed in shaving, everybody agrees that he invalidated only 30 days. But we must deal with the case that he scoffed with wine. That is, if he is still within his period of nazir. But after his period of nazir, he invalidated everything.
HALAKHAH: “If a person vowed to be a nazir and went to bring his animal,” etc. Where do we hold? If he saw an animal passing on the market and said, I am a nazir on that animal which passed by, he is a nazir even if the animal was stolen. If he thought that he had one and it turned out that he did not, would we say if he was rich and became poor, the nezirut would be invalidated? But we must hold that he said, I am a nazir on the animal I have at home, then went and found it stolen. If he vowed before the animal was stolen he is a nazir, after the animal was stolen he is not a nazir. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say: Rebbi Jehudah asked: If the thieves returned it in the night, did his nezirut return to him retroactively or for the future?
HALAKHAH: “If they were walking on the road,” etc. Should the Mishnah not read: “whose assertions are correct”? It is language of opposites, “that she did not bury her son.”
HALAKHAH: “Three kinds are forbidden for the nazir,” etc. Impurity, as it is written: “During all the days he vowed to the Eternal he shall not come close to a human corpse.” Shaving, as it is written: “During all the days of his nazir vow, a shaving knife shall not come onto his head.” Anything from the vine, as it is written: “During all the days of his vow, of anything coming from the wine-vine [he shall not eat.]”
HALAKHAH: “One is guilty for wine separately, for grapes separately,” etc. It is written: “Also grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” One understands, since it said “grapes”, do we not know that they are fresh? Why does the verse say, “grapes, fresh or dried”? To declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Ḥizqiah stated: Since at a place where He did not treat the waste of fruits like fruits, He treated fresh and dried equally, here, where He treated the waste of fruits like fruits, would it not be logical that we treat fresh and dried equally? The verse said, “fresh or dried”, to declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Rebbi Hila said: “One may not impound the movable and the fixed part of a flour-mill. “One understands, since it said “the fixed part”, do we not know that the entire mill is understood? Why does the verse say, “the movable and the fixed part”? To declare guilty for either part separately.
“Fresh”, to include unripe berries. “Fresh”, to include the flower. The baraita follows Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose said, the flower is forbidden for the nazir because it is a fruit. It is possible to eat a bunch of grapes and to be guilty in reference to “grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” If he soaked it for soaking, pressed it for wine, and they warned him about “anything that comes from the wine-vine”, etc.
HALAKHAH: “An unspecified nezirut is thirty days,” etc. It is written: “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head;” therefore, if it did pass, he is guilty. “His head’s hair grows wildly;” how much means growing hair? 30 days. {That refers to an impure nazir. A pure nazir? “He has to shave his head on the day be becomes pure.” Why does the verse say: “On the seventh day he shall shave all his hair”? That shows that he shaves a second time.} “He shaves,” all, not in part. From here that if he left two hairs, he [did] nothing. “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head.” Not only a shaving knife, from where to treat a cropper and scissors like a shaving knife? The verse says, “shall not pass over his head.” That means not only a shaving knife; all methods of removal are understood. From here that he starts again only for a [shaving knife].
HALAKHAH: “A nazir who drank wine,” etc. A nazir while he was in a cemetery: Rebbi Joḥanan said, one warns him about wine and shaving. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since one cannot warn him because of impurity, one does not warn him about wine and shaving. One reads all this in the Third Chapter.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said: “The ram he shall offer, etc.” Why does the verse say, “he shall offer”? Start the procedure with it. Rebbi Ḥinena objected before Rebbi Mana: But is it not written: “He shall offer his flour offering and his libation”? Should he not start with them? How is that? Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If he shaved for any of the three, he satisfied his obligation. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Who is the Tanna of: “All purification offerings in the Torah precede the reparation offerings”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion, “all purification offerings in the Torah precede the reparation offerings.”
HALAKHAH: A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ”, etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked: “Is one who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles.’ In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Rebbi Joshia also agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan ate bake-meats and said, I did not taste food on that day. But did we not state: “He who made a vow not to eat food is permitted water and salt”? Explain it following Rebbi Joshia, who said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. And from where that everything is called food? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said: “And ten female donkeys carrying grain, bread, and food, etc.” Why does the verse say, “and food”? From here that everything is called food.
HALAKHAH: “The High Priest and the nazir,” etc. It is written: “He shall not go close to a dead body.” Where do we hold? If to forbid non-relatives, is he not also under the rules of a simple priest? If it cannot refer to non-relatives, refer it to relatives. It is written: “Not to go close to a dead body,” and you say so? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda said, from here repeated prohibitions in the Torah. But it is to permit the corpse of obligation. Some understand it from the following: “ The man shall not defile himself, in the midst of his people” he may not defile himself. But he defiles himself for a corpse of obligation. Some understand it from the following: “ To profane himself.” He may not defile himself to profane himself; he defiles himself for a corpse of obligation.
HALAKHAH: “The nazir shaves for the following impurities,” etc. An old man asked Rebbi Joḥanan: If the volume of an olive from a corpse makes impure, then certainly all of it also? He said to him, to include the stillbirth which did not reach the volume of an olive. He continued to ask: If a limb of a corpse makes impure, then certainly all of it also? He said to him, to include the stillbirth whose limbs did not yet jell. Rebbi Yose said, was that old man wise? His questions were not wise since after he asked the first question, it was not necessary to ask the second. If he wanted to ask both, he should have asked the second and after that the first. The students of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥalaphta asked the second but did not ask the first because it was obvious for them that if he did not reach the volume of an olive it is certain that his limbs did not yet jell. Rebbi Mana bar Ḥizqiah said, do you remember when Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa was here, were not both questions by that old man [asked] about Ahilut that the nazir shaves for them? In addition, from what Rebbi Joḥanan said, I thought that the stillbirths were not Torah. But since he makes his mother sit days of purity, it is implied that [the rules of] stillbirths are Torah.
HALAKHAH: “But for overhanging branches, or protuberances,” etc. What is the status of the undistributed middle? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the undistributed middle is judged leniently. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the undistributed middle is judged restrictively. What is the undistributed middle? That is a limb from a corpse or a limb from a living body which is not sufficiently covered by flesh. Rebbi Yose asked: From where [do we infer that] a bone [induces impurity in the size of] a barley grain? Not from that verse, “or a person’s bone”? Here you require a barley grain, there you do not require a barley grain! Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon stated: “A slain one”, anything from a slain person, that is a limb from a corpse or a limb from a living body which is not sufficiently covered by flesh.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua,” etc. There, we have stated: “Two are impure from the dead, one is impure for seven days and one is impure by the impurity of evening. Three are impure from the dead, two are impure for seven days and one is impure until nightfall. Four are impure from the dead, three are impure for seven days and one is impure until nightfall. How is it for two? Any person who touches a corpse is impure for seven days; a person who touches him is impure until nightfall,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: All are biblically [impure] for heave, but for entering the Sanctuary only the second impure who touched the first impure. What is the reason? “A person who would be impure and did not purify himself;” anybody needing purification is guilty for entering the Sanctuary; anybody not needing purification is not guilty for entering the Sanctuary. They objected: But a person who touches objects which touched a corpse needs purification, but is he the second? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, for impurity of a person from a person, not for impurity of a person from objects. The statement of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya [implies that] only the first is guilty. Since [for impurity of] a person from a person only the first is guilty, so here the first is guilty. Rebbi Yose said, only if he immersed himself. That is a statement of Rebbi, since Rebbi said, all impure persons remain impure until the are immersed in water.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua,” etc. There, we have stated: “Two are impure from the dead, one is impure for seven days and one is impure by the impurity of evening. Three are impure from the dead, two are impure for seven days and one is impure until nightfall. Four are impure from the dead, three are impure for seven days and one is impure until nightfall. How is it for two? Any person who touches a corpse is impure for seven days; a person who touches him is impure until nightfall,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: All are biblically [impure] for heave, but for entering the Sanctuary only the second impure who touched the first impure. What is the reason? “A person who would be impure and did not purify himself;” anybody needing purification is guilty for entering the Sanctuary; anybody not needing purification is not guilty for entering the Sanctuary. They objected: But a person who touches objects which touched a corpse needs purification, but is he the second? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, for impurity of a person from a person, not for impurity of a person from objects. The statement of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya [implies that] only the first is guilty. Since [for impurity of] a person from a person only the first is guilty, so here the first is guilty. Rebbi Yose said, only if he immersed himself. That is a statement of Rebbi, since Rebbi said, all impure persons remain impure until the are immersed in water.
HALAKHAH: “If a person said to two nezirim,” etc. Not only if he said to one of them, “I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was,” but even if he said, “I saw one of you vowing to be a nazir but I do not know which one of you it was,” both of them have to follow the rules of nazir because of his testimony. If they do not contradict him. But if they contradict him, this does not apply. If both of them contradict, it parallels the following: “If one witness says, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, he is pure. If two witnesses say, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, the two are believed more than he is, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, everybody is believed about himself.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah and the Sages declare pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah declares pure. The rabbis’ words support Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Gurion said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah said this only about an old impurity, for he can say to them, I had been impure but I purified myself, and we have stated: The same holds for eating suet; the same holds for entering the Sanctuary. Should they not accept his position for impurity? Because of the impurity of a nazir, could they not say, where is the sacrifice which you brought? Then should they not accept his position for heave? So far the questions of Rebbi Ḥanina.
He counts another 30 days and brings all his sacrifices, stipulates, and says: If I was impure, the first elevation offering was obligatory and this one is voluntary. But if I was pure, the first elevation offering was voluntary and this one is obligatory. The purification offering is in doubt. He shaves his head, beard, and eyebrows, etc..
How does one treat him according to Ben Zoma? He brings an animal elevation offering and shaves for it, a bird as purification offering, stipulates, and says: “If I was impure, the purification offering is for my obligation and the elevation offering is voluntary. If I was pure, the elevation offering is for my obligation and the purification offering is in doubt.” He shaves his head, beard, and eyebrows, etc.
HALAKHAH: “Gentiles cannot vow as nazir,” etc. Israelites can vow as nazir, Gentiles cannot vow as nazir. Since you say, “a man”, why does the verse mention “a man”? To include Gentiles, who make vows and offer voluntary gifts like Israelites! Why should one not say the same here? There is a difference, for it is written “He shall atone for him.” This refers to one to whom atonement applies. It excludes Gentiles, to whom atonement does not apply.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. This is difficult. If somebody brings a gift document from overseas,would you require him to say, it was written and signed before me? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Rebbi Joḥanan said, that is a leniency lest she sit abandoned. Is that a leniency? It is only a restriction, for if he does not say to her, it was written and signed before me, you do not permit her to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was written and signed before me, makes it easy for her at the end. For if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void. Rebbi Mana wanted to say, a protest other than the text of the bill. But is a protest about the text of the bill a protest which has no validity? Even for a protest which has validity, said Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, since you say that the reason for the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was signed before me, is to make it easy for her at the end, that if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void; this means that there is no difference whether it is a protest not about the text of the bill or about the body of the bill, a protest which has no validity, or a protest which does have validity! But should you worry that maybe be gave the bill to disqualified witnesses to sign? Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan told the people of Sepphoris: You say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a person who brings a bill of divorce from Babylonia does not have to say “it was written and signed before me.” But I am saying that it is necessary, for there is a Mishnah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East and Reqam belongs to the East.” And even if you say that they disagree with Rebbi Jehudah and say that Reqam does not belong to the East, what about from Babylonia to here? Rav said, we consider ourselves as in the Land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. But Samuel said, even from one city quarter to another. He asked before him to change his opinion, when Cahana told him, what would we do with the earlier cases of women who remarried? He said to him, what do you have in your hand? For he was of Rebbi’s opinion as it was stated: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was neither written nor signed in his presence, she has to leave under the thirteen penalties, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages did not agree in this matter.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel,” etc. Who protests? Rav Ḥisda said, the husband protests. Rebbi Yose said, the buyers protest, lest she repossess from them. Rebbi asked: So far a protest which does not concern the text of the bill. A protest which concerns the text of the bill is in dispute between Rebbi Joḥanan and the rabbis there. In the opinion of the rabbis there, there is no difference to a protest concerning or not concerning the body of the bill. A protest not concerning the text of the bill is void, a protest concerning the text of the bill is valid.
HALAKHAH: “Any document signed by a Samaritan is invalid,” etc. They are suspected about money; about money they were disqualified.They are not suspected about incest and adultery. And testimony in capital criminal cases has the same status as testimony about incest and adultery. Then even if both of them are Samaritans? There is a difference, for they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Then even one Samaritan witness should be disqualified! Rebbi Abin said, explain it if a Jew signed last. Rebbi Yose said, that is according to the opinion that the witnesses may sign separately, not in the presence of each other. But according to him who says that witnesses may sign only in the presence of each other, it is valid even if the Samaritan signed last.
HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. One understands “it was written before me” but not “it was signed before me”, but “it was signed before me” but not “it was written before me”? Is not a bill of divorce validated by its signatures? That must follow Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates forms. Following Rebbi Jehudah outside the Land as for one who divorces in the Land of Israel. Are there forms of bills of divorce outside the Land for divorces outside the Land? It is necessary for him to know that it is a bill of divorce and that he be appointed as an agent; he would not know that it was a bill of divorce unless it was written completely before him. Rebbi Ḥanin stated: It is permitted that he enter and leave.
HALAKHAH: “If it was written during daytime and signed during daytime,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is invalid because of the usufruct. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish told him, then you should also be suspicious of the bills of divorce brought from overseas; maybe they were written during daytime and signed in the night! He answered him, there the forgery is intrinsic, here it is extrinsic.
HALAKHAH: “One writes with anything,” etc. “He shall write”, not engrave. “He shall write”, not dropping points. “He shall write”, not pouring. “He shall write”, not engrave; some Tannaïm state, he even may engrave. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says not to engrave, if the writing stands out as on a denar. He who says even to engrave, as on a writing tablet. “He shall write”, not dropping points; Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom and Rebbi Mattaniah: One said, if he did not connect the points; the other said, even if he connected the points. “He shall write”, not pouring. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, those Orientals are very sophisticated. If one of them wants to write a secret letter to another, he writes with juice of gall-nuts. The recipient pours ink without gall over it, which is absorbed at the place of the writing. If one did that on the Sabbath, what? There, we have stated: “Writing on top of writing is not prosecutable.” Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, only if he wrote ink on ink or vermilion on vermilion. But if he wrote ink on vermilion or vermilion on ink, he is guilty. Rebbi Isaac bar Mesharshia in the name of the rabbis from there: He is doubly guilty, once for erasing and once for writing.
HALAKHAH: “One does not write on anything connected to the ground,” etc. This does not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. Samuel bar Abba asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected it again, detached it, and delivered it to her; what does Rebbi Jehudah say? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abin asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected again, signed, and detached it, and delivered it to her; what do the rabbis say?
HALAKHAH: “Everybody is acceptable to write the bill of divorce,” etc. Rav Huna said, only if a sane person watches over them. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: But is it not written: “He shall write for her,” in her name? Samuel said, it is necessary that one reserve the essential text for him. This follows what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid.
HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.
HALAKHAH: “Also those women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died,” etc. Would you believe her if it was written but not signed [in her presence]? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests, his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.
HALAKHAH: “Every bill of divorce which was not written for a particular wife,” etc. Who is dictating? School teachers. What means “in addition”? There it was not written as a bill of divorce but here it was written as a bill of divorce. What means “in addition”? There it was written neither in his name nor in her name but here it was written in his name but not in her name. What means “in addition”? There it was written in his name but not in her name but here it was written in his name and in her name but it was not written for divorce from the start.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time.” He explains it, with the essential text. It is difficult for Rebbi Joḥanan: Do the Sages declare valid in case he wrote the essential text with the formulaic text? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: From its invalidity you learn its validity. If he wrote everything in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names not in her name, would that be valid? Similarly, if he wrote everything not in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names in her name, it is valid. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Jeremiah: Think of it, if it was paired? He said, so said his teacher Rebbi Ze‘ira to him: Since pairing is infrequent, even if there was pairing it is as if there was no pairing. Then it is difficult for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even if he did not write the essential text in the formula, Rebbi Jehudah declares invalid! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Jehudah refers to something else; it follows what Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines about one subject is invalid in any case.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody is transporting a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel when he falls sick,” etc. Because he falls sick; therefore not if he did not fall sick.
HALAKHAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce overseas and falls sick,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, this is only necessary if he already has arrived in the Land of Israel. Lest you say, since he arrived in the Land of Israel it should be treated as a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel, and for bills of divorce from the Land of Israel one does not have to say: “it was written and signed before me.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sets aside produce,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar ben Antigonos in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Yannai: This means that nothing is in disorder for 24 hours but the last day. Rebbi Joḥanan said: Nothing is in order for 24 hours but the first day, as we have stated there: “If a miqweh was measured and found deficient.” Ḥinena the son of Rav Assi bar Mamal in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That is to negate the words of Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated: “If they were lost, one worries about them for 24 hours back, the words of Rebbi Eleazar.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. This disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates the agent appointed by him by a declaration. He explains it by the stringency of the rules of incest. If he appointed an agent to deliver the bill of divorce, the latter has to deliver it in the presence of two [witnesses]; the agent is not counted as one of the two. If another agent went to invalidate the bill of divorce, he has to invalidate it in the presence of two [witnesses] and the agent is counted as one of the two. If he met him on the road and asked him, what about the bill of divorce I gave you? He answered, I delivered it to her. While they were talking there, he dropped it. He said, did you not tell me that you delivered it to her? He explained, I delivered it to her and she said, keep it for me. What? Can he be believed since it is in his power to divorce, or can he not be believed because it is in his hand? If the agent fell sick, how do you treat this? By the rules of divorces or the rules of preliminary marriages? By the rules of divorces one can divorce through the agency of anybody. By the rules of preliminary marriages one cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.
HALAKHAH: “In earlier times, he could go to court,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said that nobody can annul an agency by speech. Explain it in a fully constituted court.
HALAKHAH: “A widow can be paid from the orphans’ property only,” etc. Earlier they swore falsely and buried their children, since it is written: “For vain [vows] I smote your children.” In addition, they fear vows more than oaths. If she transgressed and swore? Rav Huna said, if she swore, she swore. Rav said to his daughter-in-law: If I were not a person readily making concessions, even the cover on your head would be my property. Samuel said, she acquires the garments which she is wearing. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “Neither his wife’s garments nor his children’s are his property.”
HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles,” etc. To a Gentile even in the Land. Who frees him? His original owner pays for him and the second frees him. “Or outside the Land,” even to a Jew. Let us say that if the second owner knew, both of them split the price; otherwise the first pays for him and the second frees him. “I X ben Y sold my slave Z to Antiochia”, he gains his freedom. But if he is in Lydda, he did not gain his freedom. It was stated: A slave goes outside the Land with his master. Therefore, if he sold him there, he is sold. If he came from outside the Land to the Land with the intention to return, one forces him to return. With the intention not to return, one does not force him to return. If he fled from outside the Land to the Land, he may return him. If he fled from the Land to outside the Land, Rebbi Joshia in the name of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, it is permigtted. The great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is permitted. Rebbi Marinos, the son of the great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is forbidden. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he is used to flee there. But he who says, it is forbidden, if he is not used to flee there. Rebbi Yose said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he can return him from there; but he who says, it is forbidden, if he cannot return him from there.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells himself and his children to Gentiles,” etc. The Mishnah, if he sold himself repeatedly. But if he sold himself once, one buys him back, but if he sold himself to the games, one does not buy him back. There was a case of one who sold himself to the games; the case came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said, what can we do? He did it for his livelihood.
HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”
HALAKHAH: “One cannot collect for usufruct,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should be eager to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there about an adult orphan, here about an underage orphan.
HALAKHAH: “One does not collect from encumbered property,” etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, because they have no fixed amount.
HALAKHAH: “If orphans rely on a property owner, etc.” (Num. 18:28) “you” excludes partners, “you” excludes guardians, “you” excludes one who gives heave from what is not his. Did we not state (Terumot 3:3): “Partners who gave heave one after the other?” But one must be for Great Heave, the other for heave of the tithe. Did we not infer the laws of the Great Heave from heave of the tithe? But one is for practice, the other for action. “You” excludes guardians; but did we not state: “Orphans dependent on a home owner, or for whom the father had appointed a guardian, must tithe their produce.” The colleagues say, here for a permanent guardian, there for a temporary guardian. Rebbi Yose asked, does that apply to: “he may sell slaves but not real estate?” But here one deals with an adult orphan, there with an underage orphan.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Guedgedah testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Immi. His testimony seems reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this refers to a hearing girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this refers to an underage girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became divorced.
HALAKHAH: “There was no law of siqariqon in Judea” etc. In earlier times they decided on a persecution in Judea because they had a tradition from their forefathers that Jehudah had killed Esaw, as it is written: “Your hand is on your enemies’ neck.” They went and enslaved them, took their fields and sold them to third parties. The original owners could come and repossess; therefore the land was left absolutely in the hand of the siqariqon since they refrained from buying. “They decreed that the law of siqariqon should not apply in Jehudah. When was this said? About war killings before the war. But about anybody killed in and after the war, the notion of siqariqon does not apply.” But are those killed before the war not like those killed after the war? Explain it that a siqariqon came and robbed and suppressed; there was no time left to write the sales contract before murder engulfed the entire world, that practice should not be partial.
HALAKHAH: “The following was said for communal peace,” etc. The saying of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai implies that it is of the words of the Torah, for Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Moses wrote this Torah and gave it to the Cohanim, the Levites (etc.)” and afterwards “to all the Elders of Israel.” The saying of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Joshua said, never did I recite the benediction before a Cohen and I did not allow an Israel to do it before him. The saying of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, in a city of only Cohanim, an Israel reads first because of communal peace.
HALAKHAH: “The following was said for communal peace,” etc. The saying of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai implies that it is of the words of the Torah, for Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Moses wrote this Torah and gave it to the Cohanim, the Levites (etc.)” and afterwards “to all the Elders of Israel.” The saying of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Joshua said, never did I recite the benediction before a Cohen and I did not allow an Israel to do it before him. The saying of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, in a city of only Cohanim, an Israel reads first because of communal peace.
“Traps for wild animals, birds,” etc. That is, about large ones. But small ones are as if inside his house.
HALAKHAH: “A woman may lend to her neighbor,” etc. Rebbi Zeïra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does our Mishnah deal with the implicit case, rather than the explicit? He said to him, is the implicit case not explicit? He said to him, I can say a coarse sieve to count coins, a sieve to sift sand, grindstones to grind spices, a stove to put in flax bundles.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who says, accept this bill of divorce for my wife,” etc. Everywhere you say that “accept” is the equivalent of “obtain,” but here you say that “accept” is the equivalent of “bring”? There is a difference, for one can obtain something for a person without him being present. Rebbi Shammai objected: Think of it, if she was shouting to obtain a divorce? I say, maybe she changed her mind. But did we not state: “A woman herself may bring her bill of divorce”? Could you say that she may have changed her mind? There, she is damaging herself; here it is to her detriment.
HALAKHAH: “A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me,” etc. Two say that she appointed in their presence and two say that in their presence he received and tore it. But if he agrees, the agent should be able to be added. Explain it, it he was a relative. This implies that a relative can act as agent.
HALAKHAH: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me,” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is (not) divorced unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not divorce her except at place X. “If he said, she is at place X and he delivered it at another place,” Rebbi Eleazar agrees that he only indicates a place; the rabbis agree that he only indicates a place.
HALAKHAH: : “If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. There, we have stated: “If someone tells a person who is not trustworthy, buy for me from somebody who is trustworthy, or from somebody who tithes, he is not trustworthy. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar (ben Rebbi Yose.) [Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar;] does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says: “Write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife,” etc. If somebody says in Aramaic “divorce her,” it is as if he said in Hebrew “divorce her.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was thrown into a cistern,” etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jonathan taught us, only if they saw a man’s shadow. There we have stated: “One testifies by the light of a candle or by the light of the moon and one permits to remarry on the basis of a disembodied voice”, and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow. Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That means, in the fields, but in town even without a man’s shadow. But did we not state: “If somebody had been thrown into a cistern,” and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow? Rebbi Abin said, damaging spirits were as frequent in cisterns as they are frequent on the fields.
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.
HALAKHAH: “If one said to two persons, give a bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr, from the next sentence: “If he said to three persons;” and Rav Ḥisda said, the reason of Rebbi Meïr is that we find everywhere that others write and the court signs, also here others write and the court affixes their signatures.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody had an attack of seizures”, etc. The symptoms of an insane person: One who goes out in the night, stays overnight in a graveyard, tears his clothing, and destroys what one gives to him. Rebbi Huna said, only if all of that is in him since otherwise I say that one who goes out in the night is a man-dog; he who stays overnight in a graveyard burns incense to spirits, he who tears up his clothing is [a choleric person], and he who destroys what one gives to him is a Cynic. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these symptoms is proof. Rebbi Abun said, what Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these by itself is reasonable for him who destroys what one gives to him; even the greatest idiot does not destroy all one gives to him. The one attacked by seizures does not exhibit any of these signs. What is one attacked by seizures? Rebbi Yose said, a decrepit one. There came a case before Rebbi Yose of a weaver who, when one gave him red on black he was exerting himself, black on red he was exerting himself. This is the cordiacus described by the Sages.
HALAKHAH: “If they said to him, shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife,” etc. If he said to two people, say to X that he shall write and to Y and Z that they shall sign. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, this happened in the days of Rebbi, and he said, such a thing should not be done in Israel. Samuel said, it certainly should be done. Rav Jeremiah asked Samuel: If he said to two people, say to X that he write and you sign. He said to him, that is a bill of divorce but it needs study. The opinion of Samuel seems inverted. There, he said, it certainly should be done, and here, he says so? There is a difference, because they changed their testimony.
HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce from today,” etc. If he overate on groats it is as if he died from that illness, hazelnuts alone and he did not get out of bed it is as if he did not die from that illness.
HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz,” etc. It was stated: If she did not manage to pay before he died, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, she pays his father or his brother and is free from ḥalîṣah and levirate marriage. The same holds for preliminary marriage: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that I shall give you 200 zuz;” if he did not manage to pay before he died, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, his father or his brother pay and she is subject to ḥalîṣah or levirate marriage.
HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you serve my father,” etc. Rebbi Abba said: During his lifetime, on condition that she serve all his needs, on condition that she breast-feed all his needs. Even if she did not serve all his needs, even if she did not breast-feed all his needs, but even if she served him for one hour, or breast-fed him for one hour. After death, even if she never served him or never breast-fed him. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “How long does she have to breast-feed him? Two years, Rebbi Jehudah says, eighteen months.” Rebbi Abin said, this was taught about the cost of a wet-nurse.
HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce,” etc. For what? Rebbi Elazar said, for his house; Rebbi Joḥanan said, for places. The Mishnah supports him who said, for his house: “If he came to Acco, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who said that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce. But even if you say that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce, does that mean also for conditions imposed on a bill of divorce?
HALAKHAH: “If I should not return within twelve months from today,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? Because he mentioned writing earlier. But did he not also mention delivering earlier, and you say that it is no bill of divorce?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody throws a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. “He shall write,” “he shall deliver into her hand.” Not only into her hand; from where also into her garden or into her courtyard? The verse says “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Is this following Rebbi Ismael? It is following Rebbi Aqiba. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael, “he took all his land from his hand, up to the Arnon.” Did he take it out of his hand? What means “from his hand”? From his possession.
HALAKHAH: “If he said to her, ‘take this bond,’ ” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan says, this follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Simeon, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Simeon says it never is a bill of divorce unless he says at the moment of delivery: “this is your bill of divorce.”
HALAKHAH: “The same applies for preliminary marriages”, etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Abba Cohen Bar Dalaia: A person acquires a find within four cubits of himself. What is the reason? (1Chr. 22:14) “Look, in my poverty I prepared for the House of the Eternal 100’000 kikkar of gold, 1’000’000 kikkar of silver, bronze and iron unweighed because it was so much; I prepared wood and stones, and you should add to them.”
HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai say,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: And any one of them if she was married should not leave, in order not to cause talk about her children.
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They declared the child a bastard because of the danger. Rav Huna in the name of Rav: This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for “if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.” Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yasa: Also “if somebody divorced his wife”? He said to him, not your Chapter but our Chapter.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody married his sister-in-law,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” Therefore she must leave.
HALAKHAH: “If the scribe wrote,” etc. Where do we hold? If he made a mistake, even Rebbi Eleazar agrees. If he made no error, even the rabbis agree. But we must hold that it was unexplained. Rebbi Eleazar suspects that possibly he made no mistake; the rabbis suspect that possibly he did make a mistake.
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote a bill to divorce his wife and then changed his mind,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: There is no problem because of the purity of the priestly line and the court will not denigrate her. There came a case before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and he acted following the House of Hillel. Rav asked him, why did you bring yourself into this great doubt? He answered, Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose was with me. He quoted about them: “Two are better than one.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.
HALAKHAH: “Anybody can supplement a bald document,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said, it is written: “I took the document,” etc. “And [the sealed]”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two {witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, on a simple document, the witnesses sign parallel, on a knotted one the witnesses sign lengthwise. Rebbi Idi said, the witnesses sign between any two knots, but it must be on top. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Naḥman wanted to argue that witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that two times “I accept” makes it invalid. But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Does Rav Huna not consider that he might write another text, erase and change to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that an erasure makes invalid even if the correction is certified.
HALAKHAH: “Anybody can supplement a bald document,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said, it is written: “I took the document,” etc. “And [the sealed]”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two {witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, on a simple document, the witnesses sign parallel, on a knotted one the witnesses sign lengthwise. Rebbi Idi said, the witnesses sign between any two knots, but it must be on top. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Naḥman wanted to argue that witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that two times “I accept” makes it invalid. But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Does Rav Huna not consider that he might write another text, erase and change to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that an erasure makes invalid even if the correction is certified.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody in divorcing his wife,” etc. Rebbi Ilai said, the reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”, even if he did permit her only to one other man. This argument proves more than the Mishnah! The Mishnah said if she was permitted to all but forbidden to one other man; the argument is that he forbade her to all but permitted her only to one other man. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? Death permits and divorce permits. Since death permits only partially, so the bill of divorce permits only partially. What is the reason of the rabbis? “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”; it brackets marriage and divorce. Since her divorce is without participation of a third party, so her marriage must be without participation of a third party.
HALAKHAH: “The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man,” etc. Rebbi Aḥa said: “Cutting off”, the Torah did not choose the term “cutting off” except to refer to a person with whom a marriage is possible.
HALAKHAH: “You are permitted to any man,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddušin? As we have stated there: If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, those are questionable qiddušin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.
“Three kinds of bills of divorce are invalid,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: All in handwriting. Rebbi Eleazar asked: There are witnesses; why do I need handwriting? Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: All in handwriting except if its witnesses are with it. Rav Hamnuna said, they testified to their own sin since they agreed to lie by signing on an undated bill of divorce.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar says, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it,” etc. Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of the Sages: It is invalid. There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan about a Cohen’s wife and he wanted to act on Rebbi Yannai’s statement when it was heard that Rav and Samuel disagreed. There came before him [another case] involving an Israel, and he listened to that. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, in the opinion of everybody it is valid. But did not Rebbi Eleazar say, it is valid, and the rabbis say, it is invalid? What is their disagreement? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is valid and she can collect from encumbered property. The rabbis said, it is invalid and she can collect only from unencumbered property.
HALAKHAH: “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Just as you say that a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce is invalid in the case of two wives, similarly two bills of divorce should be invalid for two women. He answered, that is correct. He said to him, but did we not state: “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce and they became mixed up, one delivers both to both women”? There, each of the bills was written in the name of the respective wife; the mix-up caused the problem. But here, neither one was written as divorce in her name; when it was delivered, could it be considered as divorce in her name from the start?
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote two bills of divorce side by side,” etc. “It is invalid if the witnesses are separated from the text by the width of two lines; less than that it is valid”. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines in a text about one subject makes invalid in any case. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said: The Mishnah says so: “One Hebrew- and one Greek-writing witness are under each of them, reaching from one column to the other, are all invalid.” Is not Hebrew combined with Greek one item? Rebbi Mana said, if he started at the end of the second line and ended at the fourth line, it is valid. “How far from the text should the witnesses sign? That they can be read with it, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, one full line. Rebbi Dositheos ben Yannai says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting.” What kind of writing does one use to estimate? Rebbi Yasa ben Rebbi Sabbatai says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula: Corresponding to לך ולך. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does the signature of Yose ben Yannai have equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh? He said to him: For that it is needed, that the signature of Yose ben Yannai has equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh.
HALAKHAH: “If some of the text remained,” etc. What does “remained” mean? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Baibon said, e. g., “true, valid, and clear.”
MISHNAH: The House of Shammai say, a person should not divorce his wife unless he found her immoral, as it was said: “For he found with her a matter of nakedness.” But the House of Hillel say, even if she spoiled his dish, as it was said: “For he found with her a bad thing.” Rebbi Aqiba said, even if he found another more beautiful than her, as it was said: “It will be if she does not appear pleasing in his eyes, etc.”
HALAKHAH: “A wife may be acquired in three ways,” etc. So is the Mishnah: Either by money, or by document, or by intercourse. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated as follows: Not only by all three together, but even by any one of them.