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2275 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “This is what the people of Jerusalem wrote,” etc. The people of Galilee cared for their honor more than for their money; the people of Judea cared for their money more than for their honor. Rebbi Ḥananiah the son of Rebbi Abbahu, and some say it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Caesarea follows Judea and all other countries Jerusalem.
HALAKHAH: “Even though they said that a virgin collects 200,” etc. How does he become indebted to her? Do not Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, if somebody writes a debenture for another person under the assumption that he owes him and it turns out that he does not owe, [he does not have] to give to him! He wants to give much to be called X’s son-in-law. That is, if he decided this at the time of the preliminary marriage. What if he decided this at the time of the definitive marriage? He wants to give much for sexual relations with her, which are sweet. That is if he slept with her. If he did not sleep with her? He wants to give much for the acquisition he made. If he had decided at the preliminary marriage, at the definitive marriage, he already is called X’s son-in-law, sexual relations are nothing new, there is no new acquisition; from thereon he wants to give much that she should not change her mind. But can she? Was it not stated that “a man divorces only by his own will”? Rebbi Abin said, she makes his life miserable and he frees her.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he wants he writes,” etc. Does Rebbi Jehudah think that the minimum for a virgin is a mina and for a widow 50 zuz? Should he not write so from the start? But it must be a diminution afterwards. Why can he not write that “I received from you such and such”? It was found that bar Kappara stated: “I received from you such and such”. Rebbi Joḥanan said: Rebbi Jehudah formulated this only for the end; but at the start, even Rebbi Jehudah agrees. What is the beginning and what is the end? The colleagues in the name of R. Joḥanan: Before he had intercourse, and after he had intercourse. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of R. Joḥanan: Before he took her in, and after he took her in. If he did not have intercourse with her, divorced her, and took her in again; that is before and after.
HALAKHAH: “The levir does not cause her to eat heave,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, we stated there: The sister-in-law is fed from her husband’s estate all of the three months. If her levir had come before the court and fled, she is fed from his property. If he became sick it is as if he had fled. If he went overseas it is as if he had fled. If the widow said, I am bound in my widowhood to my husband’s house, one listens to her. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: The one who says, I shall not giveḥalîṣah, is like the one who says, I shall not divorce. Rav Zabda said, Rebbi Isaac intructed that the one who says., I shall not give ḥalîṣah, is like the one who says, I shall not divorce.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s earnings,” etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is sanctified as his property. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian says, it is profane as his property. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, what one states there supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “When was this said? If he does not feed her. But if he feeds her, everybody agrees that it was sanctified.” But is not everything a wife has subject to the husband’s claim to its yield?
HALAKHAH: “These are the kinds of work a woman does for her husband,” etc. It was stated: Seven main labors did they enumerate; the rest the Sages did not need to specify.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” etc. The House of Shammai say, two weeks as after the birth of a girl. But the House of Hillel say one week, as after the birth of a boy or the days of her menstruation.
HALAKHAH: “For how long does one reduce? Up to the amount of her ketubah”, etc. Here you say seven, and there you say three? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, since she is obligated for seven, he deducts seven; he, since he is obligated for three, has to add three. Think of it, if she brought him slaves, she is not obligated for anything! Think of it, if he stipulated [that he is not obligated for] either šĕ‘ēr, or dress, or ‘onāh, he is not obligated for anything! What is it? Following Rebbi Joḥanan, that the suffering of the male is greater than that of the female. That is what is written: “It was when she had nagged him day after day and pressured him.” What means “and pressured him”? Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, that she slipped away from under him. “He felt badly, to die”. He felt badly, ready to die, but she did not feel badly, to die. But some say that she fulfilled her needs with others. So much more she should have wanted, since Rebbi Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Naḥman: This human limb, if you starved it you satisfied it, if you satisfied it you starved it.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody provides for his wife through a third party,” etc. What is “in proximity of Idumea”? In the South.
HALAKHAH: “One gives her half a qab of legumes and half a qab of oil,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, a mina, i. e. four riṭl. He gives her a pillow, a light and wick, and an amphora, and a pot. Rebbi Yose said, she has no right to a pillow since the wives of poor men do not sleep on a pillow. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If she left over from her food, it is hers, if she left over rags they are his - if she left over rags they are hers. That is, of a married woman. But for a widow, both her leftover food and her leftover rags are hers.
HALAKHAH: “One gives her a silver obolus for her needs and she eats with him every Friday night,” etc. The matters are formulated in clean language. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Really eating. In the opinion of Rav, she eats at his expense; in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she eats at her own expense.
HALAKHAH: “What a woman finds or makes with her hands belongs to her husband,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: One said, this is everybody’s opinion, the other said it is in dispute. We do not know who said what. It is reasonable that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish should be the one who said it is in dispute since he explained that [the husband] provides her with food but does not give her a silver obolus as pocket money, and we did state: “If he does not give her a silver obolus as pocket money, what she makes with her hands is hers.” The work of her hands is parallel to what she finds. Rebbi Jacob bar Immi came in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is everybody’s opinion. That means that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish varies in his opinions.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody decided on money for his son-in-law and the son-in-law died,” etc. Are these not the things that are acquired by speech? Bar Qappara stated: He promised the dowry on condition there be a marriage. And it is so: If somebody decided on money for his underage daughter, one forces him to give. But not for the adult one? Rebbi Abun said, one forces [the groom] to give a bill of divorce.
HALAKHAH: “If she decided to bring him 1’000 denars,” etc. Why did they say for money, one and one half times, and for estimations less one fifth? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, one estimates the will of the woman that she wants to use her vessels and depreciates them by a fifth. One estimates the will of the man to use it in trade and to make them one and one half. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that nobody has the right to sell his wife’s vessels. Example: Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi went to appraise for Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina’s daughter. They said to [the groom]: Deduct a fifth and double. He said to them, he deducts a fifth and does not double.
HALAKHAH: “If she decided to bring him money,” etc. “If she decided to bring him 500 denars by appraisal, he makes it 400. If he did not do that but made it 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts five denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 500 denars in coin, he makes it 750. If he did not do that but made them 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts six denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 1’000 zuz, he must turn them into fifteen minas. If he did not do that but wrote over to her a field worth 12 minas in place of the 1’000 zuz. If she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, one does not decrease for a virgin to less than 200 and for a widow to less than a mina.” Here, you say, he deducts. But there, you say, he does not deduct. Here, if she invalidated part of it, there if she did not invalidate part of it. Here, you say, he touches the addition but there, you say, he does not touch the addition. Here, he added but did not subtract; there, he subtracted but did not add. It was stated: Both for appraisal and for coin. Why for appraisal? Corresponding to what he subtracts, corresponding to what what he adds, corresponding to what she brings.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody marries off his daughter,” etc. Rebbi Abba Mari, Rebbi Yose’s brother, asked: Did we not state: From where that even if he said, I shall go naked but clothe her, one does not tell him to be naked and to clothe her but he clothes her according to her social standing? There, it is the way of people to say, it is better for me to stand naked if only I cover my wife; but here it was a prior condition.
HALAKHAH: “If an orphan girl was married off by her mother or her brothers,” etc. So is the Mishnah: If they married off the first one there should be given. The words of the Sages: ”Sometimes a man marries off his daughter and spends money on her, and sometimes a man marries off his daughter and collects money for her.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody gives money in trust for his daughter and she says, I am trusting my husband,” etc. The Mishnah speaks of the case that he gave at the time of the preliminary marriage. But if he gave at the definitive marriage even Rebbi Meïr agrees If he established the trust after the definitive marriage, that is the disagreement.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body, but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt. Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah, as it was stated: The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s. Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree in case he provoked her to make the vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not adorn herself,” etc. Rav Huna said, so is the Mishnah: “Among the poor if he did not give a time limit.” Ulla bar Ismael said, among the poor if he did not give a time limit; but if he gave a time limit even if it were for ten years it is permitted, for no fox dies if he gets dusty from his lair. Nathan bar Hoshaiah said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Except holidays.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not go to her father’s house,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they stated there: If he made her make a vow that she should not wash in the bathhouse, in walled cities one week, in villages two weeks. That she should not wear shoes, in villages three months, in walled cities 24 hours.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits,” etc. ”If he made her vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since he gives her a bad reputation among her [female] neighbors. And so if she made a vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, she should leave without ketubah since she gives him a bad reputation among his [male] neighbors.” ”If he made her vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since tomorrow a relative of hers will die and nobody will take notice of her. And so if she made a vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, she should leave without ketubah since tomorrow a relative of his will die and nobody will take notice of him.” ”Rebbi Meïr is saying in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba: ‘It is better to pay condolence visits than to go to a wedding since the former is the end of every human, and the living should take notice.’ Why does the verse say, ‘and the living should take notice’? But do so they shall: eulogize so they should eulogize, bury so they should bury, accompany so they should accompany.”
HALAKHAH: “The following leave without ketubah,” etc. “What is the big-voiced,” etc. And all with witnesses. “X tithed, X saw the stains, X cut her ḥallah, X permitted her vow.” They checked and found it was not so.
HALAKHAH: “The following leave without ketubah,” etc. “What is the big-voiced,” etc. And all with witnesses. “X tithed, X saw the stains, X cut her ḥallah, X permitted her vow.” They checked and found it was not so.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her,” etc. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house,” etc. We have stated defects. Which vows? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoṣadaq: If she vowed not to eat, or not to drink wine, or not to wear dyed garments. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the fine linen garments which come from Bet She‘an have the status of dyed garments. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he said to her, “on condition that you have no obligation of vows on you.” But if he said, “on condition that you have no obligation of any vow on you,” then even if she made a vow not to eat carob fruit it is a vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her,” etc. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house,” etc. We have stated defects. Which vows? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoṣadaq: If she vowed not to eat, or not to drink wine, or not to wear dyed garments. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the fine linen garments which come from Bet She‘an have the status of dyed garments. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he said to her, “on condition that you have no obligation of vows on you.” But if he said, “on condition that you have no obligation of any vow on you,” then even if she made a vow not to eat carob fruit it is a vow.
HALAKHAH: “If a man developed defects,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah, “if he had.” But if they developed newly, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah about a kopeaḥ, and he forced him. It turns out that following Rav if he did not become so, following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel if he became so. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Which [statement of] Rebbi Meïr? The former or the later? If the former, until she made a condition. If the later, even if he made a condition it is nothing. But this Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; does “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if it was a major defect, e. g., blind in one eye, amputated of one of his hands, lame in one of his legs, immediately he shall divorce and pay the ketubah.” This Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis.
HALAKHAH: “The following one forces to divorce: Those smitten with boils,” etc. “The meqammeṣ.” This is the dung collector; but some say it is the tanner. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the Mishnah implies that this is the dung collector since we have stated: “The meqammeṣ and the tanner.” “The brass refiner.” Samuel said, that is the one who smelts brass from its ore.
It was stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I met an old man, smitten with boils, from Sepphoris. He told me, there are 24 kinds of boils; the worst one, and the one for which a woman is bad, is flowing boils. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: With the latter kind, the evil Pharao was smitten; that is what is written: “The Eternal smote Pharao and his house with great plagues,” etc. Rebbi Berekhia said: Because he dared to touch the matron’s body. There are 24 kinds of cedar, and from all of them the verse mentioned only seven. That is what is written: “I shall give in the desert cedar, acacia, myrtle, and oil wood; I put in the prairie beroš, tidhar, and teaššur together. Beroš is cypress; tidhar is idra;teasššur is the box-tree. They added to them ’allonim, ‘armonim, and ’almogim. ’Allonim are oaks, ‘armonim plane trees, ’almuggim aloës.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman inherited property,” etc. So is the Mishnah: Before she was preliminarily married. What is the difference between before she was preliminarily married and after she was preliminarily married? Before she was preliminarily married, it fell to her; after she was preliminarily married it fell to her and him.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Simeon differentiates between properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, properties known to the husband are real estate, those not known to the husband are movables. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, properties known to the husband are those she inherited in the presence of the husband, those not known to the husband are those she inherited while her husband was overseas. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: The following are properties not known to the husband, what she inherited while her husband was overseas.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited money; real estate should be bought,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s opinion since Rebbi Meïr considers standing [produce] as if it were cut. Rebbi Yose said, he did not hear that Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, Rebbi Meïr said this only for standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested; therefore not unripe produce. But here, even unripe produce. Rebbi Jeremiah asked, are not the arguments of Rebbi Meïr contradictory? There, he did not consider standing [produce] as if it were cut, but here he considers standing [produce] as if it were cut. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Meïr does not consider standing [produce] as if it were cut. But if you see cut grain, you empower the woman; if you see an unseeded field, you empower the man. In case of doubt you estimate how much it is worth unseeded and how much seeded. If before it was seeded it was worth (two denars) and when it was seeded (one denar), with that denar real estate should be bought and he reaps its yield.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Simeon says, in the circumstances where he was empowered,” etc. You say, at her entrance they are his: If she sold them they are not sold, if she gave them to a sharecropper he has the reward from it, if she dedicated them as First Fruits they are not dedicated You say, at her exit they are hers, if he sold them they are not sold, if he gave them to a sharecropper she has the reward from it, if he dedicated them as First Fruits, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since they disagreed: (Deut. 26:11): ‘You shall enjoy all the good things that the Eternal, your God, gave to you and your house.’ This teaches that a person brings First Fruits from his wife’s property.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after her death but not during her lifetime. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no difference, during her lifetime and after her death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion since he said, a person does not inherit from his wife as a biblical rule. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it never was dedicated. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan it is dedicated and the holiness is removed.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited male and female slaves,” etc. The Mishnah speaks of those who do not work enough for their upkeep. But if they work enough for their upkeep, she does not have to sell because the glory of her father’s house still exists.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited old vines or olive trees,” etc. Rav Abun in the name of the rabbis there: The Mishnah deals with the case that she inherited olive trees but not their ground, vines but not their ground. But if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, she does not have to sell since her father’s house’s glory still exists. But the rabbis here say, even if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, did she not inherit the value of the olive grove, did she not inherit the value of the vineyard? A baraita supports the rabbis there: “ ‘I am selling you the vineyard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no vines since he sells him [the real estate] by description. ‘I am selling you the grove’, this is a valid sale even if there are no trees since he sells him [the real estate] by description.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody invests in his wife’s properties,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: Even if he ate only one basket of dates. Assi said, that is, if the investment is greater than the increase in value. But if the increase in value is greater than the investment, one gives him the increase in value. A baraita disagrees with Assi: “In all cases one evaluates it as for a sharecropper.” The baraita disagrees about planting; what Assi said was about a building. The baraita disagrees about planting, is that what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: Even if he ate only one basket of dates. He said to him, in one case if he ate, in the other if he did not eat.
HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid.” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.
HALAKHAH: “If his brother left money,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is necessary, if the money was deposited with him, that you would not let him say, since I am the heir it is mine.
HALAKHAH: “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody died and left a wife,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, the weakest in his claim. For example, one lent before witnesses, the other lent on a mortgage document; it should be given to the one who lent before witnesses. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the weakest in his body. Think about it, if he is rich, like those of the family Andreas. Rebbi Aḥa said, the weakest in his body and poor. As the following: They gave to a relative of Rebbi Samuel bar Abba as the weakest. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Rebbi Joḥanan was leaning on Rebbi Simeon bar Abba and said, what was done with that poor woman? He said to him, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Was he justified in doing this? Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should we say that Rebbi Joḥanan follows his doctrine and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish his own? Since they disagree: Everybody agrees that if they err in arguments, one does not reverse. In the words of the Torah, one reverses. Where do they disagree? If one errs in a Mishnah, for Rebbi Joḥanan says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in arguments, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in words of the Torah. What is said of the Mishnah is also said of words of the Elders.
HALAKHAH: “If he left produce taken,” etc. Both Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, if they were collected at a trading place. But if somebody collected it in his house, his house acquired for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he collected it in his house, his house did not acquire for him. For he thinks that they are his but they are not his. Does from this follow how the owner acquires his produce in a Sabbatical year? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, from the moment he put them into his vessel. Rebbi Yose said, even if he put them into his vessel he did not acquire, for he thinks that they are his but they are not his.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody engages his wife as grocer,” etc. Is Rebbi Eliezer not correct? What is the rabbis’ reason? If you say so, there never would be peace in his house. If she broke vessels, is she responsible as an unpaid or a paid trustee? It would be reasonable to consider her a paid trustee. They said, she is not even an unpaid trustee, for if you say so, there never would be peace in his house.
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote to her: “I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about properties over which she exercised control during her husband’s lifetime but even about properties over which she exercised control after her husband’s death are the heirs prevented from making her swear.
HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.
HALAKHAH: “If she went from her husband’s grave to her family,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ura said, this came down in the manner of a biblical oath. The ketubah is acknowledged in her hand for collection; it is as if collected. But since with the document of 200 there is an acknowledment of payment and she says, one mina [is due to her], she cannot be paid without an oath.
“If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, here about an adult orphan, there about an underage orphan.
HALAKHAH: “If she had compromised her ketubah, how is that? If her ketubah was l‘000 zuz,” etc. “If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “If she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath.”
HALAKHAH: “If she had compromised her ketubah, how is that? If her ketubah was l‘000 zuz,” etc. “If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “If she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath.”
HALAKHAH: “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah,” etc. “Two bills of divorce and two ketubot” etc. But only if the bill of divorce is dated between the two ketubot. So far if they are equal. If one was for a mina, the other for 200 [zuz]? Rav Huna and Rav Jeremiah and Rav Ḥisda. One said, she collects the first one. The other said, she collects the second one and the excess she collects from the date of the second.
HALAKHAH: “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah,” etc. “Two bills of divorce and two ketubot” etc. But only if the bill of divorce is dated between the two ketubot. So far if they are equal. If one was for a mina, the other for 200 [zuz]? Rav Huna and Rav Jeremiah and Rav Ḥisda. One said, she collects the first one. The other said, she collects the second one and the excess she collects from the date of the second.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. The Mishnah refers to ketubah, but for sustenance both are equal. Between ketubah and burial, what has precedence? Between ketubah and a loan attested to by witnesses, what has precedence? Between ketubah and daughters’ dowry, what has precedence? For him who says, one collects for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry has precedence. But for him who says, one does not collect for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry does not have precedence.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. That refers to what Rebbi Immi said, that a man should be induced to give generously to his daughter. If that is so, then even if there is no excess denar? Rebbi Abun said, in case you can uphold their words with the words of the Torah, you uphold their words with the words of the Torah. But in case you cannot uphold their words with the words of the Torah, you disregard their words and uphold the words of the Torah.
HALAKHAH: “If the estate contained expected property,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the basic claim of the two ketubot. Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. But for the excess denar everybody agrees that it is movable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everybody agrees about the basic claim of the two ketubot that it must be real estate. Where do they disagree? About the excess denar, where Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rav: But in Syria they routinely collect from bronze and bedspreads. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only from bedspreads of that night. Rav Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The people in Arabia routinely collect from camels and spices. Similarly, only from spices of that night? Rebbi Ḥuna’s widow collected from movables following her place’s custom.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to three women,” etc. Samuel said, sharpness of the judges. As in the case of two mortgages written on one field, to whom the court wants to hand it over in possession they hand it over. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If the estate is only 100, they divide equally.” Was this said for the sharpness of the judges? And did we not state: If the heirs inherited an instrument of indebtedness, the male firstborn takes a double portion; and if an instrument of indebtedness was presented to them, the male firstborn pays a double portion. Was this said for the sharpness of the judges? Rebbi Abin in the name of Samuel: There is no difference, whether two mortgages were written on one field or one mortgage was written on two fields, on whom the court decide they hand it over in possession.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to four women when he died,” etc. Rebbi Abuna in the name of Rebbi Samuel: Following Ben Nanas, if one document was produced against (the wife) buyers, they all divide evenly. Rebbi Aqiba said before Rebbi Mana: Does this not disagree with Rebbi Samuel, since Samuel said, sharpness of the judges? As in the case of two mortgages written on one field, to whom they want to hand it over in possession they hand it over. And here, he says so? Not with two mortgages, what about one? He did not hear what Rebbi Abin said in the name of Samuel: There is no difference, whether two mortgages were written on two fields or two mortgages were written on one field, to whom the court decide they hand it over in possession. Rebbi instituted that one follows Ben Nanas in matters of annona, head taxes, and real estate taxes.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two wives,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody borrowed from two persons and the second comes and says to him, get up and let us settle, and [the borrower] says, will not in the end the first hear of it and come to foreclose, he [the second lender] may say let us settle, and if he forecloses, he forecloses. If he settled, one may assume that the first will come and foreclose. If he settled with the first, Rebbi Phineas said, such a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who said, he settled. Rebbi Yose said, did he not write “what I shall acquire”? It happens only with an heir. Rebbi Ḥanina said, even with a creditor it can happen if he did not write “anything I shall acquire”, or if he said, “you shall not be paid except from this.” Rav Mattaniah said, this follows him who said, for ketubah but not for stipulations. But for him who said, for ketubah and for stipulations, does it not return?
HALAKHAH: “If a widow is supported by the orphans’ property,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: What she finds belongs to herself. If she had sustenance left over? Since her finds belong to her husband, the married woman’s leftover sustenance belongs to her husband. Since a widow’s finds belong to herself, her leftover sustenance belongs to herself. Her worn-out clothing belongs to her. Since even a married woman, whose leftover sustenance belongs to her husband, keeps her worn-out clothing to herself, the widow, whose leftover food belongs to herself, her worn-out clothing so much more! There, she needs them for the time of her period. Here also, she needs them for the time of her period.
HALAKHAH: “A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon is of the opinion that everything depends on sustenance. If he had agreed to sustain her after preliminary marriage, she may sell without court supervision If he had agreed to sustain her after definitive marriage, she may sell only under court supervision. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person is concerned for his widow’s dignity whether after preliminary or after definitive marriage.
HALAKHAH: “If she sold her ketubah entirely or partially,” etc. It was stated: “She sells and writes ‘this I sold for ketubah’ and ‘this I sold for sustenance,’ the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said, she sells and writes non-specifically; in this she is empowered.” If a loan before witnesses [comes due], she says, I sold for sustenance. If a loan by contract [comes due], she says, I sold for my ketubah. And even if a loan before witnesses [comes due], she sells for sustenance and turns around and forecloses it for her ketubah; could one not say to her, show your sale? Explain it, if the object increased in value.
HALAKHAH: “If a widow’s ketubah was 200,” etc. We understand worth a mina for 200 or worth 200 for a mina. In any case, she made the orphans lose a mina. [If it was worth] a mina [and she sold it] for 200, would the sale not be invalidated as erroneous buy? Explain it that the property increased in value. Rebbi Abin said, this supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, real estate buys are never under the laws of overcharging. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if the transaction was excessive, it comes under the law of overcharging. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “The following do not fall under the laws of overcharging: Slaves, securities, real estate, and redemptions.” He explains it, unless it was excessive. If he redeemed what was worth a mina by 200, Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not redeemed, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is redeemed. A baralta disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If he said, this toga instead of this donkey, the latter becomes profane. And its end disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is necessary to compute the value. Rebbi Yose said, the baraita itself implies that it is necessary to compute the value. Where do they disagree? To bring [a sacrifice to atone for] larceny. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he has to bring a sacrifice for larceny; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for larceny.
HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.
HALAKHAH: “If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much,” etc. As you say for a private person, in real estate up to one third, in movables up to one sixth. And similarly, for Temple property, in real estate up to one sixth, in movables up to [one in] twelve. There, we have stated: “The estimation for orphans is thirty days, the estimation for Temple property sixty days, and one publicly announces mornings and evenings.” And why thirty? In order to empower the orphans. Why should they not announce longer? Up to thirty days you empower the orphans, more than that you diminish their power. Why do you not say that for Temple property? Temple property is different because each offer made is firm. Then they should announce forever! If suffices for the Temple that it should be twice that of a private person. Rebbi Yudan said, since you say that Temple property is different because each offer made is firm, this implies that if they find their estimation they do not continue but close the deal.
HALAKHAH: “Neither the orphan girl, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram,” etc. One understands the secondarily prohibited and the she-ram. The orphan? Does an orphan not have ketubah? Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi J̣oḥanan: Explain it for an orphan who repudiated. Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari, Rebbi Immi: Just as they fined her, so they fined him. In which respect? That if he preliminarily married her by [giving her] a pound of gold, he loses it all.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody marries a woman and had contracted with her,” etc. How does he become indebted to her? Do not Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, if somebody writes a debenture for another person under the assumption that he owes him and it turns out that he does not owe, he does not have to give to him! Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they gave it the status of an addition to the ketubah. Then he should have to pay in the end! They gave it the status of the gift for a woman’s preliminary marriage. Then he should pay up front! They treated it as when one marries a woman preliminarily by promising to give her twelve silver denars within one year by delivering one silver denar’s worth every month.
HALAKHAH: “If the daughter married, the husband has to sustain her,” etc. What is the status of the ketubah stipulations if he wrote them in the document? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he wrote them for emphasis; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he wrote them to collect from encumbered property. Rebbi Jeremiah switched the traditions. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah supports him who said, he wrote them for emphasis, since we stated there: “One does not foreclose from mortgaged property to indemnify for produce or investment, or sustenance of widow and daughters, in order not to impede the economy.” Are [the first categories] not based on a document? Here also based on the document. Rebbi Ḥanania said, “since her status is that of a creditor”! Is that not based on a document? Here also based on the document.
HALAKHAH: “If the widow said, I cannot move from my husband’s house,” etc. It is written (Ps. 88:6): “Among the dead is freedom.” When a person dies he becomes free from the Commandments.
HALAKHAH: “If she said, I cannot possibly move from my father’s house,” etc. “If she argues because she is young and they are young,” to avoid a bad reputation.
HALAKHAH: “All the time she lives in her father’s house,” etc. For the good she received; her properties became delivered during her husband’s lifetime and after 25 years she gave up the claim to her ketubah. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi La: One understands for a woman who has no ketubah. But should a woman who has a ketubah not be able to collect forever? He answered him, it tells you more: Even a woman who has a ketubah collects only up to 25 years. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar says, the creditor collects forever. He said only, “the creditor”; but a woman can collect only up to years. Rebbi Abin said, this is reasonable only for a woman who is not being supported. But for a woman who is being supported, I say that she did not claim it because of her support.
HALAKHAH: “Two robbery judges were in Jerusalem,” etc. Did not Rebbi Phineas say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: 469 synagogues were in Jerusalem and each one of them had a Book house and a study house; the Book house for Scripture and the study house for Mishnah? But these two were appointed for robberies; to teach you that if anybody has the power to intervene, if he does not exercise his power the misconduct is attributed to him. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: Naḥum the Mede also was with them. In Rebbi Nathan’s opinion, three robbery judges were in Jerusalem.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody went overseas,” etc. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: If somebody pays off somebody else’s debt without the latter’s knowledge, is that the disagreement of Ḥanan and the High Priests’ sons? Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the High Priest’s sons is that he would not expect his wife to starve. But here, [the debtor could say:] “I could negotiate with him and he would forgive some.” Think of it, if [the loan] was on a pledge! “I could negotiate with him and he would return my pledge.” So far about a creditor who does not push [for repayment]. Even for a creditor who pushes, we can hear from the following: “He may give his šeqel.” If somebody does not pay his šeqel, does one not take a pledge from him? This says, even for a creditor who pushes. You should know that this is so, as we have stated: “He can bring for him nests for males or females suffering from genital discharges, nests for childbirth, purification and reparation offerings” since nothing of these comes to [the other person’s] hand. And here also, that nothing should come into his hand.
HALAKHAH: “Admon promulgated seven [rules],” etc. How large is a large estate? Rebbi Ze‘ura, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: That there should be twelve months of sustenance for all of them. Samuel heard this and said, this is the opinion of Rabban Gamliel ben Rebbi, but the Sages say, until they reach adulthood or are married. They asked before Rebbi Yose, what did you hear from Rebbi Joḥanan? He said to them, let us explain the words of the Sages by their words! Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil,” etc. The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody obligates himself about money for his son-in-law,” etc. The Mishnah [deals with the case] that he obligated himself in her presence. But if he obligated himself not in her presence, even the rabbis will agree.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody protests about a field,” etc. Not only if he himself made it a marker for another [field], but even if a third person made it for a fourth, when he signed as a witness, he lost his right.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody went overseas,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he sues with reasons. This means, only if four [owners] surround him. Samuel says, even if one surrounds him on all sides. Joshua’s stipulation! “If he was lost in vineyards or fields, he crosses and leaves until he reaches a road to his house, even a plot full of vineyards, for this is one of the conditions under which Joshua distributed the Land to Israel.” Joshua stated this to leave, maybe to enter? Joshua stipulated for a person, perhaps for his cow? Rebbi Yose said, his cow usually returns; since a swarm of bees does not usually return, they treated it as if it were his body.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody produces a promissory note on another person,” etc. Rebbi Jonah says, if it is worth it; Rebbi Yose says, even if it is not worth it. Think of it, if he had real estate! He can say to him, I want good real estate. Think of it, if he had good real estate! He can say to him, I want mine. In addition, he can say to him, to care for two parcels overtaxes my powers.
HALAKHAH: “If two people mutually produced promissory notes of one on the other,” etc. If one borrowed a mina from the other, but the other borrowed from him 200 [zuz]. Rav Huna said, Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rab Sheshet disagree. One says, one counts one mina against the other mina, but the other says, each one collects the amount of his note. He who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, learns it from tame oxen who injured one another, where half of the excess damage is paid. He who says, each one collects the amount of his note, learns it from the Sages and Admon. Can the Sages and Admon not agree that one counts one mina against the other mina? Because we have stated: Admon says: “If I owed you, how come you borrowed from me?” Therefore it was necessary to say, each one collects the amount of his note. If the holder of the note of 200 forgave a mina, but the holder of the note of a mina did not forgive. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, then what he forgave he cannot collect but what was not forgiven he can collect. If the note for 200 was written in a document but the loan for a mina was not written. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, the holder of the written note can collect but the recipient of the oral promise cannot collect.
HALAKHAH: “There are three districts for marriage, Judea, Transjordan, and Galilee.,” etc. The Mishnah refers to the case that he was from Judea and married a woman in Galilee, or from Galilee and married a woman in Judea. But if he was from Judea and married in Judea, or from Galilee and married in Galilee, one forces her to move. ”‘I, x, am from Judea and married a woman in Judea,’ one forces her to move, ‘in Galilee’ one does not force her to move. ‘I, X, am from Galilee and married a woman in Galilee,’ one forces her to move, ‘in Judea’ one does not force her to move. One moves from a mostly Gentile village to a totally Jewish village but not from a totally Jewish village to a mostly Gentile village.”
HALAKHAH: “Everybody moves,” etc. If he wants to move to the Land of Israel but she does not, one forces her to move. If she wants but he does not, one does not force him to move. If he wants to move to Jerusalem but she does not, one forces her to move. If she wants but he does not, one does not force him to move. If he wants to leave the Land of Israel but she does not, one does not force her to leave. If she wants to leave but he does not, one forces her not to leave.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
HALAKHAH: “Not profane I shall not eat from yours,” etc. That which I would eat from you shall not be profane but a sacrifice.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says sacrifice, elevation offering, or flour offering,” etc. Everybody agrees this sacrifice is permitted, like a sacrifice is forbidden. Where do they disagree? Sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah says, he who says ‘sacrifice’ is as if he said ‘this sacrifice’ and is permitted; but the rabbis say, he who says ‘sacrifice’ is as if he said ‘like a sacrifice’ and is forbidden. Rebbi Jehudah said to them: Do you not agree that one who said “oath” is like one who said “this oath” and is forbidden? And here he who says ‘sacrifice’ is as if he said ‘this sacrifice’ and is permitted! But the rabbis throw restrictions on it. One who said “oath” is like one who said “this oath” and is forbidden. But here, he who says ‘sacrifice’ is as if he said ‘like a sacrifice’ and is forbidden.
HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property, but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.
HALAKHAH: “Qorbān [shall be] what I shall not eat at your place,” etc. Why did we not state: An oath that I shall eat from you, he is permitted? Only because we stated: “That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows.” We wanted to say about “an oath that I shall not eat of yours,” that the words of the Sages are: he is forbidden. Therefore it was not stated.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
HALAKHAH: “Indeterminate oaths are interpreted restrictively,” etc. They wanted to say, salted for preservation, not short-term salted. Rebbi Yudan said, since we have stated: “this is for me like salted meat, like libation wine,” this imples that short-term salted is called “salted”. What is short-term salted? As it was stated: “He puts the limbs on the salt and turns them over.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, for if he leaves them there, they become salted meat. But which text says it? As Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, “one who takes olives from the vat dips each single one in salt and eats it.” That implies that short-term salted is called “salted”.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody made a vow of ḥerem,” etc. A person made a vow by one of these expressions. He came before Rebbi Meїr who sent him to Rebbi Jehudah and told him, inform him that you came to me and I sent you to him. He came before Rebbi Jehudah who sent him to Rebbi Yose and told him, inform him that you came to Rebbi Meïr who sent you to me and I sent you to him. He came to Rebbi Yose, who told him, if the first one does not permit it, nobody else can permit it to you, for he holds that “if they do question, one punishes them and makes it difficult for them.” He returned before Rebbi Meïr and said to him, since you knew that, why did you not tell me from the start? He said to him, I saw you flippant and made it difficult for you.
HALAKHAH: “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve,” etc. Do not the Sages permit all kinds of vows? It is written: “Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes.” He referred the paragraph to the heads of the tribes that they should dissolve the people’s vows. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: “He shall not profane his word.” He cannot profane his word; this implies that others can profane his words. Who is that? That is the Sage who dissolves the vow. Ḥananiah the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said, “I swore and I shall keep it.” Sometimes I keep it. Rebbi Joshua said, “What I swore in my rage:” In my rage I swore; I change my mind.
HALAKHAH: “Vows of exaggeration,” etc. Is it impossible that crowds like those who left Egypt went by? But we are dealing with one look. Was it not the case that when Emperor Julianus went there, 1‘200‘000 [men] went with him? But we must be dealing with one look.
HALAKHAH: “Vows in connection with acts of God: His friend made him vow,” etc. because he fell ill. Therefore, if he did not fall ill, no. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, “he is forbidden until he gives.” Rebbi Yose said, why do we not explain it according to everybody? As my teacher said, they disagree when it was indeterminate. Where do we hold? If each one of them said, because of my honor, everybody agrees that he is forbidden. If one of them said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor, everybody agrees he is permitted. Rebbi Hila said, is it the way of people to say χαρίζεσθαι βίᾳ?
HALAKHAH: “One makes a vow to assessors and to people who condemn property,” etc. To assessors in time of indiction; to condemners in times of expropriations. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi stated in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it was a dangerous situation, it is permitted. Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it was civilized, it is forbidden. It was stated: One hangs on Gentiles and government but not on Jews, because the strong-armed will fall and he should not risk that the prior [obligations] fall on him.
HALAKHAH: “These orchard trees shall be qorbān,” etc. If he saw the king’s cutting crew coming near, if he saw fire coming near, and he said: These orchard trees shall be qorbān if they are not cut, this garment shall be qorbān if it is not burned or torn. Were they sanctified retroactively or only for the future? What is the difference? If he used them. If you say that they are sanctified retroactively, he committed larceny. If you say for the future, he did not commit larceny.
HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow away from the seafaring men,” etc. That you should not say, not from those who go from Acco to Jaffa but those who frequently take to the sea. “From the dwellers on dry land he is forbidden the seafaring men,” not only those who go from Acco to Jaffa but even those who frequently take to the sea. But did he not make a vow regarding the dwellers on dry land? This implies that the seafaring men are part of the dwellers on dry land. If he made a vow away from the seafaring men after thirty days but [a certain mariner] became a land dweller, there is a dispute between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba. For Rebbi Ismael says, after the vow, and Rebbi Aqiba says, after the prohibition. And about children it is a problem.
HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow away from those who will be born,” etc. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? “And now your two sons born to you”, and they already were born. What is the Sages’ reason? “Lo, a son is born to the House of David, Josiah his name,” and he was not yet born.
HALAKHAH: “A qônām that I shall not enjoy from the descendants of Noah; he is permitted Jews and forbidden Gentiles. That I shall not enjoy from the descendants of Abraham; he is forbidden Jews and permitted Gentiles,” etc. Is Ismael not part of Abraham’s seed? “ For in Isaac will be called your seed.” And is not Esaw part of Isaac’s seed? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, “in Isaac,” in part of Isaac. Rebbi Huna said, “ב” are two, the son who will be inheriting two worlds, this world and the world to come. Rebbi Gershom in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, “ a star did step out from Jacob,” from whom did a star step out and will appear in the future? From Jacob! Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: In the future world, evil Esaw will put on his prayer shawl and sit with the Just in Paradise, but the Holy One, Praise to Him, draws him away. Why? “ If you climb as high as an eagle or if you would make your nest between stars, from there I would take you down, says the Lord.” But “stars” are only the Just. As you say, “those who justify the many are like stars, eternally.”
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yoḥanan bar Marya said, it is written: “On that day, the Eternal concluded a covenant with Abram as follows,” etc., up to “but my covenant I shall affirm with Isaac,” etc., thirteen covenants.