even
8432 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
“Then the officers shall address the people saying: ‘Is there anyone who has built a new house but has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his home’” (Deuteronomy 20:5). It is the same whether he built a house for straw, a house for cattle, a house for wood, or a storehouse; It is the same whether he built, purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has planted a vineyard but has never harvested it?’” (vs.. It is the same whether he planted a vineyard or planted five fruit-trees and even of five different species; It is the same whether he planted, bent or grafted it, or whether he purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has betrothed a woman [but who has not yet married her]?’” (vs. It is the same whether he had betrothed a virgin or a widow, or even a shomeret yavam, or even if a man heard that his brother had died in battle, he returns home. All these hear the priest’s words concerning the battles of war and return home, and they supply water and food and repair the roads.
“Then the officers shall address the people saying: ‘Is there anyone who has built a new house but has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his home’” (Deuteronomy 20:5). It is the same whether he built a house for straw, a house for cattle, a house for wood, or a storehouse; It is the same whether he built, purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has planted a vineyard but has never harvested it?’” (vs.. It is the same whether he planted a vineyard or planted five fruit-trees and even of five different species; It is the same whether he planted, bent or grafted it, or whether he purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has betrothed a woman [but who has not yet married her]?’” (vs. It is the same whether he had betrothed a virgin or a widow, or even a shomeret yavam, or even if a man heard that his brother had died in battle, he returns home. All these hear the priest’s words concerning the battles of war and return home, and they supply water and food and repair the roads.
“Then the officers shall address the people saying: ‘Is there anyone who has built a new house but has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his home’” (Deuteronomy 20:5). It is the same whether he built a house for straw, a house for cattle, a house for wood, or a storehouse; It is the same whether he built, purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has planted a vineyard but has never harvested it?’” (vs.. It is the same whether he planted a vineyard or planted five fruit-trees and even of five different species; It is the same whether he planted, bent or grafted it, or whether he purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has betrothed a woman [but who has not yet married her]?’” (vs. It is the same whether he had betrothed a virgin or a widow, or even a shomeret yavam, or even if a man heard that his brother had died in battle, he returns home. All these hear the priest’s words concerning the battles of war and return home, and they supply water and food and repair the roads.
The following do not return home: He who built a gatehouse, a portico or a porch; He who planted four fruit trees or five trees which are not fruit-bearing; He who took back his divorced wife. If a high priest married a widow, or an ordinary priest married a divorcee or a halutzah, or an Israelite married a mamzereth or a netinah, or the daughter of an Israelite married a mamzer or a natin, he does not return home. Rabbi Judah says: even he who builds a house upon its [original] foundations does not return home. Rabbi Eliezer says: even he who builds a brick-house in the Sharon does not return home.
The following do not return home: He who built a gatehouse, a portico or a porch; He who planted four fruit trees or five trees which are not fruit-bearing; He who took back his divorced wife. If a high priest married a widow, or an ordinary priest married a divorcee or a halutzah, or an Israelite married a mamzereth or a netinah, or the daughter of an Israelite married a mamzer or a natin, he does not return home. Rabbi Judah says: even he who builds a house upon its [original] foundations does not return home. Rabbi Eliezer says: even he who builds a brick-house in the Sharon does not return home.
To what this apply? To a voluntary war, but in a war commanded [by the Torah] all go out, even a bridegroom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy. Rabbi Judah says: to what does this apply? To a war commanded [commanded by the Torah], but in an obligatory war all go out, even a bridegroom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy.
To what this apply? To a voluntary war, but in a war commanded [by the Torah] all go out, even a bridegroom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy. Rabbi Judah says: to what does this apply? To a war commanded [commanded by the Torah], but in an obligatory war all go out, even a bridegroom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy.
[The declaration over] the heifer whose neck is to be broken must be in the holy tongue; as it is said, “If a corpse is found slain on the land … then your elders and judges shall go out” (Deuteronomy 21:1-2)--three used to go out from the high court in Jerusalem. Rabbi Judah says: five, as it is said, “Your elders” two, “and your judges” two, and there cannot be a court of an even number, they add one more.
The elders of Jerusalem departed and went away. The elders of that city bring “a heifer which has never been worked” (Deuteronomy 21:3). And a blemish does not disqualify it. They bring it down to a hard (etan) wadi “etan” is understood in its literal sense of “hard”. Even if it is not “hard”, it is valid [for the ceremony]. They break its neck with a hatchet from behind. The site may never be sown or tilled, but it is permitted to comb flax and chisel rocks.
One who brings a get from abroad [to the Land of Israel] must declare, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Rabban Gamaliel says: even one who brings it from Rekem or from Heger. Rabbi Eliezer says: even one who brings it from Kefar Ludim to Lud. The sages, however, say: declaration “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed” is required only from one who brings a get from abroad or who takes it there. One who brings [a get] from one province to another province in foreign lands is also required to declare, “In my presence it was written, and in my presence it was signed.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even from one hegemony to another hegemony.
One who brings a get from abroad [to the Land of Israel] must declare, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Rabban Gamaliel says: even one who brings it from Rekem or from Heger. Rabbi Eliezer says: even one who brings it from Kefar Ludim to Lud. The sages, however, say: declaration “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed” is required only from one who brings a get from abroad or who takes it there. One who brings [a get] from one province to another province in foreign lands is also required to declare, “In my presence it was written, and in my presence it was signed.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even from one hegemony to another hegemony.
One who brings a get from abroad [to the Land of Israel] must declare, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Rabban Gamaliel says: even one who brings it from Rekem or from Heger. Rabbi Eliezer says: even one who brings it from Kefar Ludim to Lud. The sages, however, say: declaration “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed” is required only from one who brings a get from abroad or who takes it there. One who brings [a get] from one province to another province in foreign lands is also required to declare, “In my presence it was written, and in my presence it was signed.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even from one hegemony to another hegemony.
Any document which has upon it the signature of a Samaritan is invalid, except for bills of divorce or a writ of emancipation. It happened that a bill of divorce was once brought before Rabban Gamaliel at Kefar Otnai and its witnesses were Samaritan, and he declared it valid. All documents which are accepted in the courts of non-Jew, even if those who signed on the documents are non-Jews, are valid except bills of divorce and of writs of emancipation. Rabbi Shimon says: these also are valid; they were only pronounced [to be invalid] when done by ordinary persons.
All are qualified to write a get, even a deaf-mute, an imbecile and a minor. A woman may write her own get and a man his own receipt [for the ketubah], since the document is upheld only by its signatures. All are qualified to bring a get except a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, a blind person and a non-Jew.
Even the women who are not trusted to say “Her husband died,” are trusted to bring her get: her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law (husband’s brother’s wife) and the daughter of her husband. What is the difference between the get and death? The writing [on the get] proves [that she is divorced.] A woman may bring her own get but she must say, “In my presence it was signed and in my presence it was delivered.”
Payment cannot be recovered from mortgaged property where there free property is available, even if it is only of the lowest quality. Payment can be recovered from orphans only from land of the lowest quality.
If a man says, “Receive this get on behalf of my wife”, or, “Carry this get to my wife”, if he desires to retract [before the wife receives it] he may do so. If a woman says, “Receive the get on my behalf”, [and he does so], if [the husband] wants to retract he may not do so. Therefore if the husband said to him, “I do not want you to receive it on her behalf, but rather carry it and give it to her”, then if he wishes to retract he may do so. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even if the wife says “Take for me”, [and he does so] the husband may not retract.
A woman who said [to an agent], “Receive my get for me” requires two sets of witnesses, two to say, “In our presence she told him”, and two to say, “In our presence he received [the get] and tore it”. Even if the first set are the same [witnesses] as the latter set or if there was one in the first set and one in the second, and one joined with them [for both testimonies]. If a young girl is betrothed, both she and her father may receive her get. Rabbi Judah said that two [different] hands cannot take possession as one. Rather her father alone may receive her get. One who is not able to keep her get is not capable of being divorced.
If a man says, “Write a get and give it to my wife”, [or] “Divorce her”, [or] “Write a letter and give it to her”, then they should write it and give it to her. If he said, “Release her”, [or] “Provide for her”, [or] “Do for her as the law dictates”, [or] “Do the proper thing for her”, he has not said anything. Originally they said that if a man was being led out to execution and said, “Write a get for my wife”, they may write a get and give [it to her]. Later they said, even if he were leaving for a sea voyage or for a caravan journey. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even if he were dangerously ill.
If a man says, “Write a get and give it to my wife”, [or] “Divorce her”, [or] “Write a letter and give it to her”, then they should write it and give it to her. If he said, “Release her”, [or] “Provide for her”, [or] “Do for her as the law dictates”, [or] “Do the proper thing for her”, he has not said anything. Originally they said that if a man was being led out to execution and said, “Write a get for my wife”, they may write a get and give [it to her]. Later they said, even if he were leaving for a sea voyage or for a caravan journey. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even if he were dangerously ill.
If a man said to two people, “Give a get to my wife”, or to three people, “Write a get and give it to my wife”, they must write it and give it. If he said to three persons, “Give a get to my wife”, they may tell others to write the get because he has made them into a court, the words of Rabbi Meir. And this is the halakhah which Rabbi Hanina a man of Ono brought from prison: “I have received a tradition that if a man says to three persons, ‘Give a get to my wife’, they may tell others to write it, because he has made them into a court. Rabbi Yose said: We said to the messenger, we also have a tradition that even were he to say to the great court in Jerusalem, ‘Give a get to my wife’, they must learn [to write] and write the get and give it. If a man says to ten persons, “Write a get”, one writes, and two sign as witnesses. [If he said,] “All of you write”, one writes and all sign. Therefore, if one of them dies, the get is invalid.
They said to him, “Shall we write a get for your wife”, and he said to them, “Write!”, and they then told a scribe and he wrote and witnesses and they signed even if they wrote it and signed it and gave it back to him and he gave it to her, the get is void until he himself says to the scribe “Write” and to the witnesses, “Sign”.
She should not be alone with him except in the presence of witnesses, even a slave or a handmaid [any witness is sufficient] except for her own female slave, since she can take liberties in front of her own handmaid. What is her status during those days? Rabbi Judah says that she is regarded as a married woman in every respect. Rabbi Yose says that she is both divorced and not divorced.
[If a husband says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child” How long must she nurse? Two years. Rabbi Judah says, eighteen months. If the child dies or the father dies, the get is valid. [If he says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father for two years”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child for two years”, if the child dies or if the father says, “I don’t want you to look after me”, even though she has not caused him to complain, the get is invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: something like this is a get. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said a general rule: wherever the obstacle does not arise from her side, the get is valid.
[If a husband says,] “This is your get if I do not return within thirty days”, and he was going from Judea to Galilee, if he got as far as Antipatras and then returned, his condition is broken. [If he says,] “This is your get if I do not return within thirty days”, and he was going from Galilee to Judea, if he got as far as Kefar Otnai and then returned, the condition is broken. [If he said,] “This is your get if I do not return within thirty days”, and he was going into foreign parts, if he got as far as Acco and then returned his condition is broken. [If he said,] “This is your get as long as I shall keep away from you for thirty days”, even though he came and went and came and went, since he was not secluded with her, the get is valid.
If a husband throws a get to his wife, and she is in her house or in her courtyard, she is divorced. If he throws it to her in his house or in his courtyard, even though it is with her on the same bed, she is not divorced. If he throws it into her lap or into her basket, she is divorced.
Similarly with betrothals and similarly with a debt. If a man’s creditor said to him, “Throw me my debt”, and he threw it to him, if it lands nearer to the creditor, the borrower is credited [with paying back his debt]; if it lands nearer to the borrower, the borrower is still obligated [to repay the money]; if it lands midway, they divide. If she was standing on a roof and he threw it up to her, as soon as it reaches the airspace of the roof, she is divorced. If he was above and she below and he threw it to her, once it has left the space of the roof, [even were it to be immediately] erased or burnt, she is divorced.
If a scribe wrote a get for the husband and a receipt for the wife and by mistake gave the get to the wife and the receipt to the husband and the two exchanged them and after some time the get came out of the hands of the man and the receipt out of the hands of the woman, she must leave both husbands and all these things apply to her. Rabbi Eliezer says: if [it comes out of her hands] immediately, it is not a get, but if [it comes out of her hands] after some time, it is a get; it is not in the power of the first to render void the right of the second. If a man wrote a get with which to divorce his wife and then changed his mind, Bet Shammai says that he has disqualified her from marrying a priest. Bet Hillel says that even if he gave it to her with a certain stipulation, if the condition was not fulfilled, he has not disqualified her for marrying a priest.
If a man divorces his wife and said to her, “You are free to marry any man but so-and-so”, Rabbi Eliezer permits her [to marry on the strength of this get], but the rabbis forbid her. What should he do? He should take it back from her and give it to her again saying, “You are free to marry any man.” If he wrote [the restriction] in the get, even though he went back and erased it, it is invalid.
[If he said,] “You are permitted to any man but my father, your father, my brother, your brother, a slave, a Gentile, or anyone to whom she is incapable of being betrothed,” the get is valid. [If he said,] “You are permitted to anyone but (supposing she was a widow) a high priest, or, (supposing she was a divorcee or a halutzah) an ordinary priest, or, (supposing she was a mamzeret or a netinah) a regular Israelite, or (supposing she was an Israelite) a mamzer or a natin, or anyone who is capable of betrothing her even in transgression, the get is invalid.
There are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit: If the husband wrote it with his own hand but there are no witnesses on it. If there are witnesses on it but no date. If it has a date but only one witness. These are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit. Rabbi Elazar says even though there are no witnesses on it, as long as he gave it to her in the presence of witnesses it is valid, [and on the strength of it] she may collect her ketubah [even] from mortgaged property, since the witnesses only sign on the get because of tikkun olam.
There are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit: If the husband wrote it with his own hand but there are no witnesses on it. If there are witnesses on it but no date. If it has a date but only one witness. These are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit. Rabbi Elazar says even though there are no witnesses on it, as long as he gave it to her in the presence of witnesses it is valid, [and on the strength of it] she may collect her ketubah [even] from mortgaged property, since the witnesses only sign on the get because of tikkun olam.
Bet Shammai says: a man should not divorce his wife unless he has found her guilty of some unseemly conduct, as it says, “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Bet Hillel says [that he may divorce her] even if she has merely burnt his dish, since it says, “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Rabbi Akiva says, [he may divorce her] even if he finds another woman more beautiful than she is, as it says, “it cometh to pass, if she find no favour in his eyes”.
Bet Shammai says: a man should not divorce his wife unless he has found her guilty of some unseemly conduct, as it says, “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Bet Hillel says [that he may divorce her] even if she has merely burnt his dish, since it says, “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Rabbi Akiva says, [he may divorce her] even if he finds another woman more beautiful than she is, as it says, “it cometh to pass, if she find no favour in his eyes”.
“[Be betrothed to me] on condition that I am a priest,” and he is found to be a Levite, or “a Levite” and he is found to be a priest; “a natin,” and he is found to be a mamzer, or “a mamzer” and he is found to be a natin; “a townsman,” and he is found to be a villager, or “a villager” and he is found to be a townsman; “on condition that my house is near the bathhouse,” and it is found to be far, or “far” and it is found to be near; “on condition that I have a daughter or maidservant that braids hair” and he does not have, “or on condition that I do not have”, and he has; “on condition that I have no sons”, and he has, or “on condition that I have sons, and he does not have --in all these cases, even if she declares, “In my heart I would have agreed to be betrothed to him in any case,” she is not betrothed. Similarly if she deceives him.
If he betroths two women with the value of a perutah, or one woman with less than the value of a perutah, even if he subsequently sends gifts, she is not betrothed, because he sent them on account of the first kiddushin. The same is true if a minor betroths.
If he betroths with terumot, tithes, priestly gifts, the water of purification or the ashes of purification behold she is betrothed, even if he is an Israelite.
Rabbi Meir says: every stipulation which is not like that of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben is not a [valid] stipulation, as it say, “And Moses said to them, ‘If the children of Gad and the children of Reuben will pass [with you over the Jordan, then you shall give them the land of Gilead for a possession].” and it is also written, “But if they will not pass over with you armed, [then they shall have possessions among you in the land of Canaan]” (Numbers 32:29-30). Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: the matter had to be stated, for had it not been stated it would have implied that even in Canaan they should not inherit.
They do not check from the altar and upwards, nor from the duchan [dais] and upwards, nor from the Sanhedrin and upwards. And all those whose fathers were established to have been among the public officers or charity collectors may marry [their daughters] into the priesthood, and he doesn’t need to check after them. Rabbi Yose says: even one who was signed as a witness in the old court of Tzippori. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: even one who was recorded in the king’s list of officers.
They do not check from the altar and upwards, nor from the duchan [dais] and upwards, nor from the Sanhedrin and upwards. And all those whose fathers were established to have been among the public officers or charity collectors may marry [their daughters] into the priesthood, and he doesn’t need to check after them. Rabbi Yose says: even one who was signed as a witness in the old court of Tzippori. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: even one who was recorded in the king’s list of officers.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if an Israelite marries a female convert, his daughter is fit for the priesthood, and if a male convert marries the daughter of an Israelite, his daughter is fit for the priesthood. But if a male convert marries a female convert, his daughter is unfit for the priesthood. [The same law applies to] a convert as to freed slaves, even for ten generations, [his daughter is unfit] unless his mother is of Israelite stock. Rabbi Yose says: even if a male convert marries a female convert, his daughter is fit for the priesthood.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if an Israelite marries a female convert, his daughter is fit for the priesthood, and if a male convert marries the daughter of an Israelite, his daughter is fit for the priesthood. But if a male convert marries a female convert, his daughter is unfit for the priesthood. [The same law applies to] a convert as to freed slaves, even for ten generations, [his daughter is unfit] unless his mother is of Israelite stock. Rabbi Yose says: even if a male convert marries a female convert, his daughter is fit for the priesthood.
If a man declares, “this son of mine is a mamzer,” he is not believed. And even if both [the husband and wife] say about the fetus inside her, “it’s a mamzer” they are not believed. Rabbi Judah says: they are believed.
A man may not be alone with two women, but one woman may be alone with two men. Rabbi Shimon says: even one man may be alone with two women, if his wife is with him, and he may sleep with them in an inn, because his wife watches him. A man may be alone with his mother and his daughter, and he may sleep with them in immediate bodily contact; but when they grow up, she must sleep in her garment and he in his.
An unmarried man must not learn to be a scribe, nor may a woman learn to be a scribe. Rabbi Eliezer says: even one who has no wife should not learn to be a scribe.
If two oxen which were accounted harmless hurt one another, the owner pays half-damages for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If both were attested dangers full damages are payable for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If one was accounted harmless and the other was an attested danger, that which was an attested danger as against that which was accounted harmless must pay full damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered, while that which was accounted harmless, as against that which was an attested danger, pays only half damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered. So, too, if two men hurt one another, full damages are payable for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If a man and an ox which was accounted harmless hurt one another, the man as against the ox accounted harmless must pay full damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered, while the ox accounted harmless, as against the man, pays only half damages for the greater hurt that the other suffered. Rabbi Akiva says: “Even if an ox accounted harmless hurt a man, full damages must be paid for that one which suffered the greater hurt.
If an ox gored a person and he died, if it was an attested danger [its owner] must pay the ransom, if it was accounted harmless he is exempt from paying the ransom. In both cases the ox is obligated for the death penalty. So too [if it killed] a son or a daughter. If it gored a male slave or a female slave its owner pays 30 sela, Whether [the slave] was worth a maneh or not even worth a dinar.
He who wounds his fellow is liable to compensate him on five counts: for injury, for pain, for healing, for loss of income and for indignity. ‘For injury’: How so? If he blinded his fellow’s eye, cut off his hand or broke his foot, [his fellow] is looked upon as if he was a slave to be sold in the market and they assess how much he was worth and how much he is worth. ‘For pain’? If he burned him with a spit or a nail, even though it was on his fingernail, a place where it leaves no wound, they estimate how much money such a man would be willing to take to suffer so. ‘Healing’? If he struck him he is liable to pay the cost of his healing. If sores arise on him on account of the blow, he is liable [for the cost of their healing]. If not on account of the blow, he is not liable. If the wound healed and then opened and healed and then opened, he is liable for the cost of the healing. If it healed completely, he is no longer liable to pay the cost of the healing. ‘Loss of income’: He is looked upon as a watchman of a cucumber field, since he already gave him compensation for the loss of his hand or foot. ‘Indignity’: All is according to the status of the one that inflicts indignity and the status of the one that suffers indignity. If a man inflicted indignity on a naked man, or a blind man, or a sleeping man, he is [still] liable. If a sleeping man inflicted indignity, he is exempt. If a man fell from the roof and caused injury and inflicted indignity, he is liable for the injury but not for the indignity, as it says, “And she puts forth her hand and grabs him by the private parts”, a man is liable only when he intended [to inflict indignity].
If a man boxed the ear of his fellow, he must pay him a sela (four. Rabbi Judah says in the name of Rabbi Yose the Galilean: “A maneh (one hundred.” If he slapped him he must pay 200 zuz. If with the back of his hand, he must pay him 400 zuz. If he tore at his ear, plucked out his hair, spat at him and his spit touched him, or pulled his cloak from off him, or loosed a woman’s hair in the street, he must pay 400 zuz. This is the general rule: all is in accordance with the person’s honor. Rabbi Akiva said: “Even the poor in Israel are regarded as free people who have lost their possessions, for they are the children of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. It once happened that a man unloosed a woman’s hair in the street and she came before Rabbi Akiva and he condemned him to pay her 400 zuz. He said, “Rabbi, give me time”. And he gave him time. He caught her standing at the entrance to her courtyard, and he broke a jug of one issar’s worth of oil in front of her. She unloosed her hair and scooped up the oil in her hand and laid her hand on her head. He had set up witnesses up against her and he came before Rabbi Akiva and said to him, “Rabbi, should I give one such as this 400 zuz?” He answered, “You have said nothing.” If a man injures himself, even though he has no right to do so, is not liable. But others who injure him are liable. If a man cuts down his own saplings, even though he has no right to do so, is not liable. But, if others cut them down, they are liable.
If a man boxed the ear of his fellow, he must pay him a sela (four. Rabbi Judah says in the name of Rabbi Yose the Galilean: “A maneh (one hundred.” If he slapped him he must pay 200 zuz. If with the back of his hand, he must pay him 400 zuz. If he tore at his ear, plucked out his hair, spat at him and his spit touched him, or pulled his cloak from off him, or loosed a woman’s hair in the street, he must pay 400 zuz. This is the general rule: all is in accordance with the person’s honor. Rabbi Akiva said: “Even the poor in Israel are regarded as free people who have lost their possessions, for they are the children of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. It once happened that a man unloosed a woman’s hair in the street and she came before Rabbi Akiva and he condemned him to pay her 400 zuz. He said, “Rabbi, give me time”. And he gave him time. He caught her standing at the entrance to her courtyard, and he broke a jug of one issar’s worth of oil in front of her. She unloosed her hair and scooped up the oil in her hand and laid her hand on her head. He had set up witnesses up against her and he came before Rabbi Akiva and said to him, “Rabbi, should I give one such as this 400 zuz?” He answered, “You have said nothing.” If a man injures himself, even though he has no right to do so, is not liable. But others who injure him are liable. If a man cuts down his own saplings, even though he has no right to do so, is not liable. But, if others cut them down, they are liable.
If a man boxed the ear of his fellow, he must pay him a sela (four. Rabbi Judah says in the name of Rabbi Yose the Galilean: “A maneh (one hundred.” If he slapped him he must pay 200 zuz. If with the back of his hand, he must pay him 400 zuz. If he tore at his ear, plucked out his hair, spat at him and his spit touched him, or pulled his cloak from off him, or loosed a woman’s hair in the street, he must pay 400 zuz. This is the general rule: all is in accordance with the person’s honor. Rabbi Akiva said: “Even the poor in Israel are regarded as free people who have lost their possessions, for they are the children of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. It once happened that a man unloosed a woman’s hair in the street and she came before Rabbi Akiva and he condemned him to pay her 400 zuz. He said, “Rabbi, give me time”. And he gave him time. He caught her standing at the entrance to her courtyard, and he broke a jug of one issar’s worth of oil in front of her. She unloosed her hair and scooped up the oil in her hand and laid her hand on her head. He had set up witnesses up against her and he came before Rabbi Akiva and said to him, “Rabbi, should I give one such as this 400 zuz?” He answered, “You have said nothing.” If a man injures himself, even though he has no right to do so, is not liable. But others who injure him are liable. If a man cuts down his own saplings, even though he has no right to do so, is not liable. But, if others cut them down, they are liable.
Even though a man pays [him that suffers the indignity], he is not forgiven until he seeks [forgiveness] from him, for it says: “Therefore restore the man’s wife… [and he shall pray for you]” (Genesis 20:7). And from where do we learn that he who must forgive should not be cruel? As it says: “And Abraham prayed unto God and God healed Avimelech” (Genesis 20:17). If a man said, “Blind my eye”, or “Cut off my hand”, or “Break my foot”, he [that does so] is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is still liable. [If he said] “Tear my garment”, or “Break my jug”, he that does so is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is exempt. [If he said], “Do so to so-and-so, on the condition that you will be exempt, he is liable, whether it was [an offense] against his person or his property.
If a man robbed his fellow of the value of a perutah and swore [falsely] to him, he must take it to him even as far as Medea. He may not give it to his son or to his agent, but he may give it to the agent of the court. If his fellow had died he must return it to his heirs.
If excise collectors took his donkey and gave him another donkey, or if bandits robbed a man of his coat and gave him another coat, they are his own, since the original owners gave up hope of recovering them. If a man saved something from a flood or from marauding troops or from bandits: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the item], it belongs to him. So too with a swarm of bees: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the swarm], it belongs to him. Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka said: “A woman or child may be believed if they say, ‘The swarm of bees went away from here.’” A man may go into his fellow’s field to save his swarm and if he causes damage he must pay for the damage that he has caused; but he may not cut off a branch of the tree [to save his swarm] even on condition that he pay its value. Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka, says: “He may even cut off [the branch] and repay the value.”
If excise collectors took his donkey and gave him another donkey, or if bandits robbed a man of his coat and gave him another coat, they are his own, since the original owners gave up hope of recovering them. If a man saved something from a flood or from marauding troops or from bandits: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the item], it belongs to him. So too with a swarm of bees: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the swarm], it belongs to him. Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka said: “A woman or child may be believed if they say, ‘The swarm of bees went away from here.’” A man may go into his fellow’s field to save his swarm and if he causes damage he must pay for the damage that he has caused; but he may not cut off a branch of the tree [to save his swarm] even on condition that he pay its value. Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka, says: “He may even cut off [the branch] and repay the value.”
Shreds of wool which the laundryman pulls out belong to him, but those which the woolcomber pull out belong to the householder. If the laundryman pulled out three threads, they belong to him, but if more than this they belong to the householder. If there were black threads among the white, he may take them all and they are his. If the tailor left over thread sufficient to sew with or a piece of cloth three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths, these belong to the householder. What a carpenter takes off with a plane belongs to him; but what [he takes off] with a hatchet belongs to the householder. And if he was working in the householder’s domain, even the sawdust belongs to the householder.
That which is found by a man’s minor son or daughter, and that which is found by his Canaanite slave or female slave, and that which is found by his wife belongs to him. That which is found by his son or daughter that are of age, and that which is found by his Hebrew slave or female slave, and that which is found by his wife whom he has divorced, even though he has not yet paid her ketubah, belongs to them.
If a man found pigeons tied together behind a fence or a hedge or on footpaths in the fields, he may not touch them. If he found an object in the dungheap and it was covered up he may not touch it, but if it was exposed he should take it and proclaim. If he found it in a pile of stones or in an old wall it belongs to him. If he found it in a new wall and it was on the outside [of the wall] it belongs to him. If it was on the inner side it belongs to the householder. But if the house had been hired to others, even if a man found something within the house, it belongs to him.
If he (the claimant) named what was lost but could not describe its distinctive marks, he should not give it back to him. And it should not be give to a [known] deceiver, even if he describes its distinctive marks, as it is said [in the verse, Deut. 22:2]: “Until your fellow claims it”, [which is to say] until you inquire about your fellow, if he is a deceiver or not. Whatsoever works and eats, let it work and eat [while in the finder’s care]. But whatsoever does not work and eat should be sold, as it is said [in the verse, Deut. 22:2]: “And you shall return it to him”, See how you can return it to him. What shall be with the money [from the sale]? Rabbi Tarfon says: “He may use it, therefore if it is lost he is responsible for it.” Rabbi Akiva says: “He may not use it, therefore if it is lost he is not responsible for it.”
What counts as lost property? If he found an ass or a cow grazing on the path, this does not count as lost property. But if he found an ass with its trappings turned over, or a cow running in the vineyards, this is lost property. If he returned it and it escaped again, and he returned it and it escaped again, even four or five times, he is obligated to return it [yet again], since it is stated (Deut. 22:1): “You shall surely return it to your brother”. If [the finder] lost time at work that was worth a sela (an amount of money), he may not say to the owner, “Give me a sela”. Rather the owner need only pay him the wages of an unemployed laborer. If there was a court of law in the that place the finder may stipulate before them [for damages for time lost]. If there was no court of law, before whom can he stipulate? His comes first.
If he found an [animal] in a stable, he is not responsible for it [even though the stable door was loose and unguarded. But if he found it in the public domain he is responsible for it. If it was in a cemetery he need not contract uncleanness because of it. If his father said to him, “Contract uncleanness”, or if he said to him, “Do not return it”, he may not listen to him. If he unloaded [the ass fallen under its load] and reloaded it and again unloaded it and reloaded it, even four or five times he is still obligated, for it is written, “You must surely raise it with him”. If the owner went and sat down and said, “Since the commandment is upon you, if you wish to unload, unload”, he is not obligated, for it is written “with him”. But if the owner was aged or sick, he is obligated. It is a commandment from the Torah to unload but not to reload. Rabbi Shimon says, “To reload as well.” Rabbi Yose the Galilean says, “If the beast was carrying more than its proper load he is not obligated [to help unload it], for it is written, “under its load”, [which is to say] a load which it is able to endure.
If he found an [animal] in a stable, he is not responsible for it [even though the stable door was loose and unguarded. But if he found it in the public domain he is responsible for it. If it was in a cemetery he need not contract uncleanness because of it. If his father said to him, “Contract uncleanness”, or if he said to him, “Do not return it”, he may not listen to him. If he unloaded [the ass fallen under its load] and reloaded it and again unloaded it and reloaded it, even four or five times he is still obligated, for it is written, “You must surely raise it with him”. If the owner went and sat down and said, “Since the commandment is upon you, if you wish to unload, unload”, he is not obligated, for it is written “with him”. But if the owner was aged or sick, he is obligated. It is a commandment from the Torah to unload but not to reload. Rabbi Shimon says, “To reload as well.” Rabbi Yose the Galilean says, “If the beast was carrying more than its proper load he is not obligated [to help unload it], for it is written, “under its load”, [which is to say] a load which it is able to endure.
If a man deposited produce with his fellow, even if it should perish he may not touch it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “He may sell it before a court of law, since he is like someone who returns a lost object to its owners.”
Until when may he [that is defrauded] return the coin? In large towns until he has had time to show it to a money-changer. In villages until the Sabbath eve. If he [that had given the coin] recognized it, even after twelve months he should accept it [in return], but [if he does not accept it the one who received it] only has a cause for complaint [against him]. And it is permitted to use it for redeeming the Second Tithe without concern, for [he who would not receive it] is but only a cheapskate.
Fraud is four pieces of silver. A claim is [a minimum] of two pieces of silver. An admission is [a minimum] of that which is worth a perutah. There are five [rules involving] that which is worth a perutah: An admission is [a minimum] of that which is worth a perutah. A woman can be betrothed with that which is worth a perutah. Someone who benefits a perutah’s worth from that which belongs to the sanctuary has committed sacrilege. One who finds that which is worth a perutah must proclaim it [as a lost object]. One who steals that which is worth a perutah from his fellow and swears [falsely] to him [that he did not steal it], must go after him [to return it] even as far as Medea.
Produce may not be mixed together with other produce, even new produce with new produce, and needless to say new with old. In truth they permitted sharp wine to be mixed with weak wine, since this improves [the taste]. Wine lees may not be mixed with wine, but [the seller] may give [the buyer] the lees that come from the same wine. One whose wine has been mixed with water may not sell it in a store unless he informs [the buyer] and not to a merchant even if he has informed him, since [the merchant would buy it] only to deceive with it. In a place where they are accustomed to put water in wine, they may do so.
Produce may not be mixed together with other produce, even new produce with new produce, and needless to say new with old. In truth they permitted sharp wine to be mixed with weak wine, since this improves [the taste]. Wine lees may not be mixed with wine, but [the seller] may give [the buyer] the lees that come from the same wine. One whose wine has been mixed with water may not sell it in a store unless he informs [the buyer] and not to a merchant even if he has informed him, since [the merchant would buy it] only to deceive with it. In a place where they are accustomed to put water in wine, they may do so.
One may not set a price for produce before its market-price is known. After its market-price is known, one may set a price, for even though this one does not have [the produce] another does have it. If he was the first to harvest his crop, he may set a price with his fellow over grain stacked in a heap, or over grapes in their harvesting basket, or over olives in a vat, or over the clay-balls of the potter, or over lime as soon as the limestone is sunk in the kiln. One may set a price for manure at any time of the year. Rabbi Yose says: “One may not set a price over manure unless the seller has manure on the dungheap.” But the Sages permit it. One may set the price at the cheapest rate [that will be at the time of delivery]. Rabbi Judah says: “Even if he didn’t set the price at the cheapest rate he may say, “Give me at the such a price or give me back my money.”
One may not set a price for produce before its market-price is known. After its market-price is known, one may set a price, for even though this one does not have [the produce] another does have it. If he was the first to harvest his crop, he may set a price with his fellow over grain stacked in a heap, or over grapes in their harvesting basket, or over olives in a vat, or over the clay-balls of the potter, or over lime as soon as the limestone is sunk in the kiln. One may set a price for manure at any time of the year. Rabbi Yose says: “One may not set a price over manure unless the seller has manure on the dungheap.” But the Sages permit it. One may set the price at the cheapest rate [that will be at the time of delivery]. Rabbi Judah says: “Even if he didn’t set the price at the cheapest rate he may say, “Give me at the such a price or give me back my money.”
If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, or to drive it through the valley and he drove it through the hill country, even though the distance of each was ten miles, if the donkey died the hirer is liable. If a man hired a donkey and it went blind or was conscripted into the king’s service, the owner may say to the hirer, “Here is yours before you” [and he need not replace the donkey]. [But] if it died or was broken, he must give him a new donkey. If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, if it slipped he is not liable, but if it overheated he is liable. [If one hires a donkey] to drive it through a valley and he drove it through hill country, if it slipped he is liable, but if it overheated he is not liable. But if [it overheated] due to the ascent he is liable.
If one hired laborers and told them to work early or to work late, he has no right to compel them to do so where the custom is not to work early or not to work late. In a place where the custom is to give them their food he should give it to them, and where the custom is to provide them with sweet food, he must give it to them. Everything should follow local custom. It once happened that Rabbi Yochanan ben Mattia said to his son: “Go and hire laborers for us”. He went and struck a deal to provide them with food. When he came to his father, his father said to him, “My son, even if you make them a banquet like Solomon’s in his time you will not have fulfilled your obligation to them. For they are sons of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. But, rather, before they begin to work go and say to them, “On condition that I am not bound to give you more than bread and beans only.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “It was not necessary to speak thus, for everything should follow local use.”
If one was working with his hands but not with his feet, with his feet but not with his hands, or even with his shoulders only, he still may eat. Rabbi Yose bar Rabbi Judah says, “Only if he works with both his hands and his feet.”
A laborer may eat cucumbers even to a denar’s worth, and dates even to a denar’s worth. Rabbi Elazar ben Hisma says: “A laborer may not eat more than the value of his wages. But the Sages permit it, but they teach a man not to be gluttonous as to close the door against himself.
A laborer may eat cucumbers even to a denar’s worth, and dates even to a denar’s worth. Rabbi Elazar ben Hisma says: “A laborer may not eat more than the value of his wages. But the Sages permit it, but they teach a man not to be gluttonous as to close the door against himself.
If one wolf [attacked the flock that he was watching] it does not count as an unavoidable accident [for which no blame is placed on the guardian]. Two wolves do count as an unavoidable accident. Rabbi Judah says: “In a time where wolves are commonly attacking the settlements, even one wolf is considered to be an unavoidable accident.” Two dogs do not count as an unavoidable accident. Yadua the Babylonian said in the name of Rabbi Meir says: “If [two dogs came] from one direction they do not count as an unavoidable accident, but if [they came] from two directions they count as an unavoidable accident. A bandit counts as an unavoidable accident. A lion or a bear or a leopard or a panther or a serpent counts as an unavoidable accident. When [is this so]? When they come of themselves. But if he took the flock to a place of wild animals or bandits they do not count as an unavoidable accident.
The laws “You must pay him his wages on the same day” (Deut. 24:15) and “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning” (Lev. 19:13) apply both to the hire of a man or of a beast or of utensils. When is this so? When the employee has laid claim to it, but if he had not laid claim to it the employer does not commit a transgression. If he gave him a draft on a shopkeeper or moneychanger [the employer] does not commit a transgression [even though the employee has not yet collected]. If an employee [claimed his wages] within the set time he may take an oath and take his wages. [But] if the set time had passed he may not take an oath and take his wages. If witnesses testified that he had claimed his wages at the set time [and was not paid], he may take an oath and receive his wages. The law “You must pay him his wages on the same day” applies also to the resident alien, but not the law, “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning”.
If one lent one’s fellow, he may exact a pledge from him only with the permission of a court, and he may not enter his house to take the pledge, as it is states, “You shall stand outside” (Deut. 24:1. If the borrower had two utensils, he may take one but must give back the other. And he must give back the pillow at night and the plow during the day. And if the creditor dies he need not return the pledge to his heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Even to the debtor himself he need only return the pledge within thirty days [of the loan], and after thirty days he may sell it with the consent of the court. A pledge may not be taken from a widow, whether she be rich or poor, as it states, “Do not take the a widow’s garment as a pledge” (Deut. 24:17). If one takes a millstone as a pledge he violates a negative commandment and he is also in violation of both parts [of the millstone], as it states, “Do not take a mill or an upper millstone as a pledge” (Deut. 24:6). And they didn’t say just an upper millstone or a mill but anything that is necessary for food, as it states, “for that would be taking someone’s life as a pledge” (ibid.).
If the wall of a courtyard fell down they obligate each of the partners to help in building it up to a height of four cubits. He is presumed to have paid [his share] unless the other brings proof that he has not paid. [If the fence was built] four cubits or higher, they do not obligate him [to help in building it.] If [the one who did not contribute] built another wall near it, even if he did not put a roof upon it, they obligate him to share in all of the costs. He is presumed not to have paid [his share] unless he brings proof that he has.
They do not divide a courtyard until there is four cubits for this [partner] and four cubits for this [partner]. Nor [do they divide up] a field until it has nine kavs for this [partner] and nine kavs for this [partner]. Rabbi Judah says: “Until it has nine half-kavs for this [partner] and nine half-kavs for this [partner]. Nor [do they divide up] a garden until it has a half-kav for this [partner] and a half-kav for this [partner]. Rabbi Akiva says: “A quarter-kav.” Nor [do they divide up] an eating hall, a watch-tower, a dovecote, a cloak, a bathhouse, or an olive-press until there is sufficient for this [partner] and for this [partner]. This is the general rule: whatever can be divided and still be called by the same name, they divide; otherwise they do not divide. When is this so? When they do not both wish [to divide the property]. However, if both wish they can divide it even if it is smaller. And with regards to the Sacred Books, they may not be divided even if both are willing.
They do not divide a courtyard until there is four cubits for this [partner] and four cubits for this [partner]. Nor [do they divide up] a field until it has nine kavs for this [partner] and nine kavs for this [partner]. Rabbi Judah says: “Until it has nine half-kavs for this [partner] and nine half-kavs for this [partner]. Nor [do they divide up] a garden until it has a half-kav for this [partner] and a half-kav for this [partner]. Rabbi Akiva says: “A quarter-kav.” Nor [do they divide up] an eating hall, a watch-tower, a dovecote, a cloak, a bathhouse, or an olive-press until there is sufficient for this [partner] and for this [partner]. This is the general rule: whatever can be divided and still be called by the same name, they divide; otherwise they do not divide. When is this so? When they do not both wish [to divide the property]. However, if both wish they can divide it even if it is smaller. And with regards to the Sacred Books, they may not be divided even if both are willing.
A tree may not be grown within twenty five cubits of a cistern, or within fifty cubits if it is a carob or a sycamore, whether it is higher or on the same level. If the cistern was there first the tree shall be cut down and compensation given. If the tree was there first it shall not be cut down. If it is in doubt which was there first, the tree shall not be cut down. Rabbi Yose says: “Even if the cistern was there before the tree it should not be cut down, since this one dug within his own domain and the other planted within his own domain.”
A gutter spout cannot cause title through possession [so that the spout may still be moved] but title through possession may be claimed to its place [so that the place must be left for its present purpose]. A gutter can give title through possession. An Egyptian ladder cannot give title through possession but a Tyrian ladder can. An Egyptian window cannot give title through possession but a Tyrian window can. What is an Egyptian window? Any through which a man’s head may not enter. Rabbi Judah says: “If it has a frame, even though a man’s head cannot enter through it, it can give title through possession.” A projection, if it extends a handbreadth or more can give title through possession, and the other [into whose premises it projects] can protest against it. But if it is less than a handbreadth it cannot give title through possession and the other cannot protest against it.
If a man sold a house, he has not sold its side chambers, even though they open into the house, nor the room that is behind [the house], nor the roof, if it has a railing more than ten hand-breadths high. Rabbi Judah says: “If the roof as entrance shaped like a door, even if the railing is not ten hand-breadths high, it is not sold.”
If a man sold a house, he has not sold its side chambers, even though they open into the house, nor the room that is behind [the house], nor the roof, if it has a railing more than ten hand-breadths high. Rabbi Judah says: “If the roof as entrance shaped like a door, even if the railing is not ten hand-breadths high, it is not sold.”
Nor [has he sold] the cistern or the cellar, even though he had written in the deed of sale, “the depth and height”. And he [the seller] must buy himself a path [from the new owner to reach the cellar or cistern], according to Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages say: “He need not buy himself a path.” And Rabbi Akiva agrees that if he had said to him, “Excepting these [the cistern or cellar]” that he need not buy himself a path. If he sold them [the cellar or cistern] to another, Rabbi Akiva says: “He need not buy himself a path.” But the Sages say: “He must buy himself a path.”
If a man sold a town, he has also sold the houses, cisterns, trenches, caves, bath houses, dovecotes, olive presses, and irrigated fields, but not the movable property. But if he had said: “It and all that is in it”, even if cattle and slaves were in it, all of these are sold. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If a man sold a town he has also sold the town watchman.”
If a man sold grain to his fellow [and after it was sown] it did not sprout, even if it was flax-seed he is not liable. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If it was garden-seeds, which are not used for food, he is liable.”
If a man said to his fellow, “I will sell you a kor’s space of soil”, and it contained crevices ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, these are not included in the measurement. But if they were less than this they are included. If he said to him, “About a kor’s space of soil”, even if it contained crevices deeper than ten handbreadths or rocks higher than ten handbreadths, they are included in the measurement.
[If he said, “I will sell you] a kor’s space of soil as measured by a rope”, and he gave him less, the buyer may reduce the price; and if he gave him more, the buyer must give it back. But if he said, “Whether less or more”, even if he gave the buyer a quarter-kab’s space less in every seah’s space, or a quarter kab’s space more in every seah’s space, it becomes his; if [the error] was more than this, a reckoning must be made. What does he (the buyer) give him back? Its value in money; but if the seller wants, he gives him back the land. And why did they say that he could give back its value in money? To strengthen the power of the seller, for if, in a field [containing a kor’s space] there would still have remained to him nine kab’s space, or, in a garden, a half-kab’s space, or according to Rabbi Akiva a quarter-kab’s space, the buyer must give back to him land. And not only must he give back the quarter-kab’s space, but all of the surplus.
If a man who lies dying wrote over his property to others [as a gift] and kept back any land whatsoever, his gift remains valid [even should he not die]. If he did not keep back any land whatsoever, his gift does not remain valid [if he should not die]. If it was not written in the document, “who lies dying”, but he said that [he had written the document] while he lay dying and they (those who received the gift) said that he was healthy [when he wrote the document], he must bring proof that he had been dying, according to Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: “He who makes a claim against his fellow bears the burden of proof.”
They may write out a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, or a receipt (stating that the husband has paid the ketubah debt) for the wife even if her husband is not with her, provided that he (the scribe) knows them. And the husband pays the (scribe’s) fee. They may write out a document for the debtor even though the creditor is not with him, but they may not write out a document for the creditor unless the debtor is with him. And the debtor pays the (scribe’s) fee. They may write out a deed of sale for the seller although the buyer is not with him, but they may not write it out for the buyer unless the seller is with him. And the buyer pays the (scribe’s) fee.
They may write out a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, or a receipt (stating that the husband has paid the ketubah debt) for the wife even if her husband is not with her, provided that he (the scribe) knows them. And the husband pays the (scribe’s) fee. They may write out a document for the debtor even though the creditor is not with him, but they may not write out a document for the creditor unless the debtor is with him. And the debtor pays the (scribe’s) fee. They may write out a deed of sale for the seller although the buyer is not with him, but they may not write it out for the buyer unless the seller is with him. And the buyer pays the (scribe’s) fee.
They may write out a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, or a receipt (stating that the husband has paid the ketubah debt) for the wife even if her husband is not with her, provided that he (the scribe) knows them. And the husband pays the (scribe’s) fee. They may write out a document for the debtor even though the creditor is not with him, but they may not write out a document for the creditor unless the debtor is with him. And the debtor pays the (scribe’s) fee. They may write out a deed of sale for the seller although the buyer is not with him, but they may not write it out for the buyer unless the seller is with him. And the buyer pays the (scribe’s) fee.
He may send forth the people to a battle waged of free choice by the decision of the court of seventy one. He may break through [the private domain of any man] to make himself a road and none may protest him. The king’s road has no limit. Whatsoever the people take in plunder they must place before him, and he may take first. “And he shall not have many wives” (Deut. 17:17) eighteen only. Rabbi Judah says: “He may take many wives provided they don’t turn his heart away [from worshipping God]. Rabbi Shimon says: “Even one that might turn his heart away, he should not marry. Why then does it say, “He shall not have many wives”, even if they are like Avigayil. “He shall not keep many horses” (Deut. 17:16) enough for his chariot only. “Nor shall he amass silver and gold to excess” (Deut. 17:17) enough to pay his soldier’s wages. He must write a Torah scroll for himself; when he goes forth to battle he shall take it with him, and when he returns he shall bring it back with him; when he sits in judgement it shall be with him, and when he sits to eat it shall be with him, as it says, “Let it remain with him and let him read it all his life” (Deut. 17:19)
He may send forth the people to a battle waged of free choice by the decision of the court of seventy one. He may break through [the private domain of any man] to make himself a road and none may protest him. The king’s road has no limit. Whatsoever the people take in plunder they must place before him, and he may take first. “And he shall not have many wives” (Deut. 17:17) eighteen only. Rabbi Judah says: “He may take many wives provided they don’t turn his heart away [from worshipping God]. Rabbi Shimon says: “Even one that might turn his heart away, he should not marry. Why then does it say, “He shall not have many wives”, even if they are like Avigayil. “He shall not keep many horses” (Deut. 17:16) enough for his chariot only. “Nor shall he amass silver and gold to excess” (Deut. 17:17) enough to pay his soldier’s wages. He must write a Torah scroll for himself; when he goes forth to battle he shall take it with him, and when he returns he shall bring it back with him; when he sits in judgement it shall be with him, and when he sits to eat it shall be with him, as it says, “Let it remain with him and let him read it all his life” (Deut. 17:19)
How do they check the witnesses? They bring them in and warn them, and then they take them out and leave behind the most important of [the witnesses]. And they would say to him: “State [for us], how do you know that this one is in debt to this one?” If he said, “He said to me, ‘I am in debt to him’, or ‘So-and-so said to me that he was in debt to him’”, he has said nothing. He must be able to say, “In our presence he acknowledged to the other one that he owed him 200 zuz.” Afterward they bring in the second witness and check him. If their words were found to agree, the judges discuss the matter. If two say, “He is not guilty” and one says, “He is guilty”, he is not guilty. If two say, “He is guilty” and one says, “He is not guilty”, he is guilty. If one says, “He is not guilty”, and one says, “He is guilty”, and even if two declared him not guilty or declared him guilty while one said, “I do not know”, they must add more judges.
How did they admonish witnesses in capital cases? They brought them in and admonished them, [saying], “Perhaps you will say something that is only a supposition or hearsay or secondhand, or even from a trustworthy man. Or perhaps you do not know that we shall check you with examination and inquiry? Know, moreover, that capital cases are not like non-capital cases: in non-capital cases a man may pay money and so make atonement, but in capital cases the witness is answerable for the blood of him [that is wrongfully condemned] and the blood of his descendants [that should have been born to him] to the end of the world.” For so have we found it with Cain that murdered his brother, for it says, “The bloods of your brother cry out” (Gen. 4:10). It doesn’t say, “The blood of your brother”, but rather “The bloods of your brother” meaning his blood and the blood of his descendants. Another saying is, “The bloods of your brother” that his blood was cast over trees and stones. Therefore but a single person was created in the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single life to perish from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had caused a whole world to perish; and anyone who saves a single soul from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had saved a whole world. Again [but a single person was created] for the sake of peace among humankind, that one should not say to another, “My father was greater than your father”. Again, [but a single person was created] against the heretics so they should not say, “There are many ruling powers in heaven”. Again [but a single person was created] to proclaim the greatness of the Holy Blessed One; for humans stamp many coins with one seal and they are all like one another; but the King of kings, the Holy Blessed One, has stamped every human with the seal of the first man, yet not one of them are like another. Therefore everyone must say, “For my sake was the world created.” And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be involved with this trouble”, was it not said, “He, being a witness, whether he has seen or known, [if he does not speak it, then he shall bear his iniquity] (Lev. 5:1). And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be guilty of the blood of this man?,” was it not said, “When the wicked perish there is rejoicing” (Proverbs 11:10).]
The more a judge examines the evidence the more he is deserving of praise. Ben Zakkai once checked with regards to the stalks of figs. What is the difference between inquiries and examinations? With regards to inquiries, if one [of the two witnesses] says “I do not know”, their evidence becomes invalid. But if to one of the examinations one answered, “I do not know”, or even if they both answered, “We do not know”, their evidence remains valid. Yet if they contradict each other, whether during the inquiries or examinations, their evidence becomes invalid.
They afterward bring in the second witness and examine him. If their words were found to agree together they begin [to examine the evidence] in favor of acquittal. If one of the witnesses said, “I have something to argue in favor of his acquittal”, or if one of the disciples said, “I have something to argue in favor of his conviction”, they silence him. If one of the disciples said, “I have something to argue in favor of his acquittal”, they bring him up and set him among them and he does not come down from there all day. If there is anything of substance in his words they listen to him. Even if the accused said, “I have something to argue in favor of my acquittal”, they listen to him, provided that there is substance to his words.
If they find him not guilty, he is discharged, if not, it [the trial] is adjourned till the following day. During this time they [the judges] go about in pairs, practice moderation in food, drink no wine the whole day, and discuss the case throughout the night. Early next morning they reassemble in court. He who is in favor of acquittal states, ‘I declare him innocent and I stand by my opinion.’ While he who is in favor of condemnation says: ‘I declare him guilty and stand by my opinion.’ One who [previously] argued for conviction may now argue for acquittal, but one who [previously] argued for acquittal may not now argue for conviction. If they have made any mistake, the two judges’ scribes are to remind them. If they find him not guilty, they discharge him. If not, they take a vote. If twelve acquit and eleven condemn, he is acquitted. If twelve condemn and eleven acquit, or if eleven condemn and eleven acquit and one says, ‘I do not know,’ or even if twenty-two acquit or condemn and a single one says, ‘I do not know,’ they add to the judges. Up to what number is the court increased? By twos up to the limit of seventy-one. If thirty-six acquit and thirty-five condemn, he is acquitted. But if thirty-six condemn and thirty-five acquit, the two sides debate the case together until one of those who condemn agrees with the view of those who are for acquittal.