except
1449 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rav Ḥisda said, [the Mishnah] implies that it is permitted to remove a corpse of obligation. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, explain it if the burial was unauthorized or subject to question. Should one not be afraid that it might be a corpse of obligation? Rebbi Ze‘ira thinks that corpses of obligation are infrequent. “It turns out that there are three kinds of burials. A grave which is found one removes; after removal the place is impure and forbidden for use. A known grave may not be removed; but if it was removed the place is pure and permitted for use. A grave which endangers the public is removed; after removal the place is impure and forbidden for use.” Rebbi Abba bar Cohen instructed in Kefar Aqabia that its place is permitted for use. Does he disagree? There if it preceded the village, here if the village preceded it. It was stated: “A grave surrounded by a village on three sides can be removed,” on two sides, some Tannaïm state that one removes it, some state that one may not remove it. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says that one removes it, if it is within slightly more than 70 cubits. He who says that one does not remove it, if it is outside slightly more than 70 cubits. He who says that one removes it, if [the village] is built in the form of a Γ. He who says that one does not remove it, if [the village] is built in the form of a ה. “All kinds of graves may be removed except the graves of a king or a prophet. They said to him, were not the graves of David’s sons removed but the graves of the sons of Ḥulda were in Jerusalem and nobody ever touched them to remove them. Rebbi Aqiba told them, is that a proof? A duct was there and the impurity exited from there horizontally into the Qidron valley.”
MISHNAH: Any document signed by a Samaritan is invalid, except bills of divorce and bills of manumission. It happened that they brought before Rabban Gamliel at Kefar Othnay a bill of divorce whose witnesses were Samaritans and he declared it valid. All documents confirmed by a Gentile recorder’s office are valid, even if they are signed by Gentiles, except bills of divorce and bills of manumission. Rebbi Simeon says, all are valid; they said it only when they were made by private persons.
MISHNAH: Any document signed by a Samaritan is invalid, except bills of divorce and bills of manumission. It happened that they brought before Rabban Gamliel at Kefar Othnay a bill of divorce whose witnesses were Samaritans and he declared it valid. All documents confirmed by a Gentile recorder’s office are valid, even if they are signed by Gentiles, except bills of divorce and bills of manumission. Rebbi Simeon says, all are valid; they said it only when they were made by private persons.
MISHNAH: If it was written during daytime and signed during daytime, in the night and signed in the night, in the night and signed during daytime, it is valid. During daytime and signed in the night it is invalid. Rebbi Simeon declares it valid since Rebbi Simeon says that all documents which were written during daytime and signed at night are invalid except for women’s bills of divorce.
MISHNAH: Everybody is acceptable to write the bill of divorce, even an insane, a deaf-and-dumb, or a minor. The wife may write her bill of divorce and a man his receipt, for the certification of the bill of divorce is only effected by its signatures. Everybody is acceptable to bring the bill of divorce except an insane, a deaf-and-dumb, a minor, a blind person, or a Gentile.
Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
MISHNAH: If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time. For bonds, he has to leave space for the lender, the borrower, the sum, and the time. For commercial deeds, he has to leave space for the buyer, the seller, the sum, the field, and the time, because of good order. Rebbi Jehudah invalidates all of these. Rebbi Eleazar validates all of them except women’s bills of divorce, for it is said: “He shall write for her”, in her name.
“His field”, except if it was mortgaged. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property.
“His field”, except if it was mortgaged. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property.
“His field”, except if it was mortgaged. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property.
“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.
“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.
“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.
“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.
“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Guedgedah testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Immi. His testimony seems reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this refers to a hearing girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this refers to an underage girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became divorced.
Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: So far if she said, bring me, but [the agent] said [to the husband] “receive for me”. If she said, receive for me but [the agent] said [to the husband] “bring me”? If was found stated in both cases, this is a bill of divorce and if he wants to retract he cannot retract. But did we not state: “He shall deliver into her hand,” that includes not only her hand, from where through his agent’s hand, into her agent’s hand, from his agent to her agent, and from her agent to his agent; the verse says, “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Who said, “it is impossible for me”? Rebbi! As it was stated: “If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he said to him, your wife said, accept my bill of divorce for me: If he brought it to her, gave it to her, he acquired it for her, it was received for her; if he wants to retract, he may not retract, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Nathan says, ‘bring it to her, give it to her,’ [if he wants to retract, he may retract; ‘acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to retract, he may not retract. Rebbi says, in any of these cases] he may not retract except if he says, ‘It is impossible for me that you accept it for her, but give it to her.’” It is difficult for Rebbi, “here you have it from my word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract. It is difficult for Rebbi Nathan, “here you have it from her word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract! Rav Ḥuna said, he becomes his and her agent. Assi said, everywhere we have stated “his and her agent”, she is both divorced and not divorced.
HALAKHAH: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me,” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is (not) divorced unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not divorce her except at place X. “If he said, she is at place X and he delivered it at another place,” Rebbi Eleazar agrees that he only indicates a place; the rabbis agree that he only indicates a place.
HALAKHAH: : “If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. There, we have stated: “If someone tells a person who is not trustworthy, buy for me from somebody who is trustworthy, or from somebody who tithes, he is not trustworthy. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar (ben Rebbi Yose.) [Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar;] does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him.
HALAKHAH: : “If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. There, we have stated: “If someone tells a person who is not trustworthy, buy for me from somebody who is trustworthy, or from somebody who tithes, he is not trustworthy. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar (ben Rebbi Yose.) [Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar;] does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him.
MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce from today if I should die from this illness;” if he got up, walked on the market, fell ill again and died, one estimates whether he died from the original sickness, in which case it is a bill of divorce; otherwise it is no bill of divorce. She may not be alone with him except in the presence of witnesses, which may be even a male or a female slave except her personal slave girl since she has no shame in the presence of her personal slave girl. What is her status in those days? Rebbi Jehudah says, she is a married woman in all respects. Rebbi Yose says, she is divorced and not divorced.
MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce from today if I should die from this illness;” if he got up, walked on the market, fell ill again and died, one estimates whether he died from the original sickness, in which case it is a bill of divorce; otherwise it is no bill of divorce. She may not be alone with him except in the presence of witnesses, which may be even a male or a female slave except her personal slave girl since she has no shame in the presence of her personal slave girl. What is her status in those days? Rebbi Jehudah says, she is a married woman in all respects. Rebbi Yose says, she is divorced and not divorced.
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They declared the child a bastard because of the danger. Rav Huna in the name of Rav: This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for “if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.” Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yasa: Also “if somebody divorced his wife”? He said to him, not your Chapter but our Chapter.
MISHNAH: If somebody in divorcing his wife says to her: Herewith you are permitted to any man except Mr. X, Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit. What should he do? He should take the document back from her and deliver it again while saying, herewith you are permitted to any man. If he had written the condition in the document it would be invalid even if he had later erased it.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.
MISHNAH: “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with, it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalȋṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful, it is invalid. The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own.
MISHNAH: “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with, it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalȋṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful, it is invalid. The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own.
HALAKHAH: “The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man,” etc. Rebbi Aḥa said: “Cutting off”, the Torah did not choose the term “cutting off” except to refer to a person with whom a marriage is possible.
“Three kinds of bills of divorce are invalid,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: All in handwriting. Rebbi Eleazar asked: There are witnesses; why do I need handwriting? Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: All in handwriting except if its witnesses are with it. Rav Hamnuna said, they testified to their own sin since they agreed to lie by signing on an undated bill of divorce.
Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: This is Rebbi Meїr’s. Why did you have to say this? Rebbi Mana said, since Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: “This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for ‘if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.’ ” You should not come to say that the first is Rebbi Meїr’s, the second the rabbis’. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s. Rebbi Yose said, since Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar, that you should not be led to say the same here. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s.
HALAKHAH: “That is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid”. Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies from the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalȋṣah in the case of a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him for up to 30 days shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?
MISHNAH: If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced, except if there was an excuse. What would be an excuse? Mr. X divorced his wife conditionally, or he threw valuables for preliminary marriage to her and it was doubtful whether it was closer to her than to him; that is an excuse.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Mana; Rebbi Tanḥum, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Real estate cannot be bought for less than a peruṭah. What is the reason? “Fields will be bought by money.” This disagrees with what Rebbi Ḥanina said: Any šeqalim mentioned in the Torah are tetradrachmas, in the Prophets pounds, and in the Hagiographs centenarii. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, except for the šeqalim paid to Ephron, which were centenarii. What is the reason? “For full money he shall give it to me.” There is no comparison since here it is written “money” but there “šeqalim”. They objected, is there not the rapist, for whom “money” is written and you say “šeqalim”?
If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Real estate cannot be bought for less than a peruṭah. What is the reason? “Fields will be bought by money.” This disagrees with what Rebbi Ḥanina said: All šeqalim mentioned in the Torah are tetradrachmas, in the Prophets pounds, and in the Hagiographs centenarii, except for the šeqalim paid to Ephron. What is the reason? “For full money he shall give it to me.” There is no comparison since here it is written “money” but there “šeqalim”. They objected, is there not the rapist, for whom “money” is written and you say “šeqalim”.
From where that non-guaranteed property may be acquired together with guaranteed property, by money, document, or by possession? Rebbi Yose in the name of Ḥizqiah; Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ḥanina Tortaya in the name of Ḥizqiah, it is written (2Chr. 21:3): “Their father gave them many gifts, silver and gold and delicacies, with fortified cities in Jehudah.” So far real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem, who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages and they upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Is not the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer like the sick person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.
MISHNAH: For any commandment a father has to fulfill towards his son, men are obligated but women are free. For any commandment the son has to fulfill towards his father, men and women are equally obligated. For any positive commandment activated by time, men are obligated but women are free. For any positive commandment not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated. For any prohibition, whether or not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated except for “do not destroy”, “do not shear,” and “do not become impure for the dead.” Leanings and weavings, presentations, taking of fistfuls, burnings and neck breakings, sprinklings and receptions apply to men but not to women except for the flour offerings of the suspected wife and the nezirah; those do weave.
MISHNAH: For any commandment a father has to fulfill towards his son, men are obligated but women are free. For any commandment the son has to fulfill towards his father, men and women are equally obligated. For any positive commandment activated by time, men are obligated but women are free. For any positive commandment not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated. For any prohibition, whether or not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated except for “do not destroy”, “do not shear,” and “do not become impure for the dead.” Leanings and weavings, presentations, taking of fistfuls, burnings and neck breakings, sprinklings and receptions apply to men but not to women except for the flour offerings of the suspected wife and the nezirah; those do weave.
“Except ‘do not destroy’, ‘do not shear,’ and ‘do not become impure for the dead’.” Issy says, also because of “do not make a bald spot.” What is the reason? “They shall not make a bald spot.” One subject to the rules of the beard is subject to the rules of the bald spot; women who have no beard are free from the rules of the bald spot. And also from the following: “sons,” not daughters. Rebbi Eleazar said, women are obligated by the rules of the bald spot. What is the reason? “For you are a holy people for the Eternal, your God.” Both men and women. How does Rebbi Eleazar explain “sons”? When they do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are called sons, but when they do not do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are not called sons. Rav was ordering his students, there came Rav Hamnuna ordering the colleagues: Order you wives not to tear out their hair when standing by a deceased, that they should not make a bald spot. What is a bald spot? There are Tannaïm who stated: Any size. There are Tannaïm who state: The size of a peeled grain. The one who says, any size, because the meaning of “bald spot” is of any size. The one who says, a peeled grain, for it is said here “to make a bald spot”, and it says there, a bald spot. Since “bald spot” mentioned there means in the size of a peeled grain, here also it means the size of a peeled grain. Rebbi Yose bar Mamal: A Cohenet is permitted to leave the Land. What is the reason? “Say to the Cohanim,” not to the Cohanot. If it were otherwise, what would we say? Since she is included in the decision, she may not leave. If you say so, you push aside the paragraph of impurities.
MISHNAH: Any commandment which does not refer to the Land is obligatory both in the Land and outside the Land. But any commandment which does refer to the Land is obligatory only in the Land, except ‘orlah and kilaim. Rebbi Eliezer says, also new grain.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody said to his agent: “Go and marry me preliminarily to woman X,” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is preliminarily married unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not preliminarily marry me to her except at place X and he went and executed the preliminary marriage at another place.
If the appointed time has arrived and he says, I gave, but she says, I did not receive: Rebbi Abun said, since he tries to wrest the contract from the woman’s hand, the burden of proof is on him. Think of it, maybe there was no contract? Rebbi Yose said, since he tries to forbid her to anybody, he has to prove that they entered into the contract. A case came before Rebbi Abbahu; he said to him, go and deliver. He answered, Rabbi, I did not acquire a wife and you say to me, go and deliver! Rebbi Abbahu said, it never happened to me that one got the better of me except this one. He rephrased and said: If he changed his mind, he shall deliver. If she changed her mind, she shall deliver. Is that not his former judgment? He rephrased to give it the status of a court document.
Rebbi Jehudah bar Sisin, Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazy in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. They formulated the symphōn according to Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, asked: Why does it have to follow Rebbi Meïr but not also the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” Why can he not say “on condition” but not double his stipulation? If he did not double his stipulation, could this eliminate the preliminary marriage? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everywhere Rebbi Meïr holds that from “no” you infer “yes”, except here? Rebbi Mattaniah said, one is more restrictive in matters of incest and adultery.
MISHNAH: If somebody has two groups of daughters from two wives and he says, I preliminarily married off my older daughter, but he does not know whether the oldest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones who is older than the oldest of the younger ones, all are forbidden except the youngest of the younger ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the oldest of the older ones. I preliminarily married off my younger daughter, but he does not know whether the youngest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones who is younger than the youngest of the older ones, all are forbidden except the oldest of the older ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the youngest of the younger ones.
MISHNAH: If somebody has two groups of daughters from two wives and he says, I preliminarily married off my older daughter, but he does not know whether the oldest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones who is older than the oldest of the younger ones, all are forbidden except the youngest of the younger ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the oldest of the older ones. I preliminarily married off my younger daughter, but he does not know whether the youngest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones who is younger than the youngest of the older ones, all are forbidden except the oldest of the older ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the youngest of the younger ones.
MISHNAH: If somebody has two groups of daughters from two wives and he says, I preliminarily married off my older daughter, but he does not know whether the oldest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones who is older than the oldest of the younger ones, all are forbidden except the youngest of the younger ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the oldest of the older ones. I preliminarily married off my younger daughter, but he does not know whether the youngest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones who is younger than the youngest of the older ones, all are forbidden except the oldest of the older ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the youngest of the younger ones.
MISHNAH: If somebody has two groups of daughters from two wives and he says, I preliminarily married off my older daughter, but he does not know whether the oldest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones who is older than the oldest of the younger ones, all are forbidden except the youngest of the younger ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the oldest of the older ones. I preliminarily married off my younger daughter, but he does not know whether the youngest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones who is younger than the youngest of the older ones, all are forbidden except the oldest of the older ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the youngest of the younger ones.
“Who is this? The child of a slave girl or a Gentile.” There, we have stated: “Except what he has from a slave girl or a Gentile.”
MISHNAH: Anything I am obligated to watch I did set up for damage claims. If I partially set up for damage claims I am liable for claims as if I had set up for any claims. Properties of people of the covenant and private property, except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage; but property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage falls under the rules of restitution.
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
MISHNAH: The wolf and the lion, the bear, and the tiger, and the panther, and the snake, are notorious. Rebbi Eliezer says, when they are trained they are not notorious; except for the snake which always is notorious. What is the difference between tame and notorious? The tame pays half the damages from its body and the notorious pays full damages from the storage room.
MISHNAH: If the carrier of the beam was first and the carrier of the amphora last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is not liable; but if the carrier of the beam stopped walking, he is liable, except that he is not liable if he said to the carrier of the amphora: stop! If the carrier of the amphora was first and the carrier of the beam last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is liable, but if the carrier of the amphora stopped walking, he is not liable, except that he is liable if he said to the carrier of the beam: stop! The same applies if one carries fire and the other flax.
MISHNAH: If the carrier of the beam was first and the carrier of the amphora last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is not liable; but if the carrier of the beam stopped walking, he is liable, except that he is not liable if he said to the carrier of the amphora: stop! If the carrier of the amphora was first and the carrier of the beam last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is liable, but if the carrier of the amphora stopped walking, he is not liable, except that he is liable if he said to the carrier of the beam: stop! The same applies if one carries fire and the other flax.
HALAKHAH: : “Two tame bulls,” etc. Ben Pedaia said: Spoilers are not liable except for one making a fire and one causing a wound. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one making a fire only if he needs the ashes; one causing a wound only if he needs the blood. But did we not state: “His bull”? His bull needs ashes.
It happened that the [Roman] government sent two officials to study Torah with Rabban Gamliel. They learned from him Bible, Mishnah, Talmud, practice, and homilies. At the end, they told him: All of your teachings are beautiful and commendable except two things which you say: “A Jewish woman shall not act as midwife to a Gentile, but a Gentile woman may act as midwife for a Jewish woman; a Jewish woman shall not nurse the child of a Gentile, but a Gentile woman may nurse for a Jewish woman with her consent; what was robbed from a Jew is forbidden but from a Gentile it is permitted.” At that moment did Rabban Gamliel decide that what was robbed from a Gentile be forbidden because of desecration of the Name. “The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of a non-Jew is not liable,” etc. But we shall not inform the government of this. Nevertheless, by the time they reached the Tyrian ladder they had forgotten everything.
HALAKHAH: “He who sets fire to a stack of sheaves,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah about threshing tools which usually are hidden there. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he says except what is hidden, but here he says including what is hidden? But does not Rebbi Jehudah simply explain “stack”? Why was “stack” written? That he has to pay for all that is in it. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There they say, including what is hidden; but here they say, except what is hidden? But did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joḥanan about threshing tools which usually are hidden there? Rebbi Hoshaia said, if there are no witnesses. But if there are witnesses, everybody agrees with Rebbi (Yose) as it was stated: “If it was a stack of wheat sheaves covered with barley or a stack of barley sheaves covered with wheat, he pays for a stack of barley.” As the following: A person deposited a tied sack with another person, when something happened. This one said, it was full of dross, but the other said, it was full of raw silk. [ ] He swears and collects.
HALAKHAH: “He who sets fire to a stack of sheaves,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah about threshing tools which usually are hidden there. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he says except what is hidden, but here he says including what is hidden? But does not Rebbi Jehudah simply explain “stack”? Why was “stack” written? That he has to pay for all that is in it. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There they say, including what is hidden; but here they say, except what is hidden? But did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joḥanan about threshing tools which usually are hidden there? Rebbi Hoshaia said, if there are no witnesses. But if there are witnesses, everybody agrees with Rebbi (Yose) as it was stated: “If it was a stack of wheat sheaves covered with barley or a stack of barley sheaves covered with wheat, he pays for a stack of barley.” As the following: A person deposited a tied sack with another person, when something happened. This one said, it was full of dross, but the other said, it was full of raw silk. [ ] He swears and collects.
MISHNAH: One who sold it except for a one percent interest in it, or had a partnership interest in it, one who slaughtered and it became a carcass in his hand, or one who stabs or tears out, pays double restitution but not quadruple or quintuple. He who stole on the owner’s property but slaughtered or sold off their property, or stole off their property and slaughtered or sold on their property, or stole and slaughtered or sold off their property has to pay quadruple or quintuple restitution. But if he stole and slaughtered or sold on their property, he is not liable.
HALAKHAH: “One who sold it except for a one percent interest in it,” etc. “He who stole on the owner’s property,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: It he sold it in halves, what is the rule? If he sold half of it to one person and the other half to another, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If he sold it except for its forefoot, except for its hindfoot, except for its horn, except for its shearings, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, except for its horn he pays double restitution, except for its shearings he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi says, except for a vital organ he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution; except for a non-vital organ he is not liable.”
HALAKHAH: “One who sold it except for a one percent interest in it,” etc. “He who stole on the owner’s property,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: It he sold it in halves, what is the rule? If he sold half of it to one person and the other half to another, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If he sold it except for its forefoot, except for its hindfoot, except for its horn, except for its shearings, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, except for its horn he pays double restitution, except for its shearings he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi says, except for a vital organ he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution; except for a non-vital organ he is not liable.”
HALAKHAH: “One who sold it except for a one percent interest in it,” etc. “He who stole on the owner’s property,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: It he sold it in halves, what is the rule? If he sold half of it to one person and the other half to another, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If he sold it except for its forefoot, except for its hindfoot, except for its horn, except for its shearings, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, except for its horn he pays double restitution, except for its shearings he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi says, except for a vital organ he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution; except for a non-vital organ he is not liable.”
HALAKHAH: “One who sold it except for a one percent interest in it,” etc. “He who stole on the owner’s property,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: It he sold it in halves, what is the rule? If he sold half of it to one person and the other half to another, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If he sold it except for its forefoot, except for its hindfoot, except for its horn, except for its shearings, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, except for its horn he pays double restitution, except for its shearings he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi says, except for a vital organ he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution; except for a non-vital organ he is not liable.”
HALAKHAH: “One who sold it except for a one percent interest in it,” etc. “He who stole on the owner’s property,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: It he sold it in halves, what is the rule? If he sold half of it to one person and the other half to another, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If he sold it except for its forefoot, except for its hindfoot, except for its horn, except for its shearings, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, except for its horn he pays double restitution, except for its shearings he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi says, except for a vital organ he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution; except for a non-vital organ he is not liable.”
HALAKHAH: “One who sold it except for a one percent interest in it,” etc. “He who stole on the owner’s property,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: It he sold it in halves, what is the rule? If he sold half of it to one person and the other half to another, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If he sold it except for its forefoot, except for its hindfoot, except for its horn, except for its shearings, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, except for its horn he pays double restitution, except for its shearings he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi says, except for a vital organ he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution; except for a non-vital organ he is not liable.”
HALAKHAH: “One who sold it except for a one percent interest in it,” etc. “He who stole on the owner’s property,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: It he sold it in halves, what is the rule? If he sold half of it to one person and the other half to another, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If he sold it except for its forefoot, except for its hindfoot, except for its horn, except for its shearings, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, except for its horn he pays double restitution, except for its shearings he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi says, except for a vital organ he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution; except for a non-vital organ he is not liable.”
HALAKHAH: “One who sold it except for a one percent interest in it,” etc. “He who stole on the owner’s property,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: It he sold it in halves, what is the rule? If he sold half of it to one person and the other half to another, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If he sold it except for its forefoot, except for its hindfoot, except for its horn, except for its shearings, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, except for its horn he pays double restitution, except for its shearings he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi says, except for a vital organ he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution; except for a non-vital organ he is not liable.”
HALAKHAH: “One who sold it except for a one percent interest in it,” etc. “He who stole on the owner’s property,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: It he sold it in halves, what is the rule? If he sold half of it to one person and the other half to another, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If he sold it except for its forefoot, except for its hindfoot, except for its horn, except for its shearings, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, except for its horn he pays double restitution, except for its shearings he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi says, except for a vital organ he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution; except for a non-vital organ he is not liable.”
MISHNAH: This is more severe regarding a human than an ox since a human pays damages and pays for unborn children, but the ox pays only damages and does not pay for unborn children. A person who hits his father or mother without causing a concussion or who causes injury on the Day of Atonement is liable for everything. He who injures a Hebrew slave is liable for everything except for lost earnings if he is his own. He who injures another person’s Canaanite slave is liable for everything. Rebbi Jehudah says, slaves have no claim for embarrassment.
MISHNAH: He who robbed at least a peruṭa’s worth from a fellow man and swore to him should deliver it to him even in Media. He should deliver neither to [the victim’s] son nor to his agent, but he may deliver to an agent of the court, and if [the victim] had died, he has to make restitution to his heirs. If he had returned the capital but not the fifth, or [the victim] had forgiven him the capital but not the fifth or had forgiven him both except for less than a peruṭa’s worth of the capital, he need not follow him. If he had returned the fifth but not the capital, or [the victim] had forgiven him the fifth but not the capital or had forgiven him both except for a peruṭa’s worth of the capital, he has to follow him. If he paid the capital but swore on the fifth, he pays a fifth for the fifth until the capital becomes less than a peruṭa’s worth. And so “for a deposit, or a partnership, or robbery, or if he oppressed his neighbor, or found lost property and denied it, and swore falsely,” has to pay the capital, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.
MISHNAH: He who robbed at least a peruṭa’s worth from a fellow man and swore to him should deliver it to him even in Media. He should deliver neither to [the victim’s] son nor to his agent, but he may deliver to an agent of the court, and if [the victim] had died, he has to make restitution to his heirs. If he had returned the capital but not the fifth, or [the victim] had forgiven him the capital but not the fifth or had forgiven him both except for less than a peruṭa’s worth of the capital, he need not follow him. If he had returned the fifth but not the capital, or [the victim] had forgiven him the fifth but not the capital or had forgiven him both except for a peruṭa’s worth of the capital, he has to follow him. If he paid the capital but swore on the fifth, he pays a fifth for the fifth until the capital becomes less than a peruṭa’s worth. And so “for a deposit, or a partnership, or robbery, or if he oppressed his neighbor, or found lost property and denied it, and swore falsely,” has to pay the capital, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody had robbed a field from another person,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, but did they not say that “real estate cannot be robbed”? Why did they say, “he has to give him a field”? It is a fine by which they fined him. If the discharged veterans took it from the robber because of the robbed, could he tell him, in any case give me what is mine and let any claimant come and deal with me? Rebbi Johua ben Levi said, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor and the latter has to repay him except annona and head-tax. Rav said, he can tell him, you redeemed your pledge with my money.
Rebbi Joḥanan followed Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan was climbing from Tiberias to Sepphoris when he saw a man descending from there. He asked him, what is new in the big city? He told him, one of the great rabbis died and everbody was running to occupy themselves with him. Rebbi Joḥanan understood that it was Rebbi Ḥanina. He sent and brought his good Sabbath clothes and tore them. But did we not state: Any tear which is not in panic is not a tear? Rebbi Joḥanan wanted to do more and show his appreciation. But we do not know whether it was because he was his teacher or because of bad news. There is the case of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba in Sepphoris. He saw that everybody was running. He asked, why is everybody running? They told him, Rebbi Joḥanan is preaching in Rebbi Banaia’s study house and everybody is running to hear him. He said, praised be the Merciful Who showed me people running while I am alive. In Agadah I explained him everything except Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. This means every single student.
“He may use it for Second Tithe without hesitation since it is only miserly.” Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simon: One does not add a fifth for any Second Tithe which in itself is not worth a peruṭah. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One does not add a fifth for any Second Tithe for which the fifth is not worth a peruṭah. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. As it was stated: “From its tithe,” except what is worth less than a peruṭah. This means, not unless itself is worth a peruṭah. Another Tanna states: “From its tithe, its fifths” except if it is worth less than a peruṭah. This means, not unless the fifth is worth a peruṭah. Rebbi Abin bar Mamal said, our Mishnah follows neither one since we have stated “there are five peruṭot”, but we did not state “not unless itself is worth a peruṭah”; we have stated “there are five fifths”, but we did not state “not unless the fifth is worth a peruṭah”.
“He may use it for Second Tithe without hesitation since it is only miserly.” Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simon: One does not add a fifth for any Second Tithe which in itself is not worth a peruṭah. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One does not add a fifth for any Second Tithe for which the fifth is not worth a peruṭah. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. As it was stated: “From its tithe,” except what is worth less than a peruṭah. This means, not unless itself is worth a peruṭah. Another Tanna states: “From its tithe, its fifths” except if it is worth less than a peruṭah. This means, not unless the fifth is worth a peruṭah. Rebbi Abin bar Mamal said, our Mishnah follows neither one since we have stated “there are five peruṭot”, but we did not state “not unless itself is worth a peruṭah”; we have stated “there are five fifths”, but we did not state “not unless the fifth is worth a peruṭah”.
HALAKHAH: “One who hires workers,” etc. Rav Hoshaia said, this means that usage supersedes practice. Rebbi Immi said, everywhere the burden of proof is on the claimant except here.
MISHNAH: He who leases a dwelling to another person and it collapsed has to provide him with a dwelling. If it was small he may not make it large, large he may not make it small. One room he shall not make into two, two he may not make into one. He may not reduce the number of windows nor add to them except with the agreement of both parties.
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Banaiah. Everything the co-owners can prevent one another from doing in the courtyard except laundering because of the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, this is at a place where women do the laundering, but not at a place where men do the laundering. And what was said, except laundering because of the honor of the daughters of Israel, only that in his own four cubits he may prevent it. And what was said, everything the co-owners can prevent one another from doing in the courtyard, in the entire courtyard except in the other person’s own four cubits where he cannot prevent him. But if the place was at an incline, even in the other person’s own four cubits he can prevent him, since he may tell him: you are pouring out in your domain but it flows down into mine.
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Banaiah. Everything the co-owners can prevent one another from doing in the courtyard except laundering because of the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, this is at a place where women do the laundering, but not at a place where men do the laundering. And what was said, except laundering because of the honor of the daughters of Israel, only that in his own four cubits he may prevent it. And what was said, everything the co-owners can prevent one another from doing in the courtyard, in the entire courtyard except in the other person’s own four cubits where he cannot prevent him. But if the place was at an incline, even in the other person’s own four cubits he can prevent him, since he may tell him: you are pouring out in your domain but it flows down into mine.
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Banaiah. Everything the co-owners can prevent one another from doing in the courtyard except laundering because of the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, this is at a place where women do the laundering, but not at a place where men do the laundering. And what was said, except laundering because of the honor of the daughters of Israel, only that in his own four cubits he may prevent it. And what was said, everything the co-owners can prevent one another from doing in the courtyard, in the entire courtyard except in the other person’s own four cubits where he cannot prevent him. But if the place was at an incline, even in the other person’s own four cubits he can prevent him, since he may tell him: you are pouring out in your domain but it flows down into mine.
MISHNAH: A person may not dig a cistern close to his neighbor’s cistern, nor a ditch, nor a cave, nor a water canal, nor a washer’s pond except if he distanced himself from his neighbor’s wall three handbreadths and lined with lime. One removes olive peat, and manure, and salt, and lime, and rocks from his neighbor’s wall three handbreadths or lines with lime. One distances seeds, and ploughs, and urine three handbreadths from the wall. One distances a grindstone three from the base, which means four from the moving stone, and the oven three from the base, which means four from its rim.
HALAKHAH: “A person may not dig a cistern,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “[A person may not dig a cistern close to the wall of his neighbor’s cistern. Nor a ditch, nor a cave, nor a water canal, nor a washer’s pond except if he distanced himself from his neighbor’s wall three handbreadths] and lined with lime. If he lined with lime, any distance. If he did not line with lime, three handbreadths. From the following: “One removes olive peat, and manure, and salt, and lime, and rocks from his neighbor’s wall three handbreadths or lines with lime.” Here you say, because rocks generate heat. But there you say that they do not generate heat. Rebbi Yose said, in no case do rocks generate heat. But because they loosen the earth and damage the ground around the wall.
MISHNAH: One distances carcasses, and graves, and tanneries 50 cubits from the town, and one builds a tannery only to the East of a town. Rebbi Aqiba says, one may build in any direction except to the West, and distances himself by 50 cubits.
HALAKHAH: “One distances carcasses,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: To the place where one prepares the skins. In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, up to the place where one might smell what he makes. It was stated so: “Rebbi Aqiba says, he may build it in any direction and distances himself, except to the West because that [wind] is frequent.” Rebbi Mana went to accompany a person afflicted with a skin disease. His father told him, do not walk to the East of him but rather to the West of him.
MISHNAH: Neither the cistern nor the cellar even though he wrote over to him “its bottom and height,” and he has to buy himself access, the words of Rebbi Aqiba, but the Sages say that he does not have to buy himself access. Rebbi Aqiba agrees that if he said “except these”, he does not have to buy himself access. If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.
MISHNAH: He who sells a field sold the stones which are needed for it, and the posts in a vineyard which are needed for it, and grain standing on the ground, and a reed fence taking up less than a bet rova‘, and a watchman’s hut not made with mortar, and a carob tree not yet grafted, and a virgin sycamore tree. But he sold neither the stones which are not needed for it, nor the posts in a vineyard which are not needed for it, nor grain harvested from the ground. But if he said to him, “it and all it contains,” all is sold. In no case did he sell either a reed fence taking up more than a bet rova‘, or a watchman’s hut made with mortar, or a grafted carob tree, or an anvil sycamore tree. Neither the cistern, nor the wine press, nor a dovecote whether deserted or intact; and he has to buy himself access, the words of Rebbi Aqiba; but the Sages say that he does not not have to buy himself access. Rebbi Aqiba agrees that if he said “except these”, he does not not have to buy himself access. If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he does have to buy access. When has this been said? For the seller. But one who gives a gift, gives everything. Brothers who divided [an inheritance]: if one acquired a field he acquired everything. Somebody taking possession of a proselyte’s property: if he took possession of a field, he took possession of everything. If somebody dedicated a field to the Temple, he dedicated everything; Rebbi Simeon says that he who dedicated a field to the Temple only dedicated a grafted carob tree and an anvil sycamore tree.
The conditions which Joshua imposed. Rebbi Levi ben Birai in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: four. One may collect grasses everywhere except from a field of fenugreek where it is forbidden because of robbery. There, we have stated: “Or fenugreek where grasses appeared, one does not require him to weed.” So is the Mishnah: One does not require him to uproot. As one of Joshua’s conditions you say, one may collect grasses everywhere except from a field of fenugreek where it is forbidden because of robbery. This implies that he does not want them. He said, there if he sowed it to make sheaves, but here when he sowed it for seeds. Did Joshua made conditions for the benefit of sinners? Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: He would like it if they were uprooted and lying before him. And he mentions a vineyard field, as Rebbi Yannai said: all spontaneous growth is forbidden except for what appears on a fallow field, or a field ready to be ploughed under, a vineyard or a field grown for seeds. A fallow field, for he does not care. A field ready to be ploughed under, for he wants to improve his field. A vineyard, not to forbid his vineyard. A field grown for seeds, for he does not want it; and if you say he does, he would like it if they were uprooted and lying before him.
The conditions which Joshua imposed. Rebbi Levi ben Birai in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: four. One may collect grasses everywhere except from a field of fenugreek where it is forbidden because of robbery. There, we have stated: “Or fenugreek where grasses appeared, one does not require him to weed.” So is the Mishnah: One does not require him to uproot. As one of Joshua’s conditions you say, one may collect grasses everywhere except from a field of fenugreek where it is forbidden because of robbery. This implies that he does not want them. He said, there if he sowed it to make sheaves, but here when he sowed it for seeds. Did Joshua made conditions for the benefit of sinners? Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: He would like it if they were uprooted and lying before him. And he mentions a vineyard field, as Rebbi Yannai said: all spontaneous growth is forbidden except for what appears on a fallow field, or a field ready to be ploughed under, a vineyard or a field grown for seeds. A fallow field, for he does not care. A field ready to be ploughed under, for he wants to improve his field. A vineyard, not to forbid his vineyard. A field grown for seeds, for he does not want it; and if you say he does, he would like it if they were uprooted and lying before him.
The conditions which Joshua imposed. Rebbi Levi ben Birai in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: four. One may collect grasses everywhere except from a field of fenugreek where it is forbidden because of robbery. There, we have stated: “Or fenugreek where grasses appeared, one does not require him to weed.” So is the Mishnah: One does not require him to uproot. As one of Joshua’s conditions you say, one may collect grasses everywhere except from a field of fenugreek where it is forbidden because of robbery. This implies that he does not want them. He said, there if he sowed it to make sheaves, but here when he sowed it for seeds. Did Joshua made conditions for the benefit of sinners? Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: He would like it if they were uprooted and lying before him. And he mentions a vineyard field, as Rebbi Yannai said: all spontaneous growth is forbidden except for what appears on a fallow field, or a field ready to be ploughed under, a vineyard or a field grown for seeds. A fallow field, for he does not care. A field ready to be ploughed under, for he wants to improve his field. A vineyard, not to forbid his vineyard. A field grown for seeds, for he does not want it; and if you say he does, he would like it if they were uprooted and lying before him.
One walks on permitted paths from the moment the harvest is cleared up to the second rainfall, and one may take shoots to plant from everywhere except from olive trees and vines. From olives trees from the very young and the very old, but if it was like a ṭrgwl even from the very young it is forbidden.
MISHNAH: Both son and daughter are equal for the rules of inheritance, except that the son take a double portion of the father’s property but no double portion of the mother’s property. And the daughters can claim sustenance from the father’s property but not from the mother’s property.
MISHNAH: One who says, “my firstborn X shall not take a double portion,” [or] “my son Y shall not inherit together with his brothers,” did not say anything since he stipulated against what is written in the Torah. One who distributes his property orally, if he increased for one, or diminished for another, or made the firstborn equal to the others, his words are upheld; except if, however, he formulated it in terms of inheritance, he did not say anything. But if he wrote in terms of gift, whether at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his words are upheld.
HALAKHAH: “One who says, “my firstborn X shall not take a double portion,’ ” etc. Rebbi La made the right of the firstborn equal to that of the brothers. Rebbi Ḥaggai said to them: Is that not a verse, “he shall not be able to declare as firstborn.” Rebbi Eliezer said, by the Temple Service! He is able, but he is not permitted. Except that he is able designating it as a gift.
Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: That there should be twelve months of sustenance for all of them. Samuel said, this is the opinion of Rabban Gamliel ben Rebbi, but the words of the Sages are, until they reach adulthood or are married. That is both a leniency and a restriction. Sometimes they are close to adulthood, sometimes far from adulthood. They asked before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, what did you hear from Rebbi Joḥanan? He said to them, I did not hear anything from him concerning this matter except what Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: what if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since they started with permission, they started.