first
7056 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
“A cistern which is close to a water canal is filled first.” Only if it passes through it. Samuel said, even if it is close by. There, they say what is farther away but easy to drink from precedes one which is close by but difficult to drink from.
MISHNAH: A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me, needs two groups of witnesses; two who say that she appointed in their presence and two who say that in their presence he received it and tore it up, even if the first ones are the latter ones, or one of the first together with one of the latter and a third person is associated with them. A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah says, no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce. Any female who cannot take care of her bill of divorce cannot be divorced. If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand. Therefore, if the husband wants to retract he can retract since an underage person cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.
MISHNAH: A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me, needs two groups of witnesses; two who say that she appointed in their presence and two who say that in their presence he received it and tore it up, even if the first ones are the latter ones, or one of the first together with one of the latter and a third person is associated with them. A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah says, no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce. Any female who cannot take care of her bill of divorce cannot be divorced. If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand. Therefore, if the husband wants to retract he can retract since an underage person cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Did we not state: (Mishnah Baba Meẓi‘a 1:4) “If somebody saw a find and fell on it, when another person came and grabbed it, he who grabbed it had the rights to it?” He answered him: Explain it if the first one did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did we not state: “If he fell on it or spread his talith on it, one removes him from it?” He said to him, that is the same, if he did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: (Tosephta Peah 2:2) “If two were pushing one another because of a sheaf and another person came and grabbed it from before them, the one who grabbed is entitled to it. He said to him, it is the same, they did not say that our four cubits should acquire it for us.
MISHNAH: If the scribe wrote and then in error handed the bill of divorce to the woman and the receipt to the man and they exchanged them, then later the bill of divorce is found with the man and the receipt with the woman, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Rebbi Eliezer says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.
“Rebbi Eleazar says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.” What is immediately? Rebbi Ze‘ira says, before she was preliminarily married, or when she was preliminarily married. Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula said, before she was definitively married, or when she was definitively married. The Mishnah supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.”
“Rebbi Eleazar says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.” What is immediately? Rebbi Ze‘ira says, before she was preliminarily married, or when she was preliminarily married. Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula said, before she was definitively married, or when she was definitively married. The Mishnah supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.”
HALAKHAH: “Anybody can supplement a bald document,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said, it is written: “I took the document,” etc. “And [the sealed]”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two {witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, on a simple document, the witnesses sign parallel, on a knotted one the witnesses sign lengthwise. Rebbi Idi said, the witnesses sign between any two knots, but it must be on top. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Naḥman wanted to argue that witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that two times “I accept” makes it invalid. But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Does Rav Huna not consider that he might write another text, erase and change to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that an erasure makes invalid even if the correction is certified.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah applies if one witness is missing, but only if there are three or more. Two or three at the beginning is invalid, one below the three is valid. Rebbi Mana asked: That is, if they are continuous. If they are with interruptions? As one says, they are considered like testimony at a distance, they only serve to certify the testimony. And so it is here. If there were nine, can he untie two and have two sign? Or are two witnesses on a knotted document nothing? If there were five, it is obvious that he unties one and has it signed. It turns out that his untying permits it following Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel, for Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel says, the essential part is what validates, even if he ties and signs after that. That is, if he ties all knots and after that the first three [witnesses] did sign. But if he tied the first three and had them signed, even if he makes many ties and lets many sign it is valid. Practice is that a knotted document is first knotted and then signed. If he made the first knots and had them signed right away, it is obvious that the first two did not sign the knotted document.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah applies if one witness is missing, but only if there are three or more. Two or three at the beginning is invalid, one below the three is valid. Rebbi Mana asked: That is, if they are continuous. If they are with interruptions? As one says, they are considered like testimony at a distance, they only serve to certify the testimony. And so it is here. If there were nine, can he untie two and have two sign? Or are two witnesses on a knotted document nothing? If there were five, it is obvious that he unties one and has it signed. It turns out that his untying permits it following Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel, for Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel says, the essential part is what validates, even if he ties and signs after that. That is, if he ties all knots and after that the first three [witnesses] did sign. But if he tied the first three and had them signed, even if he makes many ties and lets many sign it is valid. Practice is that a knotted document is first knotted and then signed. If he made the first knots and had them signed right away, it is obvious that the first two did not sign the knotted document.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah applies if one witness is missing, but only if there are three or more. Two or three at the beginning is invalid, one below the three is valid. Rebbi Mana asked: That is, if they are continuous. If they are with interruptions? As one says, they are considered like testimony at a distance, they only serve to certify the testimony. And so it is here. If there were nine, can he untie two and have two sign? Or are two witnesses on a knotted document nothing? If there were five, it is obvious that he unties one and has it signed. It turns out that his untying permits it following Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel, for Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel says, the essential part is what validates, even if he ties and signs after that. That is, if he ties all knots and after that the first three [witnesses] did sign. But if he tied the first three and had them signed, even if he makes many ties and lets many sign it is valid. Practice is that a knotted document is first knotted and then signed. If he made the first knots and had them signed right away, it is obvious that the first two did not sign the knotted document.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah applies if one witness is missing, but only if there are three or more. Two or three at the beginning is invalid, one below the three is valid. Rebbi Mana asked: That is, if they are continuous. If they are with interruptions? As one says, they are considered like testimony at a distance, they only serve to certify the testimony. And so it is here. If there were nine, can he untie two and have two sign? Or are two witnesses on a knotted document nothing? If there were five, it is obvious that he unties one and has it signed. It turns out that his untying permits it following Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel, for Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel says, the essential part is what validates, even if he ties and signs after that. That is, if he ties all knots and after that the first three [witnesses] did sign. But if he tied the first three and had them signed, even if he makes many ties and lets many sign it is valid. Practice is that a knotted document is first knotted and then signed. If he made the first knots and had them signed right away, it is obvious that the first two did not sign the knotted document.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah applies if one witness is missing, but only if there are three or more. Two or three at the beginning is invalid, one below the three is valid. Rebbi Mana asked: That is, if they are continuous. If they are with interruptions? As one says, they are considered like testimony at a distance, they only serve to certify the testimony. And so it is here. If there were nine, can he untie two and have two sign? Or are two witnesses on a knotted document nothing? If there were five, it is obvious that he unties one and has it signed. It turns out that his untying permits it following Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel, for Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel says, the essential part is what validates, even if he ties and signs after that. That is, if he ties all knots and after that the first three [witnesses] did sign. But if he tied the first three and had them signed, even if he makes many ties and lets many sign it is valid. Practice is that a knotted document is first knotted and then signed. If he made the first knots and had them signed right away, it is obvious that the first two did not sign the knotted document.
Where do we hold? If he knotted and signed it inside, everybody agrees that it can be made simple. If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple. {Rebbi objected to the statement of Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: “The body of the document.” If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple, but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple.) Rebbi objected to the statement of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: The body of the document shows whether it is simple or not simple. What is the body of the document? Rebbi Abba said, as Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But did we not state: “That is the formula of a document”? Rebbi Mana said, that is the formula of a knotted document. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say it is the same for knotted and simple, for a knotted document it is a necessity, for a simple one it is not a necessity. Rebbi Aḥa said, if one adds to practice. A simple document [is witnessed] by two persons. If common usage is to have three, one makes it with three. A knotted document is signed on its back. If common usage is to sign it inside and out, one signs it inside and out.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.
Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: This is Rebbi Meїr’s. Why did you have to say this? Rebbi Mana said, since Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: “This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for ‘if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.’ ” You should not come to say that the first is Rebbi Meїr’s, the second the rabbis’. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s. Rebbi Yose said, since Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar, that you should not be led to say the same here. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s.
If somebody contests the signature of the witnesses or the signature of the judges. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: If he wants to certify it from the handwriting of the witnesses it is certified, from the handwriting of the judges it is certified; I am saying that even from one witness and one judge it is certified. If he gave permission to the scribe to write and to the witnesses to sign, Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jeremiah: The witnesses have to write: “This loan is from the first of Nisan but we wrote at a later date.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: The confirmation of the judges is valid even if it is at some distance. Rebbi Mana said, is that correct? Could he then not certify from one handwriting? Rav said: The judges have to write: We certified this in the presence of X and Y. Why? So they can be convicted of perjury. But then also on which date, at which time, at which place? A judgment was given before Rav and this was not written. Rebbi Ḥaggai said: The judges have to know the parties. It happened that they falsified.
HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.
By money, from where? “After he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money. By marital relations, from where? “And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. I would say, by both together. Money without intercourse and intercourse without money, from where? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is written: “If a man is found lying with a woman having had intercourse with her husband.” Think of it, even if he did only acquire her by intercourse, the one coming after him is [executed] by strangulation. Not only regular intercourse but even perverse. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is necessary to mention perverse intercourse for if it were regular, why mention her husband? As we have stated there: “If she was raped by two men, the first is stoned, the second strangled.”
So far for Israel. For the Gentiles? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It is written “you shall die because of the woman whom you took, since she is having marital relations with a husband.” They are guilty for those having marital relations; they are not guilty for the betrothed. The words of Rebbi Eleazar imply, only if he had intention of acquiring her; the words of Samuel imply, even if he had no intention of acquiring her; since Rebbi Jonah said in the name of Samuel: “A prostitute stands in a window. Two men sleep with her. The first one is not killed, the second one is killed because of him.” But did the first one intend to acquire her?
So far for Israel. For the Gentiles? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It is written “you shall die because of the woman whom you took, since she is having marital relations with a husband.” They are guilty for those having marital relations; they are not guilty for the betrothed. The words of Rebbi Eleazar imply, only if he had intention of acquiring her; the words of Samuel imply, even if he had no intention of acquiring her; since Rebbi Jonah said in the name of Samuel: “A prostitute stands in a window. Two men sleep with her. The first one is not killed, the second one is killed because of him.” But did the first one intend to acquire her?
The word of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya implies that Gentiles have no divorce, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in this matter: A Gentile who divorced his wife, who herself then went and married another, when the latter divorced her and then both of them converted, I do not read for them: “Her first husband who had divorced her cannot return to marry her.” It was stated in this matter: A case came before Rebbi and he approved.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Following him, who said “for servitude”, he makes up before he leaves. But was it not stated: After he redeemed him it is as if he were sold to him, he enslaves him before he leaves. Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is no “enslaves him before he leaves”, only “he makes up before he leaves.” If his relatives want to redeem him from the first [master’s], they redeem. If his relatives want to redeem him from the second [master’s], they cannot redeem. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That follows him who said: “by these to freedom, by all others to servitude.”
Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”
Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”
Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”
If he was married to her sister who died. For him who says, he gives money for the allotment at the end, she needs additional money. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, she does not need additional money. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, she needs additional money. Why? Everybody agrees that preliminary marriage is impossible in an incestuous relationship.
If he was married to her sister who died. For him who says, he gives money for the allotment at the end, she needs additional money. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, she does not need additional money. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, she needs additional money. Why? Everybody agrees that preliminary marriage is impossible in an incestuous relationship.
“But the Sages say, small animals are taken possession of by drawing near.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “Draw near and take for yourselves small animals for your families.” As Rav Jehudah sent to ask: By what means is possession of large animals established? He answered, by handing over; and asked, is that not the Mishnah? There are Tannaïm who switch the attributions. Rav Jehudah asked Rebbi Eleazar: If a firstborn became “torn” within thirty days? He answered, he is as if dead and free from the five tetradrachmas of a son. Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: A placenta which was delivered partially today and partially tomorrow? He answered, for pure blood she counts from the first day, for impure blood from the second day. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, if no child was produced with it. But if there was a child, both for pure and impure blood she counts only from the moment of birth of the child.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rav Jehudah sent asking from Rebbi Eleazar: If brothers split [the estate] and then one of them entered a levirate marriage? He answered, the property of the deceased is like common property. Ulla bar Ismael said, it is found that in Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion there is no difference whether they split and then one of them entered a levirate marriage or one of them entered a levirate marriage and then they split, but all of them share in the property of the deceased. Why did he not say so? He answered what was asked of him. And why did he not ask? Because of what Rebbi Abinna said in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a first-born shared as a common son, it is prima facie evidence that he renounced his prerogative.
There, we have stated: “Any real estate is subject to peah and first fruits, the words of Rebbi Aqiba.” What is the use of “any” real estate? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if it had space for one stalk but a pearl was hidden in it.
HALAKHAH: “If anything is given instead of money,” etc. There, we have stated: “This is the principle: All movables acquire one another.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Even heaps among heaps. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, we have stated only: “If anything is given instead of money,” anything that needs estimation. It turns out that Rebbi Abba follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar his own opinion, as we have stated there: “Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe, but if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they exchanged kid goats against rams and rams against kid goats. But if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, that was [the recipient’s] part from the first moment. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, they are buyers. But we have stated there: “The buyer and the recipient of a gift are free from animal tithe. Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe.” When they split and then joined again. “But if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” If they never split.
There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.
The words of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba disagree, for Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rebbi Yudan, son of Rebbi Simeon bar Ioḥai’s daughter, stated that Rebbi Simeon bar Ioḥai stated: Honoring father and mother is great because the Holy One, praise to Him, preferred it over His own honor. It is said (Ex. 20:12): “Honor your father and your mother,” and it is said (Prov. 3:9): “Honor the Eternal with your property.” How do you honor Him? From your property! One gives gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah, one gives terumah, the First and Second Tithes and the tithe for the poor, ḥallah, one makes a sukkah, and lulav,shofar, and tefillin, and ẓiẓit, one feeds the hungry and gives to drink to the thirsty. If you have the wherewhithal, you are obliged for all of these; if you have nothing, you are not obliged even for one of them. But when it comes to honoring father and mother, whether you own property or you do not, you must honor father and mother, even if you are a beggar at people’s doors.
Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.
Does it follow him who says the Pesaḥ of women is voluntary? It was stated: “A woman may make the First Pesaḥ by herself and the Second joining others, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, a woman may make the Second Pesaḥ by herself, and certainly the First. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a woman may make the First Pesaḥ joining others but does not make the Second.” What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? (Ex. 12:3) “Every man a sheep for the family,” if they want “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose, “Every man a sheep for the family,” a fortiori “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? “Every man”, not woman. How do the rabbis uphold “man”? A man, not a minor. Rebbi Jonah said, even according to him who says it is an obligation, it is different here since the occasion was news, lest it become an obligation.
Does it follow him who says the Pesaḥ of women is voluntary? It was stated: “A woman may make the First Pesaḥ by herself and the Second joining others, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, a woman may make the Second Pesaḥ by herself, and certainly the First. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a woman may make the First Pesaḥ joining others but does not make the Second.” What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? (Ex. 12:3) “Every man a sheep for the family,” if they want “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose, “Every man a sheep for the family,” a fortiori “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? “Every man”, not woman. How do the rabbis uphold “man”? A man, not a minor. Rebbi Jonah said, even according to him who says it is an obligation, it is different here since the occasion was news, lest it become an obligation.
Does it follow him who says the Pesaḥ of women is voluntary? It was stated: “A woman may make the First Pesaḥ by herself and the Second joining others, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, a woman may make the Second Pesaḥ by herself, and certainly the First. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a woman may make the First Pesaḥ joining others but does not make the Second.” What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? (Ex. 12:3) “Every man a sheep for the family,” if they want “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose, “Every man a sheep for the family,” a fortiori “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? “Every man”, not woman. How do the rabbis uphold “man”? A man, not a minor. Rebbi Jonah said, even according to him who says it is an obligation, it is different here since the occasion was news, lest it become an obligation.
Rebbi Eleazar said, they accepted the tithes voluntarily. What is the reason? (Neh. 10:1) “In view of all this, we execute a contract and sign.” How does Rebbi Eleazar uphold (10:37): “The first-born of our cattle and flock”? Since they accepted upon themselves matters they were not obligated for, even matters they were obligated for the Omnipresent credited to them as if they were accepted voluntarily.
“Rebbi Eliezer says, also new grain.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? (Lev. 23:14) “In all your dwelling places,” both inside and outside the Land. How do the rabbis explain the reason of Rebbi Eliezer, “in all your dwelling places”? New grain from here which was exported. Rebbi Jonah asked: Why did we not state ḥallah with these? Rebbi Yose said to him, our Mishnah only deals with something which applies to Israel and the Gentiles. But ḥallah only applies to Israel, not to Gentiles. What is the reason? (Num. 15:20): The first of your dough,” not of Gentiles.
We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
“ ‘Hold this tetradrachma for me’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is preliminarily married. After delivery, if she agrees, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. ‘Here is the tetradrachma which I owe you,’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ if she agrees, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. If after delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is not preliminarily married even if both parties agree. What can he do? He should take the coin back, deliver it again and say, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me.’ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this mina,’ if it turns out that a denar was missing, she is not preliminarily married. If one denar was bad, she is preliminarily married if he replaces it. If he was counting the coins into her hand, she can change her mind any time before he finishes.” Rebbi Eleazar said, she is preliminarily married by the first [coin]; the remainder is a condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said, only after he completes [the count.] It was said that Rebbi Joḥanan changed his mind about this.
Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.
Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.
Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.
Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.
Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.
MISHNAH: If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard, or an ox sentenced to be stoned, or a calf whose neck was broken, or the birds of a sufferer from skin disease, the hair of a nazir, or the first-born of a she-ass, or meat cooked in milk, or profane meat slaughtered in the Temple precinct, [the woman] is not preliminarily married. If he sells any of these items and uses their proceeds for preliminary marriage, she is preliminarily married.
HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.
HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.
HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.
HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.
“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.
“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.
If the agent was not identified as such by the witnesses and he says, I married her preliminarily for myself, but she says, to the first, the second is like one who says to a woman: I married you preliminarily but she says, you did not marry me preliminarily. Also it is as if she said to the first, you married me preliminarily but he says, I did not marry you preliminarily. If she says, I do not know, the presumption is in favor of the second. If the agent was identified as such by the witnesses and he says, I married her preliminarily for myself, but she says, to the first, the presumption is in favor of the first. If she said, I do not know, both of them give a bill of divorce or, if they so desire, one gives a bill of divorce and the other marries definitively.
If the agent was not identified as such by the witnesses and he says, I married her preliminarily for myself, but she says, to the first, the second is like one who says to a woman: I married you preliminarily but she says, you did not marry me preliminarily. Also it is as if she said to the first, you married me preliminarily but he says, I did not marry you preliminarily. If she says, I do not know, the presumption is in favor of the second. If the agent was identified as such by the witnesses and he says, I married her preliminarily for myself, but she says, to the first, the presumption is in favor of the first. If she said, I do not know, both of them give a bill of divorce or, if they so desire, one gives a bill of divorce and the other marries definitively.
If the agent was not identified as such by the witnesses and he says, I married her preliminarily for myself, but she says, to the first, the second is like one who says to a woman: I married you preliminarily but she says, you did not marry me preliminarily. Also it is as if she said to the first, you married me preliminarily but he says, I did not marry you preliminarily. If she says, I do not know, the presumption is in favor of the second. If the agent was identified as such by the witnesses and he says, I married her preliminarily for myself, but she says, to the first, the presumption is in favor of the first. If she said, I do not know, both of them give a bill of divorce or, if they so desire, one gives a bill of divorce and the other marries definitively.
If the agent was not identified as such by the witnesses and he says, I married her preliminarily for myself, but she says, to the first, the second is like one who says to a woman: I married you preliminarily but she says, you did not marry me preliminarily. Also it is as if she said to the first, you married me preliminarily but he says, I did not marry you preliminarily. If she says, I do not know, the presumption is in favor of the second. If the agent was identified as such by the witnesses and he says, I married her preliminarily for myself, but she says, to the first, the presumption is in favor of the first. If she said, I do not know, both of them give a bill of divorce or, if they so desire, one gives a bill of divorce and the other marries definitively.
Therefore, if the second died within thirty days or divorced her, the preliminary marriage of the first is activated after thirty days. If he died after thirty [days] without having divorced her, the preliminary marriage of the first is not activated. That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: With any condition which was fulfilled, even if later it becomes moot, she is preliminarily married. But with any condition which was not satisfied at the moment of preliminary marriage, even if later it became moot, she is not preliminarily married.
Therefore, if the second died within thirty days or divorced her, the preliminary marriage of the first is activated after thirty days. If he died after thirty [days] without having divorced her, the preliminary marriage of the first is not activated. That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: With any condition which was fulfilled, even if later it becomes moot, she is preliminarily married. But with any condition which was not satisfied at the moment of preliminary marriage, even if later it became moot, she is not preliminarily married.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This animal shall be an elevation sacrifice after thirty days.” If he sold it within the thirty days, it is sold; its dedication sanctifies. If he bought it back within the thirty days, the dedication as elevation sacrifice applies to it. After thirty days, the dedication as elevation sacrifice no longer applies. But an elevation sacrifice cannot be compared to a woman! Could an elevation sacrifice be compared to a woman? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it that the second man died but he had a brother. Since she is a candidate for levirate, the preliminary marriage of the first cannot be valid. Could an elevation sacrifice be compared to a woman? Rebbi Mattania said, explain it that he dedicated an animal with a permanent defect. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: There you say, my promise to Heaven is like my delivery to a private person, and here, you say so? He answered him: there, immediately, but here if he says, after thirty days.
“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession.” He who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money.” He who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.
“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession.” He who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money.” He who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.
“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession.” He who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money.” He who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.
“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession.” He who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money.” He who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.
“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession.” He who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money.” He who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.
“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession.” He who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money.” He who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.
“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession.” He who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money.” He who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.
“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession.” He who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money.” He who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.
“From today and after 30 days.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply to her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it was necessary [to state], even if the second preliminarily married her absolutely. Rebbi Isaac bar Tebele asked before Rebbi Eleazar: As you take it; what the first acquired, he acquired; the remainder the second finished. He answered, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? How is that? To any woman who is not acquired by one man only, even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply.
A student asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he gave it to her in the morning on condition that he divorce her in the afternoon? A certain David was of the opinion that anything acquires; Rebbi Ze‘ira said that after thirty days he acquires absolutely. But if the second one added absolute acquisition, I am reading for her: “Her first husband who had sent her away cannot return to take her back.”
Only if it be with his and her agreement. If it was symphōn in his opinion and preliminary marriage in her opinion, Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is symphōn, Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it is preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥanina was taking up arms against Rebbi Ḥaggai, when Rebbi Hila said to him, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man; this is what Rebbi Ze‘ira said. In the first Adar, Rebbi Hila died. In the second Adar, a case came before Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, and he wanted to rule following Rebbi Ḥaggai. Rebbi Samuel bar Immi told him, Rebbi Hila was wrong when he told you, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, a Mishnah supports him: “ ‘You married me preliminarily’, and he says, ‘I did not marry you preliminarily.’ He is permitted her relatives but she is forbidden his relatives.” Rebbi Borqai asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it the same with symphōn? He answered, a symphōn is not doubtful but the rules are identical for symphōn and preliminary marriage.
There, we have stated: “A person can impose a condition of his ‘eruv.” So is the Mishnah: “A person can impose a condition of his‘eruvin.” Rebbi Eleazar said, who is the Tanna of “if they came”, “if they did not come”? Rebbi Meïr! Which Rebbi Meïr? The colleagues say, Rebbi Meïr of Qiddušin. As it was stated: If somebody say to a woman: You are preliminarily married to me on condition that there will be rain. If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Meïr says, she is preliminarily married whether or not rain fell unless he doubled his condition. Everybody agrees that if he said, after rainfall, if it rained she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Yose said, it follows Rebbi Meïr in Eruvin, as we have stated there: “If it be in doubt, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say, he is a camel-donkey driver.” Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Meïr said this only as a restriction. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct. He cannot acquire his ‘eruv since he is not able to enjoy it. [Why not] like the people of his place? If he had decided to leave his place. And here, she is not preliminarily married to the first, since no rain came. She is not preliminarily married to the second, since [the first] did not double his condition. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this “if” not a reaction? He answered, there is a difference since the land was in their hand and he wanted to take it away from them.
There, we have stated: “A person can impose a condition of his ‘eruv.” So is the Mishnah: “A person can impose a condition of his‘eruvin.” Rebbi Eleazar said, who is the Tanna of “if they came”, “if they did not come”? Rebbi Meïr! Which Rebbi Meïr? The colleagues say, Rebbi Meïr of Qiddušin. As it was stated: If somebody say to a woman: You are preliminarily married to me on condition that there will be rain. If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Meïr says, she is preliminarily married whether or not rain fell unless he doubled his condition. Everybody agrees that if he said, after rainfall, if it rained she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Yose said, it follows Rebbi Meïr in Eruvin, as we have stated there: “If it be in doubt, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say, he is a camel-donkey driver.” Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Meïr said this only as a restriction. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct. He cannot acquire his ‘eruv since he is not able to enjoy it. [Why not] like the people of his place? If he had decided to leave his place. And here, she is not preliminarily married to the first, since no rain came. She is not preliminarily married to the second, since [the first] did not double his condition. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this “if” not a reaction? He answered, there is a difference since the land was in their hand and he wanted to take it away from them.
A person met another in the market place. He said to him, give me the linen which you hold for me. The other responded, give me the denar which you hold for me. The first said, give me the linen and deduct the denar. The case came before Rebbi Mana, who said to him, you admitted that you owe him a denar; he did not admit anything about the linen. Go and give him the denar! Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Immi will agree that this is not the law but that he obligated him lest the other deny his liability for the linen.
Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they were cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he divorced her; what is the situation?
It was stated: “If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard; Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon, the child is not a bastard, for a bastard is only from a woman forbidden to him by an incest prohibition for which the penalty is extirpation.” Both of them explained the same verse, “nobody may take his father’s wife, etc.” Rebbi Meïr explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that he cannot have preliminary marriage with her, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard, so in all cases in which she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard; this excludes the Gentile and the slave who cannot contract preliminary marriage with her or with others. Rebbi Samuel bar Abba questions that first Tanna: The sister-in-law who whored cannot have preliminary marriage with him or with others, but the child is qualified! Rebbi Yannai in the name of Rebbi: If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, in the name of Rebbi (Yannai ben) Rebbi: The child is neither qualified nor disqualified but dirtied. Rebbi Jonathan went with Rebbi Jehudah Neśia to the hot springs of Gadara. There, he instructed: The child is qualified. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this child improves as time goes by. Rebbi declared the child dirtied, his grandson declared him qualified. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda instructed in the name of all rabbis: The child is qualified. Rebbi Bevai said before Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The child is qualified. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it is from that, one does not learn from a declaration. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the story from beginning to end. Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina went up to the hot springs of Gadara. He visited his father who said to him: Be careful, because there are those who are disqualified, lest you injure them.
It is written: “The King said, I shall give.” “The King took the two sons of Riṣpah bat Ayah whom she had born to Saul, Admoni and Mephiboshet,” etc. “Michal, Saul’s daughter, did not have a child until the day of her death,” and you say so? Say now that they were sons of Merab but Michal raised them, so they were named after her. “He gave them into the hand of the Gibeonites who hanged them on the mountain before the Eternal; all seven fell together.” Defective without י. That refers to Mephiboshet ben Jonathan ben Saul, who was great in the Torah and David intended to save him from their hand. David said, I let them pass by the altar and anyone received by the altar will be mine. He let each pass by the altar, prayed for him, and the altar moved and received him. This is what is written: “I shall call to the Most High God, to the Power Who has the ultimate decision about me!” For the Holy One, praise to Him, agreed with David. “ They were killed on the first days of harvest;” it is written “the barley harvest.” “Riṣpah bat Ayah took a sack and laid it out on the rock.” What means: “On the rock”? Rebbi Hoshaia said, she was reciting: “The rock, perfect is His action.” Rebbi Abba bar Zamina in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Sanctification of the Name is greater than desecration of the Name. Referring to desecration of the Name it is written: “Do not leave his corpse on the gallows overnight.” But referring to sanctification of the Name it is written: “From the start of harvest until water was poured on them.” This teaches that they were hanging from the sixteenth of Nisan to the seventeenth of Marḥeshwan. The passers-by were saying: How did these people sin that the rules of justice were changed for them? They were answered: Because these had attacked attached proselytes. They would say that even for those who did not convert for the sake of Heaven, the Eternal avenged their blood; if one would convert for the sake of Heaven not so much more? There is no Power like your God and no people like your people. Many converts were converted at that time; that is what is written: “Solomon counted all proselytes and appointed from them 70’000 carriers and 80’000 hewers of stone in the mountains.”
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Three are trustworthy immediately: a midwife, a caravan, and the one who purifies her colleagues. A midwife: “The midwife took and wound a red string [around his hand] to indicate that this one was born first.” A caravan, as Rebbi Abba, the brother of Rebbi Jehudah bar Zavdi said in the name of Rav: As long as a baby lies in the public domain, either its father or its mother can testify about him. Once it was collected from the public domain, one needs two witnesses; its father and mother are like two witnesses. The one who purifies her colleagues, as we have stated there: “Three women sleep on one bed. If blood was found under one of them, all three are impure. If one of them checked herself out and found herself impure, she is impure and the other two are pure.” Rebbi Abba said, only within 24 hours.
There, we have stated: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-months’ child of the first [brother] or a seven-months’ of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for a possible sin.” It was stated: “The first son could be [High] Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.
There, we have stated: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-months’ child of the first [brother] or a seven-months’ of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for a possible sin.” It was stated: “The first son could be [High] Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says, this my son is a bastard, he cannot be believed,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody said, this is my son, he is to be believed.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: To give him, but not to take from him. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah: “Even if both of them say about the fetus in her belly that he is a bastard, they cannot be believed”? Maybe it was said following Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah said, they can be believed; Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: To give him, but not to take from him. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, still it is a baraita: “For he has to recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated one.” If they maintained that he was his son but at the moment of his death he said that he was not his son, he cannot be believed. That he was not his son but at the moment of his death he said that he was his son, he is believed. Some Tannaïm state on the first case that he is believed. Rebbi Ḥisqiah, Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Huna: If they maintained that he was from his slave girl, he is believed. If he was standing next to the customs collectors and said, he is my son, but later he said, he is my slave, he is believed. He is my slave, but later he said, he is my son, he is not believed. Some Tannaïm state, he is believed. Rebbi Mana said, because of those Samaritans who use their sons as slaves.
MISHNAH: If somebody empowered his agent to contract preliminary marriage for his daughter and then went himself and contracted for her, ifhe was first, his preliminary marriage is valid, but if his agent was first, that preliminary marriage is valid. If precedence cannot be established, both give a bill of divorce or, if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and one marries definitively. Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent to contract preliminary marriage for her and then went and contracted for herself, if she was first, her preliminary marriage is valid, but if her agent’s was first, that preliminary marriage is valid. If precedence cannot be established, both give a bill of divorce or, if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and one marries definitively.
MISHNAH: If somebody empowered his agent to contract preliminary marriage for his daughter and then went himself and contracted for her, ifhe was first, his preliminary marriage is valid, but if his agent was first, that preliminary marriage is valid. If precedence cannot be established, both give a bill of divorce or, if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and one marries definitively. Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent to contract preliminary marriage for her and then went and contracted for herself, if she was first, her preliminary marriage is valid, but if her agent’s was first, that preliminary marriage is valid. If precedence cannot be established, both give a bill of divorce or, if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and one marries definitively.
MISHNAH: If somebody empowered his agent to contract preliminary marriage for his daughter and then went himself and contracted for her, ifhe was first, his preliminary marriage is valid, but if his agent was first, that preliminary marriage is valid. If precedence cannot be established, both give a bill of divorce or, if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and one marries definitively. Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent to contract preliminary marriage for her and then went and contracted for herself, if she was first, her preliminary marriage is valid, but if her agent’s was first, that preliminary marriage is valid. If precedence cannot be established, both give a bill of divorce or, if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and one marries definitively.
MISHNAH: If somebody empowered his agent to contract preliminary marriage for his daughter and then went himself and contracted for her, ifhe was first, his preliminary marriage is valid, but if his agent was first, that preliminary marriage is valid. If precedence cannot be established, both give a bill of divorce or, if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and one marries definitively. Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent to contract preliminary marriage for her and then went and contracted for herself, if she was first, her preliminary marriage is valid, but if her agent’s was first, that preliminary marriage is valid. If precedence cannot be established, both give a bill of divorce or, if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and one marries definitively.
Rebbi Yose said: This means that a person who injured another first has to pay even if he later becomes injured, as is written: “He who injures an animal has to pay for it,” he has to pay the diminution in value.
MISHNAH: How is the foot notorious to break anything in its way? An animal is notorious to break anything in its way. If it was kicking or if pebbles were ricocheting from under its feet and breaking vessels, he pays half of the damage. If it stepped on a vessel and broke it when [the pieces] fell on another vessel and broke that, for the first he pays full damages and half damages for the last.
HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.