forbidden
3597 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: Two deaf-mute brothers married to two deaf-mute sisters, or two hearing sisters, or two sisters of whom one is deaf-mute, the other hearing; or two deaf-mute sisters married to two deaf-mute brothers, or two hearing brothers, or two brothers of whom one is deaf-mute, these are free from ḥalîṣah and levirate. If the women are unrelated, they must marry them, and, if they want to, they may send them away. Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two hearing sisters. If the deaf-mute married to the hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife do? [The widow] has to leave as the wife’s sister. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute married to the hearing wife do? He divorces his wife by a bill of divorce; his brother’s widow is permanently forbidden.
MISHNAH: Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two sisters, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to a hearing wife do? [The widow] has to leave as the wife’s sister. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He removes his wife by a bill of divorce; his brother’s wife is permanently forbidden.
MISHNAH: If a woman went overseas with her husband and she returns and says “my husband died”, she can remarry and collect her ketubah, but her co-wife remains forbidden. If she was the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen, she should eat heave, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove her from sin unless she be forbidden to remarry and forbidden to eat heave.
MISHNAH: If a woman went overseas with her husband and she returns and says “my husband died”, she can remarry and collect her ketubah, but her co-wife remains forbidden. If she was the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen, she should eat heave, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove her from sin unless she be forbidden to remarry and forbidden to eat heave.
MISHNAH: If a woman went overseas with her husband and she returns and says “my husband died”, she can remarry and collect her ketubah, but her co-wife remains forbidden. If she was the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen, she should eat heave, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove her from sin unless she be forbidden to remarry and forbidden to eat heave.
MISHNAH: If a woman went overseas with her husband and she returns and says “my husband died and then my father-in-law died”, she can remarry and collect her ketubah, but her mother-in-law remains forbidden. If she was the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen, she should eat heave, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove her from sin unless she be forbidden to remarry and forbidden to eat heave.
MISHNAH: If a woman went overseas with her husband and she returns and says “my husband died and then my father-in-law died”, she can remarry and collect her ketubah, but her mother-in-law remains forbidden. If she was the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen, she should eat heave, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove her from sin unless she be forbidden to remarry and forbidden to eat heave.
MISHNAH: If a woman went overseas with her husband and she returns and says “my husband died and then my father-in-law died”, she can remarry and collect her ketubah, but her mother-in-law remains forbidden. If she was the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen, she should eat heave, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove her from sin unless she be forbidden to remarry and forbidden to eat heave.
MISHNAH: If each one of two sisters-in-law says “my husband died”, each one is forbidden because of the other’s husband. If one has witnesses but the other has no witnesses, the one who has witnesses is forbidden but the one who has no witnesses is permitted. If one has children but the other has no children, the one who has children is permitted but the one who has no children is forbidden. If they married in levirate but the levirs died, they are forbidden to remarry. Rebbi Eleazar said, since they were permitted to the levirs, they became permitted to any man.
MISHNAH: If each one of two sisters-in-law says “my husband died”, each one is forbidden because of the other’s husband. If one has witnesses but the other has no witnesses, the one who has witnesses is forbidden but the one who has no witnesses is permitted. If one has children but the other has no children, the one who has children is permitted but the one who has no children is forbidden. If they married in levirate but the levirs died, they are forbidden to remarry. Rebbi Eleazar said, since they were permitted to the levirs, they became permitted to any man.
MISHNAH: If each one of two sisters-in-law says “my husband died”, each one is forbidden because of the other’s husband. If one has witnesses but the other has no witnesses, the one who has witnesses is forbidden but the one who has no witnesses is permitted. If one has children but the other has no children, the one who has children is permitted but the one who has no children is forbidden. If they married in levirate but the levirs died, they are forbidden to remarry. Rebbi Eleazar said, since they were permitted to the levirs, they became permitted to any man.
MISHNAH: If each one of two sisters-in-law says “my husband died”, each one is forbidden because of the other’s husband. If one has witnesses but the other has no witnesses, the one who has witnesses is forbidden but the one who has no witnesses is permitted. If one has children but the other has no children, the one who has children is permitted but the one who has no children is forbidden. If they married in levirate but the levirs died, they are forbidden to remarry. Rebbi Eleazar said, since they were permitted to the levirs, they became permitted to any man.
What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? Is it because she is not suspected to cause trouble [to herself in order later to cause trouble to her co-wife or because she is not suspected to cause any trouble] to her co-wife? Let us hear from the following: “If a woman went overseas with her husband and returns and says ‘my husband died’, she can remarry and collect her ketubah, but her co-wife remains forbidden.” We explain it, saying that she is suspected to cause trouble to herself in order to cause trouble to her co-wife, and Rebbi Eleazar does not disagree. It is impossible that the reason be that she is not suspected to cause any trouble to her co-wife. We could suspect that perhaps her husband sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Think of it, what if her [next] husband was a Cohen? Rebbi Abba bar Rebbi Zemina said, she is suspected to produce several desecrated children in order to make bastards of her co-wife’s children.
MISHNAH: If he fell into water, both enclosed and open, his wife is forbidden. Rebbi Meїr said, if happened that someone fell into a large cistern and came up after three days. Rebbi Yose said, it happened with a blind man who went to immerse himself in a cave, and his guide went after him, they stayed there the time to die [from drowning] and they permitted their wives to remarry. It also happened in Assos that one lowered a person into the sea and only his leg was recovered. The Sages said, if from the knee and higher, she can remarry, from lower than the knee she cannot remarry.
HALAKHAH: “If he fell into water, both enclosed and open, his wife is forbidden, the words of Rebbi Meĩr. But the Sages say, in open waters his wife is forbidden, in enclosed waters, his wife is permitted.” Rebbi Meїr said, it happened that someone fell into a large cistern and came up after three days. They said to him, one does not mention wonders. Rebbi said, it happened that two went to put fish nets into the Jordan in the evening. One of them saw a fish cave and entered it. When he wanted to leave, he was unable to find the cave’s entrance. His colleague waited at the entrance of the cave so long that he would be dead; he returned and reported to his house. Next morning when the sun shone, the man recognized the entrance of the cave, left, and found his house in mourning. Rebbi Aqiba said, It happened that I was traveling on the ocean that I saw a ship sinking. I was sorry for a student Sage who was on that ship. When I came to Kappadocian Mazaga he greated me and asked me questions. I said to him, my son, how did you escape? He told me, Rabbi, one wave tore me to another, and another to another, until it vomited me onto dry land. Then I said, how great are the words of the Sages who said, in open waters his wife is forbidden, in enclosed waters, his wife is permitted.
HALAKHAH: “If he fell into water, both enclosed and open, his wife is forbidden, the words of Rebbi Meĩr. But the Sages say, in open waters his wife is forbidden, in enclosed waters, his wife is permitted.” Rebbi Meїr said, it happened that someone fell into a large cistern and came up after three days. They said to him, one does not mention wonders. Rebbi said, it happened that two went to put fish nets into the Jordan in the evening. One of them saw a fish cave and entered it. When he wanted to leave, he was unable to find the cave’s entrance. His colleague waited at the entrance of the cave so long that he would be dead; he returned and reported to his house. Next morning when the sun shone, the man recognized the entrance of the cave, left, and found his house in mourning. Rebbi Aqiba said, It happened that I was traveling on the ocean that I saw a ship sinking. I was sorry for a student Sage who was on that ship. When I came to Kappadocian Mazaga he greated me and asked me questions. I said to him, my son, how did you escape? He told me, Rabbi, one wave tore me to another, and another to another, until it vomited me onto dry land. Then I said, how great are the words of the Sages who said, in open waters his wife is forbidden, in enclosed waters, his wife is permitted.
HALAKHAH: “If he fell into water, both enclosed and open, his wife is forbidden, the words of Rebbi Meĩr. But the Sages say, in open waters his wife is forbidden, in enclosed waters, his wife is permitted.” Rebbi Meїr said, it happened that someone fell into a large cistern and came up after three days. They said to him, one does not mention wonders. Rebbi said, it happened that two went to put fish nets into the Jordan in the evening. One of them saw a fish cave and entered it. When he wanted to leave, he was unable to find the cave’s entrance. His colleague waited at the entrance of the cave so long that he would be dead; he returned and reported to his house. Next morning when the sun shone, the man recognized the entrance of the cave, left, and found his house in mourning. Rebbi Aqiba said, It happened that I was traveling on the ocean that I saw a ship sinking. I was sorry for a student Sage who was on that ship. When I came to Kappadocian Mazaga he greated me and asked me questions. I said to him, my son, how did you escape? He told me, Rabbi, one wave tore me to another, and another to another, until it vomited me onto dry land. Then I said, how great are the words of the Sages who said, in open waters his wife is forbidden, in enclosed waters, his wife is permitted.
MISHNAH: How does he declare his jealousy? If he said to her in front of two [witnesses]: Do not speak with the man X, and she spoke with him, she still is permitted to her house and to eat heave. If she enters a hidden room together with him and remains there long enough for impurity, she is forbidden to her house and forbidden to eat heave; if he dies she needs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.
MISHNAH: How does he declare his jealousy? If he said to her in front of two [witnesses]: Do not speak with the man X, and she spoke with him, she still is permitted to her house and to eat heave. If she enters a hidden room together with him and remains there long enough for impurity, she is forbidden to her house and forbidden to eat heave; if he dies she needs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.
“They asked Ben Zoma: Why is a doubt in a private domain considered impure? He said to them: Where is the suspected wife? In a private domain. He said to them, we find that she is forbidden for her house.” The words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An underage girl who whored has no will to be forbidden to her husband. But did we not state: “In any case where there is no mind to be asked, the doubtful case is pure”? Therefore, if there is a mind to be asked, the doubtful case is impure. But here, even while there is a mind to be asked, the doubtful case is pure! “Why is a doubt in a public domain considered pure? He said to them: We find that the public prepare their Passah [as in] purity when most of them are impure. If known impurity was permitted in public, so much more for a case of doubtful impurity.”
“They asked Ben Zoma: Why is a doubt in a private domain considered impure? He said to them: Where is the suspected wife? In a private domain. He said to them, we find that she is forbidden for her house.” The words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An underage girl who whored has no will to be forbidden to her husband. But did we not state: “In any case where there is no mind to be asked, the doubtful case is pure”? Therefore, if there is a mind to be asked, the doubtful case is impure. But here, even while there is a mind to be asked, the doubtful case is pure! “Why is a doubt in a public domain considered pure? He said to them: We find that the public prepare their Passah [as in] purity when most of them are impure. If known impurity was permitted in public, so much more for a case of doubtful impurity.”
It was stated: Rebbi said, three times is “impurity” said in the paragraph, one for the husband, one for the paramour, and one for heave. For heave? Do we find that a woman is forbidden to her house and permitted to eat heave? Why not? If the daughter of a Cohen was married to an Israel and raped, is she not permitted to her house but forbidden heave? We never find that a woman is forbidden to her house and permitted to eat heave! Rebbi Abin said, it was said: One for the husband, one for the paramour, and one for the levir. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah says so: “If he dies she needs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.”
It was stated: Rebbi said, three times is “impurity” said in the paragraph, one for the husband, one for the paramour, and one for heave. For heave? Do we find that a woman is forbidden to her house and permitted to eat heave? Why not? If the daughter of a Cohen was married to an Israel and raped, is she not permitted to her house but forbidden heave? We never find that a woman is forbidden to her house and permitted to eat heave! Rebbi Abin said, it was said: One for the husband, one for the paramour, and one for the levir. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah says so: “If he dies she needs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.”
It was stated: Rebbi said, three times is “impurity” said in the paragraph, one for the husband, one for the paramour, and one for heave. For heave? Do we find that a woman is forbidden to her house and permitted to eat heave? Why not? If the daughter of a Cohen was married to an Israel and raped, is she not permitted to her house but forbidden heave? We never find that a woman is forbidden to her house and permitted to eat heave! Rebbi Abin said, it was said: One for the husband, one for the paramour, and one for the levir. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah says so: “If he dies she needs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.”
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
It was stated: “‘Except your husband,” which excludes that other semen preceded your husband’s. Rebbi Hila said, parallel what has been said, “except the morning elevation offering.” But did we not state: “Just as the water examines her, so the water examines him. Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water examines her for every intercourse in which she receives her husband after [she had slept with] her paramour, so it examines him? Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: Here, if he knows, there, if he does not know.
It was stated: “‘Except your husband,” which excludes that other semen preceded your husband’s. Rebbi Hila said, parallel what has been said, “except the morning elevation offering.” But did we not state: “Just as the water examines her, so the water examines him. Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water examines her for every intercourse in which she receives her husband after [she had slept with] her paramour, so it examines him? Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: Here, if he knows, there, if he does not know.
It was stated: “‘Except your husband,” which excludes that other semen preceded your husband’s. Rebbi Hila said, parallel what has been said, “except the morning elevation offering.” But did we not state: “Just as the water examines her, so the water examines him. Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water examines her for every intercourse in which she receives her husband after [she had slept with] her paramour, so it examines him? Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: Here, if he knows, there, if he does not know.
It was stated: “‘Except your husband,” which excludes that other semen preceded your husband’s. Rebbi Hila said, parallel what has been said, “except the morning elevation offering.” But did we not state: “Just as the water examines her, so the water examines him. Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water examines her for every intercourse in which she receives her husband after [she had slept with] her paramour, so it examines him? Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: Here, if he knows, there, if he does not know.
It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, her husband is believed about her by an argument de minore ad majus. Since he is believed about her when she is menstruating, when he would be subject to extirpation because of her, but for this one he is not subject to extirpation because of her, is it not logical that he should be believed about her? They said to him, no. If you mention the menstruating, she will be permitted after being forbidden, what can you say about this one who may not be permitted after being forbidden? And it says, “stolen waters are sweet”. Rebbi Jehudah said to them, it is a decree of the verse: “The man shall bring his wife to the priest”, etc. They said to him, only with witnesses.
It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, her husband is believed about her by an argument de minore ad majus. Since he is believed about her when she is menstruating, when he would be subject to extirpation because of her, but for this one he is not subject to extirpation because of her, is it not logical that he should be believed about her? They said to him, no. If you mention the menstruating, she will be permitted after being forbidden, what can you say about this one who may not be permitted after being forbidden? And it says, “stolen waters are sweet”. Rebbi Jehudah said to them, it is a decree of the verse: “The man shall bring his wife to the priest”, etc. They said to him, only with witnesses.
May her husband dedicate for her without her knowledge? Since he is a partner in the flour offering, may he dedicate for her without her knowledge? May another person dedicate for her without her knowledge? It comes following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, for the four who need cleansing others may dedicate without their knowledge; these are the following: Man or woman [healed from] genital discharges, one [healed from] scale disease, and the woman after childbirth; since a father may dedicate for his small son who is lying in a crib. One understands man or woman [healed from] genital discharges or [healed from] scale disease, but a woman after childbirth? May a minor give birth? Did not Rebbi Redifa, Rebbi Jonah, say in the name of Rebbi Hila: If a woman became pregnant and gave birth before she grew two hairs, she and her son will die. After she grew two hairs, she and her son will live. If she became pregnant before she grew two hairs and gave birth after she grew two hairs, she will live but her son will die. How is the situation? Since a man may dedicate for his underage daughter. Since she grew [pubic hair] she already left his power. But it must be since a man may dedicate for his deaf-mute wife. Here, in the case of the suspected wife, the case of the minor does not apply since Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An underage girl who whored has no will to be forbidden to her husband. The case of the deaf-mute does not apply since it is written: “The woman shall say: Amen, amen.” Rebbi Abin said, since it is written: “You shall enjoy together with your house,” and he is the cause that he cannot enjoy with her, he may dedicate without her knowledge.
Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, who stated “the one waiting for her levir”? Rebbi Aqiba! For Rebbi Aqiba said, there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law. Rebbi Ilai said to him, why should a bastard be relevant for jealousy? The Torah said: “He shall declare his jealousy to his wife”, even a partial wife. Rebbi Shammai said, did not Rebbi Yannai say the following: More than 30 Elders voted, from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man, her levir shall come to her”, that she cannot have any existence with another man. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law! Could he not object: Why should a bastard be relevant for jealousy? The Torah said: “He shall declare his jealousy to his wife”, even a partial wife. A woman waiting for her levir who whored, Rebbi Eleazar said she is permitted to her house, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said she is forbidden to her house. What do the rabbis say? Rebbi Mana said, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to [the levir], since we have stated: “This is the rule: He cannot stipulate about any intercourse she could have had and would not be forbidden to him.”
Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, who stated “the one waiting for her levir”? Rebbi Aqiba! For Rebbi Aqiba said, there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law. Rebbi Ilai said to him, why should a bastard be relevant for jealousy? The Torah said: “He shall declare his jealousy to his wife”, even a partial wife. Rebbi Shammai said, did not Rebbi Yannai say the following: More than 30 Elders voted, from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man, her levir shall come to her”, that she cannot have any existence with another man. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law! Could he not object: Why should a bastard be relevant for jealousy? The Torah said: “He shall declare his jealousy to his wife”, even a partial wife. A woman waiting for her levir who whored, Rebbi Eleazar said she is permitted to her house, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said she is forbidden to her house. What do the rabbis say? Rebbi Mana said, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to [the levir], since we have stated: “This is the rule: He cannot stipulate about any intercourse she could have had and would not be forbidden to him.”
How could one state this Mishnah? Not the rabbis nor Rebbi Aqiba! But it is as follows. He who says that she is permitted to her house [follows] the rabbis against Rebbi Aqiba. He who says that she is forbidden to her house [follows] Rebbi Aqiba against the rabbis. Rebbi Yannai said, a woman waiting for her levir who whored is permitted to her house. One had stated this: “It was hidden from her husband’s eyes,” not from her levir’s eyes. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: It happened, she was the wife of a Cohen, and they permitted her to her house. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, no whipping is involved.
There, we have stated: “One does not make the proselyte drink, etc. But the Sages say, one makes her drink.” Where do we hold? If about an Israel who married a proselyte, it already is written: “The sons of Israel” (not proselytes). If about a proselyte who married a Jewish girl, it already is written: “The man has to bring his wife to the Cohen.” But we must hold about a proselyte who married a proselyte. What is the reason of Rebbi Aqiba? “The children of Israel”, not proselytes. What is the reason of the Sages? “You shall say to them”, to add everything written in that paragraph. What is written in that paragraph? “A man slept with her”. His lying with her makes her forbidden, then her husband declares his jealousy and makes her drink.
MISHNAH: Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced. If she was secluded after that, became impure, and after that he took her back, he cannot stipulate with her. This is the rule: He cannot stipulate about any intercourse she could have had and would not be forbidden to him.
HALAKHAH: “Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, it is obvious that a man may forgive about his jealousy. If he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven. How is that? If he had declared his jealousy, divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place. If you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven, he has to declare his jealousy a second time. But if you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had not forgiven, he does not have to declare his jealousy a second time. But if he had declared his jealousy, she was at a secluded place and he knew it, then he divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place, if she drank and the water did nothing to her, she is pure. Or maybe that since the water does not check out a woman forbidden to her husband, she might be impure.
“And if the woman was not impure but was pure,” this refers to the one who is pure, not that there came witnesses declaring her impure. “If the woman was not impure but was pure,” this refers to the one who is pure, not one whose merit suspended [punishment] for her. This follows the one who said that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who said that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Rebbi Isaac said, here we deal with one who drank and the water did not test her. It comes to tell you that the water will not test a woman who is forbidden to her house. Rebbi Yudan said, this follows the one who said that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. Why was it not recognized? Because merit suspended for her. “The man will be free of sin,” he should not worry that maybe merit suspended for her. Should I think that she also should not worry? The verse said, “but that woman shall carry her sin”. [This interpretation] follows the one who said that merit suspends and it is not recognizable.
It was stated: If her offering became impure before the fistful was sacrificed; if she died or her husband died, the rest is forbidden because it was brought from the start to resolve a doubt. Her doubt was atoned for and went away. If there came witnesses declaring that she was impure, in any case her offering is forbidden. What means “in any case”? Whether the fistful was taken or not, whether it was sacrificed or not. Rebbi Hila said, whether the fistful was taken or not as long as it was not sacrificed, but if it was sacrificed the rest is permitted.
It was stated: If her offering became impure before the fistful was sacrificed; if she died or her husband died, the rest is forbidden because it was brought from the start to resolve a doubt. Her doubt was atoned for and went away. If there came witnesses declaring that she was impure, in any case her offering is forbidden. What means “in any case”? Whether the fistful was taken or not, whether it was sacrificed or not. Rebbi Hila said, whether the fistful was taken or not as long as it was not sacrificed, but if it was sacrificed the rest is permitted.
We have stated there: “Rebbi Simeon says, a fistful is taken from the sinner’s flour offering of a Cohen. The fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest is sacrificed separately.” Both of them explained the same verse: “It shall be the Cohen’s as a flour offering.” The rabbis say, it is like his voluntary flour offering. Since his voluntary flour offering is brought entire, that one also is brought entire. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” The rest, under which category is it brought, under the rules of a fistful or under the rules of remainders? If you want to say, under the rules of a fistful, one cannot bring them during the night, one cannot bring them after death, and he is forbidden to think about them. If you want to say, under the rules of a remainder, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death. Is he forbidden to think about them? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, the fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest dispersed over the ashes. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, where are we holding? If the upper ashes, Rebbi Simeon already said it. If it cannot refer to the upper ashes, let it refer to the lower ashes. That means, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death, and he can think about them. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is forbidden to think about them since they are not qualified as food either for humans or for the altar. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: Does Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follow the rules of his father or the rules of the rabbis? According to the rules of his father, it should be brought on top [of the altar]. According to the rules of the rabbis, why should he take a fistful? He follows his father’s rules. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” Then it should be burned totally! You bound it to “it shall not be eaten”; you did not bind it to “it has to be sacrificed in its entirety.”
We have stated there: “Rebbi Simeon says, a fistful is taken from the sinner’s flour offering of a Cohen. The fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest is sacrificed separately.” Both of them explained the same verse: “It shall be the Cohen’s as a flour offering.” The rabbis say, it is like his voluntary flour offering. Since his voluntary flour offering is brought entire, that one also is brought entire. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” The rest, under which category is it brought, under the rules of a fistful or under the rules of remainders? If you want to say, under the rules of a fistful, one cannot bring them during the night, one cannot bring them after death, and he is forbidden to think about them. If you want to say, under the rules of a remainder, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death. Is he forbidden to think about them? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, the fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest dispersed over the ashes. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, where are we holding? If the upper ashes, Rebbi Simeon already said it. If it cannot refer to the upper ashes, let it refer to the lower ashes. That means, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death, and he can think about them. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is forbidden to think about them since they are not qualified as food either for humans or for the altar. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: Does Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follow the rules of his father or the rules of the rabbis? According to the rules of his father, it should be brought on top [of the altar]. According to the rules of the rabbis, why should he take a fistful? He follows his father’s rules. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” Then it should be burned totally! You bound it to “it shall not be eaten”; you did not bind it to “it has to be sacrificed in its entirety.”
We have stated there: “Rebbi Simeon says, a fistful is taken from the sinner’s flour offering of a Cohen. The fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest is sacrificed separately.” Both of them explained the same verse: “It shall be the Cohen’s as a flour offering.” The rabbis say, it is like his voluntary flour offering. Since his voluntary flour offering is brought entire, that one also is brought entire. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” The rest, under which category is it brought, under the rules of a fistful or under the rules of remainders? If you want to say, under the rules of a fistful, one cannot bring them during the night, one cannot bring them after death, and he is forbidden to think about them. If you want to say, under the rules of a remainder, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death. Is he forbidden to think about them? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, the fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest dispersed over the ashes. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, where are we holding? If the upper ashes, Rebbi Simeon already said it. If it cannot refer to the upper ashes, let it refer to the lower ashes. That means, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death, and he can think about them. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is forbidden to think about them since they are not qualified as food either for humans or for the altar. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: Does Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follow the rules of his father or the rules of the rabbis? According to the rules of his father, it should be brought on top [of the altar]. According to the rules of the rabbis, why should he take a fistful? He follows his father’s rules. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” Then it should be burned totally! You bound it to “it shall not be eaten”; you did not bind it to “it has to be sacrificed in its entirety.”
“A Cohen’s daughter may defile herself for the dead.” Rebbi Dosa from Malḥiyya, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: A Cohen’s daughter is permitted to leave the Land. What is the reason? “Say to the Cohanim.” Not to the daughters of Cohanim. If it were not so, what would he say? Because she is included in the decree, she cannot leave. Why should she not be included in the decree and be forbidden to leave? If you say so, you push aside the paragraph on impurities.
HALAKHAH: “A Cohen’s wife drinks,” etc. Otherwise, what could we say? She drank and the water had no influence on her; she is pure! I could say, merit suspended for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Rebbi Isaac said, really we deal with the case that she drank and the water had no influence on her; that you should not say since the water has no influence on a rape victim, but only on a seduced woman, this one is a rape victim. But a rape victim in the priesthood is like a willing one for an Israel, therefore it is necessary to say that she is permitted to her house. From where that rape disables a married woman in the priesthood? Since in matters of crawling things, which are a trifling matter, He made forced [impurity] equal to intentional [impurity], in the weighty matter of the deviant not so much more? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi stated before Rebbi Jonathan: “If you deviated from under your husband and became defiled,” that excludes rape. How do you understand this? He said to him, just as “under your husband” is by consent, so “if you became defiled” is by consent. “She was not raped”, she is forbidden. Therefore, if she was raped, she is permitted. But there is a rape victim which is forbidden for an Israel. Who is that? That is one who started by consent and ended up raped. And there is one who is not a rape victim which is permitted to an Israel. Who is that? That is one who started as a rape victim and ended up consenting. Like that woman who came to Rebbi Joḥanan and said to him, I was raped. He said to her, but was it not sweet to you in the end? She said to him, if a person dips a finger into honey and puts it into his mouth on the Day of Atonement, does he not feel bad about it and at the end it is sweet? He accepted her.
HALAKHAH: “A Cohen’s wife drinks,” etc. Otherwise, what could we say? She drank and the water had no influence on her; she is pure! I could say, merit suspended for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Rebbi Isaac said, really we deal with the case that she drank and the water had no influence on her; that you should not say since the water has no influence on a rape victim, but only on a seduced woman, this one is a rape victim. But a rape victim in the priesthood is like a willing one for an Israel, therefore it is necessary to say that she is permitted to her house. From where that rape disables a married woman in the priesthood? Since in matters of crawling things, which are a trifling matter, He made forced [impurity] equal to intentional [impurity], in the weighty matter of the deviant not so much more? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi stated before Rebbi Jonathan: “If you deviated from under your husband and became defiled,” that excludes rape. How do you understand this? He said to him, just as “under your husband” is by consent, so “if you became defiled” is by consent. “She was not raped”, she is forbidden. Therefore, if she was raped, she is permitted. But there is a rape victim which is forbidden for an Israel. Who is that? That is one who started by consent and ended up raped. And there is one who is not a rape victim which is permitted to an Israel. Who is that? That is one who started as a rape victim and ended up consenting. Like that woman who came to Rebbi Joḥanan and said to him, I was raped. He said to her, but was it not sweet to you in the end? She said to him, if a person dips a finger into honey and puts it into his mouth on the Day of Atonement, does he not feel bad about it and at the end it is sweet? He accepted her.
MISHNAH: Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out, as it is said, “it will come, it will come”. Just as she is forbidden to the husband so she is forbidden to her paramour as it is said, “she was impure, she was impure,” the words of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua said, that was the inference of Zachariah the butcher’s son. Rebbi said, the two times it said, “she became impure, she became impure,” once for the husband and once for the paramour.
MISHNAH: Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out, as it is said, “it will come, it will come”. Just as she is forbidden to the husband so she is forbidden to her paramour as it is said, “she was impure, she was impure,” the words of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua said, that was the inference of Zachariah the butcher’s son. Rebbi said, the two times it said, “she became impure, she became impure,” once for the husband and once for the paramour.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
A Mishnah supports Rav: “Profane food which is impure primarily is impure and defiles, secondarily it invalidates but does not defile, but the tertiary can be eaten in heave broth.” This implies that it is forbidden to turn it into heave. And it is said after that: “Heave which is impure primarily or secondarily is impure and defiles, tertiarily impure it invalidates but does not defile, but the fourth degree can be eaten in sacrificial broth.” If you say that it is forbidden to turn it into sacrificial food, you would find that Rav’s statements are contradictory since Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but the fourth degree can be turned into sacrificial food, because they spoke about fourth degree [of impurity] for sacrifices only for dedicated sacrifices of the Temple! Rebbi Ḥuna said, are we not talking about heave? But it is forbidden to turn heave into sacrificial food in order to avoid accidents! And it was said after that: “Sacrifices which are impure primarily, secondarily, or tertiarily are impure and defile, impurity in the fourth degree invalidates but does not defile, but the fifth degree can be eaten in sacrificial broth.” If you say, it is forbidden to turn it into sacrificial food, is there any impurity of the fifth degree in sacrifices? But you say there is not. So here also, there is not.
A Mishnah supports Rav: “Profane food which is impure primarily is impure and defiles, secondarily it invalidates but does not defile, but the tertiary can be eaten in heave broth.” This implies that it is forbidden to turn it into heave. And it is said after that: “Heave which is impure primarily or secondarily is impure and defiles, tertiarily impure it invalidates but does not defile, but the fourth degree can be eaten in sacrificial broth.” If you say that it is forbidden to turn it into sacrificial food, you would find that Rav’s statements are contradictory since Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but the fourth degree can be turned into sacrificial food, because they spoke about fourth degree [of impurity] for sacrifices only for dedicated sacrifices of the Temple! Rebbi Ḥuna said, are we not talking about heave? But it is forbidden to turn heave into sacrificial food in order to avoid accidents! And it was said after that: “Sacrifices which are impure primarily, secondarily, or tertiarily are impure and defile, impurity in the fourth degree invalidates but does not defile, but the fifth degree can be eaten in sacrificial broth.” If you say, it is forbidden to turn it into sacrificial food, is there any impurity of the fifth degree in sacrifices? But you say there is not. So here also, there is not.
A Mishnah supports Rav: “Profane food which is impure primarily is impure and defiles, secondarily it invalidates but does not defile, but the tertiary can be eaten in heave broth.” This implies that it is forbidden to turn it into heave. And it is said after that: “Heave which is impure primarily or secondarily is impure and defiles, tertiarily impure it invalidates but does not defile, but the fourth degree can be eaten in sacrificial broth.” If you say that it is forbidden to turn it into sacrificial food, you would find that Rav’s statements are contradictory since Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but the fourth degree can be turned into sacrificial food, because they spoke about fourth degree [of impurity] for sacrifices only for dedicated sacrifices of the Temple! Rebbi Ḥuna said, are we not talking about heave? But it is forbidden to turn heave into sacrificial food in order to avoid accidents! And it was said after that: “Sacrifices which are impure primarily, secondarily, or tertiarily are impure and defile, impurity in the fourth degree invalidates but does not defile, but the fifth degree can be eaten in sacrificial broth.” If you say, it is forbidden to turn it into sacrificial food, is there any impurity of the fifth degree in sacrifices? But you say there is not. So here also, there is not.
A Mishnah supports Rav: “Profane food which is impure primarily is impure and defiles, secondarily it invalidates but does not defile, but the tertiary can be eaten in heave broth.” This implies that it is forbidden to turn it into heave. And it is said after that: “Heave which is impure primarily or secondarily is impure and defiles, tertiarily impure it invalidates but does not defile, but the fourth degree can be eaten in sacrificial broth.” If you say that it is forbidden to turn it into sacrificial food, you would find that Rav’s statements are contradictory since Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but the fourth degree can be turned into sacrificial food, because they spoke about fourth degree [of impurity] for sacrifices only for dedicated sacrifices of the Temple! Rebbi Ḥuna said, are we not talking about heave? But it is forbidden to turn heave into sacrificial food in order to avoid accidents! And it was said after that: “Sacrifices which are impure primarily, secondarily, or tertiarily are impure and defile, impurity in the fourth degree invalidates but does not defile, but the fifth degree can be eaten in sacrificial broth.” If you say, it is forbidden to turn it into sacrificial food, is there any impurity of the fifth degree in sacrifices? But you say there is not. So here also, there is not.
Rebbi Joḥanan said: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave. They asked before him: Even for Rebbi Aqiba? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Even following Rebbi Aqiba. And why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Just as the ṭevul yom does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave, so secondary impurity does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The tertiary comes because of the reptile, and it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave but (permitted) [forbidden] to turn it into sacrificial food. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: It defiles sacrifices and you say so? He said to him, because of the distinction. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Isaac said, the source of its impurity is the distinction. Rebbi Yose said, why does it defile sacrifices? Because of the distinction. Rebbi Yudan said, even for the rabbis who say that there is no tertiary in profane food, why is it forbidden? It defiles sacrifices because of the distinction. Rebbi Yose said to him, do we not need to hear this from a great personality?
Rebbi Joḥanan said: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave. They asked before him: Even for Rebbi Aqiba? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Even following Rebbi Aqiba. And why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Just as the ṭevul yom does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave, so secondary impurity does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The tertiary comes because of the reptile, and it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave but (permitted) [forbidden] to turn it into sacrificial food. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: It defiles sacrifices and you say so? He said to him, because of the distinction. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Isaac said, the source of its impurity is the distinction. Rebbi Yose said, why does it defile sacrifices? Because of the distinction. Rebbi Yudan said, even for the rabbis who say that there is no tertiary in profane food, why is it forbidden? It defiles sacrifices because of the distinction. Rebbi Yose said to him, do we not need to hear this from a great personality?
Rebbi Joḥanan said: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave. They asked before him: Even for Rebbi Aqiba? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Even following Rebbi Aqiba. And why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Just as the ṭevul yom does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave, so secondary impurity does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The tertiary comes because of the reptile, and it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave but (permitted) [forbidden] to turn it into sacrificial food. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: It defiles sacrifices and you say so? He said to him, because of the distinction. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Isaac said, the source of its impurity is the distinction. Rebbi Yose said, why does it defile sacrifices? Because of the distinction. Rebbi Yudan said, even for the rabbis who say that there is no tertiary in profane food, why is it forbidden? It defiles sacrifices because of the distinction. Rebbi Yose said to him, do we not need to hear this from a great personality?
Rebbi Joḥanan said: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave. They asked before him: Even for Rebbi Aqiba? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Even following Rebbi Aqiba. And why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Just as the ṭevul yom does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave, so secondary impurity does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The tertiary comes because of the reptile, and it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave but (permitted) [forbidden] to turn it into sacrificial food. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: It defiles sacrifices and you say so? He said to him, because of the distinction. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Isaac said, the source of its impurity is the distinction. Rebbi Yose said, why does it defile sacrifices? Because of the distinction. Rebbi Yudan said, even for the rabbis who say that there is no tertiary in profane food, why is it forbidden? It defiles sacrifices because of the distinction. Rebbi Yose said to him, do we not need to hear this from a great personality?
HALAKHAH: “As it was said further,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, anybody who is not in the position of those [men] who had the power to object, should not object. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Just as it is a commandment to speak on things that will be done, so it is a commandment not to talk about things that would not be done. Rebbi Eleazar said, just as it is forbidden to declare the impure pure, so it is forbidden to declare the pure impure. Rebbi Abba bar Jacob in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a practical case comes before you and you do not know whether to burn or to suspend, always prefer burning to suspension since nothing is more beloved in the Torah than burned oxen and burned rams, and they are burned. Rebbi Yose asked: Does one infer something which is not commanded from something which is commanded?
HALAKHAH: “As it was said further,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, anybody who is not in the position of those [men] who had the power to object, should not object. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Just as it is a commandment to speak on things that will be done, so it is a commandment not to talk about things that would not be done. Rebbi Eleazar said, just as it is forbidden to declare the impure pure, so it is forbidden to declare the pure impure. Rebbi Abba bar Jacob in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a practical case comes before you and you do not know whether to burn or to suspend, always prefer burning to suspension since nothing is more beloved in the Torah than burned oxen and burned rams, and they are burned. Rebbi Yose asked: Does one infer something which is not commanded from something which is commanded?
If the wine is freshly pressed, if the wine is sour? As it was stated: Sour wine may be used to make an eruv and participating, one makes a benediction for it, and one may use it for the preliminary marriage of a bride, for consoling the mourner, and it may be sold in a store as wine. If somebody made an unqualified contract for wine, he did not sell sour wine. One is prohibited from delivering a decision, or to dissolve a vow, or to enter the Temple. Only it is forbidden on the altar. And about the rebellious son it is problematic.
MISHNAH: When the Elders of Jerusalem had completed their work and left, the Elders of that town bring “a cattle calf, one which never had been used for work, which never had drawn under a yoke.” Bodily defects do not disqualify it. One brings it down to an etan valley; the meaning of etan is “hard”. Even if it is not hard it is qualified. One breaks its neck with a stiletto from behind. Its place is forbidden to be used for sowing or agricultural works; it may be used to card flax or to hew stones.
The place where it falls down and its surroundings are forbidden. How much are its surroundings? Four cubits. Rebbi says, I am saying that its surroundings are fifty cubits. Rebbi Samuel the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun: “which would not be worked on,” a general statement. “And would not be sown,” a detail. If a general statement is followed by a detail, the general does not contain more than the detail. He said to him, if it were written “which would not be worked on, which would not be sown,” you would be justified; but it is written “which would not be worked on.” This does not describe general statement and detail, but an additional reference.
Rebbi Yannai said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: Even if one broke its neck he is guilty. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Immi, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The words of Rebbi Meïr: Even if one broke its neck he is guilty. The words of Rebbi Simeon: Even if he cut its throat, he is not punishable. Rebbi Yannai said, I heard about a boundary, from when it is forbidden: “They shall bring it down,” from the time of bringing down. Rebbi Ila said, to free it from “it and its young” following Rebbi Simeon.
They asked Rebbi Joshua: May a person teach Greek to his son? He said to them, he may teach him at an hour that is neither day nor night as it is written (Jos. 1:8): “You shall meditate about it day and night.” If it is so, a man would be forbidden to teach a profession to his son since it is written: “You shall meditate about it day and night.” But Rebbi Ismael stated (Deut. 30:19): “Choose life!” That refers to a profession. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of informants. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person may teach Greek to his daughter since it is an ornament for her. Simeon bar Abba heard that and said: Because he wants to teach his daughters, he attaches it to Rebbi Joḥanan. It should come over me that I never heard it from Rebbi Joḥanan.
Rebbi Eleazar explains the reason given in the Mishnah, that if he has a complaint about virginity he can quickly go to court. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Since the time of danger they used to marry on Tuesdays and the Sages did not object; about Monday one does not listen to him, but if it was because of a danger it is permitted. What is “because of a danger”? because of sorcery. What is the difference between Monday and Tuesday? One who waits one day cannot be compared to one who waits two days. Why not let him wait two days? That his acquisition should not be sweet for him. Why should his acquisition not be sweet for him? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Could we not suspect that she was raped? A rape is public knowledge. And even if you suspect that she was raped, there is no other doubt. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened. From the words of the Torah one has to be stringent. Rebbi Yose said, if you suspect that she was raped, there are two doubts. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened; there is a doubt whether it happened after she was preliminarily married or before. From the words of the Torah, with two doubts one has to be lenient.
Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Aḥa, said in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: It is forbidden to judge money matters on Friday. Does not a Mishnah object: “Therefore, one does not judge criminal matters on Friday or any day before a holiday”? Therefore, one judges money matters! Also, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: One judges money matters on Friday but not criminal matters. One is for practice, the other for Torah study.
Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Crispus: An adult woman is like an open amphora. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what Rebbi Ḥanina said, since Rebbi Ḥanina said: It happened that a woman was found without virginity and the case came before Rebbi. He said to her, where is it? She said, the stairs in my father’s house were high and it was rubbed off. Rebbi believed her. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “The ketubah sum of a virgin who is a widow, or a divorcee, or one who had received ḥalîṣah, after a preliminary marriage is 200 [zuz], and they are subject to complaints about virginity.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “One who eats unchaperoned at his father-in-law’s in Judea cannot go to court about virginity since he was alone with her.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “If somebody married a woman and found her not to be a virgin. She says, I was raped after the preliminary marriage and your field was flooded, but he says, no, it was before the preliminary marriage and my acquisition was in error,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “She says, I was injured by a piece of wood, but he says no, you were trampled on by a man,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. All these cases are based on what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful.
Rebbi Jeremiah was of the opinion to follow the standard of Judea in Galilee. Rebbi Yose said to him, is the standard of Judea in Galilee a testimony by biblical standards? No, [one follows] the standard of Judea in Judea and the standard of Galilee in Galilee. If you say, it is not testimony by biblical standards, why appoint them? That the daughters of Israel should not become wanton in immorality. If it is that the daughters of Israel should not become wanton in immorality, even if one appoints, they should not be trustworthy! Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: A man would not go to all this expense in order to give his wife a bad reputation. If it is that a man would not go to all this expense in order to give his wife a bad reputation, even if one does not appoint, he should be believed. Rebbi Hila said, because of one suspicion, because of one immoral person. Where do we hold? If he investigated and found, he found! If he did not find but investigated, did he not investigate? But we deal with the case that he did not investigate and found. She says, it is blood of virginity. He says no, it is a bird’s blood. His case is damaged since he did not follow the procedures. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. It follows what we statedthere: “A virgin and a widow, etc.” All these cases are based on what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody married a woman and found that she was no virgin”, etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does this mean that a claim of missing virginity is impossible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, only following Rebbi Joshua? He turned around and said, a claim of missing virginity is possible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, if she remains silent. And even if you say that she talks, if she said that he found her a virgin and destroyed the evidence. Why should she not be believed? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Here you say, she is believed. There, you say that she is not believed. In this case, both agree that the door was open.
Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he disqualifies since he cohabited there. What about a thoroughfare? Rebbi Jeremiah bar Abba, Rebbi Yose says: By a majority. The force of Rebbi Jeremiah comes from the following which Rebbi Ḥiyya had said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a wall fell in a dead-end street populated by Gentiles, but where one Jew lived, one digs there because of the Jew; but in a thoroughfare one follows the majority. And what is the interpretation of what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai, if he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there? In the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah, if one saw him coming out of a house. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, even in a thoroughfare. If Sepphoris was locked. Rebbi Yose says, until there is proof. But here, Rebbi Yose says, by a majority! The force of Rebbi Yose comes from the following, which Rebbi Ze‘ira had said: Rebbi [Ḥiyya] (Yose) in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If his [box] (bread) was exchanged at the miller’s, if it was established that an am haäreẓ gave [grain] to be milled there that day, he has to worry; otherwise, he does not have to worry. Should he not worry? What is the difference between this and the Saracens? Was it not stated: “If a group of Saracens one day provisioned themselves from forbidden supplies, then that day becomes a proof for all days.” It is impossible for Saracens not to supply themselves. But here it was not established that the am haäreẓ was milling there that day. And here, I am saying that the disqualified person went to draw water only that day, and one has to worry. And here, Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. And here, Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there.
Rav Huna in the name of Rav: The witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. But Rav said, it is forbidden to sign a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. Does this contradict what they say in the name of Rav, the witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust? One word of Rav contradicts a word of Rav! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, Rav did not say it is forbidden to sign but it is forbidden to keep. As the following, “if evil is in your hand, remove it,” that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust, “do not let injustice dwell in your house,” that is a document of indebtedness which was paid.
Rav Huna in the name of Rav: The witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. But Rav said, it is forbidden to sign a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. Does this contradict what they say in the name of Rav, the witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust? One word of Rav contradicts a word of Rav! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, Rav did not say it is forbidden to sign but it is forbidden to keep. As the following, “if evil is in your hand, remove it,” that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust, “do not let injustice dwell in your house,” that is a document of indebtedness which was paid.
Rav Huna in the name of Rav: The witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. But Rav said, it is forbidden to sign a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. Does this contradict what they say in the name of Rav, the witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust? One word of Rav contradicts a word of Rav! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, Rav did not say it is forbidden to sign but it is forbidden to keep. As the following, “if evil is in your hand, remove it,” that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust, “do not let injustice dwell in your house,” that is a document of indebtedness which was paid.
Should one not worry that he might be a slave? This supports what Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: It is forbidden for a man to teach Torah to his slave. But did not Rebbi Ze‘ira say in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A slave is counted as one of the seven readers; wayedabber is counted as one of three verses! Explain it, if he learned it by himself or his master taught him like Tebi. Should one not worry that he might be a slave? This supports what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Women and slaves cannot share in the distribution on the threshing floor, but one gives them the gifts of priesthood and levitic status from the house.
HALAKHAH: “One who says, I seduced X’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: Would he have to pay the slave’s value on his own testimony? What is his problem? Are the entire 30 [šeqel] a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, the entire 30 [šeqel] are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “‘Your ox killed my slave’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is free.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it if he killed a slave afflicted with boils. He said to him, what does it say afterwards? “‘Your ox killed my son’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is obligated.” Why do you not explain it that he was afflicted with boils, then he would be free. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage. He said to him, if following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage, everything is a fine. Can one say to him, be also in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out his slave Tebi’s tooth. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to free my slave Tebi. He said to him, what do you have in your hand? Fines can be imposed only by witnesses! Could they not say to him, do your duty before Heaven? That means one does not tell him, do your duty before Heaven! Rebbi Gamliel ben Avina asked before Rebbi Mana: Does Rabban Gamliel follow him who said, it is permitted to manumit? He said to him, the story in itself implies that it is forbidden to manumit since, otherwise, he could have freed him immediately!
He could appoint a provider, as the following: “X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do.” Let him appoint a provider! A woman has the right to say, it is impossible for me to be provided for by anybody other than my husband. But did we not state: “If somebody provides for his wife through a third party.” There, if she accepted it; here, if she did not accept it. If she did not accept it then he should not appoint even for one day! She continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow. Samuel says, if he vowed for thirty days. But if he vowed forever, he shall divorce immediately and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Avina in the name of Rav: Even if he vowed forever, she continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree in case he provoked her to make the vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree in case he provoked her to make the vow.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
Rebbi Reuben asked before Rebbi Mana: May the slaves of a secondarily forbidden [wife] eat heave? He said to him, be quiet, it is better for you. She eats but her slaves do not eat.