3597 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:25

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles,” etc. To a Gentile even in the Land. Who frees him? His original owner pays for him and the second frees him. “Or outside the Land,” even to a Jew. Let us say that if the second owner knew, both of them split the price; otherwise the first pays for him and the second frees him. “I X ben Y sold my slave Z to Antiochia”, he gains his freedom. But if he is in Lydda, he did not gain his freedom. It was stated: A slave goes outside the Land with his master. Therefore, if he sold him there, he is sold. If he came from outside the Land to the Land with the intention to return, one forces him to return. With the intention not to return, one does not force him to return. If he fled from outside the Land to the Land, he may return him. If he fled from the Land to outside the Land, Rebbi Joshia in the name of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, it is permigtted. The great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is permitted. Rebbi Marinos, the son of the great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is forbidden. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he is used to flee there. But he who says, it is forbidden, if he is not used to flee there. Rebbi Yose said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he can return him from there; but he who says, it is forbidden, if he cannot return him from there.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:25

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles,” etc. To a Gentile even in the Land. Who frees him? His original owner pays for him and the second frees him. “Or outside the Land,” even to a Jew. Let us say that if the second owner knew, both of them split the price; otherwise the first pays for him and the second frees him. “I X ben Y sold my slave Z to Antiochia”, he gains his freedom. But if he is in Lydda, he did not gain his freedom. It was stated: A slave goes outside the Land with his master. Therefore, if he sold him there, he is sold. If he came from outside the Land to the Land with the intention to return, one forces him to return. With the intention not to return, one does not force him to return. If he fled from outside the Land to the Land, he may return him. If he fled from the Land to outside the Land, Rebbi Joshia in the name of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, it is permigtted. The great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is permitted. Rebbi Marinos, the son of the great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is forbidden. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he is used to flee there. But he who says, it is forbidden, if he is not used to flee there. Rebbi Yose said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he can return him from there; but he who says, it is forbidden, if he cannot return him from there.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:25

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles,” etc. To a Gentile even in the Land. Who frees him? His original owner pays for him and the second frees him. “Or outside the Land,” even to a Jew. Let us say that if the second owner knew, both of them split the price; otherwise the first pays for him and the second frees him. “I X ben Y sold my slave Z to Antiochia”, he gains his freedom. But if he is in Lydda, he did not gain his freedom. It was stated: A slave goes outside the Land with his master. Therefore, if he sold him there, he is sold. If he came from outside the Land to the Land with the intention to return, one forces him to return. With the intention not to return, one does not force him to return. If he fled from outside the Land to the Land, he may return him. If he fled from the Land to outside the Land, Rebbi Joshia in the name of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, it is permigtted. The great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is permitted. Rebbi Marinos, the son of the great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is forbidden. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he is used to flee there. But he who says, it is forbidden, if he is not used to flee there. Rebbi Yose said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he can return him from there; but he who says, it is forbidden, if he cannot return him from there.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:26

There could be terms. If he entered into terms with him, it is permitted. That means, with adults. With minors, the terms can be with their masters. That is, if the master was a Jew. If he was Gentile? Rebbi Tevele sold his slave and entered into terms with his master. Rebbi Isaac the goldsmith had slaves who fled to Bnoton. He came and asked Rebbi Immi who instructed him that a sales contract is forbidden, a loan for use is permitted, a cession is questionable. The slave girl of Rebbi Abba bar Ada fled to Cilicia. He came and asked Rebbi Mana, who instructed him following Rebbi Immi: a sales contract is forbidden, a loan for use is permitted, a cession is questionable.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:26

There could be terms. If he entered into terms with him, it is permitted. That means, with adults. With minors, the terms can be with their masters. That is, if the master was a Jew. If he was Gentile? Rebbi Tevele sold his slave and entered into terms with his master. Rebbi Isaac the goldsmith had slaves who fled to Bnoton. He came and asked Rebbi Immi who instructed him that a sales contract is forbidden, a loan for use is permitted, a cession is questionable. The slave girl of Rebbi Abba bar Ada fled to Cilicia. He came and asked Rebbi Mana, who instructed him following Rebbi Immi: a sales contract is forbidden, a loan for use is permitted, a cession is questionable.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:30

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:31

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:33

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife as a she-ram cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife as a she-ram, when she went, married another man, and bore him children, and he said, if I had known that she can have children, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since there are women she-rams who are married and since [their husbands] are satisfied with them they keep them.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:56

A weaver asked Rebbi Immi, what about a Gentile wedding feast? He wanted to permit it to them from this: “Because of peaceful coexistence.” Rebbi Abba told them, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that the holiday of a Gentile wedding feast is forbidden? Rebbi Immi said, if it had not been for Rebbi Abba, we would have come to permit their strange worship; praised be He Who separated us from them.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:59

Rebbi Phineas asked: For what did they impose a fine? At a place where they sow and eat or at a place where they sow but do not eat? What is the difference? If one saw him buying from Saracens. It is forbidden; if you say at a place where they sow and eat, if one saw him buying from Saracens it is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:17

MISHNAH: “Bring my bill of divorce”, she may eat heave until the bill is delivered to her. “Receive my bill of divorce,” she is immediately forbidden to eat heave. “Receive my bill of divorce at place X,” she may eat heave until the bill arrives at that place; Rebbi Eleazar forbids immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:22

Rebbi Mana said, not only a neck-iron of mortal danger but also a neck-iron of money. For every neck-iron is a mortal danger. Rebbi Eleazar asked: Does his gift follow the rules of the gift of a sick person? Rebbi Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jacob the Armenian: That which is a problem for Rebbi Simeon is obvious for Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina, as we have stated there: “One may have use for the hair of a woman who was executed but an animal which was executed is forbidden for all use.” Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, if she said, my bonnet should be given to my daughter.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:15

HALAKHAH: “ ‘This is your bill of divorce if I should die, this is your bill of divorce from this illness, this is your bill of divorce after my death,’ he did not say anything.” But our teachers said, it is a bill of divorce. Who are “our teachers”? Rebbi Jehudah the Prince and his court. In three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers”, about bills of divorce, oil, and a sole. They should have called him “permissive court” since any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ismael said, his court disagreed with him about the bills of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:16

May she be allowed to remarry? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, she is allowed to remarry. Rebbi Yose: she is forbidden to remarry; I say that a miracle happened to him and he survived.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:37

He is forbidden to be alone with her immediately, for maybe he shall not visit her for thirty days and then her bill of divorce would be older than her child.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:40

The Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi: “This is your bill of divorce after the holiday.” He said to him, all of 30 days after the holiday are called “after the holiday”. Rebbi Bivon bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “This is your bill of divorce on Passover eve”? Even a person who says that all of 30 days after the holiday are called “after the holiday” will agree that 30 days before Passover are not like “after Passover”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If somebody said, a qonam that I shall not taste wine at the end of the Sabbath? He said to him, after the end of the Sabbath he is forbidden, Sabbath eve he is permitted, the days in between are problematic. And so it is here, after the end of the Sabbath it is a bill of divorce, Sabbath eve it is no bill of divorce, but the days in between are problematic.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody in divorcing his wife,” etc. Rebbi Ilai said, the reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”, even if he did permit her only to one other man. This argument proves more than the Mishnah! The Mishnah said if she was permitted to all but forbidden to one other man; the argument is that he forbade her to all but permitted her only to one other man. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? Death permits and divorce permits. Since death permits only partially, so the bill of divorce permits only partially. What is the reason of the rabbis? “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”; it brackets marriage and divorce. Since her divorce is without participation of a third party, so her marriage must be without participation of a third party.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:5

Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:5

Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:5

Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:5

Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:33

HALAKHAH: “That is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid”. Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies from the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalȋṣah in the case of a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him for up to 30 days shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:38

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:38

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:83

Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: One who handles a wine-skin and it splits in his hand is not responsible for it. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, it is necessary even if he takes it in the store when he had no other intention than that no other person should take it. Can he take possession at a minimal rate? Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Yose: A Mishnah says that it cannot become his possession at a minimal rate, as we have stated there: “If somebody sells his wine to a Non-Jew. If he fixed the price before he measured, the proceeds are permitted; if he measured before he fixed the price, the proceeds are forbidden.” If you say that it can come into his possession at a minimal rate, even if he measured before he fixed the price, it should be as if he fixed the price before he measured and the proceeds would be permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:29

“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:29

“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:29

“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:29

“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:29

“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:36

Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:36

Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:48

“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:48

“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:48

“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:48

“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:48

“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:53

They asked before Rebbi Zeïra: a Cohen to an Israel, Rebbi forbids. What does Rebbi Yose say? He did not respond. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa said, so he said to them: In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, why is a Cohen to an Israel forbidden, not because it looks badly? Also Rebbi Joḥanan holds that from an Israel to an Israel it is forbidden because it looks badly. In addition, because of the following, as it was stated: “Cohanim and Levites who help at the threshing floor have no right either to heave or to tithe, and if the farmer gave, it is desecrated, as it is said (Lev. 22:15): ‘They should not desecrate the sanctified things of the Children of Israel,’ but they do desecrate them! In addition, they said that their heave is no heave, their tithes are no tithes, their dedications are no dedications, and about them the verse says (Micha 3:11): ‘Their heads judge for bribes, their priests instruct for hire, etc.’ The Omnipresent brings over them three catastrophes; that is what is written (Micha 3:12): ‘Therefore, because of you Zion will be ploughed over as a field, Jerusalem will be desolate, and the Temple Mount a wooded hill.’

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:53

They asked before Rebbi Zeïra: a Cohen to an Israel, Rebbi forbids. What does Rebbi Yose say? He did not respond. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa said, so he said to them: In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, why is a Cohen to an Israel forbidden, not because it looks badly? Also Rebbi Joḥanan holds that from an Israel to an Israel it is forbidden because it looks badly. In addition, because of the following, as it was stated: “Cohanim and Levites who help at the threshing floor have no right either to heave or to tithe, and if the farmer gave, it is desecrated, as it is said (Lev. 22:15): ‘They should not desecrate the sanctified things of the Children of Israel,’ but they do desecrate them! In addition, they said that their heave is no heave, their tithes are no tithes, their dedications are no dedications, and about them the verse says (Micha 3:11): ‘Their heads judge for bribes, their priests instruct for hire, etc.’ The Omnipresent brings over them three catastrophes; that is what is written (Micha 3:12): ‘Therefore, because of you Zion will be ploughed over as a field, Jerusalem will be desolate, and the Temple Mount a wooded hill.’

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:12

If both were Cohanim or brothers, both are forbidden. If there were three brothers; two of them contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then died. That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one deceased contracts levirate marriage but not the wife of two deceased men. If they were brothers, both contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then one of them died. Is she permitted to the second? As you take it, what he had acquired, he had acquired; the rest he inherits from his brother. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, she is forbidden to him. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi is that the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law who is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees the co-wife. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said it correctly. Does she not become his because of his brother? To his brother she was forbidden; to him she should be permitted?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:12

If both were Cohanim or brothers, both are forbidden. If there were three brothers; two of them contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then died. That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one deceased contracts levirate marriage but not the wife of two deceased men. If they were brothers, both contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then one of them died. Is she permitted to the second? As you take it, what he had acquired, he had acquired; the rest he inherits from his brother. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, she is forbidden to him. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi is that the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law who is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees the co-wife. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said it correctly. Does she not become his because of his brother? To his brother she was forbidden; to him she should be permitted?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:12

If both were Cohanim or brothers, both are forbidden. If there were three brothers; two of them contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then died. That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one deceased contracts levirate marriage but not the wife of two deceased men. If they were brothers, both contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then one of them died. Is she permitted to the second? As you take it, what he had acquired, he had acquired; the rest he inherits from his brother. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, she is forbidden to him. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi is that the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law who is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees the co-wife. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said it correctly. Does she not become his because of his brother? To his brother she was forbidden; to him she should be permitted?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:19

Only if it be with his and her agreement. If it was symphōn in his opinion and preliminary marriage in her opinion, Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is symphōn, Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it is preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥanina was taking up arms against Rebbi Ḥaggai, when Rebbi Hila said to him, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man; this is what Rebbi Ze‘ira said. In the first Adar, Rebbi Hila died. In the second Adar, a case came before Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, and he wanted to rule following Rebbi Ḥaggai. Rebbi Samuel bar Immi told him, Rebbi Hila was wrong when he told you, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, a Mishnah supports him: “ ‘You married me preliminarily’, and he says, ‘I did not marry you preliminarily.’ He is permitted her relatives but she is forbidden his relatives.” Rebbi Borqai asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it the same with symphōn? He answered, a symphōn is not doubtful but the rules are identical for symphōn and preliminary marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:47

Rav Sheshet objected: Does not the Mishnah disagree? “You married me preliminarily but he says, I did not marry you preliminarily; he is permitted her relatives but she is forbidden his relatives.” They said, so did it happen: Simeon bar Abba brought a bill of divorce and delivered it in front of one witness. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said, a single witness in marital matters is nothing. Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Assi in the name of Assi say: a single witness in marital matters is nothing? Rav said, one who performs a preliminary marriage in front of a single witness did not do anything. Samuel said, he who performs a preliminary marriage without prior negotiation is whipped, but the preliminary marriage holds. Mar Uqba in the name of Samuel said three things: He who performs a preliminary marriage without prior negotiation is whipped; one who sleeps with his betrothed in his father-in-law’s house is whipped; one who insults the court bailiff is whipped.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:48

MISHNAH: If somebody has two groups of daughters from two wives and he says, I preliminarily married off my older daughter, but he does not know whether the oldest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones who is older than the oldest of the younger ones, all are forbidden except the youngest of the younger ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the oldest of the older ones. I preliminarily married off my younger daughter, but he does not know whether the youngest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones who is younger than the youngest of the older ones, all are forbidden except the oldest of the older ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the youngest of the younger ones.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:48

MISHNAH: If somebody has two groups of daughters from two wives and he says, I preliminarily married off my older daughter, but he does not know whether the oldest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones who is older than the oldest of the younger ones, all are forbidden except the youngest of the younger ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the oldest of the older ones. I preliminarily married off my younger daughter, but he does not know whether the youngest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones who is younger than the youngest of the older ones, all are forbidden except the oldest of the older ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the youngest of the younger ones.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:51

MISHNAH: If somebody says to a woman, I married you preliminarily, but she says, you did not marry me preliminarily, he is forbidden her relatives but she is permitted his relatives. I she says, you married me preliminarily but he says, I did not marry you preliminarily, she is forbidden his relatives but he is permitted her relatives. “I am preliminarily married to you,” but she says, you are only preliminarily married to my daughter; he is forbidden the relatives of the old woman, and the old woman is permitted his relatives; he is permitted the relatives of the young woman, and the young woman is permitted his relatives.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:51

MISHNAH: If somebody says to a woman, I married you preliminarily, but she says, you did not marry me preliminarily, he is forbidden her relatives but she is permitted his relatives. I she says, you married me preliminarily but he says, I did not marry you preliminarily, she is forbidden his relatives but he is permitted her relatives. “I am preliminarily married to you,” but she says, you are only preliminarily married to my daughter; he is forbidden the relatives of the old woman, and the old woman is permitted his relatives; he is permitted the relatives of the young woman, and the young woman is permitted his relatives.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:51

MISHNAH: If somebody says to a woman, I married you preliminarily, but she says, you did not marry me preliminarily, he is forbidden her relatives but she is permitted his relatives. I she says, you married me preliminarily but he says, I did not marry you preliminarily, she is forbidden his relatives but he is permitted her relatives. “I am preliminarily married to you,” but she says, you are only preliminarily married to my daughter; he is forbidden the relatives of the old woman, and the old woman is permitted his relatives; he is permitted the relatives of the young woman, and the young woman is permitted his relatives.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:53

MISHNAH: “I am preliminarily married to your daughter,” but she says, you are only preliminarily married to me; he is forbidden the relatives of the young woman, and the young woman is permitted his relatives; he is permitted the relatives of the old woman, and the old woman is forbidden his relatives.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:53

MISHNAH: “I am preliminarily married to your daughter,” but she says, you are only preliminarily married to me; he is forbidden the relatives of the young woman, and the young woman is permitted his relatives; he is permitted the relatives of the old woman, and the old woman is forbidden his relatives.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:55

MISHNAH: In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father. Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel. And in any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part. Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a Gibeonite or a bastard. In any case where a preliminary marriage with him is impossible but with others is possible, the child is a bastard. Who is this? This is one having sexual relations with any woman forbidden in the Torah because of incest or adultery. And in any case where a preliminary marriage is impossible with anybody, the child follows the mother. Who is this? The child of a slave girl or a Gentile woman.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:61

It was stated: “If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard; Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon, the child is not a bastard, for a bastard is only from a woman forbidden to him by an incest prohibition for which the penalty is extirpation.” Both of them explained the same verse, “nobody may take his father’s wife, etc.” Rebbi Meïr explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that he cannot have preliminary marriage with her, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard, so in all cases in which she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard; this excludes the Gentile and the slave who cannot contract preliminary marriage with her or with others. Rebbi Samuel bar Abba questions that first Tanna: The sister-in-law who whored cannot have preliminary marriage with him or with others, but the child is qualified! Rebbi Yannai in the name of Rebbi: If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, in the name of Rebbi (Yannai ben) Rebbi: The child is neither qualified nor disqualified but dirtied. Rebbi Jonathan went with Rebbi Jehudah Neśia to the hot springs of Gadara. There, he instructed: The child is qualified. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this child improves as time goes by. Rebbi declared the child dirtied, his grandson declared him qualified. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda instructed in the name of all rabbis: The child is qualified. Rebbi Bevai said before Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The child is qualified. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it is from that, one does not learn from a declaration. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the story from beginning to end. Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina went up to the hot springs of Gadara. He visited his father who said to him: Be careful, because there are those who are disqualified, lest you injure them.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:12

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josia: The eleventh generation of bastards is qualified following Rebbi Simeon; he does not use [the principle of gezerah šawah for] “the tenth, the tenth.” It was stated: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, in the eleventh generation of bastards, the males are forbidden but the females permitted. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of Rebbi Meïr. As Rebbi Meïr said, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse. Here also, the males are forbidden but the females permitted. In that case, even immediately? Only from the tenth onward.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:12

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josia: The eleventh generation of bastards is qualified following Rebbi Simeon; he does not use [the principle of gezerah šawah for] “the tenth, the tenth.” It was stated: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, in the eleventh generation of bastards, the males are forbidden but the females permitted. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of Rebbi Meïr. As Rebbi Meïr said, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse. Here also, the males are forbidden but the females permitted. In that case, even immediately? Only from the tenth onward.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:21

MISHNAH: Any who are forbidden to marry in the congregation are permitted to marry one another but Rebbi Jehudah forbids. Rebbi Eliezer says, certain with certain are permitted, certain with questionable, questionable with certain, and questionable with questionable are forbidden. The following are questionable: the silenced one, the foundling, and the Samaritan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:21

MISHNAH: Any who are forbidden to marry in the congregation are permitted to marry one another but Rebbi Jehudah forbids. Rebbi Eliezer says, certain with certain are permitted, certain with questionable, questionable with certain, and questionable with questionable are forbidden. The following are questionable: the silenced one, the foundling, and the Samaritan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:22

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Jeremiah said, as a matter of principle, an Israel with an injured testicle may marry a female bastard. Rebbi Yose said, it applies only to family disabilities, not to bodily defects. The strength of Rebbi Yose comes from the statement of Rebbi Ḥilqiah, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One did state this only for an Israel with an injured testicle, but not a Cohen, since, as you say there, if he is certainly a Cohen he is forbidden to marry a convert; here also, he is certainly an Israel and forbidden to marry a female bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:22

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Jeremiah said, as a matter of principle, an Israel with an injured testicle may marry a female bastard. Rebbi Yose said, it applies only to family disabilities, not to bodily defects. The strength of Rebbi Yose comes from the statement of Rebbi Ḥilqiah, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One did state this only for an Israel with an injured testicle, but not a Cohen, since, as you say there, if he is certainly a Cohen he is forbidden to marry a convert; here also, he is certainly an Israel and forbidden to marry a female bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:23

[In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah, may a male bastard not marry a female bastard?] Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Jacob from Gebal stated before Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Isaac bar Tevele in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Jehudah stated that a male bastard should not marry a female bastard so that bastards should disappear from the world. Similarly, is an Ammonite man forbidden to marry an Ammonite woman? Was that needed for the rabbis? For if Rebbi Jehudah thought that this disqualified converts from any of the Eternal’s congregations, then [the Ammonite] could not marry an Ammonite woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. He could not marry an Egyptian woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. Rebbi Mattania said, one frees a slave girl and marries her to him. Similarly, could an Egyptian man not marry an Egyptian woman? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Abbahu stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah said, Benjamin, an Egyptian convert, was a student of Rebbi Aqiba. He said, I am an Egyptian convert married to an Egyptian convert. My son is an Egyptian convert; I shall marry him to an Egyptian convert so that my grandson will be qualified to marry into the congregation. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, my son, it is not so. But you marry him to the daughter of an Egyptian woman convert so that there should be three generations on either side.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:32

HALAKHAH: “The daughter of a desecrated priest,” etc. Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rav: Daughter, daughter’s daughter, forever. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “In his clans.” Since by “in his clans” said there males are forbidden and females permitted, so by “in his clans” said here males are forbidden and females permitted. What is the difference between them? A Cohen who came to a divorcee and fathered a son; the son went and fathered a son and a daughter. In the opinion of Rav the son, the son’s daughter, the daughter’s son, and the daughter are forbidden. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan the son’s daughter is forbidden, the daughter’s son is permitted. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “The daughter of an Israel who married a desecrated woman is qualified for the priesthood.” He explains it, a broomstick desecrated one. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah says, the daughter of a male proselyte is like the daughter of a desecrated priest.” He explains that Rebbi Jehudah only comes to add. If he had said that the daughter of a desecrated priest is like the daughter of a male proselyte, you would have had a point.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:32

HALAKHAH: “The daughter of a desecrated priest,” etc. Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rav: Daughter, daughter’s daughter, forever. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “In his clans.” Since by “in his clans” said there males are forbidden and females permitted, so by “in his clans” said here males are forbidden and females permitted. What is the difference between them? A Cohen who came to a divorcee and fathered a son; the son went and fathered a son and a daughter. In the opinion of Rav the son, the son’s daughter, the daughter’s son, and the daughter are forbidden. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan the son’s daughter is forbidden, the daughter’s son is permitted. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “The daughter of an Israel who married a desecrated woman is qualified for the priesthood.” He explains it, a broomstick desecrated one. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah says, the daughter of a male proselyte is like the daughter of a desecrated priest.” He explains that Rebbi Jehudah only comes to add. If he had said that the daughter of a desecrated priest is like the daughter of a male proselyte, you would have had a point.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:32

HALAKHAH: “The daughter of a desecrated priest,” etc. Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rav: Daughter, daughter’s daughter, forever. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “In his clans.” Since by “in his clans” said there males are forbidden and females permitted, so by “in his clans” said here males are forbidden and females permitted. What is the difference between them? A Cohen who came to a divorcee and fathered a son; the son went and fathered a son and a daughter. In the opinion of Rav the son, the son’s daughter, the daughter’s son, and the daughter are forbidden. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan the son’s daughter is forbidden, the daughter’s son is permitted. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “The daughter of an Israel who married a desecrated woman is qualified for the priesthood.” He explains it, a broomstick desecrated one. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah says, the daughter of a male proselyte is like the daughter of a desecrated priest.” He explains that Rebbi Jehudah only comes to add. If he had said that the daughter of a desecrated priest is like the daughter of a male proselyte, you would have had a point.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:32

HALAKHAH: “The daughter of a desecrated priest,” etc. Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rav: Daughter, daughter’s daughter, forever. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “In his clans.” Since by “in his clans” said there males are forbidden and females permitted, so by “in his clans” said here males are forbidden and females permitted. What is the difference between them? A Cohen who came to a divorcee and fathered a son; the son went and fathered a son and a daughter. In the opinion of Rav the son, the son’s daughter, the daughter’s son, and the daughter are forbidden. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan the son’s daughter is forbidden, the daughter’s son is permitted. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “The daughter of an Israel who married a desecrated woman is qualified for the priesthood.” He explains it, a broomstick desecrated one. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah says, the daughter of a male proselyte is like the daughter of a desecrated priest.” He explains that Rebbi Jehudah only comes to add. If he had said that the daughter of a desecrated priest is like the daughter of a male proselyte, you would have had a point.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:59

Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Cohen in the name of Rav. It is forbidden to dwell in a city which has neither a medical man, nor a public bath, nor a court lashing and jailing. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, also it is forbidden to dwell in a city which has no vegetable garden. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Cohen in the name of Rav: Every person will have to justify himself for everything his eye saw and which he did not eat. Rebbi Eleazar took note of this statement and saved coins from which he ate every kind once a year.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:59

Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Cohen in the name of Rav. It is forbidden to dwell in a city which has neither a medical man, nor a public bath, nor a court lashing and jailing. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, also it is forbidden to dwell in a city which has no vegetable garden. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Cohen in the name of Rav: Every person will have to justify himself for everything his eye saw and which he did not eat. Rebbi Eleazar took note of this statement and saved coins from which he ate every kind once a year.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:4

Somebody put down an amphora in the public domain and then another person came and put another one close to the first. If the first person comes to take his own and would move [the second] and put it down at another place, he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull came to mount another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, if he drew him away before it could mount, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Rebbi Yose said, we can hear from this that if one saw a flood threatening in his irrigation canal, before the flood reached his field he is permitted to divert the water to another place; after the flood reached his field he is not permitted to divert it to another place. If the chrysargyros was imposed, before [the collector of] chrysargyros arrived, one is permitted to say, X is following my profession, Y is following my professon. Once the [the collector of] chrysarguros arrived, it is forbidden. It is permitted to bribe the quartermaster before the Roman [soldiers] arrive; after the Roman [soldiers] arrive it is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:4

Somebody put down an amphora in the public domain and then another person came and put another one close to the first. If the first person comes to take his own and would move [the second] and put it down at another place, he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull came to mount another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, if he drew him away before it could mount, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Rebbi Yose said, we can hear from this that if one saw a flood threatening in his irrigation canal, before the flood reached his field he is permitted to divert the water to another place; after the flood reached his field he is not permitted to divert it to another place. If the chrysargyros was imposed, before [the collector of] chrysargyros arrived, one is permitted to say, X is following my profession, Y is following my professon. Once the [the collector of] chrysarguros arrived, it is forbidden. It is permitted to bribe the quartermaster before the Roman [soldiers] arrive; after the Roman [soldiers] arrive it is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:15

It happened that the [Roman] government sent two officials to study Torah with Rabban Gamliel. They learned from him Bible, Mishnah, Talmud, practice, and homilies. At the end, they told him: All of your teachings are beautiful and commendable except two things which you say: “A Jewish woman shall not act as midwife to a Gentile, but a Gentile woman may act as midwife for a Jewish woman; a Jewish woman shall not nurse the child of a Gentile, but a Gentile woman may nurse for a Jewish woman with her consent; what was robbed from a Jew is forbidden but from a Gentile it is permitted.” At that moment did Rabban Gamliel decide that what was robbed from a Gentile be forbidden because of desecration of the Name. “The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of a non-Jew is not liable,” etc. But we shall not inform the government of this. Nevertheless, by the time they reached the Tyrian ladder they had forgotten everything.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:15

It happened that the [Roman] government sent two officials to study Torah with Rabban Gamliel. They learned from him Bible, Mishnah, Talmud, practice, and homilies. At the end, they told him: All of your teachings are beautiful and commendable except two things which you say: “A Jewish woman shall not act as midwife to a Gentile, but a Gentile woman may act as midwife for a Jewish woman; a Jewish woman shall not nurse the child of a Gentile, but a Gentile woman may nurse for a Jewish woman with her consent; what was robbed from a Jew is forbidden but from a Gentile it is permitted.” At that moment did Rabban Gamliel decide that what was robbed from a Gentile be forbidden because of desecration of the Name. “The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of a non-Jew is not liable,” etc. But we shall not inform the government of this. Nevertheless, by the time they reached the Tyrian ladder they had forgotten everything.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:31

MISHNAH: If one dedicates a bull which is led out to be stoned, it is not dedicated, and if it was slaughtered, its meat is forbidden. If its owner dedicated it before sentence was pronounced, it is dedicated, and if it was slaughtered, its meat is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 7:22

It is written: “They are impure for you”. Why does it say “they shall be impure for you”? One is for the prohibition of eating, the other for the prohibition of usufruct. Anything forbidden [by the Torah is forbidden for trade, but everything whose prohibition] is rabbinical is permitted for trade. But is there not the donkey? It is raised for work. Is there not the camel? It is raised for work.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 7:22

It is written: “They are impure for you”. Why does it say “they shall be impure for you”? One is for the prohibition of eating, the other for the prohibition of usufruct. Anything forbidden [by the Torah is forbidden for trade, but everything whose prohibition] is rabbinical is permitted for trade. But is there not the donkey? It is raised for work. Is there not the camel? It is raised for work.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:17

It was stated: One gives money to another to buy wheat for him, but the man bought barley. If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him. We stated otherwise: “If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them.” [He who said if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him, is Rebbi Meïr. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer. But he who said, if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them, is Rebbi Jehudah.] What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. Why does he (not) split with him? Because it is forbidden to take advantage of another person. Then even if one gave him money to buy wheat and he bought wheat? [Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he had given money to buy wheat and he bought wheat,] the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. If he had given money to buy wheat and he bought barley, the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer, who is stuck with what he has on his hands. Rebbi Nasa said, if he was true to his agency, did the seller not intend to transfer ownership to the owner of the money? If he was not true to his agency, he intended to transfer ownership to the buyer. Then why does he split with him? He said, because he realizes a profit by means of the other man’s money, he splits with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 10:23

MISHNAH: One does not buy wool, or milk, or lambs from shepherds, nor wood or fruits from orchard watchmen; but one may buy linen garments from women in Galilee, and calves in the Sharon. In all cases it is forbidden if they told to hide. One buys eggs and chickens everywhere.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 2:17

Simeon ben Shetaḥ was working with linen. His students said to him, Rabbi, in order to make it easier for you we want to buy a donkey, then you will not have to work so hard. They went and bought a donkey from a Saracen; a pearl was hanging on its neck. They came to him saying, because of this you will not have to work anymore. He said to them, why? They told him, we bought for you a donkey from a Saracen and a pearl is hanging on its neck. He asked them, does its owner know about this? They answered, no. He told them, go and return it. But did not Rav Huna, Bevay bar Gozlan, in the name of Rav say, they objected before Rebbi: Even according to him who says that an object robbed from a Gentile is forbidden, everybody agrees that what he lost is permitted. Do you think that Simeon ben Shetaḥ was a barbarian? Simeon ben Shetaḥ wanted to hear: Praised be the God of the Jews, more than any gain in this world.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 4:2

HALAKHAH: “Silver acquires gold,” etc. This is a summary of the matter: Anything worth less that the other acquires the other. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said, who stated this? Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi. His father told him, change your opinion and state the following: “Gold acquires silver.” He told him, I do not change my opinion since when your faculties were unimpaired, you instructed me to state: “Silver acquires gold.” The word of Rebbi implies that gold is like produce. The Mishnah implies that silver is like produce. [Rebbi Ḥiyya’s baraita implies that gold is like produce, but his word implies that silver is like produce, as in the following:] The elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s daughter lent denars to Rav. She came and asked her father, who told her: Take from him good and full weight denars. Do we learn from Rebbi Ḥiyya’s daughter? Rebbi Idi said, also Abba, Samuel’s father, asked before Rebbi: May one lend denars against denars? He answered him, it is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, also Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both instruct: It is permitted to lend denars against denars. Qerat against qerat is permitted, lekan against lekan is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:7

It was stated: “There are things which are interest but are permitted. How is that? A person may buy another’s promissory notes at a discount, or bills of debt at a discount, and need have no compunctions because of interest. Other things are not interest but are forbidden because of circumventing interest. How is that? One received from another a field for ten kor of wheat.… A person said to another, lend me a tetradrachma. He answered, I only have a kor of wheat, take it. If he then turned around and bought it back for 24 it is not interest but forbidden because of circumventing interest.” He might have said to him, you do not have to do this and take your denar but then you have to pay for vessels and porters of the containers.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:7

It was stated: “There are things which are interest but are permitted. How is that? A person may buy another’s promissory notes at a discount, or bills of debt at a discount, and need have no compunctions because of interest. Other things are not interest but are forbidden because of circumventing interest. How is that? One received from another a field for ten kor of wheat.… A person said to another, lend me a tetradrachma. He answered, I only have a kor of wheat, take it. If he then turned around and bought it back for 24 it is not interest but forbidden because of circumventing interest.” He might have said to him, you do not have to do this and take your denar but then you have to pay for vessels and porters of the containers.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:9

MISHNAH: One may increase rental fees but not sale price. How is this? He leased a courtyard saying to him, if [you pay] now it is yours for ten tetradrachmas a year but if paid monthly it is a tetradrachma per month; this is permitted. He sold his field and said to him, if [you pay] now it is yours for 1’000 zuz, but if after the threshing floor it is twelve mina; this is forbidden. If one sold his field, [the buyer] made a partial payment and [the seller] said, anytime you wish bring the remainder and take yours; this is forbidden. If one lent money on a field and said, if you do not repay me in three years from now, it will be mine, it is his; Boethos ben Zenon acted thus following the Sages.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:9

MISHNAH: One may increase rental fees but not sale price. How is this? He leased a courtyard saying to him, if [you pay] now it is yours for ten tetradrachmas a year but if paid monthly it is a tetradrachma per month; this is permitted. He sold his field and said to him, if [you pay] now it is yours for 1’000 zuz, but if after the threshing floor it is twelve mina; this is forbidden. If one sold his field, [the buyer] made a partial payment and [the seller] said, anytime you wish bring the remainder and take yours; this is forbidden. If one lent money on a field and said, if you do not repay me in three years from now, it will be mine, it is his; Boethos ben Zenon acted thus following the Sages.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:10

HALAKHAH: “One may increase rental fees,” etc. It was stated: “If somebody sells a field to another and stipulates, on condition that I shall work it as a sharecropper, on condition that I shall be part owner, on condition that the tithes shall be mine, on condition that if you sell it, you will sell it only to me, that anytime I want I may pay you back and take it; this is permitted.” “If he owed him money and wrote his field over to him as a sale, any time the seller eats the yield it is permitted; any time the buyer eats the yield, it is forbidden. Rebbi Jehudah says, in any case it is permitted. Rebbi Jehudah said, that is what Boethos ben Zenon did following the Sages. They said to him, is that a proof? The seller was eating the yield.” Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Eleazar, and Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Jehudah learned from the houses of walled cities. As it was stated: The year mentioned in the Torah regarding walled cities is like interest but it is not interest. Another Tanna stated: This is interest but the Torah permitted it. He who said, it is like interest but it is not interest, Rebbi Meïr. He who said, this is interest but the Torah permitted it, Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Idi said, when I came from the Diaspora, I found that a case was before Rebbi Immi of “it is like interest but it is not interest.” Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, they only said that “this is interest but the Torah permitted it.” There, the Torah permitted it, therefore not in any other case. Nevertheless, Rebbi Immi did not consider it, for he said: a house dwells with its inhabitants.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:15

“If somebody gives money to another to buy produce with it for half the gain and one says, here you have a mina for I cannot be bothered with the details, that is forbidden. But if he saw that grain was going up in price, it is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:18

“A person was transporting from a lowprice place to a highprice one. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. A person was transporting a package from place to place. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. But donkey drivers who receive from householders obtain produce for a highprice place at lowprice rates.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: At a place where usually they can go and return the same day. Rav Huna said, he becomes his agent. But did one not object to [Rav] Huna: If an agent fell victim to an accident, is he liable? If he was the victim of an accident, he is not liable. Does it not happen that an unpaid trustee accepts to be like a borrower? But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state: Just as he is liable for the entirety, so he is liable for a part! Why does one quote this? There, he would pay a high price, but here he pays at the low rate.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:18

“A person was transporting from a lowprice place to a highprice one. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. A person was transporting a package from place to place. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. But donkey drivers who receive from householders obtain produce for a highprice place at lowprice rates.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: At a place where usually they can go and return the same day. Rav Huna said, he becomes his agent. But did one not object to [Rav] Huna: If an agent fell victim to an accident, is he liable? If he was the victim of an accident, he is not liable. Does it not happen that an unpaid trustee accepts to be like a borrower? But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state: Just as he is liable for the entirety, so he is liable for a part! Why does one quote this? There, he would pay a high price, but here he pays at the low rate.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:27

HALAKHAH: “One may not receive mortmain property form a Jew,” etc. “What is mortmain property? He had 100 sheep and told another: They are valued for you at 100 gold [denars]; their young, their milk, and their shearings are yours, but if they die you are liable for them and you pay me a tetradrachma for every one of them at the end of the year. This is forbidden.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:28

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say that a paid trustee who would be responsible for accidents is forbidden. But here you say that a paid trustee who is responsible for accidents is permitted. Does it not happen that an unpaid trustee agrees to be like a borrower? Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say that mortmain belongs to the first, but here you say to the second. Rebbi Yose said, there since the essence belongs to the first, the offspring are counted for the first. But here the essence belongs to the second since the offspring belong to the second.