1443 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 9:8

Its sown seeds: the minimum of seeds are two. Rebbi Samuel bar Sisarta said, from two you infer four. Just as for two you start at the beginning of six and reduce continuously, so for four you start at the beginning of six and reduce continuously. It is impossible that there should not be a free space to plant in the middle. Rebbi Jonah said, working space joins working space but a kind does not meet another kind to jail it. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Its seed, its seeds, its sown seeds. That follows Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said six, seed, its seed, its seeds, its sown seeds. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, זרעיה has five letters; everywhere I find ו I delete it. This was asked of Rebbi Ḥuna, the scribe of the assembly, and he said, זירועיה is written plene. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: [All inside of six. Cahana in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish:] All at the outside of six. Then we should state “nine!” Rebbi Tanḥum from Bostra said, that is true. But our Mishnah speaks of a garden bed in the middle of garden beds.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 13:4

Everybody agrees that if he writes a word only at the moment when he finishes. “One who wrote one letter to complete a word or one letter to complete a scroll is liable.” One who wrote one letter on a weekday and one letter on the Sabbath, Rebbi Eliezer makes him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Why? Either because of completion of the work or because it is not appropriate to be joined to it. Come and see, is he not free from liability if he wove one thread on a weekday and one thread on the Sabbath, is it not appropriate to be joined to it? But because of completion of the work, as Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If he wrote one letter in Tiberias and one letter in Sepphoris he is liable. For if it were not so following Rebbi Eliezer. If he wrote one letter on this Sabbath and one letter on the next Sabbath, Rebbi Eliezer makes him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Come and see, if he wrote one letter on a weekday and one letter on the Sabbath, Rebbi Eliezer makes him liable for a purification sacrifice; not so much more if one letter on this Sabbath and one on the next! Because of the Sages who declare not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 7:22

Where do we hold? If she is an adult, she becomes free by the signs [of puberty]. If she is underage, may an underage person transfer rights? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it following him who said that a minor may give heave. He answered him, but even according to him who says that a minor cannot give heave, the minor can acquire rights. This is acceptable following the opinion of the rabbis there. There, they are saying in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what one finds in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what one robs from him is robbery because of the ways of peace; a nut or a pebble and he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift, since it is written, if a man give, a man’s gift is a gift, the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Robbing from him is never clear robbery unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That which you say is to make one pay by a law suit; but to have to bring a sacrifice for a [false] oath everybody agrees only after he grew two pubic hairs. But following to the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written to his neighbor, only if he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: They came to it by the rules of school children as we have stated: “School children’s buying is buying and their selling is selling, for movables.” But did we not state: “But he cannot transfer rights through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 10:8

“When has this been said? For used ones, but for new ones he is free.” Why? Old ones are checked, new ones are not checked. It was stated: One has to check tefillin once every twelve months, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, they do not need checking. Hillel the Elder said, these are from my maternal grandfather. If he found two or three heaps, he checks the first pair of the first bundle; the same with the second or the third. Isaac ben Eleazar asked: Does one create a presumption for all of them or is each one of them for itself? If you are saying that one creates a presumption for all of them, he checks the first pair of the first heap. If you are saying that each one creates a presumption for itself, he checks three pairs from each heap.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:32

There, we have stated: “A slave whom his master gave as mortgage to others and then freed him [in strict law does not owe anything, but for the public good one forces the master to formally manumit him and he writes a bond for his own value. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the one who manumits writes.] Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Haggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasaʹs name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 4:44

Rebbi Abba bar Cahana asked before Rebbi Immi: If one leased his house to another and needs the money? He said to him, it is unthinkable that he should have to starve to death. Rebbi Zeˋira, Rebbi [Il]la both say, μίστωσις like ὠνή is acquired by buying. It was stated: If one leased his house to another and went and dedicated it, [the renter] lives in it and pays the rent to the Sanctuary. When? If he did not pay the rent in advance, but if he paid the rent in advance he lives there for free. In the days of Rebbi Mana there was a company in Sepphoris, and their children were taken as pledges. When they were about to leave, Rebbi Mana published (so) [a proclamation] following Rebbi Immi. He said, not that I am of his opinion, but because of the Sepphoreans that they should not permanently lose their children.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:10

Rebbi Immi asked, if one cleaned out the tannur and roasted it in it? Rebbi Jeremiah said, his problem is following Rebbi Yose the Galilean, but it is obvious for him following Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Yose said, even following Rebbi Aqiba it is problematic for him. From the coals into the air of the tannur it is roasted in half an hour. From the coals into free air it is roasted in one hour. What is the difference between being roasted half because of the tannur or being roasted entirely because of the tannur? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the tannur does nothing for the coals, it only keeps the heat together. If the coals are inside the tannur it is roasted in half an hour; if the coals are in free air it is roasted in one hour.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:10

Rebbi Immi asked, if one cleaned out the tannur and roasted it in it? Rebbi Jeremiah said, his problem is following Rebbi Yose the Galilean, but it is obvious for him following Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Yose said, even following Rebbi Aqiba it is problematic for him. From the coals into the air of the tannur it is roasted in half an hour. From the coals into free air it is roasted in one hour. What is the difference between being roasted half because of the tannur or being roasted entirely because of the tannur? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the tannur does nothing for the coals, it only keeps the heat together. If the coals are inside the tannur it is roasted in half an hour; if the coals are in free air it is roasted in one hour.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 8:6

Rebbi Eleazar said: The Pesaḥ of women is voluntary, but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice from women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their mazzah? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is obligatory. Rebbi Zeˋira said, it is voluntary. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s {opinion}. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Zeˋira: Lettuce, mazzah and Pesaḥ are obligatory the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: Do not eat leavened matter with it, for seven days you shall eat with it mazzot, the bread of deprivation. Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat mazzah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat mazzah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a powerful positive commandment since it is implied by a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 8:9

“A slave of two owners may not eat from either of them.” Rebbi Yose said, his master has no right to say, it is impossible that you should be counted for a Pesaḥ, but he may say to him, you may not be counted for this one, only for that one. Sometimes he is counted for three Pesaḥim simultaneously. How is this? A slave of two owners must subscribe to a Pesaḥ. If one of them freed his part, he has to subscribe to another Pesaḥ. If both of them freed, he has to subscribe to yet another Pesaḥ. Samuel bar Abba asked, may the slave eat from all three of them? If you are saying that the slave may not eat from all three of them, then he should not be able to subscribe to a Pesaḥ, since perhaps his master might want to free him and it turns out that an invalid dedication is mixed up in the offering. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said that Rebbi Zeˋira asked, may the owner fulfill his obligation by the slave’s dedication? Is that not a Mishnah: “One says to his slave, go and slaughter the Pesaḥ for me.” The Mishnah on the instruction of his master, what is problematic for him not on the instruction of his master.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 8:10

“A person who is half slave and half freedman may not eat of his master’s.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a man who is half slave and half freedman preliminarily married a woman, one disregards his preliminary marriage. It is the same for divorce. Samuel says, one takes notice of his divorce. Samuel’s statement parallels Rebbi Jehudah’s, as we have stated, “One who kidnapped a person half slave and half free Rebbi Jehudah declares punishable but the Sages make him not prosecutable.”

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 8:11

MISHNAH: One says to his slave, go and slaughter the Pesaḥ for me. If he slaughtered a kid goat, it should be eaten; if he slaughtered a lamb, it should be eaten. If he slaughtered kid goat and lamb, one eats from the first. If he forgot what his master had told him, what can he do? He shall slaughter a kid goat and a lamb and say, if my master said to me a kid goat, the kid goat is his and the lamb mine, but if my master said to me a lamb, the lamb is his and the kid goat mine. If his master had forgotten what he told him, both shall be brought to the place of burning but they are free from bringing the Second Pesaḥ.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 10:7

From where the Four Cups? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Corresponding to the four deliveries: Therefore, say to the Children of Israel, I am the Eternal, and I shall take you out, etc. And I shall take you as My people, etc. I shall take you, I shall save you, I shall free you, I shall take you. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, corresponding to the four cups of Pharao: The cup of Pharao was in my hand; I took the grapes and squeezed them into Pharao ’s cup, and gave the cup in Pharao ’s hand. You will give the cup in the hand of Pharao. Rebbi Levi said, corresponding to the four kingdoms. But our teachers say, corresponding to the four cups of doom that the Holy One, praise to Him, will make the Gentiles drink at the end of days. Truly, so said the Eternal, the God of Israel, to me: take this cup of the wine of wrath. The golden cup of Babylon is in the hand of the Eternal. Truly a cup is in the hand of the Eternal, intoxicating wine, fully to be mixed; He shall sprinkle from it but its dregs shall be drunk, squeezed to the last, by all the wicked of the earth. He shall let coals rain on the wicked; fire, sulphur, and burning wind is the portion of their cup. What does the portion of their cup mean? R. Abun said: a double cup like the double cup taken after a thermal bath. And in accordance with this correspondingly the Holy One, praised be He, will let Israel drink four cups of consolation at the End of Days: The Eternal is the portion of my part and my cup. You anointed my head with oil; my cup is overflowing. I shall lift up the cup of salvations counts for two.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 6:6

Rebbi Haggai objected before Rebbi Yose. Is there not written: The two men who have the lawsuit shall stand before the Eternal? Now men, is not two the minimum of “men”? If so, why does it say two? That both be equal? But it is written: Do not bend the lawsuit of the proselyte, the orphan,… So we find that a proselyte can have a lawsuit against one who is not a proselyte, an orphan may have a lawsuit against one who is not an orphan, a widow against somebody who is not a widow. Then why does the verse say two? It is free to be combined and one may infer from it an equal cut. It is said here two and it is said there two. Since there two means men but not women nor underaged, also here two means men but not women nor underaged. From this we learn that a woman may not be a (judge) [witness]; consequently a woman may not be a (witness) [judge].

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:27

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked, what could He have said instead of will not be deprived? “Shall not eat”? All eating in the Torah is by the volume of an olive, but here by the volume of a date. Rav Hoshaia said, “watch yourself, lest, not be deprived,” would be three warnings. Rebbi Ḥuna said, watch yourself regarding the saying which I said to you, watch yourself in matters of skin disease to be very careful and act, etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Punishment could [not] have been said about work since it is unnecessary. I could have inferred it from deprivation. [Since for deprivation] which is minor one is liable to extirpation, for work which is major it should be logical that one should be liable for extirpation. Therefore punishment was spelled out for work only to imply a warning preceding it. Since the punishment indicated for work is preceded by a warning, also the punishment indicated for deprivation is preceded by a warning. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that one may infer about an “equal cut” even if it is free only on one side. Rebbi Yudan said, Is that not Rebbi Aqiba’s? And Rebbi Aqiba said, one infers about an “equal cut” even if it is not free.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:27

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked, what could He have said instead of will not be deprived? “Shall not eat”? All eating in the Torah is by the volume of an olive, but here by the volume of a date. Rav Hoshaia said, “watch yourself, lest, not be deprived,” would be three warnings. Rebbi Ḥuna said, watch yourself regarding the saying which I said to you, watch yourself in matters of skin disease to be very careful and act, etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Punishment could [not] have been said about work since it is unnecessary. I could have inferred it from deprivation. [Since for deprivation] which is minor one is liable to extirpation, for work which is major it should be logical that one should be liable for extirpation. Therefore punishment was spelled out for work only to imply a warning preceding it. Since the punishment indicated for work is preceded by a warning, also the punishment indicated for deprivation is preceded by a warning. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that one may infer about an “equal cut” even if it is free only on one side. Rebbi Yudan said, Is that not Rebbi Aqiba’s? And Rebbi Aqiba said, one infers about an “equal cut” even if it is not free.

Jerusalem Talmud Shekalim 1:19

From where that a declaration of forfeiture by a court makes it ownerless? It is written: Anybody who will not come within three days conforming to the decree of the rulers and the elders, all his property shall be devoted to destruction and he shall be separated from the community of the Diaspora. From where that it is free from tithes? Rebbi Jonathan, the son of Rebbi Isaac bar Aḥa understood it from the following: “One intercalates years neither in the Sabbatical year, nor in the year following the Sabbatical; but if they did intercalate it is intercalated.” The one month he adds, is it not free from tithes? That refers to the Sabbatical year. What about the year after the Sabbatical? Rebbi Abun said, not to prolong the prohibition of new grain. Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: That is only before Rebbi permitted the importation of vegetables from outside the Land. But after Rebbi permitted the importation of vegetables from outside the Land, the Sabbatical year is as any other year.

Jerusalem Talmud Shekalim 1:19

From where that a declaration of forfeiture by a court makes it ownerless? It is written: Anybody who will not come within three days conforming to the decree of the rulers and the elders, all his property shall be devoted to destruction and he shall be separated from the community of the Diaspora. From where that it is free from tithes? Rebbi Jonathan, the son of Rebbi Isaac bar Aḥa understood it from the following: “One intercalates years neither in the Sabbatical year, nor in the year following the Sabbatical; but if they did intercalate it is intercalated.” The one month he adds, is it not free from tithes? That refers to the Sabbatical year. What about the year after the Sabbatical? Rebbi Abun said, not to prolong the prohibition of new grain. Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: That is only before Rebbi permitted the importation of vegetables from outside the Land. But after Rebbi permitted the importation of vegetables from outside the Land, the Sabbatical year is as any other year.

Jerusalem Talmud Shekalim 5:4

Rebbi Abbahu said, it is written The families of counters, dwellers of Yabeṣ. Why does the verse say, counters? Because they formulated the teaching numbers, numbers. “Five shall not lift heave.” “Fifteen women free their co-wives.” “Thirty-six extirpations in the Torah.” “Thirteen matters about the carcass of a pure bird.” “Four main categories of torts.” “Thirty-nine categories of work.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shekalim 5:7

Robbers stole the she-ass of Rebbi Phineas ben Yair at night. She was hidden with them for three days during which she did not eat anything. After three days, they took counsel to return her. They said, remove her lest she die with us. They let her out; she returned to her master’s door and started braying. He said to them, open to that poor creature because for three days now she did not taste anything. They opened for her and she entered. He said to them, give her something to eat. They put oats before her but she did not eat. They said to him, rabbi, she does not want to eat. He asked them, did you put it in order? They said: Yes. He asked them, did you remove its demay? They said, did the rabbi not teach us: “He who buys seeds for animals, flour for tanning, oil for lighting, is free from demay”? He said to them, what can we do with this poor creature since she is very restrictive for herself? They removed the demay and she ate.

Jerusalem Talmud Sukkah 2:1

MISHNAH: One who sleeps under the bed did not fulfill his duty. Rebbi Jehudah said, we used to sleep under the beds in the presence of the Elders and they did not say a word. Rebbi Simeon said, it happened that Tabi, Rabban Gamliel’s slave, slept under the bed. Rabban Gamliel said to the Elders, did you see my slave Tabi, who is learned and knows that slaves are free from the obligation of sukkah, and is sleeping under the bed. According to our method we infer that one who sleeps under the bed did not fulfill his duty.

Jerusalem Talmud Rosh Hashanah 3:24

“A Jubilee [it is], even though they did not observe the Sabbatical, even though they did not blow the shofar. Or maybe even though they did not manumit slaves? The verse says it is, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose says, a Jubilee, even though they did not observe the Sabbatical, even though they did not manumit slaves. Or maybe even though they did not blow the shofar? The verse says it is. Rebbi Yose said, since the verse makes it dependent on blowing the shofar, and another verse makes it dependent on manumitting slaves, why am I saying, Jubilee even though they did not manumit slaves? For it is (impossible) [possible] for a Jubilee without manumitting slaves but (possible) [impossible] for the Jubilee without sounding the shofar. Another explanation: The blowing of the shofar depends on the Court but manumission of slaves depends on everybody.” And it follows what Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, the Eternal spoke to Moses and Aaron and commanded them to the Children of Israel. About what did he command them? About the chapter on manumission of slaves. This parallels what Rebbi Ila said, Israel was only punished because of the Chapter about manumission of slaves; that is what is written, at the end ofseven years everyone has to set free his Hebrew brother, etc. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah, she was like a trading vessel, from far she brings her bread. The words of the Torah are poor in their proper place but rich at another place. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, but the words of the Sages are, consecration by the High Court, and blowing the shofar, and remission of debts cause it to be Sabbatical. One understands consecration by the High Court, and blowing the shofar. But is remission of debts not at the end? Rebbi Ze`ira understood it from the following: He said to me, do not fear, Daniel, since your words were heard from the first day when you concentrated to understand and fast before your God. Your words already were heard.

Jerusalem Talmud Rosh Hashanah 3:36

MISHNAH: A deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor, may not free the public from their obligation. This is the principle: Anybody not obligated for something may not free the public from their obligation.

Jerusalem Talmud Rosh Hashanah 3:36

MISHNAH: A deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor, may not free the public from their obligation. This is the principle: Anybody not obligated for something may not free the public from their obligation.

Jerusalem Talmud Rosh Hashanah 4:36

At one place one blows, at one place one says musaf. There are Tannaim who state, he goes to the one who blows; there are Tannaim who state, to the one who says musaf. He who said, he goes to the one who blows, if there is no time left to blow; he who said, he goes to the one who says musaf, if there is time left to blow. Let us hear from the following, what Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: At one place one blows, at one place one says musaf, he goes to the one who blows and does not go to the one who says musaf. And who said the following? On a New Year’s Day which falls on a Sabbath, at one place one blows, at one place one says musaf, he goes to the one who says musaf and does not go to the one who blows. Why? Because everybody knows how to blow but not everybody known how to say musaf. Another explanation: A person frees another from his obligation in blowing; a person does not free another from his obligation in prayer. And is a New Year’s Day which falls on a Sabbath not a day where there is no time left to blow? And you are saying, he goes to the one who says musaf? This implies that they disagree.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:16

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose says, one does not cover the Koy’s blood because it is a doubtful case.” Since circumcision whose certainty pushes aside the Sabbath, in doubt does not push aside the holiday, then for covering the blood which in case of certainty does not push aside the Sabbath it only is logical that in a case of doubt it not push aside the holiday. But is it permitted to slaughter on a Sabbath? Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he slaughtered for a sick person. They told him, does not the shofar in the countryside disprove it? For in case of certainty it does not push aside the Sabbath, but in a case of doubt it pushes aside the holiday. What kind of doubt is there? If it is a weekday, he may blow, if it is a holiday, he may blow. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: In case of a hermaphrodite who blew. And it was stated so: “The hermaphrodite frees his own kind [but does not free persons not of his own kind.] The sexless frees neither his kind nor not his kind.” Rebbi Yose asked, if in the case of a hermaphrodite who blew, is that where we stated, it has no counter argument? Rebbi (Abbaye) [Abbin] said, that is one of four cases when the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya said, there is no counter-argument. But Rebbi Eleazar the son of Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower found a counter-argument. Since circumcision which in a case of doubt does not push aside the holiday, in a case of certainty pushes aside holiday night, you can say about covering the blood where in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, since in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, in a case of doubt it should push aside the holiday. This establishes that what was problematic to the earlier rabbis and was difficult for them, so it is problematic to the later rabbis and is a difficulty for them. In the opinion of Rebbi Aḥa, the hermaphrodite frees his own kind a priori, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, a posteriori.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 5:31

HALAKHAH: “Five things were said about burning charcoal and five about the flame. One commits larceny with the burning charcoal of the Temple; one may not use its flame but one cannot commit larceny with the latter. Burning charcoal of idolatry is forbidden, its flame is allowed. He who makes a vow not to use anything of another person may not use his burning charcoal but is allowed his flame. He who carries burning charcoal into the public domain is liable but for the flame he is free of punishment. One makes the benediction over the flame but not over glowing charcoal.” Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: If the charcoal was crackling one makes the benediction. Rebbi Joḥanan from Karṣion in the name of Rebbi Naḥum bar Simai: Only if {the flame} is jumping off.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 1:36

It was seen by the rabbis, a certain donkey driver should pray and rain will come. The rabbis sent and brought him. They asked him, what is your profession? He said, I am a donkey driver. They asked him, what good deed did you do? He told them, once I rented out my donkey to a certain woman, and she was crying on the road. I asked her, what is your problem? She said to me, this woman’s husband is jailed and I have to see what to do to free him. I sold my donkey, gave her its value and told her, this is yours; free your husband and do not sin. They told him, you are worthy to pray and be heard.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 1:36

It was seen by the rabbis, a certain donkey driver should pray and rain will come. The rabbis sent and brought him. They asked him, what is your profession? He said, I am a donkey driver. They asked him, what good deed did you do? He told them, once I rented out my donkey to a certain woman, and she was crying on the road. I asked her, what is your problem? She said to me, this woman’s husband is jailed and I have to see what to do to free him. I sold my donkey, gave her its value and told her, this is yours; free your husband and do not sin. They told him, you are worthy to pray and be heard.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 1:37

It was seen by Rebbi Abbahu, Pantokaka shall pray and rain will come. Rebbi Abbahu sent and brought him. He asked him, what is your profession? He told him, five sins this man commits every day. He rents out prostitutes, maintains the theater, brings their garments to the baths, claps his hands and dances before them, and plays cymbals before them. They asked him, what good deed did you do? He told them, once I was maintaining the theater, when a woman came and stood behind a pillar, crying. I asked her, what is your problem? She said to me, this woman’s husband is jailed and I have to see what to do to free him. I sold my bed, and my bed-spread, gave her its value, and told her, this is yours; free your husband and do not sin. They told him, you are worthy to pray and be heard.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 1:37

It was seen by Rebbi Abbahu, Pantokaka shall pray and rain will come. Rebbi Abbahu sent and brought him. He asked him, what is your profession? He told him, five sins this man commits every day. He rents out prostitutes, maintains the theater, brings their garments to the baths, claps his hands and dances before them, and plays cymbals before them. They asked him, what good deed did you do? He told them, once I was maintaining the theater, when a woman came and stood behind a pillar, crying. I asked her, what is your problem? She said to me, this woman’s husband is jailed and I have to see what to do to free him. I sold my bed, and my bed-spread, gave her its value, and told her, this is yours; free your husband and do not sin. They told him, you are worthy to pray and be heard.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:9

May Ne`ilah free one from evening prayers? Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Ne`ilah frees one from evening prayers. Rebbi Abba said to Rav Ḥuna: How may he mention havdalah? Rebbi Jonah said to Rebbi Abba: How may seven free one from eighteen? He said to him, did I not already contradict it? He said to him: Because you contradicted it, should it be abandoned? Rebbi Yose said, what Rebbi Abba asked is truly difficult. What Rebbi Jonah asked is not at all difficult; they made it easy on people because of the fast, that seven should free one from eighteen. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said to his colleagues: From all of them I understand that Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi <joshua ben> Levi: Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said: Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state this? “Every day one prays eighteen benedictions, including the end of Sabbath, end of Yom Kippur, and end of public fast days.”

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:9

May Ne`ilah free one from evening prayers? Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Ne`ilah frees one from evening prayers. Rebbi Abba said to Rav Ḥuna: How may he mention havdalah? Rebbi Jonah said to Rebbi Abba: How may seven free one from eighteen? He said to him, did I not already contradict it? He said to him: Because you contradicted it, should it be abandoned? Rebbi Yose said, what Rebbi Abba asked is truly difficult. What Rebbi Jonah asked is not at all difficult; they made it easy on people because of the fast, that seven should free one from eighteen. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said to his colleagues: From all of them I understand that Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi <joshua ben> Levi: Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said: Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state this? “Every day one prays eighteen benedictions, including the end of Sabbath, end of Yom Kippur, and end of public fast days.”

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:9

May Ne`ilah free one from evening prayers? Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Ne`ilah frees one from evening prayers. Rebbi Abba said to Rav Ḥuna: How may he mention havdalah? Rebbi Jonah said to Rebbi Abba: How may seven free one from eighteen? He said to him, did I not already contradict it? He said to him: Because you contradicted it, should it be abandoned? Rebbi Yose said, what Rebbi Abba asked is truly difficult. What Rebbi Jonah asked is not at all difficult; they made it easy on people because of the fast, that seven should free one from eighteen. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said to his colleagues: From all of them I understand that Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi <joshua ben> Levi: Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said: Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state this? “Every day one prays eighteen benedictions, including the end of Sabbath, end of Yom Kippur, and end of public fast days.”

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:9

May Ne`ilah free one from evening prayers? Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Ne`ilah frees one from evening prayers. Rebbi Abba said to Rav Ḥuna: How may he mention havdalah? Rebbi Jonah said to Rebbi Abba: How may seven free one from eighteen? He said to him, did I not already contradict it? He said to him: Because you contradicted it, should it be abandoned? Rebbi Yose said, what Rebbi Abba asked is truly difficult. What Rebbi Jonah asked is not at all difficult; they made it easy on people because of the fast, that seven should free one from eighteen. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said to his colleagues: From all of them I understand that Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi <joshua ben> Levi: Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said: Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state this? “Every day one prays eighteen benedictions, including the end of Sabbath, end of Yom Kippur, and end of public fast days.”

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:9

May Ne`ilah free one from evening prayers? Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Ne`ilah frees one from evening prayers. Rebbi Abba said to Rav Ḥuna: How may he mention havdalah? Rebbi Jonah said to Rebbi Abba: How may seven free one from eighteen? He said to him, did I not already contradict it? He said to him: Because you contradicted it, should it be abandoned? Rebbi Yose said, what Rebbi Abba asked is truly difficult. What Rebbi Jonah asked is not at all difficult; they made it easy on people because of the fast, that seven should free one from eighteen. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said to his colleagues: From all of them I understand that Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi <joshua ben> Levi: Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said: Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state this? “Every day one prays eighteen benedictions, including the end of Sabbath, end of Yom Kippur, and end of public fast days.”

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:15

Rebbi Jacob bar Abba said: There, they did state, what is the status of evening prayer? Rabban Gamliel said, it is obligatory. Rebbi Joshua said, it is voluntary. Rebbi Ḥanina said, this difference parallels the other difference: He who holds that evening prayer is obligatory, holds that Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. He who holds that it is voluntary, holds that Ne`ilah frees one from evening prayers.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:21

HALAKHAH: It was stated: Ten who are free from work for the synagogue. Rav Jehudah said, like us who do not need time to study. It was stated, a place with less than ten inhabitants, its improvement is by its deficiency and is treated like a village.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 2:13

May a village dweller free a city dweller of his obligation? Should it follow “anybody not obligated for something may not free the public from their obligation”? May a city dweller free a village dweller of his obligation? Should it follow “anybody not obligated for something may not free the public from their obligation”? Or should it follow what “Rebbi Ḥelbo said, Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Everybody may fulfill his obligation on the Fourteenth, which is the time of its reading”? Rebbi Yudan asked. [A village dweller who] decided to move in the night of the Fifteenth? Is that not the Mishnah, “a villager who went to a walled city”? The Mishnah if he was in the walled city. What is problematic for him, if he was in a village. But those on an ocean trip or passing through deserts read normally on the Fourteenth. Rebbi Mana said, if he intended to return to his place. Rebbi Phineas said, therefore the dispersed Jews, in that hour he was dispersed.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 2:13

May a village dweller free a city dweller of his obligation? Should it follow “anybody not obligated for something may not free the public from their obligation”? May a city dweller free a village dweller of his obligation? Should it follow “anybody not obligated for something may not free the public from their obligation”? Or should it follow what “Rebbi Ḥelbo said, Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Everybody may fulfill his obligation on the Fourteenth, which is the time of its reading”? Rebbi Yudan asked. [A village dweller who] decided to move in the night of the Fifteenth? Is that not the Mishnah, “a villager who went to a walled city”? The Mishnah if he was in the walled city. What is problematic for him, if he was in a village. But those on an ocean trip or passing through deserts read normally on the Fourteenth. Rebbi Mana said, if he intended to return to his place. Rebbi Phineas said, therefore the dispersed Jews, in that hour he was dispersed.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 2:13

May a village dweller free a city dweller of his obligation? Should it follow “anybody not obligated for something may not free the public from their obligation”? May a city dweller free a village dweller of his obligation? Should it follow “anybody not obligated for something may not free the public from their obligation”? Or should it follow what “Rebbi Ḥelbo said, Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Everybody may fulfill his obligation on the Fourteenth, which is the time of its reading”? Rebbi Yudan asked. [A village dweller who] decided to move in the night of the Fifteenth? Is that not the Mishnah, “a villager who went to a walled city”? The Mishnah if he was in the walled city. What is problematic for him, if he was in a village. But those on an ocean trip or passing through deserts read normally on the Fourteenth. Rebbi Mana said, if he intended to return to his place. Rebbi Phineas said, therefore the dispersed Jews, in that hour he was dispersed.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 2:13

May a village dweller free a city dweller of his obligation? Should it follow “anybody not obligated for something may not free the public from their obligation”? May a city dweller free a village dweller of his obligation? Should it follow “anybody not obligated for something may not free the public from their obligation”? Or should it follow what “Rebbi Ḥelbo said, Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Everybody may fulfill his obligation on the Fourteenth, which is the time of its reading”? Rebbi Yudan asked. [A village dweller who] decided to move in the night of the Fifteenth? Is that not the Mishnah, “a villager who went to a walled city”? The Mishnah if he was in the walled city. What is problematic for him, if he was in a village. But those on an ocean trip or passing through deserts read normally on the Fourteenth. Rebbi Mana said, if he intended to return to his place. Rebbi Phineas said, therefore the dispersed Jews, in that hour he was dispersed.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 4:27

It was stated: One does not make public tender for slaves, and girl slaves, and movables. What is public tender? Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, announcement. Ulla bar Ismael said, slaves lest they flee, securities and movables lest they be stolen. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen asked before Rebbi Yose: Does this not imply that a slave be redeemed in front of three people? He answered him, yes. But did we not state: “Real estate nine and a Cohen. The same holds for humans”? He answered him, but the human here is a free person. Ḥanania bar Šelemiah in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi who wanted to act following the rabbis. Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus, the grandson of Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus, said to him: Rebbi, did you not teach us in your grandfather’s name, “except if he offered public tender”? He answered, yes, changed his mind, and acted following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:7

It happened that Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai was on the road, riding on a donkey, and Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh was walking behind him. He said to him, my teacher, instruct me in a Chapter about the Work of the Chariot. He told him, did the Sagen not state, “nor the Chariot unless he was wise and understood by himself.” He said to him, my teacher, permit me to say it before you. He told him, say. When Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh started about the Work of the Chariot, Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai descended from the donkey. He said, it is not appropriate that I should hear about the glory of my Creator riding on a donkey. They went and sat under a tree, when fire descended from Heaven and surrounded them, and the angels of Service were dancing before them like wedding guests happy with the bridegroom. An angel addressed from inside the fire and said, the Work of the Chariot is as you said, Eleazar ben Arakh. Then all trees (around them) [opened their mouths] and sang; then all trees of the forest will sing. When Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh finished with the Work of the Chariot, Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai rose, kissed him on his head, and said: Praised be the Eternal, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who gave a wise son to our father Abraham who knows to speak of the Glory of our Father in Heaven. They are good speakers who do not act well, those who act well but are no good speakers. Eleazar ben Arakh speaks well and acts well. Hail to you, our father Abraham, that Eleazar ben Arakh came from your loins. When Rebbi Yosef Hakohen and Rebbi Simeon ben Nethanael heard, they also started with the Work of the Chariot. They said, it was one day after the summer solstice; the earth trembled and the Arc appeared in the cloud. An unembodied voice came and said to them, the place is free and the triclinium prepared for you. You and your students are invited to the third group. This parallels him who said, seven enjoyments are before Your presence, there are seven groups of just people in the Future World.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:41

MISHNAH: If one opens a barrel, or one starts to sell his dough, on the holiday, Rebbi Jehudah says, he may finish, but the Sages say, he may not finish. After the holiday one proclaims the purity of the courtyard. If the holiday was over on a Friday one did not go over it because of the honor of the Sabbath. Rebbi Jehudah says, also not if the holiday was over on Thursday since the priests are not free.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:44

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If a holiday falls on a Friday, one eats making Sabbath after the holiday like the holiday. Rebbi Ze`ira said, a baraita states this: The eve of Passover is like Passover, the day of slaughter is like Pentecost. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, we also stated more than this: “Rebbi Jehudah says, also not if the holiday was over on Thursday since the priests are not free.”

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:23

HALAKHAH: There, we have stated: “A white spot in the size of a grit and it spread in the size of a grit [and in the spread appeared a healthy spot or a white hair] but the original disappeared. Rebbi Aqiba declares him impure, but the Sages are saying, it should be seen as a new case.” Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba declares him impure absolutely. But the rabbis are saying, it should be seen as a new case as absolutely {impure}. What is the difference between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, holiday eve is between them. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and you do not deal with him neither to alleviate nor to restrict. But the rabbis are saying that this is a new case and you free him from the first one. And this is “not to restrict” that you should not deal with the second case neither to alleviate nor to restrict. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, it turns out that the single opinion here parallels the anonymous opinion there and the single opinion there parallels the anonymous opinion here. The single opinion here parallels the anonymous opinion there: Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and you do not deal with him neither to alleviate nor to restrict. And the single opinion there parallels the anonymous opinion here: The rabbis are saying that this is a new case and you free him from the first one. And we have stated here, “Rebbi Meïr says, one inspects skin-disease to alleviate but not to restrict” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Either following the single opinion here or the rabbis here the rabbis there agree to alleviate but not to restrict. There, if the original disappeared, but here, if the indications {of impurity} disappeared and the original remains. “Rebbi said, the opinion of Rebbi Yose is reasonable for one in quarantine and the opinion of Rebbi Meïr if he is absolutely {impure}.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, they disagree about the holiday itself. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case; could he enter the Temple courtyard? But the rabbis are saying, this is a new case; could he not enter the Temple courtyard? Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba declares him impure absolutely. But the rabbis are saying, it should be seen as a new case to become absolute. What is between them? (It will be sweet for him to hear a temporary release from the mouth of the Cohen.) Samuel said, they disagree about expansion. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and the expansion of impurity is pure. But the rabbis are saying that this is a new case and the expansion of purity is impure. One said in Samuel’s name, expansion and treatment-resistant scabies is between them. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and the expansion of impurity is pure. But the rabbis are saying that this is a new case and the expansion of purity is impure. Because it is another case. Therefore otherwise it would be pure. It parallels what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said when they differed, if it developed treatment-resistant scabies, Rebbi Joḥanan said pure, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said impure.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:23

HALAKHAH: There, we have stated: “A white spot in the size of a grit and it spread in the size of a grit [and in the spread appeared a healthy spot or a white hair] but the original disappeared. Rebbi Aqiba declares him impure, but the Sages are saying, it should be seen as a new case.” Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba declares him impure absolutely. But the rabbis are saying, it should be seen as a new case as absolutely {impure}. What is the difference between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, holiday eve is between them. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and you do not deal with him neither to alleviate nor to restrict. But the rabbis are saying that this is a new case and you free him from the first one. And this is “not to restrict” that you should not deal with the second case neither to alleviate nor to restrict. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, it turns out that the single opinion here parallels the anonymous opinion there and the single opinion there parallels the anonymous opinion here. The single opinion here parallels the anonymous opinion there: Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and you do not deal with him neither to alleviate nor to restrict. And the single opinion there parallels the anonymous opinion here: The rabbis are saying that this is a new case and you free him from the first one. And we have stated here, “Rebbi Meïr says, one inspects skin-disease to alleviate but not to restrict” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Either following the single opinion here or the rabbis here the rabbis there agree to alleviate but not to restrict. There, if the original disappeared, but here, if the indications {of impurity} disappeared and the original remains. “Rebbi said, the opinion of Rebbi Yose is reasonable for one in quarantine and the opinion of Rebbi Meïr if he is absolutely {impure}.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, they disagree about the holiday itself. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case; could he enter the Temple courtyard? But the rabbis are saying, this is a new case; could he not enter the Temple courtyard? Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba declares him impure absolutely. But the rabbis are saying, it should be seen as a new case to become absolute. What is between them? (It will be sweet for him to hear a temporary release from the mouth of the Cohen.) Samuel said, they disagree about expansion. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and the expansion of impurity is pure. But the rabbis are saying that this is a new case and the expansion of purity is impure. One said in Samuel’s name, expansion and treatment-resistant scabies is between them. Rebbi Aqiba says that this is the former case and the expansion of impurity is pure. But the rabbis are saying that this is a new case and the expansion of purity is impure. Because it is another case. Therefore otherwise it would be pure. It parallels what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said when they differed, if it developed treatment-resistant scabies, Rebbi Joḥanan said pure, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said impure.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:32

HALAKHAH: Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. They asked before Rebbi Yose: May a slave marry a woman on a holiday? He told them, let us hear from the following: “One who is half a slave and half a free man.” And Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. This implies that a slave is commanded to be fruitful and multiply and anybody commanded to be fruitful and multiply is forbidden to marry on a holiday

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:1

MISHNAH: Fifteen [categories of] women free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate forever. They are the following: one’s daughter, his daughter’s daughter and his son’s daughter, his wife’s daughter and her daughter‘s daughter and her son’s daughter, his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother, his sister and his maternat aunt and his wife’s sister, his maternal halfbrother’s wife, the wife of his brother who did not live in his world, and his daughter-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:2

HALAKHAH: “Fifteen [categories of] women free their co-wives”, etc. It is written “unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted and then forbidden, when it became permitted again should one think it returned to its prior permission? The verse states “unleavened it should be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted and then forbidden, when she became permitted again should one think she returned to her prior permission? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:17

Levi bar Sisi asked before Rebbi: Should we not state “sixteen women”? One’s mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. He said to him, it is evident that this person has no brain in his head. And why? He said to him, because of Rebbi Jehudah, because Rebbi Jehudah forbids the one who was raped or seduced by his father. Does Rebbi Jehudah not agree that if [the halfbrother] gave her qiddushin, the preliminary marriage is legally recognized? But because we have stated: “Six incest prohibitions more severe than these; because they are married to others their co-wives are free.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thereupon: “If they may marry his brother without sin their co-wives are freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate.” And among all of them there is only his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. Why did we not state this? Because Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it, should we not state it? Certainly we should state it! But because we have stated: “Her sister who also is her sister-in-law either takes ḥalîṣah or accepts the levirate.” We find in all cases that her sister who also is her sister-in-law accepts the levirate except for his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:27

MISHNAH: All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate forever. And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted. But you cannot say about his mother-in-law or his mother-in-law’s mother that they were found to be she-rams or that they had repudiated.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:28

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:31

Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, did not Rebbi Yose say correctly before he changed his mind? Once a man’s daughter is married without being a she-ram, her co-wife is forbidden. If in addition she is a she-ram, does her co-wife become permitted? He said to him, the she-ram is as if non-existent. If there are two sisters-in-law, one a she-ram and one not a she-ram, if the levir comes and performs ḥalîṣah or has intercourse with the first, did he free her companion of anything? That shows that the she-ram is as if non-existent.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:37

MISHNAH: How do they free their co-wives? If a man’s daughter or one of the incest-prohibited women was married to his brother who has another wife and dies, just as his daughter is free so her co-wife is free. If his daughter’s co-wife went and was married to a second brother who then died, just as his daughter’s co-wife is freed, so the co-wife’s co-wife is freed; even if this is repeated a hundred times.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:37

MISHNAH: How do they free their co-wives? If a man’s daughter or one of the incest-prohibited women was married to his brother who has another wife and dies, just as his daughter is free so her co-wife is free. If his daughter’s co-wife went and was married to a second brother who then died, just as his daughter’s co-wife is freed, so the co-wife’s co-wife is freed; even if this is repeated a hundred times.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:37

MISHNAH: How do they free their co-wives? If a man’s daughter or one of the incest-prohibited women was married to his brother who has another wife and dies, just as his daughter is free so her co-wife is free. If his daughter’s co-wife went and was married to a second brother who then died, just as his daughter’s co-wife is freed, so the co-wife’s co-wife is freed; even if this is repeated a hundred times.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:38

HALAKHAH: “How do they free their co-wives? If a man’s daughter or one of the incest-prohibited women,”, etc. That is the baraita: “If a woman could repudiate but did not do so, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:42

HALAKHAH: “Six incest prohibitions are more stringent than these since they [concern women who] must be married to others”, etc. In what are they more stringent? Here there is extirpation, there is extirpation. Here there is bastardy, there there is bastardy. What is more stringent? That they cannot be married to the brothers without transgression. And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: For all women who may be married to the brothers without transgression, their co-wives are free from ḥalîṣah and levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:10

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:7

If the first [sister] had a co-wife, one [of the brothers] performs ḥalîṣah, the co-wife is freed. If then he had intercourse with her, this is forbidden intercourse and the co-wife is not freed. If he performed ḥalîṣah and then had intercourse with her, as you look at it, either ḥalîṣah should free or intercourse should free! Rebbi Yudan said, I confirmed it following “If somebody married his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant”, as you say there, the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through the fetus or through intercourse; so here also the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through ḥalîṣah or through intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:7

If the first [sister] had a co-wife, one [of the brothers] performs ḥalîṣah, the co-wife is freed. If then he had intercourse with her, this is forbidden intercourse and the co-wife is not freed. If he performed ḥalîṣah and then had intercourse with her, as you look at it, either ḥalîṣah should free or intercourse should free! Rebbi Yudan said, I confirmed it following “If somebody married his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant”, as you say there, the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through the fetus or through intercourse; so here also the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through ḥalîṣah or through intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:15

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters,” etc. Ulla bar Ismael said, so explained Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah: Rebbi Simeon frees the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the group asked, would anybody think that a man could acquire two sisters together? Rebbi Ḥanina said before Rebbi Mana and disagreed: Why does Rebbi Simeon free the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate? He said to him, because nobody thinks that a man could acquire two sisters together. There they said, the words of Rebbi Simeon imply that no candidacy can come after another candidacy. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Only if he sinned and had intercourse. What is the difference? If somebody from the market gave qiddushin to the second sister. Following the rabbis, perfect qiddushin. Following Rebbi Eleazar, suspended qiddushin. When he has intercourse with the first, the qiddushin become valid for the second. If he had intercourse with the second, following the rabbis it is an incestuous act. Following Rebbi Eleazar, it is not an incestuous act. If the first one died, following the rabbis the second is permitted to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:40

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Sometimes four times, sometimes eight times, sometimes twelve times, sometimes sixteen times. They are guilty under the heading of adultery with a married woman, each couple for two. If they were brothers, under the heading of “brother’s wife”, each couple for four. If they were sisters, under the heading of “a wife together with her sister”, each couple six. If they were menstruating, under the heading of “menstruating”, each couple eight. If the men are minors and the women adults, they are free. If the men are adults and the women minors, they are obligated two by two because of menstruation. If their father married them off, for all eight. If one of the men was an adult and the other a minor, the one who had intercourse with the minor is guilty as wife of the adult but the one who had intercourse with the adult is free as wife of the minor.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:40

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Sometimes four times, sometimes eight times, sometimes twelve times, sometimes sixteen times. They are guilty under the heading of adultery with a married woman, each couple for two. If they were brothers, under the heading of “brother’s wife”, each couple for four. If they were sisters, under the heading of “a wife together with her sister”, each couple six. If they were menstruating, under the heading of “menstruating”, each couple eight. If the men are minors and the women adults, they are free. If the men are adults and the women minors, they are obligated two by two because of menstruation. If their father married them off, for all eight. If one of the men was an adult and the other a minor, the one who had intercourse with the minor is guilty as wife of the adult but the one who had intercourse with the adult is free as wife of the minor.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:30

MISHNAH: If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law while his brother had married her sister and then died, she must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife while his brother had married her sister and then died, she is free.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:5

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:5

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:5

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:5

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:5

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:5

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:6

Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:7

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:7

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:7

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:7

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:7

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:8

Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:8

Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:9

In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, can there be invalid intercourse after invalid intercourse, or the intercourse of a nine-years-old after the intercourse of [another] nine-years-old, or invalid intercourse after the intercourse of a nine-years-old, or intercourse of a nine-years-old after invalid intercourse? Do the Sages agree with Rabban Gamliel that there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” for one sister-in-law? How is that? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law, gave her a bill of divorce, and “bespoke” her again. If you say, there can be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she did not become free by that bill of divorce. If you say, there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she was freed by that bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:12

HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off.” That is no cutting off!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:12

HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off.” That is no cutting off!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:12

HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off.” That is no cutting off!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:17

That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:17

That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:17

That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:17

That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:17

That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:23

HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:26

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:8

There, we have stated: “If somebody receives [a flock] under mortmain conditions from a Gentile, the young are free, the young’s young are obligated.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say, the young are for the first, and here you say, the young are for the second! Rebbi Yosa said, there, because the property rights are with the first, the young belong to the first. But here, because the property rights are with the second, the young belong to the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:13

We find that Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose disagrees with his father since Rebbi Simon said in the name of Hilfai: Rebbi, Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose and Ben Qappara voted on the airspace of Ascalon and declared it pure from the testimony of Rebbi Phineas ben Yaïr who said, we were descending to the Saracen [market] at Ascalon where we bought wheat, returned to our town, immersed ourselves and ate our heave. The next day they wanted to vote to free it from tithes but Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose removed his hand. He was leaning on Ben Qappara. He said to him, my son, why did you not say to me: did you not remove your hand? I would have told you that yesterday I was he who declared it impure, I am he who declared it pure. But now I am saying, maybe it was conquered within the meaning of the Torah, how can I free it from the meaning of the Torah? When is it impure because of territory of Gentiles? But we found that he stated in the name of his father that they accepted tithes voluntarily! And he said, it is correct that if tithes are from their words and the food of the daughters is of their words that their words may uproot their words.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:13

We find that Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose disagrees with his father since Rebbi Simon said in the name of Hilfai: Rebbi, Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose and Ben Qappara voted on the airspace of Ascalon and declared it pure from the testimony of Rebbi Phineas ben Yaïr who said, we were descending to the Saracen [market] at Ascalon where we bought wheat, returned to our town, immersed ourselves and ate our heave. The next day they wanted to vote to free it from tithes but Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose removed his hand. He was leaning on Ben Qappara. He said to him, my son, why did you not say to me: did you not remove your hand? I would have told you that yesterday I was he who declared it impure, I am he who declared it pure. But now I am saying, maybe it was conquered within the meaning of the Torah, how can I free it from the meaning of the Torah? When is it impure because of territory of Gentiles? But we found that he stated in the name of his father that they accepted tithes voluntarily! And he said, it is correct that if tithes are from their words and the food of the daughters is of their words that their words may uproot their words.