free
1443 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
The Mishnah is Rebbi Meїr’s, since Rebbi Meїr says that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes; Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, a Gentile may acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to free it from tithes. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Meïr (Lev. 25:46): “You shall transmit them by inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit by the rules of real estate.” This brackets slaves with real estate. Just as you may buy slaves from them but they cannot buy from you, so real estate you may buy from them but they cannot buy from you. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, the following supports Rebbi Meїr (Lev. 25:23): “The land shall not be sold permanently,” absolutely. He said to him, that in itself supports Rebbi Simeon. “It shall not be sold”, because if it was sold, it would be sold absolutely. Rebbi Huna from Sepphoris said, Rebbi Ḥanina instituted in Sepphoris following Rebbi Simeon.
MISHNAH: One does not collect from encumbered property as long as there is free property, even if the latter is of lowest quality. One may collect from orphans’ property only from the lowest quality.
If [Reuben] robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi, then Simeon came and foreclosed it from Levi; then Levi collects from Reuben’s encumbered property and Simeon collects the usufruct from Levi’s free property. If Levi in the meantime improved [the property], Levi collects the capital from Reuben’s encumbered property and the improvement from Simeon’s free property. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said, only if a third party’s buying preceded the improvement by this one. But if the improvement by this one preceded a third party’s buying, Levi can collect the capital even from Simeon’s encumbered property. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said: With usufruct one proceeds in the same way. If he spent four denars and the improvement is worth six, Levi collects four denars from Reuben’s encumbered property and another two from Simeon’s free property. Rebbi Abin in the name of the rabbis there: Since he did not enter with permission, his hand is weak against Simeon. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of the rabbis there: Since he entered with permission, his hand is strong against Reuben.
If [Reuben] robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi, then Simeon came and foreclosed it from Levi; then Levi collects from Reuben’s encumbered property and Simeon collects the usufruct from Levi’s free property. If Levi in the meantime improved [the property], Levi collects the capital from Reuben’s encumbered property and the improvement from Simeon’s free property. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said, only if a third party’s buying preceded the improvement by this one. But if the improvement by this one preceded a third party’s buying, Levi can collect the capital even from Simeon’s encumbered property. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said: With usufruct one proceeds in the same way. If he spent four denars and the improvement is worth six, Levi collects four denars from Reuben’s encumbered property and another two from Simeon’s free property. Rebbi Abin in the name of the rabbis there: Since he did not enter with permission, his hand is weak against Simeon. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of the rabbis there: Since he entered with permission, his hand is strong against Reuben.
If [Reuben] robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi, then Simeon came and foreclosed it from Levi; then Levi collects from Reuben’s encumbered property and Simeon collects the usufruct from Levi’s free property. If Levi in the meantime improved [the property], Levi collects the capital from Reuben’s encumbered property and the improvement from Simeon’s free property. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said, only if a third party’s buying preceded the improvement by this one. But if the improvement by this one preceded a third party’s buying, Levi can collect the capital even from Simeon’s encumbered property. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said: With usufruct one proceeds in the same way. If he spent four denars and the improvement is worth six, Levi collects four denars from Reuben’s encumbered property and another two from Simeon’s free property. Rebbi Abin in the name of the rabbis there: Since he did not enter with permission, his hand is weak against Simeon. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of the rabbis there: Since he entered with permission, his hand is strong against Reuben.
MISHNAH: If someone causes impurity, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated. If Cohanim in the Temple intentionally made [a sacrifice] piggul, they have to pay.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”
Rav Huna in the name of Rav: If he mixed. If he made a libation and then mixed it, at the start he committed a capital crime and at the end he has to pay? Rebbi Abba objected: Think of it, if he killed somebody and broke the flask, at the start he committed a capital crime and in the end he has to pay? Rebbi Yose objected: Think of it, if he set fire to somebody’s grain stack on the Day of Atonement, at the start he committed a capital crime and in the end he has to pay? “If someone causes anything to become impure, or turn into dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine.
What is the status of her intercourse? Some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is certain, but some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is in doubt. According to him who says that her intercourse is certain, he brings a “hung” sacrifice. According to him who says that her intercourse is in doubt, if [the husband] dies, he is free; if [the husband] does not die, he brings a purification sacrifice.
HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz,” etc. It was stated: If she did not manage to pay before he died, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, she pays his father or his brother and is free from ḥalîṣah and levirate marriage. The same holds for preliminary marriage: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that I shall give you 200 zuz;” if he did not manage to pay before he died, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, his father or his brother pay and she is subject to ḥalîṣah or levirate marriage.
Rebbi Yudan said, we deal with the case that it was lost by compulsion. They treated her like an unpaid trustee who may stipulate to be free from an oath. Rebbi Yose said, do we state here that the unpaid trustee is free from an oath? But we deal with the case that it was lost by mishandling. They treated the stole according to its value. But the rabbis say that in any case it has to be treated as a case of condition of a bill of divorce.
Rebbi Yudan said, we deal with the case that it was lost by compulsion. They treated her like an unpaid trustee who may stipulate to be free from an oath. Rebbi Yose said, do we state here that the unpaid trustee is free from an oath? But we deal with the case that it was lost by mishandling. They treated the stole according to its value. But the rabbis say that in any case it has to be treated as a case of condition of a bill of divorce.
MISHNAH: “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with, it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalȋṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful, it is invalid. The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own.
Rebbi Mana said: He has to be careful not to say “וְדִין”. Rebbi Mana asked: “You are on your own”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one must say: “You are a free person, you are on your own.” The Mishnah said so: “You are a free person, you are on your own.”
Rebbi Mana said: He has to be careful not to say “וְדִין”. Rebbi Mana asked: “You are on your own”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one must say: “You are a free person, you are on your own.” The Mishnah said so: “You are a free person, you are on your own.”
So we learned intercourse without money. Money without intercourse, from where? “She shall go free, without money.” “If he did acquire another one.” Since one was by money, so the other is by money.
Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.
Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.
Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.
Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: How can a ḥăruphah slave girl acquire her autonomy in such a way that she would be freed from flogging, and [free] the one who had intercourse with her from a reparation sacrifice? It is obvious that she cannot leave by a bill of divorce since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least since (Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least). Rebbi Yose said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: Aquila the proselyte translated before Rebbi Aqiba “and she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “she spread morsels on it.” Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: So Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon explained it before the Sages. “And she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “in morsels by a pestle.”
Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: How can a ḥăruphah slave girl acquire her autonomy in such a way that she would be freed from flogging, and [free] the one who had intercourse with her from a reparation sacrifice? It is obvious that she cannot leave by a bill of divorce since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least since (Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least). Rebbi Yose said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: Aquila the proselyte translated before Rebbi Aqiba “and she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “she spread morsels on it.” Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: So Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon explained it before the Sages. “And she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “in morsels by a pestle.”
Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: How can a ḥăruphah slave girl acquire her autonomy in such a way that she would be freed from flogging, and [free] the one who had intercourse with her from a reparation sacrifice? It is obvious that she cannot leave by a bill of divorce since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least since (Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least). Rebbi Yose said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: Aquila the proselyte translated before Rebbi Aqiba “and she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “she spread morsels on it.” Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: So Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon explained it before the Sages. “And she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “in morsels by a pestle.”
Can she regain her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years]? What is the problem? Following Rebbi Aqiba? But Rebbi Aqiba said that the verse speaks about a woman half slave and half free engaged to be married by a free man. Therefore, his problem is following Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said that the verse speaks about a Canaanite slave girl married to a Hebrew slave, since this is marriage sanctioned by the Torah: “If his master give him a wife.” But his problem is whether she regains her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years] for him who says that the Hebrew slave does not serve the heir.
Can she regain her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years]? What is the problem? Following Rebbi Aqiba? But Rebbi Aqiba said that the verse speaks about a woman half slave and half free engaged to be married by a free man. Therefore, his problem is following Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said that the verse speaks about a Canaanite slave girl married to a Hebrew slave, since this is marriage sanctioned by the Torah: “If his master give him a wife.” But his problem is whether she regains her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years] for him who says that the Hebrew slave does not serve the heir.
HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.
HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.
It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.
“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.
“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.
It is written: “His master shall bring him to the judges, or he shall bring him to the door.” How is that? The one who was sold by the court, “his master shall bring him to the judges.” The one who sold himself, “or he shall bring him to the door.” Rebbi Immi asked: It is obvious that the court writes the contract for him who was sold by the court. Who is writing the contract for him who sells himself? It is written: “It shall not be hard in your eyes to send him away free from you; for twice the hire of a hireling he served you for six years.” The hired hand works during the day; he does not work in the night. The Hebrew slave works both day and night. It is written: “He shall not treat him harshly before your eyes,” and you say so? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His master marries him to a Canaanite slave; it turns out that he serves him day and night. Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked before Rebbi Immi: Think of it, if he was buying a Cohen! He answered him: Would the case of an Israel not also be permission of something prohibited following Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Abba bar Mamai here changed his mind.
“His ear.” Since “his ear” mentioned there means the right ear, also here the right ear. “If the slave says saying”, two sayings, one at the end of the sixth year and one at the start of the seventh year. One at the end of the sixth year, while he still is in his servitude and one at the start of the seventh year, “I will not go free.” “I love my master, my wife, and my children.” This teaches that he cannot be pierced unless he have a wife and children, unless he love his master and his master love him; unless the property be blessed because of him as it is said: “For he feels well with you.”
Rebbi Abun said, it follows Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave. But do the rabbis not hold that a person can free half of his slave? They admit it for a slave held in partnership. But there is a difference for a slave who entirely belongs to him, for it is as if he gave something from his right into his left hand. Does Rebbi hold that it is not as if he gave something from his right into his left hand? He admits it if he gave to him through a third party. Do the rabbis not hold that he may give to him through a third party? The rabbis hold that one who can acquire by himself can acquire through a third party; one who cannot acquire by himself cannot acquire through a third party. Rebbi says, even though he cannot acquire by himself, he can acquire through third parties.
Rebbi Abun said, it follows Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave. But do the rabbis not hold that a person can free half of his slave? They admit it for a slave held in partnership. But there is a difference for a slave who entirely belongs to him, for it is as if he gave something from his right into his left hand. Does Rebbi hold that it is not as if he gave something from his right into his left hand? He admits it if he gave to him through a third party. Do the rabbis not hold that he may give to him through a third party? The rabbis hold that one who can acquire by himself can acquire through a third party; one who cannot acquire by himself cannot acquire through a third party. Rebbi says, even though he cannot acquire by himself, he can acquire through third parties.
Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission since a bill of manumission applies to him. But he should not be able to accept a bill of divorce since a bill of divorce does not apply to him. If you say, is that not a baraita? “Your are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission but he should not be able to accept a bill of his equal. If you say, the preceding baraita? “You are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs.
Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission since a bill of manumission applies to him. But he should not be able to accept a bill of divorce since a bill of divorce does not apply to him. If you say, is that not a baraita? “Your are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission but he should not be able to accept a bill of his equal. If you say, the preceding baraita? “You are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs.
“For my slave girl X I want a document that she should not be enslaved.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan. He said, he has no power to enslave. What are her children? Slaves. What did he retain for her? Her earnings. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Yose both said, this follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. If he wrote all his possessions jointly to two of his slaves, both are free and both have to free one another. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Abba: Does this not imply that one slave accepts from his master for another one? He answered, what do you think? Since they acquired the properties they went free? No, simultaneously slaves and properties went free.
“For my slave girl X I want a document that she should not be enslaved.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan. He said, he has no power to enslave. What are her children? Slaves. What did he retain for her? Her earnings. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Yose both said, this follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. If he wrote all his possessions jointly to two of his slaves, both are free and both have to free one another. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Abba: Does this not imply that one slave accepts from his master for another one? He answered, what do you think? Since they acquired the properties they went free? No, simultaneously slaves and properties went free.
“For my slave girl X I want a document that she should not be enslaved.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan. He said, he has no power to enslave. What are her children? Slaves. What did he retain for her? Her earnings. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Yose both said, this follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. If he wrote all his possessions jointly to two of his slaves, both are free and both have to free one another. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Abba: Does this not imply that one slave accepts from his master for another one? He answered, what do you think? Since they acquired the properties they went free? No, simultaneously slaves and properties went free.
“For my slave girl X I want a document that she should not be enslaved.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan. He said, he has no power to enslave. What are her children? Slaves. What did he retain for her? Her earnings. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Yose both said, this follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. If he wrote all his possessions jointly to two of his slaves, both are free and both have to free one another. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Abba: Does this not imply that one slave accepts from his master for another one? He answered, what do you think? Since they acquired the properties they went free? No, simultaneously slaves and properties went free.
“You are free but your child will be a slave,” her child is like her, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, it is understandable; there is a disagreement. What is the disagreement following Rebbi Eleazar? But it must be so: His words stand, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. What means “he did not do anything”? Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. Following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave.
“You are free but your child will be a slave,” her child is like her, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, it is understandable; there is a disagreement. What is the disagreement following Rebbi Eleazar? But it must be so: His words stand, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. What means “he did not do anything”? Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. Following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave.
“You are free but your child will be a slave,” her child is like her, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, it is understandable; there is a disagreement. What is the disagreement following Rebbi Eleazar? But it must be so: His words stand, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. What means “he did not do anything”? Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. Following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave.
“You are free but your child will be a slave,” her child is like her, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, it is understandable; there is a disagreement. What is the disagreement following Rebbi Eleazar? But it must be so: His words stand, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say, he did not do anything. What means “he did not do anything”? Rebbi Eleazar said, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: Both are free. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both are slaves. Following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave.
“But the Sages say, small animals are taken possession of by drawing near.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “Draw near and take for yourselves small animals for your families.” As Rav Jehudah sent to ask: By what means is possession of large animals established? He answered, by handing over; and asked, is that not the Mishnah? There are Tannaïm who switch the attributions. Rav Jehudah asked Rebbi Eleazar: If a firstborn became “torn” within thirty days? He answered, he is as if dead and free from the five tetradrachmas of a son. Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: A placenta which was delivered partially today and partially tomorrow? He answered, for pure blood she counts from the first day, for impure blood from the second day. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, if no child was produced with it. But if there was a child, both for pure and impure blood she counts only from the moment of birth of the child.
Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Can movables be taken into possession by dragging? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, what is his problem? With hard hides. But soft hides are not taken into posession until lifted. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: If somebody steals another person’s pouch and removes it on the Sabbath, he is obligated since he already is obligated for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. But if he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution fall on him simultaneously. Therefore, if the obligations of capital crime and restitution do not fall on him simultaneously he is obligated. Rebbi Mattania said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged.
HALAKHAH: “If anything is given instead of money,” etc. There, we have stated: “This is the principle: All movables acquire one another.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Even heaps among heaps. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, we have stated only: “If anything is given instead of money,” anything that needs estimation. It turns out that Rebbi Abba follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar his own opinion, as we have stated there: “Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe, but if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they exchanged kid goats against rams and rams against kid goats. But if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, that was [the recipient’s] part from the first moment. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, they are buyers. But we have stated there: “The buyer and the recipient of a gift are free from animal tithe. Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe.” When they split and then joined again. “But if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” If they never split.
HALAKHAH: “If anything is given instead of money,” etc. There, we have stated: “This is the principle: All movables acquire one another.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Even heaps among heaps. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, we have stated only: “If anything is given instead of money,” anything that needs estimation. It turns out that Rebbi Abba follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar his own opinion, as we have stated there: “Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe, but if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they exchanged kid goats against rams and rams against kid goats. But if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, that was [the recipient’s] part from the first moment. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, they are buyers. But we have stated there: “The buyer and the recipient of a gift are free from animal tithe. Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe.” When they split and then joined again. “But if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” If they never split.
HALAKHAH: “If anything is given instead of money,” etc. There, we have stated: “This is the principle: All movables acquire one another.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Even heaps among heaps. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, we have stated only: “If anything is given instead of money,” anything that needs estimation. It turns out that Rebbi Abba follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar his own opinion, as we have stated there: “Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe, but if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they exchanged kid goats against rams and rams against kid goats. But if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, that was [the recipient’s] part from the first moment. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, they are buyers. But we have stated there: “The buyer and the recipient of a gift are free from animal tithe. Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe.” When they split and then joined again. “But if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” If they never split.
HALAKHAH: “If anything is given instead of money,” etc. There, we have stated: “This is the principle: All movables acquire one another.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Even heaps among heaps. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, we have stated only: “If anything is given instead of money,” anything that needs estimation. It turns out that Rebbi Abba follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar his own opinion, as we have stated there: “Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe, but if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they exchanged kid goats against rams and rams against kid goats. But if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, that was [the recipient’s] part from the first moment. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, they are buyers. But we have stated there: “The buyer and the recipient of a gift are free from animal tithe. Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe.” When they split and then joined again. “But if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” If they never split.
HALAKHAH: “If anything is given instead of money,” etc. There, we have stated: “This is the principle: All movables acquire one another.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Even heaps among heaps. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, we have stated only: “If anything is given instead of money,” anything that needs estimation. It turns out that Rebbi Abba follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar his own opinion, as we have stated there: “Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe, but if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they exchanged kid goats against rams and rams against kid goats. But if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, that was [the recipient’s] part from the first moment. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, they are buyers. But we have stated there: “The buyer and the recipient of a gift are free from animal tithe. Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe.” When they split and then joined again. “But if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” If they never split.
MISHNAH: For any commandment a father has to fulfill towards his son, men are obligated but women are free. For any commandment the son has to fulfill towards his father, men and women are equally obligated. For any positive commandment activated by time, men are obligated but women are free. For any positive commandment not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated. For any prohibition, whether or not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated except for “do not destroy”, “do not shear,” and “do not become impure for the dead.” Leanings and weavings, presentations, taking of fistfuls, burnings and neck breakings, sprinklings and receptions apply to men but not to women except for the flour offerings of the suspected wife and the nezirah; those do weave.
MISHNAH: For any commandment a father has to fulfill towards his son, men are obligated but women are free. For any commandment the son has to fulfill towards his father, men and women are equally obligated. For any positive commandment activated by time, men are obligated but women are free. For any positive commandment not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated. For any prohibition, whether or not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated except for “do not destroy”, “do not shear,” and “do not become impure for the dead.” Leanings and weavings, presentations, taking of fistfuls, burnings and neck breakings, sprinklings and receptions apply to men but not to women except for the flour offerings of the suspected wife and the nezirah; those do weave.
Rebbi Mana said: The millers are correct when they say that each and every person has in his chest that which is appropriate for him. Rebbi Tarphon’s mother said so and they answered her appropriately, Rebbi Ismael’s mother said so and they answered her appropriately. Rebbi Zeïra was sorry and said, if only I had father or mother that I could honor them and inherit paradise. When he heard these two instructions, he said: Praise to the All-Merciful that I have neither father nor mother. I could not have done as Rebbi Tarphon did and I could not accept what Rebbi Ismael accepted. Rebbi Abun said, I am free from honoring father and mother. They said, his father died when his mother was pregnant and she died in giving birth.
Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.
“Except ‘do not destroy’, ‘do not shear,’ and ‘do not become impure for the dead’.” Issy says, also because of “do not make a bald spot.” What is the reason? “They shall not make a bald spot.” One subject to the rules of the beard is subject to the rules of the bald spot; women who have no beard are free from the rules of the bald spot. And also from the following: “sons,” not daughters. Rebbi Eleazar said, women are obligated by the rules of the bald spot. What is the reason? “For you are a holy people for the Eternal, your God.” Both men and women. How does Rebbi Eleazar explain “sons”? When they do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are called sons, but when they do not do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are not called sons. Rav was ordering his students, there came Rav Hamnuna ordering the colleagues: Order you wives not to tear out their hair when standing by a deceased, that they should not make a bald spot. What is a bald spot? There are Tannaïm who stated: Any size. There are Tannaïm who state: The size of a peeled grain. The one who says, any size, because the meaning of “bald spot” is of any size. The one who says, a peeled grain, for it is said here “to make a bald spot”, and it says there, a bald spot. Since “bald spot” mentioned there means in the size of a peeled grain, here also it means the size of a peeled grain. Rebbi Yose bar Mamal: A Cohenet is permitted to leave the Land. What is the reason? “Say to the Cohanim,” not to the Cohanot. If it were otherwise, what would we say? Since she is included in the decision, she may not leave. If you say so, you push aside the paragraph of impurities.
If it is so, they should have been freed once they were redeemed. It is written (Neh. 8:17): “All the congregation coming from captivity … since the days of Joshua bin Nun.” Why Joshua? Rebbi Hillel, the son of Samuel ben Naḥmani: The verse damaged the reputation of the just person in his grave for the reputation of the just person in his time; it compares their coming in the days of Ezra to the coming in the days of Joshua. As at the coming in the days of Joshua they had been free and became obligated, also at the coming in the days of Ezra they had been free and became obligated. How did they become obligated? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they became obligated by the words of the Torah; that is what is written (Deut. 30:5): “The Eternal, your God, will bring you to the Land that your fathers inherited and you will inherit it.” Just as the inheritance of your fathers was by the words of the Torah, so your inheritance is by the words of the Torah. “He will be good to you and give increase to you more than to your forefathers.” Your fathers had been free and became obligated, also you had been free and became obligated. On your fathers there was no yoke of government, but you [are obligated] even though there is on you the yoke of government. Your fathers did become obligated only after fourteen years, seven they conquered and seven they distributed, but you became obligated [immediately when you entered. Your fathers did become obligated only after they had acquired all, but you become obligated] for every single piece at the moment you acquire it.
If it is so, they should have been freed once they were redeemed. It is written (Neh. 8:17): “All the congregation coming from captivity … since the days of Joshua bin Nun.” Why Joshua? Rebbi Hillel, the son of Samuel ben Naḥmani: The verse damaged the reputation of the just person in his grave for the reputation of the just person in his time; it compares their coming in the days of Ezra to the coming in the days of Joshua. As at the coming in the days of Joshua they had been free and became obligated, also at the coming in the days of Ezra they had been free and became obligated. How did they become obligated? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they became obligated by the words of the Torah; that is what is written (Deut. 30:5): “The Eternal, your God, will bring you to the Land that your fathers inherited and you will inherit it.” Just as the inheritance of your fathers was by the words of the Torah, so your inheritance is by the words of the Torah. “He will be good to you and give increase to you more than to your forefathers.” Your fathers had been free and became obligated, also you had been free and became obligated. On your fathers there was no yoke of government, but you [are obligated] even though there is on you the yoke of government. Your fathers did become obligated only after fourteen years, seven they conquered and seven they distributed, but you became obligated [immediately when you entered. Your fathers did become obligated only after they had acquired all, but you become obligated] for every single piece at the moment you acquire it.
If it is so, they should have been freed once they were redeemed. It is written (Neh. 8:17): “All the congregation coming from captivity … since the days of Joshua bin Nun.” Why Joshua? Rebbi Hillel, the son of Samuel ben Naḥmani: The verse damaged the reputation of the just person in his grave for the reputation of the just person in his time; it compares their coming in the days of Ezra to the coming in the days of Joshua. As at the coming in the days of Joshua they had been free and became obligated, also at the coming in the days of Ezra they had been free and became obligated. How did they become obligated? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they became obligated by the words of the Torah; that is what is written (Deut. 30:5): “The Eternal, your God, will bring you to the Land that your fathers inherited and you will inherit it.” Just as the inheritance of your fathers was by the words of the Torah, so your inheritance is by the words of the Torah. “He will be good to you and give increase to you more than to your forefathers.” Your fathers had been free and became obligated, also you had been free and became obligated. On your fathers there was no yoke of government, but you [are obligated] even though there is on you the yoke of government. Your fathers did become obligated only after fourteen years, seven they conquered and seven they distributed, but you became obligated [immediately when you entered. Your fathers did become obligated only after they had acquired all, but you become obligated] for every single piece at the moment you acquire it.
If it is so, they should have been freed once they were redeemed. It is written (Neh. 8:17): “All the congregation coming from captivity … since the days of Joshua bin Nun.” Why Joshua? Rebbi Hillel, the son of Samuel ben Naḥmani: The verse damaged the reputation of the just person in his grave for the reputation of the just person in his time; it compares their coming in the days of Ezra to the coming in the days of Joshua. As at the coming in the days of Joshua they had been free and became obligated, also at the coming in the days of Ezra they had been free and became obligated. How did they become obligated? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they became obligated by the words of the Torah; that is what is written (Deut. 30:5): “The Eternal, your God, will bring you to the Land that your fathers inherited and you will inherit it.” Just as the inheritance of your fathers was by the words of the Torah, so your inheritance is by the words of the Torah. “He will be good to you and give increase to you more than to your forefathers.” Your fathers had been free and became obligated, also you had been free and became obligated. On your fathers there was no yoke of government, but you [are obligated] even though there is on you the yoke of government. Your fathers did become obligated only after fourteen years, seven they conquered and seven they distributed, but you became obligated [immediately when you entered. Your fathers did become obligated only after they had acquired all, but you become obligated] for every single piece at the moment you acquire it.
There, we have stated: “Ḥallah of the am haäreẓ, food containing heave, food bought with money of the Second Tithe, and the remainders of flour sacrifices are free from demay.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to a woman: You are preliminarily married to me,” etc. There, we have stated: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz, she is divorced and has to pay. If she did not manage to pay before he died, it was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, she pays his father or his brother and is free from ḥalîṣah and levirate marriage. The same holds for preliminary marriage: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that I give you 200 zuz;” if he did not manage to pay before he died, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, his father or his brothers pay and she is subject to ḥalîṣah or levirate marriage.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Tarphon says, bastards can cleanse themselves. How is this? If the bastard married a slave girl, the child is a slave. When he is manumitted, the son is a free person. Rebbi Eliezer said, he is a slave and a bastard.
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A condominium courtyard is obligated. Rebbi Yasa said: and I deduced that from what Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Four principles about damages Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar enunciated in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Any place which is permitted to both the person who sustained the damage and the person who caused it, such as a hostelry or a condominium courtyard and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing by a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from [real estate] of the best quality. [Permitted] to the person who sustained the damage but not the person who caused it, he pays everyting. [Permitted] to the person who caused the damage but not the person who sustained it, he is free from everything. And everybody agrees that if neither of them had access, as a valley or public property and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing from a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from his storage room.
MISHNAH: Estimation and determination of money’s worth is by a court based on testimony of free persons of the Covenant. Women are under the rule of torts and sometimes both the person who causes and the one who suffers the damage pay.
HALAKHAH: “Estimation and determination of money’s worth,” etc. One does not say that a cow be compensated for by a stole, but one appraises all property in court. “Money’s worth,” this teaches that the court only appraises mortgageable property. But if the person suffering damage appropriated movables, one appraises those. “By a court”, this teaches that one only appraises in court. “Based on testimony”, for one only appraises by testimony. “Of free persons of the Covenant”, this excludes Gentiles, and slaves, and persons disqualified for testimony. “Women are under the rule of torts”; since the verse speaks only of men, it is necessary to include women: Rebbi Ismael stated, “these are the laws which you shall put before them” “And sometimes both the person who causes and the one who suffers the damage pay”; they pay half the damage. From here, that one splits the damage; each one loses half the value of the damage.
HALAKHAH: “How is the foot notorious,” etc. Does not an animal usually make pebbles ricochet? Rebbi Immi said, if the vessel was held by a human. But if it was lying in the public domain, since it was rightfully lying there and [the animal] was rightfully walking there, he is free. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, if there were two roads. On one there are grasses and pebbles, on the other there are no grasses or pebbles. It disregarded the one with no grasses or pebbles and went on that with grasses and pebbles; even though it was in the public domain he is free. Rebbi Eleazar said, in anything not concerning its body, the Sages made no difference between private and public domain in the matter of half damages.
HALAKHAH: “How is the foot notorious,” etc. Does not an animal usually make pebbles ricochet? Rebbi Immi said, if the vessel was held by a human. But if it was lying in the public domain, since it was rightfully lying there and [the animal] was rightfully walking there, he is free. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, if there were two roads. On one there are grasses and pebbles, on the other there are no grasses or pebbles. It disregarded the one with no grasses or pebbles and went on that with grasses and pebbles; even though it was in the public domain he is free. Rebbi Eleazar said, in anything not concerning its body, the Sages made no difference between private and public domain in the matter of half damages.
Is it subject to a declaration of notoriety in a matter extraneous to its body? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one accepts. Rebbi Illa said, one does not accept. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with him: An ox which rubs itself against a wall which fell on a human and killed him is obligated for weregilt but free from death. Does there exist weregilt for a harmless animal? But it does not disagree with Rebbi Illa. Why is it free from death if it was notorious to destroy walls? When it destroyed it, no human was there.
Is it subject to a declaration of notoriety in a matter extraneous to its body? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one accepts. Rebbi Illa said, one does not accept. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with him: An ox which rubs itself against a wall which fell on a human and killed him is obligated for weregilt but free from death. Does there exist weregilt for a harmless animal? But it does not disagree with Rebbi Illa. Why is it free from death if it was notorious to destroy walls? When it destroyed it, no human was there.
New Paragraph. “If it stepped on a vessel and broke it.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If it stepped on a skin full of oil, he pays full damages for the skin and half damages for the oil. If there was a table lying there and glass on top of it. If it stepped on the table and by that the glass broke. He pays full damages fort the table and half damages for the glass. If there were two tables on top of one another. If it stepped on the upper one and the lower one was broken. He pays full damages fort the upper table and half damages for the lower. If the table was lying in the public domain, [the animal] stepped on it and it ricocheted, went and broke into a private domain. What do you follow, the stepping or its breaking? If you say, after stepping, he is free [from paying] for its stepping on it; if you say, after its breaking, then he is guilty for the breaking.
MISHNAH: How is the tooth notorious to eat what is fitting for it? A domesticated animal is notorious for eating fruits and vegetables. If it ate a garment or vessels, he pays half damages. When has this been said? In the domain of the person sustaining the damage. But on public property he is free; but if it benefited, he pays what it benefited.
HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.
HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.
HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.
HALAKHAH: “How does he pay for what it benefited from,” etc. Rav said, if it bent its neck and ate, he pays for what it damaged. But did we not state: “From the door of a store, he pays what it benefited from; inside the store he pays for what it damaged”? How is that? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it that a donkey carried lambs and when it passed by, they bent their necks and ate; from the door of a store, he pays what they benefited from; inside the store he pays for what they damaged. Rav said, if it ate barley, he pays for straw. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state and disagree? “Therefore, if it ate wheat which is bad for it, it is free. If it changed and ate, he pays full damages. What means ‘if it changed and ate, he pays full damages’? If somebody had his chest hanging on his back and a cow stretched out its neck and ate from it, [its owner] pays full damages. If a large container was at the entrance to a store, partially outside and partially inside; if a cow stretched its neck and ate from it, he pays full damages.”
“A dog stole a hot pitta.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if he lit every single ear of grain. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another. Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If a kid goat was bound to it and a slave was close by and was burned, he is obligated. If the slave was bound and the kid goat close by, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then for the first ear he is guilty of a capital crime; for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. Rebbi Yose said, you also understand that from: “If his cattle set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is obligated. But if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then should he not become obligated since for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. A person did put out a hot water bottle outside. A donkey passed by and broke it. The case came before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai, who said to him: He does not owe you anything. Not only that but if [the donkey] suffered damage, [you] would be obligated for its damages.
“A dog stole a hot pitta.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if he lit every single ear of grain. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another. Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If a kid goat was bound to it and a slave was close by and was burned, he is obligated. If the slave was bound and the kid goat close by, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then for the first ear he is guilty of a capital crime; for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. Rebbi Yose said, you also understand that from: “If his cattle set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is obligated. But if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then should he not become obligated since for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. A person did put out a hot water bottle outside. A donkey passed by and broke it. The case came before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai, who said to him: He does not owe you anything. Not only that but if [the donkey] suffered damage, [you] would be obligated for its damages.
MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.
If it was filling the entire public domain, if he took it from here and put it down there he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull mounted another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, or [the bull] slipped away, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Could he not tell him, if you had not interferred, I would have paid your damages? But he could have answered, If I had not interferred, you would have paid me half the damage! Think of it, if it was notorious? It is not in your power to drag me through the courts.
Somebody put down an amphora in the public domain and then another person came and put another one close to the first. If the first person comes to take his own and would move [the second] and put it down at another place, he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull came to mount another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, if he drew him away before it could mount, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Rebbi Yose said, we can hear from this that if one saw a flood threatening in his irrigation canal, before the flood reached his field he is permitted to divert the water to another place; after the flood reached his field he is not permitted to divert it to another place. If the chrysargyros was imposed, before [the collector of] chrysargyros arrived, one is permitted to say, X is following my profession, Y is following my professon. Once the [the collector of] chrysarguros arrived, it is forbidden. It is permitted to bribe the quartermaster before the Roman [soldiers] arrive; after the Roman [soldiers] arrive it is forbidden.
A person put down a stone in the public domain, another person put down another stone next to the first, a third person stumbled over the first and struck the other. Who has to pay damages, the first or the second person? Let us hear from the following: “A bull pushed another ox which then fell into a pit. The owner of the bull has to pay; the ‘owner’ of the pit is free. Rebbi Nathan says, if the attacker was notorious, each of them pays one half; if it was tame, the owner of the bull pays two thirds and the ‘owner’ of the pit a quarter.” Rebbi Ḥanania said, so is the baraita: The owner of the bull pays three quarters and the ‘owner’ of the pit a quarter. (A person put down a stone in the public domain, another person put down another stone next to the first, a third person stumbled over the first and struck the other. Who has to pay damages, the first or the second person?)
Rebbi Joḥanan said: A person put down a stone and his load in the public domain, a second person stumbled over it while he held a flask in his hand. Whether he stumbled over the stone and hit the ground or hit the stone and stumbled over the ground, [the first] has to pay damages to the person but is free from damages to the flask. The statement of Rebbi Joḥanan implies that for “pit” damages one is free from damages to vessels. But if he hit it in walking, he has to pay even for the flask.
Rebbi Joḥanan said: A person put down a stone and his load in the public domain, a second person stumbled over it while he held a flask in his hand. Whether he stumbled over the stone and hit the ground or hit the stone and stumbled over the ground, [the first] has to pay damages to the person but is free from damages to the flask. The statement of Rebbi Joḥanan implies that for “pit” damages one is free from damages to vessels. But if he hit it in walking, he has to pay even for the flask.
MISHNAH: If his jar was broken in the public domain and another person slipped on the water or was hurt by one of its shards, he must pay. Rebbi Jehudah said, if intentionally, he has to pay; if unintentionally, he is free.
HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.
Rebbi Aḥa said, would that not be obvious from the reasoning of the rabbis? Is the rebellious son liable for double restitution for his first theft? Or since he is warned of a capital offense should he be freed? Let us hear from the following: If somebody steals another’s wallet and removes it on the Sabbath he is liable since he already is liable for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. Is he not forewarned of a capital offense and you say, he is liable! Here also, even though he is forewarned of a capital offense, you say that he has to be liable. Rebbi Yannai bar Ismael said, Rebbi Hoshaia follows his own opinion, as we have stated: He who takes out is guilty even if he did not put down. Similarly, he who takes out is guilty even if he did not take up with the intent to take out, for warning is possible only at the moment of his taking out. It was stated: If he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution falls on him simultaneously. Therefore, if both obligations do not fall on him simultaneously, he is liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged; one cannot infer anything from this.
HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”
HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”
HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.
HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.