frees
120 occurrences across the corpus
NT Apocrypha/Pseudepigrapha
And as the apostle was saying this, behold, Nicanora came forth from her house, and went with her slaves into the house of Stachys. And when she came near the door of the house, behold, Mariamme spoke to her in the Syriac language: Helikomaei, kosma, etaa, mariacha. And she explained her words, saying: O daughter of the Spirit, you are my lady, who hast been given in pledge to the serpent; but I have come to deliver you: I shall break your bonds, and cut them from their root. Behold, the Deliverer that frees you has come: behold, the Sun of righteousness has risen to enlighten you.
The Mishnah
Rabbi Tarfon says: mamzerim can be purified. How is this so? If a mamzer marries a slave woman, her son is a slave; if he frees him, it is found that the son is a free man. Rabbi Eliezer says: behold, he is a slave mamzer.
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: The person with gonorrhea who had an emission of semen, as well as a menstruating woman who lost semen, and the woman who started menstruating while having intercourse, need immersion, but Rebbi Yehudah frees them
HALAKHAH: So far the person with gonorrhea who had an emission of semen; is it good for anything if the person immerses himself who had an emission and afterwards has an episode of gonorrhea? We hear it from this: “The woman who started menstruating while having intercourse needs immersion, but Rebbi Yehudah frees her.”
That is if the light impurity came at the end. Is it even if the severe impurity came at the end? We may understand it from this: “The woman who started menstruating while having intercourse needs immersion, but Rebbi Yehudah frees her.” That means, one case is like the other case.
May Neïlah free one from evening prayers? Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Neïlah frees one from evening prayers. Rebbi Abba said to Rav Ḥuna: How may he mention havdalah? Rebbi Jonah said to Rebbi Abba: How may seven free one from eighteen? He said to him, did I not already contradict it? He said to him: Because you contradicted it, should it be abandoned? Rebbi Yose said, what Rebbi Abba asked is truly difficult. What Rebbi Jonah asked is not at all difficult, they made it easy on people because of the fast, that seven should free one from eighteen. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said to his colleagues: From all of them I understand that Neïlah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Neïlah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said: Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state this: “Every day one prays eighteen benedictions, including the end of Sabbath, end of Yom Kippur, and end of public fast days.”
Rebbi Jacob bar Abba said: There, they did state, what is the status of evening prayer? Rabban Gamliel said, it is obligatory. Rebbi Joshua said, it is voluntary. Rebbi Ḥanina said, this difference parallels the other difference: He who holds that evening prayer is obligatory, holds that Neïlah does not free one from evening prayers. He who holds that it is voluntary, holds that Neïlah frees one from evening prayers.
There we have stated: Rabban Gamliel says, the reader frees the public from their obligation. The older Rebbi Huna from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel for the prayer accompanying the blowing of the Shofar. Rebbi Zeïra and Rav Ḥisda were sitting there for the blowing of the Shofar. After they finished the prayer, Rav Ḥisda got up and prayed. Rebbi Zeïra said to him: Did we not pray just now? He said to him, I prayed and I am repeating the prayer, because Westerners came down and said in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel for the prayer accompanying the blowing of the Shofar, but I was inattentive. If I had been attentive, I would have fulfilled my duty. Rebbi Zeïra said, that is fine. All Tannaïm state it in the name of Rabban Gamliel, Rebbi Hoshaia states it in the name of the Sages. Rebbi Ada from Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: This is only if he attended from the start. Rebbi Tanḥum said, the Mishnah expresses this: The order of benediction, one says “Forefathers”, “Greatness”, and “Sanctification of the Name”.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, Rebbi Yehudah and the rabbis disagree only when he intended afterwards to eat bread, but if he did not intend to eat bread afterwards, everybody agrees that if among them one is of the Seven Kinds, that is the one over which he recites the benediction. Rebbi Abba said, he has to recite a benediction at the end. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Abba disagrees with Rebbi Joshua ben Levi since Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, Rebbi Yehudah and the rabbis disagree only when he intended afterwards to eat bread, but if he did not intend to eat bread afterwards everybody agrees that if among them is one of the Seven Kinds, that is the one over which he recites the benediction; but Rebbi Abba said, he has to recite a benediction at the end. If he did not recite a benediction at the end it became an accessory and we have stated there (Mishna 7): “In every situation where there is a main course and side dishes, one recites the benediction for the main course and thereby frees the side dishes.”
MISHNAH: If salted fish was brought before him with bread, one recites the benediction over the salted fish and frees the bread because the bread is accessory. The following is the principle: Anything that is the main dish and comes with a side dish, one recites the benediction on the main dish and this frees the side dish.
MISHNAH: If salted fish was brought before him with bread, one recites the benediction over the salted fish and frees the bread because the bread is accessory. The following is the principle: Anything that is the main dish and comes with a side dish, one recites the benediction on the main dish and this frees the side dish.
A butcher who is a Cohen. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One frees him for one week. Rebbi Yose said, I went to the South and I heard Rebbi Hanan, the father of Rebbi Simeon in the name of Rebbi (Simeon) [Joshua] ben Levi: One frees him for one week. Rebbi Yudan compares it to the statement of Rebbi Joḥanan, they fined them. Rebbi Yose said to him, if it is because of a fine, even one week should not be free for him. A grocer who is a Cohen, Rebbi Yudan said, one frees him for one week. Rebbi Yose said, one does not free him for one week. According to Rebbi Yose, what is the difference between the grocer and the butcher? The grocer may cheat, the butcher cannot cheat.
A butcher who is a Cohen. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One frees him for one week. Rebbi Yose said, I went to the South and I heard Rebbi Hanan, the father of Rebbi Simeon in the name of Rebbi (Simeon) [Joshua] ben Levi: One frees him for one week. Rebbi Yudan compares it to the statement of Rebbi Joḥanan, they fined them. Rebbi Yose said to him, if it is because of a fine, even one week should not be free for him. A grocer who is a Cohen, Rebbi Yudan said, one frees him for one week. Rebbi Yose said, one does not free him for one week. According to Rebbi Yose, what is the difference between the grocer and the butcher? The grocer may cheat, the butcher cannot cheat.
A butcher who is a Cohen. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One frees him for one week. Rebbi Yose said, I went to the South and I heard Rebbi Hanan, the father of Rebbi Simeon in the name of Rebbi (Simeon) [Joshua] ben Levi: One frees him for one week. Rebbi Yudan compares it to the statement of Rebbi Joḥanan, they fined them. Rebbi Yose said to him, if it is because of a fine, even one week should not be free for him. A grocer who is a Cohen, Rebbi Yudan said, one frees him for one week. Rebbi Yose said, one does not free him for one week. According to Rebbi Yose, what is the difference between the grocer and the butcher? The grocer may cheat, the butcher cannot cheat.
MISHNAH: Mother onions are subject to peah, Rebbi Yose frees. Rectangles of onions among vegetables, Rebbi Yose says peah from each single one, but the Sages say from one for everything.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: Rebbi says, the House of Shammai said this only in the Sabbatical year, but in all other years of the sabbatical cycle, the House of Shammai say that it is subject to a fifth and subject to removal. According to that Tanna, they learned the rules of the vineyard of the fourth year only from the Second Tithe; since you say that there is no Second Tithe in the Sabbatical year, so there is no fourth year after planting in the Sabbatical year. But then should there be no holiness in it? Its holiness comes from the verse (Lev. 19:24): “Holy for praises,” it has the status of those holy fruits over which praises are said. And should it be permitted to the fresh mourner? It is stated: This implies that it is forbidden to the fresh mourner. And should it be subject to removal? Since Rebbi Simeon frees it from removal. And should it be redeemed while still connected to the ground?
Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated: Both in the Sabbatical year and in the rest of the years of the sabbatical cycle, the House of Shammai say, there is no fifth and no removal. According to that Tanna, they did not at all learn the rules of the fourth year after planting from the Second Tithe. But then should there be no holiness in it? Its holiness comes from the verse (Lev. 19:24): “Holy for praises;” it has the status of those holy fruits over which praises are said. And should it be permitted to the fresh mourner? It is stated: This implies that it is forbidden to the fresh mourner. And should it be subject to removal? Since Rebbi Simeon frees it from removal. And should it be redeemed while still connected to the ground?
MISHNAH: Domestic animal with [different] domestic animal and wild with [different] wild animal, domesticated with wild and wild with domesticated animal, unclean with [different] unclean and clean with [different] clean animal, unclean with clean and clean with unclean animal, all these are [combinations] forbidden for ploughing, drawing, and leading. The driver absorbs the forty and the one sitting in the cart absorbs the forty. Rebbi Meïr frees him from prosecution. A third animal tied to their harness is forbidden.
HALAKHAH: : “One does not tie a horse to the sides or the back of a cart.” It is stated: Rebbi Meïr frees from prosecution. If it supported, whether in ascent or in descent, everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Rebbi Joḥanan said, because either one carries the laziness of the other. Rav says, because the rope is carried between them.
Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said it is written (Jud. 11:3): “Jephtah fled because of his brothers and dwelled in the land Good,” that is Hippos. Why is it called “Good”, because it frees from tithes. [ Rebbi Immi asked: Are these not of the taxpayers? Rebbi Immi is of the opinion that taxpayers count as if they were conquered.] For Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, Joshua sent three orders to the Land of Israel before they entered the Land: Those who want to evacuate should evacuate, those who want to make peace should make peace, those who want to go to war should go to war. The Girgasites evacuated, believed in the Holy One, praised be He, and went to Africa. (2K. 18:32, Is. 36:17) “Until I come and take you to a land like your Land,” that is Africa. The people of Gibeon made peace, (Jos. 10:1) “… that the inhabitants of Gibeon had made peace with Israel.” Thirty-one kings went to war and fell.
Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rav Cahana: Following the opinion that someone who cannot give heave cannot dedicate to the Temple. Why did he not say: following the opinion that he can give heave, he can dedicate to the Temple? Because of Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah says he can give heave but cannot dedicate. But Rebbi Joḥanan says, even following the opinion that he cannot give heave, he can dedicate. What can he dedicate? Holocaust and well-being offerings. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for fat because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for fat. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for blood because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for blood. May he bring a sacrifice relating to gonorrhea and skin disease? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he becomes impure by these can he bring it? If it is obvious for you that he brings, can he become an agent for these? Since he may become impure by these, may he become an agent, or since he cannot become an agent for anything else, can’t he become an agent for these? Rebbi Yudan objected: His produce is ṭevel from the Torah but he cannot free his ṭevel by Torah law! So here, even though he may become impure by them, he cannot become an agent. May he bring First Fruits following Rebbi Jehudah who says thatFirst Fruits have the status of territorial consecrated things? He may not bring following the rabbis who say they have the status of things consecrated to the Temple. May he bring a sacrifice of pilgrimage? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he may change its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring a Passover sacrifice? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Yudan the Prince, a person may bring a Passover sacrifice any day of the year when he changes its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring tithes of animals? If Rebbi Meїr is of the opinion (Num. 18:28): “From all your tithes,” that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals. May he make substitutions? If Rebbi Meїr is of the opinion that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions. One may hold with Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says that tithes of animals teach you for all sacrifices about substitutions. That means, since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions; since he cannot make substitutions for these he cannot make substitutions for any sacrifices. Is one guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple? Cahana said, one cannot be guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, one is guilty. The statement of Cahana disagrees since Rebbi Jehudah frees his ṭevel as biblical law. We can say he [Cahana] is following him who says they accepted tithes voluntarily.
MISHNAH: The heave of the Gentile and the Samaritan is heave, their tithes are tithes, and their dedications are dedications. Rebbi Jehudah says, a Gentile cannot have a fourth year vineyard but the Sages say, he may have. The Gentile’s heave creates dema‘ and one is obliged to a fifth for it, but Rebbi Simeon frees from the obligation.
“The Gentile’s heave creates dema‘ and one is obligated to a fifth for it, but Rebbi Simeon frees from the obligation.” Rebbi Zeïra said, I said this before Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree only for the heave of his threshing floor. But for a Gentile who bought the produce of a Jew, even Rebbi Simeon will agree. Rebbi Abbahu said to me in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the disagreement is about the latter case. It is difficult according to Rebbi Simeon, does he free his ṭevel from the Torah and you say so? But are sacrifices not from the Torah, and nevertheless Rebbi Simeon frees, as we have stated there: “Sacrifices of Gentiles are not subject to piggul, left-overs, and impurity and one who slaughters them outside is free [from punishment], the words of Rebbi Yose, but Rebbi Simeon declares him guilty.” They wanted to say that they disagree only about the fifth but not about dema‘. They found stated: It is all the same.
“The Gentile’s heave creates dema‘ and one is obligated to a fifth for it, but Rebbi Simeon frees from the obligation.” Rebbi Zeïra said, I said this before Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree only for the heave of his threshing floor. But for a Gentile who bought the produce of a Jew, even Rebbi Simeon will agree. Rebbi Abbahu said to me in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the disagreement is about the latter case. It is difficult according to Rebbi Simeon, does he free his ṭevel from the Torah and you say so? But are sacrifices not from the Torah, and nevertheless Rebbi Simeon frees, as we have stated there: “Sacrifices of Gentiles are not subject to piggul, left-overs, and impurity and one who slaughters them outside is free [from punishment], the words of Rebbi Yose, but Rebbi Simeon declares him guilty.” They wanted to say that they disagree only about the fifth but not about dema‘. They found stated: It is all the same.
Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the status of additional heave? He said to him, I am stating that as an isolated opinion. Do you mean for obligation or for freeing? If you say for obligation, that is understandable. If you say for freeing, if even Rebbi Jehudah, who permits from the non-earmarked, frees it, then the rabbis, who do not agree [to take] from the non-earmarked, certainly must so hold. Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Assi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish came: The additional heave is subject to tithes. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said so. Rebbi Zeïra said to Rebbi Assi, which Mishnah? He did not answer him. He said to him, maybe that which we stated: “If he gave heave and it turned out to be one in sixty-one, this is heave and he does not have to give more.” Did we not state on this: “If he added, it is subject to tithes”?
The words of the rabbis disagree. Cahana asked Samuel: Is it not reasonable that the dema‘ which we stated here contains mostly heave? He said to him, that is also my opinion, but when you go to the Land of Israel do ask about this. When he went, he heard what Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even one seah that fell into 99 [which were] profane. Rebbi Abbahu said, thus did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish answer Rebbi Joḥanan: That one seah frees everything? Is a fig cake among fig cakes such a sure thing that heave came up in his hand? But you must say it is [to be taken] lightly; here also it is [to be taken] lightly. Could he not have objected: It is different with fig cakes which already are disregarded? Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose, both in the name of Rebbi Zeïra: Even wheat and wheat he may grind and lift.
Nathan bar Hoshiah said, one speaks about a girl, the other about an adult woman. The girl has a fine but cannot be sold, the adult has no fine, she cannot be sold; has she no claim for shame and blemish? The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it that she seduced him or forgave him. Nathan bar Hoshaiah thinks that in a case of flogging and payment he pays and is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” You sentence him for one guilt but you may not sentence him for two guilts. Why should he pay and not have to be flogged? From perjured witnesses. Just as perjured witnesses pay and are not flogged, here also he pays and is not flogged. Rebbi Jonah said, the reason of Nathan bar Hoshaiah: (Deut. 25:2): “The judge shall have him laid down and flogged in his presence.” It refers to one whose flogging frees him from his guilt, excluding one who is told: get up and pay.
Did we not state: “Rebbi Eliezer holds him responsible for principal and fifth, but Rebbi Joshua frees.” They wanted to say, they disagree about the fifth, but for the principal even Rebbi Joshua agrees. They disagree for the past, but for the future even Rebbi Joshua agrees.
MISHNAH: When they came to a woman who was eating heave and told her your husband died, or he divorced you; similarly a slave who was eating heave when they came and told him your master died, or he sold you to an Israel or gave you as a gift, or made you a free person; similarly a Cohen who was eating heave when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, Rebbi Eliezer obliges them to pay principal and fifth, but Rebbi Joshua frees them. If he was standing on top of the altar and sacrificing when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, Rebbi Eliezer says that all sacrifices he performed on the altar are invalid but Rebbi Joshua declares them valid. If it became known that he has a bodily defect, his work is invalid. All of these, if heave was in their mouths, Rebbi Eliezer says, they should swallow it, Rebbi Joshua says, they should spit it out. If they said to him, you and the heave have become impure, Rebbi Eliezer says, he should swallow it, Rebbi Joshua says, he should spit it out. You or the heave were impure, or if it became known that it was ṭevel, or First Tithe of which its heave had not been taken, or Second Tithe or dedicated [food] that had not been redeemed, or that he tasted the taste of a bed bug in his mouth, he has to spit it out.
MISHNAH: Date honey, apple wine, vinegar from winter grapes, and any other fruit juices from heave, Rebbi Eliezer subjects to [repayment of] value and fifth, but Rebbi Joshua frees [from payment]. Rebbi Eliezer declares them impure as drinks. Rebbi Joshua said, the Sages did not enumerate seven fluids as one counts raw materials for perfumes but they said, seven fluids are impure, all other fluids are pure.
HALAKHAH: They want to say that they differ about the fifth but Rebbi Joshua agrees about the principal. They differ after the fact, but before the fact Rebbi Joshua agrees. But we have stated: “Rebbi Eliezer subjects date honey to tithes, but Rebbi Joshua frees it.” Here, when they obtained it after it became ṭevel, there before it became ṭevel.
MISHNAH: Of vegetables green melons, pumpkins, water melons, sweet melons, [also] apples and cedrats are obligated large and small. Rebbi Simeon frees cedrats when they are small. What is obligated among bitter almonds is free among sweet almonds; what is obligated among the sweet is free among the bitter.
MISHNAH: If somebody passed by the market place and said: “take some figs,” one may eat without tithing. Therefore, if they brought to their houses, they must put in order as certain produce. “Take some figs and bring them home,” one should not eat them as a snack. Therefore, if they brought to their houses, they have to put in order only as demay. If they were sitting in a gate or in a store and he said, take some figs, they may eat and are free, but the owners of the gate or the store are obligated. Rebbi Jehudah frees them unless they turn their faces away or change their places.
It was stated: All that was brought from the field to town became ṭevel. The baraita is Rebbi’s, as it was stated: “ If somebody brought figs from the field to eat them in his unprotected courtyard, then forgot and brought them into his house or the children brought them, he may bring them back to their intended place and eat.” They said that only concerning error; therefore, if intentional it is forbidden. Who stated this? Rebbi! As it was stated: “ If somebody brought figs from the field to eat them on his roof, Rebbi obligates, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah frees.” It is as it was stated, “if somebody transports figs through his courtyard to cut them into pieces;” therefore, if it is not to cut into pieces he is obligated.
If he cooked it while it was property of the Temple, redeemed it, and brought it into a secure courtyard, what is its status? In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it became ṭevel; this is biblical, that is not biblical. If he brought it into a secure courtyard, redeemed and then cooked it, everybody agrees that it became ṭevel, what did he process while it was property of the Temple? If he dedicated it, cooked it, brought it into a secure courtyard, redeemed it, and cooked it again, everybody agrees that it became ṭevel. If he redeemed it and put it out to dry, what is its status? If you say that fire creates ṭevel, fire frees from ṭevel; if you say that fire does not create ṭevel, fire does not free from ṭevel.
Rebbi Abun said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel goes with the argument of his ancestor Rabban Gamliel. As we stated there: “Jews who were sharecroppers for Gentiles in Syria, Rebbi Eliezer obligates their produce for tithes and the Sabbatical but Rabban Gamliel frees.”
It was stated: Rebbi says, the House of Shammai said this only for the Sabbatical year, but in all other years of the Sabbatical cycle, the House of Shammai say that it is subject to a fifth and subject to removal. According to that Tanna, they learned the rules of the fourth-year orchard only from Second Tithe; since you say that there is no Second Tithe in the Sabbatical year, so there is no fourth-year orchard in the Sabbatical year. But then should there be no holiness in it? Its holiness comes from the verse (Lev. 19:24): “Holy for praises,” it has the status of those holy fruits over which praises are said. And should it be permitted to the fresh mourner? It is stated: This implies that it is forbidden to the fresh mourner. And should it be subject to removal? Following Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon frees it from removal. And should it be redeemed while still connected to the ground?
Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated: Both in the Sabbatical year and in the rest of the years of the Sabbatical cycle, the House of Shammai say, there is no fifth and no removal. According to that Tanna, they did not at all learn the rules of the fourth-year orchard from Second Tithe. But then should there be no holiness in it? Its holiness comes from the verse (Lev. 19:24): “Holy for praises;” it has the status of those holy fruits over which praises are said. And should it be permitted to the fresh mourner? It is stated: This implies that it is forbidden to the fresh mourner. And should it be subject to removal? Following Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon frees it from removal. And should it be redeemed while still connected to the ground?
It was stated: “And First Fruits.” Who stated “First Fruits”? The rabbis. Who did not state “First Fruits”? Rebbi Simeon. As we have stated: “They are subject to removal but Rebbi Simeon frees them.”
The words of the rabbis disagree. Cahana asked Samuel: Is it not reasonable that the dema‘ which we stated here contains mostly heave? He said to him, that is also my opinion, but when you go to the Land of Israel do ask about this. When he went, he heard what Rebbi Assi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even one seah that fell into 99 [which were] profane. Rebbi Abbahu said, thus did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish answer Rebbi Joḥanan: That one seah frees everything? Is a fig cake among fig cakes such a sure thing that heave came up in his hand? But you must say it is [to be taken] lightly; here also it is [to be taken] lightly. Could he not have objected: Is it different with fig cakes which already are disregarded? Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose, both in the name of Rebbi Zeïra: Even wheat and wheat he may grind and lift.
MISHNAH: Some rules apply to tithe and First Fruits but not to heave since tithe and First Fruits need to be brought to the Place; they need a declaration and are forbidden to the current mourner, but Rebbi Simeon permits. They are subject to removal, but Rebbi Simeon frees from the obligation. They forbid in Jerusalem the most minute amount to be eaten by the unauthorized and animals; Rebbi Simeon permits. These rules apply to tithe and First Fruits but not to heave.
MISHNAH: The koy in some ways follows the rules for wild animals and in some those for domestic animals, in some the rules for both domestic and wild animals, and in some those for neither domestic nor wild animals. How does it follow the rules of wild animals? Its blood must be covered like the blood of a wild animal; one does not slaughter it on a holiday but if it was slaughtered one does not cover its blood. Its fat can become impure in the impurity of a carcass like a wild animal; that impurity is one of doubt. One may not use it to redeem the first-born of a donkey. How does it follow the rules of domestic animals? Its fat is forbidden like the fat of domestic animals, but one is not punished for it by extirpation. It cannot be bought with tithe money to be eaten in Jerusalem and it is subject to the foreleg, the lower jaw, and the first stomach [to be given to a Cohen]. Rebbi Eleazar frees since the claimant has to bring proof. How does it differ from both a wild and a domestic animal? It is forbidden as kilaim with wild animals and domestic animals. If somebody writes his wild or domestic animals over to his son, he did not include the koy. If somebody said, I am a nazir if that is neither a wild nor a domestic animal, he is a nazir. In all other ways it is like wild and domestic animals; it needs slaughtering by cutting its throat like both, and as carcass it is impure like both.
“It is subject to the foreleg, the lower jaw, and the first stomach [to be given to a Cohen]. Rebbi Eleazar frees.” Since Rebbi Eleazar says that now he is in doubt, he says “free”. But the Sages, who teach that it is an original species, say “obligated.”
There, we have stated: “A slave whom his master gave as mortgage to others and then freed him [in strict law does not owe anything, but for the public good one forces the master to formally manumit him and he writes a bond for his own value. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the one who manumits writes.] Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Haggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasaʹs name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.
If one broke a bird’s neck on leavening. There are Tannaim who state, he is liable; there are Tannaim who state, he is not liable. He who says liable, blood anywhere. He who says not liable, sacrifice. This excludes the bird which is not slaughtered as sacrifice. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi asked before Rebbi Yose. Him who said “liable” one understands as you are saying for freeing from liability. What is the reason of him who frees from liability? He said to him, one may infer punishment from punishment but one may not infer punishment from exemption.
At one place one blows, at one place one says musaf. There are Tannaim who state, he goes to the one who blows; there are Tannaim who state, to the one who says musaf. He who said, he goes to the one who blows, if there is no time left to blow; he who said, he goes to the one who says musaf, if there is time left to blow. Let us hear from the following, what Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: At one place one blows, at one place one says musaf, he goes to the one who blows and does not go to the one who says musaf. And who said the following? On a New Year’s Day which falls on a Sabbath, at one place one blows, at one place one says musaf, he goes to the one who says musaf and does not go to the one who blows. Why? Because everybody knows how to blow but not everybody known how to say musaf. Another explanation: A person frees another from his obligation in blowing; a person does not free another from his obligation in prayer. And is a New Year’s Day which falls on a Sabbath not a day where there is no time left to blow? And you are saying, he goes to the one who says musaf? This implies that they disagree.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose says, one does not cover the Koy’s blood because it is a doubtful case.” Since circumcision whose certainty pushes aside the Sabbath, in doubt does not push aside the holiday, then for covering the blood which in case of certainty does not push aside the Sabbath it only is logical that in a case of doubt it not push aside the holiday. But is it permitted to slaughter on a Sabbath? Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he slaughtered for a sick person. They told him, does not the shofar in the countryside disprove it? For in case of certainty it does not push aside the Sabbath, but in a case of doubt it pushes aside the holiday. What kind of doubt is there? If it is a weekday, he may blow, if it is a holiday, he may blow. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: In case of a hermaphrodite who blew. And it was stated so: “The hermaphrodite frees his own kind [but does not free persons not of his own kind.] The sexless frees neither his kind nor not his kind.” Rebbi Yose asked, if in the case of a hermaphrodite who blew, is that where we stated, it has no counter argument? Rebbi (Abbaye) [Abbin] said, that is one of four cases when the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya said, there is no counter-argument. But Rebbi Eleazar the son of Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower found a counter-argument. Since circumcision which in a case of doubt does not push aside the holiday, in a case of certainty pushes aside holiday night, you can say about covering the blood where in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, since in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, in a case of doubt it should push aside the holiday. This establishes that what was problematic to the earlier rabbis and was difficult for them, so it is problematic to the later rabbis and is a difficulty for them. In the opinion of Rebbi Aḥa, the hermaphrodite frees his own kind a priori, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, a posteriori.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose says, one does not cover the Koy’s blood because it is a doubtful case.” Since circumcision whose certainty pushes aside the Sabbath, in doubt does not push aside the holiday, then for covering the blood which in case of certainty does not push aside the Sabbath it only is logical that in a case of doubt it not push aside the holiday. But is it permitted to slaughter on a Sabbath? Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he slaughtered for a sick person. They told him, does not the shofar in the countryside disprove it? For in case of certainty it does not push aside the Sabbath, but in a case of doubt it pushes aside the holiday. What kind of doubt is there? If it is a weekday, he may blow, if it is a holiday, he may blow. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: In case of a hermaphrodite who blew. And it was stated so: “The hermaphrodite frees his own kind [but does not free persons not of his own kind.] The sexless frees neither his kind nor not his kind.” Rebbi Yose asked, if in the case of a hermaphrodite who blew, is that where we stated, it has no counter argument? Rebbi (Abbaye) [Abbin] said, that is one of four cases when the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya said, there is no counter-argument. But Rebbi Eleazar the son of Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower found a counter-argument. Since circumcision which in a case of doubt does not push aside the holiday, in a case of certainty pushes aside holiday night, you can say about covering the blood where in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, since in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, in a case of doubt it should push aside the holiday. This establishes that what was problematic to the earlier rabbis and was difficult for them, so it is problematic to the later rabbis and is a difficulty for them. In the opinion of Rebbi Aḥa, the hermaphrodite frees his own kind a priori, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, a posteriori.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose says, one does not cover the Koy’s blood because it is a doubtful case.” Since circumcision whose certainty pushes aside the Sabbath, in doubt does not push aside the holiday, then for covering the blood which in case of certainty does not push aside the Sabbath it only is logical that in a case of doubt it not push aside the holiday. But is it permitted to slaughter on a Sabbath? Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he slaughtered for a sick person. They told him, does not the shofar in the countryside disprove it? For in case of certainty it does not push aside the Sabbath, but in a case of doubt it pushes aside the holiday. What kind of doubt is there? If it is a weekday, he may blow, if it is a holiday, he may blow. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: In case of a hermaphrodite who blew. And it was stated so: “The hermaphrodite frees his own kind [but does not free persons not of his own kind.] The sexless frees neither his kind nor not his kind.” Rebbi Yose asked, if in the case of a hermaphrodite who blew, is that where we stated, it has no counter argument? Rebbi (Abbaye) [Abbin] said, that is one of four cases when the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya said, there is no counter-argument. But Rebbi Eleazar the son of Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower found a counter-argument. Since circumcision which in a case of doubt does not push aside the holiday, in a case of certainty pushes aside holiday night, you can say about covering the blood where in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, since in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, in a case of doubt it should push aside the holiday. This establishes that what was problematic to the earlier rabbis and was difficult for them, so it is problematic to the later rabbis and is a difficulty for them. In the opinion of Rebbi Aḥa, the hermaphrodite frees his own kind a priori, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, a posteriori.
May Ne`ilah free one from evening prayers? Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Ne`ilah frees one from evening prayers. Rebbi Abba said to Rav Ḥuna: How may he mention havdalah? Rebbi Jonah said to Rebbi Abba: How may seven free one from eighteen? He said to him, did I not already contradict it? He said to him: Because you contradicted it, should it be abandoned? Rebbi Yose said, what Rebbi Abba asked is truly difficult. What Rebbi Jonah asked is not at all difficult; they made it easy on people because of the fast, that seven should free one from eighteen. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said to his colleagues: From all of them I understand that Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi <joshua ben> Levi: Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said: Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state this? “Every day one prays eighteen benedictions, including the end of Sabbath, end of Yom Kippur, and end of public fast days.”
Rebbi Jacob bar Abba said: There, they did state, what is the status of evening prayer? Rabban Gamliel said, it is obligatory. Rebbi Joshua said, it is voluntary. Rebbi Ḥanina said, this difference parallels the other difference: He who holds that evening prayer is obligatory, holds that Ne`ilah does not free one from evening prayers. He who holds that it is voluntary, holds that Ne`ilah frees one from evening prayers.
Isaac, the son of the isatis grower, said that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked, should we state sixteen women? Ḥalîṣah frees her co-wife! Rebbi Jacob the Southerner said before Rebbi Yose, why was this not stated? Because of Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba said there is a bastard from a woman who got ḥalîṣah. One should have stated it for the rabbis! We came to state only things everybody agreed to. It turns out that Isaac, the son of the isatis grower, holds with Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Yasa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is not guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah, but the brothers are guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah. Both he and the brothers are guilty for the co-wife. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, neither he nor the brothers are guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah or for the co-wife. Rebbi Immi switches the attributions. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Yasa, does not Rebbi Immi switch the attributions? But Rebbi Joḥanan had several opinions. Did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish have several opinions? The statement of Isaac, the son of the isatis grower, supports Rebbi Immi and the statements of the rabbis support Rebbi Yasa, as both Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abba, said in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Everybody agrees about the co-wife that one is guilty. Where do they disagree? About the woman who got ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is not guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah, but the brothers are guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah.
“Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: The she-ram and the wife of his brother who did not live in his world were in the paragraph. Why do you see fit to say that the co-wife of the she-ram is permitted but the co-wife of the wife of his brother who did not live in his world is forbidden? He said to him, the she-ram was removed because of another reason: “she will bear”, this excludes the one who cannot have children. Is it not enough that she cannot be eligible for the levirate but you also want to forbid her co-wife? But the wife of his brother who did not live in his world is under an incest prohibition and any incest prohibition frees the co-wife. Assi said, the co-wife of a she-ram is forbidden. The Mishnah disagrees with Assi: “All of these, if they died, or refused, or were divorced, or turned out to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: Assi follows Rebbi Meїr since Rebbi Meїr said, in any case where you cannot take me in levirate you cannot take my co-wife.
What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.
What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.
Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife.
MISHNAH: Any person who has a child anywhere frees [the child’s] father’s wife from levirate; [the child] would be guilty for wounding or cursing [the father]; he is his child in every respect except if he were from a slave woman or a non-Jew.
It was stated: “Abba Shaul says, the House of Hillel made this easy.” Is that a criticism? It is a praise, since people were saying, what is the prohibition here? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: “If they jumped the gun and married, they should keep them.” But that is only if they had intercourse at the same time. In the opinion of Abba Shaul it is permitted to have intercourse without asking. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon only if he transgressed and had intercourse. If the first [brother] married and had intercourse, he tells the second also to have intercourse. If that one did not have intercourse, the first [brother] is forbidden to have intercourse a second time; maybe one of them will die and it turns out that he had intercourse with the sister of his sister-in-law. It was stated: If the second [brother] died, the first one had to divorce his wife with a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah. Even if the second one died? Does this not follow Rebbi Simeon? But Rebbi Simeon frees the second [sister] from ḥalîṣah and levirate! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I confirmed this: Any sister-in-law who was to be freed by ḥalîṣah will never be permitted without ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter: These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate, but Rebbi Simeon frees them. If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. But Rebbi Simeon frees them.
MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter: These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate, but Rebbi Simeon frees them. If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. But Rebbi Simeon frees them.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters,” etc. Ulla bar Ismael said, so explained Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah: Rebbi Simeon frees the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the group asked, would anybody think that a man could acquire two sisters together? Rebbi Ḥanina said before Rebbi Mana and disagreed: Why does Rebbi Simeon free the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate? He said to him, because nobody thinks that a man could acquire two sisters together. There they said, the words of Rebbi Simeon imply that no candidacy can come after another candidacy. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Only if he sinned and had intercourse. What is the difference? If somebody from the market gave qiddushin to the second sister. Following the rabbis, perfect qiddushin. Following Rebbi Eleazar, suspended qiddushin. When he has intercourse with the first, the qiddushin become valid for the second. If he had intercourse with the second, following the rabbis it is an incestuous act. Following Rebbi Eleazar, it is not an incestuous act. If the first one died, following the rabbis the second is permitted to him.
Could I say, her co-wife may remarry? “ He who marries his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant,” as you say, “her co-wife cannot marry until you know by which means she is permitted, whether by pregnancy or by intercourse” The same is valid for the one who performed ḥalîṣah. Ḥalîṣah frees and intercourse frees. As you said it for intercourse so it was said for ḥalîṣah.
Could I say, her co-wife may remarry? “ He who marries his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant,” as you say, “her co-wife cannot marry until you know by which means she is permitted, whether by pregnancy or by intercourse” The same is valid for the one who performed ḥalîṣah. Ḥalîṣah frees and intercourse frees. As you said it for intercourse so it was said for ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: If four brothers were married to four women and died, if their oldest [brother] wants to marry all of them in levirate, he is permitted to do so. If somebody was married to two women and he died, intercourse or ḥalîṣah with one of them frees the co-wife. If one was acceptable and the other blemished, if he performs ḥalîṣah, he performs it with the blemished; if he takes in levirate, he takes the acceptable one.
Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said, it is written: “His house should be called in Israel the house of the shoe-stripped.” A house which was permitted by one stripping. The same is true for intercourse. Stripping frees and intercourse frees. What you say about stripping you say about intercourse.
Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said, it is written: “His house should be called in Israel the house of the shoe-stripped.” A house which was permitted by one stripping. The same is true for intercourse. Stripping frees and intercourse frees. What you say about stripping you say about intercourse.
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.
Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off.” That is no cutting off!
Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her. If an outsider came and gave her qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?
That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.
That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah, may a male bastard not marry a female bastard? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Jacob from Gebal stated before Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Isaac bar Tevele in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Jehudah stated that a male bastard should not marry a female bastard so that bastards should disappear from the world. Similarly, is an Ammonite man forbidden to marry an Ammonite woman? Was that needed for the rabbis? For if Rebbi Jehudah would think that disqualified converts form one of the Eternal’s congregations, then [the Ammonite] could not marry an Ammonite woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. He could not marry an Egyptian woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. Rebbi Mattania said, one frees a slave girl for him. Similarly, could an Egyptian man not marry an Egyptian woman? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Abbahu stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah said, Benjamin, an Egyptian convert, was a student of Rebbi Aqiba. He said, I am an Egyptian convert married to an Egyptian convert. My son is an Egyptian convert; I shall marry him to an Egyptian convert so that my grandson will be qualified to marry into the congregation. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, my son, it is not so. But you marry him to the daughter of an Egyptian woman convert so that there should be three generations on every side.”
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose says, her ketubah is from the property of her first husband. Rebbi Eleazar says, the first [husband] is entitled to what she finds and earns and may annul her vows. Rebbi Simeon says, copulation with her or ḥaliṣah with her by a brother of the first [husband] frees her co-wives and a child from him is not a bastard; if she was married without permission she is permitted to return to him. If she married by a decision of the court, she must leave but is free from the sacrifice; without a decision of the court, she must leave but must bring the sacrifice. The power of the court frees her from the sacrifice. If the court instructed her to marry but she misbehaved, she must bring a sacrifice since they permitted her only to marry.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose says, her ketubah is from the property of her first husband. Rebbi Eleazar says, the first [husband] is entitled to what she finds and earns and may annul her vows. Rebbi Simeon says, copulation with her or ḥaliṣah with her by a brother of the first [husband] frees her co-wives and a child from him is not a bastard; if she was married without permission she is permitted to return to him. If she married by a decision of the court, she must leave but is free from the sacrifice; without a decision of the court, she must leave but must bring the sacrifice. The power of the court frees her from the sacrifice. If the court instructed her to marry but she misbehaved, she must bring a sacrifice since they permitted her only to marry.
It is reasonable to say that Rebbi Eleazar agrees with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose does not agree with Rebbi Eleazar; Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar agree with Rebbi Simeon but Rebbi Simeon does not agree with Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar. This means that in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, invalid intercourse frees.
“If he injured both of them at the same time or cursed them at the same time, he is guilty. Rebbi Jehudah frees him.” Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Is not the argument of Rebbi Jehudah inverted? As we have stated there: “If he ate the volume of an olive of one of them and the volume of an olive of the other, he absorbs eighty [lashes]; Rebbi Jehudah says, he absorbs only forty [lashes].” Rebbi Crispus said, it is not inverted. There, it was in doubt what is forbidden. Here, it was certain but it became doubtful for him. Rebbi Judan asked: If it is so, in case carcass meat was mixed up with slaughtered meat, since it was certain but became doubtful for him, should he be free if he ate it? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Jehudah agrees for all other prohibitions that he is (free). But here, Rebbi Jehudah is interpreting verses: “His father,” certain but not uncertain, “his mother”, certain but not uncertain.
Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥinena in the name of Cahana: Following the opinion that someone who cannot give heave cannot dedicate to the Temple. Why did he not say: following the opinion that he can give heave, can he dedicate to the Temple? Because of Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah says he can give heave but cannot dedicate. Rebbi Joḥanan says, even following the opinion that he cannot give heave, he can dedicate. What can he dedicate? Holocaust and well-being offerings. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for fat because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for fat. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for blood because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for blood. May he bring a sacrifice relating to gonorrhea and skin disease? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he becomes impure by these can he bring it? If it is obvious for you that he brings, can he become an agent for these? Since he may become impure by these, may he become an agent, or since he cannot become an agent for anything else, can’t he become an agent for these? Rebbi Yudan objected: His produce is ṭevel from the Torah but he can free his ṭevel by Torah law! But here, even though he may become impure by them, he cannot become an agent. May he bring First Fruits following Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah says that First Fruits have the status of territorial consecrated things? He may not bring following the rabbis who say they have the status of things consecrated to the Temple. May he bring a sacrifice of pilgrimage? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he may change its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring a Passover sacrifice? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, a person may bring a Passover sacrifice any day of the year when he changes its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring tithes of cereals? If he holds with Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said (Num.18:28): “From all your tithes,” that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals. May he make substitutions? If Rebbi Meïr is of the opinion that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions. One may hold with Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says that tithes of animals teach you for all sacrifices about substitutions. That means, since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions; since he cannot make substitutions for these he cannot make substitutions for any sacrifices. Is one guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple? Cahana said, one cannot be guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, one is guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple. The statement of Cahana disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah frees his ṭevel as biblical law. And you say so? We can say he [Cahana] is following him who says they accepted tithes voluntarily.
MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two underage orphan girls and died, intercourse or ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. The same holds for two deaf-mutes. An underaged girl and a deaf-mute: Intercourse of neither of them frees her co-wife.
MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two underage orphan girls and died, intercourse or ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. The same holds for two deaf-mutes. An underaged girl and a deaf-mute: Intercourse of neither of them frees her co-wife.
MISHNAH: A hearing wife and a deaf-mute: The intercourse of the hearing woman frees the deaf-mute but the intercourse of the deaf-mute does not free the hearing woman.
HALAKHAH: “A hearing wife and a deaf-mute,” etc.: A hearing wife and a deaf-mute. The intercourse of the hearing woman frees the deaf-mute. The intercourse of the deaf-mute does not free the hearing woman but disables the hearing woman.
MISHNAH: An adult wife and an underage wife. The intercourse of the adult woman frees the underage girl but the intercourse of the underage girl does not free the adult woman.
HALAKHAH: “An adult wife and an underage wife,” etc. An adult wife and an underage wife. The intercourse of the adult woman frees the underage girl. The intercourse of the underage girl does not free the adult woman but disables the adult woman.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
“It was hidden from her husband’s eyes”, that excludes the blind man who has no eyes. It is the same for the blind man and the blind woman. This baraita follows Rebbi Jehudah who frees him from all obligations in the Torah.
Nathan bar Hoshiah said, one speaks about an adolescent girl, the other about an adult woman. The adolescent has a fine but nobody is flogged for her; for the adult he is flogged but pays no fine, she cannot be sold; she has no claim for shame and blemish. The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it that she seduced him or remitted [the fine] for him. Nathan bar Hoshaiah thinks that in a case of flogging and payment he pays but is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. From perjured witnesses. Just as you say there, perjured witnesses pay but are not flogged, here also he pays and is not flogged. Rebbi Jonah said, the reason of Rebbi Nathan bar Hoshaiah: (Deut. 25:2): “For his evil deed.” It refers to one whose flogging frees him from his guilt, excluding one who is told: get up and pay.