had
21003 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
If he had paid him the value and had sworn [falsely] to him concerning the [added] fifth, he must pay a fifth on the fifth [and so on] until the value [of the added fifth] becomes less than a perutah’s worth. So too with a deposit, as it says: “In a matter of deposit or a pledge or through robbery, or by defrauding his fellow, or by finding something lost and lying about it” (Leviticus 5:21-2, such a one must pay the value and the [added] fifth and bring a Guilt-offering. [If a man said], “Where is my deposit?” and the other said, “It is lost,” [if the one says,] “I adjure thee”, and the other says, “Amen!”, and witnesses testify against him that he consumed it, he need pay [only] the value. But if he confessed it of himself, he must repay the value and the [added] fifth and bring a Guilt-offering.
If he had paid him the value and had sworn [falsely] to him concerning the [added] fifth, he must pay a fifth on the fifth [and so on] until the value [of the added fifth] becomes less than a perutah’s worth. So too with a deposit, as it says: “In a matter of deposit or a pledge or through robbery, or by defrauding his fellow, or by finding something lost and lying about it” (Leviticus 5:21-2, such a one must pay the value and the [added] fifth and bring a Guilt-offering. [If a man said], “Where is my deposit?” and the other said, “It is lost,” [if the one says,] “I adjure thee”, and the other says, “Amen!”, and witnesses testify against him that he consumed it, he need pay [only] the value. But if he confessed it of himself, he must repay the value and the [added] fifth and bring a Guilt-offering.
If he [who had stolen from the convert] gave the money to the men of the priestly watch and then died, his inheritors cannot recover it from their [the priests] hands, as it says, “Whatsoever a man gives to a priest shall be his” (Numbers 5:10). If he gave the money to Yehoyariv, and the Guilt-offering to Yedayah, he has fulfilled his obligation. If he gave the Guilt-offering to Yehoyariv and the money to Yedayah: if the Guilt-offering still remains, the sons of Yedayah shall offer it; otherwise, he must bring another Guilt-offering. For if a man brought what he had stolen before he offered his Guilt-offering, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if he brought his Guilt-offering before he brought what he had stolen, he has not yet fulfilled his obligation. If he gave the value but not the [added] fifth, the [added] fifth does not prevent [him from offering the Guilt-offering].
If he [who had stolen from the convert] gave the money to the men of the priestly watch and then died, his inheritors cannot recover it from their [the priests] hands, as it says, “Whatsoever a man gives to a priest shall be his” (Numbers 5:10). If he gave the money to Yehoyariv, and the Guilt-offering to Yedayah, he has fulfilled his obligation. If he gave the Guilt-offering to Yehoyariv and the money to Yedayah: if the Guilt-offering still remains, the sons of Yedayah shall offer it; otherwise, he must bring another Guilt-offering. For if a man brought what he had stolen before he offered his Guilt-offering, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if he brought his Guilt-offering before he brought what he had stolen, he has not yet fulfilled his obligation. If he gave the value but not the [added] fifth, the [added] fifth does not prevent [him from offering the Guilt-offering].
If he [who had stolen from the convert] gave the money to the men of the priestly watch and then died, his inheritors cannot recover it from their [the priests] hands, as it says, “Whatsoever a man gives to a priest shall be his” (Numbers 5:10). If he gave the money to Yehoyariv, and the Guilt-offering to Yedayah, he has fulfilled his obligation. If he gave the Guilt-offering to Yehoyariv and the money to Yedayah: if the Guilt-offering still remains, the sons of Yedayah shall offer it; otherwise, he must bring another Guilt-offering. For if a man brought what he had stolen before he offered his Guilt-offering, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if he brought his Guilt-offering before he brought what he had stolen, he has not yet fulfilled his obligation. If he gave the value but not the [added] fifth, the [added] fifth does not prevent [him from offering the Guilt-offering].
If a man recognized his utensils or books in another’s hands and a report of theft had gone out in the town, the purchaser swears how much he paid and takes this price [from the owner and restores the goods]. But if [such a report had] not [gone out], he [the original owner] does not have the power, for I might say that he had first sold them to another and this one bought it from him.
If a man recognized his utensils or books in another’s hands and a report of theft had gone out in the town, the purchaser swears how much he paid and takes this price [from the owner and restores the goods]. But if [such a report had] not [gone out], he [the original owner] does not have the power, for I might say that he had first sold them to another and this one bought it from him.
If a man recognized his utensils or books in another’s hands and a report of theft had gone out in the town, the purchaser swears how much he paid and takes this price [from the owner and restores the goods]. But if [such a report had] not [gone out], he [the original owner] does not have the power, for I might say that he had first sold them to another and this one bought it from him.
If one came with his jar of wine and the other came with his jug of honey and the jug of honey cracked, and the other poured out his wine and saved the honey [by receiving it] into his jar, he can claim no more than his wages. But if he had said, “I will save what is yours and you will pay me the value of mine,” [the owner of the honey] is liable to pay him back. If a flood swept away a man’s donkey and his fellow’s donkey, and his own was worth 100 [zuz] and his fellow’s was worth 200 [zuz], and he left his own and saved that of his fellow, he can claim no more than his wages. But if he had said, “I will save what is yours and you will pay me the value of mine,” he is liable to pay him back.
If one came with his jar of wine and the other came with his jug of honey and the jug of honey cracked, and the other poured out his wine and saved the honey [by receiving it] into his jar, he can claim no more than his wages. But if he had said, “I will save what is yours and you will pay me the value of mine,” [the owner of the honey] is liable to pay him back. If a flood swept away a man’s donkey and his fellow’s donkey, and his own was worth 100 [zuz] and his fellow’s was worth 200 [zuz], and he left his own and saved that of his fellow, he can claim no more than his wages. But if he had said, “I will save what is yours and you will pay me the value of mine,” he is liable to pay him back.
If a man stole something from his friend in an inhabited region or borrowed it or received it as a deposit, he may not return it to him in the wilderness. But if he [had borrowed it or received it] with the understanding that he was going out to the wilderness, he may return it to him in the wilderness.
If a man found pigeons tied together behind a fence or a hedge or on footpaths in the fields, he may not touch them. If he found an object in the dungheap and it was covered up he may not touch it, but if it was exposed he should take it and proclaim. If he found it in a pile of stones or in an old wall it belongs to him. If he found it in a new wall and it was on the outside [of the wall] it belongs to him. If it was on the inner side it belongs to the householder. But if the house had been hired to others, even if a man found something within the house, it belongs to him.
If a man left a jar with his fellow [to guard] and the owner did not assign it a special place [to be kept] and [the guardian] moved it and it broke: If it was broken while he was handling it: If for his own sake he is liable. If for the sake of the jar, he is not liable. But if it was broken after he had put it in place, whether he moved it for his own sake or for the sake of the jar, he is exempt. If the owner had assigned it a special place, and the guardian moved it and it broke: Whether or not it broke while he was handling it or after he had put it in its place; If for his own sake he is liable, if for the sake of the jar, he is not liable.
If a man left a jar with his fellow [to guard] and the owner did not assign it a special place [to be kept] and [the guardian] moved it and it broke: If it was broken while he was handling it: If for his own sake he is liable. If for the sake of the jar, he is not liable. But if it was broken after he had put it in place, whether he moved it for his own sake or for the sake of the jar, he is exempt. If the owner had assigned it a special place, and the guardian moved it and it broke: Whether or not it broke while he was handling it or after he had put it in its place; If for his own sake he is liable, if for the sake of the jar, he is not liable.
If a man left a jar with his fellow [to guard] and the owner did not assign it a special place [to be kept] and [the guardian] moved it and it broke: If it was broken while he was handling it: If for his own sake he is liable. If for the sake of the jar, he is not liable. But if it was broken after he had put it in place, whether he moved it for his own sake or for the sake of the jar, he is exempt. If the owner had assigned it a special place, and the guardian moved it and it broke: Whether or not it broke while he was handling it or after he had put it in its place; If for his own sake he is liable, if for the sake of the jar, he is not liable.
If a man makes personal use of a deposit: Bet Shammai holds that he is at a disadvantage whether the value rises or falls. Bet Hillel says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which he put it to use. Rabbi Akiva says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which it is claimed. One who expresses his intention to use a deposit [for personal use]: Bet Shammai says he is liable [for any subsequent damage to the deposit, as if he had already made use of it]. Bet Hillel says: He is not liable until he actually uses it, as it says (Exodus 22:7): “If he had not put his hand onto his neighbor’s property”. How is this so? If he tilted the jug and took a quarter-log of wine and the jug was then broken, he only pays the quarter-log. If he lifted it and then took a quarter-log and the jug was then broken, he pays for the whole jug.
If a man makes personal use of a deposit: Bet Shammai holds that he is at a disadvantage whether the value rises or falls. Bet Hillel says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which he put it to use. Rabbi Akiva says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which it is claimed. One who expresses his intention to use a deposit [for personal use]: Bet Shammai says he is liable [for any subsequent damage to the deposit, as if he had already made use of it]. Bet Hillel says: He is not liable until he actually uses it, as it says (Exodus 22:7): “If he had not put his hand onto his neighbor’s property”. How is this so? If he tilted the jug and took a quarter-log of wine and the jug was then broken, he only pays the quarter-log. If he lifted it and then took a quarter-log and the jug was then broken, he pays for the whole jug.
Until when may he [that is defrauded] return the coin? In large towns until he has had time to show it to a money-changer. In villages until the Sabbath eve. If he [that had given the coin] recognized it, even after twelve months he should accept it [in return], but [if he does not accept it the one who received it] only has a cause for complaint [against him]. And it is permitted to use it for redeeming the Second Tithe without concern, for [he who would not receive it] is but only a cheapskate.
Until when may he [that is defrauded] return the coin? In large towns until he has had time to show it to a money-changer. In villages until the Sabbath eve. If he [that had given the coin] recognized it, even after twelve months he should accept it [in return], but [if he does not accept it the one who received it] only has a cause for complaint [against him]. And it is permitted to use it for redeeming the Second Tithe without concern, for [he who would not receive it] is but only a cheapskate.
Just as the laws of fraud apply to buying and selling, so to do they apply to the spoken word. One may not say, “How much is this object?, if he does not wish to buy it. If one had repented, another should not say to him, “Remember your earlier deeds”. If one descended from converts, another should not say to him, “Remember the deeds of your ancestors”. For it is said (Exodus 22:21), “And a stranger you shall not wrong or oppress.”
One may say to his fellow, “Help me weed and I will help you weed” or “Help me hoe and I will help you hoe.” But one may not say, “Help me weed and I will help you hoe”, or “Help me hoe and I will help you weed”. All days of the dry season are accounted alike, and all days of the rainy season are accounted alike. One may not say to another, “Help me plow in the dry season and I will help you plow in the rainy season.” Rabban Gamaliel says: “There is interest that is paid in advance and interest that is paid afterward. How is this so? If a one intended to borrow from another and made him a present and said, “This is so that you will lend to me”, this is interest that is paid in advance. If one borrowed from another and repaid it to him, and then sent a present and said, “This is for your money of which you have not had use while it was with me”, this is interest that is paid afterward. Rabbi Shimon says: “There is interest paid in words: one may not say to his creditor, “Know that such and such a person has come form such and such a place.”
If one hired laborers to work among his fourth-year plantings, they not eat from them. If he had not told them [that they were fourth-year plantings] he must first redeem the fruit and then allow them to eat. If his fig-cakes broke up or his jars burst open, they may not eat from them. If he had not told them [that they were liable to be tithed] he must first separate the tithes and then allow them to eat.
If one hired laborers to work among his fourth-year plantings, they not eat from them. If he had not told them [that they were fourth-year plantings] he must first redeem the fruit and then allow them to eat. If his fig-cakes broke up or his jars burst open, they may not eat from them. If he had not told them [that they were liable to be tithed] he must first separate the tithes and then allow them to eat.
Those that guard [gathered] produce may eat from it because that is the custom of the land and not because that is the law of the Torah. There are four kinds of guardians: an unpaid guardian, a borrower, a paid guardian and a hirer. An unpaid guardian may take an oath [that he had not been neglectful] in every case [of loss or damage and be free of liability]. A borrower must make restitution in every case. A paid guardian or a hirer may take an oath if the beast was injured, or taken captive or dead, but he must make restitution if it was lost or stolen.
If one swapped a cow for a donkey, and it gave birth, So too if one sold his slave and she gave birth, [And] one (the seller) says, “It was born before I sold her”, and the other (the buyer) says, “It was born after I bought her”, they shall divide [the value of what was born]. If one had two slaves, one large and the other small, or two fields, one large and the other small,[And he sold one of them], If the buyer says, “I bought the large one” and the other says, “I don’t know”, the buyer can rightly claim the large one. If the seller said, “I sold the small one” and the buyer said, “I do not know”, he may only take the small one. If one said, “It was the large one” and the other said, “It was the small one”, the seller must take an oath that it was the small one that he sold [and the buyer can only take the small one]. If one said, “I do not know”, and the other said, “I do not know”, they shall divide the value [of both slaves or fields].
If one leased a field from his fellow and it was an irrigated field or a field with trees, and the spring dried up or the trees were cut down, he may not give [the owner] less than his agreed rental. But if he had said, “Lease me this irrigated field, or this field with trees”, and the spring dried up or the trees were cut down, he may give less than the prescribed rental.
If one leased a field from his fellow and the locusts devoured the crop or it was blasted [by strong winds which caused the grain to be prematurely separated from the stalks], if it was a region-wide mishap he may reduce the amount of the rental agreement. If it was not a region-wide mishap, he may not reduce the amount of the rental agreement. Rabbi Judah says: “If he had leased it from him for a fixed amount of money, in neither case may he reduce the amount of the rental agreement.”
The laws “You must pay him his wages on the same day” (Deut. 24:15) and “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning” (Lev. 19:13) apply both to the hire of a man or of a beast or of utensils. When is this so? When the employee has laid claim to it, but if he had not laid claim to it the employer does not commit a transgression. If he gave him a draft on a shopkeeper or moneychanger [the employer] does not commit a transgression [even though the employee has not yet collected]. If an employee [claimed his wages] within the set time he may take an oath and take his wages. [But] if the set time had passed he may not take an oath and take his wages. If witnesses testified that he had claimed his wages at the set time [and was not paid], he may take an oath and receive his wages. The law “You must pay him his wages on the same day” applies also to the resident alien, but not the law, “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning”.
The laws “You must pay him his wages on the same day” (Deut. 24:15) and “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning” (Lev. 19:13) apply both to the hire of a man or of a beast or of utensils. When is this so? When the employee has laid claim to it, but if he had not laid claim to it the employer does not commit a transgression. If he gave him a draft on a shopkeeper or moneychanger [the employer] does not commit a transgression [even though the employee has not yet collected]. If an employee [claimed his wages] within the set time he may take an oath and take his wages. [But] if the set time had passed he may not take an oath and take his wages. If witnesses testified that he had claimed his wages at the set time [and was not paid], he may take an oath and receive his wages. The law “You must pay him his wages on the same day” applies also to the resident alien, but not the law, “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning”.
The laws “You must pay him his wages on the same day” (Deut. 24:15) and “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning” (Lev. 19:13) apply both to the hire of a man or of a beast or of utensils. When is this so? When the employee has laid claim to it, but if he had not laid claim to it the employer does not commit a transgression. If he gave him a draft on a shopkeeper or moneychanger [the employer] does not commit a transgression [even though the employee has not yet collected]. If an employee [claimed his wages] within the set time he may take an oath and take his wages. [But] if the set time had passed he may not take an oath and take his wages. If witnesses testified that he had claimed his wages at the set time [and was not paid], he may take an oath and receive his wages. The law “You must pay him his wages on the same day” applies also to the resident alien, but not the law, “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning”.
If one lent one’s fellow, he may exact a pledge from him only with the permission of a court, and he may not enter his house to take the pledge, as it is states, “You shall stand outside” (Deut. 24:1. If the borrower had two utensils, he may take one but must give back the other. And he must give back the pillow at night and the plow during the day. And if the creditor dies he need not return the pledge to his heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Even to the debtor himself he need only return the pledge within thirty days [of the loan], and after thirty days he may sell it with the consent of the court. A pledge may not be taken from a widow, whether she be rich or poor, as it states, “Do not take the a widow’s garment as a pledge” (Deut. 24:17). If one takes a millstone as a pledge he violates a negative commandment and he is also in violation of both parts [of the millstone], as it states, “Do not take a mill or an upper millstone as a pledge” (Deut. 24:6). And they didn’t say just an upper millstone or a mill but anything that is necessary for food, as it states, “for that would be taking someone’s life as a pledge” (ibid.).
So, too, if an olive press was built in a rock and another had a garden on top of it, and [the olive press] was in part broken down, the owner of the garden may come down and sow below until the other rebuilds the ceiling of his olive press. If a wall or a tree fell into the public domain and caused damage, the owner is not liable to make restitution. If a set time had been given to him to cut down the tree or pull down the wall, and they fell down within the time, he is not liable. If after that time, he is liable.
So, too, if an olive press was built in a rock and another had a garden on top of it, and [the olive press] was in part broken down, the owner of the garden may come down and sow below until the other rebuilds the ceiling of his olive press. If a wall or a tree fell into the public domain and caused damage, the owner is not liable to make restitution. If a set time had been given to him to cut down the tree or pull down the wall, and they fell down within the time, he is not liable. If after that time, he is liable.
If one’s wall was near his fellow’s garden and it fell down and his fellow said to him, “Clear away your stones”, and he answered, “They have become yours”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the owner of the garden) had accepted he (the owner of the wall) said to him, “Here is your expenditures and I will take back what is mine”, they do not listen to him. If one hired a laborer to help him in his work with chopped straw and stubble, and the laborer said to him, “Give me my wages”, and he said to him, “Take as your wages that with which you have labored”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the employee) had accepted he (the employer) said to him, “Here are your wages and I will take what is mine”, they do not listen to him. One who removes his manure into the public domain: from the time he removes it another may take it to manure [his fields]. One may not soak clay or make bricks in the public domain, but clay may be kneaded in the public domain but not bricks. One who builds in the public domain: one brings the stones and another builds (immediately). And if he causes damage, he pays what he has damaged. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “He may, indeed, make preparation for his work for thirty days [in the public domain].
If one’s wall was near his fellow’s garden and it fell down and his fellow said to him, “Clear away your stones”, and he answered, “They have become yours”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the owner of the garden) had accepted he (the owner of the wall) said to him, “Here is your expenditures and I will take back what is mine”, they do not listen to him. If one hired a laborer to help him in his work with chopped straw and stubble, and the laborer said to him, “Give me my wages”, and he said to him, “Take as your wages that with which you have labored”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the employee) had accepted he (the employer) said to him, “Here are your wages and I will take what is mine”, they do not listen to him. One who removes his manure into the public domain: from the time he removes it another may take it to manure [his fields]. One may not soak clay or make bricks in the public domain, but clay may be kneaded in the public domain but not bricks. One who builds in the public domain: one brings the stones and another builds (immediately). And if he causes damage, he pays what he has damaged. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “He may, indeed, make preparation for his work for thirty days [in the public domain].
A person’s ladder must not be kept within four cubits of [his neighbor’s] dovecote, lest a marten (a small animal that eats doves) should jump in. His wall may not be built four cubits from [his neighbor’s] roof-gutter, so that the other can set up his ladder [to clean it out]. A dovecote may not be kept within fifty cubits of a town, and none may build a dovecote in his own domain unless his ground extends fifty cubits in every direction. Rabbi Judah says: Four kor’s space of ground, which is the length of a pigeon’s flight. But if he had bought it [and it was built already in that place] and there was only a quarter-kab’s space of ground, he has a right to the dovecote.
If two testify that he has had the use [of property] during three years and they are found to be false witnesses, they must make full restitution to the owner. If two [false witnesses] testify of the first year, two of the second, and two of the third, they divide up the costs of restitution between them. If three brothers testify and another is included with them, they offer three different acts of testimony, but their words count as a single act of testimony when the evidence is proved false.
Nor [has he sold] the cistern or the cellar, even though he had written in the deed of sale, “the depth and height”. And he [the seller] must buy himself a path [from the new owner to reach the cellar or cistern], according to Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages say: “He need not buy himself a path.” And Rabbi Akiva agrees that if he had said to him, “Excepting these [the cistern or cellar]” that he need not buy himself a path. If he sold them [the cellar or cistern] to another, Rabbi Akiva says: “He need not buy himself a path.” But the Sages say: “He must buy himself a path.”
Nor [has he sold] the cistern or the cellar, even though he had written in the deed of sale, “the depth and height”. And he [the seller] must buy himself a path [from the new owner to reach the cellar or cistern], according to Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages say: “He need not buy himself a path.” And Rabbi Akiva agrees that if he had said to him, “Excepting these [the cistern or cellar]” that he need not buy himself a path. If he sold them [the cellar or cistern] to another, Rabbi Akiva says: “He need not buy himself a path.” But the Sages say: “He must buy himself a path.”
If a man sold a house he has sold also the door, but not the key. He has sold a permanent mortar but not a movable one. He has sold the convex millstone (the lower, usually fixed stone) but not the concave one. Nor [has he sold] the oven or the stove. But if he had said: “[I am selling to you] the house and all that is in it, these are also sold.”
If a man sold a courtyard, he has also sold its houses, cisterns, trenches and caves, but not the movable property. But if he had said: “It and all that is in it” all of these are also sold. But in neither case has he sold the bath-house, or the olive press that are in it. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If a man sold a courtyard, he has sold only the air (the open spaces) of the courtyard.
If a man sold an olive press he has sold also the vat, the grindstone, and the posts, but he has not sold the pressing-boards, the wheel or the beam. But if he had said: “It and all that is in it”, all these are sold also. Rabbi Eliezer said: “If a man sold an olive press he has sold the beam also.”
If a man sold a bath house, he has not sold the planks or the benches or the curtains. But if he had said: “It and all that is in it”, all these are sold also. In neither case has he sold the water containers or the stores of wood.
If a man sold a town, he has also sold the houses, cisterns, trenches, caves, bath houses, dovecotes, olive presses, and irrigated fields, but not the movable property. But if he had said: “It and all that is in it”, even if cattle and slaves were in it, all of these are sold. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If a man sold a town he has also sold the town watchman.”
But [one who sold a field] has not sold the stones that are not necessary to it or the canes in a vineyard that are not necessary to it or the produce that is already picked from the ground. But if he had said, “It and all that is in it” all of these are sold also. But in neither case has he sold any partition of reeds that covers a quarter-kav’s space of ground, or the watchman’s hut if it was not fastened down with mortar, or grafted carob trees or cropped sycamores, or any cistern or winepress or dovecote, whether they are lying waste or in use. And [the seller] must purchase [from the buyer] a way thereto, according to Rabbi Akiva. But the sages say: “He need not.” And Rabbi Akiva agrees that if he had said, “Excepting these”, he need not buy himself a way thereto. If he had sold them (the cistern, winepress or dovecote) to another, Rabbi Akiva says: “He [that bought them] need not buy himself a way thereto. But the Sages say: “He must buy himself a way thereto.” When is this so? With regards to he that sells his field. But if he gives it as a gift, he gives everything that is in it. If brothers who divided [an inheritance] came into possession of a field, they come into possession of everything that is in it. If a man secured title by possession of the property of a convert, and secured title by possession of the [convert’s] field, he secures title to everything that is in it. If a man dedicated a field [to the Temple] he has dedicated everything in it. Rabbi Shimon says: “If a man dedicated a field, he has dedicated only the grafted carob trees and cropped sycamores.”
But [one who sold a field] has not sold the stones that are not necessary to it or the canes in a vineyard that are not necessary to it or the produce that is already picked from the ground. But if he had said, “It and all that is in it” all of these are sold also. But in neither case has he sold any partition of reeds that covers a quarter-kav’s space of ground, or the watchman’s hut if it was not fastened down with mortar, or grafted carob trees or cropped sycamores, or any cistern or winepress or dovecote, whether they are lying waste or in use. And [the seller] must purchase [from the buyer] a way thereto, according to Rabbi Akiva. But the sages say: “He need not.” And Rabbi Akiva agrees that if he had said, “Excepting these”, he need not buy himself a way thereto. If he had sold them (the cistern, winepress or dovecote) to another, Rabbi Akiva says: “He [that bought them] need not buy himself a way thereto. But the Sages say: “He must buy himself a way thereto.” When is this so? With regards to he that sells his field. But if he gives it as a gift, he gives everything that is in it. If brothers who divided [an inheritance] came into possession of a field, they come into possession of everything that is in it. If a man secured title by possession of the property of a convert, and secured title by possession of the [convert’s] field, he secures title to everything that is in it. If a man dedicated a field [to the Temple] he has dedicated everything in it. Rabbi Shimon says: “If a man dedicated a field, he has dedicated only the grafted carob trees and cropped sycamores.”
But [one who sold a field] has not sold the stones that are not necessary to it or the canes in a vineyard that are not necessary to it or the produce that is already picked from the ground. But if he had said, “It and all that is in it” all of these are sold also. But in neither case has he sold any partition of reeds that covers a quarter-kav’s space of ground, or the watchman’s hut if it was not fastened down with mortar, or grafted carob trees or cropped sycamores, or any cistern or winepress or dovecote, whether they are lying waste or in use. And [the seller] must purchase [from the buyer] a way thereto, according to Rabbi Akiva. But the sages say: “He need not.” And Rabbi Akiva agrees that if he had said, “Excepting these”, he need not buy himself a way thereto. If he had sold them (the cistern, winepress or dovecote) to another, Rabbi Akiva says: “He [that bought them] need not buy himself a way thereto. But the Sages say: “He must buy himself a way thereto.” When is this so? With regards to he that sells his field. But if he gives it as a gift, he gives everything that is in it. If brothers who divided [an inheritance] came into possession of a field, they come into possession of everything that is in it. If a man secured title by possession of the property of a convert, and secured title by possession of the [convert’s] field, he secures title to everything that is in it. If a man dedicated a field [to the Temple] he has dedicated everything in it. Rabbi Shimon says: “If a man dedicated a field, he has dedicated only the grafted carob trees and cropped sycamores.”
If a man sold a ship, he has also sold the mast, the sail, the anchor, and all the means of steering it. But he has not sold the slaves, the packing-bags, or the lading. But if he had said, “It and all that is in it”, all these are sold also. If a man sold a wagon, he has not sold the mules, and if he sold the mules, he has not sold the wagon. If he sold the yoke, he has not sold the oxen, and if he sold the oxen, he has not sold the yoke. Rabbi Judah says: “The price tells all. How is this so? If one said to him, “Sell me your yoke for 200 zuz, it is known that no yoke costs 200 zuz.” But the sages say: “The price is not proof.”
If a man sold produce to his fellow and the buyer drew it towards him but did not measure it, [the buyer] has acquired [the produce]. If [the seller] had measured it but [the buyer] did not draw it towards him, he has not acquired [the produce]. If [the buyer] is clever he will rent the place [in which the produce is located]. If a man bought flax from his fellow he has not acquired it until he has moved it from one place to another. If it was still attached to the ground, and he plucked any small quantity of it, he has acquired possession.
If a man sold wine to his fellow and it turned sour he is not responsible. But if it was known [to the seller] that his wine would [soon] turn sour, this is a mistaken purchase. If he had said to him, “I am selling you spiced wine”, he is responsible for its remaining [good] until Shavuoth. [If he said] it is old wine, it must be from last year’s. [If he said] it is vintage old wine, it must be from the year before last.
If he had a cistern behind his fellow’s house, he may go in and out only at the time when others are accustomed to go in and out. And he may not bring in his cattle and let them drink from his cistern, rather he must draw water and let them drink outside. He and the owner of the house should each make themselves a lock.
If he had a garden behind his fellow’s garden, he may go in and out only at the time when others are accustomed to go in and out. And he may not bring in merchants, or enter through it into another field. [The owner of] the outer garden may plant seeds on the path. But, if with the other’s consent, he has been given a path at the side [of the other’s garden] he may go in and out when he wishes. And he may bring in merchants, but he may not enter through it into another field. And neither of them has the right to plant seeds on the path.
If a man says, “So and so, my firstborn son, shall not receive a double portion”, or “So and so, my son, shall not inherit with his brothers”, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. If a man apportioned his property to his sons by word of mouth, and gave much to one and little to another, or made them equal to the firstborn, his words are valid. But if he had said [that it should be so] “by inheritance”, he has said nothing. If he had written down, whether at the beginning or in the middle or at the end [of his will] that it should be as a gift, his words are valid. If a man said, “So and so a man shall inherit from me” and he has a daughter; or “My daughter shall inherit from me”, and he has a son, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. Rabbi Johanan ben Baroka says: “If he said [that so and so shall inherit from me] of one that was qualified to inherit from him, his words are valid, but if of one that was not qualified to inherit from him his words do not remain valid.” If a man wrote away his property to others and passed over his sons, what he has done is done, but the Sages are not comfortable with it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If has sons did not behave properly, it should be counted to his credit.”
If a man says, “So and so, my firstborn son, shall not receive a double portion”, or “So and so, my son, shall not inherit with his brothers”, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. If a man apportioned his property to his sons by word of mouth, and gave much to one and little to another, or made them equal to the firstborn, his words are valid. But if he had said [that it should be so] “by inheritance”, he has said nothing. If he had written down, whether at the beginning or in the middle or at the end [of his will] that it should be as a gift, his words are valid. If a man said, “So and so a man shall inherit from me” and he has a daughter; or “My daughter shall inherit from me”, and he has a son, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. Rabbi Johanan ben Baroka says: “If he said [that so and so shall inherit from me] of one that was qualified to inherit from him, his words are valid, but if of one that was not qualified to inherit from him his words do not remain valid.” If a man wrote away his property to others and passed over his sons, what he has done is done, but the Sages are not comfortable with it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If has sons did not behave properly, it should be counted to his credit.”
If a man said, “This is my son”, he is believed. If [he said], “This is my brother”, he is not believed, yet the other may join him in his portion. If he died the property returns to its place. If he inherited property from elsewhere the other’s brothers inherit it together with him. If a man died and a testament was found bound to his thigh, this counts as nothing. But if [he had delivered it and] through it granted title to another, whether of his heirs or of those who are not his heirs, his words are valid.
If a man left sons and daughters and one that was of doubtful gender, if the property was great the males may push him (the one of doubtful gender) onto the females; if the property was small the females may thrust him onto the males. If a man said, “If my wife shall bear a male he shall be given 100 zuz”, and she had a male, he receives 100 zuz. [If he said, “If my wife shall bear a] female she shall be given 200 zuz”, and she had a female, she receives 200 zuz. [If he said, “If may wife shall bear a] male he shall be given 100 zuz and if a female 200 zuz” and she had a male and a female, the male receives 100 zuz and the female 200 zuz. If she had one of doubtful gender, he does not take. But if he said, “Whatsoever my wife shall bear shall be given [such an amount], he receives. If he [the one of doubtful gender] was the only heir, he inherits everything.
If a man left sons and daughters and one that was of doubtful gender, if the property was great the males may push him (the one of doubtful gender) onto the females; if the property was small the females may thrust him onto the males. If a man said, “If my wife shall bear a male he shall be given 100 zuz”, and she had a male, he receives 100 zuz. [If he said, “If my wife shall bear a] female she shall be given 200 zuz”, and she had a female, she receives 200 zuz. [If he said, “If may wife shall bear a] male he shall be given 100 zuz and if a female 200 zuz” and she had a male and a female, the male receives 100 zuz and the female 200 zuz. If she had one of doubtful gender, he does not take. But if he said, “Whatsoever my wife shall bear shall be given [such an amount], he receives. If he [the one of doubtful gender] was the only heir, he inherits everything.
If a man left sons and daughters and one that was of doubtful gender, if the property was great the males may push him (the one of doubtful gender) onto the females; if the property was small the females may thrust him onto the males. If a man said, “If my wife shall bear a male he shall be given 100 zuz”, and she had a male, he receives 100 zuz. [If he said, “If my wife shall bear a] female she shall be given 200 zuz”, and she had a female, she receives 200 zuz. [If he said, “If may wife shall bear a] male he shall be given 100 zuz and if a female 200 zuz” and she had a male and a female, the male receives 100 zuz and the female 200 zuz. If she had one of doubtful gender, he does not take. But if he said, “Whatsoever my wife shall bear shall be given [such an amount], he receives. If he [the one of doubtful gender] was the only heir, he inherits everything.
If a man left sons and daughters and one that was of doubtful gender, if the property was great the males may push him (the one of doubtful gender) onto the females; if the property was small the females may thrust him onto the males. If a man said, “If my wife shall bear a male he shall be given 100 zuz”, and she had a male, he receives 100 zuz. [If he said, “If my wife shall bear a] female she shall be given 200 zuz”, and she had a female, she receives 200 zuz. [If he said, “If may wife shall bear a] male he shall be given 100 zuz and if a female 200 zuz” and she had a male and a female, the male receives 100 zuz and the female 200 zuz. If she had one of doubtful gender, he does not take. But if he said, “Whatsoever my wife shall bear shall be given [such an amount], he receives. If he [the one of doubtful gender] was the only heir, he inherits everything.
If a man left elder sons and younger sons, and the elder sons improved the property, they improve it to the common benefit. If they said, “See, what our father has left us, lo, we will work and from that we will eat”, they improve it to their own benefit. So, too, if a woman (a widow) improved the property, she improves it to the common benefit. If she had said, “See, what my husband left to me, lo, I will work and from that I will eat”, she improves it to her own benefit.
If brothers were partners and one of them fell into a public office, it falls to the common benefit. If one [of them] got sick and needed healing, his healing is at his own expense. If certain of the brothers in their father’s lifetime had made a present as groomsmen [at their father’s expense] and [after his death] the present was restored to them, it is restored to the common benefit, for the groomsmen’s gift [counts as a loan] and can be recovered in a court of law. But if [one of the brothers in his father’s lifetime] sent his fellow jars of wine or jars of oil, they cannot be recovered through a court of law, since they count [not as a loan but] as a charitable deed.
If a man who lies dying wrote over his property to others [as a gift] and kept back any land whatsoever, his gift remains valid [even should he not die]. If he did not keep back any land whatsoever, his gift does not remain valid [if he should not die]. If it was not written in the document, “who lies dying”, but he said that [he had written the document] while he lay dying and they (those who received the gift) said that he was healthy [when he wrote the document], he must bring proof that he had been dying, according to Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: “He who makes a claim against his fellow bears the burden of proof.”
If a man who lies dying wrote over his property to others [as a gift] and kept back any land whatsoever, his gift remains valid [even should he not die]. If he did not keep back any land whatsoever, his gift does not remain valid [if he should not die]. If it was not written in the document, “who lies dying”, but he said that [he had written the document] while he lay dying and they (those who received the gift) said that he was healthy [when he wrote the document], he must bring proof that he had been dying, according to Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: “He who makes a claim against his fellow bears the burden of proof.”
If a man had paid part of his debt and gave the debt document to a third party, and the debtor said to him, “If I have not paid you back by such and such a day, give him (the creditor) back the debt document” and the time came and he had not paid, Rabbi Yose says: “He should give it to him.” Rabbi Judah says: “He should not give it to him.”
If a man had paid part of his debt and gave the debt document to a third party, and the debtor said to him, “If I have not paid you back by such and such a day, give him (the creditor) back the debt document” and the time came and he had not paid, Rabbi Yose says: “He should give it to him.” Rabbi Judah says: “He should not give it to him.”
If a man’s debt document was erased, he must have witnesses testify with regards to the loan, and come before the court to make this attestation: “So and so, the son of so and so, his debt document was erased on such and such a day, and so and so and so and so are his witnesses.” If a man had paid part of his debt, Rabbi Judah says: “He should exchange the debt document for a new one.” Rabbi Yose says: “He should write a receipt.” Rabbi Judah said: “It turns out that this one (the debtor) will have to guard his receipt from mice.” Rabbi Yose said to him: “That’s good for him, as long as the rights of the other (the creditor) have not been damaged.
If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”
If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”
If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”
If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.
So long as a litigant can produce proof he may overturn the verdict. If they had said to him, “Bring all of the proofs that you have within thirty days” and he brought them within thirty days, the court may overturn the verdict. But if he brought any proof after thirty days, the court cannot reverse the verdict. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not find [the proof] within thirty days but found it after thirty days?” If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, and he later found proof or witnesses, then they are totally invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not know that he had witnesses, then found witnesses, or that he did not know that he had proof, then found proof? If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, but when he saw that he was about to be found obligated, he said, “Come near, so-and-so and so-and-so and testify for me!”, or if he brought forth some proof from his wallet, then they are totally invalid.
So long as a litigant can produce proof he may overturn the verdict. If they had said to him, “Bring all of the proofs that you have within thirty days” and he brought them within thirty days, the court may overturn the verdict. But if he brought any proof after thirty days, the court cannot reverse the verdict. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not find [the proof] within thirty days but found it after thirty days?” If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, and he later found proof or witnesses, then they are totally invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not know that he had witnesses, then found witnesses, or that he did not know that he had proof, then found proof? If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, but when he saw that he was about to be found obligated, he said, “Come near, so-and-so and so-and-so and testify for me!”, or if he brought forth some proof from his wallet, then they are totally invalid.
So long as a litigant can produce proof he may overturn the verdict. If they had said to him, “Bring all of the proofs that you have within thirty days” and he brought them within thirty days, the court may overturn the verdict. But if he brought any proof after thirty days, the court cannot reverse the verdict. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not find [the proof] within thirty days but found it after thirty days?” If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, and he later found proof or witnesses, then they are totally invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not know that he had witnesses, then found witnesses, or that he did not know that he had proof, then found proof? If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, but when he saw that he was about to be found obligated, he said, “Come near, so-and-so and so-and-so and testify for me!”, or if he brought forth some proof from his wallet, then they are totally invalid.
So long as a litigant can produce proof he may overturn the verdict. If they had said to him, “Bring all of the proofs that you have within thirty days” and he brought them within thirty days, the court may overturn the verdict. But if he brought any proof after thirty days, the court cannot reverse the verdict. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not find [the proof] within thirty days but found it after thirty days?” If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, and he later found proof or witnesses, then they are totally invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not know that he had witnesses, then found witnesses, or that he did not know that he had proof, then found proof? If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, but when he saw that he was about to be found obligated, he said, “Come near, so-and-so and so-and-so and testify for me!”, or if he brought forth some proof from his wallet, then they are totally invalid.
So long as a litigant can produce proof he may overturn the verdict. If they had said to him, “Bring all of the proofs that you have within thirty days” and he brought them within thirty days, the court may overturn the verdict. But if he brought any proof after thirty days, the court cannot reverse the verdict. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not find [the proof] within thirty days but found it after thirty days?” If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, and he later found proof or witnesses, then they are totally invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not know that he had witnesses, then found witnesses, or that he did not know that he had proof, then found proof? If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, but when he saw that he was about to be found obligated, he said, “Come near, so-and-so and so-and-so and testify for me!”, or if he brought forth some proof from his wallet, then they are totally invalid.
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
How did they admonish witnesses in capital cases? They brought them in and admonished them, [saying], “Perhaps you will say something that is only a supposition or hearsay or secondhand, or even from a trustworthy man. Or perhaps you do not know that we shall check you with examination and inquiry? Know, moreover, that capital cases are not like non-capital cases: in non-capital cases a man may pay money and so make atonement, but in capital cases the witness is answerable for the blood of him [that is wrongfully condemned] and the blood of his descendants [that should have been born to him] to the end of the world.” For so have we found it with Cain that murdered his brother, for it says, “The bloods of your brother cry out” (Gen. 4:10). It doesn’t say, “The blood of your brother”, but rather “The bloods of your brother” meaning his blood and the blood of his descendants. Another saying is, “The bloods of your brother” that his blood was cast over trees and stones. Therefore but a single person was created in the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single life to perish from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had caused a whole world to perish; and anyone who saves a single soul from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had saved a whole world. Again [but a single person was created] for the sake of peace among humankind, that one should not say to another, “My father was greater than your father”. Again, [but a single person was created] against the heretics so they should not say, “There are many ruling powers in heaven”. Again [but a single person was created] to proclaim the greatness of the Holy Blessed One; for humans stamp many coins with one seal and they are all like one another; but the King of kings, the Holy Blessed One, has stamped every human with the seal of the first man, yet not one of them are like another. Therefore everyone must say, “For my sake was the world created.” And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be involved with this trouble”, was it not said, “He, being a witness, whether he has seen or known, [if he does not speak it, then he shall bear his iniquity] (Lev. 5:1). And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be guilty of the blood of this man?,” was it not said, “When the wicked perish there is rejoicing” (Proverbs 11:10).]
How did they admonish witnesses in capital cases? They brought them in and admonished them, [saying], “Perhaps you will say something that is only a supposition or hearsay or secondhand, or even from a trustworthy man. Or perhaps you do not know that we shall check you with examination and inquiry? Know, moreover, that capital cases are not like non-capital cases: in non-capital cases a man may pay money and so make atonement, but in capital cases the witness is answerable for the blood of him [that is wrongfully condemned] and the blood of his descendants [that should have been born to him] to the end of the world.” For so have we found it with Cain that murdered his brother, for it says, “The bloods of your brother cry out” (Gen. 4:10). It doesn’t say, “The blood of your brother”, but rather “The bloods of your brother” meaning his blood and the blood of his descendants. Another saying is, “The bloods of your brother” that his blood was cast over trees and stones. Therefore but a single person was created in the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single life to perish from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had caused a whole world to perish; and anyone who saves a single soul from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had saved a whole world. Again [but a single person was created] for the sake of peace among humankind, that one should not say to another, “My father was greater than your father”. Again, [but a single person was created] against the heretics so they should not say, “There are many ruling powers in heaven”. Again [but a single person was created] to proclaim the greatness of the Holy Blessed One; for humans stamp many coins with one seal and they are all like one another; but the King of kings, the Holy Blessed One, has stamped every human with the seal of the first man, yet not one of them are like another. Therefore everyone must say, “For my sake was the world created.” And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be involved with this trouble”, was it not said, “He, being a witness, whether he has seen or known, [if he does not speak it, then he shall bear his iniquity] (Lev. 5:1). And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be guilty of the blood of this man?,” was it not said, “When the wicked perish there is rejoicing” (Proverbs 11:10).]
They used to examine witnesses with seven inquiries: In what week of years? In what year? In what month? On what date in the month? On what day? In what hour? In what place? Rabbi Yose says: [They only asked:] On what day? In what hour? In what place? [Moreover they asked:] Do you recognize him? Did you warn him? If one had committed idolatry [they asked the witnesses:] What did he worship and how did he worship it?
The place of stoning was twice a man’s height. One of the witnesses pushed him by the hips, [so that] he was overturned on his heart. He was then turned on his back. If that caused his death, he had fulfilled [his duty]; but if not, the second witness took a stone and threw it on his chest. If he died thereby, he had done [his duty]; but if not, he [the criminal] was stoned by all Israel, for it is says: “The hand of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people” (Deut. 17:7). All who are stoned are [afterwards] hanged, according to Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: “Only the blasphemer and the idolater are hanged.” A man is hanged with his face towards the spectators, but a woman with her face towards the gallows, according to Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: a man is hanged, but not a woman. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: “But did not Shimon ben Shetah hang women at ashkelon?” They said: “[On that occasion] he hanged eighty women, even though two must not be tried on the same day. How is he hanged? The post is sunk into the ground with a [cross-] piece branching off [at the top] and he brings his hands together one over the other and hangs him up [thereby]. R. Jose said: the post is leaned against the wall, and he hangs him up the way butchers do. He is immediately let down. If he is left [hanging] over night, a negative command is thereby transgressed, for it says, “You shall not let his corpse remain all night upon the tree, but you must bury him the same day because a hanged body is a curse against god” (Deut. 21:23). As if to say why was he hanged? because he cursed the name [of god]; and so the name of Heaven [God] is profaned.
The place of stoning was twice a man’s height. One of the witnesses pushed him by the hips, [so that] he was overturned on his heart. He was then turned on his back. If that caused his death, he had fulfilled [his duty]; but if not, the second witness took a stone and threw it on his chest. If he died thereby, he had done [his duty]; but if not, he [the criminal] was stoned by all Israel, for it is says: “The hand of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people” (Deut. 17:7). All who are stoned are [afterwards] hanged, according to Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: “Only the blasphemer and the idolater are hanged.” A man is hanged with his face towards the spectators, but a woman with her face towards the gallows, according to Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: a man is hanged, but not a woman. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: “But did not Shimon ben Shetah hang women at ashkelon?” They said: “[On that occasion] he hanged eighty women, even though two must not be tried on the same day. How is he hanged? The post is sunk into the ground with a [cross-] piece branching off [at the top] and he brings his hands together one over the other and hangs him up [thereby]. R. Jose said: the post is leaned against the wall, and he hangs him up the way butchers do. He is immediately let down. If he is left [hanging] over night, a negative command is thereby transgressed, for it says, “You shall not let his corpse remain all night upon the tree, but you must bury him the same day because a hanged body is a curse against god” (Deut. 21:23). As if to say why was he hanged? because he cursed the name [of god]; and so the name of Heaven [God] is profaned.
He who has sexual relations with a betrothed young woman is not punished until she is a young woman, a virgin, betrothed, and in her father’s house. If two men had sexual relations with her, the first is stoned, but the second is strangled.
One who incites [individuals to idolatry] -- this refers to an ordinary person who incites an individual who said, “There is an idol in such and such a place; it eats thus, it drinks thus, it does good [to those who worship it] and harm [to those who do not].” For all who are liable for the death penalty according to the Torah no witnesses are hidden to entrap them, excepting for this one. If he said [these things] to two, they themselves are witnesses against him, and he is brought to court and stoned. But if he said [these things] to one, he should reply, “I have friends who wish to do so likewise [come and propose it to them too].” But if he was cunning and declined to speak before them, witnesses are hidden behind a partition, while he [who was incited] says to him, make your proposal to me now in private. When the inciter says to him (repeats to him what he had already said), the other replies, “How can we abandon our God in heaven to go and serve wood and stones?” Should he retract, it is well. But if he answers, “It is our duty [to worship idols], and is seemly for us”, then the witnesses stationed behind the partition take him to court, and have him stoned. He who incites [individuals to idolatry is one who] is one who says, “I will worship it”, or, “I will go and worship”, or, “let us go and worship”; or, “I will sacrifice [to it]”, “I will go and sacrifice”, “let us go and sacrifice”; “I will burn incense, “I will go and burn incense”; “let us go and burn incense”; or “I will make libations to it”, “I will go and make libations to it”, “let us go and make libations”; “I will prostrate myself before it”, “I will go and prostrate myself”, “let us go and prostrate ourselves”. One who seduces [a whole town to idolatry] is one who says, “Let us go and serve idols”.
When does he become liable [to be stoned]? Once he has eaten a tartemar of meat and drunk half a log of wine. Rabbi Yose said: “A maneh of meat and a log of wine. If he ate it in a company [celebrating] a religious act; or at a gathering for the purpose of intercalating the month; if he ate the second tithe in Jerusalem; if he ate the carrion or terefoth (meat that was not slaughtered in a kosher fashion), abominable and creeping things, or untithed produce, or the first tithe from which terumah had not been separated, or unredeemed second tithe, or unredeemed sacred food; if his eating involved a religious act or a transgression; if he ate any food but did not eat meat or drank any drink but did not drink wine, he does not become a ‘stubborn and rebellious son’, unless he eats meat and drinks wine, for it is written, “This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our voice;] he is a glutton and a drunkard” (Deut. 21:20). Although there is no clear proof for this, there is at least a hint, as it is says, “Do not be among wine drinkers, among gluttonous meat eaters of flesh” (Proverbs 23:20).
If his father wants [to have him punished], but not his mother; or his father does not want [to have him punished] but his mother does, he is not treated as a ‘wayward a rebellious son’, unless they both desire it. Rabbi Judah said: “If his mother is not fit for his father, he does not become a ‘wayward and rebellious son”. If one of them [his father or his mother] had a hand cut off, or was lame, mute, blind or deaf, he cannot become a ‘wayward a rebellious son’, because it says “his father and mother shall take hold of him” (Deut. 21:19) not those with a hand cut off; “and bring him out”, not lame parents; “and they shall say”, and not mute parents; “this our son”, and not blind parents; “he will not obey our voice” (Deut. 21:20), and not deaf parents. He is warned in the presence of three and beaten. If he transgresses again after this, he is tried by a court of twenty three. He cannot be sentenced to stoning unless the first three are present, because it says, “this our son” (Deut. 21:20), [implying], this one who was whipped in your presence. If he [the rebellious son] fled before his trial was completed, and then his pubic hair grew in fully, he is free. But if he fled after his trial was completed, and then his pubic hair grew in fully, he remains liable.
“And you shall gather all its spoil into the public square” (Deut. 13:17): if it had no public square, one is made for it; if the public square was outside of [the city], it is brought within it. “And you shall burn with fire the city, and all its spoil as a whole burnt offering for the Lord your God” (ibid.): “And all its spoil”, but not the spoil of heaven. From here they said, the holy objects in the city must be redeemed and the heave offerings (terumoth) allowed to rot; and the second tithe and the sacred writings hidden. “A whole burnt offering for the Lord your God”: Rabbi Shimon said: “The holy Blessed One declared, ‘If you execute judgment upon the seduced city, I will ascribe merit to you as though you had sacrificed to me a whole offering.’” “And it shall remain an everlasting ruin, never to be rebuilt”: it may not be made even into gardens and orchards, according to the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. Rabbi Akiva says: “Never to be rebuilt”: it may not be built as it was, but it may be made into gardens and orchards. “Let nothing that has been doomed stick to your hand, in order that the Lord may turn His blazing anger and show you compassion” (Deut. 13:18): as long as the wicked exist in the world, there is blazing anger in the world; when the wicked perish from the world, blazing anger disappears from the world.
“And you shall gather all its spoil into the public square” (Deut. 13:17): if it had no public square, one is made for it; if the public square was outside of [the city], it is brought within it. “And you shall burn with fire the city, and all its spoil as a whole burnt offering for the Lord your God” (ibid.): “And all its spoil”, but not the spoil of heaven. From here they said, the holy objects in the city must be redeemed and the heave offerings (terumoth) allowed to rot; and the second tithe and the sacred writings hidden. “A whole burnt offering for the Lord your God”: Rabbi Shimon said: “The holy Blessed One declared, ‘If you execute judgment upon the seduced city, I will ascribe merit to you as though you had sacrificed to me a whole offering.’” “And it shall remain an everlasting ruin, never to be rebuilt”: it may not be made even into gardens and orchards, according to the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. Rabbi Akiva says: “Never to be rebuilt”: it may not be built as it was, but it may be made into gardens and orchards. “Let nothing that has been doomed stick to your hand, in order that the Lord may turn His blazing anger and show you compassion” (Deut. 13:18): as long as the wicked exist in the world, there is blazing anger in the world; when the wicked perish from the world, blazing anger disappears from the world.
The following are strangled: One who strikes his father or mother; One who kidnaps a Jew; An elder who rebels against the ruling of the court; A false prophet; One who prophesies in the name of an idol; One who commits adultery; Witnesses who testified falsely [to the adultery of] a priest’s daughter, and the one who has had sexual relations with her. The one who strikes his father or his mother is liable only if he wounds them. In this respect, cursing is more stringent than striking, for one who curses [his/her parents] after death is liable, while one who strikes them after death is not. One who kidnaps a Jew is not liable unless he brings him onto his own property. Rabbi Judah said: “Until he brings him onto his own property and puts him to service, as it says, “If a man is found to have kidnapped a fellow Israelite, enslaving him or selling him” (Deut. 24:7). If he kidnaps his own son. Rabbi Ishmael the son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him]. If he kidnapped one who was half a slave and half free, Rabbi Judah declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him].
An elder rebelling against the ruling of the court [is strangled], for it says, “If there arise a matter too hard for you for judgement […you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the Lord your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die” (Deut. 17:8-13, JPS translation). Three courts of law were there, one situated at the entrance to the Temple mount, another at the door of the [Temple] court, and the third in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. They [first] went to the court which is at the entrance to the Temple mount, and he [the rebellious elder] stated, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this first court] had heard [a ruling on the matter], they state it. If not, they go to the [second court] which is at the entrance of the Temple court, and he declares, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this second court] had heard [a ruling on the matter] they state it; if not, they all proceed to the great court of the Chamber of Hewn Stone from whence instruction issued to all Israel, for it says, [you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you] from that place that the Lord chose (Deut. 17:10). If he returned to his town and taught again as he did before, he is not liable. But if he gave a practical decision, he is guilty, for it says, “Should a man act presumptuously” (Deut. 17:12) he is liable only for a practical ruling. But if a disciple gave a practical decision [opposed to the court], he is exempt: thus his stringency is his leniency.
An elder rebelling against the ruling of the court [is strangled], for it says, “If there arise a matter too hard for you for judgement […you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the Lord your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die” (Deut. 17:8-13, JPS translation). Three courts of law were there, one situated at the entrance to the Temple mount, another at the door of the [Temple] court, and the third in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. They [first] went to the court which is at the entrance to the Temple mount, and he [the rebellious elder] stated, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this first court] had heard [a ruling on the matter], they state it. If not, they go to the [second court] which is at the entrance of the Temple court, and he declares, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this second court] had heard [a ruling on the matter] they state it; if not, they all proceed to the great court of the Chamber of Hewn Stone from whence instruction issued to all Israel, for it says, [you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you] from that place that the Lord chose (Deut. 17:10). If he returned to his town and taught again as he did before, he is not liable. But if he gave a practical decision, he is guilty, for it says, “Should a man act presumptuously” (Deut. 17:12) he is liable only for a practical ruling. But if a disciple gave a practical decision [opposed to the court], he is exempt: thus his stringency is his leniency.
“He who prophesies in the name of an idol”: this is one who says, “Thus has the idol declared” even if he directed the teaching to declare the unclean, unclean, or the clean, clean. “One who has sexual relations with a married woman” after her entry into her husband’s home for marriage, though she did not have sexual relations with her husband, the one who has relations with her is strangled. “Witnesses who testified falsely [to the adultery of] a priest’s daughter, and the one who has had sexual relations with her”, for all false witnesses are led forth to meet the same death [which they sought to impose,] save witnesses who testified falsely [to the adultery of] a priest’s daughter, and the one who has had sexual relations with her.
“He who prophesies in the name of an idol”: this is one who says, “Thus has the idol declared” even if he directed the teaching to declare the unclean, unclean, or the clean, clean. “One who has sexual relations with a married woman” after her entry into her husband’s home for marriage, though she did not have sexual relations with her husband, the one who has relations with her is strangled. “Witnesses who testified falsely [to the adultery of] a priest’s daughter, and the one who has had sexual relations with her”, for all false witnesses are led forth to meet the same death [which they sought to impose,] save witnesses who testified falsely [to the adultery of] a priest’s daughter, and the one who has had sexual relations with her.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
Perjuring witnesses are not to be put to death until [after] the end of the trial. Because the Sadducees say: “[Perjurers were put to death] only after the accused had [actually] been executed, as it says, “ A life for a life” (Deuteronomy 19:21). The [Pharisaic] Sages said to them: “But has not it already been said “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” (Deuteronomy 19:19) which implies when his brother is still alive? If so, why does it say “A life for life”? For it might have been that perjurers are liable to be put to death from the moment their testimony had been taken, therefore the Torah states “A life for a life” that is to say that they are not executed until [after] the termination of the trial.
Perjuring witnesses are not to be put to death until [after] the end of the trial. Because the Sadducees say: “[Perjurers were put to death] only after the accused had [actually] been executed, as it says, “ A life for a life” (Deuteronomy 19:21). The [Pharisaic] Sages said to them: “But has not it already been said “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” (Deuteronomy 19:19) which implies when his brother is still alive? If so, why does it say “A life for life”? For it might have been that perjurers are liable to be put to death from the moment their testimony had been taken, therefore the Torah states “A life for a life” that is to say that they are not executed until [after] the termination of the trial.
If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter.
If one fled after having been convicted at a court and again comes up before the same court, the [first] judgment is not set aside. Wherever two witnesses stand up and declare, “We testify that so and so was tried and convicted at a certain court and that so and so were the witnesses” the accused is executed. [Trials before] a sanhedrin are customary both in the land [of Israel] and outside it. A sanhedrin that executes once in seven years, is called murderous. Rabbi Eliezer b. Azariah Says: once in seventy years. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: “Had we been members of a sanhedrin, no person would ever be put to death. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel remarked: “They would also multiply murderers in Israel.”