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21003 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: Neither the orphan, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram may claim ketubah, or usufruct, or sustenance, or depreciation. But if he married her from the start as a she-ram, she has claim to her ketubah. A widow [married] to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or Gibeonite girl to an Israel, an Israel girl married to a bastard or Gibeonite, have claim to ketubah.
“No usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, that he has from her only the usufruct. Rebbi Yose the Sidonian stated before Rebbi Jeremiah, in disgreement with Rebbi Jeremiah: “He has the right to what she finds and earns, and to dissolve her vows.” What means “no usufruct”? That she cannot reclaim from him the usufruct he had [from her property].
What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody marries a woman and had contracted with her,” etc. How does he become indebted to her? Do not Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, if somebody writes a debenture for another person under the assumption that he owes him and it turns out that he does not owe, he does not have to give to him! Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they gave it the status of an addition to the ketubah. Then he should have to pay in the end! They gave it the status of the gift for a woman’s preliminary marriage. Then he should pay up front! They treated it as when one marries a woman preliminarily by promising to give her twelve silver denars within one year by delivering one silver denar’s worth every month.
There, we have stated: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate,” and it was stated about this: They will be clothed with garments supplied by me. For whom does the daughter work? Let us hear from the following: “The husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance.” This means, he feeds her but she works for her husband. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody had agreed to sustain his daughter-in-law, he has to sustain her, but she works for his son. If he wants her to be with him but she does not want to, the law is with her, as we have stated: “They pay the cost of her sustenance.” If she fell ill, it is as if she had married. If she died, is it as if she had married? If she died, she already is dead.
There, we have stated: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate,” and it was stated about this: They will be clothed with garments supplied by me. For whom does the daughter work? Let us hear from the following: “The husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance.” This means, he feeds her but she works for her husband. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody had agreed to sustain his daughter-in-law, he has to sustain her, but she works for his son. If he wants her to be with him but she does not want to, the law is with her, as we have stated: “They pay the cost of her sustenance.” If she fell ill, it is as if she had married. If she died, is it as if she had married? If she died, she already is dead.
There, we have stated: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate,” and it was stated about this: They will be clothed with garments supplied by me. For whom does the daughter work? Let us hear from the following: “The husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance.” This means, he feeds her but she works for her husband. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody had agreed to sustain his daughter-in-law, he has to sustain her, but she works for his son. If he wants her to be with him but she does not want to, the law is with her, as we have stated: “They pay the cost of her sustenance.” If she fell ill, it is as if she had married. If she died, is it as if she had married? If she died, she already is dead.
Rebbi Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Mana: Miracles happened that day. It was Sabbath eve and all the surrounding towns came together to eulogize him. They made him [Rebbi] rest in eighteen synagogues until they brought him to his resting place but the day extended for them until each one had time to get to his house, fill an amphora of water, and light the candles. When the sun set, the rooster crowed. They were anxious and said, maybe we did desecrate the Sabbath? There came a voice and said to them, every one who was not lazy for the eulogies of Rebbi shall be announced for the life of the Future World, except the fuller. When the latter heard this, he climbed on the roof, threw himself down, and died. There came a voice and said, including the fuller.
Rebbi dwelt in Sepphoris seventeen years and applied to himself (Gen. 47:28): “Jacob lived in Egypt seventeen years,” Jehudah lived in Sepphoris seventeen years. Of these he suffered from toothache for thirteen years. {Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, all these thirteen years no woman lying-in died in the Land of Israel and no pregnant woman had a miscarriage in the Land of Israel.} Why did he have a toothache? Once he saw a calf to be slaughtered when it bellowed and said to him, Rebbi, save me! He said to it, for that you were created. At the end, how was he healed? He saw them killing a burrow of rats. He said to them, let them live, it is written (Ps. 145:9) “His mercy extends to all His creatures.”
HALAKHAH: “Two robbery judges were in Jerusalem,” etc. Did not Rebbi Phineas say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: 469 synagogues were in Jerusalem and each one of them had a Book house and a study house; the Book house for Scripture and the study house for Mishnah? But these two were appointed for robberies; to teach you that if anybody has the power to intervene, if he does not exercise his power the misconduct is attributed to him. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: Naḥum the Mede also was with them. In Rebbi Nathan’s opinion, three robbery judges were in Jerusalem.
Rebbi Ḥizqiya in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Rebbi used to explain three verses for praise. “She sat at the entrance to the double spring.” Is this possible? Even the most brazen whore would not do that. But she lifted her eyes to the door to which all hope is directed; she said before Him: Master of the universe, do not let me leave this house empty. Another explanation: “She sat at the entrance to the double spring;” she opened his eyes and told him, I am single and pure. “And Eli was very old; …, that they slept with.” It is written “they bedded them”. Rebbi said, the women were bringing their nests to become purified for their husbands and they were deferring the sacrifices; the verse counts it as if they had slept with them. Rebbi Tanḥuma said, that is what he scolds them for: “Why do you disregard my slaughter sacrifice and my flour sacrifice?” Could he remove them from the serious sin and scold them for the simple one? “His sons did not walk in his ways,” that they were taking tithe and judging. Rebbi Berekhiah said, a camel caravan was passing by, they neglected public needs and dealt in merchandise.
If somebody together with his wife left for overseas, then she returns and says, my husband died, she shall be supported and collect her ketubah. My husband divorced me, she shall be supported from her ketubah since, as you take it, if she be a married woman, she must be supported from her husband’s; if she is no longer a married woman, she can be supported from her ketubah. “If somebody returns from overseas and his wife requests support but he says, let her earnings cover her sustenance, one listens to him. But if the court had allotted, what they allotted, they have allotted.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if her earnings are not enough for her support. In this case, does one listen to him? Following him who says, there is no support for the wife in biblical law, as we have stated: “The court will not determine food for a wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s.” Rebbi Yose says, if her earnings are sufficient for her support. In that case, why what they allotted, they have allotted? Explain it, if they allotted excess.
MISHNAH: If somebody obligates himself about money for his son-in-law but then goes bankrupt, she must wait until her hair grows white. Admon says: “If I had obligated myself, I would have to wait until my hair grows white. My father obligated himself, what can I do? Marry definitively or divorce!” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement.
It was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, Admon and the rabbis did not disagree about one for whom the father had promised money but went bankrupt that she may sit until her hair grows white. Where did they disagree? If she promised herself. Admon says, she might say, “I was of the opinion that my father wants to give, but now my father does not want to give, what can I do? Marry definitively or divorce!” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement.
MISHNAH: If somebody protests about a field when he himself had signed as a witness, Admon says: “The second one fits me, the first one was harder”; but the Sages say, he lost his right [of appeal]. If he made [the field] a marker for another, he lost his right.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody produces a promissory note on another person,” etc. Rebbi Jonah says, if it is worth it; Rebbi Yose says, even if it is not worth it. Think of it, if he had real estate! He can say to him, I want good real estate. Think of it, if he had good real estate! He can say to him, I want mine. In addition, he can say to him, to care for two parcels overtaxes my powers.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody produces a promissory note on another person,” etc. Rebbi Jonah says, if it is worth it; Rebbi Yose says, even if it is not worth it. Think of it, if he had real estate! He can say to him, I want good real estate. Think of it, if he had good real estate! He can say to him, I want mine. In addition, he can say to him, to care for two parcels overtaxes my powers.
“What is a prohibition? This loaf is for me as the day of my father’s death, as the day X was killed, as the day I saw Jerusalem in ruins; that is the prohibition the Torah spoke of.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav: Both say, only if he had made a vow about that day. Rebbi Yose asked: If only he had made a vow about that day, why a separate prohibition? He should say on that day!
“What is a prohibition? This loaf is for me as the day of my father’s death, as the day X was killed, as the day I saw Jerusalem in ruins; that is the prohibition the Torah spoke of.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav: Both say, only if he had made a vow about that day. Rebbi Yose asked: If only he had made a vow about that day, why a separate prohibition? He should say on that day!
“I am vowed away from you”. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, both of them are mutually forbidden; as if [the other person] had said: and I from you. If he said, this loaf is vowed away from me and I from it, or I am vowed away from this loaf and it from me. It does not make any difference whether he said “from me” in Aramaic (מינך) or in Hebrew (מימך), or he said “I am to you [forbidden]” or “I am on you [forbidden]”, “you are to me [forbidden]” or “you are on me [forbidden].” It was stated: “I am jailed away from you, I am separated away from you”. Rebbi Jeremiah asked, why did one not state “taken away from”? Rebbi Yose said, that was stated at the end, “I am taken away from the Jews.”
It was stated: “As to their free-will offerings, he did not say anything.” Does that mean that the wicked give free-will offerings? Since he gave a free-will offering, he is not wicked. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Jehudah, since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: “It is better that you should not make a vow than that you make a vow but do not pay,” better in any case is that you should not make a vow at all. Rebbi Meїr says, “it is better that you should not make a vow than that you make a vow but do not pay,” better in any case is that you should make a vow and pay. And so it says, “make vows and pay to your God.” How does one handle a free-will offering? He brings his sheep to the Temple courtyard and says, that one is an elevation offering. Rebbi Abin said, Rebbi Jehudah used to open a door: If you had known that one who makes a vow is called wicked, would you have vowed? Rebbi Yannai said, “it is a trap for a human to call ‘sanctified’ and afterwards to check out the vows,” if one started to make vows, his account book is opened. Another explanation: “it is a trap for a human to call ‘sanctified’ and to be late to check out the vows,” if a person is in arrears with his vows, his account book is opened. It happened to one who said, I undertake to bring an elevation offering and he tarried to bring it. His ship sank at sea.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
“Mushy”. There is no difference whether mushy for an elevation offering or mushy for a well-being offering. The leftover of an elevation offering [never] had a time when it was usable, the leftover of an elevation offering (never) had a time when it was usable. If he said, this is for me as a leftover of a well-being offering, what is it?
“Mushy”. There is no difference whether mushy for an elevation offering or mushy for a well-being offering. The leftover of an elevation offering [never] had a time when it was usable, the leftover of an elevation offering (never) had a time when it was usable. If he said, this is for me as a leftover of a well-being offering, what is it?
“Rebbi Jehudah says, he who says ‘like Jerusalem’ did not say anything,” since this one intended to refer only to its wood and stones. “Like the Torah,” that is permitted. “Like the sanctity of the Torah, like what is written in it,” that is forbidden like the sacrifices written in it. There are Tannaїm who state, “like the Torah and what is written in it,” is permitted. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana said, that is Rebbi Simeon’s, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, by the words of Rebbi Simeon, if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is free also for the rest. Rebbi Yose said, it is everybody’s opinion. “Like the Torah”, like the sanctity of the Torah. “Like what is written in it,” like the sanctity of the verses.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
MISHNAH: Exaggeration vows: If he said, if I did not see on this road [crowds] like those who left Egypt; if I did not see a snake [as thick] as the beam of the olive press. Vows in error how? If he said, if I ate or drank, and he remembers that he had eaten or drunk, that I shall not eat or shall not drink, and he forgot and ate or drank. If he said, a qônām that my wife cannot enjoy anything from me because she stole my wallet or hit my son, and it turns out that she did not hit him or became known that she did not steal. If he saw people eating [his] figs and said to them, these are for you as qorbān, but the persons turned out to be his father or brothers with others. The House of Shammai say, these are permitted, those with them forbidden. But the House of Hillel say, these and those are permitted.
A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears and changes. What is vain and what is false? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it is known to two persons, that is a false oath, to three, it is vain. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the earth knows about it, that is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is whipped. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is not whipped. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Even an egg and a pearl. What means even? But, for example an egg and a pearl.
A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears and changes. What is vain and what is false? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it is known to two persons, that is a false oath, to three, it is vain. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the earth knows about it, that is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is whipped. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is not whipped. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Even an egg and a pearl. What means even? But, for example an egg and a pearl.
There, we have stated: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf.” Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on that it was said but on the following: “Whether it was for himself or for others.” Rebbi Abba said in Samuel’s name: An oath that X gave a mina to Y. If it turns out that he had not given [a mina], since it is not in his hand for the future, it is not in his hand for the past.
It was found stated about both cases: It is more restrictive for oaths than for vows that an erroneous oath is forbidden but an erroneous vow is permitted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi [ ], does Rebbi Aqiba add to the words of the House of Hillel? As we have stated there, “until Rebbi Aqiba came and taught that a vow of which any part was permitted is totally permitted.” He said to him, if you say that there, in the case of a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, you say that a vow of which any part was invalidated is totally invalidated, here, where it does not need investigation by a Sage, so much more! Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because of an erroneous vow; if I had known that my father and my brothers were there I would not have made the vow.
MISHNAH: If he had his house to build, his fence to repair, his field to harvest, the other person goes to the journeymen and tells them, X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do. They work with him and come and take their wages from the other person.
HALAKHAH: “If he had his house to build, his fence to repair,” etc. May he say, he who works will not lose? Let us hear from the following. In the days of Rebbi Immi there was a fire in the village. Rebbi Immi sent a crier to the markets of the Gentiles saying: “He who works will not lose.” Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said, that was danger to life. But if there was danger to life, Rebbi Immi himself should have fought the fire! Did we not state, in any case of danger to life one does not say that [the necessary work] be done by Gentiles or minors, but [it should be done] even by important Jewish persons. It happened that there was a fire in the courtyard of Yose ben Simai in Šiḥin, and the garrison of the barracks of Sepphoris came to fight it but he did not let them fight it; he said, let the collector collect his due. Immediately there formed a cloud, there was rain which extinguished it. After the Sabbath he sent to each of them a tetradrachma and to their commander 50 denarii. Rebbi Ḥanina said, there was no need for him to do that A Samaritan was a neighbor of Rebbi Jonah. There was a fire in Rebbi Jonah’s neighborhood; he wanted to fight it but Rebbi Jonah did not let him. He said to him, because of my property! He said, yes. And everything was saved. Rebbi Jonah from Kefar-Immi spread his garment over the grain stack and the fire retreated from it.
MISHNAH: If they were walking on the road and he had nothing to eat, the other gives something to a third person as a gift, and this one is permitted it. If nobody is with them, he puts it on a rock or a fence and says, this is ownerless for everyone to take and this one can come and eat, but Rebbi Yose forbids.
So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?
“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there.” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There, we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing, for the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.
“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there.” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There, we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing, for the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.
“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there.” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There, we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing, for the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.
“This, your house,” because of what do you catch him? Because of “your house,” “this”? If it collapsed and he himself rebuilt it, is it not “this”? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody said to his heirs, give a wedding house to my son or a widow’s house to my daughter, if it collapsed, the heirs are required to rebuild it.” There, we have stated: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, [the son] inherits. ‘During my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, [the son] does not inherit.” [Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, [the son] inherits; ‘after my death’, [the son] inherits?] What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose [ben Ḥanina] both say, ‘a qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade to him during his lifetime and after his death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Nedarim what we did not state in S̄ebuot: “A qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is forbidden.” Because he said “this”. Therefore, if he had not said “this”, he would have forbidden to him both during his lifetime and after his death.
Hillel the Elder had eighty pairs of students. The greatest among them was Jonathan ben Uzziel, the least important Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai. Once he fell sick and all came to visit him. Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai waited in the courtyard. He said to them, where is the least important among you who is a head in wisdom and a head for generations? Unnecessary to speak of the greatest among you! They said, he is in the courtyard. He said to them, let him enter. When he entered, he said to them “to let my lovers inherit substance; their treasuries I shall fill.”
If they sanctified it before its time or after its lengthening, should I assume it was lengthened? The verse says (Lev. 23:2) “them”, “them”, “these are My holidays.” Before its time is not “My holidays.” Before its time, the 29th day, after its lengthening, the 32nd day. From where that one intercalates for the year because of the [men of the] diaspora who set out but did not yet arrive? The verse says (Num. 23:44), “Moses spoke about the holidays of the Eternal to the Children of Israel”. Make the holidays so they can be observed by all of Israel. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, only if they had reached the river Euphrates.
Jeremiah intercalated outside the Land. Ezechiel intercalated outside the Land. Baruch intercalated outside the Land. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua intercalated outside the Land. Rebbi sent him three letters through Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan. In one he wrote, to His holiness Ḥanania. And in one he wrote, the kid goats you left behind became rams. And in one he wrote, if you do not accept, go to the thistle desert, do slaughter and let Onias sprinkle. After the first [letter], he honored them. After the second, he honored them. After the third, he wanted to disgrace them. They said to him, you cannot do that since you already did honor us. Rebbi Isaac rose and quoted, it is written in the Torah: These are the holidays of Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. They said to him, “the holdays of the Eternal”. He said to them, that is with us. Rebbi Nathan rose and finished: “For from Babylonia will go Torah forth and the Eternal’s word from Nahar-Peqod.” They said to him, “for from Zion will Torah go forth and the Eternal’s word from Jerusalem”. He said to them, that is with us. He went to complain about them to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis. He said to him, follow them, follow them. He said to him, I do not know whom I left there. Who would tell me that they are wise to the computations as I am? If he had said, they are not wise, they should listen to him. Since they are wise to the computations as he is, he has to listen to them. He got up and rode on a horse. Where he reached, he reached. Where he did not reach, they continued following the corrupt [calendar].
The words of Rebbi Joḥanan imply that one may fast for hours, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, I shall fast until I finish studying this chapter, until I finish studying this text. The words of Rebbi Jonah imply that one may fast for hours, for Rebbi Jonah was in Tyre when he heard that Rebbi Yose’s son had died. Even though he had eaten cheese and drunk water, he finished that day fasting. The words of Rav imply that one may fast for hours, for Rav said, one may borrow his fast day and pay back. Samuel said to him, is that a vow? If he had vowed to fast but forgot and ate the volume of an olive, he lost his fast day. Rebbi Abba in the name of the rabbis there: That is, if he said simply “a day”. But if he said “this day”, he has to continue fasting until the end. He spoke only of eating; that excludes tasting. Rebbi Abba Ḥasida in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Tasting does not create obligations of benediction, robbery, nor of demay, nor of the interruption of a fast day.
The words of Rebbi Joḥanan imply that one may fast for hours, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, I shall fast until I finish studying this chapter, until I finish studying this text. The words of Rebbi Jonah imply that one may fast for hours, for Rebbi Jonah was in Tyre when he heard that Rebbi Yose’s son had died. Even though he had eaten cheese and drunk water, he finished that day fasting. The words of Rav imply that one may fast for hours, for Rav said, one may borrow his fast day and pay back. Samuel said to him, is that a vow? If he had vowed to fast but forgot and ate the volume of an olive, he lost his fast day. Rebbi Abba in the name of the rabbis there: That is, if he said simply “a day”. But if he said “this day”, he has to continue fasting until the end. He spoke only of eating; that excludes tasting. Rebbi Abba Ḥasida in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Tasting does not create obligations of benediction, robbery, nor of demay, nor of the interruption of a fast day.
The words of Rebbi Joḥanan imply that one may fast for hours, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, I shall fast until I finish studying this chapter, until I finish studying this text. The words of Rebbi Jonah imply that one may fast for hours, for Rebbi Jonah was in Tyre when he heard that Rebbi Yose’s son had died. Even though he had eaten cheese and drunk water, he finished that day fasting. The words of Rav imply that one may fast for hours, for Rav said, one may borrow his fast day and pay back. Samuel said to him, is that a vow? If he had vowed to fast but forgot and ate the volume of an olive, he lost his fast day. Rebbi Abba in the name of the rabbis there: That is, if he said simply “a day”. But if he said “this day”, he has to continue fasting until the end. He spoke only of eating; that excludes tasting. Rebbi Abba Ḥasida in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Tasting does not create obligations of benediction, robbery, nor of demay, nor of the interruption of a fast day.
A private person who committed himself for a fast day, eats and drinks after nightfall. But if he said a public fast day, he eats and drinks only during daytime. If he made a vow to fast and it turned out to fall on Sabbath days or holidays, he is whipped but does not need permission from a Sage. If he made a vow to fast and it turned out to fall on days written in the Scroll of Fasts, Rebbi Ḥizqia and Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: One said, he fasts but does not finish, but the other one said, he is whipped but does not need permission from a Sage. That is, you say that before the scroll of fasts was abolished. But when the Scroll of Fasts was abolished, all this was abolished. Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Joḥanan both say that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, the Scroll of Fasts was abolished. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and stating: “It happened that they decreed a fast day at Lod during Ḥanukka. Rebbi Eliezer went and had a haircut, Rebbi Joshua went and took a hot bath. Rebbi Joshua said to them, go and fast for what you fasted.” And you say, the Scroll of Fasts was abolished? Rebbi Abba said, even though you say that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished, Ḥanukka and Purim were not abolished. The acts of the rabbis imply that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished: Rebbi Jonathan fasted on the day before New Year’s Day. Rebbi Abin fasted on the day before Tabernacles. Rebbi Ze‘ira fasted 300 fast days, and some say 900 fast days and did not care about the Scroll of Fasts. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa told the scribes: If a woman comes to ask you, tell her that one may fast any day except Sabbaths, holidays, New Moons, the intermediary days of holidays, Ḥanukka, and Purim.
Rebbi Yasa asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Is our Mishnah from Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, since Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, any obstacle that is not from her side does not invalidate the bill of divorce? He said to him, here it is different because of opening the vow. Rebbi Yose said, but do we not deal with vows which do not need dissolution by a Sage? Rebbi Jonah said, we deal not only with one who made his vow dependent on something. So far it is if he wants to give him something. But in the case that he does not want to give to him, he can say, I wanted only to examine you; but since I saw that it gives you pain, it is as if I had received.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is as if he put a neck-iron on his neck, would you have made the vow? It is as if a gang of prisoners was passing by, he saw that there was one unused neck-iron and put his head into it! “To bind a prohibition onto himself”, as you say, “he was bound with chains.” Rebbi Jonathan provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who builds an idolatrous altar and one who continues in it is like one who sacrifices there, would you have made the vow? That is difficult to understand. Idolatry is a capital crime but vows are a simple prohibition; how can you say that? You have only what Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. Rebbi Isaac provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who takes a sword and sticks it in his heart, would you have made the vow? “Some talk bluntly like sword piercings.” Rebbi Ḥanina from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Phineas: It does not say “piercing” but “sword piercings”. For example, one who made a vow not to eat a loaf. Woe if he eats, woe if he does not eat. If he eats he transgresses his vow. If he does not eat he sins against himself. What can he do? He goes to a Sage who will dissolve his vow, “but the speech of Sages is healing. Rebbi Eudaimon in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Is it not enough what the Torah forbade you that you want to forbid other things for yourself? “To forbid a prohibition”.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is as if he put a neck-iron on his neck, would you have made the vow? It is as if a gang of prisoners was passing by, he saw that there was one unused neck-iron and put his head into it! “To bind a prohibition onto himself”, as you say, “he was bound with chains.” Rebbi Jonathan provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who builds an idolatrous altar and one who continues in it is like one who sacrifices there, would you have made the vow? That is difficult to understand. Idolatry is a capital crime but vows are a simple prohibition; how can you say that? You have only what Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. Rebbi Isaac provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who takes a sword and sticks it in his heart, would you have made the vow? “Some talk bluntly like sword piercings.” Rebbi Ḥanina from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Phineas: It does not say “piercing” but “sword piercings”. For example, one who made a vow not to eat a loaf. Woe if he eats, woe if he does not eat. If he eats he transgresses his vow. If he does not eat he sins against himself. What can he do? He goes to a Sage who will dissolve his vow, “but the speech of Sages is healing. Rebbi Eudaimon in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Is it not enough what the Torah forbade you that you want to forbid other things for yourself? “To forbid a prohibition”.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is as if he put a neck-iron on his neck, would you have made the vow? It is as if a gang of prisoners was passing by, he saw that there was one unused neck-iron and put his head into it! “To bind a prohibition onto himself”, as you say, “he was bound with chains.” Rebbi Jonathan provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who builds an idolatrous altar and one who continues in it is like one who sacrifices there, would you have made the vow? That is difficult to understand. Idolatry is a capital crime but vows are a simple prohibition; how can you say that? You have only what Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. Rebbi Isaac provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who takes a sword and sticks it in his heart, would you have made the vow? “Some talk bluntly like sword piercings.” Rebbi Ḥanina from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Phineas: It does not say “piercing” but “sword piercings”. For example, one who made a vow not to eat a loaf. Woe if he eats, woe if he does not eat. If he eats he transgresses his vow. If he does not eat he sins against himself. What can he do? He goes to a Sage who will dissolve his vow, “but the speech of Sages is healing. Rebbi Eudaimon in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Is it not enough what the Torah forbade you that you want to forbid other things for yourself? “To forbid a prohibition”.
Rebbi Joḥanan provided an opening by having second thoughts: “If it were not for that, would he have come?” Are second thoughts not something new? Rebbi Hila said, second thoughts are a common occurrence. In this kind, Rebbi Simeon did not find an opening for his own vow until one of the Galilean Elders came; some say, that one was Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. He took him from here and put him there; he took him from here and put him there, until finally he put him into the sun and told him to check his garments for fleas. They said to him, if you had known that this old man would treat you in such a way, would you have made the vow? He said, No. He permitted him. They asked, from where do you have this? He said to them, I was Meïr’s servant both times when he fled, but some say, Rebbi Meïr’s walking stick was in my hand and it teaches me knowledge.
Rebbi Jeremiah had his vow dissolved but kept it. Whether it was because he did not trust him who dissolved it, we do not know. Whether it was because one has urges only for things forbidden to oneself, we do not know. When Rebbi Jeremiah was not in the mood to judge, he said, my eyes are weak. “Following their pronouncements shall be all quarrels and all disfiguration.” This compares quarrels to disfigurations. Since disfigurations are “for all the Cohen sees”, so also quarrels are “for all the Cohen sees”.
Rebbi Mana made a vow away from his father’s wine. His father came to him and said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that I am hurt by it? He said, no. He dissolved for him. Where do we hold? If he said, my benefit [is forbidden] to my father; is that not what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: One forces the son to support his father. But we must hold that he said, my father’s benefit [is forbidden] to me. Rebbi Mana made a vow and came to Rebbi Shammai, who said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that people do not want to deal with you since you are a vower? He said, no, and he dissolved for him.
Rebbi Mana made a vow away from his father’s wine. His father came to him and said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that I am hurt by it? He said, no. He dissolved for him. Where do we hold? If he said, my benefit [is forbidden] to my father; is that not what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: One forces the son to support his father. But we must hold that he said, my father’s benefit [is forbidden] to me. Rebbi Mana made a vow and came to Rebbi Shammai, who said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that people do not want to deal with you since you are a vower? He said, no, and he dissolved for him.
MISHNAH: In addition, Rebbi Eliezer said, one finds an opening in changed circumstances, but the Sages forbid it. How is this? If he said, a qônām that I shall not benefit from Mr. X, who then becomes a public scribe or who marries off his son to one of [the vower’s] relatives, and he said, if I had known that he will become a public scribe or marry off his son to a relative, I would not have vowed; or if he said, a qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue and he said, if I had known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed; Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit.
MISHNAH: In addition, Rebbi Eliezer said, one finds an opening in changed circumstances, but the Sages forbid it. How is this? If he said, a qônām that I shall not benefit from Mr. X, who then becomes a public scribe or who marries off his son to one of [the vower’s] relatives, and he said, if I had known that he will become a public scribe or marry off his son to a relative, I would not have vowed; or if he said, a qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue and he said, if I had known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed; Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit.
HALAKHAH: “In addition, Rebbi Eliezer said, one finds an opening in changed circumstances,” etc. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Rebbi Eliezer learned from Moses, to whom the Holy One, praise to Him, provided an opening by changed circumstances. The Holy One, praise to Him, said to him: If you had known that “all the men who want to kill you have died,” would you have vowed? But did they really die? Were they not Dathan and Abiram? Only, they became poor.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, what you say is only that there are changed circumstances before the matter is discussed. The force of Rebbi Yose is from the following: “That was the error of Naḥum the Mede.” What was his error? That he found them an opening by changed circumstances. “Naḥum the Mede said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the earlier prophets had prophesied while the Temple was standing that eventually it would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the far future: “The vision he sees is for many years; for faraway times he prophesies.” It turns out that Rebbi Jeremiah parallels Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose parallels Rebbi Hila.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, what you say is only that there are changed circumstances before the matter is discussed. The force of Rebbi Yose is from the following: “That was the error of Naḥum the Mede.” What was his error? That he found them an opening by changed circumstances. “Naḥum the Mede said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the earlier prophets had prophesied while the Temple was standing that eventually it would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the far future: “The vision he sees is for many years; for faraway times he prophesies.” It turns out that Rebbi Jeremiah parallels Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose parallels Rebbi Hila.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Meïr says, there are things like changed circumstances”. Samuel says, because of an erroneous vow; the dog was already dead, the snake had already been killed. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, because he is like someone who makes his vow dependent on something: A qônām that I shall have no benefit from this man as long as he wears black garments. If he wore white, he would be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That one does not need the permission of a Sage.
MISHNAH: In addition, Rebbi Meïr said, one opens for him with what is written in the Torah. One says to him, if you had realized that you sin against “you shall not take revenge”, “you shall not nurse hatred”, “you shall not hate your brother in your heart, “you shall love your neighbor as yourself”, “let your brother live with you”, maybe he would become poor and you cannot provide for him! If he said, if I had realized this, I would not have vowed, he is permitted.
MISHNAH: In addition, Rebbi Meïr said, one opens for him with what is written in the Torah. One says to him, if you had realized that you sin against “you shall not take revenge”, “you shall not nurse hatred”, “you shall not hate your brother in your heart, “you shall love your neighbor as yourself”, “let your brother live with you”, maybe he would become poor and you cannot provide for him! If he said, if I had realized this, I would not have vowed, he is permitted.
“Maybe he would become poor”. Are these not changed circumstances? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, poverty is frequent. As the following: A man had a lawsuit against a rich man. He wanted to be judged before Rav; Rav sent for [the rich man], who said: For this one I should come to court? If all the camels of Arabia came they could not carry all the leather sacks containing my mortgages! [Rav] heard this and said, what does this one pride himself with what is not his! There should be depreciation of it! Immediately there came a royal decree that he and his property should belong to the treasury. He [the rich man] came before Rav and said to him, pray for me that my personality could be restored. He prayed, and it was restored to him.
MISHNAH: One creates an opening for a man with his wife’s ketubah. It happened that one vowed usufruct from his wife whose ketubah was 400 denar. She came before Rebbi Aqiba who obliged him to give her her ketubah. He said, Rebbi, my father left 800 denar. My brother took 400 and I 400, would it not be enough if she take 200 and I 200? Rebbi Aqiba told him, even if you have to sell the hair on your head, you will pay her ketubah. He said to him, if I had known that, I would not have vowed. Rebbi Aqiba freed him.
HALAKHAH: “One opens about festive days and Sabbaths,” etc. It was stated: “If one was permitted, all subsequent ones are permitted, all preceding ones are forbidden.” It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: “There exists a type of vow which may be partly voided and the rest confirmed. How is this? One made a vow [not to eat] from a fig basket which contained benot s̄eba’ figs. If he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have made the vow, he is permitted the benot s̄eba’ figs and not only these but all figs. But if he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have extended my vow to benot s̄eba’ figs, only benot s̄eba’ figs are permitted to him.”
HALAKHAH: “One opens about festive days and Sabbaths,” etc. It was stated: “If one was permitted, all subsequent ones are permitted, all preceding ones are forbidden.” It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: “There exists a type of vow which may be partly voided and the rest confirmed. How is this? One made a vow [not to eat] from a fig basket which contained benot s̄eba’ figs. If he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have made the vow, he is permitted the benot s̄eba’ figs and not only these but all figs. But if he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have extended my vow to benot s̄eba’ figs, only benot s̄eba’ figs are permitted to him.”
MISHNAH: One finds an opening for a man with his own honor and that of his children. One tells him, if you had known that tomorrow one will say of you, it is the habit of this man to divorce his wife, and about your daughters one will say, they are daughters of a divorcee, what did the mother of these do to get herself divorced? If he said, if I had known that it is so I would not have made the vow, then it is dissolved.
MISHNAH: One finds an opening for a man with his own honor and that of his children. One tells him, if you had known that tomorrow one will say of you, it is the habit of this man to divorce his wife, and about your daughters one will say, they are daughters of a divorcee, what did the mother of these do to get herself divorced? If he said, if I had known that it is so I would not have made the vow, then it is dissolved.
HALAKHAH: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, one finds an opening for a man exclusively about his own honor. As the following? A woman vowed [not to have benefit] from her daughter. She came to Rebbi Joḥanan who said to her, if you had known that your daughter gets a bad reputation, would you have made the vow? She said, no, and he permitted her. Is that not the Mishnah: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor and that of his children”? That you should not think one follows Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.
It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.
It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.
HALAKHAH: “If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband,” etc. They wanted to say that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. Let us hear from the following: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’.” This implies that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.
HALAKHAH: “If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband,” etc. They wanted to say that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. Let us hear from the following: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’.” This implies that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.
HALAKHAH: “If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband,” etc. They wanted to say that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. Let us hear from the following: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’.” This implies that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.
If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.
If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.
If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.
MISHNAH: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’. Similarly, the husband tells her before she enters his domain: ‘Any vows which you had vowed before you enter my domain are dissolved,’ for after she enters his domain he cannot dissolve. An adult girl and one who had waited twelve months and a widow 30 days, Rebbi Eliezer says, since her husband is responsible for her upkeep he may dissolve but the Sages say that the husband dissolves only after she enters his domain.
MISHNAH: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’. Similarly, the husband tells her before she enters his domain: ‘Any vows which you had vowed before you enter my domain are dissolved,’ for after she enters his domain he cannot dissolve. An adult girl and one who had waited twelve months and a widow 30 days, Rebbi Eliezer says, since her husband is responsible for her upkeep he may dissolve but the Sages say that the husband dissolves only after she enters his domain.
MISHNAH: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’. Similarly, the husband tells her before she enters his domain: ‘Any vows which you had vowed before you enter my domain are dissolved,’ for after she enters his domain he cannot dissolve. An adult girl and one who had waited twelve months and a widow 30 days, Rebbi Eliezer says, since her husband is responsible for her upkeep he may dissolve but the Sages say that the husband dissolves only after she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “An adult girl and one who had waited twelve months,” etc. Rebbi Eliezer holds that the matter depends on the support. If he preliminarily married a woman on condition to support her, the husband dissolves for her. If he completely married a woman on condition that he support her, the father dissolves for her. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband never dissolves before she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who had a defect in his eye and he could not ordain him; so he ordained him for selected topics. That implies that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, and one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.
HALAKHAH: “If a person is by a vow prevented to benefit his son-in-law,” etc. It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meĩr, for Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. Because he said “neither do you.” If he had not said “neither do you”, if the wife acquired, the husband would have acquired.
MISHNAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee, anything she forbids to herself shall be confirmed.” How is that? If she said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she married within these thirty days he cannot dissolve. If she made the vow under her husband’s authority and he dissolved it, if she had said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she should become a widow or a divorcee within the next 30 days, it remains dissolved. If she made a vow, was on the same day divorced, and taken back, he cannot dissolve. This is the principle: He cannot dissolve for any one who was on her own for one moment.
It was stated: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows, and one whips because of them.” Even though Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions, he agrees in this case that he is whipped. Even though Rebbi Simeon said, he does not bring a sacrifice, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Even though Rebbi Jehudah said, a questionable nazir vow is permitted, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Where do we hold? If he has the intention of becoming a nazir, even if he only said, I shall be a nazir if I mention bread, he is a nazir. Similarly, if he had no intention of becoming a nazir, even if he mentioned nazir, he is no nazir; for example if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq. But we hold about one who says, I declared my vow of nazir by any of these expressions. If one of them is a valid expression of a vow of nazir, it will fall on him, otherwise, will the vow of nazir not fall on him? One tells him: keep the discipline.
“I did not vow as a nazir,” he is permitted. “I already had been a nazir,” he is forbidden. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Avina, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If somebody says, I am like ‘orlah juice, he did not say anything. The colleagues say, that follows Rebbi Simeon in a disagreement. As we have stated there: “If somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling things, he is guilty. But Rebbi Simeon declares him free from prosecution.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if it is an inclusive statement. But if it is a detailed statement, everybody agrees that no oath can be applied to prohibitions. And here, we consider an inclusive statement. Rebbi Yudan said, one is about vows, the other about oaths. Vows can be applied to prohibitions but no oaths can be applied to prohibitions.
If he had counted six months when he became impure, does he count another six months or does he start anew counting twelve months? If he completed his term as nazir but did not manage to shave until two or three days had passed when he became impure. Rebbi Mani asked: Since he did not sanctify his hair, but what permits him to shave? “I am a nazir after two days, already a nazir in perpetuity.” Since he may shave, he is a nazir. “I am a nazir after [20] days, already a nazir in perpetuity.” Since he may shave, is he a nazir, or since if he became impure he has no time to cancel, is he no nazir?.