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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:12

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:32

It was stated: If an heir’s father held a compromised promissory note, the son collects without swearing. In that the son’s power is greater than the father’s, since the son collects without swearing while the father can collect only by swearing. Rebbi Eleazar said, nevertheless he has to execute an heir’s oath, “that our father did not charge us, that our father did not tell us, that we did not find a document among our father’s documents that this note was paid.” Rebbi Hoshaia asked, does the baraita follow the House of Shammai? For the House of Shammai say, “she collects her ketubah and does not drink.” Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the House of Shammai is: Bring my husband and I shall drink! But here, it would be in order that even his father would not have to swear. They instituted a rule that he has to swear. They instituted that for him, but not for his son. When he died, you put his son on the biblical rule.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:32

It was stated: If an heir’s father held a compromised promissory note, the son collects without swearing. In that the son’s power is greater than the father’s, since the son collects without swearing while the father can collect only by swearing. Rebbi Eleazar said, nevertheless he has to execute an heir’s oath, “that our father did not charge us, that our father did not tell us, that we did not find a document among our father’s documents that this note was paid.” Rebbi Hoshaia asked, does the baraita follow the House of Shammai? For the House of Shammai say, “she collects her ketubah and does not drink.” Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the House of Shammai is: Bring my husband and I shall drink! But here, it would be in order that even his father would not have to swear. They instituted a rule that he has to swear. They instituted that for him, but not for his son. When he died, you put his son on the biblical rule.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:34

“If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, here about an adult orphan, there about an underage orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:46

Rebbi Ḥanaiah said before Rebbi Mana: Does this not mean that if a person borrows from another, and then he borrows again, he has to declare “in addition to the first paper you have on me”? It is frequent that a woman says, my ketubah is lost, write me another. Is it frequent that a man say, my paper is lost, write me another? But it is possible that he should declare for him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. The Mishnah refers to ketubah, but for sustenance both are equal. Between ketubah and burial, what has precedence? Between ketubah and a loan attested to by witnesses, what has precedence? Between ketubah and daughters’ dowry, what has precedence? For him who says, one collects for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry has precedence. But for him who says, one does not collect for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry does not have precedence.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. The Mishnah refers to ketubah, but for sustenance both are equal. Between ketubah and burial, what has precedence? Between ketubah and a loan attested to by witnesses, what has precedence? Between ketubah and daughters’ dowry, what has precedence? For him who says, one collects for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry has precedence. But for him who says, one does not collect for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry does not have precedence.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. The Mishnah refers to ketubah, but for sustenance both are equal. Between ketubah and burial, what has precedence? Between ketubah and a loan attested to by witnesses, what has precedence? Between ketubah and daughters’ dowry, what has precedence? For him who says, one collects for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry has precedence. But for him who says, one does not collect for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry does not have precedence.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. The Mishnah refers to ketubah, but for sustenance both are equal. Between ketubah and burial, what has precedence? Between ketubah and a loan attested to by witnesses, what has precedence? Between ketubah and daughters’ dowry, what has precedence? For him who says, one collects for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry has precedence. But for him who says, one does not collect for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry does not have precedence.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:3

It says only, “she died”. Therefore, if she was divorced, her status is that of a creditor. As it was stated: “He married a woman and wrote her a ketubah. He divorced her but did not pay the ketubah. He married another woman and wrote her a ketubah. He took back the first one and wrote her a ketubah in addition to the first ketubah. The [second ketubah] of the first [wife] has precedence over that of the second [wife] and her heirs, and the second [wife] and her heirs have precedence over the heirs of the first.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:6

How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:6

How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:6

How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:17

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to four women when he died, the first one precedes the second, the second the third, and the third the fourth. The first one swears to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth; the fourth is paid out without an oath. Ben Nanas said, should she be preferred because she is the last one? She also should be paid only after an oath. If all [ketubot] were executed on the same day, one who precedes another one even if only by an hour has acquired [precedence]; therefore in Jerusalem one used to note hours. If [the documents] were all executed at the same hour and there is only one mina, they split evenly.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:1

MISHNAH: If a widow is supported by the orphans’ property, she has to work for them but they are not obligated to bury her. Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:4

One adds to her sustenance: A married woman has no wine, a widow has wine. If a married woman said, my earnings should be counted against my sustenance, one does not listen to her; if a widow said, my earnings should be counted against my sustenance, one listens to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:4

One adds to her sustenance: A married woman has no wine, a widow has wine. If a married woman said, my earnings should be counted against my sustenance, one does not listen to her; if a widow said, my earnings should be counted against my sustenance, one listens to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:6

MISHNAH: A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage, may sell without court supervision. Rebbi Simeon says, after definitive marriage she may sell without court supervision; after preliminary marriage, she may sell only under court supervision since she has no sustenance and any person who has no claim to sustenance may sell only under court supervision.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:6

MISHNAH: A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage, may sell without court supervision. Rebbi Simeon says, after definitive marriage she may sell without court supervision; after preliminary marriage, she may sell only under court supervision since she has no sustenance and any person who has no claim to sustenance may sell only under court supervision.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:8

Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: The one who renounced her ketubah in favor of the orphans is sustained by them. This is difficult. If there were a woman without ketubah, does she not have claim to sustenance? A woman without ketubah has claim to sustenance. But here is it not enough that she renounced her ketubah in favor of the orphans, that you want to cheat her of her sustenance?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:10

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Zimra: A widow who lived two or three months without asking for sustenance, loses the sustenance of these three months. That is, if she did not take a loan. But if she took out a loan, she collects. If there is no pledge in her hand. But if she has a pledge in her hand, she collects even if she did not take a loan. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That is what they said, at the start one sells for sustenance of twelve months but one gives her sustenance for 30 days. If at the end of thirty days they say, we gave, but she says, I did not receive, it would be similar to what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one took a loan of 12’000 for a year in order to repay one gold denar per month. It is obvious that he gave for the first month and did not give for the last. About the days in between they said, not at the start.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:14

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Just as a man is concerned about his widow’s honor so he has to be concerned about his divorcee’s honor, as Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s wife did mistreat him badly. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah went to him and told him, rabbi, send her away, for she does not treat you with the honor due to you. He said to him, her ketubah is too large for me. He said to him, I shall give you the ketubah and send her away. He gave him the ketubah and he divorced her. She went and married the city treasurer. That one lost his property and became blind. She took him around the town and led him. Once they went around the entire town and nobody gave him anything. He said to her, is there not another neighborhood? She said to him, there is the neighborhood of my divorcer; it is beyond my powers to bring you there. He started hitting her. Rebbi Yose the Galilean passed by and heard them demeaning one another in public. He took them, brought them to one of his houses, and provided them with food all the days of their lives, because “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Nevertheless they quarelled loudly in the night and her voice was heard saying, the pain she suffered outside her body was easier to bear than that inside her body.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:16

HALAKHAH: “If a widow’s ketubah was 200,” etc. We understand worth a mina for 200 or worth 200 for a mina. In any case, she made the orphans lose a mina. [If it was worth] a mina [and she sold it] for 200, would the sale not be invalidated as erroneous buy? Explain it that the property increased in value. Rebbi Abin said, this supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, real estate buys are never under the laws of overcharging. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if the transaction was excessive, it comes under the law of overcharging. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “The following do not fall under the laws of overcharging: Slaves, securities, real estate, and redemptions.” He explains it, unless it was excessive. If he redeemed what was worth a mina by 200, Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not redeemed, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is redeemed. A baralta disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If he said, this toga instead of this donkey, the latter becomes profane. And its end disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is necessary to compute the value. Rebbi Yose said, the baraita itself implies that it is necessary to compute the value. Where do they disagree? To bring [a sacrifice to atone for] larceny. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he has to bring a sacrifice for larceny; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for larceny.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:24

MISHNAH: Neither the orphan, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram may claim ketubah, or usufruct, or sustenance, or depreciation. But if he married her from the start as a she-ram, she has claim to her ketubah. A widow [married] to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or Gibeonite girl to an Israel, an Israel girl married to a bastard or Gibeonite, have claim to ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:26

“No usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, that he has from her only the usufruct. Rebbi Yose the Sidonian stated before Rebbi Jeremiah, in disgreement with Rebbi Jeremiah: “He has the right to what she finds and earns, and to dissolve her vows.” What means “no usufruct”? That she cannot reclaim from him the usufruct he had [from her property].

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:26

“No usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, that he has from her only the usufruct. Rebbi Yose the Sidonian stated before Rebbi Jeremiah, in disgreement with Rebbi Jeremiah: “He has the right to what she finds and earns, and to dissolve her vows.” What means “no usufruct”? That she cannot reclaim from him the usufruct he had [from her property].

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:30

What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:30

What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:31

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said that Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila say that they differ about sustenance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may demand sustenance. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, one says to him, divorce her! And you say so? They wanted to say, for him who says they differ about the conditions attached to a ketubah, Rebbi Joḥanan said, she has the ketubah stipulations. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, everybody agrees that she cannot claim support since they even punished her heirs, so much more herself. But for him who says that they differ about sustenance, it follows that they do not differ about the stipulations of a ketubah. They fined her, but did not fine her heirs.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:1

MISHNAH: If somebody marries a woman and contracts with her to sustain her daughter for five years, he is obligated to sustain her for five years. If [the mother] was married to another man who contracted with her to sustain her daughter for five years, he is obligated to sustain her for five years. The first one cannot say, if she will come to live with me I shall sustain her, but he has to bring her support to her place. Similarly, the two cannot say we shall support her in common, but one of them sustains her and the other gives the money equivalent to her sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:4

There, we have stated: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate,” and it was stated about this: They will be clothed with garments supplied by me. For whom does the daughter work? Let us hear from the following: “The husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance.” This means, he feeds her but she works for her husband. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody had agreed to sustain his daughter-in-law, he has to sustain her, but she works for his son. If he wants her to be with him but she does not want to, the law is with her, as we have stated: “They pay the cost of her sustenance.” If she fell ill, it is as if she had married. If she died, is it as if she had married? If she died, she already is dead.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:4

There, we have stated: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate,” and it was stated about this: They will be clothed with garments supplied by me. For whom does the daughter work? Let us hear from the following: “The husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance.” This means, he feeds her but she works for her husband. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody had agreed to sustain his daughter-in-law, he has to sustain her, but she works for his son. If he wants her to be with him but she does not want to, the law is with her, as we have stated: “They pay the cost of her sustenance.” If she fell ill, it is as if she had married. If she died, is it as if she had married? If she died, she already is dead.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:5

MISHNAH: If the daughter married, the husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance. If they died, their daughters are supported from unincumbered property but she is supported from mortgaged property since her status is that of a creditor. The intelligent ones did write: On condition that I support your daughter for five years the entire time you are with me.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:6

HALAKHAH: “If the daughter married, the husband has to sustain her,” etc. What is the status of the ketubah stipulations if he wrote them in the document? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he wrote them for emphasis; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he wrote them to collect from encumbered property. Rebbi Jeremiah switched the traditions. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah supports him who said, he wrote them for emphasis, since we stated there: “One does not foreclose from mortgaged property to indemnify for produce or investment, or sustenance of widow and daughters, in order not to impede the economy.” Are [the first categories] not based on a document? Here also based on the document. Rebbi Ḥanania said, “since her status is that of a creditor”! Is that not based on a document? Here also based on the document.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:20

It is written (Jer. 20:6–7): “But you, Pashḥur, and all inhabitants of your house will go into captivity. You will come to Babylon, die there, and be buried there.” Rebbi Abba [bar Zemina] said, Rebbi Ḥelbo and Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina. One of them said, if somebody dies there and is buried there, he has two [detriments] in hand. If he dies there and is buried here, he has one [detriment] in hand. The other one said, burial atones for their death.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:20

It is written (Jer. 20:6–7): “But you, Pashḥur, and all inhabitants of your house will go into captivity. You will come to Babylon, die there, and be buried there.” Rebbi Abba [bar Zemina] said, Rebbi Ḥelbo and Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina. One of them said, if somebody dies there and is buried there, he has two [detriments] in hand. If he dies there and is buried here, he has one [detriment] in hand. The other one said, burial atones for their death.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:28

HALAKHAH: “All the time she lives in her father’s house,” etc. For the good she received; her properties became delivered during her husband’s lifetime and after 25 years she gave up the claim to her ketubah. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi La: One understands for a woman who has no ketubah. But should a woman who has a ketubah not be able to collect forever? He answered him, it tells you more: Even a woman who has a ketubah collects only up to 25 years. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar says, the creditor collects forever. He said only, “the creditor”; but a woman can collect only up to years. Rebbi Abin said, this is reasonable only for a woman who is not being supported. But for a woman who is being supported, I say that she did not claim it because of her support.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:28

HALAKHAH: “All the time she lives in her father’s house,” etc. For the good she received; her properties became delivered during her husband’s lifetime and after 25 years she gave up the claim to her ketubah. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi La: One understands for a woman who has no ketubah. But should a woman who has a ketubah not be able to collect forever? He answered him, it tells you more: Even a woman who has a ketubah collects only up to 25 years. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar says, the creditor collects forever. He said only, “the creditor”; but a woman can collect only up to years. Rebbi Abin said, this is reasonable only for a woman who is not being supported. But for a woman who is being supported, I say that she did not claim it because of her support.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:28

HALAKHAH: “All the time she lives in her father’s house,” etc. For the good she received; her properties became delivered during her husband’s lifetime and after 25 years she gave up the claim to her ketubah. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi La: One understands for a woman who has no ketubah. But should a woman who has a ketubah not be able to collect forever? He answered him, it tells you more: Even a woman who has a ketubah collects only up to 25 years. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar says, the creditor collects forever. He said only, “the creditor”; but a woman can collect only up to years. Rebbi Abin said, this is reasonable only for a woman who is not being supported. But for a woman who is being supported, I say that she did not claim it because of her support.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:2

HALAKHAH: “Two robbery judges were in Jerusalem,” etc. Did not Rebbi Phineas say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: 469 synagogues were in Jerusalem and each one of them had a Book house and a study house; the Book house for Scripture and the study house for Mishnah? But these two were appointed for robberies; to teach you that if anybody has the power to intervene, if he does not exercise his power the misconduct is attributed to him. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: Naḥum the Mede also was with them. In Rebbi Nathan’s opinion, three robbery judges were in Jerusalem.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:10

Rebbi Joshua ben Levi says, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor except for annona and head-tax. Rav said, anything for which one is held responsible for one’s neighbor has to be repaid. The strength of Rav is from the following: “He who appropriated a field and oppressors took it.” He did not hear that Rebbi Joḥanan said, they exacted a fine from a robber. Rebbi Abin asked, what is greater? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus both said in the name of Samuel; one said, it is like annona and head-tax; the other said, it is not like annona and head-tax.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:11

There, we have stated: “He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing.” Rebbi Judan and Rebbi Yose. One of them said, here if the vow refers to his body, there if the vow refers to his property. But the other said, here if he has somebody else who can heal him, there if there is nobody else who can heal him. If he has somebody else who can heal him, he should not be able to heal him personally! Not by everybody is a person successfully healed.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:11

There, we have stated: “He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing.” Rebbi Judan and Rebbi Yose. One of them said, here if the vow refers to his body, there if the vow refers to his property. But the other said, here if he has somebody else who can heal him, there if there is nobody else who can heal him. If he has somebody else who can heal him, he should not be able to heal him personally! Not by everybody is a person successfully healed.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:14

As it was stated: “If somebody went overseas and another person provided for his wife.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, another. Therefore, the father can recover. Rebbi Yose says, neither the father nor a third party can recover. There is a parallel disagreement, as we have stated there: “He has the right to what she finds and to her earnings, to dissolve her vows, and to receive her bill of divorce, but cannot eat usufruct in her lifetime… He is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, the father. Therefore, a third party cannot recover. Rebbi Yose says, both the father or a third party can recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥaggai, both for burial as for upkeep the father can recover, a third party cannot recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, for burial both the father and also a third party can recover because it is unthinkable that his wife should be thrown to the dogs. For sustenance, neither the father nor a third party can recover.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:29

MISHNAH: If somebody went overseas and lost the way to his field, Admon says, he shall go the shortest way but the Sages say, he has to buy a right of access for a hunded minas or fly through the air.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:31

Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:31

Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:31

Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:31

Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:5

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar disagree, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, one whips for prohibitions and Rebbi Eleazar said, one does not whip. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, so did Rebbi Joḥanan answer Rebbi Eleazar: According to you, who says one does not whip on prohibitions, did we not state: “If somebody has vowed not to have any usufruct from another and he goes to visit him,” let him not enter! Rebbi Jeremiah said, there is a difference there because of the ways of peace. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is because of the ways of peace, should he not also be permitted in case of an oath? But we have stated: “Vows are forbidden, oaths permitted.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:16

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:16

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:16

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:17

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: May a person bind himself by a word which has both a profane and a sacral meaning? Did we not state קוֹנָס? Its name is קונסה. Did we not state שְּׁבוּתָה? Its name is שְׁפוּתָה. But did not Bar Qappara state ḥeres? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is a name relating to the High One: “If He commands the sun: would it not shine?”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, these are Gentile words, like those Nabateans who say khaspa for ḥaspa. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable in other places, but in a place where the nazir is called naziq, do I say that a nazir of people with speech defects should not be a nazir?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:1

MISHNAH: Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve: Speeding-up vows, exaggeration vows, vows in error, and vows about acts of God. What are speeding-up vows? One who has something to sell says, a qônām that I shall not reduce the price below a tetradrachma, and the other one says, a qônām that I shall not increase my bid to more than a sheqel; both of them intend three denarii. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, also one who wants by a vow to get his neighbor to eat at his place. If he says to himself: any vow which I make in the future shall be void, [it is void] if he remembers at the moment he makes the vow.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:15

It was found stated about both cases: It is more restrictive for oaths than for vows that an erroneous oath is forbidden but an erroneous vow is permitted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi [ ], does Rebbi Aqiba add to the words of the House of Hillel? As we have stated there, “until Rebbi Aqiba came and taught that a vow of which any part was permitted is totally permitted.” He said to him, if you say that there, in the case of a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, you say that a vow of which any part was invalidated is totally invalidated, here, where it does not need investigation by a Sage, so much more! Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because of an erroneous vow; if I had known that my father and my brothers were there I would not have made the vow.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:23

Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they have been cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he has divorced her, what is the situation?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:35

“The flesh of his prepuce should be circumcized.” Even if it has white skin disease. How can I confirm: “Beware of skin disease to watch it carefully and to do …”? Also at a circumcision. Then how can I confirm: “The flesh of his prepuce should be circumcized”? If there is no white skin disease? The verse says, “the flesh”, even if it has white skin disease. This is simple in the opinion of Rebbi Jonah, who says that a positive commandment supersedes a prohibition even if they are not written together. But in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, who says that a positive commandment supersedes a prohibition only if they are written together? Since it is written “the flesh of his prepuce,” it is as if it were written together.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:35

“The flesh of his prepuce should be circumcized.” Even if it has white skin disease. How can I confirm: “Beware of skin disease to watch it carefully and to do …”? Also at a circumcision. Then how can I confirm: “The flesh of his prepuce should be circumcized”? If there is no white skin disease? The verse says, “the flesh”, even if it has white skin disease. This is simple in the opinion of Rebbi Jonah, who says that a positive commandment supersedes a prohibition even if they are not written together. But in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, who says that a positive commandment supersedes a prohibition only if they are written together? Since it is written “the flesh of his prepuce,” it is as if it were written together.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:4

MISHNAH: If one is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another, [the other] may give his šeqel, pay his debt and return what he has lost. At a place where one takes a fee for this, the gain should be given to the sacred fund.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:6

Rebbi Joshua ben Levi says, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor except for annona and head-tax. Rav said, anything for which one is held responsible for one’s neighbor has to be repaid. The strength of Rav is from the following: “He who appropriated a field and oppressors took it.” He did not hear that Rebbi Joḥanan said, they exacted a fine from a robber. Rebbi Abin asked, (who was the father of) Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus both said in the name of Samuel; one said, it is like annona and head-tax; the other one said, it is not like annona and head-tax.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:7

There, we have stated: “He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing.” Rebbi Judan and Rebbi Yose. One of them said, here if the vow refers to his body, there if the vow refers to his property. But the other one said, here if he has somebody else who can heal him, there if there is nobody else who can heal him. If he has somebody else who can heal him, he should not be able to heal him personally! Not by everybody is a person successfully healed.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:7

There, we have stated: “He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing.” Rebbi Judan and Rebbi Yose. One of them said, here if the vow refers to his body, there if the vow refers to his property. But the other one said, here if he has somebody else who can heal him, there if there is nobody else who can heal him. If he has somebody else who can heal him, he should not be able to heal him personally! Not by everybody is a person successfully healed.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:26

MISHNAH: If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow and he has nothing to eat, the other person goes to the grocer and tells him, X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do. Then he pays him and X comes and takes from him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:27

HALAKHAH: “If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow and he has nothing to eat,” etc. For he cannot recover from him in a court of law.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:31

HALAKHAH: It was stated: Rebbi Meïr says that as soon as a person abandons anything from his property, it is no longer in his possession. Rebbi Yose says, nothing may leave the hands of its owners except if it is taken up by another person. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya, both say, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of Rebbi Yose [deal with the case] that a person gave a gift to ten people and this one was one of them. If somebody abandoned his field, some Tannaïm say, he can retract, but some Tannaïm say, he cannot retract. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The one who says that he can retract follows Rebbi Yose. But the one who says that he cannot retract follows Rebbi Meïr. Does this mean that abandoned property in the sense of Rebbi Yose is subject to tithes? What did he say? Abandoned property, not gift! Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa came in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Abandoned property in the sense of Rebbi Yose is subject to tithes. There, they say that abandoned property in the sense of Rebbi Yose is not subject to tithes, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “The Levite shall come,” etc. You are obliged to give him from what you have but he has not. This excludes abandoned property for which your and his hands are equal. Gleanings, forgotten sheaves, peah, and abandoned property are all equal.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:12

HALAKHAH: “ “I am ḥerem for you”, etc. ‘A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you and anyone I would ask about you’, he has to ask about the first but not the second. Some Tannaïm state: He has to ask both about the first and the second. Samuel the son of Rebbi Joseph ben Rebbi Abun said, that follows the one who said “after the prohibition”. But for the one who said “after the vow”, a vow which is partially invalid is totally invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:12

HALAKHAH: “ “I am ḥerem for you”, etc. ‘A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you and anyone I would ask about you’, he has to ask about the first but not the second. Some Tannaïm state: He has to ask both about the first and the second. Samuel the son of Rebbi Joseph ben Rebbi Abun said, that follows the one who said “after the prohibition”. But for the one who said “after the vow”, a vow which is partially invalid is totally invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:14

It turns out that one disagreement is like an other other disagreement, as it was stated: On the Day of Atonement, one has to detail one’s deeds, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not have to detail the sin. Some Tannïm state, one has to detail the vow; some Tannïm state, one does not have to detail the vow. A person made a vow not to earn money. He came before Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom. He asked him, what did you forswear to yourself? He said to him, not to earn money. Rebbi Yudan said to him, is there anyone doing that? He said to him, as a gambler. He said, praise to Him Who chose the Torah and the Sages who said, one has to detail the vow.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:14

It turns out that one disagreement is like an other other disagreement, as it was stated: On the Day of Atonement, one has to detail one’s deeds, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not have to detail the sin. Some Tannïm state, one has to detail the vow; some Tannïm state, one does not have to detail the vow. A person made a vow not to earn money. He came before Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom. He asked him, what did you forswear to yourself? He said to him, not to earn money. Rebbi Yudan said to him, is there anyone doing that? He said to him, as a gambler. He said, praise to Him Who chose the Torah and the Sages who said, one has to detail the vow.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:14

It turns out that one disagreement is like an other other disagreement, as it was stated: On the Day of Atonement, one has to detail one’s deeds, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not have to detail the sin. Some Tannïm state, one has to detail the vow; some Tannïm state, one does not have to detail the vow. A person made a vow not to earn money. He came before Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom. He asked him, what did you forswear to yourself? He said to him, not to earn money. Rebbi Yudan said to him, is there anyone doing that? He said to him, as a gambler. He said, praise to Him Who chose the Torah and the Sages who said, one has to detail the vow.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:15

MISHNAH: What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, the courtyards, and the cistern in the middle of the road. What are the institutions of that town? For example, the town square, the bathhouse, the synagogue with the ark and the scrolls. And he writes his part to the Patriarch. Rebbi Jehudah says, one of them writes to the Patriarch and the other to a private person. What is the difference between him who writes to the Patriarch and him who writes to a private person? The one who writes to the Patriarch does not have to perform an act of delivery, the one who writes to a private person has to perform an act of delivery. But the Sages say, in either case one has to perform an act of delivery. Rebbi Jehudah says, the people of Galilee do not have to write since their forefathers already wrote for them.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:15

MISHNAH: What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, the courtyards, and the cistern in the middle of the road. What are the institutions of that town? For example, the town square, the bathhouse, the synagogue with the ark and the scrolls. And he writes his part to the Patriarch. Rebbi Jehudah says, one of them writes to the Patriarch and the other to a private person. What is the difference between him who writes to the Patriarch and him who writes to a private person? The one who writes to the Patriarch does not have to perform an act of delivery, the one who writes to a private person has to perform an act of delivery. But the Sages say, in either case one has to perform an act of delivery. Rebbi Jehudah says, the people of Galilee do not have to write since their forefathers already wrote for them.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:17

“Rebbi Jehudah says, even if only one signs over his part to the Patriarch,” etc. So is the Mishnah: One of them has to sign over his part to the Patriarch.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:18

MISHNAH: If a person who by a vow was forbidden usufruct from another has nothing to eat, the other donates [food] as a gift to a third party and the person is permitted it. It happened in Bet Ḥoron with a person whose father was by a vow forbidden usufruct from him; when he married off his son he said to a friend, here the courtyard and the meal are given to you as a gift and they shall be yours until my father has come and eaten with us at the [wedding] meal. He said to him, if they are mine, they are dedicated to Heaven. He said, I did not give you my property that you should dedicate it to Heaven. He said to him, you gave me your property only that you and your father should eat, drink, and be friendly with one another and let the sin hang on my head. When the case came before the Sages they said, any gift with the proviso that if [the recipient] dedicated, it was not sanctified, is no gift.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:18

MISHNAH: If a person who by a vow was forbidden usufruct from another has nothing to eat, the other donates [food] as a gift to a third party and the person is permitted it. It happened in Bet Ḥoron with a person whose father was by a vow forbidden usufruct from him; when he married off his son he said to a friend, here the courtyard and the meal are given to you as a gift and they shall be yours until my father has come and eaten with us at the [wedding] meal. He said to him, if they are mine, they are dedicated to Heaven. He said, I did not give you my property that you should dedicate it to Heaven. He said to him, you gave me your property only that you and your father should eat, drink, and be friendly with one another and let the sin hang on my head. When the case came before the Sages they said, any gift with the proviso that if [the recipient] dedicated, it was not sanctified, is no gift.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:17

“This is the rule Rebbi Simeon declared in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For everything that may become permitted through some action, such as ṭevel, Second Tithe, donations to the Temple, and “new grain”, the Sages did not fix any limits, but a kind with its own is forbidden in the minutest amount, a kind with a different kind if it can be tasted. But for everything that cannot become permitted through any action, such as heave, ḥallah, orlah, and kilaim in a vineyard, the Sages did fix as limit both a kind with itself or with a different kind if it can be tasted.” How do you treat vows? As referring to something that can become permitted or to something that cannot become permitted? It seems reasonable that we treat them as referring to things that can become permitted, as we have stated there “for the Elder uproots the vow from the start.” They said, he only uproots for the future. Certainly a Mishnah treats it as referring to something that cannot become permitted, as we have stated there: “The growth from heave is heave; the growth from their growth is profane. But the growths from ṭevel, First Tithe, aftergrowth of the Sabbatical, heaves from outside the Land, dema‘, and First Fruits are profane as are growths from their growths. Growths from dedicated [seeds] and Second Tithe become profane; one redeems them corresponding to the time of sowing.” We have stated on this: When has this been said? Anything whose seeds disappear. But in produce whose seeds do not disappear, the growth from their growth is forbidden. There is a restriction on growth, as Rebbi Zeïra said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: An onion of kilaim in a vineyard, taken out of the ground and replanted, stays forbidden even if it grows enormously because growth of something forbidden cannot neutralize the prohibition. But another Mishnah treats it as something that can become permitted, as we have stated there: “For if somebody vowed not to have a certain thing and it became mixed with something else, if it can be tasted it is forbidden.” This explains that it was mixed with another kind, following the rules of something that can become permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:36

Jeremiah intercalated outside the Land. Ezechiel intercalated outside the Land. Baruch intercalated outside the Land. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua intercalated outside the Land. Rebbi sent him three letters through Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan. In one he wrote, to His holiness Ḥanania. And in one he wrote, the kid goats you left behind became rams. And in one he wrote, if you do not accept, go to the thistle desert, do slaughter and let Onias sprinkle. After the first [letter], he honored them. After the second, he honored them. After the third, he wanted to disgrace them. They said to him, you cannot do that since you already did honor us. Rebbi Isaac rose and quoted, it is written in the Torah: These are the holidays of Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. They said to him, “the holdays of the Eternal”. He said to them, that is with us. Rebbi Nathan rose and finished: “For from Babylonia will go Torah forth and the Eternal’s word from Nahar-Peqod.” They said to him, “for from Zion will Torah go forth and the Eternal’s word from Jerusalem”. He said to them, that is with us. He went to complain about them to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis. He said to him, follow them, follow them. He said to him, I do not know whom I left there. Who would tell me that they are wise to the computations as I am? If he had said, they are not wise, they should listen to him. Since they are wise to the computations as he is, he has to listen to them. He got up and rode on a horse. Where he reached, he reached. Where he did not reach, they continued following the corrupt [calendar].

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 7:6

If somebody makes a vow to abstain from vegetables, would he be permited dried ones? Let us hear from the following: “He is forbidden fresh Egyptian beans and permitted dried ones.” He mentioned only Egyptian beans, a kind which has a threshing floor. Therefore, anything which has no threshing floor is forbidden even if dried. If somebody makes a vow to abstain from bulbous plants he is forbidden green melon, squash, water melon, sweet melon and all tree fruits. If somebody makes a vow to abstain from sheep meat, he is permitted lambs, pidgeon chicks, and milk. But if he said, which grew this year, he is forbidden all of these. If somebody makes a vow to abstain from cider, he is forbidden everything sweet and permitted wine. That is, following those who say that vows are interpreted in the vernacular. But following those who say, vows are interpreted in biblical Hebrew, the Torah used “cider” as an expression for wine; “your cider”, that is wine.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 7:6

If somebody makes a vow to abstain from vegetables, would he be permited dried ones? Let us hear from the following: “He is forbidden fresh Egyptian beans and permitted dried ones.” He mentioned only Egyptian beans, a kind which has a threshing floor. Therefore, anything which has no threshing floor is forbidden even if dried. If somebody makes a vow to abstain from bulbous plants he is forbidden green melon, squash, water melon, sweet melon and all tree fruits. If somebody makes a vow to abstain from sheep meat, he is permitted lambs, pidgeon chicks, and milk. But if he said, which grew this year, he is forbidden all of these. If somebody makes a vow to abstain from cider, he is forbidden everything sweet and permitted wine. That is, following those who say that vows are interpreted in the vernacular. But following those who say, vows are interpreted in biblical Hebrew, the Torah used “cider” as an expression for wine; “your cider”, that is wine.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 7:16

HALAKHAH: “One who vows not to use the bed,” etc. It was stated: “A dargesh is put upright and is not turned over. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, he removes its qlwnṭryn and that is enough.” Rebbi Yosa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose, if a couch has posts which are upright and removed together with it, he takes them off and that is enough.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:6

The words of Rebbi Joḥanan imply that one may fast for hours, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, I shall fast until I finish studying this chapter, until I finish studying this text. The words of Rebbi Jonah imply that one may fast for hours, for Rebbi Jonah was in Tyre when he heard that Rebbi Yose’s son had died. Even though he had eaten cheese and drunk water, he finished that day fasting. The words of Rav imply that one may fast for hours, for Rav said, one may borrow his fast day and pay back. Samuel said to him, is that a vow? If he had vowed to fast but forgot and ate the volume of an olive, he lost his fast day. Rebbi Abba in the name of the rabbis there: That is, if he said simply “a day”. But if he said “this day”, he has to continue fasting until the end. He spoke only of eating; that excludes tasting. Rebbi Abba Ḥasida in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Tasting does not create obligations of benediction, robbery, nor of demay, nor of the interruption of a fast day.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:10

MISHNAH: ‘Until the grain harvest, the grape harvest, the olive harvest’, he is forbidden only until their time arrives. That is the principle: Everything that has a fixed time, if he said ‘until it arrives’, he is forbidden until it arrives; if he said ‘until it shall be’, he is forbidden until it passed. But everthing that does not have a fixed time, whether he said ‘until it arrives’ or ‘until it shall be’, he is forbidden only until it arrives.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:23

MISHNAH: Rebbi Jehudah says, if one said ‘a qônām that I shall not taste wine until Passover has come’, he is forbidden only until the night of Passover since he intended only until the time everybody drinks wine. If one said, “a qônām that I shall not taste meat until the fast,’ he is forbidden only until the evening before the fast since he intended only until the time everybody eats meat. His son Rebbi Yose said, if one said ‘a qônām that I shall not taste garlic until the Sabbath,’ he is forbidden only until Friday evening, since he intended only until the time everybody eats garlic. If one says to his friend: A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you if you do not come and take for your children a kor of wheat and two amphoras of wine, he can undo his vow without referring to a Sage by saying, you did that only to honor me, that is my honor. Similarly, if one says to his friend: A qônām that you shall not have any usufruct from me if you do not come and give to my child a kor of wheat and two amphoras of wine. Rebbi Meïr says, he is forbidden until he gives, but the Sages say, this one also can undo his vow without referring to a Sage by saying, it is as if I received it.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:26

MISHNAH: If they were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter and he said, a qônām if she ever has any usufruct from me, and similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife and said, a qônām if my wife ever has any usufruct from me, they may have usufruct from him since he intended only about matters of marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:26

MISHNAH: If they were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter and he said, a qônām if she ever has any usufruct from me, and similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife and said, a qônām if my wife ever has any usufruct from me, they may have usufruct from him since he intended only about matters of marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:7

Rebbi Jeremiah had his vow dissolved but kept it. Whether it was because he did not trust him who dissolved it, we do not know. Whether it was because one has urges only for things forbidden to oneself, we do not know. When Rebbi Jeremiah was not in the mood to judge, he said, my eyes are weak. “Following their pronouncements shall be all quarrels and all disfiguration.” This compares quarrels to disfigurations. Since disfigurations are “for all the Cohen sees”, so also quarrels are “for all the Cohen sees”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:13

MISHNAH: Rebbi Meïr says, there are things like changed circumstances which are not really changed circumstances, and the Sagesagree with him. How is this? He said, a qônām that I shall not marry this woman for her father is evil, and they told him that he died or that he repented; a qônām that I shall not enter this house because it has a bad dog inside, or a snake; they said to him the dog died, the snake was killed; these there are things like changed circumstances which are not changed circumstances, and the Sages agree with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:20

HALAKHAH: “One creates an opening for a man with his wife’s ketubah” etc. Does one collect from movables? Rebbi Abba said, even if one could say, one collects from movables, one tells him to pay. Rebbi Manisha asked, could one tell the heirs to collect from pledged property? Rebbi Abba Mari said, the Mishnah says that one does not say so, as we have stated there: “It should be given to the heirs since everybody has to swear but the heirs do not have to swear.” What does one make her swear? There, they say, from straw I did not collect, from his person I did collect.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:17

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer said, if he can dissolve vows for a wife which he himself acquired, so much more that he should be able to dissolve for a wife which Heaven acquired for him. Rebbi Aqiba answered him: No. What you say is about a wife which he himself acquired, where nobody else has any authority over her; what can you say about the wife which Heaven acquired for him, where others have authority over her? Rebbi Joshua said to him, Aqiba, your words apply to two levirs. What can you reply about one levir? He said to him, the sister-in-law does not belong completely to her man as the wife belongs completely to her husband.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:22

HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say, the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night. How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night, he became paralyzed, and then his power of speech returned. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day. If he became paralyzed, and later his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:25

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband who said “there is no vow, there is no oath,” did not say anything. Also the Elder who said “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” did not say anything. But everybody has to follow his own rules. The husband says “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” and the Elder says, “there is no vow, there is no oath”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:30

May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who had a defect in his eye and he could not ordain him; so he ordained him for selected topics. That implies that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, and one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:6

“If I wash, if I do not wash.” It was stated: “If I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels”, these are vows of mortification. Both according to Rebbi Ze‘ira or according to Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose seems to contradict his own opinion, as it was stated: “A water source belonging to the townspeople, between them and outsiders, they have precedence over outsiders. Between outsiders and their animals, the outsiders have precedence over their animals. Their washing and the lives of outsiders, their washing has precedence over the lives of outsiders.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, who is the Tanna who said that washing is a necessity for survival? Rebbi Yose! As it was stated: “One may use it neither for steeping nor for washing. But Rebbi Yose permits it for washing.” The opinions of Rebbi Yose are contradictory. There he says, washing oneself is not a necessity of life. And here, he says washing one’s garments is a necessity of life! Rebbi Mana said, a person might put off washing himself but nobody puts off washing his clothes.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:8

We understand “if I wash”. “If I do not wash”? Let her wash! Rebbi Mana said, if she said: “Any benefit from me shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself, if I ever wash myself.” Why should he not dissolve for her? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, only when she said, “any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself.” Why can he not force? Did not Rebbi Huna say, [if she vowed] any benefit from me [shall be forbidden] to you, he forces her and sleeps with her. Any benefit from you [shall be forbidden] to me, he has to dissolve. There is a difference because it is a benefit for him and her. Rebbi Abba Mari said, If I wash [today], I shall not wash forever. If I wear jewellery [today], I shall not wear jewellery forever. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Nasa: If I wash I shall not wear jewellery; if I wear jewellery I shall not wash.