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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:1

MISHNAH: If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” he receives their revenues and if she should die, he inherits from her. In this case, why did he write “I shall have nothing to do with your properties”? If she sold or gave away, it is valid. If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues,” he does not receive their revenues during her lifetime but if she should die, he inherits from her. Rebbi Jehudah says, he continues to receive the investment results of her revenues unless he writes: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues, without limits.” If he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not receive the revenues during her lifetime and does not inherit from her after her death. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:4

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:4

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:7

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, but not in the matter of words. Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel for he said, if she dies he inherits from her, but in matters of words, “since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid,” in personal matters. But in money matters, one’s stipulations are valid and that is a money matter! Why did we say that the condition is invalid? Because in the end he acquired it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The law should have been that if she sold or gave it away it should be valid, for [the buyer] acquired it. Why did they say it is invalid? That a wife should not sell her husband’s property and say, it is mine.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:14

MISHNAH: If somebody died and left his wife, a creditor, and heirs, and he was owed a deposit or a debt by a third party, Rebbi Ṭarphon says, these should be given to the weakest among them. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not show mercy in law! But these should be given to the heirs for all others have to swear, only the heirs do not have to swear.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:14

MISHNAH: If somebody died and left his wife, a creditor, and heirs, and he was owed a deposit or a debt by a third party, Rebbi Ṭarphon says, these should be given to the weakest among them. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not show mercy in law! But these should be given to the heirs for all others have to swear, only the heirs do not have to swear.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:17

MISHNAH: If he left produce taken from the ground, the one who takes them first acquires them. If the widow acquired more than her ketubah sum, or the creditor more than his claim, the remainder, Rebbi Ṭarphon says, should be given to the weakest among them. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not show mercy in law! But it should be given to the heirs since all others have to swear, only the heirs do not have to swear.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:17

MISHNAH: If he left produce taken from the ground, the one who takes them first acquires them. If the widow acquired more than her ketubah sum, or the creditor more than his claim, the remainder, Rebbi Ṭarphon says, should be given to the weakest among them. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not show mercy in law! But it should be given to the heirs since all others have to swear, only the heirs do not have to swear.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:23

MISHNAH: If he wrote to her: “I have no vow or oath against you,” he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates. “I have no oath against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates, but the heirs can ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:23

MISHNAH: If he wrote to her: “I have no vow or oath against you,” he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates. “I have no oath against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates, but the heirs can ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:24

HALAKHAH: “If he wrote to her: “I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about properties over which she exercised control during her husband’s lifetime but even about properties over which she exercised control after her husband’s death are the heirs prevented from making her swear.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:26

MISHNAH: “I have no vow or oath against you, neither I, nor my heirs, nor my business associates, against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, neither he, nor the heirs, nor the business associates, from her, or her heirs, or her business associates. If she went from her husband’s grave to her family, or she remained in her in-law’s family but was not appointed as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. But if she was appointed as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:27

HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:32

It was stated: If an heir’s father held a compromised promissory note, the son collects without swearing. In that the son’s power is greater than the father’s, since the son collects without swearing while the father can collect only by swearing. Rebbi Eleazar said, nevertheless he has to execute an heir’s oath, “that our father did not charge us, that our father did not tell us, that we did not find a document among our father’s documents that this note was paid.” Rebbi Hoshaia asked, does the baraita follow the House of Shammai? For the House of Shammai say, “she collects her ketubah and does not drink.” Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the House of Shammai is: Bring my husband and I shall drink! But here, it would be in order that even his father would not have to swear. They instituted a rule that he has to swear. They instituted that for him, but not for his son. When he died, you put his son on the biblical rule.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:38

Alexis said before Rebbi Mana: We act much better than you do. We send edicts. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He answered him, we also act in this way, we have the herald announce for thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He said to him, think of it, if he was in distant corners. He said to him, we send three letters, one after thirty days, one after the next thirty days, and one after the next thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. Rebbi Ḥanina said, that is, if he was present at the trial and then fled. But if he was not present at the trial, we cannot irrevocably give away, but only announce.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:41

HALAKHAH: “From encumbered property, how is that?” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody disputes a court document, he is not trustworthy. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Is that not the Mishnah? “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah”! Rebbi Joḥanan said to him: Babylonian, after I removed the clay from the pearl, you say to me: Is that not the Mishnah? Rav said, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she produces she collects. He changed his mind and said, she collects even at a place where one writes a ketubah; let anyone powerful object to this! Rebbi Yose objected: Was it not stated: She might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, and collect a second time? If those died. Are there not witnesses? Bring them! They went overseas. Is there not an agreement? Is there no registrar of agreements? There is a registrar of agreements; as you say, if a document is lost, one writes a replacement. This is what one says, if the ketubah was lost, one writes a new one. Rebbi Abba objected: Was it not stated, she might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, wait until he dies, and collect a second time? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said to him: Would she not have to prove that she lived with him until he died?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:46

Rebbi Ḥanaiah said before Rebbi Mana: Does this not mean that if a person borrows from another, and then he borrows again, he has to declare “in addition to the first paper you have on me”? It is frequent that a woman says, my ketubah is lost, write me another. Is it frequent that a man say, my paper is lost, write me another? But it is possible that he should declare for him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. The Mishnah refers to ketubah, but for sustenance both are equal. Between ketubah and burial, what has precedence? Between ketubah and a loan attested to by witnesses, what has precedence? Between ketubah and daughters’ dowry, what has precedence? For him who says, one collects for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry has precedence. But for him who says, one does not collect for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry does not have precedence.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:3

It says only, “she died”. Therefore, if she was divorced, her status is that of a creditor. As it was stated: “He married a woman and wrote her a ketubah. He divorced her but did not pay the ketubah. He married another woman and wrote her a ketubah. He took back the first one and wrote her a ketubah in addition to the first ketubah. The [second ketubah] of the first [wife] has precedence over that of the second [wife] and her heirs, and the second [wife] and her heirs have precedence over the heirs of the first.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:6

How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:6

How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:11

MISHNAH: If the estate contained expected property, it does not have the status of property in actual possession. Rebbi Simeon says, even if there was no mortgageable property, it does not count unless there is mortgageable property in the value of at least a denar more than the two ketubot.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:16

“Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.” Rebbi Eleazar said: You say that in case the tetradrachma lost or added value. But for earnings or losses they split evenly. That is difficult! One gave 100 denars and the other gave ten, and you say so? The colleagues say, he may say to him, by my contribution the merchandise rose. So far, if they ran after little merchandise. If there was much merchandise? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, he may say to him, by the time you sold one piece, I am selling ten. That is, at a nearby place. If it was far away? Rebbi Hila said, he may say to him, by the time you go and return once, I am going and returning ten times. There, we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi [Ze‘ira]: The same holds for earnings. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan: Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:20

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two wives when he sold his field and the first wife wrote to the buyers “I have no claims against you”, the second takes from the buyer, the first from the second, and the buyer from the first; they go on in circles until they compromise between them. The same holds for a creditor and a woman who is a creditor.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:8

Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: The one who renounced her ketubah in favor of the orphans is sustained by them. This is difficult. If there were a woman without ketubah, does she not have claim to sustenance? A woman without ketubah has claim to sustenance. But here is it not enough that she renounced her ketubah in favor of the orphans, that you want to cheat her of her sustenance?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:11

Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: At the start one sells for sustenance of twelve months but one gives her sustenance for 30 days. Why should they sell for the sustenance of 12 months? Not to disadvantage the woman. Why do they give her sustenance for 30 days? If you said otherwise, you would act in detriment of the orphans, as it was stated: If a widow took possession even of 1’000 zuz for her sustenance, one does not take it away from her. What could one say to her? “Show what is in your hands!” The students of Rebbi Mana said to her, “show what is in your hands.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to them, since in the end she will have to swear about anything in her hands, one says to her, let it be so.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:16

HALAKHAH: “If a widow’s ketubah was 200,” etc. We understand worth a mina for 200 or worth 200 for a mina. In any case, she made the orphans lose a mina. [If it was worth] a mina [and she sold it] for 200, would the sale not be invalidated as erroneous buy? Explain it that the property increased in value. Rebbi Abin said, this supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, real estate buys are never under the laws of overcharging. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if the transaction was excessive, it comes under the law of overcharging. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “The following do not fall under the laws of overcharging: Slaves, securities, real estate, and redemptions.” He explains it, unless it was excessive. If he redeemed what was worth a mina by 200, Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not redeemed, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is redeemed. A baralta disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If he said, this toga instead of this donkey, the latter becomes profane. And its end disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is necessary to compute the value. Rebbi Yose said, the baraita itself implies that it is necessary to compute the value. Where do they disagree? To bring [a sacrifice to atone for] larceny. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he has to bring a sacrifice for larceny; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for larceny.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:17

MISHNAH: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid unless there would have been left a field [for sowing] nine qab, and in a garden half a qab, or following the words of Rebbi Aqiba, a fourth. If her ketubah was 400 zuz and she sold to one person worth 100, to a second 100, to a third 100, and to the last the value of a mina and a denar for a mina, the last transaction is invalid but all others are valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:20

HALAKHAH: “If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much,” etc. As you say for a private person, in real estate up to one third, in movables up to one sixth. And similarly, for Temple property, in real estate up to one sixth, in movables up to [one in] twelve. There, we have stated: “The estimation for orphans is thirty days, the estimation for Temple property sixty days, and one publicly announces mornings and evenings.” And why thirty? In order to empower the orphans. Why should they not announce longer? Up to thirty days you empower the orphans, more than that you diminish their power. Why do you not say that for Temple property? Temple property is different because each offer made is firm. Then they should announce forever! If suffices for the Temple that it should be twice that of a private person. Rebbi Yudan said, since you say that Temple property is different because each offer made is firm, this implies that if they find their estimation they do not continue but close the deal.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:24

MISHNAH: Neither the orphan, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram may claim ketubah, or usufruct, or sustenance, or depreciation. But if he married her from the start as a she-ram, she has claim to her ketubah. A widow [married] to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or Gibeonite girl to an Israel, an Israel girl married to a bastard or Gibeonite, have claim to ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:25

HALAKHAH: “Neither the orphan girl, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram,” etc. One understands the secondarily prohibited and the she-ram. The orphan? Does an orphan not have ketubah? Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi J̣oḥanan: Explain it for an orphan who repudiated. Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari, Rebbi Immi: Just as they fined her, so they fined him. In which respect? That if he preliminarily married her by [giving her] a pound of gold, he loses it all.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:27

Rebbi Yose said: All the time my teacher Rebbi Hila told me, state in your baraita that he inherits from her and defiles himself for her. We have also stated so: A man defiles himself for his qualified wife but does not become defiled for his disqualified wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:29

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:29

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:30

What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:30

What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:30

What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:30

What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody marries a woman and had contracted with her,” etc. How does he become indebted to her? Do not Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, if somebody writes a debenture for another person under the assumption that he owes him and it turns out that he does not owe, he does not have to give to him! Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they gave it the status of an addition to the ketubah. Then he should have to pay in the end! They gave it the status of the gift for a woman’s preliminary marriage. Then he should pay up front! They treated it as when one marries a woman preliminarily by promising to give her twelve silver denars within one year by delivering one silver denar’s worth every month.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody marries a woman and had contracted with her,” etc. How does he become indebted to her? Do not Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, if somebody writes a debenture for another person under the assumption that he owes him and it turns out that he does not owe, he does not have to give to him! Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they gave it the status of an addition to the ketubah. Then he should have to pay in the end! They gave it the status of the gift for a woman’s preliminary marriage. Then he should pay up front! They treated it as when one marries a woman preliminarily by promising to give her twelve silver denars within one year by delivering one silver denar’s worth every month.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:4

There, we have stated: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate,” and it was stated about this: They will be clothed with garments supplied by me. For whom does the daughter work? Let us hear from the following: “The husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance.” This means, he feeds her but she works for her husband. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody had agreed to sustain his daughter-in-law, he has to sustain her, but she works for his son. If he wants her to be with him but she does not want to, the law is with her, as we have stated: “They pay the cost of her sustenance.” If she fell ill, it is as if she had married. If she died, is it as if she had married? If she died, she already is dead.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:4

There, we have stated: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate,” and it was stated about this: They will be clothed with garments supplied by me. For whom does the daughter work? Let us hear from the following: “The husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance.” This means, he feeds her but she works for her husband. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody had agreed to sustain his daughter-in-law, he has to sustain her, but she works for his son. If he wants her to be with him but she does not want to, the law is with her, as we have stated: “They pay the cost of her sustenance.” If she fell ill, it is as if she had married. If she died, is it as if she had married? If she died, she already is dead.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:4

There, we have stated: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate,” and it was stated about this: They will be clothed with garments supplied by me. For whom does the daughter work? Let us hear from the following: “The husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance.” This means, he feeds her but she works for her husband. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody had agreed to sustain his daughter-in-law, he has to sustain her, but she works for his son. If he wants her to be with him but she does not want to, the law is with her, as we have stated: “They pay the cost of her sustenance.” If she fell ill, it is as if she had married. If she died, is it as if she had married? If she died, she already is dead.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:10

Rebbi commanded three things on his death-bed: My widow should not move from my house; do not eulogize me in small towns; and he who served me during my lifetime should also serve me in death. “My widow should not move from my house,” is that not a Mishnah? “The widow who said, I cannot possibly move from my husband’s house …” Rebbi Dositheos said, that they should not say, this is the house of the patriarchate and must serve the patriarchate. Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, as we have stated: “She lives in the houses just as she lived while her husband was overseas, she uses silver and gold vessels just as she used to while her husband was overseas, she is fed just as she was fed while her husband was overseas.” “Do not eulogize me in small towns” because of the quarrels. “He who served me during my lifetime should also serve me in death;” Rebbi Ḥananiah from Sepphoris said, for example Yose Ephrati and Joseph from Haifa. Rebbi Ḥizqiah added, do not use many shrouds on me and let my coffin have holes at the bottom. These words say that Rebbi was buried in a single shroud since Rebbi said, not as a man left, he will come. But the rabbis say, just as a man left, he will come. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: The garment that went with a person to the grave will come back with him. What is the reason? (Job 38:14) “The seal turns itself around like clay, they appear in dress.” Antoninus asked Rebbi, what is the meaning of what is written: “The seal turns itself around like clay?” He said to him, He Who brings the generation clothes it.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:10

Rebbi commanded three things on his death-bed: My widow should not move from my house; do not eulogize me in small towns; and he who served me during my lifetime should also serve me in death. “My widow should not move from my house,” is that not a Mishnah? “The widow who said, I cannot possibly move from my husband’s house …” Rebbi Dositheos said, that they should not say, this is the house of the patriarchate and must serve the patriarchate. Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, as we have stated: “She lives in the houses just as she lived while her husband was overseas, she uses silver and gold vessels just as she used to while her husband was overseas, she is fed just as she was fed while her husband was overseas.” “Do not eulogize me in small towns” because of the quarrels. “He who served me during my lifetime should also serve me in death;” Rebbi Ḥananiah from Sepphoris said, for example Yose Ephrati and Joseph from Haifa. Rebbi Ḥizqiah added, do not use many shrouds on me and let my coffin have holes at the bottom. These words say that Rebbi was buried in a single shroud since Rebbi said, not as a man left, he will come. But the rabbis say, just as a man left, he will come. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: The garment that went with a person to the grave will come back with him. What is the reason? (Job 38:14) “The seal turns itself around like clay, they appear in dress.” Antoninus asked Rebbi, what is the meaning of what is written: “The seal turns itself around like clay?” He said to him, He Who brings the generation clothes it.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:14

Rebbi dwelt in Sepphoris seventeen years and applied to himself (Gen. 47:28): “Jacob lived in Egypt seventeen years,” Jehudah lived in Sepphoris seventeen years. Of these he suffered from toothache for thirteen years. {Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, all these thirteen years no woman lying-in died in the Land of Israel and no pregnant woman had a miscarriage in the Land of Israel.} Why did he have a toothache? Once he saw a calf to be slaughtered when it bellowed and said to him, Rebbi, save me! He said to it, for that you were created. At the end, how was he healed? He saw them killing a burrow of rats. He said to them, let them live, it is written (Ps. 145:9) “His mercy extends to all His creatures.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:19

Rebbi Berekhiah asked Rebbi Ḥelbo. Rebbi Ḥelbo asked Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Immi asked Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Ḥanina, some say Rebbi Ḥanina asked Rebbi Joshua: Even those like Jeroboam and his kind? He said to him, (Deut. 29:22) “Sulphur and salt, conflagration throughout the country.” Rebbi Berekhiah said, one asked the other and we understand nothing from it. What does it mean? Since the Land of Israel was burned, judgment was executed on it. We have stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: Seven years was the Land of Israel burned; that is what is written (Dan. 9:27) “The Covenant overtook the public for one week.” What did the secondaries in it do? Pieces, pieces and it was burned.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:27

MISHNAH: All the time she lives in her father’s house, she always can collect her ketubah; if she she lives in her husband’s house, she can collect her ketubah for 25 years, for in 25 years she will have received benefits in the value of her ketubah, the words of Rebbi Meïr who spoke in the name of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. But the Sages say, all the time she lives in her husband’s house, she always can collect her ketubah; if she lives in her father’s house, she can collect her ketubah for 25 years. If she died, her heirs can sell her ketubah for up to 25 years.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:29

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not only that she claims, but even if she mentions [her claims], as we have stated there: “If she died, her heirs can mention her ketubah for up to 25 years.” He tells you more: Even if she let 25 years minus one day go by before claiming, and then claimed, one gives her another 25 years.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:30

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. This disagreement parallels the following disagreement, as was stated there: “Torts are estimated from choice land, creditor’s claims from average, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable.” Rebbi Jeremiah said to him, this was stated only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of 1’000 denar is evaluated in terms of average quality land. But Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects only from the least valuable land. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she lost her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he lets them acquire through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:5

If somebody together with his wife left for overseas, then she returns and says, my husband died, she shall be supported and collect her ketubah. My husband divorced me, she shall be supported from her ketubah since, as you take it, if she be a married woman, she must be supported from her husband’s; if she is no longer a married woman, she can be supported from her ketubah. “If somebody returns from overseas and his wife requests support but he says, let her earnings cover her sustenance, one listens to him. But if the court had allotted, what they allotted, they have allotted.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if her earnings are not enough for her support. In this case, does one listen to him? Following him who says, there is no support for the wife in biblical law, as we have stated: “The court will not determine food for a wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s.” Rebbi Yose says, if her earnings are sufficient for her support. In that case, why what they allotted, they have allotted? Explain it, if they allotted excess.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:5

If somebody together with his wife left for overseas, then she returns and says, my husband died, she shall be supported and collect her ketubah. My husband divorced me, she shall be supported from her ketubah since, as you take it, if she be a married woman, she must be supported from her husband’s; if she is no longer a married woman, she can be supported from her ketubah. “If somebody returns from overseas and his wife requests support but he says, let her earnings cover her sustenance, one listens to him. But if the court had allotted, what they allotted, they have allotted.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if her earnings are not enough for her support. In this case, does one listen to him? Following him who says, there is no support for the wife in biblical law, as we have stated: “The court will not determine food for a wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s.” Rebbi Yose says, if her earnings are sufficient for her support. In that case, why what they allotted, they have allotted? Explain it, if they allotted excess.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:5

If somebody together with his wife left for overseas, then she returns and says, my husband died, she shall be supported and collect her ketubah. My husband divorced me, she shall be supported from her ketubah since, as you take it, if she be a married woman, she must be supported from her husband’s; if she is no longer a married woman, she can be supported from her ketubah. “If somebody returns from overseas and his wife requests support but he says, let her earnings cover her sustenance, one listens to him. But if the court had allotted, what they allotted, they have allotted.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if her earnings are not enough for her support. In this case, does one listen to him? Following him who says, there is no support for the wife in biblical law, as we have stated: “The court will not determine food for a wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s.” Rebbi Yose says, if her earnings are sufficient for her support. In that case, why what they allotted, they have allotted? Explain it, if they allotted excess.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:9

HALAKHAH: “If somebody went overseas,” etc. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: If somebody pays off somebody else’s debt without the latter’s knowledge, is that the disagreement of Ḥanan and the High Priests’ sons? Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the High Priest’s sons is that he would not expect his wife to starve. But here, [the debtor could say:] “I could negotiate with him and he would forgive some.” Think of it, if [the loan] was on a pledge! “I could negotiate with him and he would return my pledge.” So far about a creditor who does not push [for repayment]. Even for a creditor who pushes, we can hear from the following: “He may give his šeqel.” If somebody does not pay his šeqel, does one not take a pledge from him? This says, even for a creditor who pushes. You should know that this is so, as we have stated: “He can bring for him nests for males or females suffering from genital discharges, nests for childbirth, purification and reparation offerings” since nothing of these comes to [the other person’s] hand. And here also, that nothing should come into his hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:11

There, we have stated: “He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing.” Rebbi Judan and Rebbi Yose. One of them said, here if the vow refers to his body, there if the vow refers to his property. But the other said, here if he has somebody else who can heal him, there if there is nobody else who can heal him. If he has somebody else who can heal him, he should not be able to heal him personally! Not by everybody is a person successfully healed.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:14

As it was stated: “If somebody went overseas and another person provided for his wife.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, another. Therefore, the father can recover. Rebbi Yose says, neither the father nor a third party can recover. There is a parallel disagreement, as we have stated there: “He has the right to what she finds and to her earnings, to dissolve her vows, and to receive her bill of divorce, but cannot eat usufruct in her lifetime… He is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, the father. Therefore, a third party cannot recover. Rebbi Yose says, both the father or a third party can recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥaggai, both for burial as for upkeep the father can recover, a third party cannot recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, for burial both the father and also a third party can recover because it is unthinkable that his wife should be thrown to the dogs. For sustenance, neither the father nor a third party can recover.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:17

When does one appraise for them? Rebbi Mana said, one appraises at the end. Rebbi Ḥanina said to him, the words of the rabbis imply that one does not listen to you, for Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone! Therefore, one appraises at the start. Rav Ḥisda asked: If there was sustenance for twelve months and then the property increased in value? Let us hear from the following, for Rebbi Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the heirs sold, they sold from their own property. So here, if it increased in value, their property value increased. If the estate was not sufficient for twelve months’ sustenance, may the sons say to the daughters, take what is yours and leave! Rebbi Abba said, is that a question? The Mishnah says that they cannot say so to them, as we have stated there: “If the orphans say, we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:23

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:24

MISHNAH: If somebody obligates himself about money for his son-in-law but then goes bankrupt, she must wait until her hair grows white. Admon says: “If I had obligated myself, I would have to wait until my hair grows white. My father obligated himself, what can I do? Marry definitively or divorce!” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:31

Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:31

Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:31

Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:31

Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:32

MISHNAH: If somebody produces a promissory note on another person who in his turn produces a document that [the creditor] sold him a field, Admon says, “if I really owed you, you should have collected what is yours when you sold me the field;” but the Sages say, that one was smart when he sold him real estate because he can take it as a pledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:35

HALAKHAH: “If two people mutually produced promissory notes of one on the other,” etc. If one borrowed a mina from the other, but the other borrowed from him 200 [zuz]. Rav Huna said, Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rab Sheshet disagree. One says, one counts one mina against the other mina, but the other says, each one collects the amount of his note. He who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, learns it from tame oxen who injured one another, where half of the excess damage is paid. He who says, each one collects the amount of his note, learns it from the Sages and Admon. Can the Sages and Admon not agree that one counts one mina against the other mina? Because we have stated: Admon says: “If I owed you, how come you borrowed from me?” Therefore it was necessary to say, each one collects the amount of his note. If the holder of the note of 200 forgave a mina, but the holder of the note of a mina did not forgive. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, then what he forgave he cannot collect but what was not forgiven he can collect. If the note for 200 was written in a document but the loan for a mina was not written. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, the holder of the written note can collect but the recipient of the oral promise cannot collect.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:5

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar disagree, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, one whips for prohibitions and Rebbi Eleazar said, one does not whip. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, so did Rebbi Joḥanan answer Rebbi Eleazar: According to you, who says one does not whip on prohibitions, did we not state: “If somebody has vowed not to have any usufruct from another and he goes to visit him,” let him not enter! Rebbi Jeremiah said, there is a difference there because of the ways of peace. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is because of the ways of peace, should he not also be permitted in case of an oath? But we have stated: “Vows are forbidden, oaths permitted.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:5

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar disagree, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, one whips for prohibitions and Rebbi Eleazar said, one does not whip. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, so did Rebbi Joḥanan answer Rebbi Eleazar: According to you, who says one does not whip on prohibitions, did we not state: “If somebody has vowed not to have any usufruct from another and he goes to visit him,” let him not enter! Rebbi Jeremiah said, there is a difference there because of the ways of peace. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is because of the ways of peace, should he not also be permitted in case of an oath? But we have stated: “Vows are forbidden, oaths permitted.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:13

It was stated: “As to their free-will offerings, he did not say anything.” Does that mean that the wicked give free-will offerings? Since he gave a free-will offering, he is not wicked. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Jehudah, since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: “It is better that you should not make a vow than that you make a vow but do not pay,” better in any case is that you should not make a vow at all. Rebbi Meїr says, “it is better that you should not make a vow than that you make a vow but do not pay,” better in any case is that you should make a vow and pay. And so it says, “make vows and pay to your God.” How does one handle a free-will offering? He brings his sheep to the Temple courtyard and says, that one is an elevation offering. Rebbi Abin said, Rebbi Jehudah used to open a door: If you had known that one who makes a vow is called wicked, would you have vowed? Rebbi Yannai said, “it is a trap for a human to call ‘sanctified’ and afterwards to check out the vows,” if one started to make vows, his account book is opened. Another explanation: “it is a trap for a human to call ‘sanctified’ and to be late to check out the vows,” if a person is in arrears with his vows, his account book is opened. It happened to one who said, I undertake to bring an elevation offering and he tarried to bring it. His ship sank at sea.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:16

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:16

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:12

HALAKHAH: “Indeterminate oaths are interpreted restrictively,” etc. They wanted to say, salted for preservation, not short-term salted. Rebbi Yudan said, since we have stated: “this is for me like salted meat, like libation wine,” this imples that short-term salted is called “salted”. What is short-term salted? As it was stated: “He puts the limbs on the salt and turns them over.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, for if he leaves them there, they become salted meat. But which text says it? As Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, “one who takes olives from the vat dips each single one in salt and eats it.” That implies that short-term salted is called “salted”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:14

“But the Sages say, indeterminate heave in Judea is prohibited, in Galilee permitted, since Galileans do not know of Temple heave.” But if they did know it, the indeterminate would be forbidden. “Indeterminate bans in Judea are permitted, in Galilee prohibited, since Galileans do not know of priest’s bans.” But if they did know it, the indeterminate would be permitted. Here you say permitted, but there you say forbidden. Rebbi Eleazar says, these are statements of two Tannaïm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, all is from one Tanna, following the one who said: “indeterminate bans are for the upkeep of the Temple.” But for the one who said, “indeterminate bans are for priests,” even in Galilee they would be permitted. In Galilee where they are used to invoke Akhan’s ban, you have to say forbidden; in Judea where they are not used to invoke Akhan’s ban, you have to say permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:14

“But the Sages say, indeterminate heave in Judea is prohibited, in Galilee permitted, since Galileans do not know of Temple heave.” But if they did know it, the indeterminate would be forbidden. “Indeterminate bans in Judea are permitted, in Galilee prohibited, since Galileans do not know of priest’s bans.” But if they did know it, the indeterminate would be permitted. Here you say permitted, but there you say forbidden. Rebbi Eleazar says, these are statements of two Tannaïm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, all is from one Tanna, following the one who said: “indeterminate bans are for the upkeep of the Temple.” But for the one who said, “indeterminate bans are for priests,” even in Galilee they would be permitted. In Galilee where they are used to invoke Akhan’s ban, you have to say forbidden; in Judea where they are not used to invoke Akhan’s ban, you have to say permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:15

MISHNAH: If somebody made a vow of ḥerem and said, I referred the vow only to mariner’s nets, or made a vow of qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the gifts for kings, or said, my bone is qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the bone that I keep in my house for purposes of vows, [or said] a qônām that my wife may not have any use from me and said, I referred the vow only to my first wife whom I divorced, all these do not need a question. If they do question, one punishes them and makes it difficult for them, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, one finds for them an opening from another place and teaches them that they should not be flippant about vows.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:3

Do the Sages permit all kinds of vows? “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve”! Rebbi Eleazar in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: Those do not need the permission of a Sage. Rav and Samuel both say that these need the permission of a Sage. Issy objected: Did we not find an opening for vows from there only? Samuel said to him, bind a rope on it. A Mishnah disagrees with Issy: “This one also can dissolve his vow without asking a Sage.” He explains it, that all vows need an opening from another place but these have their openings in themselves. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is, if they do not insist. But if they did insist they need the permission of a Sage. If one did insist but the other did not insist, since this one’s is invalid, the other one’s also should be invalid. A student of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus said [after] Rebbi Yudan: If one asked a tetradrachma, one was ready to give him three, and another one said a sheqel. (Does he insist?) Since he renounces one denar for this one he may renounce another one for the other one and give it to him for two.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:4

Rebbi Immi said, who is the Tanna of speeding-up vows? Rebbi Tarphon! For he explains it for those who insist. Rebbi Abba said, explain it according to everybody for those who do not insist. If you say for those who insist, one should have stated that Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob and Rebbi Tarphon say the same thing. Some Tannaїm say, “one who wants”; some Tannaïm say, “also one who wants”. He who says “one who wants” supports Rebbi Abba; he who says “also one who wants”, supports Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: who is the Tanna of speeding-up vows? Rebbi Tarphon!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:8

Did not the snake of king Sapor swallow camels and carts? When they wanted to kill it, they filled camel bags with straw and put glowing coals inside; it swallowed them and died. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, I saw a snake skin which filled the space between two columns. Rebbi Samuel bar Jacob said, I saw a snake skin which covered the genii of government. Samuel said, square. Could you say it was not square, why must it be large? Even if it was small! Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is the way of this Tanna to speak only about large things. You should know that it is so, for we have stated: “A flying camel”. Could he not have stated “a flying rat”?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:8

Did not the snake of king Sapor swallow camels and carts? When they wanted to kill it, they filled camel bags with straw and put glowing coals inside; it swallowed them and died. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, I saw a snake skin which filled the space between two columns. Rebbi Samuel bar Jacob said, I saw a snake skin which covered the genii of government. Samuel said, square. Could you say it was not square, why must it be large? Even if it was small! Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is the way of this Tanna to speak only about large things. You should know that it is so, for we have stated: “A flying camel”. Could he not have stated “a flying rat”?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:14

There, we have stated: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf.” Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on that it was said but on the following: “Whether it was for himself or for others.” Rebbi Abba said in Samuel’s name: An oath that X gave a mina to Y. If it turns out that he had not given [a mina], since it is not in his hand for the future, it is not in his hand for the past.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:15

It was found stated about both cases: It is more restrictive for oaths than for vows that an erroneous oath is forbidden but an erroneous vow is permitted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi [ ], does Rebbi Aqiba add to the words of the House of Hillel? As we have stated there, “until Rebbi Aqiba came and taught that a vow of which any part was permitted is totally permitted.” He said to him, if you say that there, in the case of a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, you say that a vow of which any part was invalidated is totally invalidated, here, where it does not need investigation by a Sage, so much more! Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because of an erroneous vow; if I had known that my father and my brothers were there I would not have made the vow.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:15

It was found stated about both cases: It is more restrictive for oaths than for vows that an erroneous oath is forbidden but an erroneous vow is permitted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi [ ], does Rebbi Aqiba add to the words of the House of Hillel? As we have stated there, “until Rebbi Aqiba came and taught that a vow of which any part was permitted is totally permitted.” He said to him, if you say that there, in the case of a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, you say that a vow of which any part was invalidated is totally invalidated, here, where it does not need investigation by a Sage, so much more! Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because of an erroneous vow; if I had known that my father and my brothers were there I would not have made the vow.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:18

MISHNAH: One makes a vow to tax assessors and to people who condemn property and to toll collectors that it is heave even though it is not heave, that it is king’s family’s property even though it is not theirs. The House of Shammai say, one vows anything except an oath, but the House of Hillel say, even an oath. The House of Shammai say, one may not offer a vow, but the House of Hillel say, one may offer. The House of Shammai say, only what he prescribes as vow, but the House of Hillel say, even what he does not prescribe. How is this? They said to him, say: a qônām that my wife cannot have any use from me, and he said: a qônām that my wife and my children cannot have any use from me; the House of Shammai say, his wife is permitted but his children are forbidden; but the House of Hillel say, both are permitted.