25103 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:10

It is stated: A Cohen may defile himself by leaving the Land for civil and criminal suits, for the consecration of the New Moon and intercalation of a year, to redeem a field from a Gentile, to study Torah, and to marry a wife. Rebbi Judah says, if he has a place to study, he should not defile himself. Rebbi Yose says, even if he has a place to study, he may defile himself, since a man may not have the luck to learn from every teacher. They said about Joseph the Cohen that he followed his teacher and defiled himself following his teacher to Sidon. In truth, they said a priest should not go abroad unless one promised him a wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:24

HALAKHAH: “The nazir shaves for the following impurities,” etc. An old man asked Rebbi Joḥanan: If the volume of an olive from a corpse makes impure, then certainly all of it also? He said to him, to include the stillbirth which did not reach the volume of an olive. He continued to ask: If a limb of a corpse makes impure, then certainly all of it also? He said to him, to include the stillbirth whose limbs did not yet jell. Rebbi Yose said, was that old man wise? His questions were not wise since after he asked the first question, it was not necessary to ask the second. If he wanted to ask both, he should have asked the second and after that the first. The students of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥalaphta asked the second but did not ask the first because it was obvious for them that if he did not reach the volume of an olive it is certain that his limbs did not yet jell. Rebbi Mana bar Ḥizqiah said, do you remember when Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa was here, were not both questions by that old man [asked] about Ahilut that the nazir shaves for them? In addition, from what Rebbi Joḥanan said, I thought that the stillbirths were not Torah. But since he makes his mother sit days of purity, it is implied that [the rules of] stillbirths are Torah.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:27

We have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, dried flesh from a corpse which even if soaked will not return to its former status is pure. What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Did he not infer this from a carcass? From a carcass, since a dried carcass is pure, so also a dried corpse should be pure. Rebbi Immi asked: Since a foul-smelling carcass is pure, would a foul-smelling corpse also be pure? Then there can be no decayed matter for Rebbi Yose! It was found stated in Rebbi Yose’s name that there was decayed matter. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Yose: Since a carcass has no decay, so a corpse should have no decay! He told them that he inferred from an animal only for the flesh, not for the bones. There is no decay from flesh, there is decay from bones, as Bar Qappara stated, “decay of bones is jealousy.” Rebbi Yannai said, “or a grave”, even if one touched the first Adam’s grave. The colleagues say, he transposes the verse: “or a grave qbr” means “or decay rqb”. Bar Qappara stated, “or a grave qbr”, “or decay rqb”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:27

We have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, dried flesh from a corpse which even if soaked will not return to its former status is pure. What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Did he not infer this from a carcass? From a carcass, since a dried carcass is pure, so also a dried corpse should be pure. Rebbi Immi asked: Since a foul-smelling carcass is pure, would a foul-smelling corpse also be pure? Then there can be no decayed matter for Rebbi Yose! It was found stated in Rebbi Yose’s name that there was decayed matter. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Yose: Since a carcass has no decay, so a corpse should have no decay! He told them that he inferred from an animal only for the flesh, not for the bones. There is no decay from flesh, there is decay from bones, as Bar Qappara stated, “decay of bones is jealousy.” Rebbi Yannai said, “or a grave”, even if one touched the first Adam’s grave. The colleagues say, he transposes the verse: “or a grave qbr” means “or decay rqb”. Bar Qappara stated, “or a grave qbr”, “or decay rqb”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:28

Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, the Holy One, praise to Him, took a spoonful from the place of the altar and created Adam from it. He said, he shall have been created from the place of the altar so that he should be able to stand up. That is what is written: “The Eternal Omnipotent formed Adam the first of dust from the earth”, and it is written: “You shall build for me an altar of earth.” Since “earth” there means an altar, here also [it means] an altar. “His days should be a hundred and twenty years.” Adam the first lived close to a thousand years and you say, “his days should be a hundred and twenty years”! But after 120 years he returns to be a spoonful of decay. That is difficult. For Og, the king of Bashan, 120 years, and for a newborn baby 120 years? Og [becomes] a spoonful of decay, and a newborn baby becomes a spoonful of decay. “ The spoonful of decay which they mentioned is from his finger joints and upwards, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, from a fully developed hand.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi was illustrating that of Rebbi Meïr one way, that of the rabbis in another way.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:30

If his foot was cut off, from above the joint there is no “decay”, from below the joint there is “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon: If he bound from below the joint as attachment? He said to them, if it were so, even if it was not cut I should consider it as if cut and it should be an attachment! Since it is connected to him, it forms one body. If there is something missing, can it have “decay”? Let us hear from the following: If it is imcomplete, there is no “decay”, it does not require the surrounding earth, and it is not part of a row of graves. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, how much must be missing that it have no “decay”? Might it follow what we have stated there: “That he will die if it was removed.” Is it the same here? Think of it, if the esophagus was perforated, nothing was missing but he could not survive. You have only the following: If his foot was cut off, from below the joint there is “decay”, from above the joint there is no “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:30

If his foot was cut off, from above the joint there is no “decay”, from below the joint there is “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon: If he bound from below the joint as attachment? He said to them, if it were so, even if it was not cut I should consider it as if cut and it should be an attachment! Since it is connected to him, it forms one body. If there is something missing, can it have “decay”? Let us hear from the following: If it is imcomplete, there is no “decay”, it does not require the surrounding earth, and it is not part of a row of graves. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, how much must be missing that it have no “decay”? Might it follow what we have stated there: “That he will die if it was removed.” Is it the same here? Think of it, if the esophagus was perforated, nothing was missing but he could not survive. You have only the following: If his foot was cut off, from below the joint there is “decay”, from above the joint there is no “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:30

If his foot was cut off, from above the joint there is no “decay”, from below the joint there is “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon: If he bound from below the joint as attachment? He said to them, if it were so, even if it was not cut I should consider it as if cut and it should be an attachment! Since it is connected to him, it forms one body. If there is something missing, can it have “decay”? Let us hear from the following: If it is imcomplete, there is no “decay”, it does not require the surrounding earth, and it is not part of a row of graves. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, how much must be missing that it have no “decay”? Might it follow what we have stated there: “That he will die if it was removed.” Is it the same here? Think of it, if the esophagus was perforated, nothing was missing but he could not survive. You have only the following: If his foot was cut off, from below the joint there is “decay”, from above the joint there is no “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:30

If his foot was cut off, from above the joint there is no “decay”, from below the joint there is “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon: If he bound from below the joint as attachment? He said to them, if it were so, even if it was not cut I should consider it as if cut and it should be an attachment! Since it is connected to him, it forms one body. If there is something missing, can it have “decay”? Let us hear from the following: If it is imcomplete, there is no “decay”, it does not require the surrounding earth, and it is not part of a row of graves. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, how much must be missing that it have no “decay”? Might it follow what we have stated there: “That he will die if it was removed.” Is it the same here? Think of it, if the esophagus was perforated, nothing was missing but he could not survive. You have only the following: If his foot was cut off, from below the joint there is “decay”, from above the joint there is no “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:40

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Meïr said, this should not be less than the impurity of a dead reptile! Rebbi Aqiba said, I argued before Rebbi Eliezer: If for a barley-grain sized bone, which does not cause impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir shaves if he touches or carries it, should it not be logical that for a quartarius of blood, which causes impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir should have to shave if he touches or carries it? He said to me, what is that, Aqiba? This is not a place for an argument de minore ad majus! When I came and expounded that before Rebbi Joshua, he said to me, you have a good argument, but that is what they said was practice.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:40

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Meïr said, this should not be less than the impurity of a dead reptile! Rebbi Aqiba said, I argued before Rebbi Eliezer: If for a barley-grain sized bone, which does not cause impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir shaves if he touches or carries it, should it not be logical that for a quartarius of blood, which causes impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir should have to shave if he touches or carries it? He said to me, what is that, Aqiba? This is not a place for an argument de minore ad majus! When I came and expounded that before Rebbi Joshua, he said to me, you have a good argument, but that is what they said was practice.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:41

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua,” etc. There, we have stated: “Two are impure from the dead, one is impure for seven days and one is impure by the impurity of evening. Three are impure from the dead, two are impure for seven days and one is impure until nightfall. Four are impure from the dead, three are impure for seven days and one is impure until nightfall. How is it for two? Any person who touches a corpse is impure for seven days; a person who touches him is impure until nightfall,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: All are biblically [impure] for heave, but for entering the Sanctuary only the second impure who touched the first impure. What is the reason? “A person who would be impure and did not purify himself;” anybody needing purification is guilty for entering the Sanctuary; anybody not needing purification is not guilty for entering the Sanctuary. They objected: But a person who touches objects which touched a corpse needs purification, but is he the second? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, for impurity of a person from a person, not for impurity of a person from objects. The statement of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya [implies that] only the first is guilty. Since [for impurity of] a person from a person only the first is guilty, so here the first is guilty. Rebbi Yose said, only if he immersed himself. That is a statement of Rebbi, since Rebbi said, all impure persons remain impure until the are immersed in water.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:42

Rebbi Illa said: He himself, who touched the corpse, is guilty. He said it and gave its reason: “who became impure,” that refers to the impurity of a human. But is there not a third? As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, for impurity of a person from a person a man is guilty for impurity in the Sanctuary. They objected: If objects touch the corpse, a human the objects, and objects the human. For impurity of a person from a person, not for impurity of a person from objects. Rebbi Zeriqa in the name of Rav Hamnuna: The Tanna there disagrees with Rebbi Illa: “For an object made half of cement־earth and half of dung one is not guilty for coming to the Sanctuary” Because it is half of earth and half of dung; but if it were totally of earth, one would be guilty. Who is guilty? Not the one who touches it? Is he not the second who touches the first? Rebbi Phineas said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he threw it. He answered him, about him who threw it we stated: For washing his body he is subject to extirpation, for washing his garments to the forty. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose, do we not have the Mishnah in support of that first Tanna, as is stated: “Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary.” For the first, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary; for the second, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is needed from what comes from the corpse: For a quartarius of blood or a quarter qab of bones, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary; for half a log of blood and half a qab of bones, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Jeremiah said, we were of the opinion that they disagree about a sacrifice, but one whips even the third, even the fourth. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah in opposition to Rebbi Jeremiah: “For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Yannai, Rebbi Joḥanan: It is needed from what comes from the corpse: For a quartarius of blood or a quarter qab of bones, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty; for half a log of blood and half a qab of bones, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:2

HALAKHAH: “If a person said to two nezirim,” etc. Not only if he said to one of them, “I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was,” but even if he said, “I saw one of you vowing to be a nazir but I do not know which one of you it was,” both of them have to follow the rules of nazir because of his testimony. If they do not contradict him. But if they contradict him, this does not apply. If both of them contradict, it parallels the following: “If one witness says, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, he is pure. If two witnesses say, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, the two are believed more than he is, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, everybody is believed about himself.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah and the Sages declare pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah declares pure. The rabbis’ words support Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Gurion said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah said this only about an old impurity, for he can say to them, I had been impure but I purified myself, and we have stated: The same holds for eating suet; the same holds for entering the Sanctuary. Should they not accept his position for impurity? Because of the impurity of a nazir, could they not say, where is the sacrifice which you brought? Then should they not accept his position for heave? So far the questions of Rebbi Ḥanina.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:2

HALAKHAH: “If a person said to two nezirim,” etc. Not only if he said to one of them, “I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was,” but even if he said, “I saw one of you vowing to be a nazir but I do not know which one of you it was,” both of them have to follow the rules of nazir because of his testimony. If they do not contradict him. But if they contradict him, this does not apply. If both of them contradict, it parallels the following: “If one witness says, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, he is pure. If two witnesses say, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, the two are believed more than he is, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, everybody is believed about himself.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah and the Sages declare pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah declares pure. The rabbis’ words support Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Gurion said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah said this only about an old impurity, for he can say to them, I had been impure but I purified myself, and we have stated: The same holds for eating suet; the same holds for entering the Sanctuary. Should they not accept his position for impurity? Because of the impurity of a nazir, could they not say, where is the sacrifice which you brought? Then should they not accept his position for heave? So far the questions of Rebbi Ḥanina.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:3

Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:10

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: One sprinkles on an uncircumcised Jew, for we find that our forefathers in the desert received sprinkling when uncircumcised. Rav Ḥisda said, following him who said that they circumcised on the eleventh. But for him who said that they circumcised on the tenth, they did not count sprinkling when uncircumcised. Rebbi Abin said, did they not have to count for sprinkling when uncircumcised in any case? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: It happened that an uncircumcised Cohen was sprinkled and the sprinklings were declared valid. It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, there were soldiers and gate keepers in Jerusalem who immersed themselves and ate their Passover sacrifices in the evening.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:15

He cannot bring an animal as purification sacrifice since he does not have the right to an animal purification sacrifice. He cannot bring a bird as purification sacrifice since a rich person who brought the sacrifices prescribed for a poor person did not fulfill his obligation. What can he do? He shall write his property over to another person and bring the sacrifices prescribed for a poor person; this enables the rich person to bring a bird as a purification sacrifice. He stipulates and says: If I was impure, that is my obligation. Otherwise, this is in doubt.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:20

Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are Ben Zoma’s words, but the words of the Sages: Forever is he definitively [impure] until he heave the reparation sacrifice. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Why is he definitively [impure] until he heave the reparation sacrifice? Rebbi Yose said to him, why not? We find several reparation sacrifices which are pushed aside because of doubts! As we have stated there: “If a reparation sacrifice was mixed up with a well-being sacrifice, Rebbi Simeon says that both should be slaughtered in the North and eaten following the more restrictive rules. They said to him, one does not cause sacrifices to become invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:23

Does the obligatory shaving push aside the rules of voluntary shaving? Let us hear from the following: “He shaves his head, his beard, and his eyebrows in the way sufferers from skin disease shave.” But there one could say, maybe it was an obligatory shaving. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Yudan: The Mishnah says so; “for Rebbi Simeon says, when one of the bloods was sprinkled, the nazir is permitted to drink wine and to defile himself with the dead.” Is he not forbidden because of “do not destroy”? Samuel bar Abba said, explain it if he was a eunuch. But did we not state “the beard”? How can you say, a eunuch? You have only what Rebbi Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he removed it from bottom to top it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose bar Abin said, there is no difference between bottom to top or top to bottom.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:3

There, we have stated: “The Non-Jew, Rebbi Meїr says, is evaluated but does not evaluate; Rebbi Jehudah says, he evaluates but is not evaluated. Both agree that they make vows and are objects of vows.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: For him who says there that he evaluates, here can he declare a nazir? For him who says there that he is evaluated, here can he be declared a nazir? How would it be possible for him to [be declared a nazir]? A Israelite can declare a Gentile to be a nazir. Would he listen to him? But the Israelite said, “I am a nazir,” the Gentile heard it and said, “I am responsible for what this one said.” It is only as if he paid a debt. How would it be possible for him to [declare a nazir]? A Gentile can declare an Israelite to be nazir. Since an Israelite cannot declare [another] Israelite to be a nazir, a Gentile cannot declare an Israelite to be a nazir. But it must be that the Gentile said, “I am a nazir”, the Israelite heard it and said, “I am taking upon me what this one said.” What did you exclude from him? An Israelite is subject to “not to desecrate”, a Gentile is not subject to “not to desecrate”. Rebbi Jonah said, Israelites can be relieved by a Sage, Gentiles cannot be relieved by a Sage. Rebbi Yose said, Israelites need a Sage to be relieved, Gentiles do not need a Sage to be relieved. It follows that Rebbi (Jonah) [Yose] follows Rebbi Abbahu. A Gentile woman came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said to Abime bar Tobi: Go and find her an opening by unforeseen circumstances. And Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Aḥa, who said that Laban was Kushan-Riš‘ataim. Why was he called “Kushan the doubly bad”? Because he committed two evils. One that he desecrated his oath, the other that he subjugated Israel for eight years.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:4

Why can he not force his wife? Did not Rebbi Huna say, [if she vowed] any benefit from me [shall be forbidden] to you, he forces her and sleeps with her. Any benefit from you [shall be forbidden] to me, he hasto dissolve. There is a difference because it is a benefit for him and her. He should not be able to force his slave! There is a difference, “because his God’s crown is on his head,” a person who has no other master. This excludes the slave who has another master. If he comes to protest his master’s word, one says to him: this is practice, obey your master’s orders! If his master pushed him and he became impure, does he have to bring a sacrifice of impurity? Is he a nazir, did not you decide for him that he should become impure? You say, he brings a sacrifice of impurity; could he bring here a sacrifice of impurity? Does he annul? Is he a nazir, did not you decide for him that he should become impure? You say, he annuls; could he here annul?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:6

“Rebbi Yose said, if a slave said, ‘I shall be a nazir when manumitted,’ his master forces him in matters of nezirut. [The master] can force a slave in matters of nezirut; he does not have to force him in matters either of vows or of oaths.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If his master forced him and he became impure, is he to be whipped? Or is that only practice? Where do we hold? If his nezirut has biblical status and by practice one may force, he is whipped. If both are rabbinical, he is not whipped. Rebbi Mana said, does one whip for practice? But it must be the following: If his nezirut is practice and by practice one may force, he is whipped. If both are rabbinical, he is not whipped.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:19

MISHNAH: If somebody finds a corpse in original position, lying as usual, he takes him and his surroundings. If he finds two, he takes them and their surroundings. If he finds three and between one and the next is a distance of between four and eight cubits, enough for the bier and the people who bury, that is a cemetery. He has to check on both sides for another 20 cubits. If he finds a grave at the end of 20 cubits, he has to check another 20 cubits since it is obvious that if this were a new burial ground, one would have taken him and his surroundings there.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:24

There, we have stated: “He makes a courtyard in front of the cave six cubits square as a place for the bier.” And here, he says so? There for a bier standing, here for the width of a turning bier. How far? For the carriers of the bier, their replacements, and the replacements of their replacements.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:25

There, we have stated: “If a vineyard is planted with less that four cubits of space, Rebbi Simeon says that it is no vineyard. But the Sages say that it is a vineyard and one disregards the plants in the middle as if nonexistent.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Just as they disagree here, they disagree about a graveyard. Rebbi Jonah said, one cannot compare these. There, they form a graveyard; here, they do not form a graveyard. Rebbi Yose said, one cannot compare these. There, if they were spaced apart and one moved them closer together, that is the disagreement. If they were close and one moved them apart, everybody would agree. But here, what is their disagreement? When one found them close together. Rebbi Simeon said, a landslide fell on them and compressed them. But the Sages say, were they spaced apart and somebody brought them close together?”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:32

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:32

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:32

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:33

If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Let us hear from the following: “If people quarrel,” “if people brawl.” Is not quarrel brawl and brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, “if people quarrel, if people brawl”? To apply the rules of the unintended to the intended and of the intended to the unintended. It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:33

If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Let us hear from the following: “If people quarrel,” “if people brawl.” Is not quarrel brawl and brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, “if people quarrel, if people brawl”? To apply the rules of the unintended to the intended and of the intended to the unintended. It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:2

HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. This is difficult. If somebody brings a gift document from overseas,would you require him to say, it was written and signed before me? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Rebbi Joḥanan said, that is a leniency lest she sit abandoned. Is that a leniency? It is only a restriction, for if he does not say to her, it was written and signed before me, you do not permit her to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was written and signed before me, makes it easy for her at the end. For if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void. Rebbi Mana wanted to say, a protest other than the text of the bill. But is a protest about the text of the bill a protest which has no validity? Even for a protest which has validity, said Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, since you say that the reason for the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was signed before me, is to make it easy for her at the end, that if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void; this means that there is no difference whether it is a protest not about the text of the bill or about the body of the bill, a protest which has no validity, or a protest which does have validity! But should you worry that maybe be gave the bill to disqualified witnesses to sign? Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:3

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:4

Only if he says, it was written before me during the day and signed during the day; only if he says, it was written before me especially for her and signed expressly for her. It was asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does he have to know the names of the witnesses at the moment of their signing? He said to them, did the Gentiles Luciani sign it? And you say so? A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “All bills of divorce coming from overseas are valid even if their names sound Gentile since Jews outside the Land of Israel bear Gentile names.” He said only, outside the Land; therefore not in the Land of Israel. What about this? Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Issi: unless he writes, at a Jewish place. If there is no Jewish place, in the synagogue. If there is no synagogue, he assembles there ten people. Rebbi Abun said, it would be better to certify the signatures than to assemble there ten people. What about this? Even in a Jewish store.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:5

If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:5

If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:5

If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:6

A case came before Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. He said to him, it is unnecessary. The opinion of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce, but here, he says so? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: What you said was in earlier times when no Fellows were found outside the Land, but now that there are Fellows found outside the Land, they are competent. But did we not state, “and one who brings there”? And even if you say that no Fellows are found outside the Land, are we not found in the Land of Israel? In order not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce from outside the Land. But then one who brings from overseas should not have to say: “It was written before me and signed before me.” Not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce in the Land of Israel. What about it? One is restrictive in a simple case because of the complicated one and one is not permissive in the complicated because of the easy one. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Simeon bar Abba: This of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, if it was done. But from the start even Rebbi Joshua ben Levi agrees.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:7

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Ḥana: Two who brought a bill of divorce do not have to declare: It was written before us and signed before us. Rebbi Yose ben Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They have to. He himself who brought the bill of divorce does not have to deliver the bill in the presence of two [witnesses] in order to declare her a divorcee in the presence of two. “If he gave her the bill, took it from her, and threw it into the sea or into a river. If later he says to her that it was an empty papyrus or a paid bond, he cannot be believed to disqualify her.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he cannot disqualify her, who can? He said to him, since she was declared a divorcee in the presence of two [witnesses], he cannot be believed to disqualify her. If he gave her a bill of divorce which was found to be invalid, they forced him to give her a replacement. This case came before the rabbis and they declared it valid. Did we not say, he cannot be believed to disqualify her? There, the flaw was not proved; here the flaw was proved. As the following: Ḥinena, the son of Rebbi Asi, was a medical doctor and threw a bill of divorce to his wife. She cried. Her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus. The case came before the rabbis and they took it into account. But did not Rebbi Yasa say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If the designation was checked and found to be based on [the testimony of] women or children, the designation is invalid? There, the designation was not mentioned. But here the name “bill of divorce” was mentioned. And some want to say, if he asserted that it was a valid bill of divorce, but she cried, her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:7

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Ḥana: Two who brought a bill of divorce do not have to declare: It was written before us and signed before us. Rebbi Yose ben Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They have to. He himself who brought the bill of divorce does not have to deliver the bill in the presence of two [witnesses] in order to declare her a divorcee in the presence of two. “If he gave her the bill, took it from her, and threw it into the sea or into a river. If later he says to her that it was an empty papyrus or a paid bond, he cannot be believed to disqualify her.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he cannot disqualify her, who can? He said to him, since she was declared a divorcee in the presence of two [witnesses], he cannot be believed to disqualify her. If he gave her a bill of divorce which was found to be invalid, they forced him to give her a replacement. This case came before the rabbis and they declared it valid. Did we not say, he cannot be believed to disqualify her? There, the flaw was not proved; here the flaw was proved. As the following: Ḥinena, the son of Rebbi Asi, was a medical doctor and threw a bill of divorce to his wife. She cried. Her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus. The case came before the rabbis and they took it into account. But did not Rebbi Yasa say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If the designation was checked and found to be based on [the testimony of] women or children, the designation is invalid? There, the designation was not mentioned. But here the name “bill of divorce” was mentioned. And some want to say, if he asserted that it was a valid bill of divorce, but she cried, her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:7

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Ḥana: Two who brought a bill of divorce do not have to declare: It was written before us and signed before us. Rebbi Yose ben Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They have to. He himself who brought the bill of divorce does not have to deliver the bill in the presence of two [witnesses] in order to declare her a divorcee in the presence of two. “If he gave her the bill, took it from her, and threw it into the sea or into a river. If later he says to her that it was an empty papyrus or a paid bond, he cannot be believed to disqualify her.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he cannot disqualify her, who can? He said to him, since she was declared a divorcee in the presence of two [witnesses], he cannot be believed to disqualify her. If he gave her a bill of divorce which was found to be invalid, they forced him to give her a replacement. This case came before the rabbis and they declared it valid. Did we not say, he cannot be believed to disqualify her? There, the flaw was not proved; here the flaw was proved. As the following: Ḥinena, the son of Rebbi Asi, was a medical doctor and threw a bill of divorce to his wife. She cried. Her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus. The case came before the rabbis and they took it into account. But did not Rebbi Yasa say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If the designation was checked and found to be based on [the testimony of] women or children, the designation is invalid? There, the designation was not mentioned. But here the name “bill of divorce” was mentioned. And some want to say, if he asserted that it was a valid bill of divorce, but she cried, her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:8

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he wrote it in the Land of Israel, signed it outside the Land, went to deliver it to her outside the Land but did not find her outside the Land, returned and found her in the Land of Israel. He must say, “it was written and signed before me,” because he wrote it in the Land of Israel and signed it outside the Land But if it was written and signed in the Land of Israel, he went to deliver it to her outside the Land but did not find her outside the Land, he need not say, “it was written and signed before me.” If he gave her bill of divorce to her when she said, my courtyard at Acco shall acquire it for me, Rebbi Ḥinena said, it is as if she had a long arm. If she had a long arm, she stretched it out and took it from there, does he not have to say “it was written and signed before me”? Rebbi Abba said, who would deny it?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:11

If there was one district which was subdivided into two, one does not have to say it was written and signed before me. Similarly if two were combined to form one.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:13

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan told the people of Sepphoris: You say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a person who brings a bill of divorce from Babylonia does not have to say “it was written and signed before me.” But I am saying that it is necessary, for there is a Mishnah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East and Reqam belongs to the East.” And even if you say that they disagree with Rebbi Jehudah and say that Reqam does not belong to the East, what about from Babylonia to here? Rav said, we consider ourselves as in the Land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. But Samuel said, even from one city quarter to another. He asked before him to change his opinion, when Cahana told him, what would we do with the earlier cases of women who remarried? He said to him, what do you have in your hand? For he was of Rebbi’s opinion as it was stated: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was neither written nor signed in his presence, she has to leave under the thirteen penalties, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages did not agree in this matter.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:13

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan told the people of Sepphoris: You say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a person who brings a bill of divorce from Babylonia does not have to say “it was written and signed before me.” But I am saying that it is necessary, for there is a Mishnah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East and Reqam belongs to the East.” And even if you say that they disagree with Rebbi Jehudah and say that Reqam does not belong to the East, what about from Babylonia to here? Rav said, we consider ourselves as in the Land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. But Samuel said, even from one city quarter to another. He asked before him to change his opinion, when Cahana told him, what would we do with the earlier cases of women who remarried? He said to him, what do you have in your hand? For he was of Rebbi’s opinion as it was stated: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was neither written nor signed in his presence, she has to leave under the thirteen penalties, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages did not agree in this matter.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:14

Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:14

Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:17

It was stated: A student who gave instructions about practice in front of his teacher has committed a deadly sin. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: Nadab and Abihu died only because they determined practice in the presence of their teacher Moses. It happened that a student gave instructions about practice in front of his teacher Rebbi Eliezer. The latter said to his wife Imma Shalom: That one will not live out his week. The week was not completed when he died. His students said to him: Rebbi, you are a prophet. He said to them (Amos 7:14) “I am neither a prophet nor the disciple of a prophet” but I have received a tradition that any student who gives instructions about practice in front of his teacher has committed a deadly sin. It was stated: A student is forbidden to give instructions about practice during the lifetime of his teacher unless he be at a distance of at least 12 mil from him, [the breadth of] the camp of Israel. What is the reason? (Num. 33:49) “They encamped along the Jordan from Bet Hayyešimot to Abel Haššiṭṭim in the plains of Moab”; how far is this? Twelve mil. Like this: Rebbi Tanḥum ben Jeremiah was in Ḥefer; they asked him and he gave instructions about practice. They said to him, did the Rabbi not teach us that a student may not give instructions about practice during the lifetime of his teacher unless he be at a distance of at least 12 mil from him, [the breadth of] the camp of Israel; and your teacher Rebbi Ḥana sits at Sepphoris! He said to them, so it should come over me that I did not know! From that moment on he did no longer give instructions.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:20

MISHNAH: Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel does not have to say: “It was written and signed before me.” If the document is contested, it should be confirmed by its signers. If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and is unable to say: “it was written and signed before me,” it should be confirmed by its signers. Bills of divorce and slaves’ bills of manumission are equal in [the requirement] about those who carry and bring. This is one of the aspects in which bills of divorce, have the same rules as bills of manumission.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:20

MISHNAH: Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel does not have to say: “It was written and signed before me.” If the document is contested, it should be confirmed by its signers. If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and is unable to say: “it was written and signed before me,” it should be confirmed by its signers. Bills of divorce and slaves’ bills of manumission are equal in [the requirement] about those who carry and bring. This is one of the aspects in which bills of divorce, have the same rules as bills of manumission.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:22

As it was stated: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was not written and signed in his presence, he returns the bill to its place of origin, presents it to a court and has its signatures notarized. Then he does not have so say, ‘it was written and signed before me’, but he says, ‘I am deputized by the court.’ ”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:26

Why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan said, because they are lions’ proselytes. But if somebody converted not for Heaven’s sake and then converted for Heaven’s sake, does one not accept him? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Because the child is a bastard if a Gentile or a slave have intercourse with a Jewish woman. But did not Rebbi Aqiba say, they are genuine proselytes? Because they require levirate marriage from the preliminarily married and free the definitively married. But do not the rabbis say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law? Because they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce. But does not Rabban Gamliel accept their bills of divorce? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because they intermingled with the priests of the High Places: “He chose priests from the borderline of the people,”. Rebbi Ila said, from the “thorns” of the people, i. e., from the disqualified of the people.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:29

HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:31

“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he accepted at the first moment, Rabban Gamliel will agree. If he did refuse at the first moment, the rabbis will agree. But we deal with the case that he did not specify. Rebbi says, nobody says ‘it is impossible’ unless he had accepted. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible’, the end is proof for the start.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:31

“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he accepted at the first moment, Rabban Gamliel will agree. If he did refuse at the first moment, the rabbis will agree. But we deal with the case that he did not specify. Rebbi says, nobody says ‘it is impossible’ unless he had accepted. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible’, the end is proof for the start.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:33

Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for a colleague when they were slandered. They came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:33

Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for a colleague when they were slandered. They came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:35

“ ‘Give this mina to X,’ then he died. If the heirs want to hinder [the delivery] they are powerless. It is unnecessary to say that it is so if he said, acquire for him, if he said, accept by my orders.” Rebbi Abba barMamal said, this baraita refers to a sick person. If he is sick, does he not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him? Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this by what Rebbi Abba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: They treated verbal instructions by a sick person as if they were written and delivered. But only if he died from that sickness, not if he recovered, he did not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:35

“ ‘Give this mina to X,’ then he died. If the heirs want to hinder [the delivery] they are powerless. It is unnecessary to say that it is so if he said, acquire for him, if he said, accept by my orders.” Rebbi Abba barMamal said, this baraita refers to a sick person. If he is sick, does he not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him? Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this by what Rebbi Abba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: They treated verbal instructions by a sick person as if they were written and delivered. But only if he died from that sickness, not if he recovered, he did not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:12

HALAKHAH: “One writes with anything,” etc. “He shall write”, not engrave. “He shall write”, not dropping points. “He shall write”, not pouring. “He shall write”, not engrave; some Tannaïm state, he even may engrave. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says not to engrave, if the writing stands out as on a denar. He who says even to engrave, as on a writing tablet. “He shall write”, not dropping points; Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom and Rebbi Mattaniah: One said, if he did not connect the points; the other said, even if he connected the points. “He shall write”, not pouring. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, those Orientals are very sophisticated. If one of them wants to write a secret letter to another, he writes with juice of gall-nuts. The recipient pours ink without gall over it, which is absorbed at the place of the writing. If one did that on the Sabbath, what? There, we have stated: “Writing on top of writing is not prosecutable.” Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, only if he wrote ink on ink or vermilion on vermilion. But if he wrote ink on vermilion or vermilion on ink, he is guilty. Rebbi Isaac bar Mesharshia in the name of the rabbis from there: He is doubly guilty, once for erasing and once for writing.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:13

If the witnesses do not know how to sign. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one sketches for them in ink and they sign with vermilion, or with vermilion and they sign in ink. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, because we are occupied with the rules of the Sabbath, should we permit a married woman? But he brings an blank sheet of paper and cuts it before them. Would it not have been the first person’s handwriting? One has to widen the cuts. Rebbi Mana said, why do we not say that one sketches for them with water? If he would come and protest, his protest would be accepted. If somebody tears into skin in the form of writing it is valid. If somebody sketches on skin in the form of writing it is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:14

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give it to me,” is invalid. “On condition that you return it to me,” is valid. Is that not the prior case? Rebbi Yose said, after you went to court. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, “after you have acquired all the rights for which it was made, return it to me.” Similar to that: Etrogim were scarce over there. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob gave an etrog to his son and said to him, if you have acquired it and fulfilled its obligation, return it to me.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:14

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give it to me,” is invalid. “On condition that you return it to me,” is valid. Is that not the prior case? Rebbi Yose said, after you went to court. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, “after you have acquired all the rights for which it was made, return it to me.” Similar to that: Etrogim were scarce over there. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob gave an etrog to his son and said to him, if you have acquired it and fulfilled its obligation, return it to me.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:25

HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:6

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:21

MISHNAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce overseas and falls sick, he assembles a court to send it and declares before them: “it was written and signed before me.” The later messenger does not have to say: “it was written and signed before me,” but he says: “I am an agent of the court.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:22

HALAKHAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce overseas and falls sick,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, this is only necessary if he already has arrived in the Land of Israel. Lest you say, since he arrived in the Land of Israel it should be treated as a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel, and for bills of divorce from the Land of Israel one does not have to say: “it was written and signed before me.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:23

If the messenger fell sick. Rebbi Ḥanina said, a case came before the son of Rebbi Abba and he sent to ask Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa and Rebbi Immi. They instructed him that the first messenger does not have to say: “it was written and signed before me,” but he says, “I am an agent of the court.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:24

Does he have to deliver the entire agency to him? Rebbi Jeremiah said, he has to deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana said, he need not deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana brought it from this: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’” Rebbi Jeremiah said, Rebbi Abin bar Cahana retracted this, because of: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:24

Does he have to deliver the entire agency to him? Rebbi Jeremiah said, he has to deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana said, he need not deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana brought it from this: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’” Rebbi Jeremiah said, Rebbi Abin bar Cahana retracted this, because of: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:24

Does he have to deliver the entire agency to him? Rebbi Jeremiah said, he has to deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana said, he need not deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana brought it from this: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’” Rebbi Jeremiah said, Rebbi Abin bar Cahana retracted this, because of: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:26

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:26

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:31

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sets aside produce,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar ben Antigonos in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Yannai: This means that nothing is in disorder for 24 hours but the last day. Rebbi Joḥanan said: Nothing is in order for 24 hours but the first day, as we have stated there: “If a miqweh was measured and found deficient.” Ḥinena the son of Rav Assi bar Mamal in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That is to negate the words of Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated: “If they were lost, one worries about them for 24 hours back, the words of Rebbi Eleazar.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:31

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sets aside produce,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar ben Antigonos in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Yannai: This means that nothing is in disorder for 24 hours but the last day. Rebbi Joḥanan said: Nothing is in order for 24 hours but the first day, as we have stated there: “If a miqweh was measured and found deficient.” Ḥinena the son of Rav Assi bar Mamal in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That is to negate the words of Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated: “If they were lost, one worries about them for 24 hours back, the words of Rebbi Eleazar.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:32

There, we have stated: “If someone buys wine from Samaritans.” It was stated: “Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon prohibit to do so, for the wine bag might spring a leak and it may turn out retroactively that he drank ṭevel.” Does the Mishnah here not follow Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there it was not in order from the start. But here it is not in order from now to the future.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:33

For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:7

“Mr. X and all his names.” Think of it, if his name was Reuben and he went away under the name of Simeon. But: “I am X and every other name which I have.” “In addition, they said if he had two wives, one in Judea and one in Galilee, and he is known by two names, one in Judea and one in Galilee. He used [his name] in Judea to divorce the one in Galilee and [his name] in Galilee to divorce the one in Judea. Neither one is divorced.” This baraita if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Galilee or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Judea. But if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Judea, or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Galilee, she is divorced. Rebbi Ilai said, according to the rules he has to say: “I am X with every other name which I have in Galilee.” If he was at another place, he can divorce either one he wishes. Rebbi Yose said, one says that if he did it. But to start out he has to follow Rebbi Ilai. Rebbi Abin said, if he is known by (another) name at another place, he has to mention all three.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:7

“Mr. X and all his names.” Think of it, if his name was Reuben and he went away under the name of Simeon. But: “I am X and every other name which I have.” “In addition, they said if he had two wives, one in Judea and one in Galilee, and he is known by two names, one in Judea and one in Galilee. He used [his name] in Judea to divorce the one in Galilee and [his name] in Galilee to divorce the one in Judea. Neither one is divorced.” This baraita if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Galilee or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Judea. But if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Judea, or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Galilee, she is divorced. Rebbi Ilai said, according to the rules he has to say: “I am X with every other name which I have in Galilee.” If he was at another place, he can divorce either one he wishes. Rebbi Yose said, one says that if he did it. But to start out he has to follow Rebbi Ilai. Rebbi Abin said, if he is known by (another) name at another place, he has to mention all three.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:8

There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:15

HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:15

HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:15

HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:18

If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him? Not only does this apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap, or הרנירק טיאונוס, or the king’s freedom? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:20

Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:23

There, we have stated: “One does not marry women on a holiday.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. They asked before Rebbi Yose: May a slave marry a woman on a holiday? He told them, let us hear from the following: “Shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase!” And Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Anybody commanded to be fruitful and increase is forbidden to marry on a holiday.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:30

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:31

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:31

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:31

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:33

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife as a she-ram cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife as a she-ram, when she went, married another man, and bore him children, and he said, if I had known that she can have children, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since there are women she-rams who are married and since [their husbands] are satisfied with them they keep them.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:33

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife as a she-ram cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife as a she-ram, when she went, married another man, and bore him children, and he said, if I had known that she can have children, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since there are women she-rams who are married and since [their husbands] are satisfied with them they keep them.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:38

Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even though Rebbi Meїr said that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes, he agrees that he has property rights. What are property rights? Rebbi Abba said, the usufruct; as we have stated: “the buyer brings First Fruits because of the public good,” otherwise he could have brought First Fruits by the word of the Torah.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:38

Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even though Rebbi Meїr said that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes, he agrees that he has property rights. What are property rights? Rebbi Abba said, the usufruct; as we have stated: “the buyer brings First Fruits because of the public good,” otherwise he could have brought First Fruits by the word of the Torah.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:4

“His field”, except if it was mortgaged. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:4

“His field”, except if it was mortgaged. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:6

“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. “Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:10

If there is only best quality, one collects from the best quality, [only] average quality one collects from average quality, [only] worst quality one collects from worst quality. Best and average, torts are assessed from best quality, creditors and a woman’s ketubah from average. Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. If his best quality was like everybody’s best quality, it is best quality. If his average quality was like everybody’s average quality, it is average quality. If his worst quality was like everybody’s worst quality, it is worst quality. If his best quality was like everybody’s average? Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ila asked: Let us hear from the following: Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. But just as you need in the case that you have best and average quality, torts push creditors to the average, so in this case, of average and worst quality, should not torts push creditors to the worst quality? Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Explain it that he had best quality which he sold, and the creditors were already pushed to average quality.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:11

“For a woman’s ketubah with lowest quality.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, they taught only for a ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of a thousand denar she collects from average quality. Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of a thousand denar she collects only from lowest quality. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the following disagreement: “While she lives in her father’s house, she always can collect her ketubah; if she lives in her husband’s house, she can collect her ketubah for 25 years.” Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she loses her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he sells through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:15

HALAKHAH: “One does not collect from encumbered property,” etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, because they have no fixed amount.