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15840 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law,” etc. Because he performed ḥalîṣah with her. Therefore, if he did not perform ḥalîṣah with her but she died, her mother is permitted to him. That is what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated. Rebbi Abun understood it from what follows: “And her sister as long as she is alive, but the brothers are permitted.” Is her sister’s position relative to the brothers not as if she herself had died?
HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law,” etc. Because he performed ḥalîṣah with her. Therefore, if he did not perform ḥalîṣah with her but she died, her mother is permitted to him. That is what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated. Rebbi Abun understood it from what follows: “And her sister as long as she is alive, but the brothers are permitted.” Is her sister’s position relative to the brothers not as if she herself had died?
HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law,” etc. Because he performed ḥalîṣah with her. Therefore, if he did not perform ḥalîṣah with her but she died, her mother is permitted to him. That is what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated. Rebbi Abun understood it from what follows: “And her sister as long as she is alive, but the brothers are permitted.” Is her sister’s position relative to the brothers not as if she herself had died?
HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law,” etc. Because he performed ḥalîṣah with her. Therefore, if he did not perform ḥalîṣah with her but she died, her mother is permitted to him. That is what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated. Rebbi Abun understood it from what follows: “And her sister as long as she is alive, but the brothers are permitted.” Is her sister’s position relative to the brothers not as if she herself had died?
“Forbidden to her are his father, his father’s father, his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son.” Does this imply that secondary prohibitions are imposed on the one performing ḥalîṣah? That says it, “his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son.” That implies that secondary prohibitions are imposed on the one performing ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law while his brother had married her sister and then died, she must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife while his brother had married her sister and then died, she is free.
MISHNAH: If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law while his brother had married her sister and then died, she must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife while his brother had married her sister and then died, she is free.
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife,” etc. Simeon bar Abba asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between having ḥalîṣah and divorcing? He said to him: You think that ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, but it is only freeing. The brothers are not guilty for her under the category of “wife of the one acting in ḥalîṣah” but they are guilty under the category of “wife of the deceased”.
MISHNAH: If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him wait until your older brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry. If the levir died, he has to remove himself from his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah or levirate until after three months. Similarly, no woman should be married or receive qiddushin until after three months, whether virgin or not virgin, widow or divorcee, married or betrothed. Rebbi Jehudah says, those that had been married may receive qiddushin and those that had received qiddushin can be married except those that had received qiddushin in Judea because he is familiar with her. Rebbi Yose said, any woman may receive qiddushin except a widow because of her mourning.
MISHNAH: No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah or levirate until after three months. Similarly, no woman should be married or receive qiddushin until after three months, whether virgin or not virgin, widow or divorcee, married or betrothed. Rebbi Jehudah says, those that had been married may receive qiddushin and those that had received qiddushin can be married except those that had received qiddushin in Judea because he is familiar with her. Rebbi Yose said, any woman may receive qiddushin except a widow because of her mourning.
HALAKHAH: “No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah,” etc. How long is it until a pregnancy is recognized? Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meїr: After three months. Even though it is no proof, there is a hint: “It was after about three months.” Rebbi Yudan said, even for a phantom pregnancy, “we were pregnant, we were sick, as if we gave birth to wind,” “get pregnant with dry grass, give birth to straw.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra said, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Even most of the first, most of the last, and the middle one complete. Rav Assi said, a full 90 days. Samuel said, they in their fulness. A case came before the rabbis there; we do not know if thirteen of the first and seventeen of the last or seventeen of the first and thirteen of the last, and five complete ones in the middle; they wanted to touch the child because of a doubt of bastardy. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob told them, such a case came before Abba bar Abba and he declared it acceptable. Does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Abba said, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth. A pregnancy is recognized after full months, a birth can happen after fractional months. There, we have stated: “How long can labor be? Rebbi Meїr said, even 40 to 50 days. Rebbi Jehudah said, her month is sufficient. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, no labor is longer than two weeks”. “Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after fractional months. Since otherwise one should have stated “thirty days”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after full months. Since we have stated: “Her month is sufficient.”
HALAKHAH: “No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah,” etc. How long is it until a pregnancy is recognized? Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meїr: After three months. Even though it is no proof, there is a hint: “It was after about three months.” Rebbi Yudan said, even for a phantom pregnancy, “we were pregnant, we were sick, as if we gave birth to wind,” “get pregnant with dry grass, give birth to straw.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra said, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Even most of the first, most of the last, and the middle one complete. Rav Assi said, a full 90 days. Samuel said, they in their fulness. A case came before the rabbis there; we do not know if thirteen of the first and seventeen of the last or seventeen of the first and thirteen of the last, and five complete ones in the middle; they wanted to touch the child because of a doubt of bastardy. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob told them, such a case came before Abba bar Abba and he declared it acceptable. Does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Abba said, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth. A pregnancy is recognized after full months, a birth can happen after fractional months. There, we have stated: “How long can labor be? Rebbi Meїr said, even 40 to 50 days. Rebbi Jehudah said, her month is sufficient. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, no labor is longer than two weeks”. “Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after fractional months. Since otherwise one should have stated “thirty days”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after full months. Since we have stated: “Her month is sufficient.”
Rab Ḥiyya bar Ashi was sitting before Rav who saw him disturbed. He said to him, what is the matter? He said to him, my female donkey is pregnant and will give birth; then I have to get her to copulate before she is out of heat. He said to him, when did the male mount her? He said, on day X. He calculated and said, she still has some time until then. It was stated so: A quick female donkey does not need less than the days of the moon and one who is late is not later than the days of the sun. The words of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagree, since Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, the cattle herd of the government was there for copulating and those of the house of Rebbi took bulls from them to copulate. Some of them gave birth soon and some of them later. Here it is about a pure animal, there about an impure animal. But is it not written, “do you know the time the mountain goats will give birth, etc.” “Count months, make them complete, you will know the time of their giving birth.” “Do you know the time of giving birth?” A pure wild animal is like a domestic impure animal.
Rab Ḥiyya bar Ashi was sitting before Rav who saw him disturbed. He said to him, what is the matter? He said to him, my female donkey is pregnant and will give birth; then I have to get her to copulate before she is out of heat. He said to him, when did the male mount her? He said, on day X. He calculated and said, she still has some time until then. It was stated so: A quick female donkey does not need less than the days of the moon and one who is late is not later than the days of the sun. The words of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagree, since Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, the cattle herd of the government was there for copulating and those of the house of Rebbi took bulls from them to copulate. Some of them gave birth soon and some of them later. Here it is about a pure animal, there about an impure animal. But is it not written, “do you know the time the mountain goats will give birth, etc.” “Count months, make them complete, you will know the time of their giving birth.” “Do you know the time of giving birth?” A pure wild animal is like a domestic impure animal.
The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.
The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.
The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.
“Except the widow because of her mourning.” How much does mourning last? Thirty days. That is, for women. But for men, three holidays. If he has children; but if he does not have children immediately. If he has somebody to serve him; but if he has nobody to serve him, immediately. If he does not have small children; but if he has small children, immediately, as in the following: It happened that Rebbi Ṭarphon’s wife died. While he still was in the cemetery, he said to her sister: Come into my house and raise your sister’s children. Even though he married her, he did not know her until 30 days had passed.
“Except the widow because of her mourning.” How much does mourning last? Thirty days. That is, for women. But for men, three holidays. If he has children; but if he does not have children immediately. If he has somebody to serve him; but if he has nobody to serve him, immediately. If he does not have small children; but if he has small children, immediately, as in the following: It happened that Rebbi Ṭarphon’s wife died. While he still was in the cemetery, he said to her sister: Come into my house and raise your sister’s children. Even though he married her, he did not know her until 30 days had passed.
“Except the widow because of her mourning.” How much does mourning last? Thirty days. That is, for women. But for men, three holidays. If he has children; but if he does not have children immediately. If he has somebody to serve him; but if he has nobody to serve him, immediately. If he does not have small children; but if he has small children, immediately, as in the following: It happened that Rebbi Ṭarphon’s wife died. While he still was in the cemetery, he said to her sister: Come into my house and raise your sister’s children. Even though he married her, he did not know her until 30 days had passed.
“Except the widow because of her mourning.” How much does mourning last? Thirty days. That is, for women. But for men, three holidays. If he has children; but if he does not have children immediately. If he has somebody to serve him; but if he has nobody to serve him, immediately. If he does not have small children; but if he has small children, immediately, as in the following: It happened that Rebbi Ṭarphon’s wife died. While he still was in the cemetery, he said to her sister: Come into my house and raise your sister’s children. Even though he married her, he did not know her until 30 days had passed.
MISHNAH: He who takes back his divorcee, or marries the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, or marries a relative of the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, has to divorce her and any child is a bastard, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say, it is not a bastard. But they agree that the child of one who marries a relative of his divorcee is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “He who takes back his divorcee,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who takes back his divorcee after she had remarried makes her blemished for the priesthood. Without that, is she not blemished for the priesthood? But, she is blemished in that she cannot eat heave. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughet of a man who takes back his divorcee after she had remarried is acceptable for the priesthood. What is the reason? “She is an abomination”. She is an abomination, the child is not an abomination.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
MISHNAH: If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him. If he divorced her and she died, her sister is permitted to him. If she had married another man and died, her sister is permitted to him. If his sister-in-law died, her sister is permitted to him. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him.
MISHNAH: If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him. If he divorced her and she died, her sister is permitted to him. If she had married another man and died, her sister is permitted to him. If his sister-in-law died, her sister is permitted to him. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him.
MISHNAH: If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him. If he divorced her and she died, her sister is permitted to him. If she had married another man and died, her sister is permitted to him. If his sister-in-law died, her sister is permitted to him. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him.
MISHNAH: If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him. If he divorced her and she died, her sister is permitted to him. If she had married another man and died, her sister is permitted to him. If his sister-in-law died, her sister is permitted to him. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him.
MISHNAH: If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him. If he divorced her and she died, her sister is permitted to him. If she had married another man and died, her sister is permitted to him. If his sister-in-law died, her sister is permitted to him. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him.
MISHNAH: If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him. If he divorced her and she died, her sister is permitted to him. If she had married another man and died, her sister is permitted to him. If his sister-in-law died, her sister is permitted to him. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him.
MISHNAH: If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him. If he divorced her and she died, her sister is permitted to him. If she had married another man and died, her sister is permitted to him. If his sister-in-law died, her sister is permitted to him. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him.
HALAKHAH: “If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him,” etc. That means, her mother is forbidden to him. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. But since we stated: “If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him,” therefore he stated “her sister.”
HALAKHAH: “If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him,” etc. That means, her mother is forbidden to him. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. But since we stated: “If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him,” therefore he stated “her sister.”
HALAKHAH: “If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him,” etc. That means, her mother is forbidden to him. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. But since we stated: “If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him,” therefore he stated “her sister.”
HALAKHAH: “If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him,” etc. That means, her mother is forbidden to him. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. But since we stated: “If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him,” therefore he stated “her sister.”
HALAKHAH: “If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him,” etc. That means, her mother is forbidden to him. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. But since we stated: “If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him,” therefore he stated “her sister.”
HALAKHAH: “If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him,” etc. That means, her mother is forbidden to him. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. But since we stated: “If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him,” therefore he stated “her sister.”
HALAKHAH: “If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him,” etc. That means, her mother is forbidden to him. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. But since we stated: “If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him,” therefore he stated “her sister.”
HALAKHAH: “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “her levir shall come upon her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.
HALAKHAH: “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “her levir shall come upon her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.
HALAKHAH: “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “her levir shall come upon her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.
HALAKHAH: “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “her levir shall come upon her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.
HALAKHAH: “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “her levir shall come upon her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.
HALAKHAH: “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “her levir shall come upon her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.
Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.
Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.
Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.
Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.
Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.
Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.
Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, can there be invalid intercourse after invalid intercourse, or the intercourse of a nine-years-old after the intercourse of [another] nine-years-old, or invalid intercourse after the intercourse of a nine-years-old, or intercourse of a nine-years-old after invalid intercourse? Do the Sages agree with Rabban Gamliel that there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” for one sister-in-law? How is that? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law, gave her a bill of divorce, and “bespoke” her again. If you say, there can be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she did not become free by that bill of divorce. If you say, there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she was freed by that bill of divorce.
In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, can there be invalid intercourse after invalid intercourse, or the intercourse of a nine-years-old after the intercourse of [another] nine-years-old, or invalid intercourse after the intercourse of a nine-years-old, or intercourse of a nine-years-old after invalid intercourse? Do the Sages agree with Rabban Gamliel that there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” for one sister-in-law? How is that? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law, gave her a bill of divorce, and “bespoke” her again. If you say, there can be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she did not become free by that bill of divorce. If you say, there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she was freed by that bill of divorce.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If somebody gave qiddushin to a woman “from now and after thirty days” and her sister became a candidate for levirate with him during these thirty days, is there even in this case no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking? He said, Rabban Gamliel said only “after a bill of divorce and ‘bespeaking’ ”. But what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a hundred qiddushin are valid for her, does not follow Rabban Gamliel.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If somebody gave qiddushin to a woman “from now and after thirty days” and her sister became a candidate for levirate with him during these thirty days, is there even in this case no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking? He said, Rabban Gamliel said only “after a bill of divorce and ‘bespeaking’ ”. But what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a hundred qiddushin are valid for her, does not follow Rabban Gamliel.
MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law and gave her a bill of divorce, she needs ḥalîṣah from him. If he “bespoke” and participated in ḥalîṣah, she needs a bill of divorce from him. If he “bespoke” her and copulated, that is as it is commanded.
MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law and gave her a bill of divorce, she needs ḥalîṣah from him. If he “bespoke” and participated in ḥalîṣah, she needs a bill of divorce from him. If he “bespoke” her and copulated, that is as it is commanded.
Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her. If an outsider came and gave her qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?
Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her. If an outsider came and gave her qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?
Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her. If an outsider came and gave her qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?
Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her. If an outsider came and gave her qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?
Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her. If an outsider came and gave her qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?
Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her. If an outsider came and gave her qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?
Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her. If an outsider came and gave her qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?
HALAKHAH: “If he delivered a bill of divorce and then “bespoke”, etc. A bill of divorce for his “bespeaking” and ḥalîṣah for her candidacy.
That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥalîṣah, “bespoke” her, gave a bill of divorce, and cohabited, or cohabited, “bespoke”, gave a bill of divorce, and performed ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah. There is no difference between one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
MISHNAH: If somebody comes to his sister-in-law, whether in error, or criminally, or under duress, or willingly, even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error, or he is under duress but she is not, or she is under duress but he is not, whether he touched or completed, he acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.
“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.