here
4168 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?
Rebbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by his own formulation before the court: would he not be liable for each instance separately? Rebbi Yose said, is this not the Mishnah: “Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit?” But here, since they can come back and admit, they are liable for each single instance.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.
HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.
HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.
Rebbi La: Both Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying, there is no ”witnesses “here. Why? Because they might die. But might not a document be lost? Therefore, the reason can only be that they might forget their testimony. There, we have stated: “Where is my ox? He told him, it is lost. I want you to swear, he said, Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed himself, he has to pay the value, and the fifth, and the reparation sacrifice.” The Mishnah [applies] if he does not know that there are witnesses. He comes to tell you, even if he knows that there are witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group reneged and after this the second, both are liable.” One understands that the first group becomes liable. Why the second? Not because they might forget their testimony? [Here also, because they (are commanded) to forget their testimony.]
Rebbi La: Both Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying, there is no ”witnesses “here. Why? Because they might die. But might not a document be lost? Therefore, the reason can only be that they might forget their testimony. There, we have stated: “Where is my ox? He told him, it is lost. I want you to swear, he said, Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed himself, he has to pay the value, and the fifth, and the reparation sacrifice.” The Mishnah [applies] if he does not know that there are witnesses. He comes to tell you, even if he knows that there are witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group reneged and after this the second, both are liable.” One understands that the first group becomes liable. Why the second? Not because they might forget their testimony? [Here also, because they (are commanded) to forget their testimony.]
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative not liable for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, so they neither are here? Rebbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative not liable for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, so they neither are here? Rebbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.
Rebbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by the formulation of others out of the court: would he not be liable only once? Rebbi Yose said, is this not the Mishnah: “Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they can come back and admit?” But here, since they cannot come back and admit, they are liable only once.
Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Eleazar, only if he mentioned “oath” at the start and at the end. The words of the Sages, if he mentioned “oath” at the start but not at the end. Or if he mentioned it at the end but not at the start in the opinion of the rabbis he brings a sacrifice for each single one, in Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one sacrifice for everything. If he mentions “oath” at the start but did not mention it at the end, does the oath fall on the middle ones? Come and see: If he had mentioned it at the start and the end, did he mention it for the middle ones? But you are saying that it is valid; so here it is valid.
HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person give to his neighbor, etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Or vessels; since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels? Following what Rebbi Nathan stated, or vessels, including clay vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot, that the claim should be about a peruṭah’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi’s worth.
If somebody produced both a document and ḥazaqah. Rebbi says, it should be judged by the document. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, it should be judged by ḥazaqah. Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A case came before Rebbi Jehudah following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: How? Did Rebbi switch his opinion? There he said, it should be judged by the document. But here he said it should be judged by ḥazaqah. Would we say, before he changed his opinion? Even if you say, after he changed his opinion. Rebbi only wanted to determine the truth of the matter. “If somebody occupied real estate on the basis of a document of sale and it was found invalid, this is not ḥazaqah.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, in dispute. Rebbi Samuel said, Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abinna: it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Yose said, there if one produced both a document and ḥazaqah. Here if he came with a document. Rebbi Yudan said, there if he presented two groups of witnesses; here one who contradicts his own proofs.
If somebody produced both a document and ḥazaqah. Rebbi says, it should be judged by the document. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, it should be judged by ḥazaqah. Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A case came before Rebbi Jehudah following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: How? Did Rebbi switch his opinion? There he said, it should be judged by the document. But here he said it should be judged by ḥazaqah. Would we say, before he changed his opinion? Even if you say, after he changed his opinion. Rebbi only wanted to determine the truth of the matter. “If somebody occupied real estate on the basis of a document of sale and it was found invalid, this is not ḥazaqah.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, in dispute. Rebbi Samuel said, Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abinna: it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Yose said, there if one produced both a document and ḥazaqah. Here if he came with a document. Rebbi Yudan said, there if he presented two groups of witnesses; here one who contradicts his own proofs.
If somebody produced both a document and ḥazaqah. Rebbi says, it should be judged by the document. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, it should be judged by ḥazaqah. Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A case came before Rebbi Jehudah following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: How? Did Rebbi switch his opinion? There he said, it should be judged by the document. But here he said it should be judged by ḥazaqah. Would we say, before he changed his opinion? Even if you say, after he changed his opinion. Rebbi only wanted to determine the truth of the matter. “If somebody occupied real estate on the basis of a document of sale and it was found invalid, this is not ḥazaqah.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, in dispute. Rebbi Samuel said, Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abinna: it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Yose said, there if one produced both a document and ḥazaqah. Here if he came with a document. Rebbi Yudan said, there if he presented two groups of witnesses; here one who contradicts his own proofs.
Between both of them it will never move from between them. If the one forcing the oath forces the oath lying, at the end it will come over him. If the one swearing swears lying, at the end it will come over him. What is the reason? I shall take it out, oracle of the Eternal Sabaot, and it will come into the house of the thief and the house of him who swears falsely in My Name, etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, destructive angels have no joints. What is the reason? From roving about the Earth and walking there. But here, it will destroy its wood and its stones. Come and see, things which the fire will not burn, a vain oath will destroy. Rebbi Jonah said, about falsehood. Rebbi Yose said, even on truth. Ḥaggai was preaching following Rebbi Yose. There was a case about a woman who went to knead dough with another and had two denarii bound into the seam of her head cover. These fell out and were rolled into a loaf. She went back to he house, wanted them and did not find them. She returned to her and said to her, give me the two denarii which fell from me in your house. She told her, I do not know. If she would know of it, she should bury her son. She buried him. When they returned from his grave, she heard a voice saying, if she had not known about them she would not have buried him. She said, if this woman knows about them, she should bury her other son. She buried him. They came to console her and cut one loaf and found two denarii rolled into the loaf. This says, whether innocent or guilty, never swear an oath.
HALAKHAH: “About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rebbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath; Rebbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rebbi Johanan answer Rebbi Eleazar. No. If you pronounced about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath; here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.
Some want to understand it from here: An ox, or a donkey, or a sheep. Since these are particular in that they are subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying, this excludes real estate which is not subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying. I shall exclude real estate but shall not exclude slaves. Since these are particular in that they are subject to a fine, this excludes slaves which are not subject to a fine. I shall exclude slaves but shall not exclude documents since they are subject to fines. Since these are particular in that they are subject to overcharging, this excludes documents which are not subject to overcharging. From here they say, if somebody sells documents to the spice trader, it is subject to claims of overcharging. Rebbi Ismael explained: Or a person, if he would swear, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a repeat general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is about monetary claims, [originating] from himself, which can be collected by court order, having monetary value, which is a fixed value, and are movables, and one is not liable for punishment and fines. Monetary claims, excluding one who said to another, give me the 200 denar which you promised me but never gave. [Originating] from himself, excluding one who said to another, you cursed me and shamed me, who is not liable. Which can be collected by court order, excluding one who said to another, you raped or seduced X’s daughter. It has monetary value, excluding documents. Which is a fixed value, excluding slaves. Movables, excluding real estate. One is not liable for punishment, excluding one who said to another, you set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath; who is not liable. One is not liable for fines, excluding double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution which are fines.
Some want to understand it from here: An ox, or a donkey, or a sheep. Since these are particular in that they are subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying, this excludes real estate which is not subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying. I shall exclude real estate but shall not exclude slaves. Since these are particular in that they are subject to a fine, this excludes slaves which are not subject to a fine. I shall exclude slaves but shall not exclude documents since they are subject to fines. Since these are particular in that they are subject to overcharging, this excludes documents which are not subject to overcharging. From here they say, if somebody sells documents to the spice trader, it is subject to claims of overcharging. Rebbi Ismael explained: Or a person, if he would swear, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a repeat general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is about monetary claims, [originating] from himself, which can be collected by court order, having monetary value, which is a fixed value, and are movables, and one is not liable for punishment and fines. Monetary claims, excluding one who said to another, give me the 200 denar which you promised me but never gave. [Originating] from himself, excluding one who said to another, you cursed me and shamed me, who is not liable. Which can be collected by court order, excluding one who said to another, you raped or seduced X’s daughter. It has monetary value, excluding documents. Which is a fixed value, excluding slaves. Movables, excluding real estate. One is not liable for punishment, excluding one who said to another, you set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath; who is not liable. One is not liable for fines, excluding double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution which are fines.
A person encountered another in the market and took away his linen cloth saying, “this sheet will not leave my hand until you give me what you are holding for me.” It came before Samuel. He told him, return his linen cloth to him and sue him. Does Samuel follow the judges of Nahardea? There, the pledge was held by him, here the pledge was not held by him.
Samuel says, the oath does not move away from between them. If the lender swears, he swears and takes. But if the borrower swears, the other will present the pledge. “Who has to swear? The one who holds the pledge.” Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, about the first part: “ ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it but it was worth two,’ and the other says ‘no, but I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a tetradrachma;’ he is not liable. ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it,’ ” etc. “And the other says, ‘I do not know’.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: You do not know, the other knows. Rebbi Joshua [the Southerner] asked before Rebbi Jonah: There you say, you do not know, the other knows; but here you say so? There is desecration of an oath, here there is no desecration of an oath.
Samuel says, the oath does not move away from between them. If the lender swears, he swears and takes. But if the borrower swears, the other will present the pledge. “Who has to swear? The one who holds the pledge.” Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, about the first part: “ ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it but it was worth two,’ and the other says ‘no, but I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a tetradrachma;’ he is not liable. ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it,’ ” etc. “And the other says, ‘I do not know’.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: You do not know, the other knows. Rebbi Joshua [the Southerner] asked before Rebbi Jonah: There you say, you do not know, the other knows; but here you say so? There is desecration of an oath, here there is no desecration of an oath.
Rebbi Jehudah’s argument seems inverted. There he says, even if he does not know. But here he says, not unless he knows. There since it is not in the form of a biblical oath even (about a biblical oath) he does not know. But here it is in the form of a biblical oath.
Rebbi Jehudah’s argument seems inverted. There he says, even if he does not know. But here he says, not unless he knows. There since it is not in the form of a biblical oath even (about a biblical oath) he does not know. But here it is in the form of a biblical oath.
May one roll over a biblical oath on a biblical oath? Let us hear from the following: One rolls over a biblical oath on a biblical oath, an instituted oath on an instituted oath, a biblical oath on an instituted oath. An instituted oath on a biblical oath? There, one swears and pays, but here in one case he swears and collects, in the other he swears and does not pay.
Dealers in sabbatical produce, that is the sabbatical trader. “Who is a sabbatical trader? One who sits idle all the years of a sabbatical cycle. In the sabbatical year he becomes active and trades in sabbatical produce. One does not accept him before another sabbatical year starts and he can be checked out that he repented in complete repentance.” Rebbi Yose stated, two sabbatical periods. “Rebbi Nehemiah says, repentance in money, not repentance in words; that he say to them, here are 200 denars, distribute them to the poor, for I earned them from forbidden produce.” They added shepherds, extortionists, and any who are suspect in money matters, that their testimony be invalid. Rebbi Abbahu said, shepherds of small animals.
When does one accept one who is suspect in matters of oaths? From when he comes to the court and says, I am suspect. Where do we hold? If one who stands here and is obligated to swear for another, does the court deliver an oath to a suspect person? But we must hold about one who has a suit at a court where he is unknown and tells them, this man is suspect. Also about one who stands and another owes him an oath and he forgives it.
Here you say, “one does not swear on the claim of a deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor.” But there you say, “one swears for a minor and the Temple.” If one pays from the minor’s property. But can one collect from a person in his absence? Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it about a contract for which interest is due. Would the court collect interest? Explain it that it was guaranteed for a Gentile.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yose said, this means if he trades without account; it does not apply if there are accounts. Also the family member trades without accounts. Rebbi Ze`ira agrees with Rebbi Yose. A man came for judgment before Rebbi Ze`ira who required him to swear for two denars. He told him, do I not owe you two denars? Here they are thrown to you. He answered him, and cloth of fine wool X and Y. Rebbi Ze`ira said, either you give him everything he claims from you or you swear to him everything which he rolls over to you. How far does one roll over? Rebbi Joḥanan said, until he say to him, you are my slave. Think of it, could he be Cohen and Hebrew slave? Is there such a slave today?
Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, watch it for it is otherwise. What do we say? Watch it, for it is not negligible. “Owner,” “owner.” Since the owner mentioned there is subject to annulment, so also here he is subject to annulment. The Sabbatical annuls things which are his hand’s loans and annuls the corresponding oaths; the Sabbatical does not annul things which are not his hand’s loans, nor does it annul the corresponding oaths. “For anything which the Sabbatical annuls it annuls the corresponding oath; anything which the Sabbatical does not annul it does not annul the corresponding oath.”
HALAKHAH: “There are four kinds of keepers,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there are four kinds of keepers and they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also in matters of robbery they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, a baraita said so: “one who contracts with another for a field,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, Rebbi Abun, also in theft cases they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Phineas, our Mishnah said so: “If he was pulling it to lead it out but it died on the owner’s property, he is not liable. If he lifted it or had it led outside the owner’s property when it died, he is liable.” If he lifted it inside the owner’s property it is as if he had taken it out of the entire property of the owner. If he was pulling it and it left, only after it left the entire property of the owner. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If it was standing at his feeding trough then even if he did not pull it! But we must deal with the case that it was standing in the public domain. Does Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya follow the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, “he shall be hit by less or more”? How do we hold? If it was standing in the public domain and he intended to rustle it when it died, according to everybody he became liable by that intention. If he did not start to pull it, according to everybody he is not liable. But we most hold that it was standing at a feeding trough on his property. As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, following the House of Shammai. Rebbi Abun said, there he acquired without the knowledge of its owner; but here when he acquires with the knowledge of its owner.
For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.
For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.
For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.
Another explanation: He shall pay the whole worth and add its fifths to it. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it was stated thus: “He claimed a claim of loss, swore, and dedicated a sacrifice. Since if he confessed after witnesses came it would be sanctified, it is sanctified here. He claimed a claim of thief, swore, and dedicated a sacrifice. Since if he confessed after witnesses came it would not be sanctified, it is not sanctified here, but following Rebbi Jacob it would be sanctified.”
Another explanation: He shall pay the whole worth and add its fifths to it. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it was stated thus: “He claimed a claim of loss, swore, and dedicated a sacrifice. Since if he confessed after witnesses came it would be sanctified, it is sanctified here. He claimed a claim of thief, swore, and dedicated a sacrifice. Since if he confessed after witnesses came it would not be sanctified, it is not sanctified here, but following Rebbi Jacob it would be sanctified.”
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
HALAKHAH: “Within three days before Gentile holidays,” etc. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba understood all from here: Bring your sacrifices in the morning, on the third day your tithes. Rebbi Yose said to him, if it were so, even in the diasporas. But it was stated, Nahum the Mede said, in the diasporas one day is forbidden. What about this? There, they checked and found that they supplied their needs in one day and forbade them one day. But here they checked and found that they cover their needs in three days and forbade them three days.
HALAKHAH: “Within three days before Gentile holidays,” etc. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba understood all from here: Bring your sacrifices in the morning, on the third day your tithes. Rebbi Yose said to him, if it were so, even in the diasporas. But it was stated, Nahum the Mede said, in the diasporas one day is forbidden. What about this? There, they checked and found that they supplied their needs in one day and forbade them one day. But here they checked and found that they cover their needs in three days and forbade them three days.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, a woman should not apply lime because it disfigures her.” Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mana. One said, they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday is forbidden. But the other says, they disagreed about lime which she removes after the holiday. But lime which she removes during the holiday is permitted. We did not know who said what. From what R. Ḥanina, Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jehudah is consistent. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said there, temporary disfiguration is disfiguration, so he says here, temporary pain is pain. This implies that they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday is forbidden.
“Birthday, and the day of death.” The preceding was for the public, from here on private. But it is written: You shall die in peace, and what was burned for your earlier forefathers … So is the Mishnah: “Any death where there is smoke and burning is idolatrous; if there is not smoke and burning it is not idolatrous.
“Rebbi Meïr says, it is also forbidden to sell good dates, and curved dates, and Nicolaos dates to Gentiles.” Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba said, Caryotis. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said, it is a kind known as ḥaṣda. If somebody transgressed and sold? It will come similar to what Rebbi Eleazar said, if he transgressed and built it is permitted, and here if he transgressed and sold it is permitted.
Nowhere does one sell large animals to them.” Why? For a large animal there might be an obligation for a purification offering; for a small animal there can be no obligation for a purification offering. But does he not shear, does he not milk? One says, there it is liable, here he is liable. But if it is sold, is it not the Gentile’s animal? The Babylonian Rebbi Immi in the name of the rabbis there: Sometimes he sells it on trial and returns it after three days, then it turns out that he did do work with the Jew’s animal. Then on trial it should be forbidden, not on trial permitted. One is because of the other.
“A Jewish woman should not be a midwife for a Non-Jew, for she brings a son to pagan worship; but a Non-Jew may be a midwife for a Jewish woman.” It was stated so: From the outside but not the inside. She should not put her hand inside not to squish the fetus in her innards, and she should not give her a cup of root-extract to drink. If she was a medical doctor? This will come as what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he was a professional healer it is permitted. And here, if she was a medical doctor it is permitted. [Rebbi Yose bar Abun, these questions … [doc]tor permitted.]
HALAKHAH: “One may be healed from the healing of property,” etc. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: “healing of property,” his animal. “Healing of persons,” his body. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: If it was scratched it is forbidden. As in the following case: Rebbi Immi went with Rebbi Jehudah the Prince to the hot springs of Gader. He hurt his finger and put a bandage on it. He saw it penetrate and cut it off. Did he not hear what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he was a professional healer it is permitted? This is not comparable. There if it was scratched it is permitted, but here it was scratched and is forbidden.
Rebbi Huna said, (this means) [a baraita implies] that one does not heal through uncovering nakedness, as it was stated: The Sabbath was permitted in exceptional cases; the betrothed maiden was never permitted in exceptional cases. Was not the Sabbath permitted in exceptional cases for healing? Therefore the betrothed maiden was never permitted, not even for healing. Not only if one said to another, bring me a married woman, but even to hear her voice, as the following: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar a man loved a woman and fell dangerously ill. They came and asked Rebbi Eleazar, should she parade before him that he may live? He said to them, he should die but not this. May he hear her voice and live? He said to them, he should die but not this. How was it? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi and Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman, one said, she was a married woman, but one said, she was single. One who said that she was a married woman we understand. But the one who said that she was single? Did not Bar Koḥa the carpenter love a woman in the days of Rebbi Eleazar and (became dangerously sick) [and he permitted him]? One case about a married woman and the other about a single one. Even you may say, here and here about a single one, here and here about a married woman. Explain it that he became infatuated with her when she still was married. Some want to say, she was a woman of substance (and did not listen to him) [and did not want to marry.] Everything which he did was forbidden; therefore he did permit nothing to him.
Rebbi Huna said, (this means) [a baraita implies] that one does not heal through uncovering nakedness, as it was stated: The Sabbath was permitted in exceptional cases; the betrothed maiden was never permitted in exceptional cases. Was not the Sabbath permitted in exceptional cases for healing? Therefore the betrothed maiden was never permitted, not even for healing. Not only if one said to another, bring me a married woman, but even to hear her voice, as the following: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar a man loved a woman and fell dangerously ill. They came and asked Rebbi Eleazar, should she parade before him that he may live? He said to them, he should die but not this. May he hear her voice and live? He said to them, he should die but not this. How was it? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi and Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman, one said, she was a married woman, but one said, she was single. One who said that she was a married woman we understand. But the one who said that she was single? Did not Bar Koḥa the carpenter love a woman in the days of Rebbi Eleazar and (became dangerously sick) [and he permitted him]? One case about a married woman and the other about a single one. Even you may say, here and here about a single one, here and here about a married woman. Explain it that he became infatuated with her when she still was married. Some want to say, she was a woman of substance (and did not listen to him) [and did not want to marry.] Everything which he did was forbidden; therefore he did permit nothing to him.
Rebbi Huna said, (this means) [a baraita implies] that one does not heal through uncovering nakedness, as it was stated: The Sabbath was permitted in exceptional cases; the betrothed maiden was never permitted in exceptional cases. Was not the Sabbath permitted in exceptional cases for healing? Therefore the betrothed maiden was never permitted, not even for healing. Not only if one said to another, bring me a married woman, but even to hear her voice, as the following: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar a man loved a woman and fell dangerously ill. They came and asked Rebbi Eleazar, should she parade before him that he may live? He said to them, he should die but not this. May he hear her voice and live? He said to them, he should die but not this. How was it? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi and Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman, one said, she was a married woman, but one said, she was single. One who said that she was a married woman we understand. But the one who said that she was single? Did not Bar Koḥa the carpenter love a woman in the days of Rebbi Eleazar and (became dangerously sick) [and he permitted him]? One case about a married woman and the other about a single one. Even you may say, here and here about a single one, here and here about a married woman. Explain it that he became infatuated with her when she still was married. Some want to say, she was a woman of substance (and did not listen to him) [and did not want to marry.] Everything which he did was forbidden; therefore he did permit nothing to him.
Rebbi Huna said, (this means) [a baraita implies] that one does not heal through uncovering nakedness, as it was stated: The Sabbath was permitted in exceptional cases; the betrothed maiden was never permitted in exceptional cases. Was not the Sabbath permitted in exceptional cases for healing? Therefore the betrothed maiden was never permitted, not even for healing. Not only if one said to another, bring me a married woman, but even to hear her voice, as the following: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar a man loved a woman and fell dangerously ill. They came and asked Rebbi Eleazar, should she parade before him that he may live? He said to them, he should die but not this. May he hear her voice and live? He said to them, he should die but not this. How was it? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi and Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman, one said, she was a married woman, but one said, she was single. One who said that she was a married woman we understand. But the one who said that she was single? Did not Bar Koḥa the carpenter love a woman in the days of Rebbi Eleazar and (became dangerously sick) [and he permitted him]? One case about a married woman and the other about a single one. Even you may say, here and here about a single one, here and here about a married woman. Explain it that he became infatuated with her when she still was married. Some want to say, she was a woman of substance (and did not listen to him) [and did not want to marry.] Everything which he did was forbidden; therefore he did permit nothing to him.
Rebbi Yannai said, if you bit something off, you bit off soot. If you lose, you lose a pearl. If anybody asked Rebbi Jonathan he told him: Am I the guarantor of your life? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if you sold yourself for the games, you would sell yourself for an excessive price; but here for a very cheap price.
“And Hadrianic pottery.” Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: does practice follow Rebbi Meïr? As it was stated, “Hadrianic pottery is prohibited and its prohibition is of usufruct, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, its prohibition is not of usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: what is the status of the cloth about which we stated here? He was offended by this and told him, even for him who permits there, here it is forbidden. There, the prohibition is not visible, here the prohibition is visible. May one use it to support the legs of a couch? Rebbi Eleazar says it is permitted, Rebbi Joḥanan says it is forbidden.
“And Hadrianic pottery.” Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: does practice follow Rebbi Meïr? As it was stated, “Hadrianic pottery is prohibited and its prohibition is of usufruct, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, its prohibition is not of usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: what is the status of the cloth about which we stated here? He was offended by this and told him, even for him who permits there, here it is forbidden. There, the prohibition is not visible, here the prohibition is visible. May one use it to support the legs of a couch? Rebbi Eleazar says it is permitted, Rebbi Joḥanan says it is forbidden.
“And Hadrianic pottery.” Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: does practice follow Rebbi Meïr? As it was stated, “Hadrianic pottery is prohibited and its prohibition is of usufruct, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, its prohibition is not of usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: what is the status of the cloth about which we stated here? He was offended by this and told him, even for him who permits there, here it is forbidden. There, the prohibition is not visible, here the prohibition is visible. May one use it to support the legs of a couch? Rebbi Eleazar says it is permitted, Rebbi Joḥanan says it is forbidden.
How does he do it? He tears its heart out from the living animal for pagan worship. How does one know? Rebbi Ḥuna said, if it is torn out from the living animal it rebounds and becomes circular; after slaughter it becomes stretched. Rebbi Yose said, one can infer from this that if he slaughtered one sign, even though one says that nothing living can become prohibited, here it becomes prohibited.
“Gentile jugs, new ones are permitted even tarred; old are forbidden even if not tarred.” Here you say tarred are permitted and there you say tarred are prohibited. Rebbi Abbahu said, I investigated tarring of jugs; they do not use vinegar while tarring.
Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar. One says because he diminishes its volume, the other says because he reduces the number of drinkers. We do not know who said what. Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Jehudah inverted his reasoning but Rebbi Eleazar said, it was not inverted, there for the Cohen, here for the owners, it follows that Rebbi Joḥanan said because he reduces the number of drinkers.
Rebbi Ismael stated: In the Torah there are forbidden matters and permitted matters. There are easy parts and severe parts. But in the words of the Sopherim all are severe, since we have stated: “He who says that there are no phylacteries, to transgress the words of the Torah, is not prosecutable. Five compartments to add to the words of the Sopherim is punishable.” Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Idi in the name of Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: The words of the Sages carry more weight than those of the prophets since it is written, do not preach, they preach. And it is written,I shall preach to you for wine and liquor. The relation of prophet and scholar can be compared to the case of a king who sent two seals to a province. About one of them he wrote, if he does not show you my seal and σημαντήριον, do not believe him. About the other he wrote, even if he does not show you my seal and σημαντήριον, believe him. So about a prophet is written, he gives you a sign or miracle. But here it is written, according to the teachings that they will teach you.
One of the Patriarch’s court expired. The burial cave received him but people’s lives were endangered. Rebbi Yose came and held a funeral oration, “happy the man who leaves the world in peace.” When Rebbi Yasa died, the sacred fountain of Tiberias fell down and those of the Patriarch’s court were happy. Rebbi Zeˋira told them, it is not comparable. There people were in danger, here nobody was in danger. There no pagan worship was uprooted, here pagan worship was uprooted.
One of the Patriarch’s court expired. The burial cave received him but people’s lives were endangered. Rebbi Yose came and held a funeral oration, “happy the man who leaves the world in peace.” When Rebbi Yasa died, the sacred fountain of Tiberias fell down and those of the Patriarch’s court were happy. Rebbi Zeˋira told them, it is not comparable. There people were in danger, here nobody was in danger. There no pagan worship was uprooted, here pagan worship was uprooted.
What is Rebbi Aqiba’s reason? You should treat it as an abomination, like a menstruating woman. What is the rabbis’ reason? You should detest it, like vermin. How do the rabbis uphold Rebbi Aqiba’s reason, you should treat it as abomination? Treat it as excrement, make it vile. What means “make it vile” for the rabbis? Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: you shall call it excrement. What is called God’s. Face is called Dog’s Face. Spring of the Cup is called Spring of the Thorn. The Place of Fortune is called the Place of Undress. Rebbi Tanḥuma (asked) [in the name of] Rebbi Huna: It is written, The Ai which is near Bet-Awen East of Bethel. Earlier it was called Bethel but now one calls it Bet-Awen. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If one does not want to call it ‘Omda one calls it ‘Amida since the flow of urine is called ‘amida. How (do the rabbis) [does Rebbi Aqiba] interpret you shall call it excrement? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abin, Rebbi Huna in the name of Rav Josef: from (where) [here] that one does not tell anybody to leave unless he entered with his head and most of his body.
Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Only if he brought an idol into it. In the opinion of Rebbi [Eleazar] there are two houses. But have we not stated three? Here temporarily, there permanently.
Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Only if he put an idol on it. The opinions of Rav seem inconsistent. There he says, if one casts a cup for idolatry it is immediately forbidden, and here he says so? Explain it following what has been stated: “A Gentile’s idol is immediately forbidden, but a Jew’s when it was worshipped.” There is disagreement about an idol, maybe also for its appurtenances? Rebbi Simeon in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: There is disagreement also about appurtenances.
Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Only if he put an idol on it. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar there are two stones. But have we not stated “there are three stones”? Here temporarily, there permanently.
HALAKHAH: “There are three kinds of Ashera,” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he engraved engravings in it it cannot become invalidated. This is necessary: even if he removed the engravings. It was stated: If he grafted, he has to remove what he grafted. Rebbi Yannai said, only if he grafted for idolatry. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Only if he put an idol under it. The opinions of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seem inconsistent. There Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if he engraved engravings on it it cannot become invalidated; and we interpreted this to mean, even if he removed the engravings. And here he says so? It is more severe with engravings.
Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Only if he put an idol under it. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar there are two Asherot. But have we not stated “there are three kinds of Ashera”? Here temporarily, there permanently.
HALAKHAH: “If he took from it [wood to make] a weaver’s shuttle,” etc. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, when I descended from a ship I found Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa sitting and asked him. “If he took from it [wood to make] a weaver’s shuttle, it is forbidden for usufruct. If he used it to weave cloth the cloth is forbidden for usufruct.” But did we not state, “it should all be sold to a Gentile except for the value of the libation wine in it”? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Ḥaggai raised the question, Ḥaggai resolved it. What is it? There people do not buy from the Gentile; but here people buy cloth from the Gentile.
How does one nullify it? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, by spit. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: Scattered stones of Mercurius have no nullification? Rebbi Phineas said, here those which where thrown at it; there those which were not thrown at it. As this: Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi had a Mercurius on his field. He came to his burgonar and told him, since I heard that the magistrate wants to pass by here tomorrow, by your life lift these stones. After he had lifted them, he wanted to take them away. He told him, they are mine. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba heard this and said, did not the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya state this? But since he had heard it from him, he reinforced and fixed it.
How does one nullify it? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, by spit. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: Scattered stones of Mercurius have no nullification? Rebbi Phineas said, here those which where thrown at it; there those which were not thrown at it. As this: Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi had a Mercurius on his field. He came to his burgonar and told him, since I heard that the magistrate wants to pass by here tomorrow, by your life lift these stones. After he had lifted them, he wanted to take them away. He told him, they are mine. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba heard this and said, did not the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya state this? But since he had heard it from him, he reinforced and fixed it.
Rav said, a pedestal is not annulled. Therefore if one annulled it it is annulled. The opinions of Rav seem inconsistent. There he says, if one casts a cup for idolatry it is immediately forbidden, and here he says so? Here if he burned incense, there if he did not burn incense. And even if you are saying, in both cases if he burned incense, Rav follows his opinion since Rav said, if one casts a cup for idolatry it is immediately forbidden.
Rav said, a pedestal is not annulled. Therefore if one annulled it it is annulled. The opinions of Rav seem inconsistent. There he says, if one casts a cup for idolatry it is immediately forbidden, and here he says so? Here if he burned incense, there if he did not burn incense. And even if you are saying, in both cases if he burned incense, Rav follows his opinion since Rav said, if one casts a cup for idolatry it is immediately forbidden.
Rav said, a pedestal is not annulled. Therefore its appurtenances are annulled. The opinions of Rav seem inconsistent. There Rav Sheshet said in the name of Rav, if the procession was using another way, and here he says so? There if he burned incense, here if he did not burn incense. And even if you are saying, in both cases if he burned incense, Rav follows his opinion since Rav said, if one casts a cup for idolatry it is immediately forbidden.
Rav said, a pedestal is not annulled. Therefore its appurtenances are annulled. The opinions of Rav seem inconsistent. There Rav Sheshet said in the name of Rav, if the procession was using another way, and here he says so? There if he burned incense, here if he did not burn incense. And even if you are saying, in both cases if he burned incense, Rav follows his opinion since Rav said, if one casts a cup for idolatry it is immediately forbidden.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, a stele is a monolith, an altar has many stones. Ḥizqiah said, a stele is annulled once it is damaged; of an altar one has to damage each single stone. A baraita of Ḥizqiah disagrees with him: If you tore down the altar, leave it alone; if you broke the stele, leave it alone . Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; Rebbi Ḥiyya (Rebbi) Abba, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rav Hoshaia: When He turns all stones of the altar like smashed pieces of chalk, persecute them until you eliminated its egg from the world. But here, if you broke a stele, leave it alone; if you tore down an altar, leave it alone.
Rav Huna in the name of Rav: The jet is like the cistern. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: Everywhere you do not say that flow is connection, but here you are treating flow as connection? Rav Huna is of the opinion that if the cistern became libation wine, the flow became libation wine; if the flow became libation wine the cistern did not become libation wine. Rebbi Abba did not say so, but if the cistern became libation wine, the flow did not become libation wine; if the flow became libation wine the cistern became libation wine. What Rav Huna said in the name of Rav, the jet is like the cistern, for Rav Huna is of the opinion, just as the cistern becomes libation wine so the jet becomes libation wine. There, they say in the name of Rav, the touch of a Gentile makes libation wine. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said, only when it is flowing.
What is Rebbi Jonah’s reason? Because it already became impure when it was prepared by the grape harvest. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? They were pure by biblical standards. You are the one who decided that they be impure. The strength of Rebbi Yose is the following, as Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Hila It should be logical that one may (free) his ṭevel as it is written, you should give from it the Eternal’s heave to Aaron the priest. You have to give it to Aaron in his quality of priest. But here, since you cannot give it to Aaron the priest in his quality of priest, you may make it impure.
HALAKHAH: “If a baker works in impurity,” etc. One states about this: One does not moisten, nor grind, nor mix with him. Rebbi Hila said, here for profane [bread], there for heave. Can you say heave at a baker’s? The colleagues: one if he moistens, the other if he does not moisten. But did we not state: “But she may not touch hers once water has been put in because one does not support transgressors.”