intent
172 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Now Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. Do you not catch him because of the error regarding the Sabbath? Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Abba: He asked him two questions. About intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work that he be liable for every single one. In case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding works does one treat the derivatives like that main item? Rebbi Jacob ben Dasai said, and in the House of Rebbi it was stated so: “If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or once for each single one?” Many works of the same category, this describes intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. Many Sabbaths all of the same category, this describes error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work.
Now Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. Do you not catch him because of the error regarding the Sabbath? Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Abba: He asked him two questions. About intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work that he be liable for every single one. In case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding works does one treat the derivatives like that main item? Rebbi Jacob ben Dasai said, and in the House of Rebbi it was stated so: “If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or once for each single one?” Many works of the same category, this describes intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. Many Sabbaths all of the same category, this describes error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work.
Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding works. Can anybody become liable intentionally? You superimpose the error regarding works over the intent regarding the Sabbath. Similarly, in case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work you superimpose the error regarding the Sabbath over the intent regarding works to hold him liable for each single occurrence. Does Rebbi Eliezer not accept one, to obligate for each one separately? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: An adult who was abducted among Gentiles is liable for each single one.
Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding works. Can anybody become liable intentionally? You superimpose the error regarding works over the intent regarding the Sabbath. Similarly, in case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work you superimpose the error regarding the Sabbath over the intent regarding works to hold him liable for each single occurrence. Does Rebbi Eliezer not accept one, to obligate for each one separately? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: An adult who was abducted among Gentiles is liable for each single one.
Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding works. Can anybody become liable intentionally? You superimpose the error regarding works over the intent regarding the Sabbath. Similarly, in case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work you superimpose the error regarding the Sabbath over the intent regarding works to hold him liable for each single occurrence. Does Rebbi Eliezer not accept one, to obligate for each one separately? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: An adult who was abducted among Gentiles is liable for each single one.
Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding works. Can anybody become liable intentionally? You superimpose the error regarding works over the intent regarding the Sabbath. Similarly, in case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work you superimpose the error regarding the Sabbath over the intent regarding works to hold him liable for each single occurrence. Does Rebbi Eliezer not accept one, to obligate for each one separately? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: An adult who was abducted among Gentiles is liable for each single one.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: If one harvested half the volume of a dried fig on this Sabbath, intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error regarding the work, and half the volume of a dried fig on another Sabbath, in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional regarding the work; do the errors combine? Is it possible to say Sabbaths divide, Sabbaths combine? Do not trays divide and trays combine? He answered, I do not know the reason for the tray. Is this not a baraita? If he wrote one letter on a weekday and one letter on the Sabbath, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Azariah said before Rebbi Mana, explain it by intent. He said to him, is this not an argument a fortiori? Since intent neither divides nor combines, error which does not divide a fortiori does not combine.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: If one harvested half the volume of a dried fig on this Sabbath, intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error regarding the work, and half the volume of a dried fig on another Sabbath, in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional regarding the work; do the errors combine? Is it possible to say Sabbaths divide, Sabbaths combine? Do not trays divide and trays combine? He answered, I do not know the reason for the tray. Is this not a baraita? If he wrote one letter on a weekday and one letter on the Sabbath, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Azariah said before Rebbi Mana, explain it by intent. He said to him, is this not an argument a fortiori? Since intent neither divides nor combines, error which does not divide a fortiori does not combine.
HALAKHAH: 6. It is difficult for Rabban Gamliel. If one harvested the volume of a dried fig in the morning and the volume of a dried fig in the evening in one oblivion, would he not be liable? Since oblivions do not divide, so they should not combine! Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rabban Gamliel there is that there is no awareness for half a work, and similarly, there is no intent for half a work. If one ate half the volume of an olive intentionally and half the volume of an olive in error, would this combine?
It was stated: “A Jew may circumcise a Samaritan but a Samaritan may not circumcise a Jew since he circumcises in the name of Mount Gerizim, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said to him, where do we find that circumcision needs intent? Let him continue to circumcise in the name of Mount Gerizim until he dies!”
MISHNAH: If a crawling animal was found in the Temple, a Cohen carries it outside in his belt in order not to continue the impurity, the words of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Jehudah says, with wooden tongs in order not to increase impurity. From where does one remove it? From the Temple Hall, and the vestibule, and from between the vestibule and the altar, the words of Rebbi Simeon ben Nannas. Rebbi Aqiba says, from a place where one is liable for extirpation in case of criminal intent and a purification offering if in error one removes it; at all other places one places a wine cooler over it. Rebbi Simeon said, at a place where the Sages permitted it to you they gave it from your own since they only permitted because of rabbinic Sabbath restrictions.
From where that a Pesaḥ must be in the name of its owner? Is it not a logical argument? Since a purification sacrifice, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does not invalidate it, needs to be in the name of the owner, Pesaḥ, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does invalidate it, is it not logical that it needs to be in the name of its owner? No. If you are saying about purification sacrifice which is most holy, would you say that about Pesaḥ which is a simple sanctum? Rebbi Yose said, did you not argue about intent? The Torah insisted about intent for Pesaḥ more than for purification sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: Do we infer this from the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease? But is not the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease separate for something new? And one cannot infer from anything which is separate for something new. He told him, from where do you infer that it be invalid if not for its purpose? Not from the following verse, he shall slaughter it as purification sacrifice, and it is written: this is the doctrine of the purification sacrifice. There is one doctrine for all purification sacrifices. But from the place where it is being inferred, there it permits inferences.
From where that a Pesaḥ must be in the name of its owner? Is it not a logical argument? Since a purification sacrifice, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does not invalidate it, needs to be in the name of the owner, Pesaḥ, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does invalidate it, is it not logical that it needs to be in the name of its owner? No. If you are saying about purification sacrifice which is most holy, would you say that about Pesaḥ which is a simple sanctum? Rebbi Yose said, did you not argue about intent? The Torah insisted about intent for Pesaḥ more than for purification sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: Do we infer this from the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease? But is not the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease separate for something new? And one cannot infer from anything which is separate for something new. He told him, from where do you infer that it be invalid if not for its purpose? Not from the following verse, he shall slaughter it as purification sacrifice, and it is written: this is the doctrine of the purification sacrifice. There is one doctrine for all purification sacrifices. But from the place where it is being inferred, there it permits inferences.
From where that a Pesaḥ must be in the name of its owner? Is it not a logical argument? Since a purification sacrifice, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does not invalidate it, needs to be in the name of the owner, Pesaḥ, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does invalidate it, is it not logical that it needs to be in the name of its owner? No. If you are saying about purification sacrifice which is most holy, would you say that about Pesaḥ which is a simple sanctum? Rebbi Yose said, did you not argue about intent? The Torah insisted about intent for Pesaḥ more than for purification sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: Do we infer this from the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease? But is not the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease separate for something new? And one cannot infer from anything which is separate for something new. He told him, from where do you infer that it be invalid if not for its purpose? Not from the following verse, he shall slaughter it as purification sacrifice, and it is written: this is the doctrine of the purification sacrifice. There is one doctrine for all purification sacrifices. But from the place where it is being inferred, there it permits inferences.
From where that a Pesaḥ must be in the name of its owner? Is it not a logical argument? Since a purification sacrifice, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does not invalidate it, needs to be in the name of the owner, Pesaḥ, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does invalidate it, is it not logical that it needs to be in the name of its owner? No. If you are saying about purification sacrifice which is most holy, would you say that about Pesaḥ which is a simple sanctum? Rebbi Yose said, did you not argue about intent? The Torah insisted about intent for Pesaḥ more than for purification sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: Do we infer this from the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease? But is not the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease separate for something new? And one cannot infer from anything which is separate for something new. He told him, from where do you infer that it be invalid if not for its purpose? Not from the following verse, he shall slaughter it as purification sacrifice, and it is written: this is the doctrine of the purification sacrifice. There is one doctrine for all purification sacrifices. But from the place where it is being inferred, there it permits inferences.
If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to sprinkle its blood not for its purpose. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is transfer of “not for its purpose” from service to service and it is disqualified. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, is there transfer of “not for its purpose” from service to service? It should be qualified. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned this from thought of piggul. If he poured not for its purpose would that not cause piggul? If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. Rebbi Yose said, in two aspects is the intent of piggul not equivalent to the intent of disqualification. If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to receive its blood not for its purpose, would that not be qualified? If he slaughtered for its purpose and received its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. If he slaughtered for its purpose in order to burn its parts not for its purpose, would that not be piggul? If he slaughtered for its purpose and in order to burn its parts not for its purpose, it is qualified.
If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to sprinkle its blood not for its purpose. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is transfer of “not for its purpose” from service to service and it is disqualified. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, is there transfer of “not for its purpose” from service to service? It should be qualified. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned this from thought of piggul. If he poured not for its purpose would that not cause piggul? If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. Rebbi Yose said, in two aspects is the intent of piggul not equivalent to the intent of disqualification. If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to receive its blood not for its purpose, would that not be qualified? If he slaughtered for its purpose and received its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. If he slaughtered for its purpose in order to burn its parts not for its purpose, would that not be piggul? If he slaughtered for its purpose and in order to burn its parts not for its purpose, it is qualified.
If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to sprinkle its blood not for its purpose. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is transfer of “not for its purpose” from service to service and it is disqualified. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, is there transfer of “not for its purpose” from service to service? It should be qualified. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned this from thought of piggul. If he poured not for its purpose would that not cause piggul? If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. Rebbi Yose said, in two aspects is the intent of piggul not equivalent to the intent of disqualification. If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to receive its blood not for its purpose, would that not be qualified? If he slaughtered for its purpose and received its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. If he slaughtered for its purpose in order to burn its parts not for its purpose, would that not be piggul? If he slaughtered for its purpose and in order to burn its parts not for its purpose, it is qualified.
If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to sprinkle its blood not for its purpose. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is transfer of “not for its purpose” from service to service and it is disqualified. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, is there transfer of “not for its purpose” from service to service? It should be qualified. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned this from thought of piggul. If he poured not for its purpose would that not cause piggul? If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. Rebbi Yose said, in two aspects is the intent of piggul not equivalent to the intent of disqualification. If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to receive its blood not for its purpose, would that not be qualified? If he slaughtered for its purpose and received its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. If he slaughtered for its purpose in order to burn its parts not for its purpose, would that not be piggul? If he slaughtered for its purpose and in order to burn its parts not for its purpose, it is qualified.
If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to sprinkle its blood not for its purpose. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is transfer of “not for its purpose” from service to service and it is disqualified. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, is there transfer of “not for its purpose” from service to service? It should be qualified. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned this from thought of piggul. If he poured not for its purpose would that not cause piggul? If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. Rebbi Yose said, in two aspects is the intent of piggul not equivalent to the intent of disqualification. If he slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to receive its blood not for its purpose, would that not be qualified? If he slaughtered for its purpose and received its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. If he slaughtered for its purpose in order to burn its parts not for its purpose, would that not be piggul? If he slaughtered for its purpose and in order to burn its parts not for its purpose, it is qualified.
Rebbi Yose said, I saw Rebbi Jeremiah grabbing Rebbi Abba and saying to him, tell me the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan , why it is disqualified if one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose? It is made from the start as if he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose, and it is disqualified. He told him, if this is so, even if he slaughtered not for its eaters and to sprinkle its blood not for its eaters, it should be as if from the start he slaughtered for its eaters and not for its eaters and be qualified. This you cannot do, as Rebbi Ila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , if he slaughtered for its eaters and to pour its blood not for its eaters, it is qualified. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , if he slaughtered for its eaters and to pour its blood not for its eaters, it is qualified. Rebbi Yose got his strength from the two reasons of Rebbi Joḥanan . Why is it disqualified if one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose? It is made from start as if he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose, and is disqualified. Why is it qualified if he slaughtered for its eaters and to pour its blood not for its eaters? It is made from the start as if he slaughtered for its eaters and not for its eaters, and is qualified.
Rebbi Yose said, I saw Rebbi Jeremiah grabbing Rebbi Abba and saying to him, tell me the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan , why it is disqualified if one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose? It is made from the start as if he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose, and it is disqualified. He told him, if this is so, even if he slaughtered not for its eaters and to sprinkle its blood not for its eaters, it should be as if from the start he slaughtered for its eaters and not for its eaters and be qualified. This you cannot do, as Rebbi Ila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , if he slaughtered for its eaters and to pour its blood not for its eaters, it is qualified. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , if he slaughtered for its eaters and to pour its blood not for its eaters, it is qualified. Rebbi Yose got his strength from the two reasons of Rebbi Joḥanan . Why is it disqualified if one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose? It is made from start as if he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose, and is disqualified. Why is it qualified if he slaughtered for its eaters and to pour its blood not for its eaters? It is made from the start as if he slaughtered for its eaters and not for its eaters, and is qualified.
Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana in the name of Rebbi Yudan. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan that if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues thinking from another action. If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, would that not be piggufl? If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. If one slaughtered for its purpose and to receive its blood not for its purpose, would that not be qualified, since on the act of receiving he is thinking. Therefore, if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues the thinking from another action. If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to burn its parts not for its purpose, would that not be piggul? If at the moment of burning he does not think, then if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues the thinking from another action. He told him, do not object to me about disqualification because of piggul, since Rebbi Yose said, in two aspects is the intent of piggul not equivalent to the intent of disqualification.
Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana in the name of Rebbi Yudan. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan that if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues thinking from another action. If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, would that not be piggufl? If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. If one slaughtered for its purpose and to receive its blood not for its purpose, would that not be qualified, since on the act of receiving he is thinking. Therefore, if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues the thinking from another action. If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to burn its parts not for its purpose, would that not be piggul? If at the moment of burning he does not think, then if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues the thinking from another action. He told him, do not object to me about disqualification because of piggul, since Rebbi Yose said, in two aspects is the intent of piggul not equivalent to the intent of disqualification.
Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana in the name of Rebbi Yudan. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan that if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues thinking from another action. If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, would that not be piggufl? If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. If one slaughtered for its purpose and to receive its blood not for its purpose, would that not be qualified, since on the act of receiving he is thinking. Therefore, if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues the thinking from another action. If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to burn its parts not for its purpose, would that not be piggul? If at the moment of burning he does not think, then if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues the thinking from another action. He told him, do not object to me about disqualification because of piggul, since Rebbi Yose said, in two aspects is the intent of piggul not equivalent to the intent of disqualification.
Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana in the name of Rebbi Yudan. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan that if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues thinking from another action. If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, would that not be piggufl? If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. If one slaughtered for its purpose and to receive its blood not for its purpose, would that not be qualified, since on the act of receiving he is thinking. Therefore, if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues the thinking from another action. If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to burn its parts not for its purpose, would that not be piggul? If at the moment of burning he does not think, then if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues the thinking from another action. He told him, do not object to me about disqualification because of piggul, since Rebbi Yose said, in two aspects is the intent of piggul not equivalent to the intent of disqualification.
Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana in the name of Rebbi Yudan. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan that if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues thinking from another action. If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, would that not be piggufl? If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to pour its blood not for its purpose, it is disqualified. If one slaughtered for its purpose and to receive its blood not for its purpose, would that not be qualified, since on the act of receiving he is thinking. Therefore, if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues the thinking from another action. If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to burn its parts not for its purpose, would that not be piggul? If at the moment of burning he does not think, then if one would come to perform a certain action without thinking, one continues the thinking from another action. He told him, do not object to me about disqualification because of piggul, since Rebbi Yose said, in two aspects is the intent of piggul not equivalent to the intent of disqualification.
What results from the difference between them? Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, switching on the other days of the year. If one slaughtered for its purpose with the intent to sprinkle its blood not for its purpose, on the other days of the year. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan it is qualified; in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it is disqualified.
For those who eat it in volumes of an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of an olive, it is qualified. For those who eat it in volumes of an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of half an olive, it is qualified a fortiori. For those who eat it in volumes of half an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of half an olive? Where do we hold? If intent was qualifying, intent is disqualifying. If intent is not disqualifying then the intent should be qualifying. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the intent in qualifying, as we have stated there: “To eat half the volume of an olive and to burn half the volume of an olive is qualified since slaughter and burning do not combine.” If he slaughtered it that half of its group should be covered, Rebbi Jonah disqualifies. It is as grabbing the cover for these and those. Since these are not covered, neither are those covered. Rebbi Yose said, it is qualified. During the second cycle, Rebbi Yose retracted. Rebbi Phineas said to him, did the rabbi not teach us, it is qualified. He told him, is this fixed for you by nails?
For those who eat it in volumes of an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of an olive, it is qualified. For those who eat it in volumes of an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of half an olive, it is qualified a fortiori. For those who eat it in volumes of half an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of half an olive? Where do we hold? If intent was qualifying, intent is disqualifying. If intent is not disqualifying then the intent should be qualifying. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the intent in qualifying, as we have stated there: “To eat half the volume of an olive and to burn half the volume of an olive is qualified since slaughter and burning do not combine.” If he slaughtered it that half of its group should be covered, Rebbi Jonah disqualifies. It is as grabbing the cover for these and those. Since these are not covered, neither are those covered. Rebbi Yose said, it is qualified. During the second cycle, Rebbi Yose retracted. Rebbi Phineas said to him, did the rabbi not teach us, it is qualified. He told him, is this fixed for you by nails?
For those who eat it in volumes of an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of an olive, it is qualified. For those who eat it in volumes of an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of half an olive, it is qualified a fortiori. For those who eat it in volumes of half an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of half an olive? Where do we hold? If intent was qualifying, intent is disqualifying. If intent is not disqualifying then the intent should be qualifying. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the intent in qualifying, as we have stated there: “To eat half the volume of an olive and to burn half the volume of an olive is qualified since slaughter and burning do not combine.” If he slaughtered it that half of its group should be covered, Rebbi Jonah disqualifies. It is as grabbing the cover for these and those. Since these are not covered, neither are those covered. Rebbi Yose said, it is qualified. During the second cycle, Rebbi Yose retracted. Rebbi Phineas said to him, did the rabbi not teach us, it is qualified. He told him, is this fixed for you by nails?
For those who eat it in volumes of an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of an olive, it is qualified. For those who eat it in volumes of an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of half an olive, it is qualified a fortiori. For those who eat it in volumes of half an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of half an olive? Where do we hold? If intent was qualifying, intent is disqualifying. If intent is not disqualifying then the intent should be qualifying. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the intent in qualifying, as we have stated there: “To eat half the volume of an olive and to burn half the volume of an olive is qualified since slaughter and burning do not combine.” If he slaughtered it that half of its group should be covered, Rebbi Jonah disqualifies. It is as grabbing the cover for these and those. Since these are not covered, neither are those covered. Rebbi Yose said, it is qualified. During the second cycle, Rebbi Yose retracted. Rebbi Phineas said to him, did the rabbi not teach us, it is qualified. He told him, is this fixed for you by nails?
For those who eat it in volumes of an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of an olive, it is qualified. For those who eat it in volumes of an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of half an olive, it is qualified a fortiori. For those who eat it in volumes of half an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of half an olive? Where do we hold? If intent was qualifying, intent is disqualifying. If intent is not disqualifying then the intent should be qualifying. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the intent in qualifying, as we have stated there: “To eat half the volume of an olive and to burn half the volume of an olive is qualified since slaughter and burning do not combine.” If he slaughtered it that half of its group should be covered, Rebbi Jonah disqualifies. It is as grabbing the cover for these and those. Since these are not covered, neither are those covered. Rebbi Yose said, it is qualified. During the second cycle, Rebbi Yose retracted. Rebbi Phineas said to him, did the rabbi not teach us, it is qualified. He told him, is this fixed for you by nails?
Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: Rebbi Nehemiah and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa both said the same, as it was stated: “it was burned because of deep mourning? Was it not burned only because of impurity? But it was not burned because of impurity, since if it had been burned because of mourning, all three of them should have been burned. Another opinion, was not Phineas with them? Another opinion, would it not have been permitted to be eaten in the evening?” In the opinion of Rebbi Nehemiah it should be burned but be counted. Rebbi Nehemiah is of the opinion that all three of them were burned. Should not Phineas have eaten? He was not yet appointed {High} Priest. Should not Aaron have eaten in the evening? Rebbi Nehemiah is of the opinion that deeo mourning in the night is from the Torah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, also Rebbi Yose the Galilean is with them. And we have stated there: “A purification sacrifice whose blood was received in two cups, of which one was brought outside; the one inside is qualified. If one of them was brought to the interior, Rebbi Yose the Galilean declares qualified but the Sages declare disqualified. [Rebbi Yose the Galilean said, since in a case where intent disqualifies outside the remainder was not made equal to what was brought outside, in a case where intent does not disqualify in the interior is it not logical that we not make the remainder to what was brought inside? If it was brought into the interior to atone, even if it did not atone it is disqualified, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Simeon says, only if it atones. Rebbi Jehudah says, if it was brought into the interior in error, it remains qualified. Of all disqualified blood which one gave on the altar, the diadem only makes the impure acceptable; for the diadem makes the impure acceptable but not what was brought outside.”] Rebbi Eleazar said, you have to know that for Rebbi Yose the Galilean it is disqualification of the enabler since the other part is outside and it is qualified. You have to know that for the rabbis it is disqualification of the body since it is within its enclosure and it is disqualified. The rabbis explain, since nothing of the blood was brought to the interior, you shall certainly eat it. Therefore if some of the blood had been brought to the interior, you [would have done well] in burning it. Rebbi Yose the Galilean explains, since not all of the blood was brought to the interior, [you shall certainly eat it. Therefore if all of the blood had been brought inside,] you would have done well in burning it. What is the rabbis’ reason? Any purification offering of whose blood was brought; even part of the blood. What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? Behold, its blood was not brought inside the Sanctuary. [This fits with] what was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, the entire matter only speaks of bulls to be burned and goats to be burned, to prohibit eating them and to teach that if they are disqualified they are burned inside the citadel. They asked him, from where that a purification sacrifice becomes disqualified if some of its blood is brought inside? Not from this verse, behold, its blood was not brought inside the Sanctuary? There it does not say of whose blood but all of its blood. An answer to Rebbi Aqiba who was saying, of whose blood, not all of its blood.
Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: Rebbi Nehemiah and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa both said the same, as it was stated: “it was burned because of deep mourning? Was it not burned only because of impurity? But it was not burned because of impurity, since if it had been burned because of mourning, all three of them should have been burned. Another opinion, was not Phineas with them? Another opinion, would it not have been permitted to be eaten in the evening?” In the opinion of Rebbi Nehemiah it should be burned but be counted. Rebbi Nehemiah is of the opinion that all three of them were burned. Should not Phineas have eaten? He was not yet appointed {High} Priest. Should not Aaron have eaten in the evening? Rebbi Nehemiah is of the opinion that deeo mourning in the night is from the Torah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, also Rebbi Yose the Galilean is with them. And we have stated there: “A purification sacrifice whose blood was received in two cups, of which one was brought outside; the one inside is qualified. If one of them was brought to the interior, Rebbi Yose the Galilean declares qualified but the Sages declare disqualified. [Rebbi Yose the Galilean said, since in a case where intent disqualifies outside the remainder was not made equal to what was brought outside, in a case where intent does not disqualify in the interior is it not logical that we not make the remainder to what was brought inside? If it was brought into the interior to atone, even if it did not atone it is disqualified, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Simeon says, only if it atones. Rebbi Jehudah says, if it was brought into the interior in error, it remains qualified. Of all disqualified blood which one gave on the altar, the diadem only makes the impure acceptable; for the diadem makes the impure acceptable but not what was brought outside.”] Rebbi Eleazar said, you have to know that for Rebbi Yose the Galilean it is disqualification of the enabler since the other part is outside and it is qualified. You have to know that for the rabbis it is disqualification of the body since it is within its enclosure and it is disqualified. The rabbis explain, since nothing of the blood was brought to the interior, you shall certainly eat it. Therefore if some of the blood had been brought to the interior, you [would have done well] in burning it. Rebbi Yose the Galilean explains, since not all of the blood was brought to the interior, [you shall certainly eat it. Therefore if all of the blood had been brought inside,] you would have done well in burning it. What is the rabbis’ reason? Any purification offering of whose blood was brought; even part of the blood. What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? Behold, its blood was not brought inside the Sanctuary. [This fits with] what was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, the entire matter only speaks of bulls to be burned and goats to be burned, to prohibit eating them and to teach that if they are disqualified they are burned inside the citadel. They asked him, from where that a purification sacrifice becomes disqualified if some of its blood is brought inside? Not from this verse, behold, its blood was not brought inside the Sanctuary? There it does not say of whose blood but all of its blood. An answer to Rebbi Aqiba who was saying, of whose blood, not all of its blood.
Rebbi Eleazar said, bulls and he-goats to be burned which he slaughtered with the intent to pour the blood the next day, he made piggul. To burn the parts on the next day he made piggul. To burn the meat the next day he did not make piggul since he neither intended it as food for humans nor as food for the altar.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the start one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects, and at the end one accepts from them definite objects but not non-definite objects. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, both at the beginning and at the end one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One does not accept from them voluntary gifts for Temple property for the upkeep of the Temple.” He explains it, both at the start and at the end, if it is for non-definite objects. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Everybody agrees that they make vows and are objects of vows. He explains it for elevation offerings. One understands that he makes a vow to bring an elevation offering. Can he be the object of a vow for an elevation offering? No, if an Israel says, I undertake to bring an elevation offering, when a Gentile hears him and says, I am undertaking what he says. Does he not bring libations with it? Is not the excess money given for libations used for vessels of Service? Then it turns out that he brought {money for} a definite object! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun objected, did we not state that they may offer their value? Are offerings of one’s value not for the upkeep of the Temple? It is as you are saying there, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for the upkeep of the Temple; so here you are saying, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for vessels of Service. How does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish treat this? He explains, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. Rebbi Ḥilkiah said, Rebbi Simon asked: Does this imply that one does not accept from them for an aqueduct, or the city walls, or its towers, because of you have no part, nor rightful claim, nor memorial, in Jerusalem.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the start one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects, and at the end one accepts from them definite objects but not non-definite objects. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, both at the beginning and at the end one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One does not accept from them voluntary gifts for Temple property for the upkeep of the Temple.” He explains it, both at the start and at the end, if it is for non-definite objects. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Everybody agrees that they make vows and are objects of vows. He explains it for elevation offerings. One understands that he makes a vow to bring an elevation offering. Can he be the object of a vow for an elevation offering? No, if an Israel says, I undertake to bring an elevation offering, when a Gentile hears him and says, I am undertaking what he says. Does he not bring libations with it? Is not the excess money given for libations used for vessels of Service? Then it turns out that he brought {money for} a definite object! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun objected, did we not state that they may offer their value? Are offerings of one’s value not for the upkeep of the Temple? It is as you are saying there, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for the upkeep of the Temple; so here you are saying, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for vessels of Service. How does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish treat this? He explains, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. Rebbi Ḥilkiah said, Rebbi Simon asked: Does this imply that one does not accept from them for an aqueduct, or the city walls, or its towers, because of you have no part, nor rightful claim, nor memorial, in Jerusalem.
Rebbi Meïr was sitting and preaching in the House of Study of Tiberias when his teacher Elisha passed by riding on a horse on the Sabbath. They came and told him, your teacher is outside. He stopped his sermon and went out to him. He asked him, what did you preach today? He told him, and the Eternal blessed the end etc. He asked him, what did you explain about this? He answered him, and the Eternal added double all that Job had owned; that he doubled his money. He said, woe for those who are lost and not found, your teacher Aqiba did not preach this but, the Eternal blessed the end of Job from his beginning, by the merit of commandments and good works which were in his hand from his beginning. He asked him, and what did you preach further? He told him, the end of a matter is better than the beginning. He asked him, what did you explain about this? For example, a man who had children in his youth but they died, and in his old age they lived; that is the end of a matter is better than the beginning. For example, a man who traded in his youth and lost, and in his old age and gained; that is the end of a matter is better than the beginning. For example, a man who studied Torah in his youth and forgot, in his old age he remembered; that is the end of a matter is better than the beginning. He said, woe for those who are lost and not found, your teacher Aqiba did not preach this but, the end of a matter is good from the beginning, in case it is good from the start, and this applies to me. My father Abuya was one of the leading Jerusalemites. On the day he came to circumcise me he invited all the leading Jerusalemites and sat them in one room, and Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua in another room. After they ate and drank they started to clap with their hands and dance. Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua said, while they are occupied in theirs let us be occupied with ours. They sat occupied with words of the Torah, from the Torah to Prophets, from Prophets to Hagiographs. Fire descended from Heaven and surrounded them. Abuya told them, my teachers! Why do you come to burn down my house? They told him, Heaven forbid! But we were sitting reviewing the words of the Torah, from the Torah to Prophets, from Prophets to Hagiographs, and the words were joyful as at their giving on Sinai. And was the main giving on Sinai not in fire? And the Mountain burns in the fire up to the heart of Heaven. My father Abuya told them, my teachers! If that is the power of Torah, if this son of mine survives I dedicate him to Torah. Because his intent was not for Heaven, it did not succeed with this man. He asked him, and what did you preach further? He told him, it cannot be valued by gold or glass. He asked him, what did you explain about this? He told him, the words of the Torah are as difficult to acquire as golden vessels, and as easy to lose as glass vessels. And like golden and glass vessels when they are broken he can make them vessels as before, also the student of the Sages who forgot his learning can learn it anew. He said to him, this is enough, Meïr, up to here is the Sabbath domain. He asked him, how do you know? He told him, from the horse’s hooves which I continuously counted for 2’000 cubits. He said to him, all that wisdom is in you and you do not repent? He told him, I cannot. He asked him, why? He told him, once I was passing by the Holiest of Holies riding on a horse on the Day of Atonement which fell on a Sabbath and I heard an unembodied voice coming from the Holiest of Holies, saying, return, erring children, except for Elisha ben Abuya who knew My power and rebelled against Me. And all that came to him because he was sitting memorizing in the valley of Genezareth and saw a man climbing to the top of a date palm taking the mother with the chicks and descending safely. The next day he saw another man climbing to the top of a date palm, taking the chicks and sending away the mother. When climbing down he was bitten by a snake, and he died. He said, it is written, sending away you shall send the mother, but the chicks you may take for yourself, so it will be good for you and prolong your days. Where is the good for this one? Where is the prolongation of days of this one? He did not know that Rebbi Jacob had explained it preceding him, so it will be good for you in the future world which is all good, and prolong your days, in the future which is all long. But some are saying, because he saw the tongue of Rebbi Jehudah the baker in the mouth of a dog, oozing blood. He said, is this the Torah and this is its reward? This is the tongue which was delivering the words of the Torah correctly; this is the tongue which occupied itself with Torah all its days; [is this the Torah and this is its reward?] It appears that there is no reward and no resurrection of the dead. But some are saying, when his mother was pregnant with him she passed by pagan temples and smelled of this kind. And this smell was bubbling in her body like the poison of a viper. Later Elisha fell sick. They came and informed Rebbi Meïr, your teacher is sick. He went to visit him and found him sick. He asked him, are you not repenting? He asked, and if one repents, is one accepted? He told him, is it not written, man shall repent up to extinction, one receives up to the extinction of the breath. At that moment Elisha cried, passed away, and died. Rebbi Meïr was happy internally and said, it seems that my teacher passed away repentant. After they buried him, fire descended from Heaven and burned his grave. They came and informed Rebbi Meïr, your teacher’s grave is on fire. He went to visit it and found it burning. What did he do? He took his kaftan and spread it over it. He said, stay for the night, etc. Stay for this world which compares to the night, and it will be in the morning, this is the Future World which is all morning, if the Good One will redeem, this is the Holy One, praise to Him, who is Good, as it is written, the Eternal is good to all, and His mercies are on all His creatures. And if He does not want to redeem you I shall redeem you, living is the Eternal, and it was extinguished. They asked Rebbi Meïr, if they ask you in that World, whom do you want to visit, your father or your teacher? He told them, I shall visit my teacher first and afterwards my father. They said, will they listen to you? He told them, did we not state, “one saves the case of a scroll with the scroll, and the case of phylacteries with the phylacteries”? One saves Elisha Aher by the merit of his Torah. Later his daughters went to take charity from Rebbi. Rebbi decided and said, nobody shall show him grace nor be friendly to his orphans. They told him, Rebbi. Do not look at his deeds, do look at his Torah. At this moment Rebbi cried and decided for them that they be provided for. He said, if this one who toiled in Torah not for Heaven’s sake, see what he produced; one who toils in the Torah for itself not so much more?
If they moved him from one grave to another. There are Tannaim who state, from the moment the first cover plate was laid. There are Tannaim who state, from the moment the second cover plate was laid. A case happened to Rebbi Jonah. He asked Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis, who said to him, from the moment the first cover plate was laid. A case happened to Rebbi Jeremiah. He asked Rebbi Ze`ira; Rebbi Ze`ira asked Rebbi Immi. He said to him, from the moment the second cover plate was laid. He came to him; he said to him, he instructed you by a restriction. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, this you are saying within the Seven {days}. But after Seven mourning already passed. If they intended it from the start. But if there was no intent from the start to remove him, from the moment the first cover plate was laid. As the following: The people of Bursa buried Gamliel from Yakontia with them. After three days they changed their mind to return him. They went and asked Rebbi Simon. Rebbi Simon said to them in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Since you had no intention to remove him, from the moment the first cover plate was laid. A case happened to Jesua the brother of Dorai. He came to ask Rebbi Abbahu who told him, from the moment the second cover plate was laid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said to him, I was with you when we asked this from Rebbi Eudaimon from Haifa who said, from the moment the first cover plate was laid. He told him, I did not hear. If you heard, go out and instruct.
They objected to Rebbi Jehudah: Think of it, if she was sterile and could not give birth. Think of it, if she was old. Rebbi Eleazar said, intercourse of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman not with the intent of marriage is intercourse of harlotry. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, that implies that the High Priest who performed qiddushin by copulation is not having intercourse with a deflowered one.
It was stated: “A Jew may circumcise a Samaritan but a Samaritan may not circumcise a Jew since he is circumcised in the name of Mount Gerizim, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said to him, where do we find in the Torah that circumcision needs intent? Let him continue to circumcise in the name of Mount Gerizim until he dies!” “The drawn should not circumcise [again] lest he get into danger, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said to him, many drawn ones were in the days of Ben Koziba, they all circumcised, lived, and begat sons and daughters. One has to draw a drop of covenant blood from the drawn [circumcised], the one born circumcised, and the circumcised before he converted. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar stated: The House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from the one born circumcised since that is a compressed prepuce; what did they disagree about? About the convert who converted when already circumcised, for the House of Shammai said one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from him, but the House of Hillel say, one does not have to draw a drop of covenant blood from him.” Rebbi Issac bar Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Practice follows the words of the student. There came a case before Rav, who said: Who is he who said that it is a compressed prepuce? That means, he certainly is uncircumcised and one pushes the Sabbath away for him. Rebbi Abbahu said, one does not push the Sabbath away for him but one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from him. A male child was born to Rav Ada bar Aḥawa in that condition. He squeezed it, he died. Rebbi Abin said, his penis was damaged and he fasted for him that he should die. The rabbis of Caesarea said, his testicles became injured and he fasted for him that he should die.
What is the reason of the House of Shammai? If you say so, you make all intercourse he had with her intercourse of harlotry. Rebbi Abin said, it turns out that the House of Shammai hold with Rebbi Eleazar as Rebbi Eleazar said, intercourse of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman not with the intent of marriage is intercourse of harlotry. That means, for the House of Shammai her repudiation is nothing if she transgressed and repudiated after marriage. If she entered the bridal chamber but had no intercourse yet, what is her status? As betrothed or as married? If she is betrothed in Judea where he is familiar with her, what is her status? As betrothed or as married?
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
MISHNAH: Indeterminate oaths are interpreted restrictively and explicit ones liberally. How is this? If one said, this is for me like salted meat, like libation wine, if his intent was for Heaven, he is forbidden, if for idolatry, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden. This is for me like a ban, if by a ban for Heaven, he is forbidden, if priest’s, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden. This is for me like tithe, if animal tithe, he is forbidden, if from grain, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden. This is for me like heave, if Temple heave, he is forbidden, if heave from the threshing floor, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, indeterminate heave in Judea is prohibited, in Galilee permitted, since Galileans do not know of Temple heave. Indeterminate bans in Judea are permitted, in Galilee prohibited, since Galileans do not know of priest’s bans.
It is written: “The Eternal will forgive her.” This tells that she needs forgiveness. When Rebbi Jacob came to this verse, he used to say: If somebody needs atonement having intended to get pig’s meat but happened to get kosher [animal’s] meat, so much more one who had the intent to get pig’s meat and got pig’s meat.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices.” Ḥizqiah said, in error: a prohibition, the one who substitutes: a prohibition. If he wants to say “profane” but said “an elevation sacrifice”, it is sanctified. If he wants to say “an elevation sacrifice” but said “profane”, it is not sanctified. It follows that Rebbi Joḥanan, interpreting Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, parallels Rebbi Jeremiah’s explanation regarding the House of Shammai on sacrifices. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, may one understand that “He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices,” if somebody dedicates a firstling? Can it be dedicated? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Aḥa, and Rebbi Yasa say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody dedicated a firstling and it was brought to the altar, it is not sanctified even for its money’s worth. If somebody dedicated a blemished animal for the altar, even as a substitute it is not sanctified. But if somebody dedicated an animal with a temporary blemish. Is that consistent with whipping? Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said, explain it if he gave unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices.” Ḥizqiah said, in error: a prohibition, the one who substitutes: a prohibition. If he wants to say “profane” but said “an elevation sacrifice”, it is sanctified. If he wants to say “an elevation sacrifice” but said “profane”, it is not sanctified. It follows that Rebbi Joḥanan, interpreting Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, parallels Rebbi Jeremiah’s explanation regarding the House of Shammai on sacrifices. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, may one understand that “He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices,” if somebody dedicates a firstling? Can it be dedicated? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Aḥa, and Rebbi Yasa say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody dedicated a firstling and it was brought to the altar, it is not sanctified even for its money’s worth. If somebody dedicated a blemished animal for the altar, even as a substitute it is not sanctified. But if somebody dedicated an animal with a temporary blemish. Is that consistent with whipping? Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said, explain it if he gave unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields were involved, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with the intent of taking possession of the one in Galilee, or the one in Galilee with the intent of taking possession of the one in Judea, he took possession. But in [the case of] property of a proselyte he did not acquire even the boundary strip between them. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting from the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North with the intent of also acquiring that in the South, or in the South with the intent of acquiring also that in the North, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he did not acquire unless he also intended to acquire the middle part. A baraita disagrees with Rav Ḥisda: If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his property, if one takes possession of the ground he is obligated for everything. If he took possession of standing grain, he is obligated for fallen stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah but freed from tithes. Does not the air separate between stalks? There, we have stated: “If he tore off anything connected to the ground, he took possession.” Samuel said, he took possession only of that leaf. But did we not state: “If it was connected to the ground and he tore off anything, he took possession”? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eudaimon the emigrant confirmed it: Samuel will agree, for proselyte’s property.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields were involved, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with the intent of taking possession of the one in Galilee, or the one in Galilee with the intent of taking possession of the one in Judea, he took possession. But in [the case of] property of a proselyte he did not acquire even the boundary strip between them. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting from the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North with the intent of also acquiring that in the South, or in the South with the intent of acquiring also that in the North, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he did not acquire unless he also intended to acquire the middle part. A baraita disagrees with Rav Ḥisda: If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his property, if one takes possession of the ground he is obligated for everything. If he took possession of standing grain, he is obligated for fallen stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah but freed from tithes. Does not the air separate between stalks? There, we have stated: “If he tore off anything connected to the ground, he took possession.” Samuel said, he took possession only of that leaf. But did we not state: “If it was connected to the ground and he tore off anything, he took possession”? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eudaimon the emigrant confirmed it: Samuel will agree, for proselyte’s property.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields were involved, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with the intent of taking possession of the one in Galilee, or the one in Galilee with the intent of taking possession of the one in Judea, he took possession. But in [the case of] property of a proselyte he did not acquire even the boundary strip between them. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting from the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North with the intent of also acquiring that in the South, or in the South with the intent of acquiring also that in the North, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he did not acquire unless he also intended to acquire the middle part. A baraita disagrees with Rav Ḥisda: If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his property, if one takes possession of the ground he is obligated for everything. If he took possession of standing grain, he is obligated for fallen stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah but freed from tithes. Does not the air separate between stalks? There, we have stated: “If he tore off anything connected to the ground, he took possession.” Samuel said, he took possession only of that leaf. But did we not state: “If it was connected to the ground and he tore off anything, he took possession”? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eudaimon the emigrant confirmed it: Samuel will agree, for proselyte’s property.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields were involved, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with the intent of taking possession of the one in Galilee, or the one in Galilee with the intent of taking possession of the one in Judea, he took possession. But in [the case of] property of a proselyte he did not acquire even the boundary strip between them. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting from the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North with the intent of also acquiring that in the South, or in the South with the intent of acquiring also that in the North, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he did not acquire unless he also intended to acquire the middle part. A baraita disagrees with Rav Ḥisda: If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his property, if one takes possession of the ground he is obligated for everything. If he took possession of standing grain, he is obligated for fallen stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah but freed from tithes. Does not the air separate between stalks? There, we have stated: “If he tore off anything connected to the ground, he took possession.” Samuel said, he took possession only of that leaf. But did we not state: “If it was connected to the ground and he tore off anything, he took possession”? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eudaimon the emigrant confirmed it: Samuel will agree, for proselyte’s property.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields were involved, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with the intent of taking possession of the one in Galilee, or the one in Galilee with the intent of taking possession of the one in Judea, he took possession. But in [the case of] property of a proselyte he did not acquire even the boundary strip between them. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting from the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North with the intent of also acquiring that in the South, or in the South with the intent of acquiring also that in the North, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he did not acquire unless he also intended to acquire the middle part. A baraita disagrees with Rav Ḥisda: If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his property, if one takes possession of the ground he is obligated for everything. If he took possession of standing grain, he is obligated for fallen stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah but freed from tithes. Does not the air separate between stalks? There, we have stated: “If he tore off anything connected to the ground, he took possession.” Samuel said, he took possession only of that leaf. But did we not state: “If it was connected to the ground and he tore off anything, he took possession”? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eudaimon the emigrant confirmed it: Samuel will agree, for proselyte’s property.
Did those daughters of Barzilai’s convert in the name of Heaven or not in the name of Heaven? If you say that they converted in the name of Heaven should not [their descendants] eat most holy sacrifices? But if you say that they converted not in the name of Heaven, then [their descendants] should not eat even outside sancta. Even if you say that they converted in the name of Heaven, is a female proselyte not like a prostitute for the priesthood? Explain it that they were not daughters but daughters of daughters. But if they were daughters of daughters, they are like Israel! But following Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon said, a proselyte who converted at less that three years and one day of age. She had no intent to immerse herself but [her mother] immersed her, if then later she immerses herself for the holiness of Israel, each of them then becomes a proselyte and a proselyte is like a prostitute for the priesthood.
Rebbi Aḥa said, would that not be obvious from the reasoning of the rabbis? Is the rebellious son liable for double restitution for his first theft? Or since he is warned of a capital offense should he be freed? Let us hear from the following: If somebody steals another’s wallet and removes it on the Sabbath he is liable since he already is liable for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. Is he not forewarned of a capital offense and you say, he is liable! Here also, even though he is forewarned of a capital offense, you say that he has to be liable. Rebbi Yannai bar Ismael said, Rebbi Hoshaia follows his own opinion, as we have stated: He who takes out is guilty even if he did not put down. Similarly, he who takes out is guilty even if he did not take up with the intent to take out, for warning is possible only at the moment of his taking out. It was stated: If he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution falls on him simultaneously. Therefore, if both obligations do not fall on him simultaneously, he is liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged; one cannot infer anything from this.
MISHNAH: Somebody had robbed a field which subsequently was taken by discharged veterans. If it is a provincial plague, he may tell him: Here is your property before you. But if it was because of the robber, he has to give him a field. If a river had washed it away, he may say to him: Here is your property before you. He who robbed from another, or took a loan from him, or accepted a deposit in a built-up area cannot give it back to him in the desert. [If it was given] with the intent to depart for the desert, he can give it back to him in the desert.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields of a proselyte were involved, with a boundary strip in between. If he cut off from one of them with the intent of taking possession also of the other but not the boundary strip in between, the one was acquired by him but not the other. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting [from] the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North by cutting off with the intent of also acquiring the one to the South, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he acquired the one to the North but not the one to the South. There, we have stated: “If it was connected to the ground and he cut off anything, he acquired.” Samuel said, he acquired only what he cut off. Rebbi Eudaimon the Emigrant said, this was said concerning the property of a proselyte. Rav Ḥisda said, Rebbi Isaac: It was reported that this was said concerning the property of a proselyte, so it should present no difficulty for Samuel.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields of a proselyte were involved, with a boundary strip in between. If he cut off from one of them with the intent of taking possession also of the other but not the boundary strip in between, the one was acquired by him but not the other. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting [from] the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North by cutting off with the intent of also acquiring the one to the South, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he acquired the one to the North but not the one to the South. There, we have stated: “If it was connected to the ground and he cut off anything, he acquired.” Samuel said, he acquired only what he cut off. Rebbi Eudaimon the Emigrant said, this was said concerning the property of a proselyte. Rav Ḥisda said, Rebbi Isaac: It was reported that this was said concerning the property of a proselyte, so it should present no difficulty for Samuel.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields of a proselyte were involved, with a boundary strip in between. If he cut off from one of them with the intent of taking possession also of the other but not the boundary strip in between, the one was acquired by him but not the other. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting [from] the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North by cutting off with the intent of also acquiring the one to the South, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he acquired the one to the North but not the one to the South. There, we have stated: “If it was connected to the ground and he cut off anything, he acquired.” Samuel said, he acquired only what he cut off. Rebbi Eudaimon the Emigrant said, this was said concerning the property of a proselyte. Rav Ḥisda said, Rebbi Isaac: It was reported that this was said concerning the property of a proselyte, so it should present no difficulty for Samuel.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.
MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.
The Roman Missal
Prayer. Præsta nobis. Grant us, we beseech thee, O Lord, the help of thy grace: that being duly intent on fasts and prayers, we may be delivered from enemies of mind and body. Through our Lord, &c.
Prayer. Tua nos. May thy grace, O Lord, ever precede and follow us; and make us ever intent upon good works. Through our Lord, &c.
Lesson. Acts ix. 1—22. In those days, Saul, as yet breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord, went to the high priest, and asked of him letters to Damascus, to the synagogues; that if he found any men and women of this way, he might bring them bound to Jerusalem. And as he went on his journey, it came to pass that he drew nigh to Damascus: and suddenly a light from heaven shined round about him. And falling on the ground, he heard a voice saying to him, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? Who said, Who art thou, Lord? And he said, I am Jesus of Nazareth, whom thou persecutest. It is hard for thee to kick against the goad. And he, trembling and astonished, said, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do? And the Lord said to him, Arise, and go into the city, and there it shall be told thee what thou must do. Now the men who went in company with him stood amazed, hearing indeed a voice, but seeing no man. And Saul arose from the ground, and when his eyes were opened, he saw nothing. But they leading him by the hand, brought him to Damascus. And he was there three days without sight; and he did neither eat nor drink. Now there was a certain disciple at Damascus, named Ananias: and the Lord said to him in a vision, Ananias. And he said, Behold I am here, Lord. And the Lord said to him, Arise and go into the street that is called Strait, and seek in the house of Judas, one named Saul of Tarsus; for behold he prayeth. (And he saw a man, named Ananias, coming in, and putting his hands upon him, that he might recover his sight.) But Ananias answered, Lord, I have heard by many of this man, how much evil he hath done to thy saints in Jerusalem: and here he hath authority from the chief priests to bind all that invoke thy name. And the Lord said to him, Go thy way; for this man is to me a vessel of election, to carry my name before the gentiles, and kings, and the children of Israel. For I will shew him how great things he must suffer for my name's sake. And Ananias went his way, and entered into the house, and laying his hands upon him, he said, Brother Saul, the Lord Jesus hath sent me, he that appeared to thee in the way as thou camest, that thou mayest receive thy sight, and be filled with the Holy Ghost. And immediately there fell upon his eyes as it were scales, and he received his sight; and rising up he was baptized. And when he had taken meat, he was strengthened. And he was with the disciples that were at Damascus for some days. And immediately he preached Jesus in the synagogues, that he is the Son of God. And all that heard him were astonished, and said, Is not this he who persecuted in Jerusalem those who called upon this name: and came hither for that intent, that he might carry them bound to the chief priests? But Saul increased much more in strength, and confounded the Jews who dwelt in Damascus, affirming that this is the Christ.
Prayer. Domine Jesu Christe. O Lord Jesus Christ, who didst teach us in the garden, both by word and example, how to pray, in order to overcome the dangers of temptations; mercifully grant, that, being ever intent on prayer, we may deserve to obtain its abundant fruit. Who livest, &c.