law
3727 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
If the yavam gave her a get and then ma’amar, she needs [another] get and halitzah. If he gave her a get and then had intercourse with her, she needs [another] get and halitzah. If he gave her a get and then did halitzah, there is nothing after halitzah. If the yavam did halitzah and then he did ma’amar or gave her a get, or had intercourse with her; Or if he had intercourse with her and then did ma’amar, or gave her a get, or did halitzah, there is nothing after halitzah. [And the law is the same] whether there is one yevamah to one yavam or two yevamoth to one yavam.
If he performed halitzah [for one] and then performed halitzah [for the other], Or performed halitzah [for one] and did ma'amar [with the other], or gave her get, or had intercourse with her; Or if he had intercourse [with one] and then with the other, Or had intercourse [with one] and then ma'amar with the other, or gave her a get, or performed halitzah there is nothing after halitzah. [There is no difference in the law] whether there was one yavam to two yevamoth or two yavamim to yevamah.
A boy of the age of nine years and one day disqualifies [his sister-in-law for marriage] with his brothers, and his brothers disqualify her for him, but while he disqualifies her from the outset only, the brothers disqualify her from the outset and at the end. How is this so? A boy of the age of nine years and one day who had intercourse with his sister-in-law disqualifies her [for marriage] with his brothers; The brothers disqualify her [for marriage with him] whether they had intercourse with her, did ma’amar, gave her a get or submitted to her halitzah.
A boy of the age of nine years and one day disqualifies [his sister-in-law for marriage] with his brothers, and his brothers disqualify her for him, but while he disqualifies her from the outset only, the brothers disqualify her from the outset and at the end. How is this so? A boy of the age of nine years and one day who had intercourse with his sister-in-law disqualifies her [for marriage] with his brothers; The brothers disqualify her [for marriage with him] whether they had intercourse with her, did ma’amar, gave her a get or submitted to her halitzah.
If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his sister-in-law, and after he had come of age he married another woman and then died, if he had not known the first woman after he had become of age, the first one must have halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum, while the second may either have halitzah or yibbum. Rabbi Shimon says: [the yavam] may perform yibbum with whichever one he wants, and he must perform halitzah for the other [woman]. [The same law applies] whether he is of the age of nine years and one day, or whether he is of the age of twenty years but had not produced two pubic hairs.
If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his sister-in-law, and after he had come of age he married another woman and then died, if he had not known the first woman after he had become of age, the first one must have halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum, while the second may either have halitzah or yibbum. Rabbi Shimon says: [the yavam] may perform yibbum with whichever one he wants, and he must perform halitzah for the other [woman]. [The same law applies] whether he is of the age of nine years and one day, or whether he is of the age of twenty years but had not produced two pubic hairs.
The sons of a female convert who converted with her do not perform halitzah or yibbum, even if the one was not conceived in holiness but was born in holiness, and the other was both conceived and born in holiness. So also [is the law] where the sons of a female slave were freed together with her.
If the child of a woman was mixed up with the child of her daughter-in-law and the mixed-up children grew up and married women and then died, the [other] sons of the daughter-in-law perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum, for it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother. The [other] sons of the older woman either perform halitzah or yibbum, since the only doubt is whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his brother’s son. If the not-mixed-up sons died then [with respect to the widows of the sons of the older woman] the mixed-up sons perform halitzah and may not have yibbum, since it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother; [With respect to the widows] of the sons of the daughter-in-law one performs halitzah and the other [may] have yibbum.
If the child of a woman was mixed up with the child of her daughter-in-law and the mixed-up children grew up and married women and then died, the [other] sons of the daughter-in-law perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum, for it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother. The [other] sons of the older woman either perform halitzah or yibbum, since the only doubt is whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his brother’s son. If the not-mixed-up sons died then [with respect to the widows of the sons of the older woman] the mixed-up sons perform halitzah and may not have yibbum, since it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother; [With respect to the widows] of the sons of the daughter-in-law one performs halitzah and the other [may] have yibbum.
If the child of a woman was mixed up with the child of her daughter-in-law and the mixed-up children grew up and married women and then died, the [other] sons of the daughter-in-law perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum, for it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother. The [other] sons of the older woman either perform halitzah or yibbum, since the only doubt is whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his brother’s son. If the not-mixed-up sons died then [with respect to the widows of the sons of the older woman] the mixed-up sons perform halitzah and may not have yibbum, since it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother; [With respect to the widows] of the sons of the daughter-in-law one performs halitzah and the other [may] have yibbum.
Bet Hillel says: we heard [such a tradition] only in respect of a woman who came from the harvest and [whose husband died] in the same country, and in a case similar to the one that happened. Bet Shammai said to them: [the law is] the same whether the woman came from the harvest or from olive picking, or from grape picking, or from one country to another--the Sages spoke of the harvest only [because the incident to which they referred] occurred then. Bet Hillel changed their view to rule in accordance with Bet Shammai.
All are believed to testify for her [concerning her husband’s death] except for her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law and her husband’s daughter. Why is [the bringing of] a letter of divorce different [from testifying regarding] death? The written document provides the proof. If one witness stated, “he is dead”, and his wife married again, and another came and stated “he is not dead”, she need not leave [her new husband]. If one witness said “he is dead” and two witnesses said “he is not dead”, even if she married again, she must leave him. If two witnesses stated, “he is dead”, and one witness stated, “he is not dead”, even if she had not married, she may do so.
All are believed to testify for her [concerning her husband’s death] except for her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law and her husband’s daughter. Why is [the bringing of] a letter of divorce different [from testifying regarding] death? The written document provides the proof. If one witness stated, “he is dead”, and his wife married again, and another came and stated “he is not dead”, she need not leave [her new husband]. If one witness said “he is dead” and two witnesses said “he is not dead”, even if she married again, she must leave him. If two witnesses stated, “he is dead”, and one witness stated, “he is not dead”, even if she had not married, she may do so.
All are believed to testify for her [concerning her husband’s death] except for her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law and her husband’s daughter. Why is [the bringing of] a letter of divorce different [from testifying regarding] death? The written document provides the proof. If one witness stated, “he is dead”, and his wife married again, and another came and stated “he is not dead”, she need not leave [her new husband]. If one witness said “he is dead” and two witnesses said “he is not dead”, even if she married again, she must leave him. If two witnesses stated, “he is dead”, and one witness stated, “he is not dead”, even if she had not married, she may do so.
If she stated, “my husband died first and my father-in-law died after him”, she may marry again and she also receives her ketubah, but her mother-in-law is forbidden [to remarry]. If [her mother-in-law] was the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, she is permitted to eat terumah, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead her away from transgression, unless [it be enacted that] she shall be forbidden both to marry and to eat terumah. If a man betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he has betrothed, and each states, “he has betrothed me”, he gives a letter of divorce to every one of them, and he leaves one ketubah [sum] for them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead him away from transgression, unless he gives to each of them both a get and a ketubah. If a man robbed one of five persons and does not know which of them he has robbed, and each one states, “he has robbed me”, he leaves the [amount of] the robbery among them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead them away from transgression, unless one pays [the full amount of the robbery] to every one [of the persons involved].
If she stated, “my husband died first and my father-in-law died after him”, she may marry again and she also receives her ketubah, but her mother-in-law is forbidden [to remarry]. If [her mother-in-law] was the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, she is permitted to eat terumah, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead her away from transgression, unless [it be enacted that] she shall be forbidden both to marry and to eat terumah. If a man betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he has betrothed, and each states, “he has betrothed me”, he gives a letter of divorce to every one of them, and he leaves one ketubah [sum] for them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead him away from transgression, unless he gives to each of them both a get and a ketubah. If a man robbed one of five persons and does not know which of them he has robbed, and each one states, “he has robbed me”, he leaves the [amount of] the robbery among them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead them away from transgression, unless one pays [the full amount of the robbery] to every one [of the persons involved].
If she stated, “my husband died first and my father-in-law died after him”, she may marry again and she also receives her ketubah, but her mother-in-law is forbidden [to remarry]. If [her mother-in-law] was the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, she is permitted to eat terumah, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead her away from transgression, unless [it be enacted that] she shall be forbidden both to marry and to eat terumah. If a man betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he has betrothed, and each states, “he has betrothed me”, he gives a letter of divorce to every one of them, and he leaves one ketubah [sum] for them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead him away from transgression, unless he gives to each of them both a get and a ketubah. If a man robbed one of five persons and does not know which of them he has robbed, and each one states, “he has robbed me”, he leaves the [amount of] the robbery among them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead them away from transgression, unless one pays [the full amount of the robbery] to every one [of the persons involved].
[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister.
[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister.
[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister.
[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister.
[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister.
[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister.
[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister.
A woman whose husband and rival wife went to a country beyond the sea, and to whom people came and said, “your husband is dead”, must neither marry nor contract yibbum until she has ascertained whether her rival wife is pregnant. If she had a mother-in-law she need not be concerned [she had another son]. But if [the mother-in-law] departed while pregnant she must be concerned [that another son was born]. Rabbi Joshua says: she need not be concerned.
A woman whose husband and rival wife went to a country beyond the sea, and to whom people came and said, “your husband is dead”, must neither marry nor contract yibbum until she has ascertained whether her rival wife is pregnant. If she had a mother-in-law she need not be concerned [she had another son]. But if [the mother-in-law] departed while pregnant she must be concerned [that another son was born]. Rabbi Joshua says: she need not be concerned.
Two sisters-in-law, one says, “My husband is dead”, and the other also says, “My husband is dead”, this one is forbidden on account of the husband of this one, and this one is forbidden on account of the husband of this one. If one had witnesses and the other had no witnesses, she who has the witnesses is forbidden, while she who has no witnesses is permitted. If the one has children and the other has no children, she who has children is permitted and she who has no children is forbidden. If they contracted yibbum, and the yevamim died, they are forbidden [to marry again]. Rabbi Elazar says: since they were permitted to marry the yevamim, they are subsequently permitted to marry any man.
Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.
He who eats with his father-in-law in Judea without the presence of witnesses cannot raise a claim of non-virginity against his wife because he has been alone with her. It is the same whether [the woman is] an Israelite widow or a priestly widow her kethubah is a maneh. The court of the priests collected for a virgin four hundred zuz, and the sages did not protest.
A yavam [who is a priest] does not allow [his sister-in-law] to eat terumah. If she had spent six months waiting for her husband and six months waiting for the yavam, or even [if she spent] all of them waiting for her husband less one day waiting for the yavam, or all of them waiting for the yavam less one day waiting for her husband, she may not eat terumah. This [was the ruling according to] the first mishnah. The court that followed afterwards ruled: a woman may not eat terumah until she has entered the bridal chamber.
If a man agreed to give a fixed sum of money to his son-in-law and his son-in-law died: the Sages say that he may say “I was willing to give to your brother but I am unwilling to give to you.”
If a man agreed to give a fixed sum of money to his son-in-law and his son-in-law died: the Sages say that he may say “I was willing to give to your brother but I am unwilling to give to you.”
These leave [their marriage] without their ketubah: A wife who transgresses the law of Moses or Jewish law. And what is the law of Moses? Feeding her husband with untithed food, having intercourse with him while in the period of her menstruation, not separating dough offering, or making vows and not fulfilling them. And what is Jewish practice? Going out with her head uncovered, spinning wool in the marketplace or conversing with every man. Abba Shaul says: also one who curses her husband’s parents in his presence. Rabbi Tarfon says: also one who has a loud voice. And who is regarded as one who has a loud voice? A woman whose voice can be heard by her neighbors when she speaks inside her house.
These leave [their marriage] without their ketubah: A wife who transgresses the law of Moses or Jewish law. And what is the law of Moses? Feeding her husband with untithed food, having intercourse with him while in the period of her menstruation, not separating dough offering, or making vows and not fulfilling them. And what is Jewish practice? Going out with her head uncovered, spinning wool in the marketplace or conversing with every man. Abba Shaul says: also one who curses her husband’s parents in his presence. Rabbi Tarfon says: also one who has a loud voice. And who is regarded as one who has a loud voice? A woman whose voice can be heard by her neighbors when she speaks inside her house.
These leave [their marriage] without their ketubah: A wife who transgresses the law of Moses or Jewish law. And what is the law of Moses? Feeding her husband with untithed food, having intercourse with him while in the period of her menstruation, not separating dough offering, or making vows and not fulfilling them. And what is Jewish practice? Going out with her head uncovered, spinning wool in the marketplace or conversing with every man. Abba Shaul says: also one who curses her husband’s parents in his presence. Rabbi Tarfon says: also one who has a loud voice. And who is regarded as one who has a loud voice? A woman whose voice can be heard by her neighbors when she speaks inside her house.
A man died and left a wife, a creditor, and heirs and he also had a deposit or a loan in the possession of others: Rabbi Tarfon says: It shall be given to the one who is under the greatest disadvantage. Rabbi Akiva says: We do not show mercy in a matter of law. Rather it shall be given to the heirs, for whereas all the others must take an oath the heirs need not take any oath.
If he left produce that was detached from the ground, whoever seizes it first acquires possession. If the wife took possession of more than the amount of her ketubah, or a creditor of more than the value of his debt, the balance: Rabbi Tarfon says: it should be given to the one who is under the greatest disadvantage. Rabbi Akiva says: we do not show mercy in a matter of law. Rather it shall be given to the heirs, for whereas all the others must take an oath the heirs need not take any oath.
If she went from her husband’s grave to her father’s house, or returned to her father-in-law’s house but was not made a guardian, the heirs may not make her swear an oath. But if she was made a guardian the heirs may make her swear an oath in respect of [her administration] during the subsequent period but not in respect of the past.
If a man who was married to two wives sold his field, and the first wife wrote to the buyer, “I have no claim whatsoever upon you”, the second wife may take [the field] away from the buyer, and the first wife from the second, and the buyer from the first wife; and so they go on in turn until they arrange a compromise between them. The same law applies also to a creditor and to a woman creditor.
If a man promised a money to his [prospective] son-in-law and then defaulted, [his daughter] shall sit until her hair turns white. Admon says: She may say, “Had I myself promised the sum I would sit until my hair turns white, but now that my father has promised it, what can I do? Either marry me or set me free.” Rabban Gamaliel said: I agree with the words of Admon.
If a man is under a vow that his son-in-law shall not benefit from him, and he wants to give money to his daughter, he must say to her, “This money is given to you as a gift, providing that your husband has no rights with it, [and it is only given to you] so that may put to your personal use.”
A nazirite shaves and then discovers that he was defiled: If the defilement was certain, it voids [the naziriteship], But if it is a defilement of the depth, it is not rendered void. [If he discovers that he was defiled] before shaving, in either case it voids [the naziriteship]. How is [the law regarding ‘defilement of the depth’]? If he goes down into a cavern to bathe, and a corpse is found floating at the mouth of the cavern, he is [definitely] unclean. If it is found embedded in the floor of the cavern, Then if he went in merely to cool himself off he remains clean, But if he went to purify himself after defilement through contact with the dead he remains unclean, Because the assumption concerning an unclean person is that he is unclean and the assumption concerning a clean person is that he is clean,.
The meal-offering of the daughter of an Israelite who is married to a priest is burned. But the meal-offering of the daughter of a priest who is married to an Israelite is eaten. What [differences are there in law] between a priest and a priest's daughter? The meal-offering of a priest’s daughter is eaten but the meal-offering of a priest is not eaten. A priest’s daughter may become deconsecrated, but a priest does not become deconsecrated. A priest’s daughter may defile herself by contact with the dead, but a priest may not defile himself by contact with the dead. A priest eats of the most holy things, but a priest’s daughter may not eat of the most holy things.
What [differences are there in law] between a man and a woman? A man [who has leprosy] rends his clothes and loosens his hair, but a woman does not rend her clothes and loosen her hair. A man may vow that his son will become a nazirite, but a woman may not vow that her son will become a nazirite. A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. A man may sell his daughter, but a woman may not sell her daughter. A man may give his daughter in betrothal, but a woman may not give her daughter in betrothal. A man is stoned naked, but a woman is not stoned naked. A man is hanged [after being put to death], but a woman is not hanged. A man is sold for [to make restitution for] his theft, but a woman is not sold [to make restitution] for her theft.
If one witness said, “I saw that she was defiled”, she does not drink the water. Not only that, but even a slave, male or female, is believed even to disqualify her from receiving her ketubah. Her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her rival wife, her sister-in-law, and the daughter of her husband are believed, not to disqualify her from receiving her ketubah, but that she should not drink.
If one witness said, “I saw that she was defiled”, she does not drink the water. Not only that, but even a slave, male or female, is believed even to disqualify her from receiving her ketubah. Her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her rival wife, her sister-in-law, and the daughter of her husband are believed, not to disqualify her from receiving her ketubah, but that she should not drink.
If one witness said, “I saw that she was defiled”, she does not drink the water. Not only that, but even a slave, male or female, is believed even to disqualify her from receiving her ketubah. Her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her rival wife, her sister-in-law, and the daughter of her husband are believed, not to disqualify her from receiving her ketubah, but that she should not drink.
When murderers multiplied, the [ceremony of] breaking a heifer’s neck ceased. That was from the time of Eliezer ben Dinai, and he was also called Tehinah ben Perisha and he was afterwards renamed “son of the murderer”. When adulterers multiplied, the ceremony of the bitter waters ceased and it was Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai who discontinued it, as it is said, “I will not punish their daughters for fornicating, nor their daughters-in-law for committing adultery, for they themselves [turn aside with whores and sacrifice with prostitutes]” (Hosea 4:14). When Yose ben Yoezer of Zeredah and Yose ben Yohanan of Jerusalem died, the grape-clusters ceased, as it is said, “There is not a cluster [of grapes] to eat; not a ripe fig I could desire [The pious are vanished from the land, none upright are left among men” (Micah 7:1-2).
When Rabbi Meir died, the composers of fables ceased. When Ben Azzai died, the diligent students [of Torah] ceased. When Ben Zoma died, the expounders ceased. When Rabbi Joshua died, goodness ceased from the world. When Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel died, locusts come and troubles multiplied. When Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah died, the sages ceased to be wealthy. When Rabbi Akiba died, the glory of the Torah ceased. When Rabbi Hanina ben Dosa died, men of wondrous deeds ceased. When Rabbi Yose Katnuta died, the pious men (hasidim) ceased and why was his name called Katnuta? Because he was the youngest of the pious men. When Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai died, the splendor of wisdom ceased. When Rabban Gamaliel the elder died, the glory of the torah ceased, and purity and separateness perished. When Rabbi Ishmael ben Fabi died, the splendor of the priesthood ceased. When Rabbi died, humility and fear of sin ceased. Rabbi Phineas ben Yair says: when Temple was destroyed, scholars and freemen were ashamed and covered their head, men of wondrous deeds were disregarded, and violent men and big talkers grew powerful. And nobody expounds, nobody seeks, and nobody asks. Upon whom shall we depend? Upon our father who is in heaven. Rabbi Eliezer the Great says: from the day the Temple was destroyed, the sages began to be like scribes, scribes like synagogue-attendants, synagogue-attendants like common people, and the common people became more and more debased. And nobody seeks. Upon whom shall we depend? Upon our father who is in heaven. In the footsteps of the messiah insolence (hutzpah) will increase and the cost of living will go up greatly; the vine will yield its fruit, but wine will be expensive; the government will turn to heresy, and there will be no one to rebuke; the meeting-place [of scholars] will be used for licentiousness; the Galilee will be destroyed, the Gablan will be desolated, and the dwellers on the frontier will go about [begging] from place to place without anyone to take pity on them; the wisdom of the learned will rot, fearers of sin will be despised, and the truth will be lacking; youths will put old men to shame, the old will stand up in the presence of the young, “For son spurns father, daughter rises up against mother, daughter-in-law against mother-in-law a man’s own household are his enemies” (Micah 7:6). The face of the generation will be like the face of a dog, a son will not feel ashamed before his father. Upon whom shall we depend? Upon our father who is in heaven. Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair says, “Heedfulness leads to cleanliness, cleanliness leads to purity, purity leads to separation, separation leads to holiness, holiness leads to modesty, modesty leads to fear of sin, fear of sin leads to piety, piety leads to the Holy Spirit, The Holy Spirit leads to the resurrection of the dead, and the resurrection of the dead comes from Elijah, blessed be his memory, Amen.”
When Rabbi Meir died, the composers of fables ceased. When Ben Azzai died, the diligent students [of Torah] ceased. When Ben Zoma died, the expounders ceased. When Rabbi Joshua died, goodness ceased from the world. When Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel died, locusts come and troubles multiplied. When Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah died, the sages ceased to be wealthy. When Rabbi Akiba died, the glory of the Torah ceased. When Rabbi Hanina ben Dosa died, men of wondrous deeds ceased. When Rabbi Yose Katnuta died, the pious men (hasidim) ceased and why was his name called Katnuta? Because he was the youngest of the pious men. When Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai died, the splendor of wisdom ceased. When Rabban Gamaliel the elder died, the glory of the torah ceased, and purity and separateness perished. When Rabbi Ishmael ben Fabi died, the splendor of the priesthood ceased. When Rabbi died, humility and fear of sin ceased. Rabbi Phineas ben Yair says: when Temple was destroyed, scholars and freemen were ashamed and covered their head, men of wondrous deeds were disregarded, and violent men and big talkers grew powerful. And nobody expounds, nobody seeks, and nobody asks. Upon whom shall we depend? Upon our father who is in heaven. Rabbi Eliezer the Great says: from the day the Temple was destroyed, the sages began to be like scribes, scribes like synagogue-attendants, synagogue-attendants like common people, and the common people became more and more debased. And nobody seeks. Upon whom shall we depend? Upon our father who is in heaven. In the footsteps of the messiah insolence (hutzpah) will increase and the cost of living will go up greatly; the vine will yield its fruit, but wine will be expensive; the government will turn to heresy, and there will be no one to rebuke; the meeting-place [of scholars] will be used for licentiousness; the Galilee will be destroyed, the Gablan will be desolated, and the dwellers on the frontier will go about [begging] from place to place without anyone to take pity on them; the wisdom of the learned will rot, fearers of sin will be despised, and the truth will be lacking; youths will put old men to shame, the old will stand up in the presence of the young, “For son spurns father, daughter rises up against mother, daughter-in-law against mother-in-law a man’s own household are his enemies” (Micah 7:6). The face of the generation will be like the face of a dog, a son will not feel ashamed before his father. Upon whom shall we depend? Upon our father who is in heaven. Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair says, “Heedfulness leads to cleanliness, cleanliness leads to purity, purity leads to separation, separation leads to holiness, holiness leads to modesty, modesty leads to fear of sin, fear of sin leads to piety, piety leads to the Holy Spirit, The Holy Spirit leads to the resurrection of the dead, and the resurrection of the dead comes from Elijah, blessed be his memory, Amen.”
Even the women who are not trusted to say “Her husband died,” are trusted to bring her get: her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law (husband’s brother’s wife) and the daughter of her husband. What is the difference between the get and death? The writing [on the get] proves [that she is divorced.] A woman may bring her own get but she must say, “In my presence it was signed and in my presence it was delivered.”
Even the women who are not trusted to say “Her husband died,” are trusted to bring her get: her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law (husband’s brother’s wife) and the daughter of her husband. What is the difference between the get and death? The writing [on the get] proves [that she is divorced.] A woman may bring her own get but she must say, “In my presence it was signed and in my presence it was delivered.”
Even the women who are not trusted to say “Her husband died,” are trusted to bring her get: her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law (husband’s brother’s wife) and the daughter of her husband. What is the difference between the get and death? The writing [on the get] proves [that she is divorced.] A woman may bring her own get but she must say, “In my presence it was signed and in my presence it was delivered.”
If one bringing a get from abroad becomes sick, he may arrange a court of law and send him [on with the get,] declaring before them, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” And the last agent is not required to say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”, rather he declares, “I am the messenger of a court.”
A [non-Jewish] slave [of a Jew] was taken captive and then ransomed [by a third party]: If [he is ransomed] to be a slave he goes back to slavery. If [he is ransomed] as a free man he does not go back to slavery. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: in either case he goes back to slavery. If a man makes his slave a pledge [for a debt] to another man and then he emancipates him, according to the “letter of the law” the slave is not liable to do anything. But because of tikkun olam we force his [second] master to emancipate him and he [the slave] writes a document for his purchase price. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the slave does not write the document but rather the one who emancipates him.
If a man sells his slave to a Gentile or [to someone living] outside the land [of Israel] the slave goes free. Captives should not be redeemed for more than their value, because of tikkun olam. Captives should not be helped to escape, because of tikkun olam. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says [that the reason is] to prevent the ill-treatment of fellow captives. Torah scrolls of the law, tefillin and mezuzoth are not bought from Gentiles at more than their value, because of tikkun olam.
If a man says, “Write a get and give it to my wife”, [or] “Divorce her”, [or] “Write a letter and give it to her”, then they should write it and give it to her. If he said, “Release her”, [or] “Provide for her”, [or] “Do for her as the law dictates”, [or] “Do the proper thing for her”, he has not said anything. Originally they said that if a man was being led out to execution and said, “Write a get for my wife”, they may write a get and give [it to her]. Later they said, even if he were leaving for a sea voyage or for a caravan journey. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even if he were dangerously ill.
If a man marries his sister-in-law and her rival wife goes and marries another man and it was found that the first is an aylonit, the other must leave both husbands and all these consequences apply to her.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if an Israelite marries a female convert, his daughter is fit for the priesthood, and if a male convert marries the daughter of an Israelite, his daughter is fit for the priesthood. But if a male convert marries a female convert, his daughter is unfit for the priesthood. [The same law applies to] a convert as to freed slaves, even for ten generations, [his daughter is unfit] unless his mother is of Israelite stock. Rabbi Yose says: even if a male convert marries a female convert, his daughter is fit for the priesthood.
Assessment [of injury] in money or things worth money must be made before a court of law and by witnesses that are free and Children of the Covenant (Jews). Women may be parties in [suits concerning] injury. The injured and the injurer [in certain cases may share] in the compensation.
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
The law is more strict in the case of a man than in the case of an ox: for a man must pay for injury, pain, medical costs, loss of income and indignity, and make restitution for the value of the young; whereas the ox pays only for injury and is not liable for the value of the young.
What counts as lost property? If he found an ass or a cow grazing on the path, this does not count as lost property. But if he found an ass with its trappings turned over, or a cow running in the vineyards, this is lost property. If he returned it and it escaped again, and he returned it and it escaped again, even four or five times, he is obligated to return it [yet again], since it is stated (Deut. 22:1): “You shall surely return it to your brother”. If [the finder] lost time at work that was worth a sela (an amount of money), he may not say to the owner, “Give me a sela”. Rather the owner need only pay him the wages of an unemployed laborer. If there was a court of law in the that place the finder may stipulate before them [for damages for time lost]. If there was no court of law, before whom can he stipulate? His comes first.
What counts as lost property? If he found an ass or a cow grazing on the path, this does not count as lost property. But if he found an ass with its trappings turned over, or a cow running in the vineyards, this is lost property. If he returned it and it escaped again, and he returned it and it escaped again, even four or five times, he is obligated to return it [yet again], since it is stated (Deut. 22:1): “You shall surely return it to your brother”. If [the finder] lost time at work that was worth a sela (an amount of money), he may not say to the owner, “Give me a sela”. Rather the owner need only pay him the wages of an unemployed laborer. If there was a court of law in the that place the finder may stipulate before them [for damages for time lost]. If there was no court of law, before whom can he stipulate? His comes first.
If a man deposited produce with his fellow, even if it should perish he may not touch it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “He may sell it before a court of law, since he is like someone who returns a lost object to its owners.”
Both the buyer and the seller are subject to the law of fraud. Just as the ordinary person is subject to the law of fraud so too is the merchant. Rabbi Judah said: “The law of fraud does not apply to the merchant.” He who has been subjected to [fraud] has the upper hand: if he wants he may say to him, “Give me back my money or give me back the amount you defrauded me.”
Both the buyer and the seller are subject to the law of fraud. Just as the ordinary person is subject to the law of fraud so too is the merchant. Rabbi Judah said: “The law of fraud does not apply to the merchant.” He who has been subjected to [fraud] has the upper hand: if he wants he may say to him, “Give me back my money or give me back the amount you defrauded me.”
Both the buyer and the seller are subject to the law of fraud. Just as the ordinary person is subject to the law of fraud so too is the merchant. Rabbi Judah said: “The law of fraud does not apply to the merchant.” He who has been subjected to [fraud] has the upper hand: if he wants he may say to him, “Give me back my money or give me back the amount you defrauded me.”
These may eat [of the fruits among which they work] by the law of the Torah: one who works on that which is still connected to the ground [may eat of it] when the work is finished [at the time of harvest]; and one who works on that which is already detached from the ground [may eat of it] before the work is completely finished. This applies only to that which grows from the ground. These are they that may not eat; one that works on what is still growing while the work is still unfinished; and one that works on what is already detached from the ground after the work is finished, and [one may not eat] of what does not grow from the soil.
Those that guard [gathered] produce may eat from it because that is the custom of the land and not because that is the law of the Torah. There are four kinds of guardians: an unpaid guardian, a borrower, a paid guardian and a hirer. An unpaid guardian may take an oath [that he had not been neglectful] in every case [of loss or damage and be free of liability]. A borrower must make restitution in every case. A paid guardian or a hirer may take an oath if the beast was injured, or taken captive or dead, but he must make restitution if it was lost or stolen.
The laws “You must pay him his wages on the same day” (Deut. 24:15) and “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning” (Lev. 19:13) apply both to the hire of a man or of a beast or of utensils. When is this so? When the employee has laid claim to it, but if he had not laid claim to it the employer does not commit a transgression. If he gave him a draft on a shopkeeper or moneychanger [the employer] does not commit a transgression [even though the employee has not yet collected]. If an employee [claimed his wages] within the set time he may take an oath and take his wages. [But] if the set time had passed he may not take an oath and take his wages. If witnesses testified that he had claimed his wages at the set time [and was not paid], he may take an oath and receive his wages. The law “You must pay him his wages on the same day” applies also to the resident alien, but not the law, “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning”.
The laws “You must pay him his wages on the same day” (Deut. 24:15) and “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning” (Lev. 19:13) apply both to the hire of a man or of a beast or of utensils. When is this so? When the employee has laid claim to it, but if he had not laid claim to it the employer does not commit a transgression. If he gave him a draft on a shopkeeper or moneychanger [the employer] does not commit a transgression [even though the employee has not yet collected]. If an employee [claimed his wages] within the set time he may take an oath and take his wages. [But] if the set time had passed he may not take an oath and take his wages. If witnesses testified that he had claimed his wages at the set time [and was not paid], he may take an oath and receive his wages. The law “You must pay him his wages on the same day” applies also to the resident alien, but not the law, “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning”.
If brothers were partners and one of them fell into a public office, it falls to the common benefit. If one [of them] got sick and needed healing, his healing is at his own expense. If certain of the brothers in their father’s lifetime had made a present as groomsmen [at their father’s expense] and [after his death] the present was restored to them, it is restored to the common benefit, for the groomsmen’s gift [counts as a loan] and can be recovered in a court of law. But if [one of the brothers in his father’s lifetime] sent his fellow jars of wine or jars of oil, they cannot be recovered through a court of law, since they count [not as a loan but] as a charitable deed.
If brothers were partners and one of them fell into a public office, it falls to the common benefit. If one [of them] got sick and needed healing, his healing is at his own expense. If certain of the brothers in their father’s lifetime had made a present as groomsmen [at their father’s expense] and [after his death] the present was restored to them, it is restored to the common benefit, for the groomsmen’s gift [counts as a loan] and can be recovered in a court of law. But if [one of the brothers in his father’s lifetime] sent his fellow jars of wine or jars of oil, they cannot be recovered through a court of law, since they count [not as a loan but] as a charitable deed.
If a man sent betrothal gifts to his father-in-law’s house, and he sent there 100 maneh (10,000 dinar) and he ate a betrothal meal of but one dinar, [and he afterward divorced his wife] they (the betrothal gifts) are not recoverable. But if he did not eat the betrothal meal, they are recoverable. If he sent many betrothal gifts in order for them to return with her to her his house [when he marries her], they are recoverable. If he sent few betrothal gifts which were to be used in her father’s house, they are not recoverable.
These are the relatives [that are not qualified to be witnesses or judges]: A suitor’s father, brother, father’s brother, mother’s brother, sister’s husband, father’s sister’s husband, mother’s sister’s husband, mother’s husband, father-in-law, or wife’s sister’s husband them and their sons and their sons-in-law; also the suitor’s step-son only [but not the stepsons’ sons]. Rabbi Yose said, “Such was the mishnah of Rabbi Akiva, but the first mishnah taught: ‘a suitor’s uncle, or his uncle’s son, and all that are qualified to be his heir. Moreover all that were kinsmen at the time [are disqualified]; but kinsmen that have ceased to be kinsmen become qualified.” Rabbi Judah says: “If a man’s daughter died and left children, her husband still counts as a kinsman.”
These are the relatives [that are not qualified to be witnesses or judges]: A suitor’s father, brother, father’s brother, mother’s brother, sister’s husband, father’s sister’s husband, mother’s sister’s husband, mother’s husband, father-in-law, or wife’s sister’s husband them and their sons and their sons-in-law; also the suitor’s step-son only [but not the stepsons’ sons]. Rabbi Yose said, “Such was the mishnah of Rabbi Akiva, but the first mishnah taught: ‘a suitor’s uncle, or his uncle’s son, and all that are qualified to be his heir. Moreover all that were kinsmen at the time [are disqualified]; but kinsmen that have ceased to be kinsmen become qualified.” Rabbi Judah says: “If a man’s daughter died and left children, her husband still counts as a kinsman.”
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
The manner in which burning is executed is as follows: They would lower him into dung up to his armpits, then a hard cloth was placed within a soft one, wound round his neck, and the two loose ends pulled in opposite directions, forcing him to open his mouth. A wick was then lit, and thrown into his mouth, so that it descended into his body and burned his bowels. R. Judah says: “Should he have died at their hands [being strangled by the bandage before the wick was thrown into his mouth], they would not have fulfilled the requirements of execution by fire. Rather his mouth was forced open with pincers against his wish, the wick lit and thrown into his mouth, so that it descended into his body and burned his bowels. Rabbi Eleazar ben Zadok said: “It once happened that a priest’s daughter committed adultery, whereupon bundles of sticks were placed around her and she was burnt. The Sages said to him: “That was because the court at that time was not well learned in law.
The following are stoned: He who has sexual relations with his mother, with his father’s wife, with his daughter-in-law, with a male; with a beast; a woman who commits bestiality with a beast; a blasphemer; an idolater; one who gives of his seed to molech; a necromancer or a wizard; one who desecrates the Sabbath; he who curses his father or mother; he who commits adultery with a betrothed woman; one who incites [individuals to idolatry]; one who seduces [a whole town to idolatry]; a sorcerer; and a wayward and rebellious son. He who has sexual relations with his mother incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his mother and as his father’s wife. R. Judah says: “He is liable in respect of her as his mother only.” He who has sexual relations with his father’s wife incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his father’s wife, and as a married woman, both during his father’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with his daughter-in-law incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his daughter-in-law and as a married woman, both during his son’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with a male or a beast, and a woman that commits bestiality: if the man has sinned, how has the animal sinned? But because the human was enticed to sin by the animal, therefore scripture ordered that it should be stoned. Another reason is that the animal should not pass through the market, and people say, this is the animal on account of which so and so was stoned.
The following are stoned: He who has sexual relations with his mother, with his father’s wife, with his daughter-in-law, with a male; with a beast; a woman who commits bestiality with a beast; a blasphemer; an idolater; one who gives of his seed to molech; a necromancer or a wizard; one who desecrates the Sabbath; he who curses his father or mother; he who commits adultery with a betrothed woman; one who incites [individuals to idolatry]; one who seduces [a whole town to idolatry]; a sorcerer; and a wayward and rebellious son. He who has sexual relations with his mother incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his mother and as his father’s wife. R. Judah says: “He is liable in respect of her as his mother only.” He who has sexual relations with his father’s wife incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his father’s wife, and as a married woman, both during his father’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with his daughter-in-law incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his daughter-in-law and as a married woman, both during his son’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with a male or a beast, and a woman that commits bestiality: if the man has sinned, how has the animal sinned? But because the human was enticed to sin by the animal, therefore scripture ordered that it should be stoned. Another reason is that the animal should not pass through the market, and people say, this is the animal on account of which so and so was stoned.
The following are stoned: He who has sexual relations with his mother, with his father’s wife, with his daughter-in-law, with a male; with a beast; a woman who commits bestiality with a beast; a blasphemer; an idolater; one who gives of his seed to molech; a necromancer or a wizard; one who desecrates the Sabbath; he who curses his father or mother; he who commits adultery with a betrothed woman; one who incites [individuals to idolatry]; one who seduces [a whole town to idolatry]; a sorcerer; and a wayward and rebellious son. He who has sexual relations with his mother incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his mother and as his father’s wife. R. Judah says: “He is liable in respect of her as his mother only.” He who has sexual relations with his father’s wife incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his father’s wife, and as a married woman, both during his father’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with his daughter-in-law incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his daughter-in-law and as a married woman, both during his son’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with a male or a beast, and a woman that commits bestiality: if the man has sinned, how has the animal sinned? But because the human was enticed to sin by the animal, therefore scripture ordered that it should be stoned. Another reason is that the animal should not pass through the market, and people say, this is the animal on account of which so and so was stoned.
The following are burnt: he who has sexual relations with a woman and her daughter, and a priest’s adulterous daughter. There is included in [the prohibition of having relations with] a woman and her daughter his own daughter, his daughter’s daughter, his son’s daughter, his wife’s daughter and the daughter of her daughter or son, his mother-in-law, her mother, and his father-in-law’s mother. The following are decapitated: a murderer, and the inhabitants of a city subverted into worshipping idols. A murderer who slew his fellow with a stone or iron, or kept him down under water or in fire, so that he could not get out of there, is executed. If he pushed him into water or fire, but he could get out of there , yet he died, he is not liable [for the death penalty]. If he set a dog or a snake against him [and they killed him], he is free from death. If he caused a snake to bite him, Rabbi Judah ruled that he is liable [for the death penalty] and the Sages, that he is not. If a man struck his fellow, whether with a stone or with his fist, and they [the experts] declared that he would die, but then its effect lessened [so that it was thought that he would live], only to increase subsequently, so that he died he is liable. Rabbi Nehemiah said that he is exempt, since there is a strong possibility [that he did not die as a result of his injuries].
The following are burnt: he who has sexual relations with a woman and her daughter, and a priest’s adulterous daughter. There is included in [the prohibition of having relations with] a woman and her daughter his own daughter, his daughter’s daughter, his son’s daughter, his wife’s daughter and the daughter of her daughter or son, his mother-in-law, her mother, and his father-in-law’s mother. The following are decapitated: a murderer, and the inhabitants of a city subverted into worshipping idols. A murderer who slew his fellow with a stone or iron, or kept him down under water or in fire, so that he could not get out of there, is executed. If he pushed him into water or fire, but he could get out of there , yet he died, he is not liable [for the death penalty]. If he set a dog or a snake against him [and they killed him], he is free from death. If he caused a snake to bite him, Rabbi Judah ruled that he is liable [for the death penalty] and the Sages, that he is not. If a man struck his fellow, whether with a stone or with his fist, and they [the experts] declared that he would die, but then its effect lessened [so that it was thought that he would live], only to increase subsequently, so that he died he is liable. Rabbi Nehemiah said that he is exempt, since there is a strong possibility [that he did not die as a result of his injuries].
An elder rebelling against the ruling of the court [is strangled], for it says, “If there arise a matter too hard for you for judgement […you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the Lord your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die” (Deut. 17:8-13, JPS translation). Three courts of law were there, one situated at the entrance to the Temple mount, another at the door of the [Temple] court, and the third in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. They [first] went to the court which is at the entrance to the Temple mount, and he [the rebellious elder] stated, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this first court] had heard [a ruling on the matter], they state it. If not, they go to the [second court] which is at the entrance of the Temple court, and he declares, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this second court] had heard [a ruling on the matter] they state it; if not, they all proceed to the great court of the Chamber of Hewn Stone from whence instruction issued to all Israel, for it says, [you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you] from that place that the Lord chose (Deut. 17:10). If he returned to his town and taught again as he did before, he is not liable. But if he gave a practical decision, he is guilty, for it says, “Should a man act presumptuously” (Deut. 17:12) he is liable only for a practical ruling. But if a disciple gave a practical decision [opposed to the court], he is exempt: thus his stringency is his leniency.
There is greater stringency in respect to the teachings of the scribes than in respect to the torah: [thus,] if [a rebellious elder] says, there is no commandment of tefillin, so that a biblical law may be transgressed, he is exempt. [But if he rules that the tefillin must contain] five compartments, thus adding to the words of the scribes, he is liable.
And these are the things for which no oath is imposed: slaves, bonds, lands, and dedicated objects. [The law of] paying double, or four or five times the value, does not apply to them. An unpaid guardian does not take an oath, and a paid guardian does not pay. Rabbi Shimon says: “For dedicated objects for which he is responsible an oath is imposed and for [dedicated objects] for which he is not responsible an oath is not imposed.
Shammai says: “[Dough] of a kav or more is subject to the law of hallah.” And Hillel says: “Of two kavs or more.” But the Sages say: “Neither according to the opinion of this one nor according to the opinion of this one, but [dough of] a kav and a half is subject to the law of hallah.” And after they increased the measures they said: “[Dough of] five quarters is subject. Rabbi Yose said: “Five are exempt, five and more are liable.”
Shammai says: “[Dough] of a kav or more is subject to the law of hallah.” And Hillel says: “Of two kavs or more.” But the Sages say: “Neither according to the opinion of this one nor according to the opinion of this one, but [dough of] a kav and a half is subject to the law of hallah.” And after they increased the measures they said: “[Dough of] five quarters is subject. Rabbi Yose said: “Five are exempt, five and more are liable.”
The insides of a melon and the discarded leaves of a vegetable of terumah: Rabbi Dosa permits [their] use to non-priests, and the Sages forbid it. Five ewes, their fleeces weighing each a mina and a half, are subject to [the law of] the first of the fleece, according to Rabbi Dosa. But the Sages say: “Five ewes [are subject] whatever [their fleeces weigh].”
A vineyard of the fourth year Beth Shammai says: it is not subject to the law of the fifth nor to the law of removal. And Beth Hillel says: it is subject to the law of the fifth and to the law of removal. Beth Shammai says: it is subject to the law of fallen grapes and to the law of gleanings, and the poor redeem them for themselves. And Beth Hillel says: all of it goes to the winepress.
A vineyard of the fourth year Beth Shammai says: it is not subject to the law of the fifth nor to the law of removal. And Beth Hillel says: it is subject to the law of the fifth and to the law of removal. Beth Shammai says: it is subject to the law of fallen grapes and to the law of gleanings, and the poor redeem them for themselves. And Beth Hillel says: all of it goes to the winepress.
A vineyard of the fourth year Beth Shammai says: it is not subject to the law of the fifth nor to the law of removal. And Beth Hillel says: it is subject to the law of the fifth and to the law of removal. Beth Shammai says: it is subject to the law of fallen grapes and to the law of gleanings, and the poor redeem them for themselves. And Beth Hillel says: all of it goes to the winepress.