liable
2925 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
If one throws [something] and remembers [that it is Shabbat] after it leaves his hand, and another catches it, or a dog catches it or it is burnt, he is not liable. If one throws [something] in order to inflict a wound whether to a person or a beast, and he remembers [that it is Shabbat] before the wound is inflicted he is not liable. This is the general principle: all who are liable to sin-offerings are liable only if the beginning and the end [of the forbidden action] are unwitting. If their beginning is unwitting while their end is intentional, if their beginning is intentional while their end is unwitting, they are not liable, unless their beginning and end are intentional.
One who builds: how much must he build to be liable? He who builds any amount, and he who chisels, and he who strikes with a hammer or with an axe, and he who bores [a hole] of any size, is liable. This is the general principle: whoever does work and his work endures on Shabbat, he is liable. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even one who strikes with a hammer on the anvil at the completion of his work is liable, because he is as one who improves his work.
One who builds: how much must he build to be liable? He who builds any amount, and he who chisels, and he who strikes with a hammer or with an axe, and he who bores [a hole] of any size, is liable. This is the general principle: whoever does work and his work endures on Shabbat, he is liable. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even one who strikes with a hammer on the anvil at the completion of his work is liable, because he is as one who improves his work.
One who builds: how much must he build to be liable? He who builds any amount, and he who chisels, and he who strikes with a hammer or with an axe, and he who bores [a hole] of any size, is liable. This is the general principle: whoever does work and his work endures on Shabbat, he is liable. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even one who strikes with a hammer on the anvil at the completion of his work is liable, because he is as one who improves his work.
One who builds: how much must he build to be liable? He who builds any amount, and he who chisels, and he who strikes with a hammer or with an axe, and he who bores [a hole] of any size, is liable. This is the general principle: whoever does work and his work endures on Shabbat, he is liable. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even one who strikes with a hammer on the anvil at the completion of his work is liable, because he is as one who improves his work.
He who plows any amount, or who weeds, or who prunes [trees], or who cuts off young shoots, no matter the amount, is liable. He who gathers wood: if in order to effect an improvement, [he is liable] for any amount; if for lighting a fire, as much as is required for boiling a light egg. He who collects grasses: if to effect an improvement, [he is liable] for any amount; if for an animal, as much as fits in a kid’s mouth.
He who plows any amount, or who weeds, or who prunes [trees], or who cuts off young shoots, no matter the amount, is liable. He who gathers wood: if in order to effect an improvement, [he is liable] for any amount; if for lighting a fire, as much as is required for boiling a light egg. He who collects grasses: if to effect an improvement, [he is liable] for any amount; if for an animal, as much as fits in a kid’s mouth.
He who plows any amount, or who weeds, or who prunes [trees], or who cuts off young shoots, no matter the amount, is liable. He who gathers wood: if in order to effect an improvement, [he is liable] for any amount; if for lighting a fire, as much as is required for boiling a light egg. He who collects grasses: if to effect an improvement, [he is liable] for any amount; if for an animal, as much as fits in a kid’s mouth.
He who writes two letters, whether with his right hand or with his left hand, whether the same letter or two different letters or in two pigments, in any language, is liable. Rabbi Jose said: they made one liable for writing two letters only because [he makes] a mark, since this is how they would write on each board of the tabernacle, to know which its companion was. Rabbi Judah said: we find a short name [forming part] of a long name: “Shem” as part of “Shimon” or “Shmuel”, “Noah” as part of “Nahor”, “Dan” as part of “Daniel”, “Gad” as part of “Gaddiel”.
He who writes two letters, whether with his right hand or with his left hand, whether the same letter or two different letters or in two pigments, in any language, is liable. Rabbi Jose said: they made one liable for writing two letters only because [he makes] a mark, since this is how they would write on each board of the tabernacle, to know which its companion was. Rabbi Judah said: we find a short name [forming part] of a long name: “Shem” as part of “Shimon” or “Shmuel”, “Noah” as part of “Nahor”, “Dan” as part of “Daniel”, “Gad” as part of “Gaddiel”.
He who writes two letters in one state of unawareness is liable. He who writes with ink, arsenic, red chalk, gum, sulphate of copper or with anything that leaves a mark, on the angle of two walls, or on the two leaves of a ledger, and they [the two letters] are read together, is liable. He who writes on his flesh, he is liable. He who scratches a mark on his flesh: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a sin-offering; But the sages exempt him.
He who writes two letters in one state of unawareness is liable. He who writes with ink, arsenic, red chalk, gum, sulphate of copper or with anything that leaves a mark, on the angle of two walls, or on the two leaves of a ledger, and they [the two letters] are read together, is liable. He who writes on his flesh, he is liable. He who scratches a mark on his flesh: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a sin-offering; But the sages exempt him.
He who writes two letters in one state of unawareness is liable. He who writes with ink, arsenic, red chalk, gum, sulphate of copper or with anything that leaves a mark, on the angle of two walls, or on the two leaves of a ledger, and they [the two letters] are read together, is liable. He who writes on his flesh, he is liable. He who scratches a mark on his flesh: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a sin-offering; But the sages exempt him.
He who writes two letters in one state of unawareness is liable. He who writes with ink, arsenic, red chalk, gum, sulphate of copper or with anything that leaves a mark, on the angle of two walls, or on the two leaves of a ledger, and they [the two letters] are read together, is liable. He who writes on his flesh, he is liable. He who scratches a mark on his flesh: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a sin-offering; But the sages exempt him.
If he wrote with liquids, or with fruit juice, on the dust of the road, or on writer’s powder, or with anything that cannot endure, he is exempt. [If he wrote] with the back of his hand, with his foot, with his mouth, or with his elbow; If he wrote one letter near [other] writing, If he wrote on top of other writing; If he intended to write a cheth but wrote two zayyinin; [If he wrote] one [letter] on the ground and another on a beam; If he wrote on two walls of the house, or on two leaves of a ledger which are not read together, he is exempt. If he wrote one letter as an abbreviation: Rabbi Joshua ben Bathyra declares him liable, But the sages exempt him.
He who writes two letters in two states of unawareness, one in the morning and one in the evening: Rabban Gamaliel declares him liable; But the sages exempt him.
Rabbi Eliezer says: he who weaves three threads at the beginning or one [thread] added to woven stuff is liable; But the sages say: whether at the beginning or at the end, the standard [for liability] is two threads.
He who makes two loops, on either the cross-pieces [nirim] or one the slips [keros], or in a sifter, sieve, or basket, is liable. And he who sews two stitches, and he who tears in order to sew two stitches [is liable].
He who makes two loops, on either the cross-pieces [nirim] or one the slips [keros], or in a sifter, sieve, or basket, is liable. And he who sews two stitches, and he who tears in order to sew two stitches [is liable].
Rabbi Judah says: he who hunts a bird into a tower trap, or a deer into a house, is liable; But the sages say: [he who hunts] a bird into a tower trap, and a deer into a house, courtyard or corral. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: not all corrals are the same. This is the general principle: if it lacks further work of hunting, he is exempt. If it does not lack further work of hunting, he is liable.
Rabbi Judah says: he who hunts a bird into a tower trap, or a deer into a house, is liable; But the sages say: [he who hunts] a bird into a tower trap, and a deer into a house, courtyard or corral. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: not all corrals are the same. This is the general principle: if it lacks further work of hunting, he is exempt. If it does not lack further work of hunting, he is liable.
If a deer enters a house and one person shuts [the door] before it, he is liable. If two shut it, they are exempt. If one could not shut it, and both shut it, they are liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts them.
If a deer enters a house and one person shuts [the door] before it, he is liable. If two shut it, they are exempt. If one could not shut it, and both shut it, they are liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts them.
If one sat down in the doorway but did not fill it, and a second sat down and filled it, the second is liable. If the first sat down in the doorway and fills it, and a second came and sat down at his side, even if the first [then] rises and goes away, the first is liable and the second is exempt. To what is this similar? To one who shuts his house to guard it, and a deer is found to be guarded in it.
If one sat down in the doorway but did not fill it, and a second sat down and filled it, the second is liable. If the first sat down in the doorway and fills it, and a second came and sat down at his side, even if the first [then] rises and goes away, the first is liable and the second is exempt. To what is this similar? To one who shuts his house to guard it, and a deer is found to be guarded in it.
The eight creeping things which are mentioned in the Torah: he who hunts them or wounds them [on Shabbat] is liable; But [as for] other abominations and creeping things, he who wounds them is exempt. He who hunts them for need is liable; Not for need, he is exempt. A beast or a chicken in one’s own domain, he who hunts them is exempt. He who wounds them is liable.
The eight creeping things which are mentioned in the Torah: he who hunts them or wounds them [on Shabbat] is liable; But [as for] other abominations and creeping things, he who wounds them is exempt. He who hunts them for need is liable; Not for need, he is exempt. A beast or a chicken in one’s own domain, he who hunts them is exempt. He who wounds them is liable.
The eight creeping things which are mentioned in the Torah: he who hunts them or wounds them [on Shabbat] is liable; But [as for] other abominations and creeping things, he who wounds them is exempt. He who hunts them for need is liable; Not for need, he is exempt. A beast or a chicken in one’s own domain, he who hunts them is exempt. He who wounds them is liable.
These are the knots for which a person is liable? Camel-drivers’ knots and sailors’ knots. And just as one is guilty for tying them, so one is guilty for untying them. Rabbi Meir says: any knot which one can untie with one hand they are not liable for it.
These are the knots for which a person is liable? Camel-drivers’ knots and sailors’ knots. And just as one is guilty for tying them, so one is guilty for untying them. Rabbi Meir says: any knot which one can untie with one hand they are not liable for it.
You have some knots for which one is not liable like [one is] for camel-drivers’ knots and sailors’ knots. A woman may tie up the opening of her chemise, the strings of her hair-net and of her belt, the laces of her shoes or sandals, leather-bottles of wine and oil, and a meat dish. Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov says: one may tie [a rope] in front of an animal, that it should not go out. One may tie a bucket [over a well] with a belt but not with a rope; Rabbi Judah permits it. Rabbi Judah stated a general rule: any knot that is not permanent one is not liable for it.
You have some knots for which one is not liable like [one is] for camel-drivers’ knots and sailors’ knots. A woman may tie up the opening of her chemise, the strings of her hair-net and of her belt, the laces of her shoes or sandals, leather-bottles of wine and oil, and a meat dish. Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov says: one may tie [a rope] in front of an animal, that it should not go out. One may tie a bucket [over a well] with a belt but not with a rope; Rabbi Judah permits it. Rabbi Judah stated a general rule: any knot that is not permanent one is not liable for it.
One may turn a dish over a lamp so that the beams should not catch [fire], and over an infant’s excrement, and over a scorpion so that it should not bite. Rabbi Judah said: an incident came before Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai in Arabia and he said, “I fear that he may be liable for a sin-offering.”
If a man has two infants, one to circumcise after Shabbat and the other to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgets and circumcises the one who should be circumcised after Shabbat on the Shabbat, he is liable. [If he has] one to circumcise on the eve of Shabbat and another to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgets and circumcises the one who should be circumcised on the eve of Shabbat on Shabbat: Rabbi Eliezer holds [him] liable to a sin-offering, but Rabbi Joshua exempts [him].
If a man has two infants, one to circumcise after Shabbat and the other to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgets and circumcises the one who should be circumcised after Shabbat on the Shabbat, he is liable. [If he has] one to circumcise on the eve of Shabbat and another to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgets and circumcises the one who should be circumcised on the eve of Shabbat on Shabbat: Rabbi Eliezer holds [him] liable to a sin-offering, but Rabbi Joshua exempts [him].
A man may break open a cask in order to eat dried figs from it, provided that he does not intend to make the cask into a vessel. And one may not perforate the stopper of a cask, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages permit it. And one may not pierce it at its side; And if it is already perforated one may not place wax upon it, because he smoothes it out. Rabbi Judah said: a case came before Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai in Arav and he said, “I fear [that he may be liable] to a sin-offering.”
A large roof close to a small roof: the large one is permitted but that of the small one is forbidden. If [the wall of a] large courtyard which shared a wall with a small courtyard was broken down, the use of the large one is permitted, but that of the smaller one is forbidden, because the gap is like a doorway to the large one. If [the wall of a] courtyard which shared a wall with the public domain was broken down, one who brings from it into a private domain or from a private domain into it is liable, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. The sages say: from it into the public domain or from the public domain into it he is exempt because it is like a karmelit.
Si’ur must be burnt, while he who eats it is exempt; sidduk must be burnt, while he who eats it is liable to kareth. What is si'ur? [When there are lines on the surface] like locusts’ horns. Sidduk is when the cracks have intermingled with each other, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages say: regarding the one and the other, he who eats it is liable for karet. And what is si'ur? When its surface is blanched, like [the face of] a man whose hair is standing [on end].
Si’ur must be burnt, while he who eats it is exempt; sidduk must be burnt, while he who eats it is liable to kareth. What is si'ur? [When there are lines on the surface] like locusts’ horns. Sidduk is when the cracks have intermingled with each other, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages say: regarding the one and the other, he who eats it is liable for karet. And what is si'ur? When its surface is blanched, like [the face of] a man whose hair is standing [on end].
One who slaughters the pesah with chametz [in his possession] violates a negative commandment. Rabbi Judah says: also the [evening] tamid. Rabbi Shimon says: [If he slaughters] the pesah [with chametz] on the fourteenth for its own purpose, he is liable; [if] for a different purpose, he is exempt. But [for] all other sacrifices, whether slaughtered for their own purpose or for a different purpose, he is exempt. [If he slaughters the pesah with chametz] on the festival for its own purpose, he is exempt; if for a different purpose, he is liable; But [for] all other sacrifices [slaughtered on the festival with chametz], whether for their own purpose or for another purpose, he is liable, except [in the case or] a sin-offering which he slaughtered for a different purpose.
One who slaughters the pesah with chametz [in his possession] violates a negative commandment. Rabbi Judah says: also the [evening] tamid. Rabbi Shimon says: [If he slaughters] the pesah [with chametz] on the fourteenth for its own purpose, he is liable; [if] for a different purpose, he is exempt. But [for] all other sacrifices, whether slaughtered for their own purpose or for a different purpose, he is exempt. [If he slaughters the pesah with chametz] on the festival for its own purpose, he is exempt; if for a different purpose, he is liable; But [for] all other sacrifices [slaughtered on the festival with chametz], whether for their own purpose or for another purpose, he is liable, except [in the case or] a sin-offering which he slaughtered for a different purpose.
One who slaughters the pesah with chametz [in his possession] violates a negative commandment. Rabbi Judah says: also the [evening] tamid. Rabbi Shimon says: [If he slaughters] the pesah [with chametz] on the fourteenth for its own purpose, he is liable; [if] for a different purpose, he is exempt. But [for] all other sacrifices, whether slaughtered for their own purpose or for a different purpose, he is exempt. [If he slaughters the pesah with chametz] on the festival for its own purpose, he is exempt; if for a different purpose, he is liable; But [for] all other sacrifices [slaughtered on the festival with chametz], whether for their own purpose or for another purpose, he is liable, except [in the case or] a sin-offering which he slaughtered for a different purpose.
If the pesah was slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, he [the slaughterer] is liable to a sin-offering on its account. All other sacrifices which he slaughtered as a pesah: if they are not fit [to be a pesah] he is liable; if they are fit [to be a pesah]: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to a sin-offering, But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: if for the pesah, which it is permitted [to slaughter] for its own purpose, yet when he changes its purpose he is liable; then [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden [to slaughter even] for their own purpose, if he changes their purpose is it not logical that he should be liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the pesah, [he is liable] because he changed it to something that is forbidden; will you say [the same] of [other] sacrifices, where he changed them for something that is permitted? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: let the community sacrifices prove it, which are permitted for their own sake, yet he who slaughters [other sacrifices] in their name is liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the public sacrifices, [that is] because they have a limit; will you say [the same] of the pesah, which has no limit? Rabbi Meir says: he too who slaughters [other sacrifices] in the name of public sacrifice is not liable.
If the pesah was slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, he [the slaughterer] is liable to a sin-offering on its account. All other sacrifices which he slaughtered as a pesah: if they are not fit [to be a pesah] he is liable; if they are fit [to be a pesah]: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to a sin-offering, But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: if for the pesah, which it is permitted [to slaughter] for its own purpose, yet when he changes its purpose he is liable; then [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden [to slaughter even] for their own purpose, if he changes their purpose is it not logical that he should be liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the pesah, [he is liable] because he changed it to something that is forbidden; will you say [the same] of [other] sacrifices, where he changed them for something that is permitted? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: let the community sacrifices prove it, which are permitted for their own sake, yet he who slaughters [other sacrifices] in their name is liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the public sacrifices, [that is] because they have a limit; will you say [the same] of the pesah, which has no limit? Rabbi Meir says: he too who slaughters [other sacrifices] in the name of public sacrifice is not liable.
If the pesah was slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, he [the slaughterer] is liable to a sin-offering on its account. All other sacrifices which he slaughtered as a pesah: if they are not fit [to be a pesah] he is liable; if they are fit [to be a pesah]: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to a sin-offering, But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: if for the pesah, which it is permitted [to slaughter] for its own purpose, yet when he changes its purpose he is liable; then [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden [to slaughter even] for their own purpose, if he changes their purpose is it not logical that he should be liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the pesah, [he is liable] because he changed it to something that is forbidden; will you say [the same] of [other] sacrifices, where he changed them for something that is permitted? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: let the community sacrifices prove it, which are permitted for their own sake, yet he who slaughters [other sacrifices] in their name is liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the public sacrifices, [that is] because they have a limit; will you say [the same] of the pesah, which has no limit? Rabbi Meir says: he too who slaughters [other sacrifices] in the name of public sacrifice is not liable.
If the pesah was slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, he [the slaughterer] is liable to a sin-offering on its account. All other sacrifices which he slaughtered as a pesah: if they are not fit [to be a pesah] he is liable; if they are fit [to be a pesah]: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to a sin-offering, But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: if for the pesah, which it is permitted [to slaughter] for its own purpose, yet when he changes its purpose he is liable; then [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden [to slaughter even] for their own purpose, if he changes their purpose is it not logical that he should be liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the pesah, [he is liable] because he changed it to something that is forbidden; will you say [the same] of [other] sacrifices, where he changed them for something that is permitted? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: let the community sacrifices prove it, which are permitted for their own sake, yet he who slaughters [other sacrifices] in their name is liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the public sacrifices, [that is] because they have a limit; will you say [the same] of the pesah, which has no limit? Rabbi Meir says: he too who slaughters [other sacrifices] in the name of public sacrifice is not liable.
If the pesah was slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, he [the slaughterer] is liable to a sin-offering on its account. All other sacrifices which he slaughtered as a pesah: if they are not fit [to be a pesah] he is liable; if they are fit [to be a pesah]: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to a sin-offering, But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: if for the pesah, which it is permitted [to slaughter] for its own purpose, yet when he changes its purpose he is liable; then [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden [to slaughter even] for their own purpose, if he changes their purpose is it not logical that he should be liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the pesah, [he is liable] because he changed it to something that is forbidden; will you say [the same] of [other] sacrifices, where he changed them for something that is permitted? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: let the community sacrifices prove it, which are permitted for their own sake, yet he who slaughters [other sacrifices] in their name is liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the public sacrifices, [that is] because they have a limit; will you say [the same] of the pesah, which has no limit? Rabbi Meir says: he too who slaughters [other sacrifices] in the name of public sacrifice is not liable.
If the pesah was slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, he [the slaughterer] is liable to a sin-offering on its account. All other sacrifices which he slaughtered as a pesah: if they are not fit [to be a pesah] he is liable; if they are fit [to be a pesah]: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to a sin-offering, But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: if for the pesah, which it is permitted [to slaughter] for its own purpose, yet when he changes its purpose he is liable; then [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden [to slaughter even] for their own purpose, if he changes their purpose is it not logical that he should be liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the pesah, [he is liable] because he changed it to something that is forbidden; will you say [the same] of [other] sacrifices, where he changed them for something that is permitted? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: let the community sacrifices prove it, which are permitted for their own sake, yet he who slaughters [other sacrifices] in their name is liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the public sacrifices, [that is] because they have a limit; will you say [the same] of the pesah, which has no limit? Rabbi Meir says: he too who slaughters [other sacrifices] in the name of public sacrifice is not liable.
If the pesah was slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, he [the slaughterer] is liable to a sin-offering on its account. All other sacrifices which he slaughtered as a pesah: if they are not fit [to be a pesah] he is liable; if they are fit [to be a pesah]: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to a sin-offering, But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: if for the pesah, which it is permitted [to slaughter] for its own purpose, yet when he changes its purpose he is liable; then [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden [to slaughter even] for their own purpose, if he changes their purpose is it not logical that he should be liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the pesah, [he is liable] because he changed it to something that is forbidden; will you say [the same] of [other] sacrifices, where he changed them for something that is permitted? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: let the community sacrifices prove it, which are permitted for their own sake, yet he who slaughters [other sacrifices] in their name is liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the public sacrifices, [that is] because they have a limit; will you say [the same] of the pesah, which has no limit? Rabbi Meir says: he too who slaughters [other sacrifices] in the name of public sacrifice is not liable.
If the pesah was slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, he [the slaughterer] is liable to a sin-offering on its account. All other sacrifices which he slaughtered as a pesah: if they are not fit [to be a pesah] he is liable; if they are fit [to be a pesah]: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to a sin-offering, But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: if for the pesah, which it is permitted [to slaughter] for its own purpose, yet when he changes its purpose he is liable; then [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden [to slaughter even] for their own purpose, if he changes their purpose is it not logical that he should be liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the pesah, [he is liable] because he changed it to something that is forbidden; will you say [the same] of [other] sacrifices, where he changed them for something that is permitted? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: let the community sacrifices prove it, which are permitted for their own sake, yet he who slaughters [other sacrifices] in their name is liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the public sacrifices, [that is] because they have a limit; will you say [the same] of the pesah, which has no limit? Rabbi Meir says: he too who slaughters [other sacrifices] in the name of public sacrifice is not liable.
If he slaughtered it for those who are not its eaters, or for those who were not registered for it, for uncircumcised or for unclean [persons], he is liable. [If he slaughtered it] for its eaters and for those who are not its eaters, for those who are registered for it and for those who are not registered for it, for circumcised and for uncircumcised, for unclean and for clean [persons], he is exempt. If he slaughtered it, and it was found to possess a blemish, he is liable. If he slaughtered it and it was found to be an internal terefah, he is exempt. If he slaughtered it, and [then] it became known that its owners had withdrawn their hands from it, or that they had died, or that they had become unclean, he is not culpable, because he slaughtered it with permission.
If he slaughtered it for those who are not its eaters, or for those who were not registered for it, for uncircumcised or for unclean [persons], he is liable. [If he slaughtered it] for its eaters and for those who are not its eaters, for those who are registered for it and for those who are not registered for it, for circumcised and for uncircumcised, for unclean and for clean [persons], he is exempt. If he slaughtered it, and it was found to possess a blemish, he is liable. If he slaughtered it and it was found to be an internal terefah, he is exempt. If he slaughtered it, and [then] it became known that its owners had withdrawn their hands from it, or that they had died, or that they had become unclean, he is not culpable, because he slaughtered it with permission.
He who was unclean or on a far-off journey and did not keep the first [Pesah] must keep the second. If he unwittingly erred or was prevented and did not keep the first, he must keep the second. If so, why does it say “an unclean person” and “one who was one a long journey” specified? That these are not liable to karet, whereas these are liable to karet.
He who was unclean or on a far-off journey and did not keep the first [Pesah] must keep the second. If he unwittingly erred or was prevented and did not keep the first, he must keep the second. If so, why does it say “an unclean person” and “one who was one a long journey” specified? That these are not liable to karet, whereas these are liable to karet.
The following are liable [to pay] the kalbon (surcharge): Levites and Israelites and converts and freed slaves; but not priests or women or slaves or minors. If a man paid the shekel on behalf of a priest, or on behalf of a woman, or on behalf of a slave, or on behalf of a minor, he is exempt. If a man paid the shekel on his own behalf and on behalf of his fellow he is liable for one kalbon. Rabbi Meir says: two kalbons. If one gave a sela and received a shekel, he is liable to pay two kalbons.
The following are liable [to pay] the kalbon (surcharge): Levites and Israelites and converts and freed slaves; but not priests or women or slaves or minors. If a man paid the shekel on behalf of a priest, or on behalf of a woman, or on behalf of a slave, or on behalf of a minor, he is exempt. If a man paid the shekel on his own behalf and on behalf of his fellow he is liable for one kalbon. Rabbi Meir says: two kalbons. If one gave a sela and received a shekel, he is liable to pay two kalbons.
The following are liable [to pay] the kalbon (surcharge): Levites and Israelites and converts and freed slaves; but not priests or women or slaves or minors. If a man paid the shekel on behalf of a priest, or on behalf of a woman, or on behalf of a slave, or on behalf of a minor, he is exempt. If a man paid the shekel on his own behalf and on behalf of his fellow he is liable for one kalbon. Rabbi Meir says: two kalbons. If one gave a sela and received a shekel, he is liable to pay two kalbons.
If one paid the shekel on behalf of a poor man or on behalf of his neighbor or on behalf of his fellow-townsman, he is exempt [from the kalbon]. But if he loaned [it] to them he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are obligated for the kalbon are exempt from the tithe of beasts. But when they are liable to the tithe of beasts they are exempt from the surcharge. And how much is the kalbon? A silver ma'ah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: half a ma'ah.
If one paid the shekel on behalf of a poor man or on behalf of his neighbor or on behalf of his fellow-townsman, he is exempt [from the kalbon]. But if he loaned [it] to them he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are obligated for the kalbon are exempt from the tithe of beasts. But when they are liable to the tithe of beasts they are exempt from the surcharge. And how much is the kalbon? A silver ma'ah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: half a ma'ah.
If one eats [an amount] the size of a large date, like it and its seed, or if he drank [an amount equivalent to a] mouthful, he is liable. All foods add up to make an amount equivalent to a date, and all the liquids add up to make a mouthful. Food and drink do not add up.
If he ate and drank in one state of unawareness, he is not obligated to bring more than one sin-offering. But if he ate and performed labor while in one state of unawareness he is obligated for two sin-offerings. If he ate foods unfit for eating, or drank liquids unfit for drinking, or drank fish-brine or fish pickling liquid, he is not liable.
Rabbi Yose says: if the first day of the festival fell on Shabbat, and he forgot and carried out his lulav into the public domain, he is not liable, since he brought it out while under the influence [of a religious act].
Every [act] for which one is liable on Shabbat because of mandated rest [shevut], [or] because it is only optional [reshut], [or] even though it is a religious act [mitzvah], he is also liable on Yom Tov. For the following acts he is liable because of shevut: One may not climb a tree, And one may not ride on an animal. And one may not swim in water. And one may not clap hands, nor slap [thighs], nor dance. For the following acts he is liable because they are only optional: One may not judge; And one may not betroth a wife, nor perform halizah, nor perform yibbum [consummate a levirate marriage]. And for the following acts one is liable even though it is a religious act [mitzvah]: One may not dedicate [anything to the Temple], nor vow a personal valuation, nor make a vow of herem, nor set aside terumah or tithes. All these things they [the rabbis said that they are forbidden] on Yom Tov, how much more so [are they forbidden] on Shabbat. There is no difference between Yom Tov and Shabbat except for the preparation of food alone.
Every [act] for which one is liable on Shabbat because of mandated rest [shevut], [or] because it is only optional [reshut], [or] even though it is a religious act [mitzvah], he is also liable on Yom Tov. For the following acts he is liable because of shevut: One may not climb a tree, And one may not ride on an animal. And one may not swim in water. And one may not clap hands, nor slap [thighs], nor dance. For the following acts he is liable because they are only optional: One may not judge; And one may not betroth a wife, nor perform halizah, nor perform yibbum [consummate a levirate marriage]. And for the following acts one is liable even though it is a religious act [mitzvah]: One may not dedicate [anything to the Temple], nor vow a personal valuation, nor make a vow of herem, nor set aside terumah or tithes. All these things they [the rabbis said that they are forbidden] on Yom Tov, how much more so [are they forbidden] on Shabbat. There is no difference between Yom Tov and Shabbat except for the preparation of food alone.
Every [act] for which one is liable on Shabbat because of mandated rest [shevut], [or] because it is only optional [reshut], [or] even though it is a religious act [mitzvah], he is also liable on Yom Tov. For the following acts he is liable because of shevut: One may not climb a tree, And one may not ride on an animal. And one may not swim in water. And one may not clap hands, nor slap [thighs], nor dance. For the following acts he is liable because they are only optional: One may not judge; And one may not betroth a wife, nor perform halizah, nor perform yibbum [consummate a levirate marriage]. And for the following acts one is liable even though it is a religious act [mitzvah]: One may not dedicate [anything to the Temple], nor vow a personal valuation, nor make a vow of herem, nor set aside terumah or tithes. All these things they [the rabbis said that they are forbidden] on Yom Tov, how much more so [are they forbidden] on Shabbat. There is no difference between Yom Tov and Shabbat except for the preparation of food alone.
Every [act] for which one is liable on Shabbat because of mandated rest [shevut], [or] because it is only optional [reshut], [or] even though it is a religious act [mitzvah], he is also liable on Yom Tov. For the following acts he is liable because of shevut: One may not climb a tree, And one may not ride on an animal. And one may not swim in water. And one may not clap hands, nor slap [thighs], nor dance. For the following acts he is liable because they are only optional: One may not judge; And one may not betroth a wife, nor perform halizah, nor perform yibbum [consummate a levirate marriage]. And for the following acts one is liable even though it is a religious act [mitzvah]: One may not dedicate [anything to the Temple], nor vow a personal valuation, nor make a vow of herem, nor set aside terumah or tithes. All these things they [the rabbis said that they are forbidden] on Yom Tov, how much more so [are they forbidden] on Shabbat. There is no difference between Yom Tov and Shabbat except for the preparation of food alone.
Every [act] for which one is liable on Shabbat because of mandated rest [shevut], [or] because it is only optional [reshut], [or] even though it is a religious act [mitzvah], he is also liable on Yom Tov. For the following acts he is liable because of shevut: One may not climb a tree, And one may not ride on an animal. And one may not swim in water. And one may not clap hands, nor slap [thighs], nor dance. For the following acts he is liable because they are only optional: One may not judge; And one may not betroth a wife, nor perform halizah, nor perform yibbum [consummate a levirate marriage]. And for the following acts one is liable even though it is a religious act [mitzvah]: One may not dedicate [anything to the Temple], nor vow a personal valuation, nor make a vow of herem, nor set aside terumah or tithes. All these things they [the rabbis said that they are forbidden] on Yom Tov, how much more so [are they forbidden] on Shabbat. There is no difference between Yom Tov and Shabbat except for the preparation of food alone.
A live coal is [restricted to the same limits] as its owner, but a flame can be taken anywhere. In respect of a live coal of sanctified property [one who makes use of it] is considered as having trespassed, but as for a flame [of sanctified property], one may not derive benefit from it, but [one who does] has not trespassed. If one carries out a live coal into the public domain [on Shabbat] he is liable, but [if he carries out] a flame he is exempt. [The water from]: A private well is [restricted to the same limits] as its owner, And [the water from a well] belonging to the inhabitants of that town is [restricted to the same limits] as the people of that town; And [the water from a well] belonging to those who came up from Babylonia is [restricted to the same limits] as he who draws [the water].
He who did not bring his hagigah on the first day of the festival of Sukkot, may bring it during the whole of the festival, even on the last festival day of Sukkot. If the festival, passed and he did not bring the festival offering, he is no longer liable for it. Of such a person it is said: “A twisted thing cannot be made straight, a lack cannot be made good” (Ecclesiastes 1:15).
If one has any kind of brother, [that brother] requires his brother’s wife to have yibbum, and he is his brother in every respect, except for a brother born from a female slave or a non-Jewish woman. If one has any kind of son, [that son] exempts his father’s wife from yibbum, and he is liable for striking or cursing [his father], and he is his son in every respect, except for the son of a female slave or a non-Jewish woman.
A high priest shall not marry a widow whether she became a widow after a betrothal or after a marriage. He shall not marry one who has reached puberty. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon permit him to marry one who has reached puberty, but he may not marry one who lost her virginity through a stick. [A priest who] betrothed a widow, and was subsequently appointed high priest, may bring her into marriage. It once happened with Joshua ben Gamla that he betrothed Marta the daughter of Boethus, and the king appointed him high priest, and he brought her into marriage. If a shomeret yavam became liable to have yibbum with an ordinary priest and then he was appointed high priest, even though he already did ma’amar, he may not bring her into marriage. A high priest whose brother died must perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum.
If a priest who was eunuch by nature married the daughter of an Israelite, he confers upon her the right to eat terumah. Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon stated: if a priest who was an hermaphrodite married the daughter of an Israelite, he confers upon her the right to eat terumah. Rabbi Judah stated: if a tumtum was opened up and found to be a male, he may not perform halitzah, because he has the same status as a eunuch. The hermaphrodite may marry [a wife] but may not be married [by a man]. Rabbi Eliezer stated: concerning the hermaphrodite, [the one who has relations with him] is liable to be stoned like one [who has relations with] a male.
If she married with the authorization of the court, she must leave, but is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. If she married without the authorization of the court, she must leave and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The authority of the court is thus more greater in that it exempts her from the sacrifice. If the court ruled that she may be married and she went and disgraced herself, she must bring a sacrifice, because the court permitted her only to marry.
An orphan who was betrothed and then divorced Rabbi Elazar says that one who seduces her is exempt but one who rapes her is liable [to pay the fine].
If he did not write a kethubah for her, a virgin still collects two hundred zuz and a widow one mane, because it is a condition laid down by court. If he assigned to her in writing a field that was worth one mane instead of the two hundred zuz and did not write for her, “All property that I possess is a lien for your ketubah”, he is liable [for the full amount] because it is a condition laid down by the court.
If he did not write for her, “if you are taken captive I will ransom you and take you again as my wife”, or in the case of a priest’s wife, “I will restore you to your people”, he is liable [to carry out these obligations], because it is a condition laid down by court.
If he did not write for her, “The male children that will be born from our marriage shall inherit the money of your ketubah over and above their shares with their brothers”, he is nevertheless liable, because [this clause] is a condition laid down by the court.
If he did not write for her, “the female children that I will have from you will dwell in my house and be maintained out of my estate until they are taken in marriage”, he is nevertheless liable, because [this clause] is a condition laid down by the court.
If he did not write for her, “You shall live in my house and be maintained from my estate throughout the duration of your widowhood”, he is nevertheless liable, because [this clause] is a condition laid down by the court. Thus did the men of Jerusalem write. The men of Galilee wrote as did the men of Jerusalem. The men of Judea used to write: “Until the heirs wish to pay you your ketubah”. Therefore if the heirs wish to, they may pay her her ketubah and dismiss her.
And these [vows] are not binding: [One who says] “What I eat of yours shall be unconsecrated”; “As the flesh of the swine”; “As an object of idolatrous worship”; “As hides pierced at the heart”; “As carrion”; “As terefoth”; “As abominations”; “As creeping things”; “As Aaron’s dough”; “As his terumah”--[in all these cases the vow is] not binding. If one says to his wife, “Behold! You are like my mother to me”, he must be given an opening on other grounds, in order that he should not act lightly in such matters. [If one says,] “Konam if I sleep”; “If I speak”; or “If I walk”; or if one says to his wife, “Konam if I cohabit with you,” he is liable to [the biblical prohibition] “he shall not break his word” (Numbers 30:. [If he says,] “I swear] an oath not to sleep”, or, “talk,” or, “walk,” he is forbidden [to do so].
There is a vow within a vow, but not an oath within an oath. How is this so? If one declares, “Behold, I will be a nazir if I eat [this thing]”; “Behold, I will be a nazir if I eat [this thing]” and then he eats [it], he is liable for each and every one. “I swear that I will not eat [this thing]”, “I swear that I will not eat [this thing]” and then he eats [it], he is only liable for one oath.
There is a vow within a vow, but not an oath within an oath. How is this so? If one declares, “Behold, I will be a nazir if I eat [this thing]”; “Behold, I will be a nazir if I eat [this thing]” and then he eats [it], he is liable for each and every one. “I swear that I will not eat [this thing]”, “I swear that I will not eat [this thing]” and then he eats [it], he is only liable for one oath.
He may donate his terumah and his tithes with his consent. He may offer up for him the bird sacrifices of zavim and zavoth and the bird sacrifices of women after childbirth, sin-offerings and guilt-offerings. He may teach him midrash, halakhoth and aggadoth, but not Scripture, yet he may teach his sons and daughters Scripture And he may support his wife and children, even though he is liable for their maintenance. But he may not feed his beasts, whether clean or unclean. Rabbi Eliezer says: he may feed an unclean beast of his, but not a clean one. They said to him: what is the difference between an unclean and a clean beast? He replied to them, a clean beast, its life belongs to heaven, but its body is his own; but an unclean animal its body and life belongs to heaven. They said to him: The life of an unclean beast too belongs to heaven and the body is his own for if he wishes, he can sell it to a non-Jew or feed dogs with it.
Three things are forbidden to a nazirite: ritual defilement, shaving, and products of the vine. All products of the vine join together [to add up to a minimum measure], and he is not liable until he eats an olive’s worth of grapes. According to the earlier mishnah, until he drinks a quarter [of a log] of wine. Rabbi Akiba says: even if he soaked his bread in wine and it is enough to make an olive’s worth he is liable.
Three things are forbidden to a nazirite: ritual defilement, shaving, and products of the vine. All products of the vine join together [to add up to a minimum measure], and he is not liable until he eats an olive’s worth of grapes. According to the earlier mishnah, until he drinks a quarter [of a log] of wine. Rabbi Akiba says: even if he soaked his bread in wine and it is enough to make an olive’s worth he is liable.
He is liable for wine on its own, for grapes on their own, for grape-skins (hartzanim) on their own and for seeds (zagim) on their own. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said: there is no penalty unless he eats two grape-skins and one seed. What are harzanim and what are zagim? Harzanim: those are the outer part, and the zagim are the inner part, according to Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose says: that you may not err, [think of] the zug [bell] of an animal, the outer part is called the zug [hood] and the inner part the inbal [clapper].
A nazirite vow of unspecified duration is for thirty days. If [the nazirite] shaved himself or bandits shaved him, it overturns thirty days. A nazirite who shaves himself, whether with scissors or a razor, or who singes [the ends of his hair], even a minimal amount, is liable. A nazirite may shampoo [his hair] and part it [with his fingers] but may not comb it. Rabbi Ishmael says: he is not to cleanse it with dirt because it causes the hair to fall out.
A nazirite who drank wine all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not drink,” “do not drink” and he drank, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him]. [A nazirite who was] shaving all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not shave,” “do not shave” and he shaved, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him]. [A nazirite who was] defiling himself with the dead all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not be defiled,” “do not be defiled” and he was defiled, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him].
A nazirite who drank wine all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not drink,” “do not drink” and he drank, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him]. [A nazirite who was] shaving all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not shave,” “do not shave” and he shaved, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him]. [A nazirite who was] defiling himself with the dead all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not be defiled,” “do not be defiled” and he was defiled, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him].
A nazirite who drank wine all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not drink,” “do not drink” and he drank, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him]. [A nazirite who was] shaving all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not shave,” “do not shave” and he shaved, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him]. [A nazirite who was] defiling himself with the dead all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not be defiled,” “do not be defiled” and he was defiled, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him].
A nazirite who drank wine all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not drink,” “do not drink” and he drank, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him]. [A nazirite who was] shaving all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not shave,” “do not shave” and he shaved, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him]. [A nazirite who was] defiling himself with the dead all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not be defiled,” “do not be defiled” and he was defiled, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him].
A nazirite who drank wine all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not drink,” “do not drink” and he drank, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him]. [A nazirite who was] shaving all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not shave,” “do not shave” and he shaved, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him]. [A nazirite who was] defiling himself with the dead all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not be defiled,” “do not be defiled” and he was defiled, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him].
A nazirite who drank wine all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not drink,” “do not drink” and he drank, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him]. [A nazirite who was] shaving all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not shave,” “do not shave” and he shaved, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him]. [A nazirite who was] defiling himself with the dead all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not be defiled,” “do not be defiled” and he was defiled, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him].
Three things are forbidden to a nazirite: ritual defilement, shaving and products of the vine. Defilement and shaving have a stringency that products of the vine do not have, in that defilement and shaving annul [the period of naziriteship already observed], whereas [partaking of] products of the vine does not do so. Products of the vine have a stringency that defilement or shaving do not have, in that products of the vine permit of no exception from the general prohibition, whereas defilement and shaving are allowed as exception from the general prohibition in the case where shaving is a religious duty, or where there is a neglected corpse. And defilement has a stringency that shaving does not have, in that defilement annuls the whole [period of naziriteship already served], and [a nazirite who is defiled] is liable for a sacrifice, whereas shaving annuls only thirty days and he is not liable for a sacrifice.
Three things are forbidden to a nazirite: ritual defilement, shaving and products of the vine. Defilement and shaving have a stringency that products of the vine do not have, in that defilement and shaving annul [the period of naziriteship already observed], whereas [partaking of] products of the vine does not do so. Products of the vine have a stringency that defilement or shaving do not have, in that products of the vine permit of no exception from the general prohibition, whereas defilement and shaving are allowed as exception from the general prohibition in the case where shaving is a religious duty, or where there is a neglected corpse. And defilement has a stringency that shaving does not have, in that defilement annuls the whole [period of naziriteship already served], and [a nazirite who is defiled] is liable for a sacrifice, whereas shaving annuls only thirty days and he is not liable for a sacrifice.
Rabbi Eliezer said in the name of Rabbi Joshua: for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite must shave, people are liable for entering the sanctuary, and for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite does not shave, people are not liable for one entering the sanctuary. Rabbi Meir said: such [defilement] should not be less serious than [defilement through] a dead creeping thing. Rabbi Akiba said: I argued in the presence of Rabbi Eliezer: Now if on account of a barley-corn’s bulk of bone which does not defile a man by overshadowing, a nazirite shaves should he touch it or carry it, then surely a quarter-log of blood which defiles a man by overshadowing, should cause a nazirite to shave should he touch it or carry it? He replied: What is this Akiva! We do not make here an ‘all the more so’ (a kal vehomer) argument. When I afterwards went and recounted these words to Rabbi Joshua, he said to me, “You spoke well, but thus they have ruled the halakhah.”
Rabbi Eliezer said in the name of Rabbi Joshua: for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite must shave, people are liable for entering the sanctuary, and for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite does not shave, people are not liable for one entering the sanctuary. Rabbi Meir said: such [defilement] should not be less serious than [defilement through] a dead creeping thing. Rabbi Akiba said: I argued in the presence of Rabbi Eliezer: Now if on account of a barley-corn’s bulk of bone which does not defile a man by overshadowing, a nazirite shaves should he touch it or carry it, then surely a quarter-log of blood which defiles a man by overshadowing, should cause a nazirite to shave should he touch it or carry it? He replied: What is this Akiva! We do not make here an ‘all the more so’ (a kal vehomer) argument. When I afterwards went and recounted these words to Rabbi Joshua, he said to me, “You spoke well, but thus they have ruled the halakhah.”
Any matter of doubt regarding [leprous affliction] at the outset is clean before a decision is made [to declare it] unclean. Once a decision has been made [to declare it] unclean, any matter of doubt is regarded as unclean. A person suffering from gonorrhea (a is examined regarding seven things, before it has been decided that it is gonorrhea: With regard to food, drink, carrying things, jumping, sickness, something seen, or an impure thought. Once gonorrhea is established, he is no longer examined. [Any flux resulting] from an accident to him, doubtful [flux] and his semen are unclean, for there are grounds for this assumption. If a one strikes his fellow, and they expected him to die and he partially recovered and then grew worse and died [the other] is liable [for murder]. Rabbi Nehemiah exempts him, for there are grounds for this assumption.
A [non-Jewish] slave [of a Jew] was taken captive and then ransomed [by a third party]: If [he is ransomed] to be a slave he goes back to slavery. If [he is ransomed] as a free man he does not go back to slavery. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: in either case he goes back to slavery. If a man makes his slave a pledge [for a debt] to another man and then he emancipates him, according to the “letter of the law” the slave is not liable to do anything. But because of tikkun olam we force his [second] master to emancipate him and he [the slave] writes a document for his purchase price. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the slave does not write the document but rather the one who emancipates him.
If orphans relied on a householder or if their father appointed a guardian for them, he must tithe their produce. A guardian who was appointed by the father of the orphans is required to take an oath. [A guardian who was] appointed by the court does not need to take an oath. Abba Shaul says that the rule is the reverse. One who renders impure [someone else’s pure food] or mixes terumah [with someone else’s non-terumah produce] or makes a libation [with someone else’s wine], if he does so inadvertently, he is exempt, but if intentionally he is liable. Priests who intentionally made someone else’s sacrifice piggul in the Temple are liable.