liable
2925 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
If a man left a jar with his fellow [to guard] and the owner did not assign it a special place [to be kept] and [the guardian] moved it and it broke: If it was broken while he was handling it: If for his own sake he is liable. If for the sake of the jar, he is not liable. But if it was broken after he had put it in place, whether he moved it for his own sake or for the sake of the jar, he is exempt. If the owner had assigned it a special place, and the guardian moved it and it broke: Whether or not it broke while he was handling it or after he had put it in its place; If for his own sake he is liable, if for the sake of the jar, he is not liable.
If a man left money in his fellow’s keeping and his fellow bound it up and hung it over his back, or delivered it to his son or his daughter who were minors, or locked it up improperly, he is liable since he did not guard in the way of guardians. If he guarded it in the way of guardians he is exempt.
If a man makes personal use of a deposit: Bet Shammai holds that he is at a disadvantage whether the value rises or falls. Bet Hillel says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which he put it to use. Rabbi Akiva says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which it is claimed. One who expresses his intention to use a deposit [for personal use]: Bet Shammai says he is liable [for any subsequent damage to the deposit, as if he had already made use of it]. Bet Hillel says: He is not liable until he actually uses it, as it says (Exodus 22:7): “If he had not put his hand onto his neighbor’s property”. How is this so? If he tilted the jug and took a quarter-log of wine and the jug was then broken, he only pays the quarter-log. If he lifted it and then took a quarter-log and the jug was then broken, he pays for the whole jug.
If a man makes personal use of a deposit: Bet Shammai holds that he is at a disadvantage whether the value rises or falls. Bet Hillel says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which he put it to use. Rabbi Akiva says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which it is claimed. One who expresses his intention to use a deposit [for personal use]: Bet Shammai says he is liable [for any subsequent damage to the deposit, as if he had already made use of it]. Bet Hillel says: He is not liable until he actually uses it, as it says (Exodus 22:7): “If he had not put his hand onto his neighbor’s property”. How is this so? If he tilted the jug and took a quarter-log of wine and the jug was then broken, he only pays the quarter-log. If he lifted it and then took a quarter-log and the jug was then broken, he pays for the whole jug.
If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, or to drive it through the valley and he drove it through the hill country, even though the distance of each was ten miles, if the donkey died the hirer is liable. If a man hired a donkey and it went blind or was conscripted into the king’s service, the owner may say to the hirer, “Here is yours before you” [and he need not replace the donkey]. [But] if it died or was broken, he must give him a new donkey. If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, if it slipped he is not liable, but if it overheated he is liable. [If one hires a donkey] to drive it through a valley and he drove it through hill country, if it slipped he is liable, but if it overheated he is not liable. But if [it overheated] due to the ascent he is liable.
If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, or to drive it through the valley and he drove it through the hill country, even though the distance of each was ten miles, if the donkey died the hirer is liable. If a man hired a donkey and it went blind or was conscripted into the king’s service, the owner may say to the hirer, “Here is yours before you” [and he need not replace the donkey]. [But] if it died or was broken, he must give him a new donkey. If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, if it slipped he is not liable, but if it overheated he is liable. [If one hires a donkey] to drive it through a valley and he drove it through hill country, if it slipped he is liable, but if it overheated he is not liable. But if [it overheated] due to the ascent he is liable.
If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, or to drive it through the valley and he drove it through the hill country, even though the distance of each was ten miles, if the donkey died the hirer is liable. If a man hired a donkey and it went blind or was conscripted into the king’s service, the owner may say to the hirer, “Here is yours before you” [and he need not replace the donkey]. [But] if it died or was broken, he must give him a new donkey. If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, if it slipped he is not liable, but if it overheated he is liable. [If one hires a donkey] to drive it through a valley and he drove it through hill country, if it slipped he is liable, but if it overheated he is not liable. But if [it overheated] due to the ascent he is liable.
If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, or to drive it through the valley and he drove it through the hill country, even though the distance of each was ten miles, if the donkey died the hirer is liable. If a man hired a donkey and it went blind or was conscripted into the king’s service, the owner may say to the hirer, “Here is yours before you” [and he need not replace the donkey]. [But] if it died or was broken, he must give him a new donkey. If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, if it slipped he is not liable, but if it overheated he is liable. [If one hires a donkey] to drive it through a valley and he drove it through hill country, if it slipped he is liable, but if it overheated he is not liable. But if [it overheated] due to the ascent he is liable.
If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, or to drive it through the valley and he drove it through the hill country, even though the distance of each was ten miles, if the donkey died the hirer is liable. If a man hired a donkey and it went blind or was conscripted into the king’s service, the owner may say to the hirer, “Here is yours before you” [and he need not replace the donkey]. [But] if it died or was broken, he must give him a new donkey. If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, if it slipped he is not liable, but if it overheated he is liable. [If one hires a donkey] to drive it through a valley and he drove it through hill country, if it slipped he is liable, but if it overheated he is not liable. But if [it overheated] due to the ascent he is liable.
If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, or to drive it through the valley and he drove it through the hill country, even though the distance of each was ten miles, if the donkey died the hirer is liable. If a man hired a donkey and it went blind or was conscripted into the king’s service, the owner may say to the hirer, “Here is yours before you” [and he need not replace the donkey]. [But] if it died or was broken, he must give him a new donkey. If one hires a donkey to drive it through hill country and he drove it through a valley, if it slipped he is not liable, but if it overheated he is liable. [If one hires a donkey] to drive it through a valley and he drove it through hill country, if it slipped he is liable, but if it overheated he is not liable. But if [it overheated] due to the ascent he is liable.
If one hired a cow to plow in the hill country and he plowed in the valley, if the plowshare was broken he is exempt. [If one hired a cow to plow] in the valley and he plowed in the hill country, if the plowshare was broken he is liable. [If one hired it] to thresh beans and he threshed grain [and the cow slipped and was injured], he is exempt. [If one hired it] to thresh grain and he threshed beans [and the cow slipped and was injured], he is liable.
If one hired a cow to plow in the hill country and he plowed in the valley, if the plowshare was broken he is exempt. [If one hired a cow to plow] in the valley and he plowed in the hill country, if the plowshare was broken he is liable. [If one hired it] to thresh beans and he threshed grain [and the cow slipped and was injured], he is exempt. [If one hired it] to thresh grain and he threshed beans [and the cow slipped and was injured], he is liable.
If one hired a donkey to carry wheat and he used it to carry [a like weight] of barley, he is liable [if the donkey was injured]. [If he hired it to carry] grain and he used it to carry [a like weight of] chopped straw he is liable, since the greater bulk is more difficult to carry. [If he hired it to carry] a letech of wheat and it carried a letech of barley he is not liable. But if he increased the weight, he is liable. What increase in weight renders him liable? Symmachos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: “One seah for a camel and three kavs for a donkey.”
If one hired a donkey to carry wheat and he used it to carry [a like weight] of barley, he is liable [if the donkey was injured]. [If he hired it to carry] grain and he used it to carry [a like weight of] chopped straw he is liable, since the greater bulk is more difficult to carry. [If he hired it to carry] a letech of wheat and it carried a letech of barley he is not liable. But if he increased the weight, he is liable. What increase in weight renders him liable? Symmachos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: “One seah for a camel and three kavs for a donkey.”
If one hired a donkey to carry wheat and he used it to carry [a like weight] of barley, he is liable [if the donkey was injured]. [If he hired it to carry] grain and he used it to carry [a like weight of] chopped straw he is liable, since the greater bulk is more difficult to carry. [If he hired it to carry] a letech of wheat and it carried a letech of barley he is not liable. But if he increased the weight, he is liable. What increase in weight renders him liable? Symmachos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: “One seah for a camel and three kavs for a donkey.”
If one hired a donkey to carry wheat and he used it to carry [a like weight] of barley, he is liable [if the donkey was injured]. [If he hired it to carry] grain and he used it to carry [a like weight of] chopped straw he is liable, since the greater bulk is more difficult to carry. [If he hired it to carry] a letech of wheat and it carried a letech of barley he is not liable. But if he increased the weight, he is liable. What increase in weight renders him liable? Symmachos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: “One seah for a camel and three kavs for a donkey.”
If one hired a donkey to carry wheat and he used it to carry [a like weight] of barley, he is liable [if the donkey was injured]. [If he hired it to carry] grain and he used it to carry [a like weight of] chopped straw he is liable, since the greater bulk is more difficult to carry. [If he hired it to carry] a letech of wheat and it carried a letech of barley he is not liable. But if he increased the weight, he is liable. What increase in weight renders him liable? Symmachos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: “One seah for a camel and three kavs for a donkey.”
If one hired laborers to work among his fourth-year plantings, they not eat from them. If he had not told them [that they were fourth-year plantings] he must first redeem the fruit and then allow them to eat. If his fig-cakes broke up or his jars burst open, they may not eat from them. If he had not told them [that they were liable to be tithed] he must first separate the tithes and then allow them to eat.
If a beast died a natural death this counts as an unavoidable accident [for which a hirer or paid guardian is not liable]. But if he tortured it and it died it does not count as an unavoidable accident [and the hirer and paid guardian would be liable]. If it was led up to the top of a crag and it fell down and died, this does not count as an unavoidable accident. An unpaid guardian may make a stipulation that he will be exempt from taking an oath, and a borrower [may make a stipulation that he will be exempt] from making restitution, and a paid guardian and a hirer [may make a stipulation that they will be exempt] from taking an oath or from making restitution.
If a beast died a natural death this counts as an unavoidable accident [for which a hirer or paid guardian is not liable]. But if he tortured it and it died it does not count as an unavoidable accident [and the hirer and paid guardian would be liable]. If it was led up to the top of a crag and it fell down and died, this does not count as an unavoidable accident. An unpaid guardian may make a stipulation that he will be exempt from taking an oath, and a borrower [may make a stipulation that he will be exempt] from making restitution, and a paid guardian and a hirer [may make a stipulation that they will be exempt] from taking an oath or from making restitution.
If one borrowed a cow together with the service of its owner, or hired its owner together with the cow, or if he borrowed the service of the owner or hired him, and afterward borrowed the cow, and the cow died he is not liable, for it is written, “If its owner was with it no restitution need be made” (Exodus 22:14). But if he first borrowed the cow and afterward borrowed or hired the service of its owner, and the cow died, he is liable, for it is written, “Its owner not being with it, he must make restitution” (Exodus 22:13).
If one borrowed a cow together with the service of its owner, or hired its owner together with the cow, or if he borrowed the service of the owner or hired him, and afterward borrowed the cow, and the cow died he is not liable, for it is written, “If its owner was with it no restitution need be made” (Exodus 22:14). But if he first borrowed the cow and afterward borrowed or hired the service of its owner, and the cow died, he is liable, for it is written, “Its owner not being with it, he must make restitution” (Exodus 22:13).
If one borrowed a cow, and borrowed it for half a day and hired it for half a day; or borrowed it for one day and hired it for the next; or if he borrowed one cow, and hired another and the cow died if he that lent the cow says: “It was the borrowed cow that died”, [or] “On the day when it was borrowed it died”, [or] “During the time when it was borrowed it died” and the other one says: “I don’t know”, he is liable. If the hirer says, “It is the hired one that died”, [or] “On the day when it was hired it died”, and the other says, “I do not know”, he is not liable. If the one says, “It was borrowed”, and the other says, “It was hired”, the hirer must take an oath that it was the hired one that died. If the one says, “I do not know”, and the other says, “I do not know”, they share in the loss.
If one borrowed a cow, and borrowed it for half a day and hired it for half a day; or borrowed it for one day and hired it for the next; or if he borrowed one cow, and hired another and the cow died if he that lent the cow says: “It was the borrowed cow that died”, [or] “On the day when it was borrowed it died”, [or] “During the time when it was borrowed it died” and the other one says: “I don’t know”, he is liable. If the hirer says, “It is the hired one that died”, [or] “On the day when it was hired it died”, and the other says, “I do not know”, he is not liable. If the one says, “It was borrowed”, and the other says, “It was hired”, the hirer must take an oath that it was the hired one that died. If the one says, “I do not know”, and the other says, “I do not know”, they share in the loss.
If one borrowed a cow and the owner sent it by the hand of his son or his slave or his agent, or by the hand of the borrower’s son or slave or agent and it died [on the way], the borrower is not liable. But if the borrower said, “Send it to me by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent, or by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, or if the lender said, “I am sending it to you by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent”, or “by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, and the borrower said, “Send it”, and he sent it and it died [on the way], the borrower is liable. So, too, when the cow is returned.
If one borrowed a cow and the owner sent it by the hand of his son or his slave or his agent, or by the hand of the borrower’s son or slave or agent and it died [on the way], the borrower is not liable. But if the borrower said, “Send it to me by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent, or by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, or if the lender said, “I am sending it to you by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent”, or “by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, and the borrower said, “Send it”, and he sent it and it died [on the way], the borrower is liable. So, too, when the cow is returned.
So, too, if an olive press was built in a rock and another had a garden on top of it, and [the olive press] was in part broken down, the owner of the garden may come down and sow below until the other rebuilds the ceiling of his olive press. If a wall or a tree fell into the public domain and caused damage, the owner is not liable to make restitution. If a set time had been given to him to cut down the tree or pull down the wall, and they fell down within the time, he is not liable. If after that time, he is liable.
So, too, if an olive press was built in a rock and another had a garden on top of it, and [the olive press] was in part broken down, the owner of the garden may come down and sow below until the other rebuilds the ceiling of his olive press. If a wall or a tree fell into the public domain and caused damage, the owner is not liable to make restitution. If a set time had been given to him to cut down the tree or pull down the wall, and they fell down within the time, he is not liable. If after that time, he is liable.
So, too, if an olive press was built in a rock and another had a garden on top of it, and [the olive press] was in part broken down, the owner of the garden may come down and sow below until the other rebuilds the ceiling of his olive press. If a wall or a tree fell into the public domain and caused damage, the owner is not liable to make restitution. If a set time had been given to him to cut down the tree or pull down the wall, and they fell down within the time, he is not liable. If after that time, he is liable.
If a man sent his child to a shopkeeper with a pondion (a coin) in his hand and he measured him out an issar’s (a coin worth half a pondion) worth of oil and gave him an issar in change and the child broke the flask and lost the issar, the shopkeeper is liable. Rabbi Judah declares him exempt, since the father sent the child for this purpose. And the Sages agree with Rabbi Judah that if the flask was in the child’s hand, and the shopkeeper measured the oil into it, the shopkeeper is exempt.
If a man sold grain to his fellow [and after it was sown] it did not sprout, even if it was flax-seed he is not liable. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If it was garden-seeds, which are not used for food, he is liable.”
If a man sold grain to his fellow [and after it was sown] it did not sprout, even if it was flax-seed he is not liable. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If it was garden-seeds, which are not used for food, he is liable.”
If the house fell down on a man and his father, or upon a man and any from whom he inherits, and he was liable for his wife’s ketubah or to a creditor: the father’s heirs say, “The son died first and the father died afterward”, and the creditors say, “The father died first and the son died afterward.” The School of Shammai says: “Let them split [the property].” The School of Hillel says: “The property remains in its former status [in the hands of those who inherit the father].”
If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.
If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.
If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.
The following are stoned: He who has sexual relations with his mother, with his father’s wife, with his daughter-in-law, with a male; with a beast; a woman who commits bestiality with a beast; a blasphemer; an idolater; one who gives of his seed to molech; a necromancer or a wizard; one who desecrates the Sabbath; he who curses his father or mother; he who commits adultery with a betrothed woman; one who incites [individuals to idolatry]; one who seduces [a whole town to idolatry]; a sorcerer; and a wayward and rebellious son. He who has sexual relations with his mother incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his mother and as his father’s wife. R. Judah says: “He is liable in respect of her as his mother only.” He who has sexual relations with his father’s wife incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his father’s wife, and as a married woman, both during his father’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with his daughter-in-law incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his daughter-in-law and as a married woman, both during his son’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with a male or a beast, and a woman that commits bestiality: if the man has sinned, how has the animal sinned? But because the human was enticed to sin by the animal, therefore scripture ordered that it should be stoned. Another reason is that the animal should not pass through the market, and people say, this is the animal on account of which so and so was stoned.
He who gives of his seed to Molech is not liable unless he delivers it to Molech and causes it to pass through the fire. If he gave it to Molech but did not cause it to pass through the fire, or he caused it to pass through fire but did not give it to Molech, he incurs no penalty, unless he does both. A Ba’al Ob is the pithom who speaks from his armpit. The Yidde’oni is one who speaks from his mouth. These two are stoned; while he who inquires of them transgresses a formal prohibition.
He who desecrates the Sabbath [is stoned], providing that it is an offence punished by “kareth” if deliberate, and by a sin-offering if unwitting. One who curses His father or his mother is not punished unless he curses them by the divine name. If he cursed them by a nickname, Rabbi Meir held him liable, but the Sages ruled that he is exempt.
One who incites [individuals to idolatry] -- this refers to an ordinary person who incites an individual who said, “There is an idol in such and such a place; it eats thus, it drinks thus, it does good [to those who worship it] and harm [to those who do not].” For all who are liable for the death penalty according to the Torah no witnesses are hidden to entrap them, excepting for this one. If he said [these things] to two, they themselves are witnesses against him, and he is brought to court and stoned. But if he said [these things] to one, he should reply, “I have friends who wish to do so likewise [come and propose it to them too].” But if he was cunning and declined to speak before them, witnesses are hidden behind a partition, while he [who was incited] says to him, make your proposal to me now in private. When the inciter says to him (repeats to him what he had already said), the other replies, “How can we abandon our God in heaven to go and serve wood and stones?” Should he retract, it is well. But if he answers, “It is our duty [to worship idols], and is seemly for us”, then the witnesses stationed behind the partition take him to court, and have him stoned. He who incites [individuals to idolatry is one who] is one who says, “I will worship it”, or, “I will go and worship”, or, “let us go and worship”; or, “I will sacrifice [to it]”, “I will go and sacrifice”, “let us go and sacrifice”; “I will burn incense, “I will go and burn incense”; “let us go and burn incense”; or “I will make libations to it”, “I will go and make libations to it”, “let us go and make libations”; “I will prostrate myself before it”, “I will go and prostrate myself”, “let us go and prostrate ourselves”. One who seduces [a whole town to idolatry] is one who says, “Let us go and serve idols”.
A sorcerer, if he actually performs magic, is liable [to death], but not if he merely creates illusions. Rabbi Akiva says in Rabbi Joshua’s name: “If two are gathering cucumbers [by magic] one may be punished and the other exempt: he who really gathers them is punished: while he who produces an illusion is exempt.”
A wayward and rebellious son: at what age does he become liable [to be stoned]? From the time that he produces two hairs until the beard is full by which is meant the hair of the genitals, not that of the face, but the Sages used euphemisms, for it says, “If a man has a son” (Deut. 21:18) a son, but not a daughter; ‘a son’, but not an adult man. The minor is exempt, since he does not come within the scope of the commandments.
When does he become liable [to be stoned]? Once he has eaten a tartemar of meat and drunk half a log of wine. Rabbi Yose said: “A maneh of meat and a log of wine. If he ate it in a company [celebrating] a religious act; or at a gathering for the purpose of intercalating the month; if he ate the second tithe in Jerusalem; if he ate the carrion or terefoth (meat that was not slaughtered in a kosher fashion), abominable and creeping things, or untithed produce, or the first tithe from which terumah had not been separated, or unredeemed second tithe, or unredeemed sacred food; if his eating involved a religious act or a transgression; if he ate any food but did not eat meat or drank any drink but did not drink wine, he does not become a ‘stubborn and rebellious son’, unless he eats meat and drinks wine, for it is written, “This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our voice;] he is a glutton and a drunkard” (Deut. 21:20). Although there is no clear proof for this, there is at least a hint, as it is says, “Do not be among wine drinkers, among gluttonous meat eaters of flesh” (Proverbs 23:20).
If his father wants [to have him punished], but not his mother; or his father does not want [to have him punished] but his mother does, he is not treated as a ‘wayward a rebellious son’, unless they both desire it. Rabbi Judah said: “If his mother is not fit for his father, he does not become a ‘wayward and rebellious son”. If one of them [his father or his mother] had a hand cut off, or was lame, mute, blind or deaf, he cannot become a ‘wayward a rebellious son’, because it says “his father and mother shall take hold of him” (Deut. 21:19) not those with a hand cut off; “and bring him out”, not lame parents; “and they shall say”, and not mute parents; “this our son”, and not blind parents; “he will not obey our voice” (Deut. 21:20), and not deaf parents. He is warned in the presence of three and beaten. If he transgresses again after this, he is tried by a court of twenty three. He cannot be sentenced to stoning unless the first three are present, because it says, “this our son” (Deut. 21:20), [implying], this one who was whipped in your presence. If he [the rebellious son] fled before his trial was completed, and then his pubic hair grew in fully, he is free. But if he fled after his trial was completed, and then his pubic hair grew in fully, he remains liable.
[The thief] who burrows his way in [to someone’s home] is judged on account of his outcome. If he burrowed his way in and broke a jug, should there be blood-guiltiness for him, he must pay [for the jug], but if there is no blood-guiltiness for him, he is not liable.
The following are burnt: he who has sexual relations with a woman and her daughter, and a priest’s adulterous daughter. There is included in [the prohibition of having relations with] a woman and her daughter his own daughter, his daughter’s daughter, his son’s daughter, his wife’s daughter and the daughter of her daughter or son, his mother-in-law, her mother, and his father-in-law’s mother. The following are decapitated: a murderer, and the inhabitants of a city subverted into worshipping idols. A murderer who slew his fellow with a stone or iron, or kept him down under water or in fire, so that he could not get out of there, is executed. If he pushed him into water or fire, but he could get out of there , yet he died, he is not liable [for the death penalty]. If he set a dog or a snake against him [and they killed him], he is free from death. If he caused a snake to bite him, Rabbi Judah ruled that he is liable [for the death penalty] and the Sages, that he is not. If a man struck his fellow, whether with a stone or with his fist, and they [the experts] declared that he would die, but then its effect lessened [so that it was thought that he would live], only to increase subsequently, so that he died he is liable. Rabbi Nehemiah said that he is exempt, since there is a strong possibility [that he did not die as a result of his injuries].
The following are burnt: he who has sexual relations with a woman and her daughter, and a priest’s adulterous daughter. There is included in [the prohibition of having relations with] a woman and her daughter his own daughter, his daughter’s daughter, his son’s daughter, his wife’s daughter and the daughter of her daughter or son, his mother-in-law, her mother, and his father-in-law’s mother. The following are decapitated: a murderer, and the inhabitants of a city subverted into worshipping idols. A murderer who slew his fellow with a stone or iron, or kept him down under water or in fire, so that he could not get out of there, is executed. If he pushed him into water or fire, but he could get out of there , yet he died, he is not liable [for the death penalty]. If he set a dog or a snake against him [and they killed him], he is free from death. If he caused a snake to bite him, Rabbi Judah ruled that he is liable [for the death penalty] and the Sages, that he is not. If a man struck his fellow, whether with a stone or with his fist, and they [the experts] declared that he would die, but then its effect lessened [so that it was thought that he would live], only to increase subsequently, so that he died he is liable. Rabbi Nehemiah said that he is exempt, since there is a strong possibility [that he did not die as a result of his injuries].
The following are burnt: he who has sexual relations with a woman and her daughter, and a priest’s adulterous daughter. There is included in [the prohibition of having relations with] a woman and her daughter his own daughter, his daughter’s daughter, his son’s daughter, his wife’s daughter and the daughter of her daughter or son, his mother-in-law, her mother, and his father-in-law’s mother. The following are decapitated: a murderer, and the inhabitants of a city subverted into worshipping idols. A murderer who slew his fellow with a stone or iron, or kept him down under water or in fire, so that he could not get out of there, is executed. If he pushed him into water or fire, but he could get out of there , yet he died, he is not liable [for the death penalty]. If he set a dog or a snake against him [and they killed him], he is free from death. If he caused a snake to bite him, Rabbi Judah ruled that he is liable [for the death penalty] and the Sages, that he is not. If a man struck his fellow, whether with a stone or with his fist, and they [the experts] declared that he would die, but then its effect lessened [so that it was thought that he would live], only to increase subsequently, so that he died he is liable. Rabbi Nehemiah said that he is exempt, since there is a strong possibility [that he did not die as a result of his injuries].
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
The following are strangled: One who strikes his father or mother; One who kidnaps a Jew; An elder who rebels against the ruling of the court; A false prophet; One who prophesies in the name of an idol; One who commits adultery; Witnesses who testified falsely [to the adultery of] a priest’s daughter, and the one who has had sexual relations with her. The one who strikes his father or his mother is liable only if he wounds them. In this respect, cursing is more stringent than striking, for one who curses [his/her parents] after death is liable, while one who strikes them after death is not. One who kidnaps a Jew is not liable unless he brings him onto his own property. Rabbi Judah said: “Until he brings him onto his own property and puts him to service, as it says, “If a man is found to have kidnapped a fellow Israelite, enslaving him or selling him” (Deut. 24:7). If he kidnaps his own son. Rabbi Ishmael the son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him]. If he kidnapped one who was half a slave and half free, Rabbi Judah declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him].
The following are strangled: One who strikes his father or mother; One who kidnaps a Jew; An elder who rebels against the ruling of the court; A false prophet; One who prophesies in the name of an idol; One who commits adultery; Witnesses who testified falsely [to the adultery of] a priest’s daughter, and the one who has had sexual relations with her. The one who strikes his father or his mother is liable only if he wounds them. In this respect, cursing is more stringent than striking, for one who curses [his/her parents] after death is liable, while one who strikes them after death is not. One who kidnaps a Jew is not liable unless he brings him onto his own property. Rabbi Judah said: “Until he brings him onto his own property and puts him to service, as it says, “If a man is found to have kidnapped a fellow Israelite, enslaving him or selling him” (Deut. 24:7). If he kidnaps his own son. Rabbi Ishmael the son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him]. If he kidnapped one who was half a slave and half free, Rabbi Judah declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him].
The following are strangled: One who strikes his father or mother; One who kidnaps a Jew; An elder who rebels against the ruling of the court; A false prophet; One who prophesies in the name of an idol; One who commits adultery; Witnesses who testified falsely [to the adultery of] a priest’s daughter, and the one who has had sexual relations with her. The one who strikes his father or his mother is liable only if he wounds them. In this respect, cursing is more stringent than striking, for one who curses [his/her parents] after death is liable, while one who strikes them after death is not. One who kidnaps a Jew is not liable unless he brings him onto his own property. Rabbi Judah said: “Until he brings him onto his own property and puts him to service, as it says, “If a man is found to have kidnapped a fellow Israelite, enslaving him or selling him” (Deut. 24:7). If he kidnaps his own son. Rabbi Ishmael the son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him]. If he kidnapped one who was half a slave and half free, Rabbi Judah declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him].
The following are strangled: One who strikes his father or mother; One who kidnaps a Jew; An elder who rebels against the ruling of the court; A false prophet; One who prophesies in the name of an idol; One who commits adultery; Witnesses who testified falsely [to the adultery of] a priest’s daughter, and the one who has had sexual relations with her. The one who strikes his father or his mother is liable only if he wounds them. In this respect, cursing is more stringent than striking, for one who curses [his/her parents] after death is liable, while one who strikes them after death is not. One who kidnaps a Jew is not liable unless he brings him onto his own property. Rabbi Judah said: “Until he brings him onto his own property and puts him to service, as it says, “If a man is found to have kidnapped a fellow Israelite, enslaving him or selling him” (Deut. 24:7). If he kidnaps his own son. Rabbi Ishmael the son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him]. If he kidnapped one who was half a slave and half free, Rabbi Judah declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him].
The following are strangled: One who strikes his father or mother; One who kidnaps a Jew; An elder who rebels against the ruling of the court; A false prophet; One who prophesies in the name of an idol; One who commits adultery; Witnesses who testified falsely [to the adultery of] a priest’s daughter, and the one who has had sexual relations with her. The one who strikes his father or his mother is liable only if he wounds them. In this respect, cursing is more stringent than striking, for one who curses [his/her parents] after death is liable, while one who strikes them after death is not. One who kidnaps a Jew is not liable unless he brings him onto his own property. Rabbi Judah said: “Until he brings him onto his own property and puts him to service, as it says, “If a man is found to have kidnapped a fellow Israelite, enslaving him or selling him” (Deut. 24:7). If he kidnaps his own son. Rabbi Ishmael the son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him]. If he kidnapped one who was half a slave and half free, Rabbi Judah declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him].
An elder rebelling against the ruling of the court [is strangled], for it says, “If there arise a matter too hard for you for judgement […you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the Lord your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die” (Deut. 17:8-13, JPS translation). Three courts of law were there, one situated at the entrance to the Temple mount, another at the door of the [Temple] court, and the third in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. They [first] went to the court which is at the entrance to the Temple mount, and he [the rebellious elder] stated, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this first court] had heard [a ruling on the matter], they state it. If not, they go to the [second court] which is at the entrance of the Temple court, and he declares, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this second court] had heard [a ruling on the matter] they state it; if not, they all proceed to the great court of the Chamber of Hewn Stone from whence instruction issued to all Israel, for it says, [you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you] from that place that the Lord chose (Deut. 17:10). If he returned to his town and taught again as he did before, he is not liable. But if he gave a practical decision, he is guilty, for it says, “Should a man act presumptuously” (Deut. 17:12) he is liable only for a practical ruling. But if a disciple gave a practical decision [opposed to the court], he is exempt: thus his stringency is his leniency.
An elder rebelling against the ruling of the court [is strangled], for it says, “If there arise a matter too hard for you for judgement […you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the Lord your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die” (Deut. 17:8-13, JPS translation). Three courts of law were there, one situated at the entrance to the Temple mount, another at the door of the [Temple] court, and the third in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. They [first] went to the court which is at the entrance to the Temple mount, and he [the rebellious elder] stated, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this first court] had heard [a ruling on the matter], they state it. If not, they go to the [second court] which is at the entrance of the Temple court, and he declares, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this second court] had heard [a ruling on the matter] they state it; if not, they all proceed to the great court of the Chamber of Hewn Stone from whence instruction issued to all Israel, for it says, [you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you] from that place that the Lord chose (Deut. 17:10). If he returned to his town and taught again as he did before, he is not liable. But if he gave a practical decision, he is guilty, for it says, “Should a man act presumptuously” (Deut. 17:12) he is liable only for a practical ruling. But if a disciple gave a practical decision [opposed to the court], he is exempt: thus his stringency is his leniency.
There is greater stringency in respect to the teachings of the scribes than in respect to the torah: [thus,] if [a rebellious elder] says, there is no commandment of tefillin, so that a biblical law may be transgressed, he is exempt. [But if he rules that the tefillin must contain] five compartments, thus adding to the words of the scribes, he is liable.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
[If they say:] “We testify that so and so is liable to a flogging of forty lashes, and they are found to be perjurers, they receive eighty lashes, because of, “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13) and “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” (Deuteronomy 19:19), these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, “They receive only forty lashes.” Monetary impositions are shared among the offenders, but the lashes are not shared among the offenders. How so? If they testified that he owed his friend two hundred zuz, and they were found to be perjurers, they divide the corresponding damages proportionately between them. But if they testified that he was liable to a flogging of forty lashes and were found to be perjurers, each one receives forty lashes.
[If they say:] “We testify that so and so is liable to a flogging of forty lashes, and they are found to be perjurers, they receive eighty lashes, because of, “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13) and “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” (Deuteronomy 19:19), these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, “They receive only forty lashes.” Monetary impositions are shared among the offenders, but the lashes are not shared among the offenders. How so? If they testified that he owed his friend two hundred zuz, and they were found to be perjurers, they divide the corresponding damages proportionately between them. But if they testified that he was liable to a flogging of forty lashes and were found to be perjurers, each one receives forty lashes.
Perjuring witnesses are not to be put to death until [after] the end of the trial. Because the Sadducees say: “[Perjurers were put to death] only after the accused had [actually] been executed, as it says, “ A life for a life” (Deuteronomy 19:21). The [Pharisaic] Sages said to them: “But has not it already been said “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” (Deuteronomy 19:19) which implies when his brother is still alive? If so, why does it say “A life for life”? For it might have been that perjurers are liable to be put to death from the moment their testimony had been taken, therefore the Torah states “A life for a life” that is to say that they are not executed until [after] the termination of the trial.
Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: “Initially a slayer is sent in advance to [one of] the cities of refuge, whether he had slain in error or with intent and then the court sends and brings him out. Whoever was found guilty of a capital crime the court had executed, and whoever was found not guilty of a capital crime they acquitted. Whoever was found liable to banishment they restored to his place [of refuge] as it says, “And the congregation shall restore him to the city of refuge to which he fled” (Numbers 35:25). All the same are [the deaths of] the high priest who had been anointed with the anointing oil; or had worn many garments, or had retired from his office all make possible the return of the manslayer. Rabbi Judah says also the [death of the] priest who had been anointed for war makes possible the return of the manslayer. Therefore, mothers of high priests would provide food and clothing for them [who had been exiled] that they might not pray for their son’s death. If the high priest died at the conclusion of the trial, the slayer does not go into banishment. If he died before the trial was concluded and another high priest was appointed in his stead and the trial was then concluded, the slayer returns [home from refuge only] after the latter’s death.
If the trial was concluded when there was no high priest [in office], or if one kills a high priest, or a high priest that kills, [in these cases the manslayer] can never come away from that place [of refuge]. He [the manslayer] may not go out to bear witness, neither for cases having to do with a religious observance, nor to bear witness in a monetary suit, nor to bear witness in a capital case. Even should [all] Israel need him, and even a general like Yoav the son of Zeruiah, he may never go out, as it is said, “to there he fled”: ‘there’ must be his abode, ‘there’ his death, ‘there’ his burial. Just as the city affords asylum so does its Sabbath boundary afford asylum. If a manslayer went beyond the boundary [of the city] and the blood avenger found him: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: “For the avenger it is a matter of obligation [to kill him]; for everyone else, a matter of option.” Rabbi Akiba says: “It is a matter of option for the avenger, and anyone else [who kills him] is not liable for doing so.” If a tree was standing within the boundary and its boughs extended beyond [the boundary] or if it was standing outside of the boundary and its boughs extended within, it wholly follows [the position of] the boughs. If he slew [someone] in that city [of refuge] he is banished from one neighborhood to another neighborhood. And a Levite is banished from one city to another.
And these are liable to be flogged: One who had relations with his sister, or his father's sister, or his mother's sister, or his wife's sister, or his brother's wife, or his father's brother's wife, or a menstruant; A high priest who marries a widow, an ordinary priest who marries a divorcee or a halutzah; An Israelite who marries a mamzereth or natinah, or an Israelite woman who is married to a mamzer or a natin. In the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a widow [a high priest] is liable on two counts. But in the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a halutzah, an ordinary priest is liable only on one count.
And these are liable to be flogged: One who had relations with his sister, or his father's sister, or his mother's sister, or his wife's sister, or his brother's wife, or his father's brother's wife, or a menstruant; A high priest who marries a widow, an ordinary priest who marries a divorcee or a halutzah; An Israelite who marries a mamzereth or natinah, or an Israelite woman who is married to a mamzer or a natin. In the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a widow [a high priest] is liable on two counts. But in the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a halutzah, an ordinary priest is liable only on one count.
And these are liable to be flogged: One who had relations with his sister, or his father's sister, or his mother's sister, or his wife's sister, or his brother's wife, or his father's brother's wife, or a menstruant; A high priest who marries a widow, an ordinary priest who marries a divorcee or a halutzah; An Israelite who marries a mamzereth or natinah, or an Israelite woman who is married to a mamzer or a natin. In the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a widow [a high priest] is liable on two counts. But in the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a halutzah, an ordinary priest is liable only on one count.
An unclean person who ate holy meat (Leviticus 7:20, 12:4); One who entered the sanctuary while unclean (Leviticus 12:4, Numbers 5:3, 19:13); One who ate forbidden fat or blood (Leviticus 3:16, 7:23-27); Or leftover sacrificial meats (Leviticus 19:6-8); Or sacrifices that had been offered up with improper intention (Leviticus 7:18); Or [an offering] that has became unclean (Leviticus 7:19); One who slaughters, or offers up a sacrifice, outside the Temple precincts (Leviticus 17:4); One who ate leavened [bread] during Passover (Exodus 12:15,; One who partakes of food [or drink] or does work on the Day of Atonement (Leviticus 23:27-31); One who puts together the ingredients for the [anointing] oil, or the ingredients for the incense, or anoints with the oil for anointing (Exodus 30:22-28): One who eats an animal that died a natural death (Deuteronomy 14:21); Or was improperly slaughtered (Exodus 22:30); Or any of the [creatures deemed] ‘abominable’ and ‘teeming’ (Leviticus 11:11,. One who eats non-tithed produce, or first-tithe from which heave offering has not been removed, or unredeemed second-tithe, or unredeemed sanctified property. How much untithed produce is one to eat to become liable? Rabbi Shimon says: “Any amount.” The Sages say: “An olive's size.” Rabbi Shimon said to them: “Do you not admit that if one ate the minutest ant that he would be liable? They said to him: “[Only] because it is a whole creature.” He said to them: “Even a grain of wheat is a whole entity.”
An unclean person who ate holy meat (Leviticus 7:20, 12:4); One who entered the sanctuary while unclean (Leviticus 12:4, Numbers 5:3, 19:13); One who ate forbidden fat or blood (Leviticus 3:16, 7:23-27); Or leftover sacrificial meats (Leviticus 19:6-8); Or sacrifices that had been offered up with improper intention (Leviticus 7:18); Or [an offering] that has became unclean (Leviticus 7:19); One who slaughters, or offers up a sacrifice, outside the Temple precincts (Leviticus 17:4); One who ate leavened [bread] during Passover (Exodus 12:15,; One who partakes of food [or drink] or does work on the Day of Atonement (Leviticus 23:27-31); One who puts together the ingredients for the [anointing] oil, or the ingredients for the incense, or anoints with the oil for anointing (Exodus 30:22-28): One who eats an animal that died a natural death (Deuteronomy 14:21); Or was improperly slaughtered (Exodus 22:30); Or any of the [creatures deemed] ‘abominable’ and ‘teeming’ (Leviticus 11:11,. One who eats non-tithed produce, or first-tithe from which heave offering has not been removed, or unredeemed second-tithe, or unredeemed sanctified property. How much untithed produce is one to eat to become liable? Rabbi Shimon says: “Any amount.” The Sages say: “An olive's size.” Rabbi Shimon said to them: “Do you not admit that if one ate the minutest ant that he would be liable? They said to him: “[Only] because it is a whole creature.” He said to them: “Even a grain of wheat is a whole entity.”
If one takes the mother bird with the young (Deuteronomy 22:6-7): Rabbi Judah says he is flogged and need not [then] send the mother free; But the Sages say: “He lets the mother go and is not flogged.” This is the general principle; any negative commandment which involves a positive deed, one is not liable (for transgressing over.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
He who writes an incision on his skin [is flogged]. If he writes [on his flesh] without incising, or incises without writing, he is not liable, until he writes and incises with ink, eye-paint or anything that lasts. Rabbi Shimon ben Judah says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: “He is not liable until he has written there the name [of a god], as it is says: “Nor shall you incise any marks on yourselves; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:28).
He who writes an incision on his skin [is flogged]. If he writes [on his flesh] without incising, or incises without writing, he is not liable, until he writes and incises with ink, eye-paint or anything that lasts. Rabbi Shimon ben Judah says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: “He is not liable until he has written there the name [of a god], as it is says: “Nor shall you incise any marks on yourselves; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:28).
If a nazirite has been drinking wine all day, he is liable for only one lashing. If they said to him, “Don’t drink wine”, “Don’t drink wine”, and he kept drinking, he is liable for each instance.
If a nazirite has been drinking wine all day, he is liable for only one lashing. If they said to him, “Don’t drink wine”, “Don’t drink wine”, and he kept drinking, he is liable for each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
It is possible for one to plough one furrow and become liable for eight prohibited acts: If he ploughs with an ox and donkey [yoked together] (2+3) and these were sanctified [animals], [the plough being drawn over] diverse mixed-seed sown] in a vineyard, during the sabbatical year, on a festival-day, [the plower being] a priest and a nazirite and the plot being situated on a defiled area. Hanania ben Hakinai says: “He may also have been wearing a garment mixed of wool and linen.” They said too him: “This is not of the same category.” He said to them: “Even the nazirite is not in the same category.”
It is the same whether one [while impure] enters the Temple court or the addition to the Temple court, for additions are not made to the city [of Jerusalem], or to the Temple courts except by the king, prophet, Urim and Thummim, the Sanhedrin of seventy one, and with two [loaves] of thanksgiving, and with song. And the court walks in a procession, the two [loaves] of thanksgiving [being carried] after them, and all Israel [following] behind them. The inner one is eaten, and the outer one is burnt. And as to any addition that was made without all these he who enters it [while impure] is not liable.
If he became impure while in the Temple court [and was aware of it], and then forgot that he was impure, though he remembered that he was in the Temple; [Or] he forgot that he was in the Temple, though he remembered that he was impure; [Or,] he forgot both; And he prostrated himself, or waited [in the Temple] the time it takes to prostrate; Or went out the long way, he is liable; [If he went out] the shorter way, he is not liable; This is the positive precept concerning the temple for which they [the court] are not liable.
If he became impure while in the Temple court [and was aware of it], and then forgot that he was impure, though he remembered that he was in the Temple; [Or] he forgot that he was in the Temple, though he remembered that he was impure; [Or,] he forgot both; And he prostrated himself, or waited [in the Temple] the time it takes to prostrate; Or went out the long way, he is liable; [If he went out] the shorter way, he is not liable; This is the positive precept concerning the temple for which they [the court] are not liable.
If he became impure while in the Temple court [and was aware of it], and then forgot that he was impure, though he remembered that he was in the Temple; [Or] he forgot that he was in the Temple, though he remembered that he was impure; [Or,] he forgot both; And he prostrated himself, or waited [in the Temple] the time it takes to prostrate; Or went out the long way, he is liable; [If he went out] the shorter way, he is not liable; This is the positive precept concerning the temple for which they [the court] are not liable.
And which is the positive precept concerning a menstruant for which they are liable? [This:] if one cohabited with a [ritually] pure woman, and she said to him: “I have become impure”, and he withdrew immediately, he is liable, because his withdrawal is as pleasant to him as his entry.
And which is the positive precept concerning a menstruant for which they are liable? [This:] if one cohabited with a [ritually] pure woman, and she said to him: “I have become impure”, and he withdrew immediately, he is liable, because his withdrawal is as pleasant to him as his entry.