2925 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:14

Rebbi Joḥanan asked: If he was standing in the public domain, threw, and then caught it, what? Is that not a Mishnah, “if another person caught it, a dog caught it, or it was burned, he is not liable”? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: So it is if he snatches; therefore if he caught it he is liable. What is the difference between its coming to rest on the ground to coming to rest in his arm? There, why is he liable? There he threw and another one received it but here he threw, he received it. Should it be obvious for him that he is not liable? Would he not be liable because of his mouth if he threw with his right hand and received with his left? Is his mouth not like another person? Here, his left hand should be like another person. Rebbi Yudan said, it is obvious to Rebbi Joḥanan that he is liable if he threw with his right hand and received with his left. What was his problem? If he threw with his right and and received with his right hand. The rabbis of Caesarea, Rebbi Shammai in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: He is in doubt whether he is liable even if he threw with his right hand and received with his left. If you want to say “his mouth”, his mouth is like another person since he ate it; but is here his hand like another person? Rebbi Mana asked, if this be so, then even if he exported the volume of a dried fig in both hands he should be not liable because of one action executed by two persons! Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said to him, is that when he did it? But was it not stated: An individual who acted is liable, two or three who acted are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:14

Rebbi Joḥanan asked: If he was standing in the public domain, threw, and then caught it, what? Is that not a Mishnah, “if another person caught it, a dog caught it, or it was burned, he is not liable”? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: So it is if he snatches; therefore if he caught it he is liable. What is the difference between its coming to rest on the ground to coming to rest in his arm? There, why is he liable? There he threw and another one received it but here he threw, he received it. Should it be obvious for him that he is not liable? Would he not be liable because of his mouth if he threw with his right hand and received with his left? Is his mouth not like another person? Here, his left hand should be like another person. Rebbi Yudan said, it is obvious to Rebbi Joḥanan that he is liable if he threw with his right hand and received with his left. What was his problem? If he threw with his right and and received with his right hand. The rabbis of Caesarea, Rebbi Shammai in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: He is in doubt whether he is liable even if he threw with his right hand and received with his left. If you want to say “his mouth”, his mouth is like another person since he ate it; but is here his hand like another person? Rebbi Mana asked, if this be so, then even if he exported the volume of a dried fig in both hands he should be not liable because of one action executed by two persons! Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said to him, is that when he did it? But was it not stated: An individual who acted is liable, two or three who acted are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:14

Rebbi Joḥanan asked: If he was standing in the public domain, threw, and then caught it, what? Is that not a Mishnah, “if another person caught it, a dog caught it, or it was burned, he is not liable”? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: So it is if he snatches; therefore if he caught it he is liable. What is the difference between its coming to rest on the ground to coming to rest in his arm? There, why is he liable? There he threw and another one received it but here he threw, he received it. Should it be obvious for him that he is not liable? Would he not be liable because of his mouth if he threw with his right hand and received with his left? Is his mouth not like another person? Here, his left hand should be like another person. Rebbi Yudan said, it is obvious to Rebbi Joḥanan that he is liable if he threw with his right hand and received with his left. What was his problem? If he threw with his right and and received with his right hand. The rabbis of Caesarea, Rebbi Shammai in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: He is in doubt whether he is liable even if he threw with his right hand and received with his left. If you want to say “his mouth”, his mouth is like another person since he ate it; but is here his hand like another person? Rebbi Mana asked, if this be so, then even if he exported the volume of a dried fig in both hands he should be not liable because of one action executed by two persons! Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said to him, is that when he did it? But was it not stated: An individual who acted is liable, two or three who acted are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:15

Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody was standing in the public domain, collected rain from the airspace of walls and carried it out, he is liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira, it is so if he grabbed it, but if he collected it he is not liable. What is the difference between whether another person gave him or if Heaven gave? It follows Rebbi, for Rebbi made the airspace of walls like their substance.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:15

Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody was standing in the public domain, collected rain from the airspace of walls and carried it out, he is liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira, it is so if he grabbed it, but if he collected it he is not liable. What is the difference between whether another person gave him or if Heaven gave? It follows Rebbi, for Rebbi made the airspace of walls like their substance.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:17

Mishnah: “The poor man is liable but the householder is not liable.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Only if the poor man’s hand is within ten hand-breadths from the ground. Rebbi Zeˋira said, if he is distant four [hand-breadths] from the wall. But if he is not distant four [hand-breadths] from the wall, it is karmelit. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Simeon Karsanah: If his face was turned towards the public road. But if his face was turned towards the wall it is karmelit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:17

Mishnah: “The poor man is liable but the householder is not liable.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Only if the poor man’s hand is within ten hand-breadths from the ground. Rebbi Zeˋira said, if he is distant four [hand-breadths] from the wall. But if he is not distant four [hand-breadths] from the wall, it is karmelit. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Simeon Karsanah: If his face was turned towards the public road. But if his face was turned towards the wall it is karmelit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:18

Rebbi Ḥisda in the name of Ashi: If a stick stuck in the public domain ten hand-breadths high, anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable. Rav said, a leather container which stands in the public domain, ten hand-breadths high and four wide; anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: “A candelabra which stands in the public domain, ten hand-breadths high and its flower four [wide]; anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable.” Rebbi Mana said, not only a candelabra but even a stick stuck in the public domain ten hand-breadths high with a tablet fixed to its head, anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:18

Rebbi Ḥisda in the name of Ashi: If a stick stuck in the public domain ten hand-breadths high, anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable. Rav said, a leather container which stands in the public domain, ten hand-breadths high and four wide; anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: “A candelabra which stands in the public domain, ten hand-breadths high and its flower four [wide]; anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable.” Rebbi Mana said, not only a candelabra but even a stick stuck in the public domain ten hand-breadths high with a tablet fixed to its head, anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:18

Rebbi Ḥisda in the name of Ashi: If a stick stuck in the public domain ten hand-breadths high, anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable. Rav said, a leather container which stands in the public domain, ten hand-breadths high and four wide; anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: “A candelabra which stands in the public domain, ten hand-breadths high and its flower four [wide]; anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable.” Rebbi Mana said, not only a candelabra but even a stick stuck in the public domain ten hand-breadths high with a tablet fixed to its head, anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:18

Rebbi Ḥisda in the name of Ashi: If a stick stuck in the public domain ten hand-breadths high, anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable. Rav said, a leather container which stands in the public domain, ten hand-breadths high and four wide; anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: “A candelabra which stands in the public domain, ten hand-breadths high and its flower four [wide]; anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable.” Rebbi Mana said, not only a candelabra but even a stick stuck in the public domain ten hand-breadths high with a tablet fixed to its head, anybody who uses anything from in it into the public domain or from the public domain into it is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:21

“Neither is liable.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Ḥizqiah, the rabbis in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In the category of two people performing one work. Rav asked Rebbi, if another person put a bundle on his back, when he forgot and brought it out? On the occasion of the second repetition he told him, he is liable because it does not compare to this. Rebbi is of the opinion that when he started to walk it is as if he had taken up the object. In the opinion of Rebbi, if he stood in the public domain and threw but ran and caught it in a private domain, what? But is that not Rebbi since Rebbi made the airspace enclosed by walls like its essence? It is only necessary in case he stood in the private domain and threw but ran and and caught it in a public domain, what? It was found stated: Rebbi declares him not liable until the moment it comes to rest.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:21

“Neither is liable.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Ḥizqiah, the rabbis in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In the category of two people performing one work. Rav asked Rebbi, if another person put a bundle on his back, when he forgot and brought it out? On the occasion of the second repetition he told him, he is liable because it does not compare to this. Rebbi is of the opinion that when he started to walk it is as if he had taken up the object. In the opinion of Rebbi, if he stood in the public domain and threw but ran and caught it in a private domain, what? But is that not Rebbi since Rebbi made the airspace enclosed by walls like its essence? It is only necessary in case he stood in the private domain and threw but ran and and caught it in a public domain, what? It was found stated: Rebbi declares him not liable until the moment it comes to rest.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:21

“Neither is liable.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Ḥizqiah, the rabbis in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In the category of two people performing one work. Rav asked Rebbi, if another person put a bundle on his back, when he forgot and brought it out? On the occasion of the second repetition he told him, he is liable because it does not compare to this. Rebbi is of the opinion that when he started to walk it is as if he had taken up the object. In the opinion of Rebbi, if he stood in the public domain and threw but ran and caught it in a private domain, what? But is that not Rebbi since Rebbi made the airspace enclosed by walls like its essence? It is only necessary in case he stood in the private domain and threw but ran and and caught it in a public domain, what? It was found stated: Rebbi declares him not liable until the moment it comes to rest.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:23

“There are four kinds of domain on the Sabbath: Private domain, public domain, karmelit, and dead-end streets. What is private domain? A ditch ten deep and four wide, or a wall ten high and four wide; this is completely private domain. And what is completely public domain? A street, a wide road, desert, and passages open at both ends. One does not export from a private to a public domain nor import from a public to a private domain. If somebody exported or imported in error he is liable for a purification sacrifice; intentionally he is liable for extirpation or is stoned, whether he exports or imports, or lifts or throws. An ocean, or a valley, or a platform, or a threshold, or karmelit are neither public nor private domain; one does not carry there but if one carried he is not liable.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:23

“There are four kinds of domain on the Sabbath: Private domain, public domain, karmelit, and dead-end streets. What is private domain? A ditch ten deep and four wide, or a wall ten high and four wide; this is completely private domain. And what is completely public domain? A street, a wide road, desert, and passages open at both ends. One does not export from a private to a public domain nor import from a public to a private domain. If somebody exported or imported in error he is liable for a purification sacrifice; intentionally he is liable for extirpation or is stoned, whether he exports or imports, or lifts or throws. An ocean, or a valley, or a platform, or a threshold, or karmelit are neither public nor private domain; one does not carry there but if one carried he is not liable.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:23

“There are four kinds of domain on the Sabbath: Private domain, public domain, karmelit, and dead-end streets. What is private domain? A ditch ten deep and four wide, or a wall ten high and four wide; this is completely private domain. And what is completely public domain? A street, a wide road, desert, and passages open at both ends. One does not export from a private to a public domain nor import from a public to a private domain. If somebody exported or imported in error he is liable for a purification sacrifice; intentionally he is liable for extirpation or is stoned, whether he exports or imports, or lifts or throws. An ocean, or a valley, or a platform, or a threshold, or karmelit are neither public nor private domain; one does not carry there but if one carried he is not liable.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:24

Rav Joseph said, in fact we have stated all of these. The sea as we have stated there: “One who in the sea throws four cubits is not liable.” Not only in the sea four cubits, but even if he throws the entire length of the sea he is not liable, for the entire sea is called karmelit. A valley as we have stated: “A valley during the dry season is private domain for the Sabbath but public domain for impurity. During the rainy season it is (private) [public] domain for both.” If you say private domain for both it should not need surrounding by animals’ gear, but we have stated: “If they surrounded it by animals’ gear one carries in the interior.” A platform, as we have stated: “And similarly one carries under open bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah; but the rabbis forbid.” A threshold, as we have stated: “If one carries out foodstuffs and puts them on the threshold; whether he or another person then carries it out, he is not liable since the work was not performed in one step.” Therefore if the work was completed in one step he would be liable. Ben Azzai said, even if he completed the work at one time he would not be liable. Karmelit. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: karmel “soft full”, neither moist nor dry but average. And here it is neither public nor private domain but karmelit. What is karmelit? Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, for example the store of Bar Justinus. A multi-party courtyard and dead-end streets: if there is an eruv they are permitted, but if no eruv was made they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:24

Rav Joseph said, in fact we have stated all of these. The sea as we have stated there: “One who in the sea throws four cubits is not liable.” Not only in the sea four cubits, but even if he throws the entire length of the sea he is not liable, for the entire sea is called karmelit. A valley as we have stated: “A valley during the dry season is private domain for the Sabbath but public domain for impurity. During the rainy season it is (private) [public] domain for both.” If you say private domain for both it should not need surrounding by animals’ gear, but we have stated: “If they surrounded it by animals’ gear one carries in the interior.” A platform, as we have stated: “And similarly one carries under open bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah; but the rabbis forbid.” A threshold, as we have stated: “If one carries out foodstuffs and puts them on the threshold; whether he or another person then carries it out, he is not liable since the work was not performed in one step.” Therefore if the work was completed in one step he would be liable. Ben Azzai said, even if he completed the work at one time he would not be liable. Karmelit. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: karmel “soft full”, neither moist nor dry but average. And here it is neither public nor private domain but karmelit. What is karmelit? Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, for example the store of Bar Justinus. A multi-party courtyard and dead-end streets: if there is an eruv they are permitted, but if no eruv was made they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:24

Rav Joseph said, in fact we have stated all of these. The sea as we have stated there: “One who in the sea throws four cubits is not liable.” Not only in the sea four cubits, but even if he throws the entire length of the sea he is not liable, for the entire sea is called karmelit. A valley as we have stated: “A valley during the dry season is private domain for the Sabbath but public domain for impurity. During the rainy season it is (private) [public] domain for both.” If you say private domain for both it should not need surrounding by animals’ gear, but we have stated: “If they surrounded it by animals’ gear one carries in the interior.” A platform, as we have stated: “And similarly one carries under open bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah; but the rabbis forbid.” A threshold, as we have stated: “If one carries out foodstuffs and puts them on the threshold; whether he or another person then carries it out, he is not liable since the work was not performed in one step.” Therefore if the work was completed in one step he would be liable. Ben Azzai said, even if he completed the work at one time he would not be liable. Karmelit. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: karmel “soft full”, neither moist nor dry but average. And here it is neither public nor private domain but karmelit. What is karmelit? Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, for example the store of Bar Justinus. A multi-party courtyard and dead-end streets: if there is an eruv they are permitted, but if no eruv was made they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:24

Rav Joseph said, in fact we have stated all of these. The sea as we have stated there: “One who in the sea throws four cubits is not liable.” Not only in the sea four cubits, but even if he throws the entire length of the sea he is not liable, for the entire sea is called karmelit. A valley as we have stated: “A valley during the dry season is private domain for the Sabbath but public domain for impurity. During the rainy season it is (private) [public] domain for both.” If you say private domain for both it should not need surrounding by animals’ gear, but we have stated: “If they surrounded it by animals’ gear one carries in the interior.” A platform, as we have stated: “And similarly one carries under open bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah; but the rabbis forbid.” A threshold, as we have stated: “If one carries out foodstuffs and puts them on the threshold; whether he or another person then carries it out, he is not liable since the work was not performed in one step.” Therefore if the work was completed in one step he would be liable. Ben Azzai said, even if he completed the work at one time he would not be liable. Karmelit. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: karmel “soft full”, neither moist nor dry but average. And here it is neither public nor private domain but karmelit. What is karmelit? Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, for example the store of Bar Justinus. A multi-party courtyard and dead-end streets: if there is an eruv they are permitted, but if no eruv was made they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:24

Rav Joseph said, in fact we have stated all of these. The sea as we have stated there: “One who in the sea throws four cubits is not liable.” Not only in the sea four cubits, but even if he throws the entire length of the sea he is not liable, for the entire sea is called karmelit. A valley as we have stated: “A valley during the dry season is private domain for the Sabbath but public domain for impurity. During the rainy season it is (private) [public] domain for both.” If you say private domain for both it should not need surrounding by animals’ gear, but we have stated: “If they surrounded it by animals’ gear one carries in the interior.” A platform, as we have stated: “And similarly one carries under open bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah; but the rabbis forbid.” A threshold, as we have stated: “If one carries out foodstuffs and puts them on the threshold; whether he or another person then carries it out, he is not liable since the work was not performed in one step.” Therefore if the work was completed in one step he would be liable. Ben Azzai said, even if he completed the work at one time he would not be liable. Karmelit. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: karmel “soft full”, neither moist nor dry but average. And here it is neither public nor private domain but karmelit. What is karmelit? Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, for example the store of Bar Justinus. A multi-party courtyard and dead-end streets: if there is an eruv they are permitted, but if no eruv was made they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:35

Clarification. Rebbi Miasha and Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac were sitting and eating in one of the upper synagogues. There came the time of prayer and Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac got up to pray. Rebbi Misha said to him, Teacher, did you not teach us that once one started one does not interrupt? And Ḥizqiah stated, every one who is not under an obligation and does it anyway is called uneducated? He said to him, did we not state, “the bridegroom is not liable,” “the bridegroom if he wants to recite recites.” He answered him, I can explain this following Rabban Gamliel who said, “I shall not listen to you to lift from me the Kingdom of Heaven for one moment.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:40

HALAKHAH: Mishnah: “A tailor should not leave with his needle close to sundown lest he forget and leave,” etc. It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If one of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.”The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle with ear she is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:40

HALAKHAH: Mishnah: “A tailor should not leave with his needle close to sundown lest he forget and leave,” etc. It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If one of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.”The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle with ear she is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:40

HALAKHAH: Mishnah: “A tailor should not leave with his needle close to sundown lest he forget and leave,” etc. It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If one of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.”The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle with ear she is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:40

HALAKHAH: Mishnah: “A tailor should not leave with his needle close to sundown lest he forget and leave,” etc. It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If one of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.”The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle with ear she is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:40

HALAKHAH: Mishnah: “A tailor should not leave with his needle close to sundown lest he forget and leave,” etc. It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If one of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.”The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle with ear she is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:40

HALAKHAH: Mishnah: “A tailor should not leave with his needle close to sundown lest he forget and leave,” etc. It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If one of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.”The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle with ear she is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 1:44

It was stated, lest he forget and turn. “Rebbi Ismael said, I will read but not turn. He forgot and almost turned. He said, how great are the words of the Sages who said, lest he forget and turn. Rebbi Nathan says, he actually turned and wrote on his writing tablet, Ismael ben Elisha turned the light on the Sabbath. When the Temple will be rebuilt he is liable for a purification sacrifice.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:38

MISHNAH: One who extinguishes a light because he is afraid of Gentiles, of robbers, of evil spirits, or because of a sick person to let him sleep, is not liable. If to save the light, to save the oil, to save the wick, he is liable. Rebbi Yose declares them all not liable except for the wick because he produces charcoal.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:38

MISHNAH: One who extinguishes a light because he is afraid of Gentiles, of robbers, of evil spirits, or because of a sick person to let him sleep, is not liable. If to save the light, to save the oil, to save the wick, he is liable. Rebbi Yose declares them all not liable except for the wick because he produces charcoal.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:38

MISHNAH: One who extinguishes a light because he is afraid of Gentiles, of robbers, of evil spirits, or because of a sick person to let him sleep, is not liable. If to save the light, to save the oil, to save the wick, he is liable. Rebbi Yose declares them all not liable except for the wick because he produces charcoal.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:42

There, we have stated: “All who destroy are not liable,” except the incendiary and one causing an injury. Bar Qappara said, even if he did not need the blood, even if he did not need the ashes. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable.” If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable. Is that not for no purpose? So here if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable, even if it was for no purpose. Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, since it was for no purpose, did he commit a capital crime? But here even it was for no purpose he should be free from paying restitution, from the following: The slayer of an animal shall pay for it; the slayer of a human shall die. Since for the slayer of an animal you did not differentiate between unintentional and intentional to make him liable for money, so for the slayer of a human you cannot differentiate between unintentional and intentional to free him from liability for money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:42

There, we have stated: “All who destroy are not liable,” except the incendiary and one causing an injury. Bar Qappara said, even if he did not need the blood, even if he did not need the ashes. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable.” If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable. Is that not for no purpose? So here if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable, even if it was for no purpose. Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, since it was for no purpose, did he commit a capital crime? But here even it was for no purpose he should be free from paying restitution, from the following: The slayer of an animal shall pay for it; the slayer of a human shall die. Since for the slayer of an animal you did not differentiate between unintentional and intentional to make him liable for money, so for the slayer of a human you cannot differentiate between unintentional and intentional to free him from liability for money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:42

There, we have stated: “All who destroy are not liable,” except the incendiary and one causing an injury. Bar Qappara said, even if he did not need the blood, even if he did not need the ashes. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable.” If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable. Is that not for no purpose? So here if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable, even if it was for no purpose. Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, since it was for no purpose, did he commit a capital crime? But here even it was for no purpose he should be free from paying restitution, from the following: The slayer of an animal shall pay for it; the slayer of a human shall die. Since for the slayer of an animal you did not differentiate between unintentional and intentional to make him liable for money, so for the slayer of a human you cannot differentiate between unintentional and intentional to free him from liability for money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:42

There, we have stated: “All who destroy are not liable,” except the incendiary and one causing an injury. Bar Qappara said, even if he did not need the blood, even if he did not need the ashes. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable.” If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable. Is that not for no purpose? So here if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable, even if it was for no purpose. Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, since it was for no purpose, did he commit a capital crime? But here even it was for no purpose he should be free from paying restitution, from the following: The slayer of an animal shall pay for it; the slayer of a human shall die. Since for the slayer of an animal you did not differentiate between unintentional and intentional to make him liable for money, so for the slayer of a human you cannot differentiate between unintentional and intentional to free him from liability for money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:42

There, we have stated: “All who destroy are not liable,” except the incendiary and one causing an injury. Bar Qappara said, even if he did not need the blood, even if he did not need the ashes. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable.” If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable. Is that not for no purpose? So here if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable, even if it was for no purpose. Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, since it was for no purpose, did he commit a capital crime? But here even it was for no purpose he should be free from paying restitution, from the following: The slayer of an animal shall pay for it; the slayer of a human shall die. Since for the slayer of an animal you did not differentiate between unintentional and intentional to make him liable for money, so for the slayer of a human you cannot differentiate between unintentional and intentional to free him from liability for money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:42

There, we have stated: “All who destroy are not liable,” except the incendiary and one causing an injury. Bar Qappara said, even if he did not need the blood, even if he did not need the ashes. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable.” If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable. Is that not for no purpose? So here if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable, even if it was for no purpose. Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, since it was for no purpose, did he commit a capital crime? But here even it was for no purpose he should be free from paying restitution, from the following: The slayer of an animal shall pay for it; the slayer of a human shall die. Since for the slayer of an animal you did not differentiate between unintentional and intentional to make him liable for money, so for the slayer of a human you cannot differentiate between unintentional and intentional to free him from liability for money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:43

It is difficult for Bar Qappara. Setting fire taught about all work [mentioned] in the Torah; they are all for a need, itself not for a need? Rebbi Yose said, if (Rebbi Eleazar) would think with Rebbi Joḥanan who said, setting fire taught about all work [mentioned] in the Torah. Rebbi Eleazar said, setting fire taught about itself. Does Rebbi Eleazar not have about one to make him liable for each single one? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, of these, to make him liable once for all of them. We understand setting fire. A wound? Its main point for a need, itself not for a need? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Joḥanan disagree. One said, slaughter is the main point and a wound derivative; the other one switches.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:43

It is difficult for Bar Qappara. Setting fire taught about all work [mentioned] in the Torah; they are all for a need, itself not for a need? Rebbi Yose said, if (Rebbi Eleazar) would think with Rebbi Joḥanan who said, setting fire taught about all work [mentioned] in the Torah. Rebbi Eleazar said, setting fire taught about itself. Does Rebbi Eleazar not have about one to make him liable for each single one? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, of these, to make him liable once for all of them. We understand setting fire. A wound? Its main point for a need, itself not for a need? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Joḥanan disagree. One said, slaughter is the main point and a wound derivative; the other one switches.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:44

If one set a fire and extinguished with the same blowing he is liable twice. Rebbi Eudaimon the brother of Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if he blew at vessels and broke them, he pays full damages. He who stirs coals under a pot on the Sabbath is liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, he is liable twice, once that he extinguished the upper layer and once that he set fire to the lower layer. But he who stirs coals to warm himself in front of them on the Sabbath is not liable. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is a disagreement; according to him who said that he is liable only once. But according to him who said that he is twice liable he is liable. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, he is not twice liable but he is considered as if twice liable. Rebbi Yudan said, there he does not want that they be set on fire and he does not want that they be extinguished. But here he wants that they be set on fire and he wants that they be extinguished.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:44

If one set a fire and extinguished with the same blowing he is liable twice. Rebbi Eudaimon the brother of Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if he blew at vessels and broke them, he pays full damages. He who stirs coals under a pot on the Sabbath is liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, he is liable twice, once that he extinguished the upper layer and once that he set fire to the lower layer. But he who stirs coals to warm himself in front of them on the Sabbath is not liable. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is a disagreement; according to him who said that he is liable only once. But according to him who said that he is twice liable he is liable. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, he is not twice liable but he is considered as if twice liable. Rebbi Yudan said, there he does not want that they be set on fire and he does not want that they be extinguished. But here he wants that they be set on fire and he wants that they be extinguished.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:44

If one set a fire and extinguished with the same blowing he is liable twice. Rebbi Eudaimon the brother of Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if he blew at vessels and broke them, he pays full damages. He who stirs coals under a pot on the Sabbath is liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, he is liable twice, once that he extinguished the upper layer and once that he set fire to the lower layer. But he who stirs coals to warm himself in front of them on the Sabbath is not liable. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is a disagreement; according to him who said that he is liable only once. But according to him who said that he is twice liable he is liable. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, he is not twice liable but he is considered as if twice liable. Rebbi Yudan said, there he does not want that they be set on fire and he does not want that they be extinguished. But here he wants that they be set on fire and he wants that they be extinguished.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:44

If one set a fire and extinguished with the same blowing he is liable twice. Rebbi Eudaimon the brother of Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if he blew at vessels and broke them, he pays full damages. He who stirs coals under a pot on the Sabbath is liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, he is liable twice, once that he extinguished the upper layer and once that he set fire to the lower layer. But he who stirs coals to warm himself in front of them on the Sabbath is not liable. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is a disagreement; according to him who said that he is liable only once. But according to him who said that he is twice liable he is liable. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, he is not twice liable but he is considered as if twice liable. Rebbi Yudan said, there he does not want that they be set on fire and he does not want that they be extinguished. But here he wants that they be set on fire and he wants that they be extinguished.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:44

If one set a fire and extinguished with the same blowing he is liable twice. Rebbi Eudaimon the brother of Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if he blew at vessels and broke them, he pays full damages. He who stirs coals under a pot on the Sabbath is liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, he is liable twice, once that he extinguished the upper layer and once that he set fire to the lower layer. But he who stirs coals to warm himself in front of them on the Sabbath is not liable. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is a disagreement; according to him who said that he is liable only once. But according to him who said that he is twice liable he is liable. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, he is not twice liable but he is considered as if twice liable. Rebbi Yudan said, there he does not want that they be set on fire and he does not want that they be extinguished. But here he wants that they be set on fire and he wants that they be extinguished.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:44

If one set a fire and extinguished with the same blowing he is liable twice. Rebbi Eudaimon the brother of Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if he blew at vessels and broke them, he pays full damages. He who stirs coals under a pot on the Sabbath is liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, he is liable twice, once that he extinguished the upper layer and once that he set fire to the lower layer. But he who stirs coals to warm himself in front of them on the Sabbath is not liable. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is a disagreement; according to him who said that he is liable only once. But according to him who said that he is twice liable he is liable. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, he is not twice liable but he is considered as if twice liable. Rebbi Yudan said, there he does not want that they be set on fire and he does not want that they be extinguished. But here he wants that they be set on fire and he wants that they be extinguished.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:44

If one set a fire and extinguished with the same blowing he is liable twice. Rebbi Eudaimon the brother of Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if he blew at vessels and broke them, he pays full damages. He who stirs coals under a pot on the Sabbath is liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, he is liable twice, once that he extinguished the upper layer and once that he set fire to the lower layer. But he who stirs coals to warm himself in front of them on the Sabbath is not liable. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is a disagreement; according to him who said that he is liable only once. But according to him who said that he is twice liable he is liable. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, he is not twice liable but he is considered as if twice liable. Rebbi Yudan said, there he does not want that they be set on fire and he does not want that they be extinguished. But here he wants that they be set on fire and he wants that they be extinguished.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:44

If one set a fire and extinguished with the same blowing he is liable twice. Rebbi Eudaimon the brother of Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if he blew at vessels and broke them, he pays full damages. He who stirs coals under a pot on the Sabbath is liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, he is liable twice, once that he extinguished the upper layer and once that he set fire to the lower layer. But he who stirs coals to warm himself in front of them on the Sabbath is not liable. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is a disagreement; according to him who said that he is liable only once. But according to him who said that he is twice liable he is liable. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, he is not twice liable but he is considered as if twice liable. Rebbi Yudan said, there he does not want that they be set on fire and he does not want that they be extinguished. But here he wants that they be set on fire and he wants that they be extinguished.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:44

If one set a fire and extinguished with the same blowing he is liable twice. Rebbi Eudaimon the brother of Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if he blew at vessels and broke them, he pays full damages. He who stirs coals under a pot on the Sabbath is liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, he is liable twice, once that he extinguished the upper layer and once that he set fire to the lower layer. But he who stirs coals to warm himself in front of them on the Sabbath is not liable. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is a disagreement; according to him who said that he is liable only once. But according to him who said that he is twice liable he is liable. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, he is not twice liable but he is considered as if twice liable. Rebbi Yudan said, there he does not want that they be set on fire and he does not want that they be extinguished. But here he wants that they be set on fire and he wants that they be extinguished.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:45

If one made a fire and cooked, there are Tannaim who state, he is twice liable, and there are Tannaim who state, he is once liable. He who said that he is twice liable, once because of setting a fire and once because of cooking. But he who said once, which one is it? Rebbi Jehudah says, because of setting a fire. Rebbi Yose says, because of cooking. It is difficult for Rebbi Yose; setting fire taught about all work [mentioned] in the Torah; he is not liable because of setting a fire but because of cooking?

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:45

If one made a fire and cooked, there are Tannaim who state, he is twice liable, and there are Tannaim who state, he is once liable. He who said that he is twice liable, once because of setting a fire and once because of cooking. But he who said once, which one is it? Rebbi Jehudah says, because of setting a fire. Rebbi Yose says, because of cooking. It is difficult for Rebbi Yose; setting fire taught about all work [mentioned] in the Torah; he is not liable because of setting a fire but because of cooking?

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:45

If one made a fire and cooked, there are Tannaim who state, he is twice liable, and there are Tannaim who state, he is once liable. He who said that he is twice liable, once because of setting a fire and once because of cooking. But he who said once, which one is it? Rebbi Jehudah says, because of setting a fire. Rebbi Yose says, because of cooking. It is difficult for Rebbi Yose; setting fire taught about all work [mentioned] in the Torah; he is not liable because of setting a fire but because of cooking?

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:45

If one made a fire and cooked, there are Tannaim who state, he is twice liable, and there are Tannaim who state, he is once liable. He who said that he is twice liable, once because of setting a fire and once because of cooking. But he who said once, which one is it? Rebbi Jehudah says, because of setting a fire. Rebbi Yose says, because of cooking. It is difficult for Rebbi Yose; setting fire taught about all work [mentioned] in the Torah; he is not liable because of setting a fire but because of cooking?

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:46

An outsider who officiated in the Temple on the Sabbath, or a deformed person who officiated in impurity, the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, two; bar Qappara said, one. Bar Qappara objected to the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: is the outsider liable for any service which is permitted to a Cohen? He objected and he answered it. Is there not the handful; before the handful was taken it was forbidden for both; after the handful was taken it is forbidden for outsiders and permitted to Cohanim? He said to him, there is a difference, for it is written: no outsider may eat sanctified food. Is there not the breaking of the neck; before the neck was broken it was forbidden for both; after the neck was broken it is forbidden for outsiders and permitted to Cohanim? He said to him, there is a difference, for it is written: no outsider may eat sanctified food. Is there not the ṭevel; before it was put in order it was forbidden for both; after it was put in order it is forbidden for outsiders and permitted to Cohanim? He said to him, there is a difference, for it is written: no outsider may eat sanctified food. They said, let us go outside and learn. They went outside and heard, Rebbi Yose said, two; Rebbi Simeon said, one. He who said one, because of outsider status. He who said two, one because of outsider status; why the other? Because of slaughter. But slaughter by an outsider is valid! But because bringing, sprinkling, and receiving. These are only because of Sabbath rest. Therefore the reason may be only because of the consumption of limbs and fat which were consumed on the altar during the entire night. In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah who said because of setting fire it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose who said because of cooking, what cooking is here? Since he wants their being consumed it is like cooking.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:10

As it was stated: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if it was done unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath, intentionally it may not be eaten. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath by others but not by himself, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” Samuel followed Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. When Rav was instructing his own group he said following Rebbi Meïr; in public he instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rebbi Simeon bar Karsana said, he explained to us following Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, as it was stated: “Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said in his father’s name, in any case where for an intentional sin one is liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin for a purification offering, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result is forbidden both to him and to others. In any case where for an intentional sin one is not liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin no purification offering is due, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result unintentional it may be eaten by others after the end of the Sabbath but not by him, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, what do you say? He said, I have only the Mishnah: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten.” Rav Ḥisda heard this and said, the Sabbaths have been permitted! Rav Huna in the name of Rav, and Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “In earlier times they said, one who forgets some dish on his stove on the Sabbath, unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten. People were suspected that they left it intentionally and said, it was forgotten; they forbade it to them when it was forgotten.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Ila said, they were suspected to leave it on, they were not suspected to cook. They imposed a fine for forgetting but not for cooking.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:10

As it was stated: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if it was done unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath, intentionally it may not be eaten. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath by others but not by himself, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” Samuel followed Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. When Rav was instructing his own group he said following Rebbi Meïr; in public he instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rebbi Simeon bar Karsana said, he explained to us following Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, as it was stated: “Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said in his father’s name, in any case where for an intentional sin one is liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin for a purification offering, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result is forbidden both to him and to others. In any case where for an intentional sin one is not liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin no purification offering is due, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result unintentional it may be eaten by others after the end of the Sabbath but not by him, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, what do you say? He said, I have only the Mishnah: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten.” Rav Ḥisda heard this and said, the Sabbaths have been permitted! Rav Huna in the name of Rav, and Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “In earlier times they said, one who forgets some dish on his stove on the Sabbath, unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten. People were suspected that they left it intentionally and said, it was forgotten; they forbade it to them when it was forgotten.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Ila said, they were suspected to leave it on, they were not suspected to cook. They imposed a fine for forgetting but not for cooking.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:51

It was stated: If a light was lying on a table he takes away the table and the light falls down. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this one is close to be liable for a purification sacrifice; forwards for setting a fire, backwards for extinguishing. Samuel bar Abba before Rebbi Yasa: when it was extinguished. He told him, may your mind be at rest. Where do we hold? If following Rebbi Meïr, even the table should be forbidden. If following Rebbi Simeon, even the light should be permitted. But here following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah says, a pottery light is disgusting, a table is not disgusting.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:1

MISHNAH: With what may a woman go out and with what may she not go out? A woman may go out neither with woolen or linen threads nor with ribbons on her head and she may not immerse herself wearing them unless she relaxes them. To the public domain not with a frontlet nor with a head-dress hanging down the cheeks as long as they are not sewn, nor an under-cap. Also not with a city of gold, nor with a chain, nor with nose rings, nor with a ring without a seal, nor with a pin. If she went out she is not liable for a purification offering.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:10

“Nor with a city of gold.” Rav Jehudah said, for example a Jerusalem of gold The rabbis of Caesarea said, פרוש טוק טקלין. It happened that Rebbi Aqiba made a city of gold for his wife. Rabban Gamliel’s wife saw her and became jealous. She came and mentioned it before her husband. He told her, if you had done for me what she did for him, for she sold the braids of her head, gave him, and he studied Torah. There, we have stated: “Two in the name of Rebbi Eliezer. A woman may go out with a city of gold and participants in pigeon contests are disqualified for testimony.” It was stated, Rebbi Meïr declares liable. Between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis it is understandable, Rebbi Meïr declares liable and the Sages declare not liable. Between Rebbi Eliezer and the rabbis it is understandable, Rebbi Eliezer permits and the Sages prohibit. Between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Eliezer it is difficult, Rebbi Meïr declares liable and Rebbi Eliezer permits.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:10

“Nor with a city of gold.” Rav Jehudah said, for example a Jerusalem of gold The rabbis of Caesarea said, פרוש טוק טקלין. It happened that Rebbi Aqiba made a city of gold for his wife. Rabban Gamliel’s wife saw her and became jealous. She came and mentioned it before her husband. He told her, if you had done for me what she did for him, for she sold the braids of her head, gave him, and he studied Torah. There, we have stated: “Two in the name of Rebbi Eliezer. A woman may go out with a city of gold and participants in pigeon contests are disqualified for testimony.” It was stated, Rebbi Meïr declares liable. Between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis it is understandable, Rebbi Meïr declares liable and the Sages declare not liable. Between Rebbi Eliezer and the rabbis it is understandable, Rebbi Eliezer permits and the Sages prohibit. Between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Eliezer it is difficult, Rebbi Meïr declares liable and Rebbi Eliezer permits.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:10

“Nor with a city of gold.” Rav Jehudah said, for example a Jerusalem of gold The rabbis of Caesarea said, פרוש טוק טקלין. It happened that Rebbi Aqiba made a city of gold for his wife. Rabban Gamliel’s wife saw her and became jealous. She came and mentioned it before her husband. He told her, if you had done for me what she did for him, for she sold the braids of her head, gave him, and he studied Torah. There, we have stated: “Two in the name of Rebbi Eliezer. A woman may go out with a city of gold and participants in pigeon contests are disqualified for testimony.” It was stated, Rebbi Meïr declares liable. Between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis it is understandable, Rebbi Meïr declares liable and the Sages declare not liable. Between Rebbi Eliezer and the rabbis it is understandable, Rebbi Eliezer permits and the Sages prohibit. Between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Eliezer it is difficult, Rebbi Meïr declares liable and Rebbi Eliezer permits.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:10

“Nor with a city of gold.” Rav Jehudah said, for example a Jerusalem of gold The rabbis of Caesarea said, פרוש טוק טקלין. It happened that Rebbi Aqiba made a city of gold for his wife. Rabban Gamliel’s wife saw her and became jealous. She came and mentioned it before her husband. He told her, if you had done for me what she did for him, for she sold the braids of her head, gave him, and he studied Torah. There, we have stated: “Two in the name of Rebbi Eliezer. A woman may go out with a city of gold and participants in pigeon contests are disqualified for testimony.” It was stated, Rebbi Meïr declares liable. Between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis it is understandable, Rebbi Meïr declares liable and the Sages declare not liable. Between Rebbi Eliezer and the rabbis it is understandable, Rebbi Eliezer permits and the Sages prohibit. Between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Eliezer it is difficult, Rebbi Meïr declares liable and Rebbi Eliezer permits.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:12

MISHNAH: A man may not go out with a nailed shoe, nor with a single one if he does not have a wound on his foot, nor with a phylactery nor with a amulet not written by an expert, nor with armor, nor with a helmet, nor with soldier’s boots. If he went out he is not liable for a purification offering.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:28

MISHNAH: A woman may not go out with a needle that has an ear, nor with a signet ring, nor with a snail-shaped headdress, nor with a perfume bouquet, nor with a perfume flask; if she went out she is liable for a purification offering, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages declare her not liable for a perfume bouquet or a perfume flask.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:28

MISHNAH: A woman may not go out with a needle that has an ear, nor with a signet ring, nor with a snail-shaped headdress, nor with a perfume bouquet, nor with a perfume flask; if she went out she is liable for a purification offering, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages declare her not liable for a perfume bouquet or a perfume flask.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:29

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If any of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.” The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle without ear one is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:29

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If any of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.” The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle without ear one is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:29

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If any of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.” The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle without ear one is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:29

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If any of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.” The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle without ear one is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:29

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If any of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.” The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle without ear one is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:29

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If any of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.” The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle without ear one is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:30

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Rav Naḥman, it is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s, as we have stated there: “A metal ring with a coral seal is impure; a coral ring with a metal seal is pure.” It was stated about this: “Rebbi Neḥemiah switches. And so did Rebbi Neḥemiah say, for a ring after its seal, for a ladder after its steps, for a קוֹלָב after what fixes it, for a (lock) [yoke] after its strips.” Rebbi Ila said, explain it according to everybody if she took it out in order to seal with it. Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: if it was made for dual purpose, if she brought it out in order to seal one is liable, if she brought it out as jewelry one is not liable even for the seal for also the seal becomes an accessory of jewelry.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:30

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Rav Naḥman, it is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s, as we have stated there: “A metal ring with a coral seal is impure; a coral ring with a metal seal is pure.” It was stated about this: “Rebbi Neḥemiah switches. And so did Rebbi Neḥemiah say, for a ring after its seal, for a ladder after its steps, for a קוֹלָב after what fixes it, for a (lock) [yoke] after its strips.” Rebbi Ila said, explain it according to everybody if she took it out in order to seal with it. Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: if it was made for dual purpose, if she brought it out in order to seal one is liable, if she brought it out as jewelry one is not liable even for the seal for also the seal becomes an accessory of jewelry.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6:31

MISHNAH: A man may go out neither with a sword, nor with a bow, nor with a shield, nor with a bludgeon, nor with a spear, and if he went out he is liable for a purification offering. Rebbi Eliezer says, these are adornments for him, but the Sages say, they only are shameful for him, as it is said, they will forge their swords into ploughs and their lances into vintner’s knives. A garter is pure and one may go out with in on the Sabbath. Ropes are impure and one may not go out with them on the Sabbath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:3

We have stated: “Anybody who is oblivious of the principle of the Sabbath.” They stated in the House of Rebbi: Anybody ignorant of the principles of the Sabbath. Rebbi Eleazar follows our Mishnah. Rebbi Joḥanan follows what was stated in the House of Rebbi. But Rebbi Eliezer said, “anybody who is oblivious of the principle of the Sabbath.” Therefore if he does not know anything of the principles of the Sabbath is he not liable? Since Rav stated our Mishnah and explained it: who is the one who does not know anything of the principles of the Sabbath? A child who was taken prisoner among the Gentiles. This implies that both versions are the same. As Rebbi Joḥanan said, anybody ignorant of the principles of the Sabbath. Therefore (if he does not) [if he did] know and forgot he is liable. Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that both versions are the same. They asked before Rebbi Yasa’s son: What did you hear from your father about Rebbi Yose? He said, following Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Ḥizqiah told them, he did not say so. But Rebbi Simon bar Zavda was simply with Rebbi Yose’s son and heard from him following Rebbi Eliezer.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:3

We have stated: “Anybody who is oblivious of the principle of the Sabbath.” They stated in the House of Rebbi: Anybody ignorant of the principles of the Sabbath. Rebbi Eleazar follows our Mishnah. Rebbi Joḥanan follows what was stated in the House of Rebbi. But Rebbi Eliezer said, “anybody who is oblivious of the principle of the Sabbath.” Therefore if he does not know anything of the principles of the Sabbath is he not liable? Since Rav stated our Mishnah and explained it: who is the one who does not know anything of the principles of the Sabbath? A child who was taken prisoner among the Gentiles. This implies that both versions are the same. As Rebbi Joḥanan said, anybody ignorant of the principles of the Sabbath. Therefore (if he does not) [if he did] know and forgot he is liable. Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that both versions are the same. They asked before Rebbi Yasa’s son: What did you hear from your father about Rebbi Yose? He said, following Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Ḥizqiah told them, he did not say so. But Rebbi Simon bar Zavda was simply with Rebbi Yose’s son and heard from him following Rebbi Eliezer.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:3

We have stated: “Anybody who is oblivious of the principle of the Sabbath.” They stated in the House of Rebbi: Anybody ignorant of the principles of the Sabbath. Rebbi Eleazar follows our Mishnah. Rebbi Joḥanan follows what was stated in the House of Rebbi. But Rebbi Eliezer said, “anybody who is oblivious of the principle of the Sabbath.” Therefore if he does not know anything of the principles of the Sabbath is he not liable? Since Rav stated our Mishnah and explained it: who is the one who does not know anything of the principles of the Sabbath? A child who was taken prisoner among the Gentiles. This implies that both versions are the same. As Rebbi Joḥanan said, anybody ignorant of the principles of the Sabbath. Therefore (if he does not) [if he did] know and forgot he is liable. Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that both versions are the same. They asked before Rebbi Yasa’s son: What did you hear from your father about Rebbi Yose? He said, following Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Ḥizqiah told them, he did not say so. But Rebbi Simon bar Zavda was simply with Rebbi Yose’s son and heard from him following Rebbi Eliezer.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:4

From where these things? He did one, and did these, and did of these. He did one, to obligate for each one separately; and did these, to obligate for all of them together. Of these, to obligate for derivatives. Or should we say that the verse refers to idolatry? Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Babylonian! You crossed by hand three rivers and were broken; he is liable only once. Before it was broken in his hand there was one but no these; after it was broken in his hand there was these but no one. But it could be idolatry worshipped by the rules of worship of Heaven as by prostration. In its own worship to obligate for each one separately. By the rules of worship of Heaven to obligate one for all of them. Like prostration to obligate for partial action. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac. It is written, if the anointed priest should sin to damage the people … he has to bring a bull. This excludes idolatry for which he does not bring a bull but only a she-goat. They objected, are there not fat and sexual taboos for which the Anointed brings a bull? We come only to state things that have derivatives. Fat has no derivatives. For sexual taboos He made one who touched equal to one who had full intercourse. The colleagues say, a Sabbath it is for the Eternal, to obligate for each single Sabbath. Rebbi Ila said, it is written: Anybody doing work on it shall by put to death, not one who does on it and another. You are saying, the Sabbaths do not combine. Do they separate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, just as they do not combine they do not separate.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:4

From where these things? He did one, and did these, and did of these. He did one, to obligate for each one separately; and did these, to obligate for all of them together. Of these, to obligate for derivatives. Or should we say that the verse refers to idolatry? Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Babylonian! You crossed by hand three rivers and were broken; he is liable only once. Before it was broken in his hand there was one but no these; after it was broken in his hand there was these but no one. But it could be idolatry worshipped by the rules of worship of Heaven as by prostration. In its own worship to obligate for each one separately. By the rules of worship of Heaven to obligate one for all of them. Like prostration to obligate for partial action. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac. It is written, if the anointed priest should sin to damage the people … he has to bring a bull. This excludes idolatry for which he does not bring a bull but only a she-goat. They objected, are there not fat and sexual taboos for which the Anointed brings a bull? We come only to state things that have derivatives. Fat has no derivatives. For sexual taboos He made one who touched equal to one who had full intercourse. The colleagues say, a Sabbath it is for the Eternal, to obligate for each single Sabbath. Rebbi Ila said, it is written: Anybody doing work on it shall by put to death, not one who does on it and another. You are saying, the Sabbaths do not combine. Do they separate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, just as they do not combine they do not separate.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:6

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Aqiba said, I asked Rebbi Eliezer: If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or for each single one separately? He told him, he is liable for each occurrence separately by an argument de minore ad majus. Since for the menstruating woman, which does not entail many ramifications nor many purification sacrifices, he is liable for each single occurrence, for the Sabbath which has many ramifications and many purification sacrifices it is only logical that he be liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the menstruating woman where there are two warnings, for he is warned about a menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is warned about him, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one warning? He said to me, one who has intercourse with an underage girl shall prove it, where there is only one warning, but he is liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the underage girl who even though there is no warning now there will be one in the future, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one [warning] whether now or in the future. He told me, one having intercourse with an animal shall prove it. I said to him, the animal is like the Sabbath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:6

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Aqiba said, I asked Rebbi Eliezer: If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or for each single one separately? He told him, he is liable for each occurrence separately by an argument de minore ad majus. Since for the menstruating woman, which does not entail many ramifications nor many purification sacrifices, he is liable for each single occurrence, for the Sabbath which has many ramifications and many purification sacrifices it is only logical that he be liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the menstruating woman where there are two warnings, for he is warned about a menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is warned about him, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one warning? He said to me, one who has intercourse with an underage girl shall prove it, where there is only one warning, but he is liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the underage girl who even though there is no warning now there will be one in the future, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one [warning] whether now or in the future. He told me, one having intercourse with an animal shall prove it. I said to him, the animal is like the Sabbath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:6

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Aqiba said, I asked Rebbi Eliezer: If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or for each single one separately? He told him, he is liable for each occurrence separately by an argument de minore ad majus. Since for the menstruating woman, which does not entail many ramifications nor many purification sacrifices, he is liable for each single occurrence, for the Sabbath which has many ramifications and many purification sacrifices it is only logical that he be liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the menstruating woman where there are two warnings, for he is warned about a menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is warned about him, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one warning? He said to me, one who has intercourse with an underage girl shall prove it, where there is only one warning, but he is liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the underage girl who even though there is no warning now there will be one in the future, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one [warning] whether now or in the future. He told me, one having intercourse with an animal shall prove it. I said to him, the animal is like the Sabbath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:6

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Aqiba said, I asked Rebbi Eliezer: If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or for each single one separately? He told him, he is liable for each occurrence separately by an argument de minore ad majus. Since for the menstruating woman, which does not entail many ramifications nor many purification sacrifices, he is liable for each single occurrence, for the Sabbath which has many ramifications and many purification sacrifices it is only logical that he be liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the menstruating woman where there are two warnings, for he is warned about a menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is warned about him, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one warning? He said to me, one who has intercourse with an underage girl shall prove it, where there is only one warning, but he is liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the underage girl who even though there is no warning now there will be one in the future, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one [warning] whether now or in the future. He told me, one having intercourse with an animal shall prove it. I said to him, the animal is like the Sabbath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:6

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Aqiba said, I asked Rebbi Eliezer: If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or for each single one separately? He told him, he is liable for each occurrence separately by an argument de minore ad majus. Since for the menstruating woman, which does not entail many ramifications nor many purification sacrifices, he is liable for each single occurrence, for the Sabbath which has many ramifications and many purification sacrifices it is only logical that he be liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the menstruating woman where there are two warnings, for he is warned about a menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is warned about him, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one warning? He said to me, one who has intercourse with an underage girl shall prove it, where there is only one warning, but he is liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the underage girl who even though there is no warning now there will be one in the future, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one [warning] whether now or in the future. He told me, one having intercourse with an animal shall prove it. I said to him, the animal is like the Sabbath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:7

Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:7

Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:7

Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:7

Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:7

Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:7

Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:7

Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. About this we have stated “many works”. He is not liable because of Sabbaths. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. About this we have stated “many Sabbaths”. He is not liable because of the works. Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not concede to him? Since what Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: This entire Halakhah follows Rebbi Eliezer, but following the rabbis he is liable only once. This implies that he did not concede to him. (It was) [Now] Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work. Did he concede to him or did he not (instruct) [concede to] him? Rebbi Zeˋira said before Rebbi Yasa, a baraita implies that he did not concede to him, as it was stated, “ ‘I know that it is the Sabbath, I know that this is work. But I do not know that this is work for which one becomes liable to extirpation.’ If he did work of several categories he is liable for every single work. If he did work of one category only, he is liable for every episode of oblivion if there were many oblivions, but if all was one oblivion he is liable only once.” Since he did not quote this as an objection it implies that he did not concede to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:8

Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. Therefore, in the case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work even Rebbi Eliezer should agree with Rebbi Aqiba that he is liable only once. But then Rebbi Aqiba should have objected, is there not the case of intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work, where there are many ramifications or many purification sacrifices and you are instructing that he is liable only once! Since he did not object in this way it implies that one case is like the other case.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:8

Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. Therefore, in the case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent about the work even Rebbi Eliezer should agree with Rebbi Aqiba that he is liable only once. But then Rebbi Aqiba should have objected, is there not the case of intent regarding the Sabbath but error about the work, where there are many ramifications or many purification sacrifices and you are instructing that he is liable only once! Since he did not object in this way it implies that one case is like the other case.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:9

Now Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. Therefore about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work even Rebbi Aqiba will agree with Rebbi Eliezer that he is liable for every single one. Then Rebbi Eliezer should have objected to him, is there not error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the works where there are not many ramifications and many purification sacrifices and you are agreeing with me that he is liable for every single one. Since he did not object in this way it implies that one case is like the other case.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:9

Now Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. Therefore about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work even Rebbi Aqiba will agree with Rebbi Eliezer that he is liable for every single one. Then Rebbi Eliezer should have objected to him, is there not error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the works where there are not many ramifications and many purification sacrifices and you are agreeing with me that he is liable for every single one. Since he did not object in this way it implies that one case is like the other case.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:10

Now Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. Do you not catch him because of the error regarding the Sabbath? Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Abba: He asked him two questions. About intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work that he be liable for every single one. In case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding works does one treat the derivatives like that main item? Rebbi Jacob ben Dasai said, and in the House of Rebbi it was stated so: “If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or once for each single one?” Many works of the same category, this describes intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. Many Sabbaths all of the same category, this describes error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:10

Now Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda said, he asked him about error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work. Do you not catch him because of the error regarding the Sabbath? Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Abba: He asked him two questions. About intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work that he be liable for every single one. In case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding works does one treat the derivatives like that main item? Rebbi Jacob ben Dasai said, and in the House of Rebbi it was stated so: “If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or once for each single one?” Many works of the same category, this describes intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding the work. Many Sabbaths all of the same category, this describes error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:11

Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding works. Can anybody become liable intentionally? You superimpose the error regarding works over the intent regarding the Sabbath. Similarly, in case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work you superimpose the error regarding the Sabbath over the intent regarding works to hold him liable for each single occurrence. Does Rebbi Eliezer not accept one, to obligate for each one separately? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: An adult who was abducted among Gentiles is liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:11

Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding works. Can anybody become liable intentionally? You superimpose the error regarding works over the intent regarding the Sabbath. Similarly, in case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work you superimpose the error regarding the Sabbath over the intent regarding works to hold him liable for each single occurrence. Does Rebbi Eliezer not accept one, to obligate for each one separately? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: An adult who was abducted among Gentiles is liable for each single one.