man
12481 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
If a man forbade his wife by vow from visiting a house of mourning or a house of feasting, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah, because he has closed [peoples doors] against her. If he claims [that his vow] was due to some other cause he is permitted [to forbid her]. If he said to her: “[There shall be no prohibition] provided you tell so-and-so what you have told me” or “what I have told you” or “that you will fill and pour out in the garbage”, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah.
These leave [their marriage] without their ketubah: A wife who transgresses the law of Moses or Jewish law. And what is the law of Moses? Feeding her husband with untithed food, having intercourse with him while in the period of her menstruation, not separating dough offering, or making vows and not fulfilling them. And what is Jewish practice? Going out with her head uncovered, spinning wool in the marketplace or conversing with every man. Abba Shaul says: also one who curses her husband’s parents in his presence. Rabbi Tarfon says: also one who has a loud voice. And who is regarded as one who has a loud voice? A woman whose voice can be heard by her neighbors when she speaks inside her house.
If a man betrothed a woman on condition that she was under no vows and she was found to be under vows, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to be under vows, she leaves without her ketubah. [If a woman was betrothed] on condition that she has no bodily defects, and she was found to have defects, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to have defects, she leaves without her ketubah. All defects which disqualify priests also disqualify women.
A man in whom defects have arisen [after marriage] cannot be forced to divorce [his wife]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: To what does this apply: to minor defects, but with regard to major defects he can be forced to divorce her.
These are the ones who are forced to divorce [their wives]: one who is afflicted with boils, one who has a polypus, a gatherer [of dog feces for the treatment of hides], a coppersmith or a tanner whether they were [in such a condition] before they married or whether they arose after they had married. And concerning all these Rabbi Meir said: although the man made a condition with her [that she accept him despite these defects] she may nevertheless say, “I thought I could accept him, but now I cannot accept him.” The Sages say: she must accept [such a person] against her will, the only exception being a man afflicted with boils, because she [by her intercourse] will enervate him. It once happened at Sidon that a tanner died, and he had a brother who was also a tanner. The Sages said: she may say, “I was able to accept your brother but I cannot accept you.”
These are the ones who are forced to divorce [their wives]: one who is afflicted with boils, one who has a polypus, a gatherer [of dog feces for the treatment of hides], a coppersmith or a tanner whether they were [in such a condition] before they married or whether they arose after they had married. And concerning all these Rabbi Meir said: although the man made a condition with her [that she accept him despite these defects] she may nevertheless say, “I thought I could accept him, but now I cannot accept him.” The Sages say: she must accept [such a person] against her will, the only exception being a man afflicted with boils, because she [by her intercourse] will enervate him. It once happened at Sidon that a tanner died, and he had a brother who was also a tanner. The Sages said: she may say, “I was able to accept your brother but I cannot accept you.”
If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid. If she came into the possession of property after she was betrothed, Bet Shammai says: she may sell it, and Beth Hillel says: she may not sell it. Both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?” If she came into the possession of property after she was married, both agree that, even if she had sold it or given it away, the husband may seize it from the buyers. [If she came into possession] before she married and then she married, Rabban Gamaliel says: if she sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also gain acquires her property?” He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”
If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid. If she came into the possession of property after she was betrothed, Bet Shammai says: she may sell it, and Beth Hillel says: she may not sell it. Both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?” If she came into the possession of property after she was married, both agree that, even if she had sold it or given it away, the husband may seize it from the buyers. [If she came into possession] before she married and then she married, Rabban Gamaliel says: if she sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also gain acquires her property?” He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”
He cannot say to her, “Behold your ketubah lies on the table’, rather all of his property has on it a lien from her kethubah. So too, a man may not say to his wife, behold your ketubah lies on the table, but all of his property has on it a lien from her ketubah. If he divorced her she is entitled only to her ketubah. If he remarried her she is like all other wives, and is entitled only to her ketubah.
If a husband writes to his wife, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property”, he may enjoy its usufruct during her lifetime and, when she dies, he is her heir. If so, why might he have written to her, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property”? That if she sold it or gave it away her act is valid. If he wrote, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property and upon their produce”, he may not enjoy their usufruct during her lifetime but, when she dies, he inherits her. Rabbi Judah says: he may in all cases enjoy the usufruct from the usufruct unless he wrote to her: “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property and upon its produce and the produce of its produce and so on without end.” If he wrote, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property, its produce and the produce of its produce during your lifetime and after your death”, he may neither enjoy it produce during her lifetime nor does he inherit her when she dies. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: when she dies he inherits her because [by his declaration] he is making a condition which is contrary to what is written in the Torah and whenever a man makes a condition which is contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition is null and void.
A man died and left a wife, a creditor, and heirs and he also had a deposit or a loan in the possession of others: Rabbi Tarfon says: It shall be given to the one who is under the greatest disadvantage. Rabbi Akiva says: We do not show mercy in a matter of law. Rather it shall be given to the heirs, for whereas all the others must take an oath the heirs need not take any oath.
If she produced a get without a ketubah, she collects her kethubah. [If she produced her] ketubah without a get, and she says, “My get was lost”, and he says, “My receipt was lost”, and also a creditor who produced a debt document that was unaccompanied by a prosbul, these are not paid back. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: from the time of danger a woman collects her ketubah with out a get and a creditor collects [his debt] without a prosbul. [A woman who produced] two letters of divorce and two ketuboth collects two kethuboth. Two kethuboth and one get or one kethubah and two gittin, or a kethubah, a get and [evidence of her husband’s] death, she collects one kethubah only, for a man who divorces his wife and then remarries her contracts his second marriage on the condition of the first kethubah. A minor whose his father had given him in marriage, the ketubah of his wife is valid, since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife. A convert who converted with his wife, the kethubah remains valid, since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife.
If a man was married to two wives and died, the first wife takes precedence over the second, and the heirs of the first wife take precedence over the heirs of the second. If he married a first wife and she died and then he married a second wife and he died, the second wife and her heirs take precedence over the heirs of the first wife.
If a man was married to two wives and they died, and subsequently he died, and the orphans [of one of the wives] claim their mother’s kethubah and there is only enough for the two kethuboth,[all the orphans] they divide it equally. If there was a surplus of [at least] one dinar, these take their mother’s ketubah and these take their mothers ketubah. If the orphans [of one of the wives] says, “We are raising the estate of our father by a denar [more than the total amount of the kethuboth]”, in order that they can take their mother's kethubah, they are not listened to, rather the estate is evaluated by the court.
If a man who was married to three wives died, and the kethubah of one was a maneh, and of the other two hundred zuz, and of the third three hundred zuz and the estate [was worth] only one maneh they divide it equally. If the estate [was worth] two hundred zuz [the woman whose ketubah] is a maneh receives fifty zuz [and the woman whose ketubah] was two hundred and [the woman whose ketubah] was three hundred [receive each] three gold denarii (=seventy-five). If the estate [was worth] three hundred zuz, [the woman whose ketubah] was a maneh receives fifty zuz and [the woman whose ketubah] was two hundred [receives] a maneh and [the woman whose ketubah] was worth three hundred [receives] six gold denarii (=one hundred and fifty). Similarly, if three persons contributed to a joint fund and the fund lost or gained they share in the same manner.
If a man who was married to four wives died, his first wife takes precedence over the second, the second over the third and the third over the fourth. The first must take an oath to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth, and the fourth recovers payment without an oath. Ben Nannus says: Should she be rewarded because she is the last? She too may not exact payment except by an oath. If all were issued on the same day then the woman [whose kethubah] preceded that of the other, even if only by one hour, gets [her ketubah first]. And so it was the custom in Jerusalem to write the hours. If all kethuboth were issued at the same hour and the estate is worth no more than a maneh, they divide it equally.
If a man who was married to two wives sold his field, and the first wife wrote to the buyer, “I have no claim whatsoever upon you”, the second wife may take [the field] away from the buyer, and the first wife from the second, and the buyer from the first wife; and so they go on in turn until they arrange a compromise between them. The same law applies also to a creditor and to a woman creditor.
If a man married a woman and she cut a deal with him that he should maintain her daughter for five years, he must maintain her for five years. If she was [subsequently] married to another man and cut a deal with him [as well] that he should maintain her daughter for five years, he must maintain her for five years. The first husband may not plead, “If she will come to me I will maintain her”, rather he must send her maintenance to her at the place where her mother [lives]. Similarly, the two husbands cannot plead, “We will maintain her jointly”, but one must maintain her and the other give her the cost of her maintenance.
If a man married a woman and she cut a deal with him that he should maintain her daughter for five years, he must maintain her for five years. If she was [subsequently] married to another man and cut a deal with him [as well] that he should maintain her daughter for five years, he must maintain her for five years. The first husband may not plead, “If she will come to me I will maintain her”, rather he must send her maintenance to her at the place where her mother [lives]. Similarly, the two husbands cannot plead, “We will maintain her jointly”, but one must maintain her and the other give her the cost of her maintenance.
There were two judges of fines in Jerusalem, Admon and Hanan ben Avishalom. Hanan stated two rulings and Admon stated seven. If a man went to a country beyond the sea and his wife claimed maintenance: Hanan says: she must take an oath at the end but not at the beginning. The sons of the high priests differed from him and ruled that she must take an oath both at the beginning and at the end. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agreed with their ruling. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Hanan has spoken well; she need take an oath only at the end.
If a man went to a country beyond the sea and someone came forward and financially supported his wife, Hanan says: he lost his money. The sons of the high priests differed from him and said: let him take an oath as to how much he spent and recover it. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agreed with their ruling. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Hanan has spoken well [the man] put his money on the horn of a deer.
If a man went to a country beyond the sea and someone came forward and financially supported his wife, Hanan says: he lost his money. The sons of the high priests differed from him and said: let him take an oath as to how much he spent and recover it. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agreed with their ruling. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Hanan has spoken well [the man] put his money on the horn of a deer.
Admon said seven [rulings]: If a man dies and leaves sons and daughters, if the estate is large, the sons inherit it and the daughters are maintained [from it]. And if the estate is small, the daughters are maintained from it, and the sons can go begging. Admon said, “Just because I’m a male I lose out!” Rabban Gamaliel said; I agree with the words of Admon.
If a man promised a money to his [prospective] son-in-law and then defaulted, [his daughter] shall sit until her hair turns white. Admon says: She may say, “Had I myself promised the sum I would sit until my hair turns white, but now that my father has promised it, what can I do? Either marry me or set me free.” Rabban Gamaliel said: I agree with the words of Admon.
If a man contests [the ownership of] a field and he has signed as a witness on [its deed of sale], Admon says: He can say, “[Litigation with] the second is easier for me, since the first is a more difficult person than he”. But the Sages say: He lost his right. If [the protester] made it a boundary mark [when selling an adjacent piece of land to] another person he has lost his right [to protest].
If a man went to a country beyond the sea and [in his absence] the path to his field was lost, Admon ruled: let him walk [to his field] by the shortest way. But the Sages say: let him purchase a path for himself even if it costs him a hundred maneh or let him fly through the air.
If a man produced a debt document against another, and the latter produced [a deed of sale showing] that the former had sold him a field, Admon ruled: [The other] can say, had I owed you [anything] you should have been paid pack when you sold me the field”. But the Sages say: This [seller] was clever, since he may have sold him the land in order to be able to take it from him as a pledge.
[The following regions are regarded as] three countries in respect of marriage: Judaea, Transjordan and Galilee. [A husband] may not take out [his wife with him] from one town to another or from one city to an other. But within the same country he may take her out with him from one town into another town or from one city into an other city, but not from a town to a city nor from a city to a town. [A man] may take out [his wife with him] from an inferior to a superior dwelling, but not from a superior to an inferior dwelling. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: not even from an inferior dwelling to a superior dwelling, because the [change to a] superior dwelling tests.
Everyone may compel [their spouse] to go up to the land of Israel, but none may compel [their spouse] to leave. Everyone may compel [their spouse] to go up to Jerusalem, but none may compel [their spouse] to leave. The same is true for both men and women and [slaves]. If a man married a woman in the land of Israel and divorced her in the land of Israel, he must pay her [her ketubah] in the currency of the land of Israel. If he married a woman in the land of Israel and divorced her in Cappadocia he must pay her [her ketubah] in the currency of the land of Israel. If he married a woman in Cappadocia and divorced her in the land of Israel, he must a gain pay [her ketubah] in the currency of the land of Israel. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that he must pay her [her ketubah] in the Cappadocian currency.
The only difference between one who is under a vow not to benefit at all from his neighbor, and one who is under a vow prohibiting food benefit, is in respect of walking [on his property] and [the use of] utensils not employed in the preparation of food. If a man is under a vow not to derive food benefit from his neighbor, he may not lend him a sifter, sieve, mill-stone or oven, but he may lend him a cloak, ring, garment, and earrings, and whatever is not employed in the preparation of food. In a place where things such as these are rented out, it is forbidden.
If a man from the street was forbidden by vow to benefit from one of them, he may not enter the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: He can say to him, “I am entering into your friend’s and not into yours.”
If one is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor, and he owns a bath-house or an olive press which is leased to someone in the town, and he has an interest in them, he is forbidden [to make use of them]; If [he does] not [have an interest in them], he is permitted. If a man says to his neighbor, “Konam, if I enter your house”, or “[Konam] if I purchase your field”, and then [the owner] dies or sells it to another, he is permitted [to enter or buy it]; [But if he says] “Konam, if I enter this house”, or “[Konam] if I purchase this field”, and [the owner] dies or sells it to another, he is forbidden.
[If a man says to his neighbor] “Behold, I am herem to you” the opposite party is forbidden [to derive benefit from the one who swore]. “Behold, you are herem to me” the one who swore is forbidden. “Behold, I am [herem] to you, and you are [herem] to me”, both are forbidden. Both are permitted [to enjoy the use of] those things which belong to those who came up from Babylonia [to Jerusalem], but are forbidden [the use of] things that belong to that town.
He who vows abstinence from vegetables is permitted gourds. Rabbi Akiba prohibits. They said to him: And does not a man say to his messenger “Bring me vegetables,” and he replies, “I could find only gourds.” He said to them: That is so! But would he say, “I could find only pulse?” For gourds are included in vegetables, while pulse is not. He is forbidden fresh Egyptian beans but permitted the dry species.
They release a vow by reference to a wife’s kethubah. And it once happened that a man vowed not to benefit from his wife and her ketubah amounted to four hundred denarii. He went before Rabbi Akiva, who ordered him to pay her the ketubah [in full]. He said to him, “Rabbi! My father left eight hundred denarii, of which my brother took four hundred and I took four hundred. Isn’t it enough that she should receive two hundred and I two hundred?” Rabbi Akiva replied: even if you have to sell the hair of your head you must pay her her ketubah. He said to him, “Had I known that it is so, I would not have vowed.” And Rabbi Akiva released his vow.
If a woman waits for a yavam, whether for one or for two [yevamim]: Rabbi Eliezer says: he can annul [her vows]. Rabbi Joshua says: [only if she waits] for one, but not for two. Rabbi Akiva says: neither for one nor for two. Rabbi Eliezer said: if a man can annul the vows of a woman whom he himself acquired, isn’t it logical that can he annul those of a woman bequeathed to him by Heaven! Rabbi Akiva said to him: No! If you speak of a woman whom he himself acquires, that is because others have no rights in her; will you say [the same] of a woman given to him by Heaven, in whom others too have rights! Rabbi Joshua said to him: Akiva, your words apply to two yevamim; but what will you answer if there is only one yavam? He (Rabbi Akiva) said to him (Rabbi Joshua): the yevamah is not as completely acquired to the yavam as a betrothed girl is to her [betrothed] husband.
If a man says to his wife, “All vows which you may vow from now until I return from such and such a place behold, they are upheld,” he has not said anything. [If he said: All vows which you may vow from now until I return from such and such a place], behold, they are annulled,”: Rabbi Eliezer says: they are annulled; The Sages say: they are not annulled. Said Rabbi Eliezer: if he can annul vows which have already had the force of a prohibition, surely he can annul those which have not had the force of prohibition! They said to him: behold, it is said, “Her husband may uphold it, and her husband may annul it” (Numbers 30:14), that which has entered the category of upholding, has entered the category of annulment; but that which has not entered the category of upholding, has not entered the category of annulment.
If a man is under a vow that his son-in-law shall not benefit from him, and he wants to give money to his daughter, he must say to her, “This money is given to you as a gift, providing that your husband has no rights with it, [and it is only given to you] so that may put to your personal use.”
[If one says], “Behold I am a nazirite, as the number of days in a solar year” he must count as many naziriteships as there are days in the solar year. Rabbi Judah said: such a case once occurred, and when the man had completed [his naziriteships], he died.
If a man vows two naziriteships, he shaves for the first one on the thirty-first day, and for the second on the sixty-first day. If he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he can shave for the second on the sixtieth day. If he shaved on the day before the sixtieth, he has fulfilled his obligation. For this was the testimony that Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who vows two naziriteships, that if he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he is to shave for the second on the sixtieth day. And if he shaved on the day before the sixtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation, the thirtieth day counting towards the required number.
A man may impose a nazirite vow on his son, but a woman cannot impose a nazirite vow on her son. How so? [If the boy] shaves himself or is shaved by his relatives, or if he protests or his relatives protest on his behalf, Then if [the father] had set aside an animal [for the sacrifice]: the sin-offering is left to die, the burnt-offering is offered as an [ordinary] burnt-offering, and the peace-offering is offered as an [ordinary] peace-offering, and it may be eaten for one day [only], and it does not require loaves of bread. If he had a lump sum of money [set aside for the purchase of these sacrifices] it is to be used for voluntary offerings; If he had specified money: The money for the sin-offering is to be taken to the Dead Sea, the use of it is forbidden, but the laws of sacrilege do not apply; The money for the burnt-offering they bring a burnt-offering, and the laws of sacrilege do apply; The money for the peace-offering they bring a peace-offering, and it may be eaten for one day [only], and it does not require loaves of bread.
A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. How so? If a man’s father had been a nazirite, and had set apart a lump sum of money for [the sacrifices of] his naziriteship and died and [the son] said, “Behold, I am a nazirite on condition that I may shave with my father’s money.” Rabbi Yose said: this money is to be used for freewill-offerings, this man cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship. Who is the one who can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship? He who was a nazirite together with his father, and whose father had set apart a lump sum of money for his nazirite [sacrifices] and died. This one can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship.
A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. How so? If a man’s father had been a nazirite, and had set apart a lump sum of money for [the sacrifices of] his naziriteship and died and [the son] said, “Behold, I am a nazirite on condition that I may shave with my father’s money.” Rabbi Yose said: this money is to be used for freewill-offerings, this man cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship. Who is the one who can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship? He who was a nazirite together with his father, and whose father had set apart a lump sum of money for his nazirite [sacrifices] and died. This one can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship.
A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. How so? If a man’s father had been a nazirite, and had set apart a lump sum of money for [the sacrifices of] his naziriteship and died and [the son] said, “Behold, I am a nazirite on condition that I may shave with my father’s money.” Rabbi Yose said: this money is to be used for freewill-offerings, this man cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship. Who is the one who can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship? He who was a nazirite together with his father, and whose father had set apart a lump sum of money for his nazirite [sacrifices] and died. This one can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship.
If a man vowed to be a nazirite and then asked a sage [to be released from his vow] but [the sage] bound him [to his vow] he counts [the naziriteship] from the time that the vow was made. If he asked a sage [to be released from his vow] and he released him, if he had an animal set aside [for a sacrifice], it goes forth to pasture with [the rest of] the herd. Beth Hillel said to Beth Shammai: do you not admit that here where the consecration is in error, [the animal] goes forth to pasture with the herd? Beth Shammai said to them: do you not admit that if a man in error calls the ninth [animal], the tenth, or the tenth the ninth, or the eleventh the tenth, each is consecrated? Beth Hillel said to them: it is not the staff that makes these consecrated. For suppose that by mistake he placed the staff upon the eighth or upon the twelfth, would this have any effect? Rather Scripture which has consecrated the tenth, has also declared consecrated the ninth and the eleventh.
If a man vowed to be a nazirite and then asked a sage [to be released from his vow] but [the sage] bound him [to his vow] he counts [the naziriteship] from the time that the vow was made. If he asked a sage [to be released from his vow] and he released him, if he had an animal set aside [for a sacrifice], it goes forth to pasture with [the rest of] the herd. Beth Hillel said to Beth Shammai: do you not admit that here where the consecration is in error, [the animal] goes forth to pasture with the herd? Beth Shammai said to them: do you not admit that if a man in error calls the ninth [animal], the tenth, or the tenth the ninth, or the eleventh the tenth, each is consecrated? Beth Hillel said to them: it is not the staff that makes these consecrated. For suppose that by mistake he placed the staff upon the eighth or upon the twelfth, would this have any effect? Rather Scripture which has consecrated the tenth, has also declared consecrated the ninth and the eleventh.
Rabbi Eliezer said in the name of Rabbi Joshua: for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite must shave, people are liable for entering the sanctuary, and for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite does not shave, people are not liable for one entering the sanctuary. Rabbi Meir said: such [defilement] should not be less serious than [defilement through] a dead creeping thing. Rabbi Akiba said: I argued in the presence of Rabbi Eliezer: Now if on account of a barley-corn’s bulk of bone which does not defile a man by overshadowing, a nazirite shaves should he touch it or carry it, then surely a quarter-log of blood which defiles a man by overshadowing, should cause a nazirite to shave should he touch it or carry it? He replied: What is this Akiva! We do not make here an ‘all the more so’ (a kal vehomer) argument. When I afterwards went and recounted these words to Rabbi Joshua, he said to me, “You spoke well, but thus they have ruled the halakhah.”
Rabbi Eliezer said in the name of Rabbi Joshua: for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite must shave, people are liable for entering the sanctuary, and for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite does not shave, people are not liable for one entering the sanctuary. Rabbi Meir said: such [defilement] should not be less serious than [defilement through] a dead creeping thing. Rabbi Akiba said: I argued in the presence of Rabbi Eliezer: Now if on account of a barley-corn’s bulk of bone which does not defile a man by overshadowing, a nazirite shaves should he touch it or carry it, then surely a quarter-log of blood which defiles a man by overshadowing, should cause a nazirite to shave should he touch it or carry it? He replied: What is this Akiva! We do not make here an ‘all the more so’ (a kal vehomer) argument. When I afterwards went and recounted these words to Rabbi Joshua, he said to me, “You spoke well, but thus they have ruled the halakhah.”
Gentiles are not subject [to the laws] of naziriteship. Women and slaves are subject [to the laws] of naziriteship. The nazirite vow is more stringent in the case of women than in the case of slaves, for a man can compel his slave [to break his vow] but he cannot compel his wife [to do so]. [The nazirite vow] is more stringent in the case of slaves than in the case of women, for he can void the vows of his wife, but he cannot void the vows of his slaves. If he voids his wife’s [vow], it is void for ever, but if he voids his slave’s vow, [if] the slave becomes free he must complete his naziriteship. When [the slave] passes from [his master's] presence: Rabbi Meir says: he may not drink [wine]. Rabbi Yose says: he may drink [wine].
If a man finds a corpse for the first time lying in a typical position, he may remove it together with the soil that it occupies. [If he finds] two, he may remove them together with the ground they occupy. If he finds three, then if the distance between the first and the last is from four to eight cubits, this is a graveyard site. He [must] check from that point twenty cubits in all directions. If he finds one twenty cubits away, he must check from it another twenty cubits, for there are grounds [that it is a graveyard]. For if he had found it at the outset he would have removed it and the soil that it occupies.
One who warns his wife [not to associate with a certain man]: Rabbi Eliezer says: he warns her on the testimony of two witnesses, and makes her drink [the bitter waters] on the testimony of one witness or on his own testimony. Rabbi Joshua says: he warns her on the testimony of two and makes her drink on the testimony of two.
How does he warn her? If he says to her in front of two [witnesses], “Do not speak with that man”, and she spoke with him, she is still permitted to her husband and permitted to eat terumah. If she entered a private place with him and stayed with him a time sufficient for her to be defiled [by having sexual intercourse with him], she is forbidden to her husband and forbidden to eat terumah. If [her husband] died, she performs halitzah but cannot contract yibbum.
He now comes to write the scroll. From what place [in Scripture] does he write? From “If no man has lain with you … but if you have gone astray while married to your husband” (Numbers 5:19-20). He does not write, “Then the priest shall cause the woman to swear” (v., but continues, “May the Lord make you a curse and an imprecation … And may this water that induces the spell enter your body make your belly swell, and your thigh to sag.” (vs. 21-22) He does not write “And the woman shall say, ‘amen, amen’” (vs.. Rabbi Yose says: he makes no omissions. Rabbi Judah says: he writes nothing except, ““May the Lord make you a curse and an imprecation … And may this water that induces the spell enter your body make your belly swell, and your thigh to sag.” (vs. 21-2 He does not write “And the woman shall say, ‘amen, amen’” (vs..
To what does she respond “Amen, amen”?“Amen” over the curse and “amen” over the oath; “Amen” with respect to this man and “amen” with respect to any other man. “Amen” that I did not go astray as a betrothed girl or married woman or a shomeret yavam or a woman taken into [her yavam’s] house. “Amen” that I have not been defiled and if I have, may [these curses] come upon me. Rabbi Meir says: “Amen” that I have not been defiled and the “amen” that I will not become defiled in the future.
To what does she respond “Amen, amen”?“Amen” over the curse and “amen” over the oath; “Amen” with respect to this man and “amen” with respect to any other man. “Amen” that I did not go astray as a betrothed girl or married woman or a shomeret yavam or a woman taken into [her yavam’s] house. “Amen” that I have not been defiled and if I have, may [these curses] come upon me. Rabbi Meir says: “Amen” that I have not been defiled and the “amen” that I will not become defiled in the future.
All agree that he cannot make a stipulation with her with regard to the time before she was betrothed or after she is divorced. If she secludes herself [with the man about whom she was warned, but after being divorced] and was defiled and subsequently [her husband] took her back, he cannot make a stipulation with her [in regard to this]. This is the general rule: any with whom she has intercourse and was not prohibited to him [at that time] the husband cannot make a stipulation on this.
What [differences are there in law] between a man and a woman? A man [who has leprosy] rends his clothes and loosens his hair, but a woman does not rend her clothes and loosen her hair. A man may vow that his son will become a nazirite, but a woman may not vow that her son will become a nazirite. A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. A man may sell his daughter, but a woman may not sell her daughter. A man may give his daughter in betrothal, but a woman may not give her daughter in betrothal. A man is stoned naked, but a woman is not stoned naked. A man is hanged [after being put to death], but a woman is not hanged. A man is sold for [to make restitution for] his theft, but a woman is not sold [to make restitution] for her theft.
What [differences are there in law] between a man and a woman? A man [who has leprosy] rends his clothes and loosens his hair, but a woman does not rend her clothes and loosen her hair. A man may vow that his son will become a nazirite, but a woman may not vow that her son will become a nazirite. A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. A man may sell his daughter, but a woman may not sell her daughter. A man may give his daughter in betrothal, but a woman may not give her daughter in betrothal. A man is stoned naked, but a woman is not stoned naked. A man is hanged [after being put to death], but a woman is not hanged. A man is sold for [to make restitution for] his theft, but a woman is not sold [to make restitution] for her theft.
What [differences are there in law] between a man and a woman? A man [who has leprosy] rends his clothes and loosens his hair, but a woman does not rend her clothes and loosen her hair. A man may vow that his son will become a nazirite, but a woman may not vow that her son will become a nazirite. A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. A man may sell his daughter, but a woman may not sell her daughter. A man may give his daughter in betrothal, but a woman may not give her daughter in betrothal. A man is stoned naked, but a woman is not stoned naked. A man is hanged [after being put to death], but a woman is not hanged. A man is sold for [to make restitution for] his theft, but a woman is not sold [to make restitution] for her theft.
What [differences are there in law] between a man and a woman? A man [who has leprosy] rends his clothes and loosens his hair, but a woman does not rend her clothes and loosen her hair. A man may vow that his son will become a nazirite, but a woman may not vow that her son will become a nazirite. A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. A man may sell his daughter, but a woman may not sell her daughter. A man may give his daughter in betrothal, but a woman may not give her daughter in betrothal. A man is stoned naked, but a woman is not stoned naked. A man is hanged [after being put to death], but a woman is not hanged. A man is sold for [to make restitution for] his theft, but a woman is not sold [to make restitution] for her theft.
What [differences are there in law] between a man and a woman? A man [who has leprosy] rends his clothes and loosens his hair, but a woman does not rend her clothes and loosen her hair. A man may vow that his son will become a nazirite, but a woman may not vow that her son will become a nazirite. A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. A man may sell his daughter, but a woman may not sell her daughter. A man may give his daughter in betrothal, but a woman may not give her daughter in betrothal. A man is stoned naked, but a woman is not stoned naked. A man is hanged [after being put to death], but a woman is not hanged. A man is sold for [to make restitution for] his theft, but a woman is not sold [to make restitution] for her theft.
What [differences are there in law] between a man and a woman? A man [who has leprosy] rends his clothes and loosens his hair, but a woman does not rend her clothes and loosen her hair. A man may vow that his son will become a nazirite, but a woman may not vow that her son will become a nazirite. A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. A man may sell his daughter, but a woman may not sell her daughter. A man may give his daughter in betrothal, but a woman may not give her daughter in betrothal. A man is stoned naked, but a woman is not stoned naked. A man is hanged [after being put to death], but a woman is not hanged. A man is sold for [to make restitution for] his theft, but a woman is not sold [to make restitution] for her theft.
What [differences are there in law] between a man and a woman? A man [who has leprosy] rends his clothes and loosens his hair, but a woman does not rend her clothes and loosen her hair. A man may vow that his son will become a nazirite, but a woman may not vow that her son will become a nazirite. A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. A man may sell his daughter, but a woman may not sell her daughter. A man may give his daughter in betrothal, but a woman may not give her daughter in betrothal. A man is stoned naked, but a woman is not stoned naked. A man is hanged [after being put to death], but a woman is not hanged. A man is sold for [to make restitution for] his theft, but a woman is not sold [to make restitution] for her theft.
What [differences are there in law] between a man and a woman? A man [who has leprosy] rends his clothes and loosens his hair, but a woman does not rend her clothes and loosen her hair. A man may vow that his son will become a nazirite, but a woman may not vow that her son will become a nazirite. A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. A man may sell his daughter, but a woman may not sell her daughter. A man may give his daughter in betrothal, but a woman may not give her daughter in betrothal. A man is stoned naked, but a woman is not stoned naked. A man is hanged [after being put to death], but a woman is not hanged. A man is sold for [to make restitution for] his theft, but a woman is not sold [to make restitution] for her theft.
What [differences are there in law] between a man and a woman? A man [who has leprosy] rends his clothes and loosens his hair, but a woman does not rend her clothes and loosen her hair. A man may vow that his son will become a nazirite, but a woman may not vow that her son will become a nazirite. A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. A man may sell his daughter, but a woman may not sell her daughter. A man may give his daughter in betrothal, but a woman may not give her daughter in betrothal. A man is stoned naked, but a woman is not stoned naked. A man is hanged [after being put to death], but a woman is not hanged. A man is sold for [to make restitution for] his theft, but a woman is not sold [to make restitution] for her theft.
On that day Rabbi Joshua ben Hyrcanus expounded: Job only served the Holy One, blessed be He, from love: as it is said, “Though he slay me, yet I will wait for him” (Job 13:15). And it is still evenly balanced whether to read “I will wait for him” or “I will not wait for him”? Scripture states, “Until I die I will maintain my integrity” (Job 27:5), this teaches that what he did was from love. Rabbi Joshua [ben Hananiah] said: who will remove the dust from your eyes, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, since you had expounded all your life that Job only served the Omnipresent from fear, as it is said, “A blameless and upright man that fears God and shuns evil” (Job 1:8) did not Joshua, the student of your student, teach that what he did was from love?
If a man warned his wife and she secluded herself [with another man], even if he heard [that she had done so] from a flying bird, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Joshua says: until women who spin by moonlight discuss her.
If a man warned his wife and she secluded herself [with another man], even if he heard [that she had done so] from a flying bird, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Joshua says: until women who spin by moonlight discuss her.
For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.
For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.
“Then the officers shall address the people saying: ‘Is there anyone who has built a new house but has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his home’” (Deuteronomy 20:5). It is the same whether he built a house for straw, a house for cattle, a house for wood, or a storehouse; It is the same whether he built, purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has planted a vineyard but has never harvested it?’” (vs.. It is the same whether he planted a vineyard or planted five fruit-trees and even of five different species; It is the same whether he planted, bent or grafted it, or whether he purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has betrothed a woman [but who has not yet married her]?’” (vs. It is the same whether he had betrothed a virgin or a widow, or even a shomeret yavam, or even if a man heard that his brother had died in battle, he returns home. All these hear the priest’s words concerning the battles of war and return home, and they supply water and food and repair the roads.
The elders of that city then wash their hands with water in the place where the heifer's neck was broken and they say, “Our hands have not shed this blood, neither have our eyes seen it” (Deuteronomy 21:7). But did we really think that the elders of a court of justice are shedders of blood! Rather, [the intention of their statement is that the man found dead] did not come to us [for help] and we dismissed him without supplying him with food and we did not see him and let him go without escort. Then the priests exclaim, “Absolve, O Lord, Your people Israel, whom You redeemed, and do not let guilt for the blood of the innocent remain among your people Israel” (vs.. They did not need to say, “And they will be absolved of bloodguilt” (ibid), rather the Holy Spirit announces to them, “When you act in this way, the blood is forgiven you.”
When Rabbi Meir died, the composers of fables ceased. When Ben Azzai died, the diligent students [of Torah] ceased. When Ben Zoma died, the expounders ceased. When Rabbi Joshua died, goodness ceased from the world. When Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel died, locusts come and troubles multiplied. When Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah died, the sages ceased to be wealthy. When Rabbi Akiba died, the glory of the Torah ceased. When Rabbi Hanina ben Dosa died, men of wondrous deeds ceased. When Rabbi Yose Katnuta died, the pious men (hasidim) ceased and why was his name called Katnuta? Because he was the youngest of the pious men. When Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai died, the splendor of wisdom ceased. When Rabban Gamaliel the elder died, the glory of the torah ceased, and purity and separateness perished. When Rabbi Ishmael ben Fabi died, the splendor of the priesthood ceased. When Rabbi died, humility and fear of sin ceased. Rabbi Phineas ben Yair says: when Temple was destroyed, scholars and freemen were ashamed and covered their head, men of wondrous deeds were disregarded, and violent men and big talkers grew powerful. And nobody expounds, nobody seeks, and nobody asks. Upon whom shall we depend? Upon our father who is in heaven. Rabbi Eliezer the Great says: from the day the Temple was destroyed, the sages began to be like scribes, scribes like synagogue-attendants, synagogue-attendants like common people, and the common people became more and more debased. And nobody seeks. Upon whom shall we depend? Upon our father who is in heaven. In the footsteps of the messiah insolence (hutzpah) will increase and the cost of living will go up greatly; the vine will yield its fruit, but wine will be expensive; the government will turn to heresy, and there will be no one to rebuke; the meeting-place [of scholars] will be used for licentiousness; the Galilee will be destroyed, the Gablan will be desolated, and the dwellers on the frontier will go about [begging] from place to place without anyone to take pity on them; the wisdom of the learned will rot, fearers of sin will be despised, and the truth will be lacking; youths will put old men to shame, the old will stand up in the presence of the young, “For son spurns father, daughter rises up against mother, daughter-in-law against mother-in-law a man’s own household are his enemies” (Micah 7:6). The face of the generation will be like the face of a dog, a son will not feel ashamed before his father. Upon whom shall we depend? Upon our father who is in heaven. Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair says, “Heedfulness leads to cleanliness, cleanliness leads to purity, purity leads to separation, separation leads to holiness, holiness leads to modesty, modesty leads to fear of sin, fear of sin leads to piety, piety leads to the Holy Spirit, The Holy Spirit leads to the resurrection of the dead, and the resurrection of the dead comes from Elijah, blessed be his memory, Amen.”
If a man says: “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, if he wants he may change his mind on either document, the words of Rabbi Meir. The Sages say: he may change his mind in the case of the get but not in the case of the writ of emancipation, since a benefit may be conferred on a person not in his presence but a disability may be imposed on him only in his presence; for if he does not want to maintain his slave he is permitted, but if he does not want to maintain his wife he is not permitted. Rabbi Meir said to them: behold, he disqualifies his slave from eating terumah [by emancipating him] in the same way that he disqualifies his wife [by divorcing her]? They said to him: [the slave is disqualified] because he is the priest’s property. If a man says, “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, and dies [before they are given], they do not give [the documents] after his death. [If he said], “Give a maneh to so-and-so” and died, the money should be given after his death.
If a man says: “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, if he wants he may change his mind on either document, the words of Rabbi Meir. The Sages say: he may change his mind in the case of the get but not in the case of the writ of emancipation, since a benefit may be conferred on a person not in his presence but a disability may be imposed on him only in his presence; for if he does not want to maintain his slave he is permitted, but if he does not want to maintain his wife he is not permitted. Rabbi Meir said to them: behold, he disqualifies his slave from eating terumah [by emancipating him] in the same way that he disqualifies his wife [by divorcing her]? They said to him: [the slave is disqualified] because he is the priest’s property. If a man says, “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, and dies [before they are given], they do not give [the documents] after his death. [If he said], “Give a maneh to so-and-so” and died, the money should be given after his death.
All are qualified to write a get, even a deaf-mute, an imbecile and a minor. A woman may write her own get and a man his own receipt [for the ketubah], since the document is upheld only by its signatures. All are qualified to bring a get except a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, a blind person and a non-Jew.
Any get which is not written [expressly] for the woman [for whom it is intended] is invalid. How is this so? If a man was passing through the street and heard the voice of a scribe dictating “So-and-so divorces so-and-so from such and such a place” and he says “that is my name and that is the name of my wife”, it is not a valid [document] with which to divorce his wife. Moreover: if he wrote [a get] with which to divorce his wife and changed his mind and a person found him and said to him, “My name is the same as yours and my wife’s name the same as your wife’s”, it is not a valid [document with which the second] may divorce his wife. Moreover: if he had two wives with the same name and wrote a get with which to divorce the elder, he may not use it to divorce the younger. Moreover: if he said to the scribe, “Write [a get] and I will divorce whichever I choose,” it is not a valid [document] with which to divorce his wife.
[A scribe] who writes out formulas of bills of divorce must leave blank spaces for the name of the man and the name of the woman and the date. [A scribe who writes] loan documents must leave blank spaces for the name of the lender, the name of the borrower, the amount of money and the date. [A scribe who writes] sale documents must leave blank spaces for the name of the seller, the name of the purchaser, the amount of money, the property and the date; [These spaces must be left blank] because of the “takkanah” (enactment). Rabbi Judah disqualifies all of them. Rabbi Elazar validates all of them valid except divorce documents, as it says, “He writes for her” (Deut 24:1), expressly for her.
One who brings a get and loses it on the way: If he finds it immediately it is valid, and if not it is not valid. If he finds it in a small bag or in a folder if he recognizes it, it is valid. If one brings a get and left [the husband] when [the husband] was an old man or sick, he should deliver it to her on the presumption that he is still alive. If the daughter of an ordinary Israelite is married to a priest and her husband goes abroad, she continues eating terumah on the presumption that he is still alive. If a man sends a sin-offering from abroad they sacrifice it on the presumption that he is still alive.
One who brings a get and loses it on the way: If he finds it immediately it is valid, and if not it is not valid. If he finds it in a small bag or in a folder if he recognizes it, it is valid. If one brings a get and left [the husband] when [the husband] was an old man or sick, he should deliver it to her on the presumption that he is still alive. If the daughter of an ordinary Israelite is married to a priest and her husband goes abroad, she continues eating terumah on the presumption that he is still alive. If a man sends a sin-offering from abroad they sacrifice it on the presumption that he is still alive.
If a man lends money to a priest or a levite or a poor man on condition that he can may separate [terumah or tithes] from their portion, he may do so, in the presumption that they are still alive, and he need not be concerned that the priest or the levite may have died or the poor man may have become rich. If they died, he must obtain the permission of the heirs. If he made the loan in the presence of the court, he need not obtain permission from the heirs.
If a man lends money to a priest or a levite or a poor man on condition that he can may separate [terumah or tithes] from their portion, he may do so, in the presumption that they are still alive, and he need not be concerned that the priest or the levite may have died or the poor man may have become rich. If they died, he must obtain the permission of the heirs. If he made the loan in the presence of the court, he need not obtain permission from the heirs.
If a man lends money to a priest or a levite or a poor man on condition that he can may separate [terumah or tithes] from their portion, he may do so, in the presumption that they are still alive, and he need not be concerned that the priest or the levite may have died or the poor man may have become rich. If they died, he must obtain the permission of the heirs. If he made the loan in the presence of the court, he need not obtain permission from the heirs.
If a man sets aside produce in order to count it as terumah and tithe, or money in order to count it as second tithe, he may continue to count it as such in the presumption that they still exist. If they are lost, he must be concerned from time period to time period, the words of Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua. Rabbi Judah says: at three seasons they check the wine: when the east wind begins to blow at the end of Sukkot, when the buds first appear [on the vine], and when the juice begins to form in the grapes.
If man sends a get to his wife and then catches up with the messenger, or sends a messenger after the original messenger, and says to him, “The get which I gave you is annulled”, then it is annulled. If the husband arrives at his wife before [the messenger] or sends a messenger to her and says, “The get which I sent to you is annulled”, then it is annulled. Once the get has reached her hand, he cannot annul it.
Originally, a husband would bring together a court wherever he was and annul the get. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that this should not be done, because of tikkun olam. Originally the husband would change his name, or his wife’s name, or the name of his town or of his wife’s town. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that he should write, “The man so-and-so or any name that he has,”; “the woman so-and-so or any name that she has,” because of tikkun olam.
A [non-Jewish] slave [of a Jew] was taken captive and then ransomed [by a third party]: If [he is ransomed] to be a slave he goes back to slavery. If [he is ransomed] as a free man he does not go back to slavery. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: in either case he goes back to slavery. If a man makes his slave a pledge [for a debt] to another man and then he emancipates him, according to the “letter of the law” the slave is not liable to do anything. But because of tikkun olam we force his [second] master to emancipate him and he [the slave] writes a document for his purchase price. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the slave does not write the document but rather the one who emancipates him.
A [non-Jewish] slave [of a Jew] was taken captive and then ransomed [by a third party]: If [he is ransomed] to be a slave he goes back to slavery. If [he is ransomed] as a free man he does not go back to slavery. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: in either case he goes back to slavery. If a man makes his slave a pledge [for a debt] to another man and then he emancipates him, according to the “letter of the law” the slave is not liable to do anything. But because of tikkun olam we force his [second] master to emancipate him and he [the slave] writes a document for his purchase price. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the slave does not write the document but rather the one who emancipates him.
A [non-Jewish] slave [of a Jew] was taken captive and then ransomed [by a third party]: If [he is ransomed] to be a slave he goes back to slavery. If [he is ransomed] as a free man he does not go back to slavery. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: in either case he goes back to slavery. If a man makes his slave a pledge [for a debt] to another man and then he emancipates him, according to the “letter of the law” the slave is not liable to do anything. But because of tikkun olam we force his [second] master to emancipate him and he [the slave] writes a document for his purchase price. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the slave does not write the document but rather the one who emancipates him.
If a man sells his slave to a Gentile or [to someone living] outside the land [of Israel] the slave goes free. Captives should not be redeemed for more than their value, because of tikkun olam. Captives should not be helped to escape, because of tikkun olam. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says [that the reason is] to prevent the ill-treatment of fellow captives. Torah scrolls of the law, tefillin and mezuzoth are not bought from Gentiles at more than their value, because of tikkun olam.
If a man divorces his wife because of ill-repute, he cannot remarry her. If because of a vow, he cannot remarry her. Rabbi Judah says: [if he divorces her] for vows which she made in front of many people, he may not remarry her, but if for vows which she did not make in front of many people, he may remarry her. Rabbi Meir says: [if he divorces her] for a vow which requires the investigation of a sage, he may not remarry her, but if for one which does not require the investigation of a sage, he may remarry her. Rabbi Eliezer says: they only forbid that one because of that one. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah said: a case happened in Sidon of a man who said to his wife, “Konam, if I do not divorce you”, and he did divorce her, and the Sages permitted him to remarry her because of tikkun olam.
If a man divorces his wife because of ill-repute, he cannot remarry her. If because of a vow, he cannot remarry her. Rabbi Judah says: [if he divorces her] for vows which she made in front of many people, he may not remarry her, but if for vows which she did not make in front of many people, he may remarry her. Rabbi Meir says: [if he divorces her] for a vow which requires the investigation of a sage, he may not remarry her, but if for one which does not require the investigation of a sage, he may remarry her. Rabbi Eliezer says: they only forbid that one because of that one. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah said: a case happened in Sidon of a man who said to his wife, “Konam, if I do not divorce you”, and he did divorce her, and the Sages permitted him to remarry her because of tikkun olam.
A man divorces his wife because she is an aylonit: Rabbi Judah says he may not remarry her, But the sages say that he may remarry her. She marries someone else and has children from him and then demands her ketubah settlement [from her first husband]: Rabbi Judah said, they say to her, “Your silence is better than your speaking.”
If a man sells himself and his children to a Gentile, he is not to be redeemed but his children are to be redeemed after the death of their father. If a man sells his field to a Gentile, and an Israelite bought it back, he has to bring, the purchaser must bring first fruits from it, because of tikkun olam.
If a man sells himself and his children to a Gentile, he is not to be redeemed but his children are to be redeemed after the death of their father. If a man sells his field to a Gentile, and an Israelite bought it back, he has to bring, the purchaser must bring first fruits from it, because of tikkun olam.
There was no Sicaricon in Judea for those killed in war. After the war’s slaughter ended there is Sicaricon there. How so? If a man buys a field from the Sicaricon and then buys it again from the original owner, his purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the original owner and then from the Sicaricon it is valid. If a man buys [a piece of a married woman’s property] from the husband and then buys it from the wife, the purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the wife and then from the husband it is valid. This was [the ruling] of the first mishnah. The court that came after them said if a man buys property from the Sicaricon he had to give the original owner a quarter [of the value]. When is this so? When the original owners cannot buy it themselves, but if they can they have preemption over everyone else. Rabbi assembled a court and they decided by vote that if the property had been in the hands of the Sicaricon twelve months, whoever purchased it first acquired the title, but he had to give a quarter [of the price] to the original owner.
There was no Sicaricon in Judea for those killed in war. After the war’s slaughter ended there is Sicaricon there. How so? If a man buys a field from the Sicaricon and then buys it again from the original owner, his purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the original owner and then from the Sicaricon it is valid. If a man buys [a piece of a married woman’s property] from the husband and then buys it from the wife, the purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the wife and then from the husband it is valid. This was [the ruling] of the first mishnah. The court that came after them said if a man buys property from the Sicaricon he had to give the original owner a quarter [of the value]. When is this so? When the original owners cannot buy it themselves, but if they can they have preemption over everyone else. Rabbi assembled a court and they decided by vote that if the property had been in the hands of the Sicaricon twelve months, whoever purchased it first acquired the title, but he had to give a quarter [of the price] to the original owner.
There was no Sicaricon in Judea for those killed in war. After the war’s slaughter ended there is Sicaricon there. How so? If a man buys a field from the Sicaricon and then buys it again from the original owner, his purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the original owner and then from the Sicaricon it is valid. If a man buys [a piece of a married woman’s property] from the husband and then buys it from the wife, the purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the wife and then from the husband it is valid. This was [the ruling] of the first mishnah. The court that came after them said if a man buys property from the Sicaricon he had to give the original owner a quarter [of the value]. When is this so? When the original owners cannot buy it themselves, but if they can they have preemption over everyone else. Rabbi assembled a court and they decided by vote that if the property had been in the hands of the Sicaricon twelve months, whoever purchased it first acquired the title, but he had to give a quarter [of the price] to the original owner.
These were the rules they laid down because of the ways of peace: A priest is called up first to read the Torah and after him a Levite and then an Israelite, because of the ways of peace. An “eruv” is placed in the room where it has always been placed, because of the ways of peace. The cistern which is nearest to the channel is filled first, because of the ways of peace. [Taking of] beasts, birds and fishes from traps [set by others] is robbery, because of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yose says that it is actual robbery. [Taking away] anything found by a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor is robbery, because of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yose says that it is actual robbery. If a poor man strikes [down olives] on top of an olive tree, [taking the fruit] that is beneath him is robbery. Rabbi Yose says that it is actual robbery. Poor Gentiles are not prevented from gathering gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of the field, because of the ways of peace.
If a man says, “Receive this get on behalf of my wife”, or, “Carry this get to my wife”, if he desires to retract [before the wife receives it] he may do so. If a woman says, “Receive the get on my behalf”, [and he does so], if [the husband] wants to retract he may not do so. Therefore if the husband said to him, “I do not want you to receive it on her behalf, but rather carry it and give it to her”, then if he wishes to retract he may do so. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even if the wife says “Take for me”, [and he does so] the husband may not retract.