man
12481 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. Even if his father was dying [when a man vowed] and left him ten thousand, or if he had a ship on the sea and it brought to him ten thousand, the sanctuary has no claim at all on them.
“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.
“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.
“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.
“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.
“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.
“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.
One who said: “I vow my weight,” he must pay his weight, in silver [if he had said in] silver, or in gold [if he had said in] gold. It happened with the mother of Yirmatia, who said, “I vow my daughter's weight.” She went up to Jerusalem and weighed her and then paid her weight in gold. [If a man said: “I vow] the weight of my hand,” Rabbi Judah says: let him fill a barrel with water and put it [his hand] in up to the elbow. Then let him weigh the flesh, bones and sinews of a donkey and put it into the barrel until it is filled up again. Rabbi Yose said: “But how is it possible to account exactly one kind of flesh against another kind of flesh, and one kind of bones against another kind of bones? Rather: one estimates what the hand is likely to weigh.
[The property] of orphans which has been evaluated [must be proclaimed for] thirty days. And [the property of] the Sanctuary which has been evaluated, [for] sixty days. They must make the proclamation in the morning and in the evening. If a man dedicates his property to the Sanctuary and he is still liable for his wife’s ketubah: Rabbi Eliezer says: when he divorces her he must vow that he will not derive any further benefit from her. Rabbi Joshua says: he need not do so. Similarly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: Also if one guarantees a woman's ketubah and her husband divorces her, the husband must vow to derive no benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of that man [the guarantor] and take his wife back again.
[The property] of orphans which has been evaluated [must be proclaimed for] thirty days. And [the property of] the Sanctuary which has been evaluated, [for] sixty days. They must make the proclamation in the morning and in the evening. If a man dedicates his property to the Sanctuary and he is still liable for his wife’s ketubah: Rabbi Eliezer says: when he divorces her he must vow that he will not derive any further benefit from her. Rabbi Joshua says: he need not do so. Similarly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: Also if one guarantees a woman's ketubah and her husband divorces her, the husband must vow to derive no benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of that man [the guarantor] and take his wife back again.
A man who dedicates his possessions to the sanctuary while he is still liable for his wife's kethubah or in debt to a creditor, the wife cannot collect her ketubah from the consecrated property nor the creditor his debt. Rather he who redeems them must redeem for the purpose of paying the wife her ketubah or the creditor his debt. If he had dedicated ninety maneh, worth of property, and he owed one hundred maneh, then he [the creditor] must add one dinar more and he redeems the property for the purpose of paying the ketubah to the wife or the debt to the creditor.
One may not consecrate [a field of his possession] less than two years before the Jubilee, nor redeem it less than one year after the Jubilee. One does not reckon months to [the disadvantage of] the Sanctuary, but the Sanctuary does reckon months [to its own advantage]. If a man consecrated his field at a time when the law of the Jubilee is in force, he must pay fifty shekels for [every piece of field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. If the field contained ravines ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not included as part of the field. But if less than this, they are included. If he consecrated it two or three years before the Jubilee, he must pay one sela [shekel] and one pondion for each year. If he says: “I shall pay for each year as it comes,” they do not listen to him, rather he must pay for all the years together.
It is all the same whether the owner or anyone else [redeems the field]. What is the difference between the owner and any other man? The owner must add one fifth, whereas any other man need not add one fifth.
It is all the same whether the owner or anyone else [redeems the field]. What is the difference between the owner and any other man? The owner must add one fifth, whereas any other man need not add one fifth.
If a man consecrated [his field] and then redeemed it, it does not go out of his possession in the Jubilee. If his son redeemed it, it reverts to his father in the Jubilee. If another person, or a relative redeemed it, and he redeemed it from his hand, it goes out [to the priests]. If one of the priests redeemed it, and it was still in his possession, he cannot say: “Since it goes out to the priests in the Jubilee, and since it is now in my possession, therefore it belongs to me.” Rather, it goes out of his possession to all his fellow priests.
If one bought a field from his father, and his father died and afterwards he consecrated it, it is considered a field of possession. If he consecrated it and afterwards his father died, then it is considered a field acquired by purchase, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: it is considered a field of possession, as it is said: “And if a field which he has, which is not a field of his possession” (Leviticus 27:22) a field which is not capable of becoming a field of his possession, thus excluding a field which is capable of becoming a field of possession. A field acquired by purchase does not go out to the priests in the year of the Jubilee, for no man can consecrate an object not belonging to him. Priests and Levites may consecrate [their fields] at any time and redeem at any time, both before and after the jubilee.
If one said: I will acquire it for ten selas, and another, [for] twenty, and another for thirty, and another for forty, and another for fifty, If he [that bid] fifty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he [that bid] forty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he [that bid] thirty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he that bid twenty reneged they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he that bid ten reneged they sell [the field] for what it is worth, and collect what remains from him who bid ten. If the owner bid twenty and any other man bid twenty, then the owner comes first, because he must add one fifth.
A man may proscribe [part] of his flock or of his herd, of his Canaanite slaves or female slaves or of his field of possession. But if he proscribed all of them, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah said: just as when it comes to the Highest One, one is not permitted to proscribe all of his possessions, how much more so should one be careful with his property.
A man may proscribe his holy things, whether they are most holy things or less holy things. If [they had been] consecrated as a vow, he must give their value, if as a freewill-offering, he must give what it is worth to him. [If he said:] “Let this ox be an olah,” one estimates how much a man would pay for the ox to offer it as an olah, which he was not obliged [to offer]. A first-born, whether unblemished or blemished, may be proscribed. How can it be redeemed? They estimate what a man would give for this first-born in order to give it to the son of his daughter or to the son of his sister. Rabbi Ishmael says: one verse says, [All first-born males] you shall sanctify,” (Deuteronomy 15:19) and another verse says: [“The first-borns among beasts] no man shall sanctify it” (Leviticus 27:26). It is impossible to say: “You shall sanctify,” since it was said already: “No man shall sanctify,” and it is impossible to say: “No man shall sanctify,” since it is also said: “You shall sanctify”? Therefore resolve [thus]: you may sanctify it by consecrating its value [to the owner], but you may not sanctify it by consecrating it to the altar.
A man may proscribe his holy things, whether they are most holy things or less holy things. If [they had been] consecrated as a vow, he must give their value, if as a freewill-offering, he must give what it is worth to him. [If he said:] “Let this ox be an olah,” one estimates how much a man would pay for the ox to offer it as an olah, which he was not obliged [to offer]. A first-born, whether unblemished or blemished, may be proscribed. How can it be redeemed? They estimate what a man would give for this first-born in order to give it to the son of his daughter or to the son of his sister. Rabbi Ishmael says: one verse says, [All first-born males] you shall sanctify,” (Deuteronomy 15:19) and another verse says: [“The first-borns among beasts] no man shall sanctify it” (Leviticus 27:26). It is impossible to say: “You shall sanctify,” since it was said already: “No man shall sanctify,” and it is impossible to say: “No man shall sanctify,” since it is also said: “You shall sanctify”? Therefore resolve [thus]: you may sanctify it by consecrating its value [to the owner], but you may not sanctify it by consecrating it to the altar.
A man may proscribe his holy things, whether they are most holy things or less holy things. If [they had been] consecrated as a vow, he must give their value, if as a freewill-offering, he must give what it is worth to him. [If he said:] “Let this ox be an olah,” one estimates how much a man would pay for the ox to offer it as an olah, which he was not obliged [to offer]. A first-born, whether unblemished or blemished, may be proscribed. How can it be redeemed? They estimate what a man would give for this first-born in order to give it to the son of his daughter or to the son of his sister. Rabbi Ishmael says: one verse says, [All first-born males] you shall sanctify,” (Deuteronomy 15:19) and another verse says: [“The first-borns among beasts] no man shall sanctify it” (Leviticus 27:26). It is impossible to say: “You shall sanctify,” since it was said already: “No man shall sanctify,” and it is impossible to say: “No man shall sanctify,” since it is also said: “You shall sanctify”? Therefore resolve [thus]: you may sanctify it by consecrating its value [to the owner], but you may not sanctify it by consecrating it to the altar.
A man may proscribe his holy things, whether they are most holy things or less holy things. If [they had been] consecrated as a vow, he must give their value, if as a freewill-offering, he must give what it is worth to him. [If he said:] “Let this ox be an olah,” one estimates how much a man would pay for the ox to offer it as an olah, which he was not obliged [to offer]. A first-born, whether unblemished or blemished, may be proscribed. How can it be redeemed? They estimate what a man would give for this first-born in order to give it to the son of his daughter or to the son of his sister. Rabbi Ishmael says: one verse says, [All first-born males] you shall sanctify,” (Deuteronomy 15:19) and another verse says: [“The first-borns among beasts] no man shall sanctify it” (Leviticus 27:26). It is impossible to say: “You shall sanctify,” since it was said already: “No man shall sanctify,” and it is impossible to say: “No man shall sanctify,” since it is also said: “You shall sanctify”? Therefore resolve [thus]: you may sanctify it by consecrating its value [to the owner], but you may not sanctify it by consecrating it to the altar.
A man may proscribe his holy things, whether they are most holy things or less holy things. If [they had been] consecrated as a vow, he must give their value, if as a freewill-offering, he must give what it is worth to him. [If he said:] “Let this ox be an olah,” one estimates how much a man would pay for the ox to offer it as an olah, which he was not obliged [to offer]. A first-born, whether unblemished or blemished, may be proscribed. How can it be redeemed? They estimate what a man would give for this first-born in order to give it to the son of his daughter or to the son of his sister. Rabbi Ishmael says: one verse says, [All first-born males] you shall sanctify,” (Deuteronomy 15:19) and another verse says: [“The first-borns among beasts] no man shall sanctify it” (Leviticus 27:26). It is impossible to say: “You shall sanctify,” since it was said already: “No man shall sanctify,” and it is impossible to say: “No man shall sanctify,” since it is also said: “You shall sanctify”? Therefore resolve [thus]: you may sanctify it by consecrating its value [to the owner], but you may not sanctify it by consecrating it to the altar.
A man may proscribe his holy things, whether they are most holy things or less holy things. If [they had been] consecrated as a vow, he must give their value, if as a freewill-offering, he must give what it is worth to him. [If he said:] “Let this ox be an olah,” one estimates how much a man would pay for the ox to offer it as an olah, which he was not obliged [to offer]. A first-born, whether unblemished or blemished, may be proscribed. How can it be redeemed? They estimate what a man would give for this first-born in order to give it to the son of his daughter or to the son of his sister. Rabbi Ishmael says: one verse says, [All first-born males] you shall sanctify,” (Deuteronomy 15:19) and another verse says: [“The first-borns among beasts] no man shall sanctify it” (Leviticus 27:26). It is impossible to say: “You shall sanctify,” since it was said already: “No man shall sanctify,” and it is impossible to say: “No man shall sanctify,” since it is also said: “You shall sanctify”? Therefore resolve [thus]: you may sanctify it by consecrating its value [to the owner], but you may not sanctify it by consecrating it to the altar.
If he sold it to the first for one hundred [denars] and the first sold it to the second for two hundred, then he need reckon only with the first, as it says, “With the man to whom he sold” (Leviticus 25:27). If he sold it to the first for two hundred, and the first sold it to the second for one hundred, then he need reckon only with the second, as it says: “With the man” (ibid) the man in possession of the field. One may not sell a distant field in order to redeem a near one, or a poor field in order to redeem a good one. One may not borrow [money] in order to redeem, nor redeem it in halves. But in the case of objects consecrated all these things are permitted. In this respect the laws concerning a person’s [property] are more stringent than those concerning sacred things.
If he sold it to the first for one hundred [denars] and the first sold it to the second for two hundred, then he need reckon only with the first, as it says, “With the man to whom he sold” (Leviticus 25:27). If he sold it to the first for two hundred, and the first sold it to the second for one hundred, then he need reckon only with the second, as it says: “With the man” (ibid) the man in possession of the field. One may not sell a distant field in order to redeem a near one, or a poor field in order to redeem a good one. One may not borrow [money] in order to redeem, nor redeem it in halves. But in the case of objects consecrated all these things are permitted. In this respect the laws concerning a person’s [property] are more stringent than those concerning sacred things.
If he sold it to the first for one hundred [denars] and the first sold it to the second for two hundred, then he need reckon only with the first, as it says, “With the man to whom he sold” (Leviticus 25:27). If he sold it to the first for two hundred, and the first sold it to the second for one hundred, then he need reckon only with the second, as it says: “With the man” (ibid) the man in possession of the field. One may not sell a distant field in order to redeem a near one, or a poor field in order to redeem a good one. One may not borrow [money] in order to redeem, nor redeem it in halves. But in the case of objects consecrated all these things are permitted. In this respect the laws concerning a person’s [property] are more stringent than those concerning sacred things.
All [animals] forbidden for the altar render [others] unfit however few there are. [These are the animals forbidden for the altar]: An animal which had sexual relations with [a woman] or [an animal] that had sexual relations [with a man], an animal set aside (muktzeh) [for idolatry], or that had been worshipped (ne’evad) [as an idol]; or that was the fee of a whore, or [a dog's] exchange; or that was kilayim; or terefah; or an animal born through a caesarean section,What is meant by muktzeh? That which has been set aside for idolatrous use. It [the animal itself] is forbidden, but what is upon it, is permitted. And what is meant by ne'evad? That which has been used for idolatry. Both it [the animal itself] and that which is upon it, are forbidden. In both cases the animal may be eaten.
There are in the Torah thirty-six [transgressions which are punishable with] karet: When one has intercourse with his mother, His father's wife; Or his daughter-in-law; When a man has intercourse with a male, Or with a beast, Or when a woman brings a beast upon herself; When one has intercourse with a woman and her daughter; Or with a married woman; Or with his sister; Or with his father's sister; Or his mother's sister; Or his wife's sister; Or his brother's wife; Or the wife of his father's brother; Or with a menstruating woman; One who blasphemes [the Lord]; One who worships idols; Or dedicates his children to Molech; Or has a ba’al ov; Or desecrates the Shabbat; When an unclean person eats of sacred food; Or when one enters the precincts of the Temple in an unclean state; When one eats forbidden fat, Or blood; Notar; Or piggul; When one slaughters Or offers up [a consecrated animal] outside [the Temple]; One who eats anything leavened on Pesah; One who eats Or works on Yom Kippur; One who compounds the oil [of anointing]; Or compounds incense; Or uses [unlawfully] oil of anointing; And [when one transgresses the laws of] the pesah, And circumcision from among positive commandments.
A woman who has had several births. If she miscarried a female within eighty days of the birth of a girl, and then she again miscarried a female within eighty days of the previous [miscarriage]; or if she miscarried twins. Rabbi Judah says: she brings an offering for the first and not for the second, for the third again but not for the fourth. The following persons bring an offering of higher or lesser value: One who hears the voice (see Leviticus 5:1); One who has broken the word of his lips (Leviticus 5:4); One who while unclean has entered the sanctuary or [has partaken] of holy things, A woman after childbirth And a metzora. What is the difference between [intercourse] with a female slave and the other forbidden sexual relations? For they are not equivalent in regard to the punishment nor the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations a hatat is brought, in that of a female slave an asham; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations a female animal is brought, in that of the female slave a male; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations man and woman are alike with respect to lashes and the sacrifice; in that of the female slave the man is unlike the woman regarding the lashes, and the woman is unlike the man regarding the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations sexual contact is punishable as well as consummation, and one is liable for each act of intercourse separately. For in this the case of the female slave is more stringent in that intentional transgression is of the same status as unwitting transgression.
A woman who has had several births. If she miscarried a female within eighty days of the birth of a girl, and then she again miscarried a female within eighty days of the previous [miscarriage]; or if she miscarried twins. Rabbi Judah says: she brings an offering for the first and not for the second, for the third again but not for the fourth. The following persons bring an offering of higher or lesser value: One who hears the voice (see Leviticus 5:1); One who has broken the word of his lips (Leviticus 5:4); One who while unclean has entered the sanctuary or [has partaken] of holy things, A woman after childbirth And a metzora. What is the difference between [intercourse] with a female slave and the other forbidden sexual relations? For they are not equivalent in regard to the punishment nor the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations a hatat is brought, in that of a female slave an asham; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations a female animal is brought, in that of the female slave a male; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations man and woman are alike with respect to lashes and the sacrifice; in that of the female slave the man is unlike the woman regarding the lashes, and the woman is unlike the man regarding the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations sexual contact is punishable as well as consummation, and one is liable for each act of intercourse separately. For in this the case of the female slave is more stringent in that intentional transgression is of the same status as unwitting transgression.
A woman who has had several births. If she miscarried a female within eighty days of the birth of a girl, and then she again miscarried a female within eighty days of the previous [miscarriage]; or if she miscarried twins. Rabbi Judah says: she brings an offering for the first and not for the second, for the third again but not for the fourth. The following persons bring an offering of higher or lesser value: One who hears the voice (see Leviticus 5:1); One who has broken the word of his lips (Leviticus 5:4); One who while unclean has entered the sanctuary or [has partaken] of holy things, A woman after childbirth And a metzora. What is the difference between [intercourse] with a female slave and the other forbidden sexual relations? For they are not equivalent in regard to the punishment nor the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations a hatat is brought, in that of a female slave an asham; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations a female animal is brought, in that of the female slave a male; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations man and woman are alike with respect to lashes and the sacrifice; in that of the female slave the man is unlike the woman regarding the lashes, and the woman is unlike the man regarding the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations sexual contact is punishable as well as consummation, and one is liable for each act of intercourse separately. For in this the case of the female slave is more stringent in that intentional transgression is of the same status as unwitting transgression.
Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua at the meat-market of Emmaus, where they went to buy meat for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamaliel's son: What [is the law concerning] a man who had intercourse with his sister, his father's sister and his mother's sister? Is he liable for one sacrifice for all of them, or to one [separate sacrifice] for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing [about this], but we have heard that if one had intercourse with five menstruants in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to a sacrifice for each [act], and it seems to us that the case [you asked about] may be derived by an a fortiori conclusion (kal vehomer).
Rabbi Akiva further asked: If a limb hangs loose from the body of a living beast, what is the law? They replied: We have heard nothing about this, but we have heard about a limb hanging loose from the body of a man, that it is clean. And thus those that were afflicted with boils used to do in Jerusalem. He would go on the eve of Pesah to the doctor, and he would cut the limb until only contact of a hairbreadth was left; he then stuck it on a thorn and then tore himself away from it. In this manner both that man and the physician could make their pesah offering. And it seems to us that your case may be derived from this by a kal vehomer.
Rabbi Akiva further asked: If a limb hangs loose from the body of a living beast, what is the law? They replied: We have heard nothing about this, but we have heard about a limb hanging loose from the body of a man, that it is clean. And thus those that were afflicted with boils used to do in Jerusalem. He would go on the eve of Pesah to the doctor, and he would cut the limb until only contact of a hairbreadth was left; he then stuck it on a thorn and then tore himself away from it. In this manner both that man and the physician could make their pesah offering. And it seems to us that your case may be derived from this by a kal vehomer.
Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.
A man set apart two sela's for an asham: If he bought with it two rams for an asham; if one was of the value of two sela's, it may be offered for his asham, and the other must be let out to pasture until it becomes blemished when it is sold and its value goes for freewill-offerings. If he had bought with the money two rams for hullin use, one worth two sela's and the other worth ten zuz, that which is worth two sela's should be offered for his asham and the other for his sacrilege. [If he had bought with the money] one for an asham and the other for ordinary use, if that for the asham was worth two sela's it should be offered for his asham and the other for his sacrilege, and with it he shall bring a sela and its fifth.
If a man set aside his hatat and then died, his son should not offer it after him. A man may not offer [what was set apart] for one sin for another sin. Even if he had set apart [the hatat] for forbidden fat that he had eaten yesterday, he may not offer it for forbidden fat that he has eaten today, for it is said, “His offering ... for his sin” (Leviticus 4:28) the offering must be for that particular sin.
If a man set aside his hatat and then died, his son should not offer it after him. A man may not offer [what was set apart] for one sin for another sin. Even if he had set apart [the hatat] for forbidden fat that he had eaten yesterday, he may not offer it for forbidden fat that he has eaten today, for it is said, “His offering ... for his sin” (Leviticus 4:28) the offering must be for that particular sin.
One may bring with [money] dedicated to buy a lamb [for a hatat] a goat, or with [what was] dedicated to buy a goat [one may bring] a lamb; Or with [what was] dedicated to buy a lamb or a goat [one may bring] turtle-doves or young pigeons; Or with [what was] dedicated to buy turtle-doves or young pigeons [one may bring] the tenth of an ephah. How so? If a man set apart [money] for a lamb or a goat [for a hatat] and he became poor, he may bring a bird-offering; If he became still poorer he may bring the tenth of an ephah. If a man set apart [money] for the tenth of an ephah and he became richer, he must bring a bird-offering; If he became still richer he must bring a lamb or a goat. If a man set apart a lamb or a goat and they became blemished, he may bring with their price a bird-offering; But if he set apart a bird-offering and it became blemished, he may not bring with its price the tenth of an ephah, since a bird-offering cannot be redeemed.
One may bring with [money] dedicated to buy a lamb [for a hatat] a goat, or with [what was] dedicated to buy a goat [one may bring] a lamb; Or with [what was] dedicated to buy a lamb or a goat [one may bring] turtle-doves or young pigeons; Or with [what was] dedicated to buy turtle-doves or young pigeons [one may bring] the tenth of an ephah. How so? If a man set apart [money] for a lamb or a goat [for a hatat] and he became poor, he may bring a bird-offering; If he became still poorer he may bring the tenth of an ephah. If a man set apart [money] for the tenth of an ephah and he became richer, he must bring a bird-offering; If he became still richer he must bring a lamb or a goat. If a man set apart a lamb or a goat and they became blemished, he may bring with their price a bird-offering; But if he set apart a bird-offering and it became blemished, he may not bring with its price the tenth of an ephah, since a bird-offering cannot be redeemed.
One may bring with [money] dedicated to buy a lamb [for a hatat] a goat, or with [what was] dedicated to buy a goat [one may bring] a lamb; Or with [what was] dedicated to buy a lamb or a goat [one may bring] turtle-doves or young pigeons; Or with [what was] dedicated to buy turtle-doves or young pigeons [one may bring] the tenth of an ephah. How so? If a man set apart [money] for a lamb or a goat [for a hatat] and he became poor, he may bring a bird-offering; If he became still poorer he may bring the tenth of an ephah. If a man set apart [money] for the tenth of an ephah and he became richer, he must bring a bird-offering; If he became still richer he must bring a lamb or a goat. If a man set apart a lamb or a goat and they became blemished, he may bring with their price a bird-offering; But if he set apart a bird-offering and it became blemished, he may not bring with its price the tenth of an ephah, since a bird-offering cannot be redeemed.
Rabbi Shimon says: lambs are mentioned before goats in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “And if he brings a lamb as his offering,” (Leviticus 4:32) to teach that both are equal. Turtle-doves are mentioned before young pigeons in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “A young pigeon or a turtle-dove for a hatat,” (Leviticus 12:6) to teach that both are equal. The father comes before the mother in all places. You might think that it is because the honor due a father is greater than the honor due a mother, therefore Scripture states, “A man shall fear his mother and his father,” (Leviticus 19: to teach that both are equal. But the sages have said: the father comes before the mother in all places, because both a son and his mother are obligated to honor the father. And so it is also with the study of Torah; if the son has been worthy [to sit] before the teacher, the teacher comes before the father in all places, because both a man and his father are obligated to honor the teacher.
Rabbi Shimon says: lambs are mentioned before goats in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “And if he brings a lamb as his offering,” (Leviticus 4:32) to teach that both are equal. Turtle-doves are mentioned before young pigeons in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “A young pigeon or a turtle-dove for a hatat,” (Leviticus 12:6) to teach that both are equal. The father comes before the mother in all places. You might think that it is because the honor due a father is greater than the honor due a mother, therefore Scripture states, “A man shall fear his mother and his father,” (Leviticus 19: to teach that both are equal. But the sages have said: the father comes before the mother in all places, because both a son and his mother are obligated to honor the father. And so it is also with the study of Torah; if the son has been worthy [to sit] before the teacher, the teacher comes before the father in all places, because both a man and his father are obligated to honor the teacher.
He then came to the small opening on the north. The great gate had two small openings, one on the north and one on the south. No one ever went in by the openings on the south, about which it is stated explicitly in Ezekiel, “And the Lord said to me, ‘This gate shall be closed, it shall not be opened, and no man shall enter by it, for the Lord God of Israel has entered by it” (Ezekiel 44:2). He took the key and opened the small opening and went in to the cell and from the cell to the Sanctuary, until he reached the great gate. When he reached the great gate he drew back the bolt and the latches and opened it. The slaughterer did not slaughter till he heard the sound of the great gate being opened.
The great gate had two small doors, one to the north and one to the south. By the one to the south no one ever went in, and concerning it was stated explicitly be Ezekiel, as it says, “And the Lord said to me: this gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, neither shall any man enter in by it, for the Lord God of Israel has entered in by it; therefore it shall be shut” (Ezekiel 44:2). He [the priest] took the key and opened the [northern] door and went in to the cell, and from the cell he went into the Hekhal. Rabbi Judah says: he used to walk along in the thickness of the wall until he came to the space between the two gates. He would open the outer doors from within and the inner doors from without.
Above the zav is the zavah, for she conveys impurity to the man who has intercourse with her. Above the zavah is the metzora, for he conveys impurity by entering into a house. Above the metzora is a [human] bone the size of a barley grain, for it conveys impurity for seven days. More strict than all these is a corpse, for it conveys impurity by ohel (tent) whereby all the others convey no impurity.
The area within the wall [of Jerusalem] is holier, for it is there that lesser holy things and second tithe may be eaten. The Temple Mount is holier, for zavim, zavot, menstruants and women after childbirth may not enter it. The chel is holier, for neither non-Jews nor one who contracted corpse impurity may enter it. The court of women is holier, for a tevul yom may not enter it, though he is not obligated a hatat for doing so. The court of the Israelites is holier, for a man who has not yet offered his obligatory sacrifices may not enter it, and if he enters he is liable for a hatat. The court of the priests is holier, for Israelites may not enter it except when they are required to do so: for laying on of the hands, slaying or waving.
The dung bag of a bull and its muzzle, a bee shelf, and a fan are clean. The cover of a small box is susceptible to uncleanness; The cover of a clothes chest is clean. The cover of a box, the cover of a basket, a carpenter's vice, a cushion under a box or its arched cover, a reading-desk for a book, a bolt-socket, a lock-socket, a mezuzah case, a lyre case, a violin case, the block of the turban-makers, a wooden musical toy horse, the clappers of a wailing woman, a poor man's parasol, bed posts, a tefillin mould, and the mould of string makers all these are clean. This is the general rule which Rabbi Yose stated: all objects that serve as a protection to objects that a man uses, both when the latter are in use and when they are not in use, are susceptible to uncleanness; but those that serve them as a protection only when the latter are in use are clean.
A person who walks through a bet peras on stones that cannot [easily] be moved, or [who rides] on a man or beast whose strength is great, remains clean. [But if he walks] on stones that can [easily] be moved, or [rides] upon a man or beast whose strength is lousy, he becomes unclean. A person who travels in the land of the gentiles over mountains or rocks, becomes unclean; But if [he travels] by the sea or along the strand, he remains clean. What is [meant by] ‘the strand’? Any place to which the sea rises when it is stormy.
A person who walks through a bet peras on stones that cannot [easily] be moved, or [who rides] on a man or beast whose strength is great, remains clean. [But if he walks] on stones that can [easily] be moved, or [rides] upon a man or beast whose strength is lousy, he becomes unclean. A person who travels in the land of the gentiles over mountains or rocks, becomes unclean; But if [he travels] by the sea or along the strand, he remains clean. What is [meant by] ‘the strand’? Any place to which the sea rises when it is stormy.
What is [the posture] of examining negaim? A man is inspected in the posture of one that hoes or one that gathers olives. And a woman [is inspected in the posture] of one who is arranging dough and one who nurses her child, and one that weaves at an upright loom if the nega was in the right armpit. Rabbi Judah says: also in the posture of one that spins flax if it was within the left armpit. Just as [is the posture] for examining for the nega, so too [is the posture] for shaving hair.
Everyone can become impure from negaim, except for a non-Jew and a resident alien. All are qualified to inspect negaim, but only a priest may declare them unclean or clean. He is told, "Say: 'unclean,'" and he repeats "unclean," or "Say: 'clean,'" and he repeats "clean." Two negaim may not be inspected simultaneously whether in one man or in two men; rather he inspects one first and isolates him, certifies him as unclean or pronounces him clean, and then he inspects the second. One who is isolated may not be isolated again nor may one who is certified unclean be certified unclean again. One who is certified unclean may not be isolated nor may one who is isolated be certified unclean. But in the beginning, or at the end of a week, he may isolate on account of the one nega and isolate him on account of another one; he may certify him unclean on account of one sign and also certify him unclean on account of another sign; he may isolated the one sign and declare the other clean, or certify the one unclean and declare the other clean.
If one had been certified unclean on account of white hair, and the white hair disappeared and other white hair appeared, And so also in the case of quick flesh or a spreading, Whether this occurred in the beginning, at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after he had been released from uncleanness, he is regarded as being in the same position as before. If he had been certified unclean on account of quick flesh, and the quick flesh disappeared and other quick flesh appeared, And so also in the case of white hair and spreading, Whether this occurred in the beginning, at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after the man had been released from uncleanness, he is regarded as being in the same position as before. If he had been certified unclean on account of a spreading, and the spreading disappeared and another spreading appeared, And so also in the case of white hair, Whether this occurred at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after the man had been released from uncleanness, he is in the same position as before.
If one had been certified unclean on account of white hair, and the white hair disappeared and other white hair appeared, And so also in the case of quick flesh or a spreading, Whether this occurred in the beginning, at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after he had been released from uncleanness, he is regarded as being in the same position as before. If he had been certified unclean on account of quick flesh, and the quick flesh disappeared and other quick flesh appeared, And so also in the case of white hair and spreading, Whether this occurred in the beginning, at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after the man had been released from uncleanness, he is regarded as being in the same position as before. If he had been certified unclean on account of a spreading, and the spreading disappeared and another spreading appeared, And so also in the case of white hair, Whether this occurred at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after the man had been released from uncleanness, he is in the same position as before.
Any doubt in negaim in the beginning is regarded as clean before uncleanness has been established, but after uncleanness has been established a doubt is regarded as unclean. How is this so? If two men came to a priest one having a bright spot the size of a split bean and the other having one of the size of a sela, and at the end of the week each had one the size of a sela, and it is not known on which of them the spreading had occurred, Whether this occurred with one man or with two men, each is clean. Rabbi Akiva said: if one man is involved he is unclean, but if two men are involved each is clean.
Any doubt in negaim in the beginning is regarded as clean before uncleanness has been established, but after uncleanness has been established a doubt is regarded as unclean. How is this so? If two men came to a priest one having a bright spot the size of a split bean and the other having one of the size of a sela, and at the end of the week each had one the size of a sela, and it is not known on which of them the spreading had occurred, Whether this occurred with one man or with two men, each is clean. Rabbi Akiva said: if one man is involved he is unclean, but if two men are involved each is clean.
There are twenty-four tips of limbs in the human body that do not become unclean on account of quick flesh: the tips of the fingers and the toes, the tips of the ears, the tip of the nose, the tip of the penis; and also the nipples of a woman. Rabbi Judah says: also those of a man. Rabbi Eliezer says: also warts and warts with thin necks do not become unclean on account of quick flesh.
One who plucks out signs of uncleanness or burns quick flesh transgresses a negative commandment. And as regards cleanness: If they were plucked out before he came to the priest, he is clean; But if after he had been certified as unclean, he remains unclean. Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua while they were on the way to Narbata, "What is the ruling if the plucking occurred while he was isolated?" They said to me, "We did not hear anything [about this case], but we have heard that if they were plucked before he came to the priest he is clean, and if after he had been certified as unclean he remains unclean." I began to bring them proofs: whether the man stands before the priest or whether he is isolated, he is clean unless the priest had pronounced him unclean. When does he attain cleanness [after he has been certified unclean]? Rabbi Eliezer says: after another nega arises in him and he has attained cleanness after it. But the sages says: only after another nega has spread over his whole body or after his bright spot has been reduced to less than the size of a split bean.
What is the procedure for the inspection of a house? "The owner of the house shall come and tell the priest, saying, "Something like a plague has appeared upon my house" (Leviticus 14:35). Even if he is a learned sage and knows that it is definitely a nega, he may not speak with certainty saying, "A plague has appeared upon my house," but rather, "Something like a plague has appeared upon my house." "The priest shall order the house cleared before the priest enters to examine the plague, so that nothing in the house may become unclean; after that the priest shall enter to examine the house." Even bundles of wood and even bundles of reeds [must be removed], the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon said: clearing keeps him occupied. Rabbi Meir said: But which [of his goods] could become unclean? If you were to say, his articles of wood, of cloth or of metal, he could immerse them and they will become clean. What is it that the Torah has spared? His earthenware, even his cruse and his bucket. If the Torah thus spared a man's humble possessions, how much more so would it spare his cherished possessions! If for his material possessions, how much more so for the life of his sons and daughters! If for the possessions of a wicked man, how much more so for the possessions of a righteous one!
If a person who was clean put his head and the greater part of his body inside an unclean house, he becomes unclean. And if an unclean man put his head and the greater part of his body inside a clean house he causes it to be unclean. If he put three fingerbreadths square of a clean cloak into an unclean house, the cloak becomes unclean; And if he put even the size of an olive of an unclean [cloak] into a clean house, the house becomes unclean.
On the eighth day he would bring three beasts: a sin-offering, a guilt-offering and a whole burnt-offering. And a poor man would bring a sin-offering of a bird and a burnt-offering of a bird.
If a metzora brought his sacrifice as a poor man and he became rich, or as a rich man and he became poor, all depends on the sin-offering, the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Judah says: all depends on the guilt-offering.
If a metzora brought his sacrifice as a poor man and he became rich, or as a rich man and he became poor, all depends on the sin-offering, the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Judah says: all depends on the guilt-offering.
A poor metzora who brought the sacrifice of a rich man has fulfilled his duty; But a rich metzora that brought the sacrifice of a poor man has not fulfilled his duty. A man may bring a poor man's sacrifice for his son, his daughter, his slave or his female, and thereby enable them to eat of the offerings. Rabbi Judah says: for his wife also he must bring the sacrifice of a rich man; and the same applies to any other sacrifice to which she is liable.
A poor metzora who brought the sacrifice of a rich man has fulfilled his duty; But a rich metzora that brought the sacrifice of a poor man has not fulfilled his duty. A man may bring a poor man's sacrifice for his son, his daughter, his slave or his female, and thereby enable them to eat of the offerings. Rabbi Judah says: for his wife also he must bring the sacrifice of a rich man; and the same applies to any other sacrifice to which she is liable.
A poor metzora who brought the sacrifice of a rich man has fulfilled his duty; But a rich metzora that brought the sacrifice of a poor man has not fulfilled his duty. A man may bring a poor man's sacrifice for his son, his daughter, his slave or his female, and thereby enable them to eat of the offerings. Rabbi Judah says: for his wife also he must bring the sacrifice of a rich man; and the same applies to any other sacrifice to which she is liable.
A poor metzora who brought the sacrifice of a rich man has fulfilled his duty; But a rich metzora that brought the sacrifice of a poor man has not fulfilled his duty. A man may bring a poor man's sacrifice for his son, his daughter, his slave or his female, and thereby enable them to eat of the offerings. Rabbi Judah says: for his wife also he must bring the sacrifice of a rich man; and the same applies to any other sacrifice to which she is liable.
Rabbi Eliezer says: the heifer is no more than one year old and the cow no more than two years old. But the sages ruled: the heifer may be even two years old and the red cow even three or four years old. Rabbi Meir says: even five years old, though she is old. But they did not wait with it so long since it might in the meantime grow some black hairs and [thus] become invalid. Rabbi Joshua said: I only heard of [a cow] that was three years old [shelashit]. They said to him: What does "shelashit" mean? He replied: thus have I heard it without any explanation. Ben Azzai said: I will explain: if you say "shelishit" the meaning is ‘the third’ in number to others, but when you say "shelashit" the meaning is one that is three years old. Similarly they said a vineyard that is "revai." They said to him: what does "revai" mean? He replied: thus have I heard it without any explanation. Ben Azzai said: I will explain: if you say "revii" the meaning is the fourth in number to others, but when you say "revai" the meaning is one that is four years old. Similarly it was ruled: if a man ate in an afflicted house half a loaf, three of which can be made from a kav, he becomes unclean. They said to him: say rather "eighteen of which are made of a se'ah." He replied: thus have I heard it without any explanation. Ben Azzai said: I will explain: when you say, three of which are made of a kav it would not contain hallah, but if you say, eighteen of which are made of a se'ah, it has been reduced by its hallah.
Lambs no more than one year old, And rams no more than two years old. And all these years are reckoned from day to day. One that is thirteen months old is not valid, neither as a ram nor as a lamb. Rabbi Tarfon called it palges. Ben Azzai called it noked. Rabbi Ishmael called it parakhrigma. If a man offered it he must bring for it the libation of a ram, but it is not counted as his offering. One that is thirteen months old behold it is a ram.
If five men filled five jars to prepare with them five mixtures, and then they changed their minds to prepare one mixture from all of them, or if they filled the jars to prepare with them one mixture and then they changed their minds to prepare with them five mixtures, all the water remains valid. If one man filled five jars intending to prepare five [separate] mixtures, [even though] he changed his mind to prepare one mixture from all of them, only the last is valid. If he intended to prepare one mixture from all of them and then he changed his mind to prepare five separate mixtures, only the water in the one that was mixed first is valid. If he said to another man, "Prepare mixtures from these for yourself," only the first is valid; But if he said, "Prepare a mixture from these for me," all are valid.
If five men filled five jars to prepare with them five mixtures, and then they changed their minds to prepare one mixture from all of them, or if they filled the jars to prepare with them one mixture and then they changed their minds to prepare with them five mixtures, all the water remains valid. If one man filled five jars intending to prepare five [separate] mixtures, [even though] he changed his mind to prepare one mixture from all of them, only the last is valid. If he intended to prepare one mixture from all of them and then he changed his mind to prepare five separate mixtures, only the water in the one that was mixed first is valid. If he said to another man, "Prepare mixtures from these for yourself," only the first is valid; But if he said, "Prepare a mixture from these for me," all are valid.
One who filled the water with one hand and did some other work with the other hand, or filled the water for himself and for another man, or filled two jars at the same time, the water of both is invalid, for work causes invalidity whether one acts for oneself or for another person.
One who prepared the mixture with one hand and did some other work with the other hand, the mixture is invalid if he prepared it for himself, but if he prepared it for another man, it is valid. If he prepared a mixture both for himself and for another man, his is invalid and that of the other man is valid. If he prepares mixtures for two men simultaneously, both are valid.
One who prepared the mixture with one hand and did some other work with the other hand, the mixture is invalid if he prepared it for himself, but if he prepared it for another man, it is valid. If he prepared a mixture both for himself and for another man, his is invalid and that of the other man is valid. If he prepares mixtures for two men simultaneously, both are valid.
One who prepared the mixture with one hand and did some other work with the other hand, the mixture is invalid if he prepared it for himself, but if he prepared it for another man, it is valid. If he prepared a mixture both for himself and for another man, his is invalid and that of the other man is valid. If he prepares mixtures for two men simultaneously, both are valid.
If a man coils the rope around his hand little by little, [the mixture] is valid; But if he coiled it afterwards, it is invalid. Rabbi Yose said: this also had been ruled to be valid as a temporary measure.
One was carrying his water on his shoulder and he ruled in a matter of law, or showed others the way, or killed a snake or a scorpion, or picked up food in order to store it, it [the water] is invalid; But [if he picked up] food to eat, it is valid. [And if he killed] a snake or a scorpion that hindered him, it remains valid. Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: If the act was is in the nature of work, the mixture is invalid whether the man stopped or not, If it was not in the nature of work: If he stopped, it is invalid; But if he did not stop it remains valid.
If one gave over his water to someone who was unclean, it is invalid. But if to a clean one it is valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: even if it was entrusted to an unclean man it is valid, provided the owner did no other work in the meantime.
If he intended to sprinkle upon a thing that is susceptible to uncleanness and he sprinkled upon something that is not susceptible to uncleanness, if any of the water still remained on the hyssop he should not sprinkle with it again. [If he intended to sprinkle] upon a thing that is not susceptible to uncleanness and he sprinkled on that which is susceptible to uncleanness, even though there was still some water on the hyssop, he can sprinkle with it again. [If he intended to sprinkle] upon a man and he sprinkled upon a beast, if any of the water remained on the hyssop he should not sprinkle with it again; But [if he intended to sprinkle] upon a beast and he sprinkled upon a man, even though there was still some water on the hyssop, he can sprinkle with it again. The water that drips off is valid, and therefore it conveys uncleanness as the usual hatat waters.
If he intended to sprinkle upon a thing that is susceptible to uncleanness and he sprinkled upon something that is not susceptible to uncleanness, if any of the water still remained on the hyssop he should not sprinkle with it again. [If he intended to sprinkle] upon a thing that is not susceptible to uncleanness and he sprinkled on that which is susceptible to uncleanness, even though there was still some water on the hyssop, he can sprinkle with it again. [If he intended to sprinkle] upon a man and he sprinkled upon a beast, if any of the water remained on the hyssop he should not sprinkle with it again; But [if he intended to sprinkle] upon a beast and he sprinkled upon a man, even though there was still some water on the hyssop, he can sprinkle with it again. The water that drips off is valid, and therefore it conveys uncleanness as the usual hatat waters.
If one was sprinkling from a window in a public domain and [a man who was thus sprinkled upon] entered the sanctuary, and the water was found to be invalid, he is exempt; But if the sprinkling was done from a private window and [a man who was thus sprinkled upon] entered the sanctuary, and the water was found to be invalid, he is liable. A high priest, however, is exempt, whether the sprinkling upon him was done from a private window or from one in a public domain, for a high priest is never liable for entering the sanctuary. [The people] used to slip before a certain window in a public domain, and [nevertheless] they trod [on that spot] and did not refrain [from entering the sanctuary], because they said that hatat waters whose mitzvah had been performed do not defile.
If one was sprinkling from a window in a public domain and [a man who was thus sprinkled upon] entered the sanctuary, and the water was found to be invalid, he is exempt; But if the sprinkling was done from a private window and [a man who was thus sprinkled upon] entered the sanctuary, and the water was found to be invalid, he is liable. A high priest, however, is exempt, whether the sprinkling upon him was done from a private window or from one in a public domain, for a high priest is never liable for entering the sanctuary. [The people] used to slip before a certain window in a public domain, and [nevertheless] they trod [on that spot] and did not refrain [from entering the sanctuary], because they said that hatat waters whose mitzvah had been performed do not defile.
If the hands of a man who was clean for the hatat waters became unclean, his body also becomes unclean, and he conveys uncleanness to his fellow, and his fellow to his fellow, even if they be a hundred.
The lid of a kettle which is joined to a chain: Bet Shammai say: these are regarded as connected in respect of uncleanness but not in respect of sprinkling. Bet Hillel say: if he sprinkled on the kettle, it is the same as if the lid also was sprinkled upon; but if he sprinkled on the lid only it is not the same as if the kettle also was sprinkled upon. All are eligible to sprinkle, except a tumtum, a hermaphrodite, a woman, and a child that is without understanding. A woman may assist [a man] while he sprinkles, and hold the water for him while he dips and sprinkles. If she held his hand, even if only at the time of sprinkling, it is invalid.
The hide, meat juice, sediment, dried-up meat, bones, sinews, horns and hooves join together [to make up the minimum quantity in order] to convey food-uncleanness, but not to [make up the minimum quantity in order to] convey nevelah-uncleanness. Similarly, if a man slaughtered an unclean animal for a Gentile and it still has convulsions, it can convey food-uncleanness, but it conveys nevelah-uncleanness only after it is dead, or its head has been chopped off. [Scripture] has [thus] made more cases that convey food-uncleanness than those that convey nevelah-uncleanness.
A man who had corpse uncleanness who pressed olives or grapes: If its bulk was exactly that of an egg, the juice remains clean provided he does not touch the place on which the liquid is; But [if the bulk was] more than that of an egg, the juice becomes unclean, for as soon as the first drop came out, it became unclean by contact with an egg's bulk. If the person was a zav or a zavah [the juice] becomes unclean even if only one berry [was pressed out], for as soon as the first drop came out it became unclean by carrying. If a zav milked a goat, the milk becomes unclean, for as soon as the first drop comes out it becomes unclean by carrying.
"A doubt concerning an object of uncleanness that floated upon water:" [It is clean] whether the water was in vessels or in the ground. Rabbi Shimon says: if in vessels he is deemed unclean but if in the ground he is deemed clean. Rabbi Judah says: if the doubt arose when the man went down into the water he is deemed unclean, but if when he came up he is deemed clean. Rabbi Yose says: even if there is only enough room for a man and the uncleanness the former remains clean.