1407 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:50

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said the argument is about the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he enables her for heave but not for breast and thigh. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina asked, what means “there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter”? He said to him, open your mouth and receive. Rebbi Mana said, he made fun of him. Rebbi Abun said, he gave him an example. “Since she eats heave that never was within the reach of an Israel, is it not logical that she should eat breast and thigh that were within the reach of Israel? Breast and thigh were within the reach of Israel but when they became guilty these were taken from them and given to the priests. I could think, since these were taken from them when they incurred guilt, so they would be given back to them when they acquire merit. The verse says, ‘I gave them to Aaron the priest and his sons for an eternal law;’ since a gift is not returned, so these are not returned.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:41

“If he allots her to his son;” he allots her to his son but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you take the grandson like the son but here you do not take the grandson like the son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Tanḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of the son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of the son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider the brother like the son and all [near] relatives like the son but not the grandson like the son. He said, there went the spiced wine.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:13

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, “No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry” interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. He retorted, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. (Let the father’s wife be selected to teach about bastardy for all incests prohibitions.) Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. He said to him, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say that the rape victim was in a set of all rape victims, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victims in her case? He said to him, is she is the father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; is she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:14

Does a court convene for repudiation? Was it not stated: Flee from three and cling to three. Cling to ḥalîṣah, annulling vows, and making peace. But flee from repudiations, from being a guarantor, and from receiving deposits. Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said, its name is not פקדון “deposit” but פק דון “go to court”. Rebbi Berekhiah said, “My son, if you became guanrantor for your neighbor.” Does a court convene for repudiation? Explain it that they were sitting in another matter and the case came before them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:19

Rebbi Eliezer says, the actions of an underage girl have no legal standing. He has no right to what she finds or earns, nor may he dissolve her vows; she is as if not his wife in any respect except that she needs repudiation from him. Rebbi Joshua said, he owns what she finds or earns, he may he dissolve her vows; she is his wife in all respects except that she needs a bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Ismael said, I looked around at all logical systems of Sages and did not find anybody who was consistent in the matter of an underage girl except Rebbi Eliezer, only that he requires repudiation from him.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:3

The declaration of jealousy, Rebbi Joshua said in the name of Rebbi Eliezer, is obligatory; but Rebbi Joshua said, it is optional. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, it turns out that Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel. As the House of Shammai say, a man may not divorce his wife except if he found in her a matter of nakedness. If he found her behavior ugly, he cannot divorce her since he found no proof of adultery; he cannot keep her since he found her behavior ugly. Therefore, he says, it is obligatory. But was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this if there are witnesses, but not if there are no witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:3

The declaration of jealousy, Rebbi Joshua said in the name of Rebbi Eliezer, is obligatory; but Rebbi Joshua said, it is optional. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, it turns out that Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel. As the House of Shammai say, a man may not divorce his wife except if he found in her a matter of nakedness. If he found her behavior ugly, he cannot divorce her since he found no proof of adultery; he cannot keep her since he found her behavior ugly. Therefore, he says, it is obligatory. But was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this if there are witnesses, but not if there are no witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:9

Witnesses of a declaration of jealousy who were found to be false are whipped. About witnesses concerning her being in a secluded place who were found to be false, you say that they are whipped; why should they not pay? It is not through their action that she loses her ketubah. Or it might be, following what Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah, said in the name of Samuel: One does not infer one thing from another in the matter of false witnesses. And here it is so.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:21

“A sly wicked man.” Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rav Huna: That is one who chooses leniencies for himself and teaches restrictions to others. In this matter, it was stated: “About anybody who wants to take upon himself the stringencies both of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel it was said: ‘The silly one walks in darkness’. The leniencies of both of them, he is called wicked. Only either following the words of the House of Shammai in their leniencies and stringencies, or following the words of the House of Hillel in their leniencies and stringencies.” That is, before there came the disembodied voice. But after the disembodied voice was heard, “practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” And any who transgresses the words of the House of Hillel is deserving of death. It was stated: There came the disembodied voice and said: “Both of them are the words of the Living God, but practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” Where was the disembodied voice heard? Rav Bebai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The disembodied voice was heard at Yabneh.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 4:14

HALAKHAH: “A Cohen’s wife drinks,” etc. Otherwise, what could we say? She drank and the water had no influence on her; she is pure! I could say, merit suspended for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Rebbi Isaac said, really we deal with the case that she drank and the water had no influence on her; that you should not say since the water has no influence on a rape victim, but only on a seduced woman, this one is a rape victim. But a rape victim in the priesthood is like a willing one for an Israel, therefore it is necessary to say that she is permitted to her house. From where that rape disables a married woman in the priesthood? Since in matters of crawling things, which are a trifling matter, He made forced [impurity] equal to intentional [impurity], in the weighty matter of the deviant not so much more? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi stated before Rebbi Jonathan: “If you deviated from under your husband and became defiled,” that excludes rape. How do you understand this? He said to him, just as “under your husband” is by consent, so “if you became defiled” is by consent. “She was not raped”, she is forbidden. Therefore, if she was raped, she is permitted. But there is a rape victim which is forbidden for an Israel. Who is that? That is one who started by consent and ended up raped. And there is one who is not a rape victim which is permitted to an Israel. Who is that? That is one who started as a rape victim and ended up consenting. Like that woman who came to Rebbi Joḥanan and said to him, I was raped. He said to her, but was it not sweet to you in the end? She said to him, if a person dips a finger into honey and puts it into his mouth on the Day of Atonement, does he not feel bad about it and at the end it is sweet? He accepted her.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 4:14

HALAKHAH: “A Cohen’s wife drinks,” etc. Otherwise, what could we say? She drank and the water had no influence on her; she is pure! I could say, merit suspended for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Rebbi Isaac said, really we deal with the case that she drank and the water had no influence on her; that you should not say since the water has no influence on a rape victim, but only on a seduced woman, this one is a rape victim. But a rape victim in the priesthood is like a willing one for an Israel, therefore it is necessary to say that she is permitted to her house. From where that rape disables a married woman in the priesthood? Since in matters of crawling things, which are a trifling matter, He made forced [impurity] equal to intentional [impurity], in the weighty matter of the deviant not so much more? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi stated before Rebbi Jonathan: “If you deviated from under your husband and became defiled,” that excludes rape. How do you understand this? He said to him, just as “under your husband” is by consent, so “if you became defiled” is by consent. “She was not raped”, she is forbidden. Therefore, if she was raped, she is permitted. But there is a rape victim which is forbidden for an Israel. Who is that? That is one who started by consent and ended up raped. And there is one who is not a rape victim which is permitted to an Israel. Who is that? That is one who started as a rape victim and ended up consenting. Like that woman who came to Rebbi Joḥanan and said to him, I was raped. He said to her, but was it not sweet to you in the end? She said to him, if a person dips a finger into honey and puts it into his mouth on the Day of Atonement, does he not feel bad about it and at the end it is sweet? He accepted her.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:24

MISHNAH: On the same day, Joshua ben Hyrkanos explained that Job served the Holy One, praise to Him, only out of love, as it is said: “Behold, even if He will kill me, to Him I pray.” But the matter is still in suspense, “to Him I look forward” or “I do not look forward to Him”. The verse says, “until I die I shall not remove my innocence from me,” this teaches that he did it out of love.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 6:10

MISHNAH: It would have been logical: Since the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, is not confirmed if not from two [witnesses], the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, should reasonably only be confirmed by [witnesses]. The verse says: “There is no witness about her”, any kind of testimony about her. There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony! Since the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, is confirmed from a single witness, the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, should logically be confirmed from a single witness. The verse says, “for he found out about her a matter of sexual misbehavior,” and further, it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses a matter should be confirmed.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 6:10

MISHNAH: It would have been logical: Since the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, is not confirmed if not from two [witnesses], the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, should reasonably only be confirmed by [witnesses]. The verse says: “There is no witness about her”, any kind of testimony about her. There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony! Since the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, is confirmed from a single witness, the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, should logically be confirmed from a single witness. The verse says, “for he found out about her a matter of sexual misbehavior,” and further, it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses a matter should be confirmed.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 6:15

Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:48

Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel asked: If they were proven to be false witnesses, do they have to pay? Or it might be, following what Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah, said in the name of Samuel: One does not infer one thing from another in the matter of false witnesses. And here it is so.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:33

MISHNAH: How does he drink from his pot? Even if she is lame, even if she is blind, or even if she is afflicted with boils. If a matter of immorality was found with her or she could not marry in Israel, he may not keep here since it is written: “She shall be his wife,” a wife appropriate for him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:42

There, we have stated: “He who comes to a preliminarily married adolescent is guilty only if she was an adolescent, virgin, preliminarily married, in her father’s house. If two came upon her, the first is stoned and the second strangled.” Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That is Rebbi Meïr’s. But following the rabbis even if she is a minor. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? “A lad” is written in the paragraph. How do the rabbis explain “a lad”? Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Once in the paragraph it is written “a young woman”; this teaches that in the entire paragraph she is an adult. Rebbi Meïr objected to the rabbis: In the matter of the calumniator, “a lad” is written and she is an adult since a minor is not stoned! What do the rabbis with this? Rebbi Abin said, explain it if he came to her as to a male.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:8

HALAKHAH: “If she did appear in court before she became an adult,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “The man who had lain with her shall give 50 silver pieces to the girl’s father;” this teaches that the father acquires only by handing over. Rebbi Simeon says, the matter depends on the collection, but the rabbis say, the matter depends on the court procedure. Rebbi Simeon treats it as court decrees but the rabbis treat it as a loan. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, he forecloses from the best land; in the opinion of the rabbis he forecloses from average land. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, the Sabbatical year does not cancel the debt; in the opinion of the rabbis the Sabbatical year cancels the debt. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon the firstborn takes a double portion; in the opinion of the rabbis the firstborn does not take a double portion.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:8

HALAKHAH: “If she did appear in court before she became an adult,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “The man who had lain with her shall give 50 silver pieces to the girl’s father;” this teaches that the father acquires only by handing over. Rebbi Simeon says, the matter depends on the collection, but the rabbis say, the matter depends on the court procedure. Rebbi Simeon treats it as court decrees but the rabbis treat it as a loan. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, he forecloses from the best land; in the opinion of the rabbis he forecloses from average land. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, the Sabbatical year does not cancel the debt; in the opinion of the rabbis the Sabbatical year cancels the debt. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon the firstborn takes a double portion; in the opinion of the rabbis the firstborn does not take a double portion.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:24

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not say “his” but [ ]. In which respect? In case the heir took it, one removes it from his hand. Does one have the same rule for the creditor? Was it not stated: If either the heir or the creditor took it, one takes it from their hands? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said, let us hear from the following: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas, [the creditor] adds another denar and redeems these properties.” Not necessarily a denar, but anything, that a dedication should not be seen to be profanated without redemption. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One would be guilty of complete larceny. That is difficult. If one would be guilty of complete larceny, should if not be redeemed for its full value? If it can be redeemed for less than its full value, one should not be guilty of complete larceny! What are we talking about? If it is connected to the ground, can there be larceny about real estate? But we talk about standing grain. Since if the administrator misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand; the administrator and the heir follow the same rule. Also if the heir misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The same rule holds for an ox. Can you say that an ox is real estate? Rebbi Tanḥum bar Mari in the name of Rebbi Yose: They made the rules for an ox parallel those of dedications that lost their value. Here, you say one takes it from his hand, but there you say, one does not take it from his hand. Since you diminished the woman’s power in that her ketubah is a lien only on the properties of her first husband, you strengthened her power in this matter that if the heir came and took it, one removes it from his hand. It was stated thus: Trees and cutting, old or young, one removes from their hands.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:7

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, but not in the matter of words. Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel for he said, if she dies he inherits from her, but in matters of words, “since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid,” in personal matters. But in money matters, one’s stipulations are valid and that is a money matter! Why did we say that the condition is invalid? Because in the end he acquired it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The law should have been that if she sold or gave it away it should be valid, for [the buyer] acquired it. Why did they say it is invalid? That a wife should not sell her husband’s property and say, it is mine.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:7

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, but not in the matter of words. Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel for he said, if she dies he inherits from her, but in matters of words, “since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid,” in personal matters. But in money matters, one’s stipulations are valid and that is a money matter! Why did we say that the condition is invalid? Because in the end he acquired it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The law should have been that if she sold or gave it away it should be valid, for [the buyer] acquired it. Why did they say it is invalid? That a wife should not sell her husband’s property and say, it is mine.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:9

Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If she requested her ketubah in court, she lost her claim to sustenance. Rebbi Yose said, but only from a clear mind; not if forced. As in the case of the widow of Rebbi Eudaimon from Mozva to whom they said, Rebbi Abba bar Cohen wants you. She requested her ketubah and lost her sustenance. After the matter became known, it was brought before Rebbi Yose and she returned to her sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:8

“That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows. What is more restrictive for vows than for oaths?” “Or a person who swears to lightly express with his lips for bad or for good.” Just as doing good is a matter of choice, so doing bad is a matter of choice; that excludes any prohibition which is a commandment. They wanted to say, inadvertently, but not intentionally. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, “anything that comes out of his mouth he shall do,” not what comes out of Heaven’s mouth. Should we say that this is the same for vows of sanctification? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: For a man may vow his sukkah to Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:8

“That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows. What is more restrictive for vows than for oaths?” “Or a person who swears to lightly express with his lips for bad or for good.” Just as doing good is a matter of choice, so doing bad is a matter of choice; that excludes any prohibition which is a commandment. They wanted to say, inadvertently, but not intentionally. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, “anything that comes out of his mouth he shall do,” not what comes out of Heaven’s mouth. Should we say that this is the same for vows of sanctification? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: For a man may vow his sukkah to Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:12

It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:12

It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:16

HALAKHAH: “What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia,” etc. So is the Mishnah: A town square which is crossed by a public road is as if from the returnees from Babylonia. A man used a Torah scroll for his preliminary marriage to a woman. Rebbi Sabbatai and Rebbi Ḥasida brought the matter before Rebbi Yose who said, she is not married. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, you read the letter and there is written in it “not only”. Rebbi Mana said, I asked before Rebbi Ḥizqiah, what means “not only”? Did he marry with a Torah scroll which is private property? He said to us, she is not married. That comes to tell you, even if he used the public Torah scroll to marry, that is “not only”. But that means, even if he used a privately owned Torah scroll to marry, that is “she is not married.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:38

Rebbi Hoshaia, when he received witnesses at Kallirhoë, used to say to them: You should know the importance of the testimony that comes from your mouth, how much rent money depends on your mouths. Rebbi Abuna said, if it is so, it is even a matter of criminal law. If somebody sleeps with a girl three years and one day old, he is stoned. The Court decided to lengthen, if he sleeps with her he is not stoned. Rebbi Abun said: “I am calling to Almighty God, to the God who decides with me.” If a girl is three years and one day old, if the Court decided to lengthen, her hymen repairs itself, otherwise it does not repair itself.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:1

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, one opens for a man by the honor of his father and mother, but the Sages forbid it. Rebbi Ṣadoq said, before one opens by the honor of his father and mother one should open by the honor of the Omnipresent; then there are no vows. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer that if was a matter between a man and his father and mother, that one opens for him by the honor of his father and mother.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:11

Rebbi Jeremiah said, what you say is only that there are changed circumstances before the matter is discussed. The force of Rebbi Yose is from the following: “That was the error of Naḥum the Mede.” What was his error? That he found them an opening by changed circumstances. “Naḥum the Mede said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the earlier prophets had prophesied while the Temple was standing that eventually it would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the far future: “The vision he sees is for many years; for faraway times he prophesies.” It turns out that Rebbi Jeremiah parallels Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose parallels Rebbi Hila.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6

MISHNAH: If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father. In this, He strengthened the father’s power over the husband. In another matter, He strengthened the husband’s power over the father since the husband dissolves in adulthood but the father does not dissolve in adulthood.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:14

HALAKHAH: “An adult girl and one who had waited twelve months,” etc. Rebbi Eliezer holds that the matter depends on the support. If he preliminarily married a woman on condition to support her, the husband dissolves for her. If he completely married a woman on condition that he support her, the father dissolves for her. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband never dissolves before she enters his domain.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:25

HALAKHAH: Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. The Mishnah follows him who said, “he shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. As we have stated: “If he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes.” If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste a fig nor a grape berry, that is a matter of difference between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides, and Rebbi Aqiba says, the prohibition decides.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:33

If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:3

Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:3

Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:23

MISHNAH: The nazir shaves for the following impurities: For a corpse, for flesh in the volume of an olive of a corpse, and for the volume of an olive of decayed matter from a corpse, and for a spoonful of decay, for the spine and for the skull, for a limb from a corpse or a limb from the living on which there is sufficient flesh, for half a qab of bones, and for half a log of blood, if they are touched, or carried, or under a tent. Also for a bone in the volume of a barley grain if it is touched, or carried, (or under a tent.) For these, the nazir shaves, he sprinkles on the third and seventh [days], he disregards the preceding days and starts to count only after he purifies himself and brings all his sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:26

What is decayed matter? Flesh of the corpse which was separated and fluid that coagulated. Therefore not when it is still mashed? Did not Rebbi Ḥanina say in the name of Rebbi: Fat from a corpse which was melted remains impure; if he cut it and then melted it, it is pure. Rebbi Yudan and Rebbi Yose, one says to exclude the fluid in the flesh; the other says that if it will fill the volume of an olive when congealed, it will be impure when still mashed.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:27

We have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, dried flesh from a corpse which even if soaked will not return to its former status is pure. What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Did he not infer this from a carcass? From a carcass, since a dried carcass is pure, so also a dried corpse should be pure. Rebbi Immi asked: Since a foul-smelling carcass is pure, would a foul-smelling corpse also be pure? Then there can be no decayed matter for Rebbi Yose! It was found stated in Rebbi Yose’s name that there was decayed matter. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Yose: Since a carcass has no decay, so a corpse should have no decay! He told them that he inferred from an animal only for the flesh, not for the bones. There is no decay from flesh, there is decay from bones, as Bar Qappara stated, “decay of bones is jealousy.” Rebbi Yannai said, “or a grave”, even if one touched the first Adam’s grave. The colleagues say, he transposes the verse: “or a grave qbr” means “or decay rqb”. Bar Qappara stated, “or a grave qbr”, “or decay rqb”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:27

We have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, dried flesh from a corpse which even if soaked will not return to its former status is pure. What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Did he not infer this from a carcass? From a carcass, since a dried carcass is pure, so also a dried corpse should be pure. Rebbi Immi asked: Since a foul-smelling carcass is pure, would a foul-smelling corpse also be pure? Then there can be no decayed matter for Rebbi Yose! It was found stated in Rebbi Yose’s name that there was decayed matter. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Yose: Since a carcass has no decay, so a corpse should have no decay! He told them that he inferred from an animal only for the flesh, not for the bones. There is no decay from flesh, there is decay from bones, as Bar Qappara stated, “decay of bones is jealousy.” Rebbi Yannai said, “or a grave”, even if one touched the first Adam’s grave. The colleagues say, he transposes the verse: “or a grave qbr” means “or decay rqb”. Bar Qappara stated, “or a grave qbr”, “or decay rqb”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:29

“Which corpse has decay? One who was buried naked in a marble coffin, or on a stone floor, or on a marble table. But if he was buried in a wooden casket or on a woooden plank; that is not decay but graves’ dust and needs somewhat more than a spoonful.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, if even the smallest attachment was buried with him, there is no decay. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Of two corpses which were buried together, each one becomes an attachment for the other. This is automatic; could one alone be an attachment to another? Abba bar Nathan objected: Think of it, that somebody brought half a spoonful from one and half a spoonful from the other! He was considering it when he was seen laughing; he was offended by him and he died. Rebbi Yose said, there this man is gone and we did hear nothing about it. What about it? There, neither of them will produce a spoonful of decayed matter, but here, each of them can generate a spoonful of decay.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:27

MISHNAH: Any person with initially doubtful skin disease is pure as long as he was not declared impure. After he was declared impure, in doubt he is impure. In seven ways does one check the sufferer from a genital discharge before he becomes impure: About eating and drinking, carrying a load or jumping, sickness, looking, and thought. After he becomes impure one does not check him; his accident, doubtful case, and semen are impure since the matter is not unsubstantiated.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:13

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan told the people of Sepphoris: You say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a person who brings a bill of divorce from Babylonia does not have to say “it was written and signed before me.” But I am saying that it is necessary, for there is a Mishnah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East and Reqam belongs to the East.” And even if you say that they disagree with Rebbi Jehudah and say that Reqam does not belong to the East, what about from Babylonia to here? Rav said, we consider ourselves as in the Land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. But Samuel said, even from one city quarter to another. He asked before him to change his opinion, when Cahana told him, what would we do with the earlier cases of women who remarried? He said to him, what do you have in your hand? For he was of Rebbi’s opinion as it was stated: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was neither written nor signed in his presence, she has to leave under the thirteen penalties, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages did not agree in this matter.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:13

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan told the people of Sepphoris: You say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a person who brings a bill of divorce from Babylonia does not have to say “it was written and signed before me.” But I am saying that it is necessary, for there is a Mishnah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East and Reqam belongs to the East.” And even if you say that they disagree with Rebbi Jehudah and say that Reqam does not belong to the East, what about from Babylonia to here? Rav said, we consider ourselves as in the Land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. But Samuel said, even from one city quarter to another. He asked before him to change his opinion, when Cahana told him, what would we do with the earlier cases of women who remarried? He said to him, what do you have in your hand? For he was of Rebbi’s opinion as it was stated: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was neither written nor signed in his presence, she has to leave under the thirteen penalties, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages did not agree in this matter.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:14

Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:14

Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:20

Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:20

Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:26

Rebbi Joḥanan said, as a matter of principle one does not appoint guardians for orphans to their detriment, only to their profit; but if they are detrimental, they are detrimental. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, neither as a matter of principle nor as a reaction, neither for profit not for detriment. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: “One appoints a guardian for them” There is a difference about an ox, lest it continue to cause damage. If it did do damage, from whom does one take payment? Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the orphans. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, from the guardian. And even if Rebbi Joḥanan never taught this, does not his word imply it since he said if in the end they are detrimental, they are detrimental?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:26

Rebbi Joḥanan said, as a matter of principle one does not appoint guardians for orphans to their detriment, only to their profit; but if they are detrimental, they are detrimental. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, neither as a matter of principle nor as a reaction, neither for profit not for detriment. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: “One appoints a guardian for them” There is a difference about an ox, lest it continue to cause damage. If it did do damage, from whom does one take payment? Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the orphans. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, from the guardian. And even if Rebbi Joḥanan never taught this, does not his word imply it since he said if in the end they are detrimental, they are detrimental?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:28

If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:17

Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah speaks of a roof with a parapet when it descended lower than the parapet, or one without a parapet when it descended lower than within three handbreadths of the roof, since anything within three handbreadths of the roof is as if it were part of the roof. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: This refers to the rules of the Sabbath, where anything within three handbreadths of a partition is considered part of the partition. Rebbi Yasa said, they are not comparable, for bills of divorce are about the top, the rules of the Sabbath about the below. For bills of divorce even if it never came to rest, for the Sabbath only if it rested. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only if it descended to within the partitions. Rebbi Immi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi, since Rebbi considers partitions as solidly filled up? He said to him, here in the matter of bills of divorce it is everybody’s opinion. Could one not object that Rebbi said, if it is roofed? And you say, it is not roofed? What is the difference between bills of divorce and the Sabbath? Rebbi Abba said, about the Sabbath it is written: “You shall not do any work;” it may make itself automatically. But here “he shall deliver into her hand,” into her domain.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:32

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:25

A document which has an erasure or insertion in its main part is invalid; in the routine matter it is valid; but if it was mentioned later it is valid even in the main part. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, one has to mention it at least in the second line before the end of the text. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav: One has to mention the essence of the document with it. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If one did not mention the essence of the document with it. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, Rebbi Ba said in the name of Rav Jeremiah: Disqualified witnesses do not constitute remote testimony since they came only to support the document’s validity. And here, he says so? There, in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, here in the name of Rav.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:37

MISHNAH: The House of Shammai say, a person should not divorce his wife unless he found her immoral, as it was said: “For he found with her a matter of nakedness.” But the House of Hillel say, even if she spoiled his dish, as it was said: “For he found with her a bad thing.” Rebbi Aqiba said, even if he found another more beautiful than her, as it was said: “It will be if she does not appear pleasing in his eyes, etc.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:38

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:16

The word of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya implies that Gentiles have no divorce, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in this matter: A Gentile who divorced his wife, who herself then went and married another, when the latter divorced her and then both of them converted, I do not read for them: “Her first husband who had divorced her cannot return to marry her.” It was stated in this matter: A case came before Rebbi and he approved.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:16

The word of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya implies that Gentiles have no divorce, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in this matter: A Gentile who divorced his wife, who herself then went and married another, when the latter divorced her and then both of them converted, I do not read for them: “Her first husband who had divorced her cannot return to marry her.” It was stated in this matter: A case came before Rebbi and he approved.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:22

In this matter, it was stated: “About anybody who wanted to take upon himself the stringencies both of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel it was said: ‘The silly one walks in darkness’. The leniencies of both of them, he is called wicked. Either following the words of the House of Shammai in their leniencies and stringencies, or following the words of the House of Hillel in their leniencies and stringencies.” That is, before there came the disembodied voice. But after the disembodied voice was heard, “practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” And any who transgress the words of the House of Hillel are deserving of death. It was stated: There came the disembodied voice and said: Both of them are the words of God, but practice follows the House of Hillel. Where was the disembodied voice heard? Rebbi Bebai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The disembodied voice was heard at Yabneh.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:52

“If he allots her to his son;” but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you recognize the grandson like a son but here you do not recognize the grandson like a son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Naḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of a son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of a son. But here, where neither the brother nor any other relative can take the place of a son, the grandson cannot take the place of a son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider a brother like a son and all [near] relatives like a son but not a grandson like a son. They said, there went the spiced wine.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:58

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:58

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:103

From where that non-guaranteed property may be acquired together with guaranteed property, by money, document, or by possession? Rebbi Yose in the name of Ḥizqiah; Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ḥanina Tortaya in the name of Ḥizqiah, it is written (2Chr. 21:3): “Their father gave them many gifts, silver and gold and delicacies, with fortified cities in Jehudah.” So far real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem, who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages and they upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Is not the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer like the sick person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:131

Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:131

Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:131

Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:3

The House of Shammai say, an agent may not testify as witness. But the House of Hillel say, an agent may testify as witness. How is that? If he sent two, in the opinion of the House of Shammai there is an agent and two witnesses. In the opinion of the House of Hillel, all three can be agents and all three can be witnesses. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the matter is reasonable if the preliminary marriage was executed by document. But if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he became an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Yose said, since the Torah made him trustworthy, even if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he did not become an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Abba said, there came a case before Rav who admitted the agent as witness. A person deposited his amphoras in another’s corral; [the latter] reneged. The case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who admitted the agent as witness and made him swear [by the testimony of] the porter.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:41

It was stated: “Concerning all of these, if he gave a name to their heave of the tithe or Second Tithe, what he did is done.” Rebbi Eleazar said, with the exception of the remainders of flour sacrifices. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the rest is in dispute. Rebbi Yose asked, what dispute? Where are we standing, if according to Rebbi Meïr, both for Second Tithe and for the remainders of flour sacrifices, he did not do anything. If according to Rebbi Jehudah, what he did is done. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and heard Rebbi Ḥizqiah who was sitting there, stating: “If [a priest] preliminarily marries by means of his share in the holiest sacrifices or simple holy sacrifices, she is not married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, that is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is in dispute. I said to him, from whom did you hear this, and he said, from Rebbi Jeremiah. I said, this explains the matter! Rebbi Jeremiah, who heard that Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion, he says it is in dispute. Rebbi Yose, who did not hear that, asked which dispute? If according to Rebbi Meïr, both for tithe and for the remainders of flour sacrifices, he did not do anything; if according to Rebbi Jehudah, what he did is done.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:28

Similarly, the pedlars directed the village wax chandlers to a merchant. The merchant absconded. The case came before Rebbi Mana, who said, if it is a matter of pennies, they were negligent. If it is a matter of denars, it is the way of merchants to move around.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:28

Similarly, the pedlars directed the village wax chandlers to a merchant. The merchant absconded. The case came before Rebbi Mana, who said, if it is a matter of pennies, they were negligent. If it is a matter of denars, it is the way of merchants to move around.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:22

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Jeremiah said, as a matter of principle, an Israel with an injured testicle may marry a female bastard. Rebbi Yose said, it applies only to family disabilities, not to bodily defects. The strength of Rebbi Yose comes from the statement of Rebbi Ḥilqiah, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One did state this only for an Israel with an injured testicle, but not a Cohen, since, as you say there, if he is certainly a Cohen he is forbidden to marry a convert; here also, he is certainly an Israel and forbidden to marry a female bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 2:2

HALAKHAH: “How is the foot notorious,” etc. Does not an animal usually make pebbles ricochet? Rebbi Immi said, if the vessel was held by a human. But if it was lying in the public domain, since it was rightfully lying there and [the animal] was rightfully walking there, he is free. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, if there were two roads. On one there are grasses and pebbles, on the other there are no grasses or pebbles. It disregarded the one with no grasses or pebbles and went on that with grasses and pebbles; even though it was in the public domain he is free. Rebbi Eleazar said, in anything not concerning its body, the Sages made no difference between private and public domain in the matter of half damages.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 2:3

Is it subject to a declaration of notoriety in a matter extraneous to its body? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one accepts. Rebbi Illa said, one does not accept. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with him: An ox which rubs itself against a wall which fell on a human and killed him is obligated for weregilt but free from death. Does there exist weregilt for a harmless animal? But it does not disagree with Rebbi Illa. Why is it free from death if it was notorious to destroy walls? When it destroyed it, no human was there.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:19

Rebbi Joḥanan said, as a matter of principle one does not appoint guardians for orphans to their detriment, but only to their profit; but if they are detrimental, they are detrimental. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, neither as a matter of principle nor as a reaction, neither for profit nor for detriment. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: “One appoints a guardian for them” There is a difference about an ox, lest it continue to cause damage.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:19

Rebbi Joḥanan said, as a matter of principle one does not appoint guardians for orphans to their detriment, but only to their profit; but if they are detrimental, they are detrimental. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, neither as a matter of principle nor as a reaction, neither for profit nor for detriment. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: “One appoints a guardian for them” There is a difference about an ox, lest it continue to cause damage.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:24

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:8

MISHNAH: If he robbed a coin and it was split, fruits and they rotted, wine and it spoiled, he pays their value at the time of the robbery. A coin and it was declared invalid, heave and it became impure, leavened matter and Passover passed, an animal which was used for sin, or which became disqualified from the altar, or which was taken out to be stoned, he tells him: Here is your property before you.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:11

Ḥilfai said, if he swore to him before Passover, then after Passover he pays him for fully useable leavened matter. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and asked Rebbi Ḥizqiah, who quoted this in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, is there anybody who disagrees with Ḥilfai so that he would not have to pay for fully useable leavened matter? Everybody agrees about leavened matter that he has to pay for fully useable leavened matter.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:11

Ḥilfai said, if he swore to him before Passover, then after Passover he pays him for fully useable leavened matter. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and asked Rebbi Ḥizqiah, who quoted this in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, is there anybody who disagrees with Ḥilfai so that he would not have to pay for fully useable leavened matter? Everybody agrees about leavened matter that he has to pay for fully useable leavened matter.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:11

Ḥilfai said, if he swore to him before Passover, then after Passover he pays him for fully useable leavened matter. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and asked Rebbi Ḥizqiah, who quoted this in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, is there anybody who disagrees with Ḥilfai so that he would not have to pay for fully useable leavened matter? Everybody agrees about leavened matter that he has to pay for fully useable leavened matter.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:11

Ḥilfai said, if he swore to him before Passover, then after Passover he pays him for fully useable leavened matter. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and asked Rebbi Ḥizqiah, who quoted this in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, is there anybody who disagrees with Ḥilfai so that he would not have to pay for fully useable leavened matter? Everybody agrees about leavened matter that he has to pay for fully useable leavened matter.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 10:20

HALAKHAH: “He who says to another: I robbed you,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wants to clear himself before Heaven. I robbed you, or I took a loan from you, you deposited with me; did I return it to you? The other party says, I do not know. Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, he is required to make good as a matter of law. Rebbi Yose wanted to say, still it is to become clear before Heaven. I took from the wallet and gave to you, and the other party says, I do not know. Rav Huna said, one tells him: You do not know but the other party knows.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 4:2

HALAKHAH: “Silver acquires gold,” etc. This is a summary of the matter: Anything worth less that the other acquires the other. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said, who stated this? Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi. His father told him, change your opinion and state the following: “Gold acquires silver.” He told him, I do not change my opinion since when your faculties were unimpaired, you instructed me to state: “Silver acquires gold.” The word of Rebbi implies that gold is like produce. The Mishnah implies that silver is like produce. [Rebbi Ḥiyya’s baraita implies that gold is like produce, but his word implies that silver is like produce, as in the following:] The elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s daughter lent denars to Rav. She came and asked her father, who told her: Take from him good and full weight denars. Do we learn from Rebbi Ḥiyya’s daughter? Rebbi Idi said, also Abba, Samuel’s father, asked before Rebbi: May one lend denars against denars? He answered him, it is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, also Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both instruct: It is permitted to lend denars against denars. Qerat against qerat is permitted, lekan against lekan is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 5:14

MISHNAH: Somebody sent his son to a grocer who measured him oil for an assarius and he gave him the assarius; if he broke the flask and lost the assarius, the grocer is liable. Rebbi Jehudah holds him not liable since for that he sent him. The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that if the flask was in the child’s hand and the grocer measured into the flask, the grocer is not liable. The wolesaler cleans his measuring vessels once every thirty days, the householder every twelve months. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, it is the other way around. The retail grocer cleans his measuring vessels twice a week, wipes his weights clean once a week, and cleans his scales after each weighing. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, when has this been said? For fluids, but for dry matter it is not necessary; he has to let [the scales] bend down a handbreadth. If he weighed strictly by eyesight he has to give him surplus, one tenth for fluids and one twentieth for dry products. At a place where one is used to small measures he should not use large ones, to large measures he should not use small ones, to level one must not heap, to heap one must not level.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 8:15

HALAKHAH: “Both son and daughter are equal for the rules of inheritance,” etc. It is written: “Of anything which will be found with him,” etc. How could he inherit the expectancy like existing property? How? If his father died during his father’s father’s lifetime, he takes a double portion of his father’s estate but not a double portion of his grandfather’s estate. But if his father was a firstborn, just as he takes from his father’s estate so he takes from his grandfather’s estate. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Abba [Cohen] bar Delaiah: It was said “a rule of law” in the matter of a double portion just as it was said “a rule of law” in the matter of a single portion. Since for a single portion one considers the son as if he were alive to take his father’s single portion so for a double portion one considers the son as if he were alive to take his father’s double portion.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 8:15

HALAKHAH: “Both son and daughter are equal for the rules of inheritance,” etc. It is written: “Of anything which will be found with him,” etc. How could he inherit the expectancy like existing property? How? If his father died during his father’s father’s lifetime, he takes a double portion of his father’s estate but not a double portion of his grandfather’s estate. But if his father was a firstborn, just as he takes from his father’s estate so he takes from his grandfather’s estate. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Abba [Cohen] bar Delaiah: It was said “a rule of law” in the matter of a double portion just as it was said “a rule of law” in the matter of a single portion. Since for a single portion one considers the son as if he were alive to take his father’s single portion so for a double portion one considers the son as if he were alive to take his father’s double portion.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 8:22

There, we have stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah.” Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “Since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid”? Conditions other than for money matters. But here we are dealing with a money matter! What is Rav’s reason? Because in the end he acquired it. Rebbi Joḥanan said, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, if she sold or gave away, the rule should be that it is valid. Then why did they say that her sale is invalid? Lest she smuggle away her properties from her husband and say, they are mine. Rebbi Justinus had a case before the rabbis and they obligated him. He came before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who told him, enter your properties. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did not Rav say, because in the end he acquired it. Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, go and enter your properties? Who are these rabbis? The rabbis of Rebbi Justinus.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 9:3

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: That there should be twelve months of sustenance for all of them. Samuel said, this is the opinion of Rabban Gamliel ben Rebbi, but the words of the Sages are, until they reach adulthood or are married. That is both a leniency and a restriction. Sometimes they are close to adulthood, sometimes far from adulthood. They asked before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, what did you hear from Rebbi Joḥanan? He said to them, I did not hear anything from him concerning this matter except what Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: what if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since they started with permission, they started.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 9:29

HALAKHAH: So far if real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred sheep and a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages, who upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Would the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer be like the healthy person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:67

Rebbi Hoshaia, when he received witnesses at Kallirhoë, used to say to them: you should know the importance of the testimony that comes from your mouths; how much rent money depends on your mouths. Rebbi Abuna said, if it is so, it is even a matter of criminal law. If somebody sleeps with a girl three years and one day old, he is stoned. The court decides to lengthen, if he sleeps with her he is not stoned. Rebbi Abun said, I am calling to Almighty God, to the God Who decides with me. If a girl is three years and one day old, if the court decides to lengthen her hymen does (not) repair itself, otherwise it does [not] repair itself.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:25

Rebbi Yose ben Abun said: I shall keep the King’s sayings, Who told me at Sinai I am the Eternal, your God, on the pronouncement, you shall not have other gods before Me, of God’s oath, do not take the Name of the Eternal, your God, in vain. In this matter we come together, this man and this dog are both equal.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:3

From where the seven investigations? Samuel the Elder stated before Rebbi Aḥa: You shall inquire, investigate, ask in depth, and behold, the matter is well founded. He told him, this verse does not work; but: you shall inquire, investigate, ask in depth; it will be told to you, you shall listen, ask in depth. In depth, in depth for an equal cut, to require in each case listening, asking, inquiry, and investigation. Rebbi Isaac asked about this: If they caught an armed robber in Tiberias and said, this is the murderer, this is the murdered; why does this need seven investigations? Issi said, any time that the witnesses could not be proven perjured, the murderer cannot be executed on that testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:18

Rebbi Meïr says, from noontime on it is from their words; Rebbi Jehudah says, from noontime on it is biblical. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Only on the first day, that is the fifteenth. I could think at nightfall; the verse says only, to separate. How is this? Give it one hour before sundown. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Only on the first day, that is the fourteenth. I could think the entire day; the verse says only, to separate. Half for leavened matter, half for mazzah. Rebbi Meïr’s argument seems inverted. There, he said only to add; here he said only to diminish. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, he diminished, lest it be for leavened matter. Rebbi Meïr said, do not eat leavened matter with it, while it is eaten. Rebbi Jehudah said, do not eat leavened matter with it, while it is prepared.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:18

Rebbi Meïr says, from noontime on it is from their words; Rebbi Jehudah says, from noontime on it is biblical. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Only on the first day, that is the fifteenth. I could think at nightfall; the verse says only, to separate. How is this? Give it one hour before sundown. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Only on the first day, that is the fourteenth. I could think the entire day; the verse says only, to separate. Half for leavened matter, half for mazzah. Rebbi Meïr’s argument seems inverted. There, he said only to add; here he said only to diminish. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, he diminished, lest it be for leavened matter. Rebbi Meïr said, do not eat leavened matter with it, while it is eaten. Rebbi Jehudah said, do not eat leavened matter with it, while it is prepared.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:18

Rebbi Meïr says, from noontime on it is from their words; Rebbi Jehudah says, from noontime on it is biblical. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Only on the first day, that is the fifteenth. I could think at nightfall; the verse says only, to separate. How is this? Give it one hour before sundown. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Only on the first day, that is the fourteenth. I could think the entire day; the verse says only, to separate. Half for leavened matter, half for mazzah. Rebbi Meïr’s argument seems inverted. There, he said only to add; here he said only to diminish. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, he diminished, lest it be for leavened matter. Rebbi Meïr said, do not eat leavened matter with it, while it is eaten. Rebbi Jehudah said, do not eat leavened matter with it, while it is prepared.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:18

Rebbi Meïr says, from noontime on it is from their words; Rebbi Jehudah says, from noontime on it is biblical. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Only on the first day, that is the fifteenth. I could think at nightfall; the verse says only, to separate. How is this? Give it one hour before sundown. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Only on the first day, that is the fourteenth. I could think the entire day; the verse says only, to separate. Half for leavened matter, half for mazzah. Rebbi Meïr’s argument seems inverted. There, he said only to add; here he said only to diminish. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, he diminished, lest it be for leavened matter. Rebbi Meïr said, do not eat leavened matter with it, while it is eaten. Rebbi Jehudah said, do not eat leavened matter with it, while it is prepared.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:20

Now Rebbi Meïr says, after noontime it is forbidden because of their words. The (sixth) [seventh] hour it is forbidden because of a fence. Why the (fifth) [sixth]? Because of a fence. Is there a fence around a fence? But the (fifth) [sixth] may be confounded with the seventh. Rebbi Jehudah’s argument seems inverted. There, he says that the fifth cannot be confounded with the seventh. But here, he says that the fifth can be confounded with the seventh. Rebbi Yose said, there the matter is given over to women who are lazy, here the matter is given over to the court who is careful. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there it is a matter between the beginning of the fifth and the end of the seventh hour. Here it is between the end of the fifth and the start of the seventh. It also was stated thus: At the start of the fifth hour, the sun is in the East, and the end of the seventh the sun is in the West. The sun never starts setting before the end of the seventh hour.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:20

Now Rebbi Meïr says, after noontime it is forbidden because of their words. The (sixth) [seventh] hour it is forbidden because of a fence. Why the (fifth) [sixth]? Because of a fence. Is there a fence around a fence? But the (fifth) [sixth] may be confounded with the seventh. Rebbi Jehudah’s argument seems inverted. There, he says that the fifth cannot be confounded with the seventh. But here, he says that the fifth can be confounded with the seventh. Rebbi Yose said, there the matter is given over to women who are lazy, here the matter is given over to the court who is careful. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there it is a matter between the beginning of the fifth and the end of the seventh hour. Here it is between the end of the fifth and the start of the seventh. It also was stated thus: At the start of the fifth hour, the sun is in the East, and the end of the seventh the sun is in the West. The sun never starts setting before the end of the seventh hour.