may
15962 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: : “He does not write on a wooden plank,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Zimra: “Amen” [is said] for acceptance, “Amen” for an oath, “Amen”, may the words be confirmed. “Amen” [is said] for acceptance, from the suspected wife. “Amen” for an oath: “To keep the oath I had sworn to your forefathers”, etc. “Amen”, may the words be confirmed: “Benaiah ben Yehoyada (the priest) answered the king and said Amen”, etc. Rebbi Tanḥuma said, that does not prove that Amen means an oath, it implies nothing. But the following says: “that you pass by the covenant of your God and His curse,” because oath means curse, as you say: “The Cohen has to administer to the woman the oath of the curse.”
HALAKHAH: : “He does not write on a wooden plank,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Zimra: “Amen” [is said] for acceptance, “Amen” for an oath, “Amen”, may the words be confirmed. “Amen” [is said] for acceptance, from the suspected wife. “Amen” for an oath: “To keep the oath I had sworn to your forefathers”, etc. “Amen”, may the words be confirmed: “Benaiah ben Yehoyada (the priest) answered the king and said Amen”, etc. Rebbi Tanḥuma said, that does not prove that Amen means an oath, it implies nothing. But the following says: “that you pass by the covenant of your God and His curse,” because oath means curse, as you say: “The Cohen has to administer to the woman the oath of the curse.”
Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, who stated “the one waiting for her levir”? Rebbi Aqiba! For Rebbi Aqiba said, there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law. Rebbi Ilai said to him, why should a bastard be relevant for jealousy? The Torah said: “He shall declare his jealousy to his wife”, even a partial wife. Rebbi Shammai said, did not Rebbi Yannai say the following: More than 30 Elders voted, from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man, her levir shall come to her”, that she cannot have any existence with another man. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law! Could he not object: Why should a bastard be relevant for jealousy? The Torah said: “He shall declare his jealousy to his wife”, even a partial wife. A woman waiting for her levir who whored, Rebbi Eleazar said she is permitted to her house, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said she is forbidden to her house. What do the rabbis say? Rebbi Mana said, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to [the levir], since we have stated: “This is the rule: He cannot stipulate about any intercourse she could have had and would not be forbidden to him.”
MISHNAH: Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced. If she was secluded after that, became impure, and after that he took her back, he cannot stipulate with her. This is the rule: He cannot stipulate about any intercourse she could have had and would not be forbidden to him.
HALAKHAH: “Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, it is obvious that a man may forgive about his jealousy. If he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven. How is that? If he had declared his jealousy, divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place. If you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven, he has to declare his jealousy a second time. But if you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had not forgiven, he does not have to declare his jealousy a second time. But if he had declared his jealousy, she was at a secluded place and he knew it, then he divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place, if she drank and the water did nothing to her, she is pure. Or maybe that since the water does not check out a woman forbidden to her husband, she might be impure.
HALAKHAH: “Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, it is obvious that a man may forgive about his jealousy. If he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven. How is that? If he had declared his jealousy, divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place. If you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven, he has to declare his jealousy a second time. But if you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had not forgiven, he does not have to declare his jealousy a second time. But if he had declared his jealousy, she was at a secluded place and he knew it, then he divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place, if she drank and the water did nothing to her, she is pure. Or maybe that since the water does not check out a woman forbidden to her husband, she might be impure.
HALAKHAH: “He took the flour-offering,” etc. It is written: “The Cohen shall take the jealousy-flour-offering from the woman’s hand.” Does he perform the weave? Does not she perform the weave? But from here [one understands that] he takes it from a profane vessel and puts it into a Temple vessel. “The Cohen puts his hands under hers and performs the weave.” Does the Cohen put his hands under hers? Is that not objectionable? He brings a kerchief. Does that not separate? He brings an elderly Cohen. You may even say, a young man, since bad inclinations do not happen at that hour. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If the suspected wife has no hands, two priests weave in her stead.
The rabbis say, he writes, erases, gives to drink, and sacrifices [the flour offering]. Rebbi Simeon says, he writes, sacrifices, erases, and gives to drink. Everybody agrees that erasing immediately precedes drinking; only that the rabbis say, he writes, erases, gives to drink, and sacrifices, while Rebbi Simeon says, he writes, sacrifices, erases, and gives to drink. It was stated: “She may always change her mind as long as her offering was not sacrificed. If her offering was sacrificed and she said I do not want to drink’ one makes her gargle and forces her to drink”. Following Rebbi Simeon. But following the rabbis she already drank. We have stated: “She did not finish drinking”. Some Tannaïm state: She did not move from there. He who says, she did not finish drinking, Rebbi Simeon. He who says, she did not move from there, the rabbis.
HALAKHAH: “Before the scroll was erased,” etc. It was stated: Her scroll is put away under the hinges of a [gate of] the Temple hall. Why? In order to shred it. A small hollow space was where the water was poured out. It was stated: There is no holiness in it. May it be used to moisten mortar? What should be wrong? It is poured out! It was stated: There is holiness in it.
A lady asked Rebbi Eliezer, why did one sin of the golden calf lead to three different kinds of death? He said to her, the wisdom of a woman is only in her spinning rod, as is written: “All wise women span with their hands.” His son Hyrkanos said to him, in order not to give her an answer you made me lose 300 kor of tithes every year. He answered him: May the words of the Torah be burned and not be delivered to women! After she had left, his students said to him, rabbi, this one you pushed away with a stick, what do you explain to us? Rebbi Berekhiah, Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: Anybody against whom there were witnesses and warning was executed in court. Anybody against whom there were witnesses but no warning was checked similar to a suspected wife. Anybody against whom there were neither witnesses nor warning died from a plague. Rav and Levi bar Sissi both say: One who sacrificed, burned, and poured out a libation was executed in court. He who clapped his hands, danced, laughed, was checked similar to a suspected wife. If he enjoyed himself silently, he died from a plague.
MISHNAH: The offering of an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen is burned, the offering of a Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel is not burned. What is the difference between a Cohen and a Cohen’s daughter? The flour offering of a Cohen’s daughter is eaten, that of a Cohen is not eaten. A Cohen’s daughter is desecrated, a Cohen is not desecrated. A Cohen’s daughter may defile herself for the dead, a Cohen may not defile himself for the dead. A Cohen eats most holy [food] a Cohen’s daughter may not eat most holy [food].
MISHNAH: The offering of an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen is burned, the offering of a Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel is not burned. What is the difference between a Cohen and a Cohen’s daughter? The flour offering of a Cohen’s daughter is eaten, that of a Cohen is not eaten. A Cohen’s daughter is desecrated, a Cohen is not desecrated. A Cohen’s daughter may defile herself for the dead, a Cohen may not defile himself for the dead. A Cohen eats most holy [food] a Cohen’s daughter may not eat most holy [food].
MISHNAH: The offering of an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen is burned, the offering of a Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel is not burned. What is the difference between a Cohen and a Cohen’s daughter? The flour offering of a Cohen’s daughter is eaten, that of a Cohen is not eaten. A Cohen’s daughter is desecrated, a Cohen is not desecrated. A Cohen’s daughter may defile herself for the dead, a Cohen may not defile himself for the dead. A Cohen eats most holy [food] a Cohen’s daughter may not eat most holy [food].
“A Cohen’s daughter may defile herself for the dead.” Rebbi Dosa from Malḥiyya, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: A Cohen’s daughter is permitted to leave the Land. What is the reason? “Say to the Cohanim.” Not to the daughters of Cohanim. If it were not so, what would he say? Because she is included in the decree, she cannot leave. Why should she not be included in the decree and be forbidden to leave? If you say so, you push aside the paragraph on impurities.
“A Cohen eats most holy [food], a Cohen’s daughter may not eat most holy [food].” For it is written (Lev. 7:6): “Every male among the Cohanim shall eat it.”
Does our Mishnah follow the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, “she takes her ketubah but does not drink”? Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the House of Shammai is that she may say, bring me my husband, then I shall drink. But here, she knew that the preliminarily married cannot drink; why did she bring herself into that great doubt? In order to disqualify herself from receiving her ketubah.
There, we have stated: “A she-ram, an old woman, or a sterile one neither drinks nor collects her ketubah,” as it is said: “She will be declared innocent and bear seed,” [this refers to] one able to bear seed; it excludes one who is unable to bear seed. They objected, is there not the widow [married to] the High Priest, is she not able to bear seed? There is a difference, since it is written: “He may not desecrate his seed among his people.” There, we have stated: “A bastard disables and enables to eat. How is this?” And here he says so? Rebbi Tanḥuma said, there, “she has no issue” of any kind, but here one requires enabled seed, not disabled seed. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the water only serves to permit her to her house; but about this one one tells him to divorce once she went to a secluded place.
HALAKHAH: “The following cannot drink or collect their ketubah: One who says, I am impure for you,” etc. Rebbi Joshia said, Ze‘ira told me in the name of the people of Jerusalem: In three cases, if they want to forgive, they may forgive. These are: The suspect wife, the rebellious son, and the rebellious Elder, etc.
MISHNAH: A woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child] may neither drink nor collect her ketubah, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, he may separate from her and take her back later. A she-ram, an old woman, or a sterile one, neither drinks nor collects her ketubah; Rebbi Eleazar says, he may marry another wife and be fruitful and multiply with her. All other women either drink or cannot collect their ketubah.
MISHNAH: A woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child] may neither drink nor collect her ketubah, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, he may separate from her and take her back later. A she-ram, an old woman, or a sterile one, neither drinks nor collects her ketubah; Rebbi Eleazar says, he may marry another wife and be fruitful and multiply with her. All other women either drink or cannot collect their ketubah.
MISHNAH: A woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child] may neither drink nor collect her ketubah, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, he may separate from her and take her back later. A she-ram, an old woman, or a sterile one, neither drinks nor collects her ketubah; Rebbi Eleazar says, he may marry another wife and be fruitful and multiply with her. All other women either drink or cannot collect their ketubah.
HALAKHAH: A woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child],” etc. A man should not marry a woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child], but if he did marry her, the verse says about him: “Do not remove the eternal boundaries and do not enter the orphans’ field.” He who marries a woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child] has to divorce her and should never retake her, the words of Rebbi Meĩr, but the Sages say, he may separate from her and take her back later. Does Rebbi Meїr always fine people? Let us hear from the following: “The underage woman who performed ḥalîṣah should repeat ḥalîṣah once she becomes of age but if she did not repeat it, the ḥalîṣah is valid.” Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Isaac the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya the scribe in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is Rebbi Meїr who said that one does not perform ḥalîṣah or levirate with an underage girl because she might turn out to be a she-ram.
MISHNAH: A Cohen’s wife drinks and is permitted to her husband; the wife of a eunuch drinks. One may declare one’s jealousy with respect to any incest-‘prohibited person, except for a minor and a non-man.
HALAKHAH: “On the same day, Rebbi Aqiba explained,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel. One said, Rebbi Aqiba referred to both heave and profane food, but the other referred to heave but not to profane food. But one does not know who said what. Since Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Jonah, they said, Rav in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: The tertiary comes because of the reptile. This implies that he said that Rebbi Aqiba referred to both heave and profane food. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If tithe food was prepared [for impurity] by a fluid and a ṭevul yom or unclean hands touched it, one may take from it the heave of the tithe in purity because it is tertiary, and the tertiary is pure for profane food.” He explains that it is a leniency about hands [whose impurity] is rabbinical. But did we not state: “A ṭevul yom”? Explain it by a ṭevul yom from [the impurity] of a broken field. Rebbi Zeïra said, you may even say a biblical tevul yom. There is a difference since it is written “pure, impure”. Pure for profane food during daytime and for heave when it gets dark. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: May we not say: Pure for touch and impure for eating? He answered him, vessels are mentioned in the paragraph! Can you say about vessels that they are pure for touch and impure for eating?
HALAKHAH: “On the same day, Rebbi Aqiba explained,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel. One said, Rebbi Aqiba referred to both heave and profane food, but the other referred to heave but not to profane food. But one does not know who said what. Since Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Jonah, they said, Rav in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: The tertiary comes because of the reptile. This implies that he said that Rebbi Aqiba referred to both heave and profane food. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If tithe food was prepared [for impurity] by a fluid and a ṭevul yom or unclean hands touched it, one may take from it the heave of the tithe in purity because it is tertiary, and the tertiary is pure for profane food.” He explains that it is a leniency about hands [whose impurity] is rabbinical. But did we not state: “A ṭevul yom”? Explain it by a ṭevul yom from [the impurity] of a broken field. Rebbi Zeïra said, you may even say a biblical tevul yom. There is a difference since it is written “pure, impure”. Pure for profane food during daytime and for heave when it gets dark. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: May we not say: Pure for touch and impure for eating? He answered him, vessels are mentioned in the paragraph! Can you say about vessels that they are pure for touch and impure for eating?
HALAKHAH: “On the same day, Rebbi Aqiba explained,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel. One said, Rebbi Aqiba referred to both heave and profane food, but the other referred to heave but not to profane food. But one does not know who said what. Since Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Jonah, they said, Rav in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: The tertiary comes because of the reptile. This implies that he said that Rebbi Aqiba referred to both heave and profane food. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If tithe food was prepared [for impurity] by a fluid and a ṭevul yom or unclean hands touched it, one may take from it the heave of the tithe in purity because it is tertiary, and the tertiary is pure for profane food.” He explains that it is a leniency about hands [whose impurity] is rabbinical. But did we not state: “A ṭevul yom”? Explain it by a ṭevul yom from [the impurity] of a broken field. Rebbi Zeïra said, you may even say a biblical tevul yom. There is a difference since it is written “pure, impure”. Pure for profane food during daytime and for heave when it gets dark. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: May we not say: Pure for touch and impure for eating? He answered him, vessels are mentioned in the paragraph! Can you say about vessels that they are pure for touch and impure for eating?
“And the oath of a witness and the oath about a deposit.” One makes him swear in his own language. If one made them swear not in their language and they said “Amen”, they are not prosecutable. As we have stated: The oath before the judges is according to our understanding, not according to your understanding. Rebbi Yudan said, it is to be assumed that he makes them swear according to his understanding. Why does he have to spell out this condition to him? Because of the uneducated, lest they say that there may be mental reservations for oaths. Rebbi Ḥanania stated before Rebbi Mana: Is there not written: “But with everybody who stands here with us today”? He said to him, the future generations do not have mental reservations.
HALAKHAH: It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: Any place where it was said in any of these expressions: you begin and say, thus, and thus, it means in the holy language. Rebbi Eleazar said, the defining paradigm for all is: “Moses would speak and God would answer him by voice.” Rebbi Ḥaggai objected, is there not written, “Laban and Bethuel began,” if you say because of “beginning” only, is there not written “and said”? If you want to say, by “saying” only, is there not written “from the Eternal came the word”? If you want to say, in the holy language, is there not written “the stone heap of testimony”? If you want to say, before the Torah was given, is there not the text of the declaration of tithes which may be recited in any language?
You may say that there were three kinds of stones: The stones of the resting place, and the stones which Joshua put under the soles of the feet of the Cohanim, and the steles that Moses had given them. Rebbi Ḥaninan said, it is obvious to us that there were four kinds of stones. Rebbi Simon ben Zebid said, that is correct. If you would say, they were the stones of the resting place; these were temporary and were hidden. If you would say, the stones which Joshua put under the soles of the feet of the Cohanim; these were submerged in the water. If you would say, the steles that Moses had given them; they already had moved with them into the Land. But we must deal with the stones that Joshua put up for them on the banks of the Jordan.
HALAKHAH: “The priest anointed for war,” etc. Why the priest anointed for war? Because it is written “he shall speak”? But about the reading of the Šema‘ it is written: “You shall speak about them,” and it may be recited in any language. But because it is written there “saying”. But for the declaration of tithes it is written “saying” and it may be recited in any language! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, it says here “to come close” and it says there, “the Levitic Cohanim shall come close;” since “coming close” there implies [recitation in] the holy language, so also “coming close” here implies [recitation in] the holy language. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who says, these are expressions of additions. Following Rebbi Ismael who says, these are double expressions? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, it says here “to come close” and it says there, “Moses shall come close to the mist”, since “coming close” there implies [recitation in] the holy language, so also “coming close” here implies [recitation in] the holy language.
HALAKHAH: “The priest anointed for war,” etc. Why the priest anointed for war? Because it is written “he shall speak”? But about the reading of the Šema‘ it is written: “You shall speak about them,” and it may be recited in any language. But because it is written there “saying”. But for the declaration of tithes it is written “saying” and it may be recited in any language! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, it says here “to come close” and it says there, “the Levitic Cohanim shall come close;” since “coming close” there implies [recitation in] the holy language, so also “coming close” here implies [recitation in] the holy language. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who says, these are expressions of additions. Following Rebbi Ismael who says, these are double expressions? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, it says here “to come close” and it says there, “Moses shall come close to the mist”, since “coming close” there implies [recitation in] the holy language, so also “coming close” here implies [recitation in] the holy language.
HALAKHAH: “Who planted”. Not only who planted; if he bought, inherited, or it was given to him as a gift, from where? The verse says, “the man,” “who is the man”. From where about him who planted a vineyard but also who planted five fruit trees, even from five different kinds? The verse says, “who planted”, in any circumstance. I could think that one who planted four fruit trees or five futile trees may return? The verse says, “a vineyard.” Since a vineyard is special in that it is composed of five vines, this excludes the case where there are not five vines.
If the wine is freshly pressed, if the wine is sour? As it was stated: Sour wine may be used to make an eruv and participating, one makes a benediction for it, and one may use it for the preliminary marriage of a bride, for consoling the mourner, and it may be sold in a store as wine. If somebody made an unqualified contract for wine, he did not sell sour wine. One is prohibited from delivering a decision, or to dissolve a vow, or to enter the Temple. Only it is forbidden on the altar. And about the rebellious son it is problematic.
If the wine is freshly pressed, if the wine is sour? As it was stated: Sour wine may be used to make an eruv and participating, one makes a benediction for it, and one may use it for the preliminary marriage of a bride, for consoling the mourner, and it may be sold in a store as wine. If somebody made an unqualified contract for wine, he did not sell sour wine. One is prohibited from delivering a decision, or to dissolve a vow, or to enter the Temple. Only it is forbidden on the altar. And about the rebellious son it is problematic.
If the wine is freshly pressed, if the wine is sour? As it was stated: Sour wine may be used to make an eruv and participating, one makes a benediction for it, and one may use it for the preliminary marriage of a bride, for consoling the mourner, and it may be sold in a store as wine. If somebody made an unqualified contract for wine, he did not sell sour wine. One is prohibited from delivering a decision, or to dissolve a vow, or to enter the Temple. Only it is forbidden on the altar. And about the rebellious son it is problematic.
HALAKHAH: “If he built a house and inaugurated it,” but did not use it for twelve months. “If he planted a vineyard and redeemed it,” but did not use it for twelve months. And all are derived from the wife: Since the wife needs twelve months, also all of them need twelve months. It was stated: All those mentioned remain unoccupied in town, [do not pay city taxes], and do not provide food and water nor improve the roads, as it is said: “nor should anything be imposed on him,” but it may be imposed on others.
MISHNAH: [The portion of] the calf whose neck was broken, in the holy language. For it is said: “If a murder victim be found on the land, etc. Then your Elders and judges should go out.” Three from the High Court in Jerusalem had to go out. Rebbi Jehudah says five, since it is written “your Elders”, two, “and your judges”, two. Since no court may have an even number of members, one adds another one.
Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: “A slain one”, not one in convulsions; “a slain one”, not one in death-throes. If one saw him in convulsions and after some time he came back and did not find him, I say that a miracle occurred and he survived. If one saw him in death-throes here and then found him at another place, one measures from the place where he was found. “Which the Eternal, your God, is giving to you,” this excludes places outside the Land. “To inherit it,” this excludes Jerusalem which belongs to all tribes, and following Rebbi Ismael. For Rebbi Ismael said, any “comings” which were said in the Torah mean after fourteen years, seven during which they conquered and seven during which they distributed. Rebbi Phineas ben Rebbi Abun said, we may say that all these fourteen years they were not breaking the neck, for it is written “if there be found,” not in a time when they are frequent. And all these fourteen years they were frequent.
It was stated: How is it done? The emissaries of the court come out, collect all his signs and bury him. They put up a marker on his grave so that the court who come from the stone hall may measure.
MISHNAH: When the Elders of Jerusalem had completed their work and left, the Elders of that town bring “a cattle calf, one which never had been used for work, which never had drawn under a yoke.” Bodily defects do not disqualify it. One brings it down to an etan valley; the meaning of etan is “hard”. Even if it is not hard it is qualified. One breaks its neck with a stiletto from behind. Its place is forbidden to be used for sowing or agricultural works; it may be used to card flax or to hew stones.
They asked Rebbi Joshua: May a person teach Greek to his son? He said to them, he may teach him at an hour that is neither day nor night as it is written (Jos. 1:8): “You shall meditate about it day and night.” If it is so, a man would be forbidden to teach a profession to his son since it is written: “You shall meditate about it day and night.” But Rebbi Ismael stated (Deut. 30:19): “Choose life!” That refers to a profession. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of informants. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person may teach Greek to his daughter since it is an ornament for her. Simeon bar Abba heard that and said: Because he wants to teach his daughters, he attaches it to Rebbi Joḥanan. It should come over me that I never heard it from Rebbi Joḥanan.
They asked Rebbi Joshua: May a person teach Greek to his son? He said to them, he may teach him at an hour that is neither day nor night as it is written (Jos. 1:8): “You shall meditate about it day and night.” If it is so, a man would be forbidden to teach a profession to his son since it is written: “You shall meditate about it day and night.” But Rebbi Ismael stated (Deut. 30:19): “Choose life!” That refers to a profession. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of informants. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person may teach Greek to his daughter since it is an ornament for her. Simeon bar Abba heard that and said: Because he wants to teach his daughters, he attaches it to Rebbi Joḥanan. It should come over me that I never heard it from Rebbi Joḥanan.
They asked Rebbi Joshua: May a person teach Greek to his son? He said to them, he may teach him at an hour that is neither day nor night as it is written (Jos. 1:8): “You shall meditate about it day and night.” If it is so, a man would be forbidden to teach a profession to his son since it is written: “You shall meditate about it day and night.” But Rebbi Ismael stated (Deut. 30:19): “Choose life!” That refers to a profession. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of informants. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person may teach Greek to his daughter since it is an ornament for her. Simeon bar Abba heard that and said: Because he wants to teach his daughters, he attaches it to Rebbi Joḥanan. It should come over me that I never heard it from Rebbi Joḥanan.
Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Idi: A man may not [preliminarily] marry on a Friday. That means, to make an engagement feast. This implies that the preliminary marriage itself is permitted. Samuel says, even on the Ninth of Ab a preliminary marriage is permitted, lest another forestall him. The argument of Samuel seems inverted. There, he says, “God puts singles in a house, etc.,” “To rise on scales; they all are of vapor!” And there, he says so? That means, that he should not forestall him in prayer. Even so, it would not be permanent.
It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must deal with the case that it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meïr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meïr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child of unknown paternity? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṢah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṢah with her.” And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must deal with the case that it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meïr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meïr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child of unknown paternity? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṢah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṢah with her.” And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
It was stated: A person may write down his testimony and testify about it even some years later. Rav Ḥuna said, only if he remembers his testimony. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he does not remember his testimony. It turns out that Rav Ḥuna follows Rebbi and Rebbi Joḥanan the Sages.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market place cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. How is that? If one identified his own signature and that of his colleague, but that second witness’s signature was not known to anybody except his colleague, may that colleague together with somebody from the market place testify on that signature? That is what Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, said in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. Another case where there are no two persons: The signature of one is known by everybody, but that second witness’s signature is not known to anybody except his colleague. Can that colleague testify on his signature as if he were someone from the market place? If you say so, the entire testimony is confirmed by one witness. Rebbi Yudan said, that is correct. If two people come from a town that is mostly Gentile, like Hippos. One is known by everybody as a Jew, but the other is not known by anybody except his companion. Can the latter be considered one from the market place to testify about him? If you say so, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness! And in the prior case, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness.
Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, I never testified except once, when I raised a slave to priestly status. Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father; one to the priesthood, the other to levitic status. A person came before Rebbi Hila; he said to him, this is my son and he is a Cohen. He answered him, he is your son but he is no Cohen. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder said to him, if you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is his son, do not believe him that he is a Cohen. He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Abin said, so he said to him: If you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is a Cohen, do not believe him that he is his son. In that case, he would be unrelated and trustworthy in his testimony! He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Did they not say, Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father? Let us say that Rebbi elevated a brother on the testimony of his brother. You may even say, a son on the testimony of his father, to levitic status.
May one act in money matters on their testimony? How is that? If everybody knew that the Sabbath boundary was at Reuben’s field; they came and said, this far we came on the Sabbath, and it turns out that this field is in Simeon’s hand. May one take it from Simeon and return it to Reuben?
May one act in money matters on their testimony? How is that? If everybody knew that the Sabbath boundary was at Reuben’s field; they came and said, this far we came on the Sabbath, and it turns out that this field is in Simeon’s hand. May one take it from Simeon and return it to Reuben?
There, we have stated: “If somebody eats heave intentionally, he pays the principal but not the fifth.” And we have stated: “The following are flogged.” Here you say, he is flogged, and there you say, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah is two-sided: If he was cautioned, he is flogged; if he was not cautioned, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan is of the opinion that in a case where there is flogging or restitution, when he pays he is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Corresponding to his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. The verse speaks of one who may incur two punishments (Deut. 25:2): “The judge shall have him laid down and flogged in his presence a number [of times] because of his guilt.”
There, we have stated: “If somebody eats heave intentionally, he pays the principal but not the fifth.” And we have stated: “The following are flogged.” Here you say, he is flogged, and there you say, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah is two-sided: If he was cautioned, he is flogged; if he was not cautioned, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan is of the opinion that in a case where there is flogging or restitution, when he pays he is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Corresponding to his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. The verse speaks of one who may incur two punishments (Deut. 25:2): “The judge shall have him laid down and flogged in his presence a number [of times] because of his guilt.”
Nathan bar Hoshiah said, one speaks about an adolescent girl, the other about an adult woman. The adolescent has a fine but nobody is flogged for her; for the adult he is flogged but pays no fine, she cannot be sold; she has no claim for shame and blemish. The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it that she seduced him or remitted [the fine] for him. Nathan bar Hoshaiah thinks that in a case of flogging and payment he pays but is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. From perjured witnesses. Just as you say there, perjured witnesses pay but are not flogged, here also he pays and is not flogged. Rebbi Jonah said, the reason of Rebbi Nathan bar Hoshaiah: (Deut. 25:2): “For his evil deed.” It refers to one whose flogging frees him from his guilt, excluding one who is told: get up and pay.
There, we have stated: “The only difference between the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement is that intentional infraction of the former is punished by the hands of man, but intentional infraction of the latter is punished by extirpation.” Therefore, for payment both follow the same rules. This is by Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah since “Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah says, the Day of Atonement follows the rules of Sabbath for payment. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says those subject to extirpation equal those subject to capital punishment.” What is between them? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Avina said, a menstruating adolescent girl is between them. Rebbi Mana said, also his wife’s sister is between them. In the opinion of Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah, just as the Sabbath does not become permitted after its prohibition started; so theDay of Atonement does not become permitted after its prohibition started. However, these may become permitted after their prohibition started, he has to pay. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah said, extirpation applies to the Sabbath and the day of Atonement; extirpation does not apply to these, he has to pay.
MISHNAH: The seducer pays for three things and the rapist for four. The seducer pays for shame, diminution of value, and fine. The rapist in addition pays for suffering; the seducer does not pay for suffering. The rapist pays immediately, the seducer only if he divorces her. The rapist drinks from his pot; the seducer may divorce if he wishes.
MISHNAH: How does he drink from his pot? Even if she is lame, even if she is blind, or even if she is afflicted with boils. If a matter of immorality was found with her or she could not marry in Israel, he may not keep here since it is written: “She shall be his wife,” a wife appropriate for him.
Rebbi Simeon bar Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥanina: They voted at Usha that a person may donate a fifth of his property for good deeds. How far down? Rebbi Jeremiah and Rebbi Abba bar Cahana; one said corresponding to terumah and the terumah of the tithe, the other said (Prov. 3:9): “Honor the Eternal with your property” … “corresponding to the first of all your yield”. Rebbi Gamliel bar Ininia asked before Rebbi Mana: Does it mean one fifth every year? {One studies this in the first Halakhah of Peah.} Will he not die? But lest he die in the future.
Rebbi Jehudah insists on interpreting the contract text. Rebbi Jehudah explained: A man brings for his wife any sacrifice she is obligated for, even if she ate suet or desecrated the Sabbath. Also, Rebbi Jehudah says, once he divorces her, he is no longer obligated for her, for she writes to him “any other obligations that may come to you from me from earlier times.”
Rav Huna insists on interpreting the contract text. Rav Huna explained: “The sons shall inherit but the daughters must be fed.” Since the sons inherit movables, the daughters also are fed from movables. Samuel said, the daughters are not fed from movables. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “The female children you shall have from me shall dwell in my house and be supported from my property.” It was stated on this: From real estate but not from movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said: Rav Huna follows Rebbi and Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “One uses both guaranteed property and non-guaranteed property for the support of the wife and the daughters, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, guaranteed property may be taken by sons from sons, by daughters from daughters, by sons from daughters, and by daughters from sons. But non-guaranteed property may be taken by sons from daughters but not by daughters from sons.” They said, Rav Huna reversed himself. They said, that was well done, ketubah is a biblical commandment but support of the daughters is from their words. May their words uproot a biblical commandment? It must be that they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah. [Even if you say, they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah.] But is the money stipulated in their mother’s ketubah not also real estate?
Rav Huna insists on interpreting the contract text. Rav Huna explained: “The sons shall inherit but the daughters must be fed.” Since the sons inherit movables, the daughters also are fed from movables. Samuel said, the daughters are not fed from movables. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “The female children you shall have from me shall dwell in my house and be supported from my property.” It was stated on this: From real estate but not from movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said: Rav Huna follows Rebbi and Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “One uses both guaranteed property and non-guaranteed property for the support of the wife and the daughters, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, guaranteed property may be taken by sons from sons, by daughters from daughters, by sons from daughters, and by daughters from sons. But non-guaranteed property may be taken by sons from daughters but not by daughters from sons.” They said, Rav Huna reversed himself. They said, that was well done, ketubah is a biblical commandment but support of the daughters is from their words. May their words uproot a biblical commandment? It must be that they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah. [Even if you say, they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah.] But is the money stipulated in their mother’s ketubah not also real estate?
Rav Huna insists on interpreting the contract text. Rav Huna explained: “The sons shall inherit but the daughters must be fed.” Since the sons inherit movables, the daughters also are fed from movables. Samuel said, the daughters are not fed from movables. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “The female children you shall have from me shall dwell in my house and be supported from my property.” It was stated on this: From real estate but not from movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said: Rav Huna follows Rebbi and Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “One uses both guaranteed property and non-guaranteed property for the support of the wife and the daughters, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, guaranteed property may be taken by sons from sons, by daughters from daughters, by sons from daughters, and by daughters from sons. But non-guaranteed property may be taken by sons from daughters but not by daughters from sons.” They said, Rav Huna reversed himself. They said, that was well done, ketubah is a biblical commandment but support of the daughters is from their words. May their words uproot a biblical commandment? It must be that they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah. [Even if you say, they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah.] But is the money stipulated in their mother’s ketubah not also real estate?
MISHNAH: Even though they said that a virgin collects 200 [zuz] and a widow a mina, if he wants to add even 100 minas, he may add. If she became widowed or divorced, whether preliminarily or definitively married, she collects everything. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, definitively married, she collects everything; preliminarily married a virgin collects 200 [zuz] and a widow a mina since he added only with the idea to bring her in.
What is a wife and what is a concubine? Rebbi Meïr says, a wife has a ketubah, a concubine has no ketubah. Rebbi Jehudah says, both have a ketubah. A wife has a ketubah and the ketubah stipulations; a concubine has a ketubah but no ketubah stipulations. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: These are the opinions of Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah. But the words of the Sages: “A man may marry a woman and stipulate with her not to feed her and not to provide for her. Not only that, but that she should feed and provide for him and teach him Torah. It happened that Rebbi Joshua, son of Rebbi Aqiba, married a woman and stipulated with her not to feed her and not to provide for her. Not only that, but that she should feed and provide for him and teach him Torah. But when years of famine came and they distributed the properties among themselves, she started complaining about him to the Sages of Israel. He said to them, for me she is trustworthy more than anybody. She told them, it is true that thus I stipulated with him. [They said to her], nothing comes after acquisition.”
MISHNAH: One gives a virgin twelve months from when the husband requested to marry her to provide for herself. Just as one gives to the woman so one gives to the man to provide for himself. And to a widow thirty days. If the time has come and they are not definitively married, they eat from his [property] and may eat heave. Rebbi Ṭarphon says, one gives her everything in heave. Rebbi Aqiba said, half profane and half heave.
”The period mentioned in the Torah.” Some Tannaïm state: שְׁאֵר that is intercourse; עוֹנָה that is food. Some Tannaïm state: עוֹנָה that is intercourse; שְׁאֵר that is food. He who said שְׁאֵר is intercourse: “No person to the שְׁאֵר of his flesh;” עוֹנָה is food: “He fed you and made you hunger”. He who said שְׁאֵר is food: “He let rain on them שְׁאֵר like dust”; עוֹנָה that is intercourse, “that you should not deprive my daughters,” that refers to intercourse. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob explains the verse, “her flesh her garment”, that her garment should fit her flesh, that he should not give a young woman clothes of an old woman nor an old woman clothes of a young one. “Her garment her season”, that he should not give summer clothing for the rainy season nor that for the rainy season in summer. From where does he get food? Since he is not permitted to withhold from her things that are not necessities of life, not so much more things that are necessities of life! From where does he get the obligation of periodic intercourse? Since he may not withhold from her things which do not constitute the main reason for marriage, so certainly he may not withhold the things which constitute the main reason for marriage!
”The period mentioned in the Torah.” Some Tannaïm state: שְׁאֵר that is intercourse; עוֹנָה that is food. Some Tannaïm state: עוֹנָה that is intercourse; שְׁאֵר that is food. He who said שְׁאֵר is intercourse: “No person to the שְׁאֵר of his flesh;” עוֹנָה is food: “He fed you and made you hunger”. He who said שְׁאֵר is food: “He let rain on them שְׁאֵר like dust”; עוֹנָה that is intercourse, “that you should not deprive my daughters,” that refers to intercourse. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob explains the verse, “her flesh her garment”, that her garment should fit her flesh, that he should not give a young woman clothes of an old woman nor an old woman clothes of a young one. “Her garment her season”, that he should not give summer clothing for the rainy season nor that for the rainy season in summer. From where does he get food? Since he is not permitted to withhold from her things that are not necessities of life, not so much more things that are necessities of life! From where does he get the obligation of periodic intercourse? Since he may not withhold from her things which do not constitute the main reason for marriage, so certainly he may not withhold the things which constitute the main reason for marriage!
So is the Mishnah: And so those who provide for the orphan girl. Rebbi Ḥinena said, this means that one says to the overseers to take out a loan. For he explains it, if nothing is in the wallet one takes out a loan up to fifty. But if there is money in the wallet, one may add. Rebbi Yose said, this means that one does not say to the overseers to take out a loan. For he explains if there is money in the wallet. But if there is no money one diminishes. As the following, about a girl in the days of Rebbi Immi. He said, let it be held over for the holiday. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to him, you are causing a loss, but give everything, for the Lord of the holiday exists. It turns out that Rebbi Ḥanina holds with Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose with Rebbi Immi.
If there were two daughters and one son; the first one took a tenth of the estate, but the son died before the second could take her tenth. Rebbi Ḥanina was of the opinion that the second takes a tenth of the estate and the rest they divide equally among themselves. Rebbi Joḥanan told him that in this case there was nothing else to provide for her, but here she may sell from the remainder and provide for herself! Rebbi Tebi in the name of Rebbi Joshia: The reason of Rebbi Ḥanina: If she can collect from encumbered real estate, from what lies before her not so much more? Rebbi Joḥanan sticks to his opinion, since Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina [and Rebbi Hila] collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked to be provided for. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans get up and complain, I would give it to them. Even so, they saw and did not complain. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yose: How do you decide in practical cases? He said to him, following Rebbi Ḥanina. And so an actual case was decided following Rebbi Ḥanina. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Hila: One considers the estate as if it were dry.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body, but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt. Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah, as it was stated: The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s. Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: If they saw her putting on her underpants and the pedlar leaves her house, the thing is ugly, she should leave. There is slime on her bed, the thing is ugly, she should leave. There is slime on his bed, the thing is ugly, she should leave. His sandal is in front of her bed, the thing is ugly, she should leave. Her sandal is in front of his bed, the thing is ugly, she should leave. Both leave the same dark place, the thing is ugly, she should leave. They lift one another from the cistern, the thing is ugly, she should leave. Both of them clap on her thighs in the bathhouse, the thing is ugly, she should leave. Ḥanina bar Iqa in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, in all these cases, if she brings an explanation for her behavior she is believed. Rav Ada bar Aḥawa in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi and he said, what of it? They asked before him: Even if they saw him putting his mouth on her mouth? He said, this did happen, that they saw a man putting his mouth on her mouth. The case came befote Rebbi Yose, who said that she should leave without ketubah. Her relatives appealed the case and said, if she is deviant, she should leave without ketubah. If she is not deviant, she should take the entire ketubah. Rebbi Mana said to them, bring the ketubah that we may read it. They brought the ketubah and found written in it: If this X marries this Y as her husband and should no longer desire his company, she shall take half the ketubah sum. Rebbi Abun said, since she agreed that he should put his mouth on her mouth it is as if she hated him; she has only half the ketubah. She lies in his bosom or he lies in her bosom, she is deviant. If they embrace, she is deviant. If they kiss, she is deviant. If the door is locked, she is deviant. If it is blocked, that is a problem.
MISHNAH: If a woman inherited property before she became preliminarily married, the Houses of Shammai and Hillel agree that if she sells or gives it away it is valid. If she inherited after she became preliminarily married, the House of Shammai say she may sell, the House of Hillel say she should not sell, but both of them agree that if she sold or gave it away it is valid. Rebbi Jehudah said: They said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman, should he not also acquire the right to the property? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties] and you want to burden us with the old ones?
Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.
HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid.” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.
HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid.” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.
HALAKHAH: “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.
Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.
Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.
Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.
Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.
There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
You find that one may say that Ḥanan and Rebbi Simeon said the same thing. Just as Ḥanan said, she shall swear only at the end, so Rebbi Simeon says, she shall swear only at the end. Just as you say, practice follows Ḥanan, so here practice follows Rebbi Simeon.
“Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.” Rebbi Eleazar said: You say that in case the tetradrachma lost or added value. But for earnings or losses they split evenly. That is difficult! One gave 100 denars and the other gave ten, and you say so? The colleagues say, he may say to him, by my contribution the merchandise rose. So far, if they ran after little merchandise. If there was much merchandise? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, he may say to him, by the time you sold one piece, I am selling ten. That is, at a nearby place. If it was far away? Rebbi Hila said, he may say to him, by the time you go and return once, I am going and returning ten times. There, we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi [Ze‘ira]: The same holds for earnings. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan: Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution.
“Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.” Rebbi Eleazar said: You say that in case the tetradrachma lost or added value. But for earnings or losses they split evenly. That is difficult! One gave 100 denars and the other gave ten, and you say so? The colleagues say, he may say to him, by my contribution the merchandise rose. So far, if they ran after little merchandise. If there was much merchandise? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, he may say to him, by the time you sold one piece, I am selling ten. That is, at a nearby place. If it was far away? Rebbi Hila said, he may say to him, by the time you go and return once, I am going and returning ten times. There, we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi [Ze‘ira]: The same holds for earnings. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan: Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution.
“Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.” Rebbi Eleazar said: You say that in case the tetradrachma lost or added value. But for earnings or losses they split evenly. That is difficult! One gave 100 denars and the other gave ten, and you say so? The colleagues say, he may say to him, by my contribution the merchandise rose. So far, if they ran after little merchandise. If there was much merchandise? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, he may say to him, by the time you sold one piece, I am selling ten. That is, at a nearby place. If it was far away? Rebbi Hila said, he may say to him, by the time you go and return once, I am going and returning ten times. There, we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi [Ze‘ira]: The same holds for earnings. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan: Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two wives,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody borrowed from two persons and the second comes and says to him, get up and let us settle, and [the borrower] says, will not in the end the first hear of it and come to foreclose, he [the second lender] may say let us settle, and if he forecloses, he forecloses. If he settled, one may assume that the first will come and foreclose. If he settled with the first, Rebbi Phineas said, such a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who said, he settled. Rebbi Yose said, did he not write “what I shall acquire”? It happens only with an heir. Rebbi Ḥanina said, even with a creditor it can happen if he did not write “anything I shall acquire”, or if he said, “you shall not be paid except from this.” Rav Mattaniah said, this follows him who said, for ketubah but not for stipulations. But for him who said, for ketubah and for stipulations, does it not return?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two wives,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody borrowed from two persons and the second comes and says to him, get up and let us settle, and [the borrower] says, will not in the end the first hear of it and come to foreclose, he [the second lender] may say let us settle, and if he forecloses, he forecloses. If he settled, one may assume that the first will come and foreclose. If he settled with the first, Rebbi Phineas said, such a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who said, he settled. Rebbi Yose said, did he not write “what I shall acquire”? It happens only with an heir. Rebbi Ḥanina said, even with a creditor it can happen if he did not write “anything I shall acquire”, or if he said, “you shall not be paid except from this.” Rav Mattaniah said, this follows him who said, for ketubah but not for stipulations. But for him who said, for ketubah and for stipulations, does it not return?
MISHNAH: A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage, may sell without court supervision. Rebbi Simeon says, after definitive marriage she may sell without court supervision; after preliminary marriage, she may sell only under court supervision since she has no sustenance and any person who has no claim to sustenance may sell only under court supervision.
MISHNAH: A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage, may sell without court supervision. Rebbi Simeon says, after definitive marriage she may sell without court supervision; after preliminary marriage, she may sell only under court supervision since she has no sustenance and any person who has no claim to sustenance may sell only under court supervision.
MISHNAH: A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage, may sell without court supervision. Rebbi Simeon says, after definitive marriage she may sell without court supervision; after preliminary marriage, she may sell only under court supervision since she has no sustenance and any person who has no claim to sustenance may sell only under court supervision.
MISHNAH: A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage, may sell without court supervision. Rebbi Simeon says, after definitive marriage she may sell without court supervision; after preliminary marriage, she may sell only under court supervision since she has no sustenance and any person who has no claim to sustenance may sell only under court supervision.
HALAKHAH: “A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon is of the opinion that everything depends on sustenance. If he had agreed to sustain her after preliminary marriage, she may sell without court supervision If he had agreed to sustain her after definitive marriage, she may sell only under court supervision. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person is concerned for his widow’s dignity whether after preliminary or after definitive marriage.
HALAKHAH: “A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon is of the opinion that everything depends on sustenance. If he had agreed to sustain her after preliminary marriage, she may sell without court supervision If he had agreed to sustain her after definitive marriage, she may sell only under court supervision. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person is concerned for his widow’s dignity whether after preliminary or after definitive marriage.
MISHNAH: If she sold her ketubah entirely or partially, or donated her ketubah to another, entirely or partially, she cannot sell the remainder except under court supervision. But the Sages say, she may sell even four or five times, and may sell for sustenance without court supervision but writes in the document that “I sold for sustenance.” A divorcee may sell only under court supervision.
MISHNAH: If she sold her ketubah entirely or partially, or donated her ketubah to another, entirely or partially, she cannot sell the remainder except under court supervision. But the Sages say, she may sell even four or five times, and may sell for sustenance without court supervision but writes in the document that “I sold for sustenance.” A divorcee may sell only under court supervision.
MISHNAH: If she sold her ketubah entirely or partially, or donated her ketubah to another, entirely or partially, she cannot sell the remainder except under court supervision. But the Sages say, she may sell even four or five times, and may sell for sustenance without court supervision but writes in the document that “I sold for sustenance.” A divorcee may sell only under court supervision.
MISHNAH: Neither the orphan, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram may claim ketubah, or usufruct, or sustenance, or depreciation. But if he married her from the start as a she-ram, she has claim to her ketubah. A widow [married] to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or Gibeonite girl to an Israel, an Israel girl married to a bastard or Gibeonite, have claim to ketubah.