15962 occurrences across the corpus

The Mishnah

Mishnah Bava Batra 10:8

If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.

Mishnah Bava Batra 10:8

If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.

Mishnah Bava Batra 10:8

If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.

Mishnah Bava Batra 10:8

If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.

Mishnah Bava Batra 10:8

If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.

Mishnah Bava Batra 10:8

If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:1

Cases concerning property [are decided] by three. Cases concerning robbery or personal injury, by three. Claims for full damages or half-damages, twofold restitution, or fourfold or fivefold restitution, by three. Claims against a rapist, a seducer and one who defames [a virgin are decided] by three, according to Rabbi Meir. The Sages say: “One who defames [a virgin is decided] by twenty-three, for there may arise from it a capital case.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:5

A tribe, a false prophet, or the high priest may not be tried save by the court of seventy-one; They may not send forth the people to wage a battle of free choice save by the decision of the court of one and seventy; They may not add to the City [of Jerusalem], or the Courts of the Temple save by the decision of the court of seventy-one; They may not set up sanhedrins for the several tribes save by the decision of the court of one and seventy. And they may not proclaim [any city to be] an Apostate City (ir ha-niddahat) (Deut. 13:13–19] save by the decision of one and seventy. No city on the frontier may be proclaimed an Apostate City, nor three together, but only one or two.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:5

A tribe, a false prophet, or the high priest may not be tried save by the court of seventy-one; They may not send forth the people to wage a battle of free choice save by the decision of the court of one and seventy; They may not add to the City [of Jerusalem], or the Courts of the Temple save by the decision of the court of seventy-one; They may not set up sanhedrins for the several tribes save by the decision of the court of one and seventy. And they may not proclaim [any city to be] an Apostate City (ir ha-niddahat) (Deut. 13:13–19] save by the decision of one and seventy. No city on the frontier may be proclaimed an Apostate City, nor three together, but only one or two.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:5

A tribe, a false prophet, or the high priest may not be tried save by the court of seventy-one; They may not send forth the people to wage a battle of free choice save by the decision of the court of one and seventy; They may not add to the City [of Jerusalem], or the Courts of the Temple save by the decision of the court of seventy-one; They may not set up sanhedrins for the several tribes save by the decision of the court of one and seventy. And they may not proclaim [any city to be] an Apostate City (ir ha-niddahat) (Deut. 13:13–19] save by the decision of one and seventy. No city on the frontier may be proclaimed an Apostate City, nor three together, but only one or two.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:5

A tribe, a false prophet, or the high priest may not be tried save by the court of seventy-one; They may not send forth the people to wage a battle of free choice save by the decision of the court of one and seventy; They may not add to the City [of Jerusalem], or the Courts of the Temple save by the decision of the court of seventy-one; They may not set up sanhedrins for the several tribes save by the decision of the court of one and seventy. And they may not proclaim [any city to be] an Apostate City (ir ha-niddahat) (Deut. 13:13–19] save by the decision of one and seventy. No city on the frontier may be proclaimed an Apostate City, nor three together, but only one or two.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:5

A tribe, a false prophet, or the high priest may not be tried save by the court of seventy-one; They may not send forth the people to wage a battle of free choice save by the decision of the court of one and seventy; They may not add to the City [of Jerusalem], or the Courts of the Temple save by the decision of the court of seventy-one; They may not set up sanhedrins for the several tribes save by the decision of the court of one and seventy. And they may not proclaim [any city to be] an Apostate City (ir ha-niddahat) (Deut. 13:13–19] save by the decision of one and seventy. No city on the frontier may be proclaimed an Apostate City, nor three together, but only one or two.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:5

A tribe, a false prophet, or the high priest may not be tried save by the court of seventy-one; They may not send forth the people to wage a battle of free choice save by the decision of the court of one and seventy; They may not add to the City [of Jerusalem], or the Courts of the Temple save by the decision of the court of seventy-one; They may not set up sanhedrins for the several tribes save by the decision of the court of one and seventy. And they may not proclaim [any city to be] an Apostate City (ir ha-niddahat) (Deut. 13:13–19] save by the decision of one and seventy. No city on the frontier may be proclaimed an Apostate City, nor three together, but only one or two.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:6

The greater Sanhedrin was made up of seventy one and the little Sanhedrin of twenty three. From where do we learn that the greater Sanhedrin should be made up of seventy one? As it says, “Gather unto me seventy men of the elders of Israel” (Num. 11:16), and when Moses is added to them there is seventy one. Rabbi Judah says: “Seventy.” From where do we learn that the little Sanhedrin should be made up of twenty three? As it says, “The assembly shall judge”, “The assembly shall deliver” (Num. 35:24-25), an assembly that judges and an assembly that delivers, thus we have twenty. And from where do we know that an assembly has ten? As it says, “How long shall I bear this evil congregation?” (Num. 14:27) [which refers to the twelve spies] but Joshua and Caleb were not included. And from where do we learn that we should bring three others [to the twenty]? By inference from what it says, “You shall not follow after the many to do evil” (Ex. 23:2), I conclude that I must be with them to do well. Then why does it say, “[To follow] after the many to change judgment” (Ex. 23:2). [It means that] your verdict of condemnation should not be like your verdict of acquittal, for your verdict of acquittal is reached by the decision of a majority of one, but your verdict of condemnation must be reached by the decision of a majority of two. The court must not be divisible equally, therefore they add to them one more; thus they are twenty three. And how many should there be in a city that it may be fit to have a Sanhedrin? A hundred and twenty. Rabbi Nehemiah says: “Two hundred and thirty, so that [the Sanhedrin of twenty three] should correspond with them that are chiefs of [at least] groups of ten.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:1

The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed [priest] stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:1

The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed [priest] stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:1

The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed [priest] stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:1

The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed [priest] stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:2

The king can neither judge nor be judged, he cannot testify and others cannot testify against him. He may not perform halitzah, nor may others perform halitzah for his wife. He may not contract levirate marriage nor may his brothers contract levirate marriage with his wife. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wished to perform halitzah or to contract levirate marriage his memory is a blessing.” They said to him: “They should not listen to him.” None may marry his widow. Rabbi Judah says: “The king may marry the widow of a king, for so have we found it with David, who married the widow of Saul, as it says, “And I gave you my master’s house and my master’s wives into your embrace” (II Samuel 12:8).

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:2

The king can neither judge nor be judged, he cannot testify and others cannot testify against him. He may not perform halitzah, nor may others perform halitzah for his wife. He may not contract levirate marriage nor may his brothers contract levirate marriage with his wife. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wished to perform halitzah or to contract levirate marriage his memory is a blessing.” They said to him: “They should not listen to him.” None may marry his widow. Rabbi Judah says: “The king may marry the widow of a king, for so have we found it with David, who married the widow of Saul, as it says, “And I gave you my master’s house and my master’s wives into your embrace” (II Samuel 12:8).

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:2

The king can neither judge nor be judged, he cannot testify and others cannot testify against him. He may not perform halitzah, nor may others perform halitzah for his wife. He may not contract levirate marriage nor may his brothers contract levirate marriage with his wife. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wished to perform halitzah or to contract levirate marriage his memory is a blessing.” They said to him: “They should not listen to him.” None may marry his widow. Rabbi Judah says: “The king may marry the widow of a king, for so have we found it with David, who married the widow of Saul, as it says, “And I gave you my master’s house and my master’s wives into your embrace” (II Samuel 12:8).

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:2

The king can neither judge nor be judged, he cannot testify and others cannot testify against him. He may not perform halitzah, nor may others perform halitzah for his wife. He may not contract levirate marriage nor may his brothers contract levirate marriage with his wife. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wished to perform halitzah or to contract levirate marriage his memory is a blessing.” They said to him: “They should not listen to him.” None may marry his widow. Rabbi Judah says: “The king may marry the widow of a king, for so have we found it with David, who married the widow of Saul, as it says, “And I gave you my master’s house and my master’s wives into your embrace” (II Samuel 12:8).

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:2

The king can neither judge nor be judged, he cannot testify and others cannot testify against him. He may not perform halitzah, nor may others perform halitzah for his wife. He may not contract levirate marriage nor may his brothers contract levirate marriage with his wife. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wished to perform halitzah or to contract levirate marriage his memory is a blessing.” They said to him: “They should not listen to him.” None may marry his widow. Rabbi Judah says: “The king may marry the widow of a king, for so have we found it with David, who married the widow of Saul, as it says, “And I gave you my master’s house and my master’s wives into your embrace” (II Samuel 12:8).

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:2

The king can neither judge nor be judged, he cannot testify and others cannot testify against him. He may not perform halitzah, nor may others perform halitzah for his wife. He may not contract levirate marriage nor may his brothers contract levirate marriage with his wife. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wished to perform halitzah or to contract levirate marriage his memory is a blessing.” They said to him: “They should not listen to him.” None may marry his widow. Rabbi Judah says: “The king may marry the widow of a king, for so have we found it with David, who married the widow of Saul, as it says, “And I gave you my master’s house and my master’s wives into your embrace” (II Samuel 12:8).

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:3

If any of his near kin die he may not go out of the door of his palace. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wishes to follow the bier he may, since we have found that David followed the bier of Avner, as it says, “And King David followed the bier” (II Samuel 3:31) They answered, “That was only to appease the people.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit on the floor and he sits on a couch.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:3

If any of his near kin die he may not go out of the door of his palace. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wishes to follow the bier he may, since we have found that David followed the bier of Avner, as it says, “And King David followed the bier” (II Samuel 3:31) They answered, “That was only to appease the people.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit on the floor and he sits on a couch.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4

He may send forth the people to a battle waged of free choice by the decision of the court of seventy one. He may break through [the private domain of any man] to make himself a road and none may protest him. The king’s road has no limit. Whatsoever the people take in plunder they must place before him, and he may take first. “And he shall not have many wives” (Deut. 17:17) eighteen only. Rabbi Judah says: “He may take many wives provided they don’t turn his heart away [from worshipping God]. Rabbi Shimon says: “Even one that might turn his heart away, he should not marry. Why then does it say, “He shall not have many wives”, even if they are like Avigayil. “He shall not keep many horses” (Deut. 17:16) enough for his chariot only. “Nor shall he amass silver and gold to excess” (Deut. 17:17) enough to pay his soldier’s wages. He must write a Torah scroll for himself; when he goes forth to battle he shall take it with him, and when he returns he shall bring it back with him; when he sits in judgement it shall be with him, and when he sits to eat it shall be with him, as it says, “Let it remain with him and let him read it all his life” (Deut. 17:19)

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4

He may send forth the people to a battle waged of free choice by the decision of the court of seventy one. He may break through [the private domain of any man] to make himself a road and none may protest him. The king’s road has no limit. Whatsoever the people take in plunder they must place before him, and he may take first. “And he shall not have many wives” (Deut. 17:17) eighteen only. Rabbi Judah says: “He may take many wives provided they don’t turn his heart away [from worshipping God]. Rabbi Shimon says: “Even one that might turn his heart away, he should not marry. Why then does it say, “He shall not have many wives”, even if they are like Avigayil. “He shall not keep many horses” (Deut. 17:16) enough for his chariot only. “Nor shall he amass silver and gold to excess” (Deut. 17:17) enough to pay his soldier’s wages. He must write a Torah scroll for himself; when he goes forth to battle he shall take it with him, and when he returns he shall bring it back with him; when he sits in judgement it shall be with him, and when he sits to eat it shall be with him, as it says, “Let it remain with him and let him read it all his life” (Deut. 17:19)

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4

He may send forth the people to a battle waged of free choice by the decision of the court of seventy one. He may break through [the private domain of any man] to make himself a road and none may protest him. The king’s road has no limit. Whatsoever the people take in plunder they must place before him, and he may take first. “And he shall not have many wives” (Deut. 17:17) eighteen only. Rabbi Judah says: “He may take many wives provided they don’t turn his heart away [from worshipping God]. Rabbi Shimon says: “Even one that might turn his heart away, he should not marry. Why then does it say, “He shall not have many wives”, even if they are like Avigayil. “He shall not keep many horses” (Deut. 17:16) enough for his chariot only. “Nor shall he amass silver and gold to excess” (Deut. 17:17) enough to pay his soldier’s wages. He must write a Torah scroll for himself; when he goes forth to battle he shall take it with him, and when he returns he shall bring it back with him; when he sits in judgement it shall be with him, and when he sits to eat it shall be with him, as it says, “Let it remain with him and let him read it all his life” (Deut. 17:19)

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4

He may send forth the people to a battle waged of free choice by the decision of the court of seventy one. He may break through [the private domain of any man] to make himself a road and none may protest him. The king’s road has no limit. Whatsoever the people take in plunder they must place before him, and he may take first. “And he shall not have many wives” (Deut. 17:17) eighteen only. Rabbi Judah says: “He may take many wives provided they don’t turn his heart away [from worshipping God]. Rabbi Shimon says: “Even one that might turn his heart away, he should not marry. Why then does it say, “He shall not have many wives”, even if they are like Avigayil. “He shall not keep many horses” (Deut. 17:16) enough for his chariot only. “Nor shall he amass silver and gold to excess” (Deut. 17:17) enough to pay his soldier’s wages. He must write a Torah scroll for himself; when he goes forth to battle he shall take it with him, and when he returns he shall bring it back with him; when he sits in judgement it shall be with him, and when he sits to eat it shall be with him, as it says, “Let it remain with him and let him read it all his life” (Deut. 17:19)

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4

He may send forth the people to a battle waged of free choice by the decision of the court of seventy one. He may break through [the private domain of any man] to make himself a road and none may protest him. The king’s road has no limit. Whatsoever the people take in plunder they must place before him, and he may take first. “And he shall not have many wives” (Deut. 17:17) eighteen only. Rabbi Judah says: “He may take many wives provided they don’t turn his heart away [from worshipping God]. Rabbi Shimon says: “Even one that might turn his heart away, he should not marry. Why then does it say, “He shall not have many wives”, even if they are like Avigayil. “He shall not keep many horses” (Deut. 17:16) enough for his chariot only. “Nor shall he amass silver and gold to excess” (Deut. 17:17) enough to pay his soldier’s wages. He must write a Torah scroll for himself; when he goes forth to battle he shall take it with him, and when he returns he shall bring it back with him; when he sits in judgement it shall be with him, and when he sits to eat it shall be with him, as it says, “Let it remain with him and let him read it all his life” (Deut. 17:19)

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:5

None may ride his horse and none may sit on his throne and none may make use of his scepter. No one may see him when his hair is being cut or when he is naked or when he is in the bath house, for it says, “You shall set a king upon yourself” (Deut. 17:15) that his awe should be over you.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:5

None may ride his horse and none may sit on his throne and none may make use of his scepter. No one may see him when his hair is being cut or when he is naked or when he is in the bath house, for it says, “You shall set a king upon yourself” (Deut. 17:15) that his awe should be over you.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:5

None may ride his horse and none may sit on his throne and none may make use of his scepter. No one may see him when his hair is being cut or when he is naked or when he is in the bath house, for it says, “You shall set a king upon yourself” (Deut. 17:15) that his awe should be over you.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:5

None may ride his horse and none may sit on his throne and none may make use of his scepter. No one may see him when his hair is being cut or when he is naked or when he is in the bath house, for it says, “You shall set a king upon yourself” (Deut. 17:15) that his awe should be over you.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:1

Cases concerning property [are decided] by three [judges]. This [litigant] chooses one and this [litigant] chooses one and then the two of them choose another, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “The two judges choose the other judge.” This [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, and this [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid and experts, he cannot invalidate them. This [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses and this [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid, he cannot invalidate them.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:1

Cases concerning property [are decided] by three [judges]. This [litigant] chooses one and this [litigant] chooses one and then the two of them choose another, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “The two judges choose the other judge.” This [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, and this [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid and experts, he cannot invalidate them. This [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses and this [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid, he cannot invalidate them.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:2

If one litigant said to the other, “I accept my father as trustworthy”, or “I accept your father as trustworthy”, or “I accept three herdsman as trustworthy”, Rabbi Meir says, “He may retract.” But the Sages say, “He cannot retract.” If one must take an oath before his fellow, and his fellow said to him, “Vow to me by the life of your head”, Rabbi Meir says, “He may retract.” But the Sages say, “He cannot retract.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:2

If one litigant said to the other, “I accept my father as trustworthy”, or “I accept your father as trustworthy”, or “I accept three herdsman as trustworthy”, Rabbi Meir says, “He may retract.” But the Sages say, “He cannot retract.” If one must take an oath before his fellow, and his fellow said to him, “Vow to me by the life of your head”, Rabbi Meir says, “He may retract.” But the Sages say, “He cannot retract.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:7

When the judges reached their decision they would bring in the litigants. The chief among the judges says: “You, so-and-so are not obligated”, or “You, so-and-so are obligated”. And from where do we know that after one of the judges has gone out that he may not say, “I declared him not obligated and my colleagues declared him obligated, so what can I do since they outvoted me?” Of such a one it says, “Do not go about as a talebearer amongst your people” (Lev. 19:16) and it also says, “He that goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets” (Proverbs 11:13).

Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:8

So long as a litigant can produce proof he may overturn the verdict. If they had said to him, “Bring all of the proofs that you have within thirty days” and he brought them within thirty days, the court may overturn the verdict. But if he brought any proof after thirty days, the court cannot reverse the verdict. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not find [the proof] within thirty days but found it after thirty days?” If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, and he later found proof or witnesses, then they are totally invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not know that he had witnesses, then found witnesses, or that he did not know that he had proof, then found proof? If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, but when he saw that he was about to be found obligated, he said, “Come near, so-and-so and so-and-so and testify for me!”, or if he brought forth some proof from his wallet, then they are totally invalid.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:8

So long as a litigant can produce proof he may overturn the verdict. If they had said to him, “Bring all of the proofs that you have within thirty days” and he brought them within thirty days, the court may overturn the verdict. But if he brought any proof after thirty days, the court cannot reverse the verdict. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not find [the proof] within thirty days but found it after thirty days?” If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, and he later found proof or witnesses, then they are totally invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “What could he have done that he did not know that he had witnesses, then found witnesses, or that he did not know that he had proof, then found proof? If they had said to him, “Bring witnesses” and he said, “I have no witnesses”, or [if they said], “Bring proof”, and he said, “I have no proof”, but when he saw that he was about to be found obligated, he said, “Come near, so-and-so and so-and-so and testify for me!”, or if he brought forth some proof from his wallet, then they are totally invalid.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:2

In non-capital cases and those concerning uncleanness and cleanness [the judges declare their opinion] beginning from the eldest, but in capital cases they begin from [them that sit at] the side. All are qualified to try non-capital cases, but not all are qualified to try capital cases, only priests, levites and Israelites that may give [their daughters] in marriage to priests.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:5

How did they admonish witnesses in capital cases? They brought them in and admonished them, [saying], “Perhaps you will say something that is only a supposition or hearsay or secondhand, or even from a trustworthy man. Or perhaps you do not know that we shall check you with examination and inquiry? Know, moreover, that capital cases are not like non-capital cases: in non-capital cases a man may pay money and so make atonement, but in capital cases the witness is answerable for the blood of him [that is wrongfully condemned] and the blood of his descendants [that should have been born to him] to the end of the world.” For so have we found it with Cain that murdered his brother, for it says, “The bloods of your brother cry out” (Gen. 4:10). It doesn’t say, “The blood of your brother”, but rather “The bloods of your brother” meaning his blood and the blood of his descendants. Another saying is, “The bloods of your brother” that his blood was cast over trees and stones. Therefore but a single person was created in the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single life to perish from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had caused a whole world to perish; and anyone who saves a single soul from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had saved a whole world. Again [but a single person was created] for the sake of peace among humankind, that one should not say to another, “My father was greater than your father”. Again, [but a single person was created] against the heretics so they should not say, “There are many ruling powers in heaven”. Again [but a single person was created] to proclaim the greatness of the Holy Blessed One; for humans stamp many coins with one seal and they are all like one another; but the King of kings, the Holy Blessed One, has stamped every human with the seal of the first man, yet not one of them are like another. Therefore everyone must say, “For my sake was the world created.” And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be involved with this trouble”, was it not said, “He, being a witness, whether he has seen or known, [if he does not speak it, then he shall bear his iniquity] (Lev. 5:1). And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be guilty of the blood of this man?,” was it not said, “When the wicked perish there is rejoicing” (Proverbs 11:10).]

Mishnah Sanhedrin 5:3

If one said, “On the second of the month”, and the other said, “On the third”, their evidence remains valid, since one may have known that the month was intercalated and the other may not have known that the month was intercalated. If one said, “On the third” and the other said, “On the fifth”, their evidence is invalid. If one said, “At the second hour”, and the other said, “At the third”, their evidence remains valid. If one said, “At the third hour”, and the other said, “At the fifth”, their evidence becomes invalid. Rabbi Judah says: “It remains valid. [But] if one said, ‘At the fifth hour’ and one said ‘At the seventh’, their evidence becomes invalid, since at the fifth hour the sun is in the east and at the seventh it is in the west.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 5:3

If one said, “On the second of the month”, and the other said, “On the third”, their evidence remains valid, since one may have known that the month was intercalated and the other may not have known that the month was intercalated. If one said, “On the third” and the other said, “On the fifth”, their evidence is invalid. If one said, “At the second hour”, and the other said, “At the third”, their evidence remains valid. If one said, “At the third hour”, and the other said, “At the fifth”, their evidence becomes invalid. Rabbi Judah says: “It remains valid. [But] if one said, ‘At the fifth hour’ and one said ‘At the seventh’, their evidence becomes invalid, since at the fifth hour the sun is in the east and at the seventh it is in the west.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 5:5

If they find him not guilty, he is discharged, if not, it [the trial] is adjourned till the following day. During this time they [the judges] go about in pairs, practice moderation in food, drink no wine the whole day, and discuss the case throughout the night. Early next morning they reassemble in court. He who is in favor of acquittal states, ‘I declare him innocent and I stand by my opinion.’ While he who is in favor of condemnation says: ‘I declare him guilty and stand by my opinion.’ One who [previously] argued for conviction may now argue for acquittal, but one who [previously] argued for acquittal may not now argue for conviction. If they have made any mistake, the two judges’ scribes are to remind them. If they find him not guilty, they discharge him. If not, they take a vote. If twelve acquit and eleven condemn, he is acquitted. If twelve condemn and eleven acquit, or if eleven condemn and eleven acquit and one says, ‘I do not know,’ or even if twenty-two acquit or condemn and a single one says, ‘I do not know,’ they add to the judges. Up to what number is the court increased? By twos up to the limit of seventy-one. If thirty-six acquit and thirty-five condemn, he is acquitted. But if thirty-six condemn and thirty-five acquit, the two sides debate the case together until one of those who condemn agrees with the view of those who are for acquittal.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 5:5

If they find him not guilty, he is discharged, if not, it [the trial] is adjourned till the following day. During this time they [the judges] go about in pairs, practice moderation in food, drink no wine the whole day, and discuss the case throughout the night. Early next morning they reassemble in court. He who is in favor of acquittal states, ‘I declare him innocent and I stand by my opinion.’ While he who is in favor of condemnation says: ‘I declare him guilty and stand by my opinion.’ One who [previously] argued for conviction may now argue for acquittal, but one who [previously] argued for acquittal may not now argue for conviction. If they have made any mistake, the two judges’ scribes are to remind them. If they find him not guilty, they discharge him. If not, they take a vote. If twelve acquit and eleven condemn, he is acquitted. If twelve condemn and eleven acquit, or if eleven condemn and eleven acquit and one says, ‘I do not know,’ or even if twenty-two acquit or condemn and a single one says, ‘I do not know,’ they add to the judges. Up to what number is the court increased? By twos up to the limit of seventy-one. If thirty-six acquit and thirty-five condemn, he is acquitted. But if thirty-six condemn and thirty-five acquit, the two sides debate the case together until one of those who condemn agrees with the view of those who are for acquittal.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 6:2

When he is about ten cubits away from the place of stoning, they say to him, ‘confess’, for such is the practice of all who are executed, that they [first] confess, for he who confesses has a portion in the world to come. For so we find in the case of Achan, that Joshua said to him, “My son, pay honor to the Lord, the God of Israel, and make confession to him. [Tell me what you have done, do not hold anything back from me.]” And Achan answered Joshua and said, “It is true, I have sinned against the Lord the God of Israel, and this is what I have done” (Josh. 7:19-20). And how do we know that his confessions made atonement for him? As it says, “And Joshua said, “What calamity have you brought upon us! The Lord will bring calamity upon you this day” (Josh. 7:35), [meaning] this day you are a calamity, but you are not to be a calamity in the next world. And if he does not know how to confess, they say to him, “Say, may my death be an expiation for all my sins.” Rabbi Judah said: “If he knows that he is a victim of false evidence, he can say: may my death be an expiation for all my sins but this.” They [the sages] said to him: “If so, everyone will speak likewise in order to clear himself.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 6:2

When he is about ten cubits away from the place of stoning, they say to him, ‘confess’, for such is the practice of all who are executed, that they [first] confess, for he who confesses has a portion in the world to come. For so we find in the case of Achan, that Joshua said to him, “My son, pay honor to the Lord, the God of Israel, and make confession to him. [Tell me what you have done, do not hold anything back from me.]” And Achan answered Joshua and said, “It is true, I have sinned against the Lord the God of Israel, and this is what I have done” (Josh. 7:19-20). And how do we know that his confessions made atonement for him? As it says, “And Joshua said, “What calamity have you brought upon us! The Lord will bring calamity upon you this day” (Josh. 7:35), [meaning] this day you are a calamity, but you are not to be a calamity in the next world. And if he does not know how to confess, they say to him, “Say, may my death be an expiation for all my sins.” Rabbi Judah said: “If he knows that he is a victim of false evidence, he can say: may my death be an expiation for all my sins but this.” They [the sages] said to him: “If so, everyone will speak likewise in order to clear himself.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 7:5

The blasphemer is punished only if he utters [the divine] name. Rabbi Joshua b. Korcha said: “The whole day [of the trial] the witnesses are examined by means of a substitute for the divine name: ‘may Yose smite Yose.’” When the trial was finished, the accused was not executed on this evidence, but all persons were removed [from court], and the chief witness was told, ‘State literally what you heard.’ Thereupon he did so, [using the divine name]. The judges then arose and tore their garments, which were not to be resewn. The second witness stated: “I too have heard thus” [but not uttering the divine name], and the third says: “I too heard thus.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 7:11

A sorcerer, if he actually performs magic, is liable [to death], but not if he merely creates illusions. Rabbi Akiva says in Rabbi Joshua’s name: “If two are gathering cucumbers [by magic] one may be punished and the other exempt: he who really gathers them is punished: while he who produces an illusion is exempt.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:6

“And you shall gather all its spoil into the public square” (Deut. 13:17): if it had no public square, one is made for it; if the public square was outside of [the city], it is brought within it. “And you shall burn with fire the city, and all its spoil as a whole burnt offering for the Lord your God” (ibid.): “And all its spoil”, but not the spoil of heaven. From here they said, the holy objects in the city must be redeemed and the heave offerings (terumoth) allowed to rot; and the second tithe and the sacred writings hidden. “A whole burnt offering for the Lord your God”: Rabbi Shimon said: “The holy Blessed One declared, ‘If you execute judgment upon the seduced city, I will ascribe merit to you as though you had sacrificed to me a whole offering.’” “And it shall remain an everlasting ruin, never to be rebuilt”: it may not be made even into gardens and orchards, according to the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. Rabbi Akiva says: “Never to be rebuilt”: it may not be built as it was, but it may be made into gardens and orchards. “Let nothing that has been doomed stick to your hand, in order that the Lord may turn His blazing anger and show you compassion” (Deut. 13:18): as long as the wicked exist in the world, there is blazing anger in the world; when the wicked perish from the world, blazing anger disappears from the world.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:6

“And you shall gather all its spoil into the public square” (Deut. 13:17): if it had no public square, one is made for it; if the public square was outside of [the city], it is brought within it. “And you shall burn with fire the city, and all its spoil as a whole burnt offering for the Lord your God” (ibid.): “And all its spoil”, but not the spoil of heaven. From here they said, the holy objects in the city must be redeemed and the heave offerings (terumoth) allowed to rot; and the second tithe and the sacred writings hidden. “A whole burnt offering for the Lord your God”: Rabbi Shimon said: “The holy Blessed One declared, ‘If you execute judgment upon the seduced city, I will ascribe merit to you as though you had sacrificed to me a whole offering.’” “And it shall remain an everlasting ruin, never to be rebuilt”: it may not be made even into gardens and orchards, according to the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. Rabbi Akiva says: “Never to be rebuilt”: it may not be built as it was, but it may be made into gardens and orchards. “Let nothing that has been doomed stick to your hand, in order that the Lord may turn His blazing anger and show you compassion” (Deut. 13:18): as long as the wicked exist in the world, there is blazing anger in the world; when the wicked perish from the world, blazing anger disappears from the world.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:6

“And you shall gather all its spoil into the public square” (Deut. 13:17): if it had no public square, one is made for it; if the public square was outside of [the city], it is brought within it. “And you shall burn with fire the city, and all its spoil as a whole burnt offering for the Lord your God” (ibid.): “And all its spoil”, but not the spoil of heaven. From here they said, the holy objects in the city must be redeemed and the heave offerings (terumoth) allowed to rot; and the second tithe and the sacred writings hidden. “A whole burnt offering for the Lord your God”: Rabbi Shimon said: “The holy Blessed One declared, ‘If you execute judgment upon the seduced city, I will ascribe merit to you as though you had sacrificed to me a whole offering.’” “And it shall remain an everlasting ruin, never to be rebuilt”: it may not be made even into gardens and orchards, according to the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. Rabbi Akiva says: “Never to be rebuilt”: it may not be built as it was, but it may be made into gardens and orchards. “Let nothing that has been doomed stick to your hand, in order that the Lord may turn His blazing anger and show you compassion” (Deut. 13:18): as long as the wicked exist in the world, there is blazing anger in the world; when the wicked perish from the world, blazing anger disappears from the world.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:6

“And you shall gather all its spoil into the public square” (Deut. 13:17): if it had no public square, one is made for it; if the public square was outside of [the city], it is brought within it. “And you shall burn with fire the city, and all its spoil as a whole burnt offering for the Lord your God” (ibid.): “And all its spoil”, but not the spoil of heaven. From here they said, the holy objects in the city must be redeemed and the heave offerings (terumoth) allowed to rot; and the second tithe and the sacred writings hidden. “A whole burnt offering for the Lord your God”: Rabbi Shimon said: “The holy Blessed One declared, ‘If you execute judgment upon the seduced city, I will ascribe merit to you as though you had sacrificed to me a whole offering.’” “And it shall remain an everlasting ruin, never to be rebuilt”: it may not be made even into gardens and orchards, according to the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. Rabbi Akiva says: “Never to be rebuilt”: it may not be built as it was, but it may be made into gardens and orchards. “Let nothing that has been doomed stick to your hand, in order that the Lord may turn His blazing anger and show you compassion” (Deut. 13:18): as long as the wicked exist in the world, there is blazing anger in the world; when the wicked perish from the world, blazing anger disappears from the world.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 11:3

There is greater stringency in respect to the teachings of the scribes than in respect to the torah: [thus,] if [a rebellious elder] says, there is no commandment of tefillin, so that a biblical law may be transgressed, he is exempt. [But if he rules that the tefillin must contain] five compartments, thus adding to the words of the scribes, he is liable.

Mishnah Makkot 1:8

Just as in the case of two witnesses, if one of them was found to be a relative or [otherwise] disqualified, their whole evidence is rendered void, so it is with three, if one of them was found to be a relative or [otherwise] disqualified, the whole evidence is void. How do we know that this is the case even with a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Yose said: “When is this true? With regards to capital cases; but in monetary suits, the evidence may be established by the rest. Rabbi says: “It is one and the same rule, be it in monetary suits or capital cases.” This is the rule when both [disqualified] witnesses warned the transgressor, but when they did not warn him, what could two brothers do that saw someone killing a person?

Mishnah Makkot 2:5

And direct roads were made leading from one to the other, as it says, “You shall prepare the way and divide the borders of your land into three parts” (Deut. 19:3). And they delegate to him two disciples of the Sages [as escorts] in case anyone attempted to slay him on the way, and that they might speak to him. Rabbi Meir says: “He may [even] plead his cause himself, as it says, “And this is the word of the manslayer” (Deut. 19:4).

Mishnah Makkot 2:7

If the trial was concluded when there was no high priest [in office], or if one kills a high priest, or a high priest that kills, [in these cases the manslayer] can never come away from that place [of refuge]. He [the manslayer] may not go out to bear witness, neither for cases having to do with a religious observance, nor to bear witness in a monetary suit, nor to bear witness in a capital case. Even should [all] Israel need him, and even a general like Yoav the son of Zeruiah, he may never go out, as it is said, “to there he fled”: ‘there’ must be his abode, ‘there’ his death, ‘there’ his burial. Just as the city affords asylum so does its Sabbath boundary afford asylum. If a manslayer went beyond the boundary [of the city] and the blood avenger found him: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: “For the avenger it is a matter of obligation [to kill him]; for everyone else, a matter of option.” Rabbi Akiba says: “It is a matter of option for the avenger, and anyone else [who kills him] is not liable for doing so.” If a tree was standing within the boundary and its boughs extended beyond [the boundary] or if it was standing outside of the boundary and its boughs extended within, it wholly follows [the position of] the boughs. If he slew [someone] in that city [of refuge] he is banished from one neighborhood to another neighborhood. And a Levite is banished from one city to another.

Mishnah Makkot 2:7

If the trial was concluded when there was no high priest [in office], or if one kills a high priest, or a high priest that kills, [in these cases the manslayer] can never come away from that place [of refuge]. He [the manslayer] may not go out to bear witness, neither for cases having to do with a religious observance, nor to bear witness in a monetary suit, nor to bear witness in a capital case. Even should [all] Israel need him, and even a general like Yoav the son of Zeruiah, he may never go out, as it is said, “to there he fled”: ‘there’ must be his abode, ‘there’ his death, ‘there’ his burial. Just as the city affords asylum so does its Sabbath boundary afford asylum. If a manslayer went beyond the boundary [of the city] and the blood avenger found him: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: “For the avenger it is a matter of obligation [to kill him]; for everyone else, a matter of option.” Rabbi Akiba says: “It is a matter of option for the avenger, and anyone else [who kills him] is not liable for doing so.” If a tree was standing within the boundary and its boughs extended beyond [the boundary] or if it was standing outside of the boundary and its boughs extended within, it wholly follows [the position of] the boughs. If he slew [someone] in that city [of refuge] he is banished from one neighborhood to another neighborhood. And a Levite is banished from one city to another.

Mishnah Makkot 3:9

It is possible for one to plough one furrow and become liable for eight prohibited acts: If he ploughs with an ox and donkey [yoked together] (2+3) and these were sanctified [animals], [the plough being drawn over] diverse mixed-seed sown] in a vineyard, during the sabbatical year, on a festival-day, [the plower being] a priest and a nazirite and the plot being situated on a defiled area. Hanania ben Hakinai says: “He may also have been wearing a garment mixed of wool and linen.” They said too him: “This is not of the same category.” He said to them: “Even the nazirite is not in the same category.”

Mishnah Makkot 3:15

All who have incurred [the penalty of] kareth, on being flogged are exempt from their punishment of kareth, for it says, “[He may be given up to forty lashes, but not more] ... lest your brother shall be dishonored before your eyes” (Deut. 25;3) once he has been lashed he is [considered] “your brother”, the words of Rabbi Hananiah ben Gamaliel. Rabbi Hananiah ben Gamaliel said: “Just as one who transgresses one transgression forfeits his life, how much more does one who performs one commandment have his life granted him.” Rabbi Shimon says: “You can learn this from its own passage; as it says: “[All who do any of those abhorrent things] such persons shall be cut off from their people” (Lev. 18:29), and it says: “You shall keep my statutes and my ordinances which if a man do, he shall live by them” (Lev. 18:5), which means that one who desists from transgressing is granted reward like one who performs a precept. Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi says: Behold [the Torah] says, “But makes sure that you do not partake of the blood; for the blood is the life, and you must not consume the life with the flesh…[that it may go well with you and with your descendents to come..” (Deut. 12:23-25”-- now, if in the case of blood which a person’s soul loathes, anyone who refrains from it receives reward, how much more so in regard to robbery and sexual sin for which a person’s soul craves and longs shall one who refrains from them acquire merit for himself and for generations and generations to come, to the end of all generations!

Mishnah Makkot 3:15

All who have incurred [the penalty of] kareth, on being flogged are exempt from their punishment of kareth, for it says, “[He may be given up to forty lashes, but not more] ... lest your brother shall be dishonored before your eyes” (Deut. 25;3) once he has been lashed he is [considered] “your brother”, the words of Rabbi Hananiah ben Gamaliel. Rabbi Hananiah ben Gamaliel said: “Just as one who transgresses one transgression forfeits his life, how much more does one who performs one commandment have his life granted him.” Rabbi Shimon says: “You can learn this from its own passage; as it says: “[All who do any of those abhorrent things] such persons shall be cut off from their people” (Lev. 18:29), and it says: “You shall keep my statutes and my ordinances which if a man do, he shall live by them” (Lev. 18:5), which means that one who desists from transgressing is granted reward like one who performs a precept. Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi says: Behold [the Torah] says, “But makes sure that you do not partake of the blood; for the blood is the life, and you must not consume the life with the flesh…[that it may go well with you and with your descendents to come..” (Deut. 12:23-25”-- now, if in the case of blood which a person’s soul loathes, anyone who refrains from it receives reward, how much more so in regard to robbery and sexual sin for which a person’s soul craves and longs shall one who refrains from them acquire merit for himself and for generations and generations to come, to the end of all generations!

Mishnah Makkot 3:16

Rabbi Hananiah ben Akashia says: “The Holy Blessed One, desired to make Israel worthy, therefore He gave them much Torah [to study] and many commandments [to perform]: for it is says, “The Lord desires [his servant’s] vindication, that he may magnify and glorify [His] teaching” (Isaiah 42).

Mishnah Shevuot 1:5

Rabbi Shimon ben Judah said in his name [of Rabbi Shimon (bar Yohai)]: “The new month goats bring atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food; the festival goats, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food, atone also for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end; the ‘outer’ goat of the Day of Atonement, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food and for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end, atones also for a case where there was no knowledge at the beginning but there was knowledge at the end. They said to him: “Is it permitted to offer up the goat set apart for one day on another?” He said, “Yes.” They [further] said to him: “Granted that the Day of Atonement goat may be offered up on the new month, but how can the new month goat be offered up on the Day of Atonement to bring atonement for a sin that is not within its scope?” He replied: “They are all at least equal [in the wider sense] in that they bring atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food.”

Mishnah Shevuot 4:13

[If he said]: "I adjure you"; "I command you"; "I bind you"; they are liable. "By heaven and earth!", they are exempt. "By Alef Daleth"; "By Yod He"; "By God Almighty"; "By The Lord of Hosts; "By the Merciful and Gracious one"; "By the Long Suffering One"; "By the One Abounding in Kindness"; or by any of the substitutes [for the name], they are liable. He who blasphemes by any of them is liable, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses his father or mother by any of them is liable according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses himself or his neighbor by any of them transgresses a negative precept. [If he said,] "May God smite you"; or "Yea, may God smite you"; this is the curse written in the Torah. "May [God] not smite you"; or "May he bless you"; Or "May he do good unto you [if you bear testimony for me]": Rabbi Meir makes [them] liable, and the Sages exempt [them].

Mishnah Shevuot 4:13

[If he said]: "I adjure you"; "I command you"; "I bind you"; they are liable. "By heaven and earth!", they are exempt. "By Alef Daleth"; "By Yod He"; "By God Almighty"; "By The Lord of Hosts; "By the Merciful and Gracious one"; "By the Long Suffering One"; "By the One Abounding in Kindness"; or by any of the substitutes [for the name], they are liable. He who blasphemes by any of them is liable, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses his father or mother by any of them is liable according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses himself or his neighbor by any of them transgresses a negative precept. [If he said,] "May God smite you"; or "Yea, may God smite you"; this is the curse written in the Torah. "May [God] not smite you"; or "May he bless you"; Or "May he do good unto you [if you bear testimony for me]": Rabbi Meir makes [them] liable, and the Sages exempt [them].

Mishnah Shevuot 4:13

[If he said]: "I adjure you"; "I command you"; "I bind you"; they are liable. "By heaven and earth!", they are exempt. "By Alef Daleth"; "By Yod He"; "By God Almighty"; "By The Lord of Hosts; "By the Merciful and Gracious one"; "By the Long Suffering One"; "By the One Abounding in Kindness"; or by any of the substitutes [for the name], they are liable. He who blasphemes by any of them is liable, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses his father or mother by any of them is liable according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses himself or his neighbor by any of them transgresses a negative precept. [If he said,] "May God smite you"; or "Yea, may God smite you"; this is the curse written in the Torah. "May [God] not smite you"; or "May he bless you"; Or "May he do good unto you [if you bear testimony for me]": Rabbi Meir makes [them] liable, and the Sages exempt [them].

Mishnah Shevuot 4:13

[If he said]: "I adjure you"; "I command you"; "I bind you"; they are liable. "By heaven and earth!", they are exempt. "By Alef Daleth"; "By Yod He"; "By God Almighty"; "By The Lord of Hosts; "By the Merciful and Gracious one"; "By the Long Suffering One"; "By the One Abounding in Kindness"; or by any of the substitutes [for the name], they are liable. He who blasphemes by any of them is liable, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses his father or mother by any of them is liable according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses himself or his neighbor by any of them transgresses a negative precept. [If he said,] "May God smite you"; or "Yea, may God smite you"; this is the curse written in the Torah. "May [God] not smite you"; or "May he bless you"; Or "May he do good unto you [if you bear testimony for me]": Rabbi Meir makes [them] liable, and the Sages exempt [them].

Mishnah Shevuot 4:13

[If he said]: "I adjure you"; "I command you"; "I bind you"; they are liable. "By heaven and earth!", they are exempt. "By Alef Daleth"; "By Yod He"; "By God Almighty"; "By The Lord of Hosts; "By the Merciful and Gracious one"; "By the Long Suffering One"; "By the One Abounding in Kindness"; or by any of the substitutes [for the name], they are liable. He who blasphemes by any of them is liable, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses his father or mother by any of them is liable according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses himself or his neighbor by any of them transgresses a negative precept. [If he said,] "May God smite you"; or "Yea, may God smite you"; this is the curse written in the Torah. "May [God] not smite you"; or "May he bless you"; Or "May he do good unto you [if you bear testimony for me]": Rabbi Meir makes [them] liable, and the Sages exempt [them].

Mishnah Shevuot 6:6

Rabbi Meir says: “There are things which are [attached] to land, but are not like land.” But the sages do not agree with him. How so? [If one says,] “Ten vines laden with fruit I delivered to you” and the other says, “There were only five”; Rabbi Meir makes him take an oath; But the Sages say: “All that is attached to land is like land.” An oath is imposed only for a thing [defined] by size, weight, or number. How so? [If one says,] “A store room full [of produce] I delivered to you,” or “A purse full [of money] I delivered to you” – and the other says, “I do not know; but what you left you may take,” he is exempt. If one says, “[I gave you produce reaching] up to the moulding [above the window],” and the other says, “Only up to the window,” he is liable.

Mishnah Shevuot 6:7

If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.

Mishnah Shevuot 7:7

So too they have said that she who impairs her kethubah [by admitting that it had already been partially paid] cannot receive [the remainder of the] payment except on oath; And that if one witness testifies against her that it [the kethubah] has been paid [in full], she cannot receive payment except on oath; And that from assigned property or orphans’ property she cannot exact payment [for her kethubah] except on oath; And that if she claims [her kethubah] not in his presence, she cannot receive payment except on oath. So, too, orphans cannot receive payment except on oath [namely]: “We swear that our father did not enjoin in his will, neither did our father say unto us, nor did we find [written] among the documents of our father that this document is paid.” Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says: “Even if the son was born after his father’s death he may take an oath, and collect his claim.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “If there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death that this document was not paid, he receives [his claim] without an oath.”

Mishnah Shevuot 8:1

There are four kinds of guardians: an unpaid guardian, a borrower, a paid guardian and a hirer. An unpaid guardian may take an oath [that he had not been neglectful] in every case [of loss or damage and be free of liability]. A borrower must make restitution in every case. A paid guardian or a hirer may take an oath if the beast was injured, or taken captive or dead, but he must make restitution if it was lost or stolen.

Mishnah Shevuot 8:1

There are four kinds of guardians: an unpaid guardian, a borrower, a paid guardian and a hirer. An unpaid guardian may take an oath [that he had not been neglectful] in every case [of loss or damage and be free of liability]. A borrower must make restitution in every case. A paid guardian or a hirer may take an oath if the beast was injured, or taken captive or dead, but he must make restitution if it was lost or stolen.

Mishnah Eduyot 1:5

And why do they record the opinion of a single person among the many, when the halakhah must be according to the opinion of the many? So that if a court prefers the opinion of the single person it may depend on him. For no court may set aside the decision of another court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number. If it was greater than it in wisdom but not in number, in number but not in wisdom, it may not set aside its decision, unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number.

Mishnah Eduyot 1:5

And why do they record the opinion of a single person among the many, when the halakhah must be according to the opinion of the many? So that if a court prefers the opinion of the single person it may depend on him. For no court may set aside the decision of another court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number. If it was greater than it in wisdom but not in number, in number but not in wisdom, it may not set aside its decision, unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number.

Mishnah Eduyot 1:5

And why do they record the opinion of a single person among the many, when the halakhah must be according to the opinion of the many? So that if a court prefers the opinion of the single person it may depend on him. For no court may set aside the decision of another court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number. If it was greater than it in wisdom but not in number, in number but not in wisdom, it may not set aside its decision, unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number.

Mishnah Eduyot 1:6

Rabbi Judah said: “If so, why do they record the opinion of a single person among the many to set it aside? So that if a man shall say, ‘Thus have I received the tradition’, it may be said to him, ‘According to the [refuted] opinion of that individual did you hear it.’”

Mishnah Eduyot 1:9

One who changes for a sela copper coins from second tithe: Beth Shammai says: “Copper coin for the whole sela.” And Beth Hillel say: “Silver for one shekel and copper coin for one shekel.” Rabbi Meir says: “Silver and fruits may not be substituted for silver.” But the sages allow it.

Mishnah Eduyot 1:12

These are subjects concerning which Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai: A woman who came from overseas and said: “My husband died” may be married again; “My husband died [without children]” she must be married by her husband’s brother (the levir). But Beth Hillel says: “We have heard so only in the case of one who came from the harvesting.” Beth Shammai said to them: “It is the same thing in the case of one who came from the harvesting or who came from the olive-picking or who came from overseas; they mentioned harvesting only because that is how it happened.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to Beth Shammai. Beth Shammai says: “She may be married again and take her kethubah payment.” But Beth Hillel says: “She may be married again but may not take her kethubah payment.” Beth Shammai said to them: “You have permitted the graver matter of a forbidden marriage, should you not permit the lighter matter of property?” Beth Hillel said to them: “We have found that brothers do not inherit on her statement.” Beth Shammai said to them: “Do we not infer it from her marriage document in which he writes to her ‘That if you be married to another you shall take what is written for you’?” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.

Mishnah Eduyot 1:12

These are subjects concerning which Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai: A woman who came from overseas and said: “My husband died” may be married again; “My husband died [without children]” she must be married by her husband’s brother (the levir). But Beth Hillel says: “We have heard so only in the case of one who came from the harvesting.” Beth Shammai said to them: “It is the same thing in the case of one who came from the harvesting or who came from the olive-picking or who came from overseas; they mentioned harvesting only because that is how it happened.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to Beth Shammai. Beth Shammai says: “She may be married again and take her kethubah payment.” But Beth Hillel says: “She may be married again but may not take her kethubah payment.” Beth Shammai said to them: “You have permitted the graver matter of a forbidden marriage, should you not permit the lighter matter of property?” Beth Hillel said to them: “We have found that brothers do not inherit on her statement.” Beth Shammai said to them: “Do we not infer it from her marriage document in which he writes to her ‘That if you be married to another you shall take what is written for you’?” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.

Mishnah Eduyot 1:12

These are subjects concerning which Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai: A woman who came from overseas and said: “My husband died” may be married again; “My husband died [without children]” she must be married by her husband’s brother (the levir). But Beth Hillel says: “We have heard so only in the case of one who came from the harvesting.” Beth Shammai said to them: “It is the same thing in the case of one who came from the harvesting or who came from the olive-picking or who came from overseas; they mentioned harvesting only because that is how it happened.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to Beth Shammai. Beth Shammai says: “She may be married again and take her kethubah payment.” But Beth Hillel says: “She may be married again but may not take her kethubah payment.” Beth Shammai said to them: “You have permitted the graver matter of a forbidden marriage, should you not permit the lighter matter of property?” Beth Hillel said to them: “We have found that brothers do not inherit on her statement.” Beth Shammai said to them: “Do we not infer it from her marriage document in which he writes to her ‘That if you be married to another you shall take what is written for you’?” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.

Mishnah Eduyot 1:12

These are subjects concerning which Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai: A woman who came from overseas and said: “My husband died” may be married again; “My husband died [without children]” she must be married by her husband’s brother (the levir). But Beth Hillel says: “We have heard so only in the case of one who came from the harvesting.” Beth Shammai said to them: “It is the same thing in the case of one who came from the harvesting or who came from the olive-picking or who came from overseas; they mentioned harvesting only because that is how it happened.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to Beth Shammai. Beth Shammai says: “She may be married again and take her kethubah payment.” But Beth Hillel says: “She may be married again but may not take her kethubah payment.” Beth Shammai said to them: “You have permitted the graver matter of a forbidden marriage, should you not permit the lighter matter of property?” Beth Hillel said to them: “We have found that brothers do not inherit on her statement.” Beth Shammai said to them: “Do we not infer it from her marriage document in which he writes to her ‘That if you be married to another you shall take what is written for you’?” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.