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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:18

It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, the words should be said as they are written. What means “the words should be said as they are written”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is not guilty unless he marries her definitively, has intercourse, and accuses her not to be a virgin. “They spread the cloth”. Not that “they spread the cloth” but until the things become clear like a cloth. Assi said, “they spread the cloth”, the witnesses are not stoned, nor is the husband flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas, until they say: you were with us at a certain place, and the husband hired them to testify falsely. If they said, you were with us at a certain place, but they did not say, the husband hired them to testify falsely? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is said here “putting”, it is said there “putting”. Since “putting” there means money, also “putting” here must mean money. But did we not state: He did not say to the witnesses, come and testify in my case, but they came on their own, he is not flogged nor does he pay 100 tetradrachmas but either she or the false witnesses would be stoned’? Because he did not say. But if he said, even if he did not hire them it is as if he hired them. If the father brought two groups of witnesses. One side say, you were with us at a certain place. The other side say, the husband hired them to testify falsely. It is obvious that those who said, you were with us at a certain place, are stoned, and those who said, the husband hired them to testify falsely, are flogged and pay 100 tetradrachmas. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, neither by these not by those are they flogged and pay 100 tetradrachmas, but they are flogged because of “you shall not testify as a false witness against your fellow man.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:18

It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, the words should be said as they are written. What means “the words should be said as they are written”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is not guilty unless he marries her definitively, has intercourse, and accuses her not to be a virgin. “They spread the cloth”. Not that “they spread the cloth” but until the things become clear like a cloth. Assi said, “they spread the cloth”, the witnesses are not stoned, nor is the husband flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas, until they say: you were with us at a certain place, and the husband hired them to testify falsely. If they said, you were with us at a certain place, but they did not say, the husband hired them to testify falsely? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is said here “putting”, it is said there “putting”. Since “putting” there means money, also “putting” here must mean money. But did we not state: He did not say to the witnesses, come and testify in my case, but they came on their own, he is not flogged nor does he pay 100 tetradrachmas but either she or the false witnesses would be stoned’? Because he did not say. But if he said, even if he did not hire them it is as if he hired them. If the father brought two groups of witnesses. One side say, you were with us at a certain place. The other side say, the husband hired them to testify falsely. It is obvious that those who said, you were with us at a certain place, are stoned, and those who said, the husband hired them to testify falsely, are flogged and pay 100 tetradrachmas. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, neither by these not by those are they flogged and pay 100 tetradrachmas, but they are flogged because of “you shall not testify as a false witness against your fellow man.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:35

HALAKHAH: “For how long does one reduce? Up to the amount of her ketubah”, etc. Here you say seven, and there you say three? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, since she is obligated for seven, he deducts seven; he, since he is obligated for three, has to add three. Think of it, if she brought him slaves, she is not obligated for anything! Think of it, if he stipulated [that he is not obligated for] either šĕ‘ēr, or dress, or ‘onāh, he is not obligated for anything! What is it? Following Rebbi Joḥanan, that the suffering of the male is greater than that of the female. That is what is written: “It was when she had nagged him day after day and pressured him.” What means “and pressured him”? Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, that she slipped away from under him. “He felt badly, to die”. He felt badly, ready to die, but she did not feel badly, to die. But some say that she fulfilled her needs with others. So much more she should have wanted, since Rebbi Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Naḥman: This human limb, if you starved it you satisfied it, if you satisfied it you starved it.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:36

Following Rebbi Eliezer, how far can he deduct? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion for the husband of a preliminarily married woman, or a sick one, a menstruating woman or one who is waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him when she was having her period, the Torah made her rebel against him! But we must hold that she rebelled against him before she had her period and now she has it. At that moment she would not be able to rebel but you say one writes, therefore one also deducts. From where does one deduct? From the additions to her ketubah. Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose says, he continues to reduce, for maybe an inheritance will come to her from outside and he would be able to collect from it.” He mentioned only inheritance, which is infrequent. That means he deducts from the additions to he ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: One writes a bill of rebellion for a preliminarily married woman, but one does not write a bill of rebellion for one who is waiting for her levir. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that one writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married woman or one who is waiting for her levir? There, according to the first Mishnah, here according to the later Mishnah. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even if you say according to the later Mishnah, ”the later Court [instituted that] one warns her for four weeks, then she writes a receipt for her ketubah and leaves.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:2

HALAKHAH: “What a woman finds or makes with her hands belongs to her husband,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: One said, this is everybody’s opinion, the other said it is in dispute. We do not know who said what. It is reasonable that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish should be the one who said it is in dispute since he explained that [the husband] provides her with food but does not give her a silver obolus as pocket money, and we did state: “If he does not give her a silver obolus as pocket money, what she makes with her hands is hers.” The work of her hands is parallel to what she finds. Rebbi Jacob bar Immi came in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is everybody’s opinion. That means that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish varies in his opinions.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:16

So is the Mishnah: And so those who provide for the orphan girl. Rebbi Ḥinena said, this means that one says to the overseers to take out a loan. For he explains it, if nothing is in the wallet one takes out a loan up to fifty. But if there is money in the wallet, one may add. Rebbi Yose said, this means that one does not say to the overseers to take out a loan. For he explains if there is money in the wallet. But if there is no money one diminishes. As the following, about a girl in the days of Rebbi Immi. He said, let it be held over for the holiday. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to him, you are causing a loss, but give everything, for the Lord of the holiday exists. It turns out that Rebbi Ḥanina holds with Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose with Rebbi Immi.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:16

So is the Mishnah: And so those who provide for the orphan girl. Rebbi Ḥinena said, this means that one says to the overseers to take out a loan. For he explains it, if nothing is in the wallet one takes out a loan up to fifty. But if there is money in the wallet, one may add. Rebbi Yose said, this means that one does not say to the overseers to take out a loan. For he explains if there is money in the wallet. But if there is no money one diminishes. As the following, about a girl in the days of Rebbi Immi. He said, let it be held over for the holiday. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to him, you are causing a loss, but give everything, for the Lord of the holiday exists. It turns out that Rebbi Ḥanina holds with Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose with Rebbi Immi.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:4

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:12

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:21

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two wives,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody borrowed from two persons and the second comes and says to him, get up and let us settle, and [the borrower] says, will not in the end the first hear of it and come to foreclose, he [the second lender] may say let us settle, and if he forecloses, he forecloses. If he settled, one may assume that the first will come and foreclose. If he settled with the first, Rebbi Phineas said, such a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who said, he settled. Rebbi Yose said, did he not write “what I shall acquire”? It happens only with an heir. Rebbi Ḥanina said, even with a creditor it can happen if he did not write “anything I shall acquire”, or if he said, “you shall not be paid except from this.” Rav Mattaniah said, this follows him who said, for ketubah but not for stipulations. But for him who said, for ketubah and for stipulations, does it not return?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:26

“No usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, that he has from her only the usufruct. Rebbi Yose the Sidonian stated before Rebbi Jeremiah, in disgreement with Rebbi Jeremiah: “He has the right to what she finds and earns, and to dissolve her vows.” What means “no usufruct”? That she cannot reclaim from him the usufruct he had [from her property].

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:4

There, we have stated: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate,” and it was stated about this: They will be clothed with garments supplied by me. For whom does the daughter work? Let us hear from the following: “The husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance.” This means, he feeds her but she works for her husband. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody had agreed to sustain his daughter-in-law, he has to sustain her, but she works for his son. If he wants her to be with him but she does not want to, the law is with her, as we have stated: “They pay the cost of her sustenance.” If she fell ill, it is as if she had married. If she died, is it as if she had married? If she died, she already is dead.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:4

There, we have stated: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate,” and it was stated about this: They will be clothed with garments supplied by me. For whom does the daughter work? Let us hear from the following: “The husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance.” This means, he feeds her but she works for her husband. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody had agreed to sustain his daughter-in-law, he has to sustain her, but she works for his son. If he wants her to be with him but she does not want to, the law is with her, as we have stated: “They pay the cost of her sustenance.” If she fell ill, it is as if she had married. If she died, is it as if she had married? If she died, she already is dead.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:4

It happened that Rebbi Ismael allotted sustenance to a woman in the markets of Sepphoris. What means “in the markets”? From the markets. Rebbi heard this and said, who told him that he did not send her? Who told me that he did not leave for her? Do the passers-by know? Rebbi Hila said, this is what Rebbi asked: Rebbi is of the opinion that the Mishnah does not speak of a married woman but of a widow. He said, Samuel and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the Mishnah deals with a widow. It was stated in the House of Rebbi thus: “If somebody left for overseas and his wife demands sustenance.” They wanted to say, for him who says, the Mishnah speaks of a married woman, “in the beginning” that he did not send her, “in the end” that she did not put aside and did not act dishonestly. For him who says, the Mishnah speaks of a widow, “in the beginning” that he did not leave for her, “in the end” that she did not put aside and did not act dishonestly. Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said, that she did not renounce her ketubah in the orphans’ favor.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:18

As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:18

As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:18

As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:30

HALAKHAH: “If somebody went overseas,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he sues with reasons. This means, only if four [owners] surround him. Samuel says, even if one surrounds him on all sides. Joshua’s stipulation! “If he was lost in vineyards or fields, he crosses and leaves until he reaches a road to his house, even a plot full of vineyards, for this is one of the conditions under which Joshua distributed the Land to Israel.” Joshua stated this to leave, maybe to enter? Joshua stipulated for a person, perhaps for his cow? Rebbi Yose said, his cow usually returns; since a swarm of bees does not usually return, they treated it as if it were his body.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:16

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:16

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:16

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:11

A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears and changes. What is vain and what is false? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it is known to two persons, that is a false oath, to three, it is vain. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the earth knows about it, that is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is whipped. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is not whipped. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Even an egg and a pearl. What means even? But, for example an egg and a pearl.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:20

If he transgressed and offered [a vow], how is that in the opinion of the House of Shammai? Let us hear from the following: “The House of Shammai say, his wife is permitted but his children are forbidden.” That means, if he transgressed and offered [a vow], in the opinion of the House of Shammai he is permitted. They wanted to say, vows but not oaths. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, “do not swear falsely in My Name,” you may swear to assessors and to people who condemn property and to toll collectors.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:2

HALAKHAH: “The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another,” etc. This means that vessels used to prepare food are forbidden. But did he not make the vow about food? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, so is the Mishnah: The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use for food. In the House of Rebbi it was stated thus: “One who is under a vow about use of food should not borrow from him a fine or coarse sieve, a grindstone, or an oven.” It was stated: But he may borrow from him cups and bowls and fruit bowls, since these are not used to prepare food, only to serve food. Pans and pots are forbidden. To mill and to press is forbidden. Cutting is a problem, harvesting is a problem. What kind of usufruct? It was stated: But he may borrow a spade from him. We wanted to say, a spade of a digger. Explain it by a spade for weeding, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Abuna said, that ysṭ’, since one removes and separates the bran from flour with it, it is forbidden to borrow from him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:32

So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:32

So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:32

So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:33

“This one can come and eat, but Rebbi Yose forbids.” What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Because his vow preceded his abandonment. Therefore, not if his abandonment preceded his vow. They asked before Rebbi Yose: What is the difference if his vow preceded his abandonment? He said to them, it did not occur to him to forbid what he abandoned. Rebbi Jonah said, so they asked before him: That means, not if it applies to a single person? But did we not state: “This one can come and eat, but Rebbi Yose forbids”? He said to them, it did not occur to him to forbid what he abandoned. Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Joṣadaq: If somebody abandons his field to ten persons he cannot retract. Rebbi Yose said, that follows Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana asked: When you said, “to three,” [did you not mean] “in the presence of three”? Instead of asking about Rebbi Meïr, ask about Rebbi Yose! When you said, “to ten,” [did you not mean] “in the presence of ten”? He said to him, if he abandoned it before two persons, he can retract and it remains subject to tithes. If he abandoned it before three persons, he cannot retract and it is free from tithes.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:16

HALAKHAH: “What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia,” etc. So is the Mishnah: A town square which is crossed by a public road is as if from the returnees from Babylonia. A man used a Torah scroll for his preliminary marriage to a woman. Rebbi Sabbatai and Rebbi Ḥasida brought the matter before Rebbi Yose who said, she is not married. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, you read the letter and there is written in it “not only”. Rebbi Mana said, I asked before Rebbi Ḥizqiah, what means “not only”? Did he marry with a Torah scroll which is private property? He said to us, she is not married. That comes to tell you, even if he used the public Torah scroll to marry, that is “not only”. But that means, even if he used a privately owned Torah scroll to marry, that is “she is not married.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:16

HALAKHAH: “What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia,” etc. So is the Mishnah: A town square which is crossed by a public road is as if from the returnees from Babylonia. A man used a Torah scroll for his preliminary marriage to a woman. Rebbi Sabbatai and Rebbi Ḥasida brought the matter before Rebbi Yose who said, she is not married. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, you read the letter and there is written in it “not only”. Rebbi Mana said, I asked before Rebbi Ḥizqiah, what means “not only”? Did he marry with a Torah scroll which is private property? He said to us, she is not married. That comes to tell you, even if he used the public Torah scroll to marry, that is “not only”. But that means, even if he used a privately owned Torah scroll to marry, that is “she is not married.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:26

“Not vegetables, he is permitted field vegetables because this is an accompanying name.” We have stated on that: “He who makes a vow to abstain from vegetables in the Sabbatical is also forbidden field vegetables.” Rebbi Crispus stated the reason in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel: That means, as long as Rebbi did not permit to import vegetables into the Land. But since Rebbi permitted to import into the Land there is no difference between the Sabbatical and the remaining years of the Sabbatical cycle. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina says, endives are important enough to become impure as food in the Seventh year. That means, as long as Rebbi did not permit to import vegetables into the Land. But since Rebbi permitted to import vegetables into the Land there is no difference between the Sabbatical and the remaining years of the Sabbatical cycle.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:26

“Not vegetables, he is permitted field vegetables because this is an accompanying name.” We have stated on that: “He who makes a vow to abstain from vegetables in the Sabbatical is also forbidden field vegetables.” Rebbi Crispus stated the reason in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel: That means, as long as Rebbi did not permit to import vegetables into the Land. But since Rebbi permitted to import into the Land there is no difference between the Sabbatical and the remaining years of the Sabbatical cycle. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina says, endives are important enough to become impure as food in the Seventh year. That means, as long as Rebbi did not permit to import vegetables into the Land. But since Rebbi permitted to import vegetables into the Land there is no difference between the Sabbatical and the remaining years of the Sabbatical cycle.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:27

It was stated: “One intercalates for a year neither in a Sabbatical nor in the year after the Sabbatical; but if they intercalated it is intercalated.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Abbahu said: That means, as long as Rebbi did not permit to buy vegetables for importation into the Land. But since Rebbi permitted to buy vegetables for importation into the Land there is no difference between the Sabbatical and the remaining years of the Sabbatical cycle.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:28

HALAKHAH: “And when Rebbi Ismael died,” etc. It is written, ““Daughters of Israel, cry about Saul, etc.” Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Neḥemiah. One said, really daughters of Israel. For their husbands went to war and he provided them with food. Why does the verse say “who puts a golden jewel on your garments”? Jewellery looks good only on a supple body. The other one said, “the daughters of Israel” means the builders of Israel, the councils of Israel. When he saw a group of fellows, he gave them to eat and drink. What does the verse mean by “who puts a golden jewel on your garments”? That he heard the reason for a practice from a Sage and praised him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:8

If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:9

“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:9

“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:28

It was stated: One is asked about vows only while sitting and wrapped. The one who is asked must be sitting and the one who is asking is standing; from the following: “And the two people who have the dispute shall stand.” “Standing” means only “being judged”. That is for asking legal rules. Asking about sermons from where? The verse says “shall stand, and shall stand”. Rebbi Aḥa bar Pappus went to permit the vow of Rebbi Immi. He remained standing to say “there is no vow”. Rebbi Mana went to permit the vow of the older Gamliel. He remained standing to say “there is no vow, there is no oath”. Rebbi Mana went to permit the vow of Gamliel the grandson. He said to him, do not treat me as you treated my grandfather, but sit down and I shall remain standing.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:4

Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:5

Rebbi Hila explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ ” What means “Rebbi Yose said, these vows are not vows of mortification”? They are vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” is everybody’s opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:11

It is written: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:8

“I shall be like this one”; Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, if he grabs [a nazir’s] hair and says, “I shall be like this one.” “I shall tend my hair, I shall groom my hair”. If he says, I shall be of those who have to tend or grow their hair. “I shall tend my hair and I shall groom my hair”, if he says I shall neither tend nor grow my hair for less than thirty [days], he means thirty. “It shall be my obligation neither to tend nor to grow my hair,” if he says, it shall be my obligation neither to tend nor to grow my hair more than thirty [days], he means thirty. “I shall be obligated to grow my hair”, means “I shall tend my hair, I shall groom my hair”. Or “It shall be my obligation neither to tend nor to groom my hair, but to let it grow wildly.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:8

“I shall be like this one”; Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, if he grabs [a nazir’s] hair and says, “I shall be like this one.” “I shall tend my hair, I shall groom my hair”. If he says, I shall be of those who have to tend or grow their hair. “I shall tend my hair and I shall groom my hair”, if he says I shall neither tend nor grow my hair for less than thirty [days], he means thirty. “It shall be my obligation neither to tend nor to grow my hair,” if he says, it shall be my obligation neither to tend nor to grow my hair more than thirty [days], he means thirty. “I shall be obligated to grow my hair”, means “I shall tend my hair, I shall groom my hair”. Or “It shall be my obligation neither to tend nor to groom my hair, but to let it grow wildly.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:8

“I shall be like this one”; Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, if he grabs [a nazir’s] hair and says, “I shall be like this one.” “I shall tend my hair, I shall groom my hair”. If he says, I shall be of those who have to tend or grow their hair. “I shall tend my hair and I shall groom my hair”, if he says I shall neither tend nor grow my hair for less than thirty [days], he means thirty. “It shall be my obligation neither to tend nor to grow my hair,” if he says, it shall be my obligation neither to tend nor to grow my hair more than thirty [days], he means thirty. “I shall be obligated to grow my hair”, means “I shall tend my hair, I shall groom my hair”. Or “It shall be my obligation neither to tend nor to groom my hair, but to let it grow wildly.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:16

From here, “if his hair became heavy”: Rebbi. For Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Immi: The words of Rebbi: A nazir in perpetuity shaves once in twelve months. The words of the Sages: A nazir in perpetuity sometimes shaves every thirty days, sometimes once in twelve months. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Assi: It says so: “I am a nazir like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea. He is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days. Rebbi says, this one does not shave every thirty days,” but once in twelve months. “Who is one who shaves every thirty days? If he says, I am obligated for nezirut like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they differ if it was not made explicit. Where do we hold? If he says, “the fullness of my hair”, everybody agrees that he shaves once every thirty days. If he says, “the number of the hairs on my head,” everybody agrees that he shaves after twelve months. But we must hold that he says “like hair”. Rebbi says, “the fullness of my hair”. But the rabbis say, he means “the number of the hairs on my head.” And here, why? Why did the man not make the vow? He only encourages himself to avoid prohibitions. In addition, from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah added: If he said, like that which is collected in the fig harvest, or like sheaves in a Sabbatical year, or like stars in the sky, he is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days.” Could you say that Rebbi Jehudah follows the rabbis? He holds with Rebbi, as Rebbi Jehudah added: “Absalom was a nazir in perpetuity and shaved every twelve months.” What is the reason? Because of nezirut. But that would mean for the rabbis that he shaved every thirty days; that is what we have stated: “I am a nazir the house full, or a chest full. One checks him out.” It was stated on that: He shaves every thirty days. But here he said, he shaved every twelve months.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:18

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:5

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vowed two neziriot,” etc. If he finished his first period of nezirut and started to lean on the second, when they did not find an opening for the first while they found an opening for the second, the second can be used for the first. Where do we hold? If he said, “I am a nazir twice,” a vow which is partially annulled is totally annulled. If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. But we must hold that he said, “I am a nazir and nazir.” If he said, “these are for nezirut.” But if he said, “these are for my nezirut; those are for the other nezirut,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. Rebbi Eleazar said, if he finished the first nezirut, as soon as he brought a sacrifice and shaved, the first is credited for the second. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa commanded the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees: not unless he brings all his sacrifices, following the rabbis; but following Rebbi Simeon even if he brings only one sacrifice. If he dedicated both together, he has only one in his hand. If he dedicated each of them separately or brought each of them for the other, he did not acquit himself [of his obligation]. This means that as far as holiness goes, they became holy. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “His sacrifice to the Eternal for his nezirut,” i. e., that his vow of nazir should precede his sacrifice, rather than that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. It is different, because he still is in nezirut. One understands the second for the first. The first for the second? Rebbi Jehudah said, this supports Rebbi Eleazar. But did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa command the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees; not unless he brings all his sacrifices. They wanted to say, following the rabbis. But here, we hold with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Explain it for his nezirut and the nezirut he pledged for his son. In that, the second can be used for the first. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, did we not argue about one who said, “I am a nazir”? He really should be a nazir only once. You were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice. Is it not enough that you were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice, that now you say, he has nothing in his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:12

If he is still there, Rebbi Joḥanan said, one warns him about everything for every possible leaving, and he is whipped. Rebbi Eleazar said, he does not accept [warning] unless he leaves and returns. Rebbi Abba said: So did Rebbi Joḥanan answer Rebbi Eleazar: Is it not written, “he shall not come” and “he may not defile himself”? He said to him, if they warned him because of “he shall not come”, he is whipped; because of “he shall not defile himself” he is not whipped. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned from prostrating, as we have stated there: “If he prostrated himself or stayed there long enough to prostrate himself.” Rebbi Mattaniah said, we thought that was where they do disagree? About lashes, but not about a sacrifice. Since Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned from prostrating, that means that lashes and sacrifices are one and the same. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A nazir who drank wine the entire day is guilty only once.” He explains it, that his throat was never empty. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he was defiling himself for the dead the entire day, he is guilty only once.” He explains it about one who waits before every leaving, who is whipped. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If a Cohen was standing in a cemetery and they were handing another corpse to him, could he accept? The verse says, “the husband shall be defiled for his family.” If he accepted it, I could think that he was guilty. The verse says, “to be profaned”. One who adds impurity to the impurity; that excludes him who does not add impurity to his impurity. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Neḥemiah said, “to be profaned”, that excludes him who does not add impurity to his impurity, lest he say, because I became defiled for my father I may go and collect the bones of X. “To be profaned”, at the time of death; Rebbi said, also “in their death.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree. It follows that Rebbi Simeon bar Abba follows Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. When Simeon bar Abba was dying, he said, this should be taken out here, that should be taken out there.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody said ‘I am a nazir’ and another person heard it and said, ‘and so am I’,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “and so am I”, “and so am I”. Who is the Tanna of conjunctions? Rebbi Jehudah. But following Rebbi Meïr, “I am,” “I am”. Does the Mishnah require that all of them follow immediately after the speaking of the first? It was stated: If the middle one was permitted, all following him are permitted, all preceding him are forbidden. The Mishnah applies even if not all of them follow immediately after the speaking of the first, but each one follows immediately after the speaking of the preceding person. What means “to follow immediately after the speaking”? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The time needed for greeting between two people. Abba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The time needed for greeting between teacher and student, that he say to him, “peace upon you, my master.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:26

HALAKHAH: “If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her,” etc. He dissolves for her because of her hair. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is a decision of Scripture: “He dissolved her vows,” he dissolves what is on her. Whenever he dissolves her vow, he dissolves what is on her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, after she was transferred from the prohibition to the positive commandment. The rabbis say, “afterwards, the nazir shall drink wine,” after all these actions. Rebbi Simeon says, even after a single action. Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi (Bevai). “When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity, he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife.” Therefore, shaving in purity does not make her unseemly. Who holds that shaving does not make unseemly? Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even Rebbi thinks so: “Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves [in purity], since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife.” Should he not say, I cannot stand an unseemly and shorn wife? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi (Jehudah) said that only for the purification sacrifice, since a purification sacrifice would be invalid if not in her name. That means, as long as it is alive it is surrendered to Heaven only by slaughter.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:13

“According to the early Mishnah if he drinks a quartarius of wine.” They did explain “liquor”. Since “liquor” mentioned there means a quartarius, so “liquor” mentioned here also means a quartarius. They changed to say “he shall not eat, he shall not drink.” Since eating is defined by an olive’s size so drinking is by an olive’s size.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:13

“According to the early Mishnah if he drinks a quartarius of wine.” They did explain “liquor”. Since “liquor” mentioned there means a quartarius, so “liquor” mentioned here also means a quartarius. They changed to say “he shall not eat, he shall not drink.” Since eating is defined by an olive’s size so drinking is by an olive’s size.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:21

HALAKHAH: “An unspecified nezirut is thirty days,” etc. It is written: “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head;” therefore, if it did pass, he is guilty. “His head’s hair grows wildly;” how much means growing hair? 30 days. {That refers to an impure nazir. A pure nazir? “He has to shave his head on the day be becomes pure.” Why does the verse say: “On the seventh day he shall shave all his hair”? That shows that he shaves a second time.} “He shaves,” all, not in part. From here that if he left two hairs, he [did] nothing. “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head.” Not only a shaving knife, from where to treat a cropper and scissors like a shaving knife? The verse says, “shall not pass over his head.” That means not only a shaving knife; all methods of removal are understood. From here that he starts again only for a [shaving knife].

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:21

HALAKHAH: “An unspecified nezirut is thirty days,” etc. It is written: “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head;” therefore, if it did pass, he is guilty. “His head’s hair grows wildly;” how much means growing hair? 30 days. {That refers to an impure nazir. A pure nazir? “He has to shave his head on the day be becomes pure.” Why does the verse say: “On the seventh day he shall shave all his hair”? That shows that he shaves a second time.} “He shaves,” all, not in part. From here that if he left two hairs, he [did] nothing. “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head.” Not only a shaving knife, from where to treat a cropper and scissors like a shaving knife? The verse says, “shall not pass over his head.” That means not only a shaving knife; all methods of removal are understood. From here that he starts again only for a [shaving knife].

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:52

How is this? One says, all sources of flavor by one in 100; the other says, all sources of flavor by one in 60. For him who says all sources of taste by one in 100, you take the foreleg as one in 100 of the ram. For him who says all sources of taste by one in 60, you take the foreleg as one in 60 of the ram. For him who says one in 100, you remove the bones from the foreleg. But if you remove the bones from the foreleg, remove them from the ram! This you cannot do, as it was stated: “The waste of heave does not combine with heave to forbid the profane, but the waste of profane combines with the profane to lift the heave.” Rebbi Vivian asked: Does the waste of heave combine with profane to lift the heave? Since Rav Ḥuna said, the husks of what is forbidden combine to permit; that means waste of heave combines with profane to lift the heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:56

HALAKHAH: Is it counted for him and his shaving? If you would say that it is not counted for him and his shaving, then his sacrifices count for nothing. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Following Rebbi Simeon, may he shave for his holiday well-being offerings? Is that not the Mishnah? “Rebbi Simeon says, that sacrifice is not counted for him but the others are counted for him.” When he slaughtered them are they not like voluntary well-being offerings? This means that he may shave for voluntary well-being offerings following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa and Rebbi Joḥanan. For Rav Ada bar Aḥawa it is problematic, but for Rebbi Joḥanan it is obvious.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:15

May a (person) [Cohen] defile himself in honor of the public? It is stated: When there are two acceptable roads, one long and pure, the other one short and impure: If the public was walking on the long one, he goes on the long one; otherwise, he goes on the short one in honor of the public. That refers to impurity by their words; also for impurity that is from the words of the Torah? From what Rebbi Zeïra said, so great is the honor of the public that it temporarily pushes aside a prohibition, that means even impurity that is from the words of the Torah.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:27

We have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, dried flesh from a corpse which even if soaked will not return to its former status is pure. What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Did he not infer this from a carcass? From a carcass, since a dried carcass is pure, so also a dried corpse should be pure. Rebbi Immi asked: Since a foul-smelling carcass is pure, would a foul-smelling corpse also be pure? Then there can be no decayed matter for Rebbi Yose! It was found stated in Rebbi Yose’s name that there was decayed matter. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Yose: Since a carcass has no decay, so a corpse should have no decay! He told them that he inferred from an animal only for the flesh, not for the bones. There is no decay from flesh, there is decay from bones, as Bar Qappara stated, “decay of bones is jealousy.” Rebbi Yannai said, “or a grave”, even if one touched the first Adam’s grave. The colleagues say, he transposes the verse: “or a grave qbr” means “or decay rqb”. Bar Qappara stated, “or a grave qbr”, “or decay rqb”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:28

Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, the Holy One, praise to Him, took a spoonful from the place of the altar and created Adam from it. He said, he shall have been created from the place of the altar so that he should be able to stand up. That is what is written: “The Eternal Omnipotent formed Adam the first of dust from the earth”, and it is written: “You shall build for me an altar of earth.” Since “earth” there means an altar, here also [it means] an altar. “His days should be a hundred and twenty years.” Adam the first lived close to a thousand years and you say, “his days should be a hundred and twenty years”! But after 120 years he returns to be a spoonful of decay. That is difficult. For Og, the king of Bashan, 120 years, and for a newborn baby 120 years? Og [becomes] a spoonful of decay, and a newborn baby becomes a spoonful of decay. “ The spoonful of decay which they mentioned is from his finger joints and upwards, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, from a fully developed hand.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi was illustrating that of Rebbi Meïr one way, that of the rabbis in another way.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:28

Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, the Holy One, praise to Him, took a spoonful from the place of the altar and created Adam from it. He said, he shall have been created from the place of the altar so that he should be able to stand up. That is what is written: “The Eternal Omnipotent formed Adam the first of dust from the earth”, and it is written: “You shall build for me an altar of earth.” Since “earth” there means an altar, here also [it means] an altar. “His days should be a hundred and twenty years.” Adam the first lived close to a thousand years and you say, “his days should be a hundred and twenty years”! But after 120 years he returns to be a spoonful of decay. That is difficult. For Og, the king of Bashan, 120 years, and for a newborn baby 120 years? Og [becomes] a spoonful of decay, and a newborn baby becomes a spoonful of decay. “ The spoonful of decay which they mentioned is from his finger joints and upwards, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, from a fully developed hand.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi was illustrating that of Rebbi Meïr one way, that of the rabbis in another way.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:7

If his master forced him in one respect, did he force him in all respects? We came to the disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Yose: “If [the slave] is not in the presence of his master, Rebbi Meїr says, he cannot drink, but Rebbi Yose says, he may drink.” Where do we hold? If he told him, drink whether in my presence or not in my presence, even Rebbi Meїr will agree. If he told him, drink in my presence, do not drink in my absence, even Rebbi Yose will agree. But we hold in the case that he tells him: “drink!” Rebbi Meїr says, [it means] drink in my presence, do not drink in my absence. Rebbi Yose says, [it is] as if he said, drink whether in my presence or not in my presence.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:13

If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:18

Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joshia, since Rebbi Joshia said, if impurity is hidden in the ground below the house, the nazir shaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, here on the side, there on place. Rebbi Ezra said in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Even if you say in both cases on the side, in both cases on place. What means “impure”? Impure and he does not shave?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:20

HALAKHAH: What means “lying as usual”? His legs straight and his hands over his heart. But if he found him compressed, I am saying that a heap fell on him and killed him. But did we not state: “If he found two with their heads beside their legs, he takes them and their surroundings?” They wanted to say, what means “compressed”? Their heads beside their legs. Rebbi Isaac ben Rebbi Eleazar said, like fried fish, the head of one near the tail of the other and vice versa.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:20

HALAKHAH: What means “lying as usual”? His legs straight and his hands over his heart. But if he found him compressed, I am saying that a heap fell on him and killed him. But did we not state: “If he found two with their heads beside their legs, he takes them and their surroundings?” They wanted to say, what means “compressed”? Their heads beside their legs. Rebbi Isaac ben Rebbi Eleazar said, like fried fish, the head of one near the tail of the other and vice versa.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:2

HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. This is difficult. If somebody brings a gift document from overseas,would you require him to say, it was written and signed before me? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Rebbi Joḥanan said, that is a leniency lest she sit abandoned. Is that a leniency? It is only a restriction, for if he does not say to her, it was written and signed before me, you do not permit her to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was written and signed before me, makes it easy for her at the end. For if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void. Rebbi Mana wanted to say, a protest other than the text of the bill. But is a protest about the text of the bill a protest which has no validity? Even for a protest which has validity, said Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, since you say that the reason for the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was signed before me, is to make it easy for her at the end, that if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void; this means that there is no difference whether it is a protest not about the text of the bill or about the body of the bill, a protest which has no validity, or a protest which does have validity! But should you worry that maybe be gave the bill to disqualified witnesses to sign? Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:14

Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:29

HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:29

HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:2

HALAKHAH: “Every bill of divorce which was not written for a particular wife,” etc. Who is dictating? School teachers. What means “in addition”? There it was not written as a bill of divorce but here it was written as a bill of divorce. What means “in addition”? There it was written neither in his name nor in her name but here it was written in his name but not in her name. What means “in addition”? There it was written in his name but not in her name but here it was written in his name and in her name but it was not written for divorce from the start.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:2

HALAKHAH: “Every bill of divorce which was not written for a particular wife,” etc. Who is dictating? School teachers. What means “in addition”? There it was not written as a bill of divorce but here it was written as a bill of divorce. What means “in addition”? There it was written neither in his name nor in her name but here it was written in his name but not in her name. What means “in addition”? There it was written in his name but not in her name but here it was written in his name and in her name but it was not written for divorce from the start.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:2

HALAKHAH: “Every bill of divorce which was not written for a particular wife,” etc. Who is dictating? School teachers. What means “in addition”? There it was not written as a bill of divorce but here it was written as a bill of divorce. What means “in addition”? There it was written neither in his name nor in her name but here it was written in his name but not in her name. What means “in addition”? There it was written in his name but not in her name but here it was written in his name and in her name but it was not written for divorce from the start.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:12

HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:12

HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:28

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The Mishnah speaks of the heirs in priesthood and Levitic status. But concerning the poor, the poor has no inheritance. Bar Qappara stated: No person is immune from this; if not he then his son, if not his son then his grandson. This means, he can change the terms. Can the creditor change the terms? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody lends money to a first rich and then poor person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost and the poor acquired what is in his hand.” This implies that the creditor cannot change the terms.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:31

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sets aside produce,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar ben Antigonos in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Yannai: This means that nothing is in disorder for 24 hours but the last day. Rebbi Joḥanan said: Nothing is in order for 24 hours but the first day, as we have stated there: “If a miqweh was measured and found deficient.” Ḥinena the son of Rav Assi bar Mamal in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That is to negate the words of Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated: “If they were lost, one worries about them for 24 hours back, the words of Rebbi Eleazar.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:34

Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:34

Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:34

Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:8

There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:26

There could be terms. If he entered into terms with him, it is permitted. That means, with adults. With minors, the terms can be with their masters. That is, if the master was a Jew. If he was Gentile? Rebbi Tevele sold his slave and entered into terms with his master. Rebbi Isaac the goldsmith had slaves who fled to Bnoton. He came and asked Rebbi Immi who instructed him that a sales contract is forbidden, a loan for use is permitted, a cession is questionable. The slave girl of Rebbi Abba bar Ada fled to Cilicia. He came and asked Rebbi Mana, who instructed him following Rebbi Immi: a sales contract is forbidden, a loan for use is permitted, a cession is questionable.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:34

Rebbi Joḥanan said, why did they say “an Israel underage girl eats heave,” that all should be eager to marry her for her attractiveness. Rebbi Shammai said, only if she knows how to keep her [valuables given for] preliminary marriage. Rebbi Immi said, a Mishnah said so, “married to a Cohen she eats heave.” Rebbi Ḥananiah said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, for her attractiveness, that means, even if she does not know how to keep her [valuables given for] preliminary marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:38

MISHNAH: There was no law of siqarii in Judea for those killed in the war. After those killed in the war there was a law of siqarii. How is this? If one bought from a siqarius and afterwards from the original owner, his acquisition is void; from the original owner and afterwards from the siqarius, his acquisition is valid. If one bought from a husband and afterwards from the wife, his acquisition is void; from the wife and afterwards from the husband, his acquisition is valid. This is the earlier Mishnah; a later court said that he who buys from a siqarius gives a quarter to the original owner. When is this? If they have no means to buy, but if they have the means to buy, they precede everybody else. Rebbi (Joshua) assembled a court who voted that if it was in the siqarius’s hand for twelve months, any who wants to buy shall buy and give a quarter to the original owner.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:38

MISHNAH: There was no law of siqarii in Judea for those killed in the war. After those killed in the war there was a law of siqarii. How is this? If one bought from a siqarius and afterwards from the original owner, his acquisition is void; from the original owner and afterwards from the siqarius, his acquisition is valid. If one bought from a husband and afterwards from the wife, his acquisition is void; from the wife and afterwards from the husband, his acquisition is valid. This is the earlier Mishnah; a later court said that he who buys from a siqarius gives a quarter to the original owner. When is this? If they have no means to buy, but if they have the means to buy, they precede everybody else. Rebbi (Joshua) assembled a court who voted that if it was in the siqarius’s hand for twelve months, any who wants to buy shall buy and give a quarter to the original owner.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:43

(The deaf-mute communicates by sign language.) They say, we had the means to buy; the buyer says, no. Rebbi Yose says, the field is always in the possession of the current owner since the burden of proof is on the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:54

“If a poor person knocks off [olives] from high up in the olive tree, what is under him falls under the category of robbery, for communal peace; Rebbi Yose says, complete robbery.” That means, on the earth. But if he plucks with his hand, his hand acquires for him.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:62

Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ammi. One said: “Plough it well then, I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical.” The other one said: “May you succeed” For him who says, plough it well, then I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical, what means “one greets them” in a Jewish way? “May you succeed.” For him who says to the Gentile “may you succeed”? Explanation: Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa and Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman passed by one of the ploughmen in the Sabbatical. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said to him, are you not Jewish? Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa said to him, did not Rebbi teach us (Ps. 129:8): “The passers-by did not say, the blessing of the Eternal be on you,” these are the nations of the world who pass out of the world, they did not say to Israel “the blessing of the Eternal is on you.” What does Israel say to them, “we bless you in the Name of the Eternal.” All blessings that come into the world because of us are not enough for you; not only do you not say, come and take from these blessings for yourselves, but you roll over us pro-rated contributions and fines, head taxes and annonae.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:26

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was thrown into a cistern,” etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jonathan taught us, only if they saw a man’s shadow. There we have stated: “One testifies by the light of a candle or by the light of the moon and one permits to remarry on the basis of a disembodied voice”, and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow. Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That means, in the fields, but in town even without a man’s shadow. But did we not state: “If somebody had been thrown into a cistern,” and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow? Rebbi Abin said, damaging spirits were as frequent in cisterns as they are frequent on the fields.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:28

If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:28

If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody throws a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. “He shall write,” “he shall deliver into her hand.” Not only into her hand; from where also into her garden or into her courtyard? The verse says “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Is this following Rebbi Ismael? It is following Rebbi Aqiba. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael, “he took all his land from his hand, up to the Arnon.” Did he take it out of his hand? What means “from his hand”? From his possession.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:12

Rebbi Abun said, what means “in my poverty?” That there is no wealth before Him Who commanded and the world came into existence! Another explanation: בְּעוֹנְיִי “in my deprivation,” because he fasted and donated the price of his meal to Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:14

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.