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3705 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers married to three women,” etc. Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. One understands that he has to perform ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” because the wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Why can the other one not be married in levirate? Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, of any one you cannot marry in levirate, you cannot marry the co-wife in levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar formulated this, he formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “ A boy at least nine years and one day old who had intercourse with his sister-in-law and when he grew up he married another wife; if he never had intercourse with the first again after he became an adult, the second [wife] may perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis. Rebbi Abun bar Bisna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, but only if first he married in levirate and then performed ḥalîṣah. But if he performed ḥalîṣah first, it is forbidden; perhaps “bespeaking” acquired and she was freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If he performed ḥalîṣah with a pregnant woman and she had a miscarriage? Let us hear from the following: If somebody died and left a pregnant widow, should I think that she must have recourse to her levir? The verse says, “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is extinguished. The verse says, “to establish a name in Israel for his brother,” until you know whether there is a live child or not. I could think that the wife of an eunuch should need levirate, the verse says “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is not extinguished; this excludes this one whose name was already extinguished.
Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”
Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”
MISHNAH: If somebody marries his sister-in-law but she turned out to have been pregnant and gave birth. If the child is alive, [the levir] has to divorce her and they must bring a sacrifice. If the child is not alive, he may keep her. If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated to bring a reparation offering for an uncertain case.
Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!
How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.
Rebbi Hoshaia stated: The heirs of her ketubah are obliged to bury her. Rebbi Yose said, if Rebbi Hoshaia had not stated this, we would have had a problem. If she had no ketubah, do they not have to bury her? This is difficult. If a woman has no ketubah, does she not have to be buried? A wife, even if she has a ketubah, must be buried. This one, if she has a ketubah, is entitled to burial costs. But here, if she does not have a ketubah, she is not entitled to burial costs.
MISHNAH: If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law while his brother had married her sister and then died, she must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife while his brother had married her sister and then died, she is free.
Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: There Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu, said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Every place where Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous Mishnah. And here, you say so? He said to him, if not Rebbi, maybe somebody else said it? Since when Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. It must be that Rebbi did not find a disagreement in the Mishnah; but if others taught it in disagreement and Rebbi taught it anonymously, certainly practice follows the anonymous [text]. There come Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Abba and Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even if others taught a disagreement but Rebbi taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. Why does he agree here with a dissenting opinion? Rebbi Samuel ben Inaya in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That means, if no diagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], but if a disagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], practice does not follow the anonymous [opinion]. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That is, if individual disagrees with individual. But if an individual disagrees next to the [anonymous] Sages, practice does not follow the anonymous [text].
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.
Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
What is touching? Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: That the finger should be seen between the lips. Rebbi Joḥanan said, until the gland enters. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When the gland has entered that is completion of intercourse. What are we dealing with? If about incest prohibitions, He made the one who touches equal to him who finishes. If for a bound slave girl, until he ejaculates, since Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, said in the name of Rav: “Flow of semen”, until he ejaculates. But we must deal with a widow for the High Priest. When he touched her, he became guilty for desecrating her. When the gland entered, he became guilty for having intercourse. When he ejaculated, he became guilty because “he shall not desecrate his semen in his people.”
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.
HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?
HALAKHAH: “The uncircumcised and any impure persons,” etc. “Every man”, to include the uncircumcised. Or “every man” to include the mourner? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it is written, “no outsider shall eat sanctified [food]”. I forbade to you because of outside status, I did not forbid because of prepuce. The reddish Rebbi Tiufa asked before Rebbi Yose: may we not say, I did not forbid because of prepuce and because of mourning? He said to him, since one verse includes and the other excludes, I am including the uncircumcised who is missing some procedure performed on his body and excluding the mourner who is not missing some procedure performed on his body. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: It said “sojourner and hireling” with regard to Passover and “sojourner and hireling” with regard to heave. Since “sojourner and hireling” with regard to Passover implies disabling the uncircumcised, so “sojourner and hireling” with regard to heave must imply disabling the uncircumcised. Rebbi Ḥaggai questioned: If “sojourner and hireling” with regard to Passover is in a group of laws disabling the mourner, also “sojourner and hireling” with regard to heave should imply disabling the mourner. Rebbi Hila answered: They inferred from “under, under” only items mentioned in the paragraph. The sexless and the hermaphrodite came under another category. The mourner comes from second tithe.
Are sacrifices forbidden for the uncircumcised? One cannot deduce the answer from Passover since they are not subject to [the prohibition of] breaking a bone, neither from heave since that would be inference after inference. At the end, you have to say “from it, from it.” Since “from it” which was said in the laws of Passover implies that the uncircumcised is disqualified, so “from it” which was said in the laws of sacrifices must imply that the uncircumcised is disqualified. Are sacrifices forbidden for the mourner? “From it, from it.” Since “from it” which was said in the laws of tithe states that the mourner is disqualified, so “from it” which was said in the laws of Passover must imply that the mourner is disqualified.
Are sacrifices forbidden for the uncircumcised? One cannot deduce the answer from Passover since they are not subject to [the prohibition of] breaking a bone, neither from heave since that would be inference after inference. At the end, you have to say “from it, from it.” Since “from it” which was said in the laws of Passover implies that the uncircumcised is disqualified, so “from it” which was said in the laws of sacrifices must imply that the uncircumcised is disqualified. Are sacrifices forbidden for the mourner? “From it, from it.” Since “from it” which was said in the laws of tithe states that the mourner is disqualified, so “from it” which was said in the laws of Passover must imply that the mourner is disqualified.
Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, only from the place of masculinity. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: even from the female place. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi retracted this, from the following verse: “And with a male you should not lie in the way of a woman’s beddings”, one who may lie in two ways, including the female. Who is that? That is the hermaphrodite. Rebbi said, I looked for but did not find words of Ben Shamua about the hermaphrodite, for the entire group ganged up on me. Why? Not to make it public or because he was not worth it? What difference does it make? He usually made public. If you say, it was not to make it public, the publicity is already in his hand. The reason must be that he was not worth it. What could he made public? He inherits, he testifies, his grain offering is burnt completely, one says grace with him as with a male.
MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.
Rebbi Bisna in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: A promiscuous priestly woman may eat tithe. Is that not the Mishnah: “the daughter of a Cohen from heave,” this implies that she eats tithe. It may follow him who says that tithe is not given to Cohanim. Rebbi Nasa said, the words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Hila, Simeon ben Yosina, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia said: If a Cohen came upon a divorcee, had a son from her, and died. [If the father died] within thirty days [of the son’s birth], the son must redeem himself. After thirty days, the presumption is that his father redeemed him. If he redeems for others, certainly for his son.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose says, her ketubah is from the property of her first husband. Rebbi Eleazar says, the first [husband] is entitled to what she finds and earns and may annul her vows. Rebbi Simeon says, copulation with her or ḥaliṣah with her by a brother of the first [husband] frees her co-wives and a child from him is not a bastard; if she was married without permission she is permitted to return to him. If she married by a decision of the court, she must leave but is free from the sacrifice; without a decision of the court, she must leave but must bring the sacrifice. The power of the court frees her from the sacrifice. If the court instructed her to marry but she misbehaved, she must bring a sacrifice since they permitted her only to marry.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose says, her ketubah is from the property of her first husband. Rebbi Eleazar says, the first [husband] is entitled to what she finds and earns and may annul her vows. Rebbi Simeon says, copulation with her or ḥaliṣah with her by a brother of the first [husband] frees her co-wives and a child from him is not a bastard; if she was married without permission she is permitted to return to him. If she married by a decision of the court, she must leave but is free from the sacrifice; without a decision of the court, she must leave but must bring the sacrifice. The power of the court frees her from the sacrifice. If the court instructed her to marry but she misbehaved, she must bring a sacrifice since they permitted her only to marry.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose says, her ketubah is from the property of her first husband. Rebbi Eleazar says, the first [husband] is entitled to what she finds and earns and may annul her vows. Rebbi Simeon says, copulation with her or ḥaliṣah with her by a brother of the first [husband] frees her co-wives and a child from him is not a bastard; if she was married without permission she is permitted to return to him. If she married by a decision of the court, she must leave but is free from the sacrifice; without a decision of the court, she must leave but must bring the sacrifice. The power of the court frees her from the sacrifice. If the court instructed her to marry but she misbehaved, she must bring a sacrifice since they permitted her only to marry.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose says, her ketubah is from the property of her first husband. Rebbi Eleazar says, the first [husband] is entitled to what she finds and earns and may annul her vows. Rebbi Simeon says, copulation with her or ḥaliṣah with her by a brother of the first [husband] frees her co-wives and a child from him is not a bastard; if she was married without permission she is permitted to return to him. If she married by a decision of the court, she must leave but is free from the sacrifice; without a decision of the court, she must leave but must bring the sacrifice. The power of the court frees her from the sacrifice. If the court instructed her to marry but she misbehaved, she must bring a sacrifice since they permitted her only to marry.
MISHNAH: A woman’s husband and son went overseas and people came and told her, your husband died and after that your son died, and she remarried. After that, they said to her, the sequence was inverted. Then she must leave and the first and the last children are bastards.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
MISHNAH: They came and told her, your son died and after that your husband died, and she was married in levirate. After that, they said to her, the sequence was inverted. Then she must leave and the first and the last children are bastards.
HALAKHAH: “They came and told her, your son died,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” They only said, “there is no bastard from a sister-in-law,” therefore she must leave. And we have stated, “she must leave”. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, she must leave.
HALAKHAH: “They came and told her, your son died,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” They only said, “there is no bastard from a sister-in-law,” therefore she must leave. And we have stated, “she must leave”. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, she must leave.
HALAKHAH: “They came and told her, your son died,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” They only said, “there is no bastard from a sister-in-law,” therefore she must leave. And we have stated, “she must leave”. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, she must leave.
HALAKHAH: “They came and told her, your son died,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” They only said, “there is no bastard from a sister-in-law,” therefore she must leave. And we have stated, “she must leave”. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, she must leave.
HALAKHAH: “They came and told her, your son died,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” They only said, “there is no bastard from a sister-in-law,” therefore she must leave. And we have stated, “she must leave”. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, she must leave.
HALAKHAH: “They came and told her, your son died,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” They only said, “there is no bastard from a sister-in-law,” therefore she must leave. And we have stated, “she must leave”. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, she must leave.
MISHNAH: If they told her, your husband died, and she remarried, and then they told her, he was alive but died, she must leave and the first child is a bastard, but the last is not a bastard. If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed and after that her husband returned, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the second [husband] gave her a bill of divorce he did not disable her from priesthood. This Rebbi Eleazar ben Matthew explained, “a woman divorced from her husband,” and not a woman divorced from a non-husband.
“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of R. Joḥanan who will explain this for allotments it is understandable; since he acquires by allotment he makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.
Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one dead [husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, “any one who cannot marry me in levirate, cannot marry my co-wife in levirate.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eleazar formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis.
So far his daughter’s daughter from marriage. His daughter’s daughter from a rape? “The genitals of your son’s daughter or your daughter’s daughter.” Where do we hold? If from marriage, it already had been said. So it it cannot refer to marriage but must refer to rape. So far for the warning, from where the punishment? Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, “they, they; taboo, taboo”. That follows Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “they”, from “them”. So far about his daughter’s daughter, from where his daughter? Rav said, if he is forewarned about his daughter’s daughter, so much more for his daughter! If for his daughter’s daughter he is subject to extirpation, so much more for his daughter!
A convert has to separate from his sister, whether paternal or maternal, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his maternal halfsister; a paternal halfsister he may keep. He must separate from his mother’s sister but may keep his father’s sister, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his mother’s maternal halfsister but may keep his mother’s paternal halfsister. If he married any other incest prohibited woman, he may keep her. It was only said, “if he married”. Therefore, not from the start.
A convert has to separate from his sister, whether paternal or maternal, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his maternal halfsister; a paternal halfsister he may keep. He must separate from his mother’s sister but may keep his father’s sister, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his mother’s maternal halfsister but may keep his mother’s paternal halfsister. If he married any other incest prohibited woman, he may keep her. It was only said, “if he married”. Therefore, not from the start.
A convert has to separate from his sister, whether paternal or maternal, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his maternal halfsister; a paternal halfsister he may keep. He must separate from his mother’s sister but may keep his father’s sister, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his mother’s maternal halfsister but may keep his mother’s paternal halfsister. If he married any other incest prohibited woman, he may keep her. It was only said, “if he married”. Therefore, not from the start.
A Gentile has to separate from his sister, whether paternal or maternal, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his maternal halfsister; a paternal halfsister he may keep. He must separate from his mother’s sister but may keep his father’s sister, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his mother’s maternal halfsister but may keep his mother’s paternal halfsister. Rav Ḥanin said, he explained us the words of Rebbi Meïr simply: “Therefore, a man has to abandon his father and his mother.” What is close to him from his father’s side, what is close to him from his mother’s side. Rebbi Vivian asked: Then his father’s sister should be forbidden because she is close to his father! His mother’s sister should be forbidden because she is close to his mother! Rebbi Simeon, the son of Rebbi Ayvo objected: “Amram took his aunt Yokhebed as wife.” Does that mean that the Israelites did not even behave as descendants of Noah? Rebbi Hila said, what is close to him from his father’s side, what is close to him from his mother’s side. They objected to Rebbi Meïr: “And truly she is my sister, my father’s daughter, but not my mother’s.” He said to them: Is a proof from there? Not “she became my wife”?
A Gentile has to separate from his sister, whether paternal or maternal, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his maternal halfsister; a paternal halfsister he may keep. He must separate from his mother’s sister but may keep his father’s sister, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his mother’s maternal halfsister but may keep his mother’s paternal halfsister. Rav Ḥanin said, he explained us the words of Rebbi Meïr simply: “Therefore, a man has to abandon his father and his mother.” What is close to him from his father’s side, what is close to him from his mother’s side. Rebbi Vivian asked: Then his father’s sister should be forbidden because she is close to his father! His mother’s sister should be forbidden because she is close to his mother! Rebbi Simeon, the son of Rebbi Ayvo objected: “Amram took his aunt Yokhebed as wife.” Does that mean that the Israelites did not even behave as descendants of Noah? Rebbi Hila said, what is close to him from his father’s side, what is close to him from his mother’s side. They objected to Rebbi Meïr: “And truly she is my sister, my father’s daughter, but not my mother’s.” He said to them: Is a proof from there? Not “she became my wife”?
A Gentile has to separate from his sister, whether paternal or maternal, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his maternal halfsister; a paternal halfsister he may keep. He must separate from his mother’s sister but may keep his father’s sister, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his mother’s maternal halfsister but may keep his mother’s paternal halfsister. Rav Ḥanin said, he explained us the words of Rebbi Meïr simply: “Therefore, a man has to abandon his father and his mother.” What is close to him from his father’s side, what is close to him from his mother’s side. Rebbi Vivian asked: Then his father’s sister should be forbidden because she is close to his father! His mother’s sister should be forbidden because she is close to his mother! Rebbi Simeon, the son of Rebbi Ayvo objected: “Amram took his aunt Yokhebed as wife.” Does that mean that the Israelites did not even behave as descendants of Noah? Rebbi Hila said, what is close to him from his father’s side, what is close to him from his mother’s side. They objected to Rebbi Meïr: “And truly she is my sister, my father’s daughter, but not my mother’s.” He said to them: Is a proof from there? Not “she became my wife”?
MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.
MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.
From where that a Cohen presents his sacrifices during [the period of duty of] any watch he chooses? The verse says, “he may come as his heart desires … and serve”. If he was old or sick, he may give it to any watch he likes but the hide and meat are his. If he was impure or had a bodily defect, he must give it to the acting watch, and the hide and meat are theirs. These mixed-up ones, how do you treat them? Comparing them to the old or sick, or to the impure or to those with a bodily defect. It seems reasonable to compare them to the impure or those having a bodily defect; but the Mishnah compares them to the old or sick, since we have stated: “One cannot take his from him.”
HALAKHAH: “[A woman] did not wait three months,” etc. “If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them,” etc. Where do we hold? It is impossible after death [of the first] since we have stated: “He has to mourn intensely for them and they for him.” One understands that he does not defile himself for the second [husband], I say that he is the son of the first. But why does he not defile himself for the first one? It must be that he divorced. Then, as you take it, if he is his son, he should defile himself for him. If he is not his son, he is desecrated, and what happens if he defiles himself? It must be that he raped. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah that a rape victim does not have to wait three months? Should we say, following the rabbis, but we follow Rebbi Yose!
HALAKHAH: “[A woman] did not wait three months,” etc. “If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them,” etc. Where do we hold? It is impossible after death [of the first] since we have stated: “He has to mourn intensely for them and they for him.” One understands that he does not defile himself for the second [husband], I say that he is the son of the first. But why does he not defile himself for the first one? It must be that he divorced. Then, as you take it, if he is his son, he should defile himself for him. If he is not his son, he is desecrated, and what happens if he defiles himself? It must be that he raped. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah that a rape victim does not have to wait three months? Should we say, following the rabbis, but we follow Rebbi Yose!
An eight months’ child is like a stone and one does not move him on the Sabbath, but his mother lies down beside him and nurses him. Rebbi Yose asked: May one push aside the Sabbath for babies that are in doubt? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it is fine. How you take it, if he is a nine months’ child, he must be circumcised. If he is an eight months’ child, it is as if he cut flesh without need. The rabbis of Caesarea said, Rebbi Jacob ben Dositheos asked, who permitted to cut flesh without need?
Rebbi Yannai said, if he took off [his shoe] and she put it on again, or she took it off but he had untied, the ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back, he may not go back on it. Why? Is it since the two actions are not there together or because they are not in the right order? What is the difference? If she afterwards untied [the shoestrings]. If you say, because the two actions are not there together? They are there together! The reason therefore must be that they are not in the right order.
It was stated: But he may walk on it until he reaches the entrance of his courtyard. Rebbi Aḥa and Rebbi Ze‘ira were walking on the highway. The sandal of Rebbi Aḥa was torn. When they came to the city gate, Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, that is the entrance of your courtyard. Rebbi Aḥa wound a fiber around. Rebbi Abbahu wound a bundle of Jew’s mallow. Rebbi Abbahu was of the opinion that a bundle of Jew’s mallow is ready to be used. Rebbi Jonah threw them away before the fried food store. That is little honor. The honor of Rebbi Eleazar obliged him to take it off. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: May one switch? He said to him, it is permitted. Nevertheless, he told him: go and look for an Elder and rely on him. He went out and found Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, asked him, and he permitted. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said that this is clothing, since we have stated: “Or with a left [foot sandal] on the right [foot], the ḥalîṣah is valid.” That means, in width. But in length it must cover most of the foot.
Rebbi Yoḥanan had a difficulty with the words of Rebbi Joshua. Is her marriage valid by biblical standards? The dissolution of her vows must be by biblical standards! And you say so! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there is no dissolution of vows here, because of what Rebbi Joḥanan had against the words of Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Nissa asked: Would it be the same for prohibitions? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions. Would that be as we stated there: “Before that time, even though they said, we know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are no vows and their dedications no dedications. After that time, even though they said, we do not know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are vows and their dedications dedications.” What is the status of that Mishnah? For Cahana it is in dispute, for Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it is everybody’s opinion.
HALAKHAH: “If an underage levir,” etc. It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must hold if it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meїr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meїr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child fatherless? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṣah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah with her.” (After thirty days.) And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meїr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
“If a woman made a vow forbidding herself any usufruct,” etc. Consider the following: He said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption. The colleagues asked: What are we talking about? If following the early Mishnah, we have understood that one may marry in levirate. If following the later Mishnah, we have understood that one may perform ḥalîṣah. Where did we hear that one coerces? Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose asked, after thirty days, the presumption is that he copulated and you say one coerces? But it must be the following: Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to performḥalîṣah. The following: If he says, I copulated, and she says, I was not copulated with, it is obvious that he has to sustain her. It is obvious that he does not inherit from her. The problem is whether he inherits his brother’s property. If she says, I was copulated with, and he says, I did not copulate, it is obvious that he does not have to sustain her. It is obvious that he inherits his brother’s property. The problem is whether he inherits from her.
MISHNAH: Two deaf-mute brothers married to two deaf-mute sisters, or two hearing sisters, or two sisters of whom one is deaf-mute, the other hearing; or two deaf-mute sisters married to two deaf-mute brothers, or two hearing brothers, or two brothers of whom one is deaf-mute, these are free from ḥalîṣah and levirate. If the women are unrelated, they must marry them, and, if they want to, they may send them away. Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two hearing sisters. If the deaf-mute married to the hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife do? [The widow] has to leave as the wife’s sister. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute married to the hearing wife do? He divorces his wife by a bill of divorce; his brother’s widow is permanently forbidden.
Rav Huna insists on interpreting the contract text. Rav Huna explained: “The sons shall inherit but the daughters must be fed.” Since the sons inherit movables, the daughters also are fed from movables. Samuel said, the daughters are not fed from movables. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “The female children you shall have from me shall dwell in my house and be supported from my property.” It was stated on this: From real estate but not from movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said: Rav Huna follows Rebbi and Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “One uses both guaranteed property and non-guaranteed property for the support of the wife and the daughters, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, guaranteed property may be taken by sons from sons, by daughters from daughters, by sons from daughters, and by daughters from sons. But non-guaranteed property may be taken by sons from daughters but not by daughters from sons.” They said, Rav Huna reversed himself. They said, that was well done, ketubah is a biblical commandment but support of the daughters is from their words. May their words uproot a biblical commandment? It must be that they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah. But is the money contained in their mother’s ketubah not also real estate?
Rav Huna insists on interpreting the contract text. Rav Huna explained: “The sons shall inherit but the daughters must be fed.” Since the sons inherit movables, the daughters also are fed from movables. Samuel said, the daughters are not fed from movables. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “The female children you shall have from me shall dwell in my house and be supported from my property.” It was stated on this: From real estate but not from movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said: Rav Huna follows Rebbi and Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “One uses both guaranteed property and non-guaranteed property for the support of the wife and the daughters, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, guaranteed property may be taken by sons from sons, by daughters from daughters, by sons from daughters, and by daughters from sons. But non-guaranteed property may be taken by sons from daughters but not by daughters from sons.” They said, Rav Huna reversed himself. They said, that was well done, ketubah is a biblical commandment but support of the daughters is from their words. May their words uproot a biblical commandment? It must be that they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah. But is the money contained in their mother’s ketubah not also real estate?
MISHNAH: Everybody is accepted to be a witness for her except her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her levir’s wife, and her husband’s daughter. What is the difference between a bill of divorce and death? The document is the proof. If one witness says that he died and she remarried, then another comes and says that he is not dead, she shall not leave. If one witness says that he died but two say that he did not die, even if she remarried she must leave. If two say that he died but one said that he did not die, even if she has not yet remarried she may remarry.
There, we have stated: “If somebody was bringing a bill of divorce and lost it, if he found it again immediately, it is valid; otherwise it is invalid.” What is immediately? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as less than three people passed by. If a Gentile passed by, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana was bringing a bill of divorce when he lost it. A Saracen found it. The case came before the rabbis and they declared [the bill] valid. That means, if a Gentile passed by, it is valid. May we say that he had an identifying mark on [the bill]? But was it not stated that there are no identifying marks on bills of divorce? That means, two or three lines. But here it had a heh which was pointed. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana, why should it be invalid in that case? I would say, it was another bill executed for a person with the same name. Think of it, if they investigated and did not find there another person with the same name! It must be that one is very strict in matters of possible incest. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry?” Rebbi Mana said to him: So says Rebbi Shammai, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid and one invalid. He lost the valid one after he had thrown away the invalid one. When he found it, I am saying that he found the invalid one.
The declaration of jealousy, Rebbi Joshua said in the name of Rebbi Eliezer, is obligatory; but Rebbi Joshua said, it is optional. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, it turns out that Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel. As the House of Shammai say, a man may not divorce his wife except if he found in her a matter of nakedness. If he found her behavior ugly, he cannot divorce her since he found no proof of adultery; he cannot keep her since he found her behavior ugly. Therefore, he says, it is obligatory. But was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this if there are witnesses, but not if there are no witnesses.
The declaration of jealousy, Rebbi Joshua said in the name of Rebbi Eliezer, is obligatory; but Rebbi Joshua said, it is optional. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, it turns out that Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel. As the House of Shammai say, a man may not divorce his wife except if he found in her a matter of nakedness. If he found her behavior ugly, he cannot divorce her since he found no proof of adultery; he cannot keep her since he found her behavior ugly. Therefore, he says, it is obligatory. But was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this if there are witnesses, but not if there are no witnesses.
May her husband dedicate for her without her knowledge? Since he is a partner in the flour offering, may he dedicate for her without her knowledge? May another person dedicate for her without her knowledge? It comes following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, for the four who need cleansing others may dedicate without their knowledge; these are the following: Man or woman [healed from] genital discharges, one [healed from] scale disease, and the woman after childbirth; since a father may dedicate for his small son who is lying in a crib. One understands man or woman [healed from] genital discharges or [healed from] scale disease, but a woman after childbirth? May a minor give birth? Did not Rebbi Redifa, Rebbi Jonah, say in the name of Rebbi Hila: If a woman became pregnant and gave birth before she grew two hairs, she and her son will die. After she grew two hairs, she and her son will live. If she became pregnant before she grew two hairs and gave birth after she grew two hairs, she will live but her son will die. How is the situation? Since a man may dedicate for his underage daughter. Since she grew [pubic hair] she already left his power. But it must be since a man may dedicate for his deaf-mute wife. Here, in the case of the suspected wife, the case of the minor does not apply since Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An underage girl who whored has no will to be forbidden to her husband. The case of the deaf-mute does not apply since it is written: “The woman shall say: Amen, amen.” Rebbi Abin said, since it is written: “You shall enjoy together with your house,” and he is the cause that he cannot enjoy with her, he may dedicate without her knowledge.
There, we have stated: “One does not make the proselyte drink, etc. But the Sages say, one makes her drink.” Where do we hold? If about an Israel who married a proselyte, it already is written: “The sons of Israel” (not proselytes). If about a proselyte who married a Jewish girl, it already is written: “The man has to bring his wife to the Cohen.” But we must hold about a proselyte who married a proselyte. What is the reason of Rebbi Aqiba? “The children of Israel”, not proselytes. What is the reason of the Sages? “You shall say to them”, to add everything written in that paragraph. What is written in that paragraph? “A man slept with her”. His lying with her makes her forbidden, then her husband declares his jealousy and makes her drink.
“If she said ‘I shall not drink’ after the scroll was erased, one makes her gargle and forces her to drink against her will.” How many letters have to be erased? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: The House of Shammai say, one; the House of Hillel say, two. Rebbi Hilai said, the reason of the House of Hillel: That he could have written Yah. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: But why does one make her drink? If it is to check her out, she already is completely checked out! But Rebbi Aqiba must hold that the one who says “I shall not drink” is as the one who says “I am impure for you”. But does Rebbi Aqiba not agree that “one makes her gargle until her face turned yellow and forces her to drink against her will”? He does, if she started to drink.
“An offering of remembrance,” a general statement; “referring to sin”, a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a specific one, the general does not mean more than the specific. If you say so, do you not find the argument disadvantaged? If punishment, which is given out sparingly, can refer, then reward, which is given out in abundance, should do so much more! But, “an offering of remembrance,” if she has merit, “referring to sin”, if she has no merit. It was stated: Rebbi Tarphon said, all statements of “remembrance” in the Torah have a good meaning except this one which is for punishment. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: If it only said, “referring to sin”, and then was silent, I would agree with your statement. But since it says “an offering of remembrance,” this must be for a good [purpose].
Ben Azai does not follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, as it was stated: It happened that Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa and Rebbi Eleazar Ḥasma were walking from Jabneh to Lydda when they were visiting Rebbi Joshua in Beqiïn. He asked them, what was new today in the House of Study? They said to him, we all are your students and drink from your waters. He said to them, even so, it is impossible that there not be a new idea every day in the House of Study. Who stayed there over the Sabbath? They said to him, Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. And what was his text? “Assemble the people, men, women, and children.” What did he say about this? Since the men come to learn and the women to hear, why do the children come? It must be to give a reward to those who bring them. He said to them, the generation is not orphaned which counts Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah among them.
One verse says, “you shall love the Eternal, your God,” and another verse says, “fear the Eternal, your God, and Him you should serve.” Act from love and act from fear. Act from love, because if you are tempted to hate, know that you must love and a lover is no hater. Act from fear, because if you are tempted to rebel, know that you must fear and one who fears does not rebel.
One verse says, “you shall love the Eternal, your God,” and another verse says, “fear the Eternal, your God, and Him you should serve.” Act from love and act from fear. Act from love, because if you are tempted to hate, know that you must love and a lover is no hater. Act from fear, because if you are tempted to rebel, know that you must fear and one who fears does not rebel.
Rebbi Aqiba was tortured before the evil Tineius Rufus. There came the time for reciting the Shema‘. He started to read and laughed. He said to him: Old man, you are either a sorcerer or one contemptuous of suffering. He said to him: The spirit of this man should be blown away; I am neither a sorcerer nor contemptuous of sufferings. But all my life I read this verse (Deut. 6:5): “You must love the Eternal, your God, with all your heart, all your soul, and all your force.” I loved Him with all my heart. I loved Him with all my money. But whether with all my soul I could not test. But now, when “with all your soul” came, the time of reciting the Shema‘ has arrived and my mind has not wavered, therefore I am reciting and laughing.
Neḥemiah from Emmaus served Rebbi Aqiba for 22 years and he taught him “את and גם mean additions, אך and רק mean exclusions.” He asked him: What means that which is written (Deut. 6:13) “את the Eternal, your God, you must fear.” He said to him, Him and His Torah.
MISHNAH: But the following must be said in the holy language: The recitation for the first fruits, ḥalîṣah, blessings and curses, the priestly blessing, the benedictions of the High Priest, the portion about the king, the portion about the calf whose neck was broken, the [priest] anointed for war at the time he speaks to the people. The recitation for the first fruits, how? “You shall begin and say before the Eternal, your God” but further on it says, “the Levites shall begin and say to all the men of Israel in an elevated voice”. Since “beginning” further on means in the holy language, so also here in the holy language. Ḥalîṣah how? “She shall begin and say: So shall be done to the man” but further on it says, “the Levites shall begin and say to all the men of Israel in an elevated voice”. Since “beginning” further on means in the holy language, so also here in the holy language. Rebbi Jehudah says, “She shall begin and say so,” [it is invalid] unless she says exactly that text.
You may say that there were three kinds of stones: The stones of the resting place, and the stones which Joshua put under the soles of the feet of the Cohanim, and the steles that Moses had given them. Rebbi Ḥaninan said, it is obvious to us that there were four kinds of stones. Rebbi Simon ben Zebid said, that is correct. If you would say, they were the stones of the resting place; these were temporary and were hidden. If you would say, the stones which Joshua put under the soles of the feet of the Cohanim; these were submerged in the water. If you would say, the steles that Moses had given them; they already had moved with them into the Land. But we must deal with the stones that Joshua put up for them on the banks of the Jordan.
He recites eight benedictions: For the Torah, “He who chooses the Torah.” For the Temple service, “For You alone in fear we worship.” For thanksgiving, “the Good One, You one must thank.” For forgiveness of sins, “He Who forgives the sins of His people Israel in mercy.” For the Temple, “He Who chooses the Temple”; and Rebbi Idi said, “He Who dwells in Zion.” For Israel, “He Who chooses Israel.” For the Cohanim, “He Who chooses the Cohanim.” And the remainder of the prayer, “entreaty and begging, for Your people Israel need to be helped before You; Praise to You, Eternal, Who hears prayer”.
It supports him because he says it is all praise, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, Joḥanan the High Priest sent and checked in all localities of Israel and found that they separated only Great Heave. But First and Second Tithes some were separating and some did not. He said, since [omitting] First Tithe is a deadly sin and [omitting] Second Tithe [implies] the sin of ṭevel, a person should give a name to heave and heave of the tithe and give them to the Cohen; Second Tithe he exchanges for coins. About the remaining tithe of the poor, he who has a claim on another person must bring proof.
Because no blessing is written for creatures? Could she have been married on the Sabbath if a blessing were written for creatures? But was it not stated: “A man should not first have sexual relations on the Sabbath, for he makes a wound.” It must follow “others”, for “others permit it.” But “others” permit only when he is already married, for before he was married he had no right to what she finds, what she earns, and to dissolve her vows. After he married her, he has the right to receive what she finds or earns, and to dissolve her vows. If you say so, he is like someone who acquires on the Sabbath. Rebbi Mana said, this means that those who marry a widow must take her in when it is still daytime on Friday, that he should not be like someone who acquires on the Sabbath.
Because no blessing is written for creatures? Could she have been married on the Sabbath if a blessing were written for creatures? But was it not stated: “A man should not first have sexual relations on the Sabbath, for he makes a wound.” It must follow “others”, for “others permit it.” But “others” permit only when he is already married, for before he was married he had no right to what she finds, what she earns, and to dissolve her vows. After he married her, he has the right to receive what she finds or earns, and to dissolve her vows. If you say so, he is like someone who acquires on the Sabbath. Rebbi Mana said, this means that those who marry a widow must take her in when it is still daytime on Friday, that he should not be like someone who acquires on the Sabbath.
It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must deal with the case that it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meïr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meïr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child of unknown paternity? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṢah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṢah with her.” And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
“She went out with uncovered head.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, like those who went out on the Day of Atonement. If she went out with uncovered head, the witnesses testify that she had not been cohabitated with. Should one not worry that she was a virgin after final marriage? That means, a virgin after final marriage does not go out with uncovered head. Should one not worry that she had been injured by wood? That must follow Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says the ketubah of one injured by wood is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they did not worry about infrequent occurrences.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.
Rebbi Ḥinena said before Rebbi Mana: Even if Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish thought the entire Mishnaiot were Rebbi Meïr’s, does the verse agree with Rebbi Meïr? Is it not written (Lev. 22:14): “If a person ate consecrated food in error”? But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish must hold that the fifth is a sacrifice. But even if he holds that the fifth is a sacrifice, can the principal be a sacrifice? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, the Mishnah declares that the principal is a fine, as we have stated: “He does not pay in heave but in totally profane food which is turned into heave.” If he had to pay from what he ate, it would be fine. And it was stated: “If he ate impure heave, he has to pay in pure profane food, but if he paid in impure profane, he discharged his obligation.” Does he not owe him the price of wood? That shows that the principal is a fine and since the principal is a fine, the fifth also is a fine. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there, everybody was under the obligation of (Ex. 20:16) “Do not become a false witness against your neighbor”, but this one was treated separately, (Deut. 19:19) “do to him what he intended to do to his brother”, to pay money; also here, everybody was under the obligation of (Lev. 22:10) “no outsider shall eat holy [food],” but this one was treated separately, (Lev. 22:14) “if somebody should eat holy [food] in error,” to pay money.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: We understand that, since it said “if there is no case of murder, a fine shall be imposed”, that if it is a case of murder, you shall take life for life? Why does the verse say, it is a case of murder? To add the case of premeditation and warning. Rebbi Yose said, is that not a Mishnah, “for anybody committing a capital crime does not pay cash”, that it deals not only with cases of error. Ḥizqiah said, one states a baraita: “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money.
So far payments that are consequences of sexual relations. If somebody injured her, blinded one of her eyes, cut off one of her hands, broke one of her legs? To whom does he pay, to her or to her father? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays to her father; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he pays to her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is of the opinion that her earnings belong to her even before she becomes an adult. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only after she comes of age. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: They disagree before she comes of age, but after she is an adult everybody agrees that all belongs to her. A baraita supports either one of them. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody injures somebody else’s daughter or son, the payments for the son must be given immediately; those for the daughter shall be held as property value. Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Judah the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said that some state it so that beginning and end support Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If somebody injures his own underage daughter, diminution of value belong to her and he is free from paying for shame and diminution of value. If others injure her, diminution of values belong to her, the rest shall be transformed into property value, but payments for shame and diminution of value belong to her father.
HALAKHAH: “If a proselyte woman converted,” etc. It is written: “For he calumniated a virgin of Israel”. That excludes this one who is not from Israel. “For he calumniated a virgin,” to include the proselyte whose conception was not in holiness but her birth was in holiness, that she should be stoned. Why does one not add her for the fine? You cannot do that; as Ḥizqiah stated: We understand that it was said “they shall stone her,” does that not imply that she dies? Why does the verse say, “and she shall die”? But there must be another one who is stoned but (she) [he] is free; who is that? That is the proselyte whose conception was not in holiness but who was born in holiness.
It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, the words should be said as they are written. What means “the words should be said as they are written”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is not guilty unless he marries her definitively, has intercourse, and accuses her not to be a virgin. “They spread the cloth”. Not that “they spread the cloth” but until the things become clear like a cloth. Assi said, “they spread the cloth”, the witnesses are not stoned, nor is the husband flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas, until they say: you were with us at a certain place, and the husband hired them to testify falsely. If they said, you were with us at a certain place, but they did not say, the husband hired them to testify falsely? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is said here “putting”, it is said there “putting”. Since “putting” there means money, also “putting” here must mean money. But did we not state: He did not say to the witnesses, come and testify in my case, but they came on their own, he is not flogged nor does he pay 100 tetradrachmas but either she or the false witnesses would be stoned’? Because he did not say. But if he said, even if he did not hire them it is as if he hired them. If the father brought two groups of witnesses. One side say, you were with us at a certain place. The other side say, the husband hired them to testify falsely. It is obvious that those who said, you were with us at a certain place, are stoned, and those who said, the husband hired them to testify falsely, are flogged and pay 100 tetradrachmas. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, neither by these not by those are they flogged and pay 100 tetradrachmas, but they are flogged because of “you shall not testify as a false witness against your fellow man.”
Rav Huna insists on interpreting the contract text. Rav Huna explained: “The sons shall inherit but the daughters must be fed.” Since the sons inherit movables, the daughters also are fed from movables. Samuel said, the daughters are not fed from movables. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “The female children you shall have from me shall dwell in my house and be supported from my property.” It was stated on this: From real estate but not from movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said: Rav Huna follows Rebbi and Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “One uses both guaranteed property and non-guaranteed property for the support of the wife and the daughters, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, guaranteed property may be taken by sons from sons, by daughters from daughters, by sons from daughters, and by daughters from sons. But non-guaranteed property may be taken by sons from daughters but not by daughters from sons.” They said, Rav Huna reversed himself. They said, that was well done, ketubah is a biblical commandment but support of the daughters is from their words. May their words uproot a biblical commandment? It must be that they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah. [Even if you say, they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah.] But is the money stipulated in their mother’s ketubah not also real estate?
Rav Huna insists on interpreting the contract text. Rav Huna explained: “The sons shall inherit but the daughters must be fed.” Since the sons inherit movables, the daughters also are fed from movables. Samuel said, the daughters are not fed from movables. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “The female children you shall have from me shall dwell in my house and be supported from my property.” It was stated on this: From real estate but not from movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said: Rav Huna follows Rebbi and Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “One uses both guaranteed property and non-guaranteed property for the support of the wife and the daughters, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, guaranteed property may be taken by sons from sons, by daughters from daughters, by sons from daughters, and by daughters from sons. But non-guaranteed property may be taken by sons from daughters but not by daughters from sons.” They said, Rav Huna reversed himself. They said, that was well done, ketubah is a biblical commandment but support of the daughters is from their words. May their words uproot a biblical commandment? It must be that they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah. [Even if you say, they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah.] But is the money stipulated in their mother’s ketubah not also real estate?
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he wants he writes,” etc. Does Rebbi Jehudah think that the minimum for a virgin is a mina and for a widow 50 zuz? Should he not write so from the start? But it must be a diminution afterwards. Why can he not write that “I received from you such and such”? It was found that bar Kappara stated: “I received from you such and such”. Rebbi Joḥanan said: Rebbi Jehudah formulated this only for the end; but at the start, even Rebbi Jehudah agrees. What is the beginning and what is the end? The colleagues in the name of R. Joḥanan: Before he had intercourse, and after he had intercourse. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of R. Joḥanan: Before he took her in, and after he took her in. If he did not have intercourse with her, divorced her, and took her in again; that is before and after.