oath
1029 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears and changes. What is vain and what is false? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it is known to two persons, that is a false oath, to three, it is vain. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the earth knows about it, that is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is whipped. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is not whipped. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Even an egg and a pearl. What means even? But, for example an egg and a pearl.
A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears and changes. What is vain and what is false? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it is known to two persons, that is a false oath, to three, it is vain. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the earth knows about it, that is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is whipped. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is not whipped. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Even an egg and a pearl. What means even? But, for example an egg and a pearl.
A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears and changes. What is vain and what is false? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it is known to two persons, that is a false oath, to three, it is vain. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the earth knows about it, that is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is whipped. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is not whipped. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Even an egg and a pearl. What means even? But, for example an egg and a pearl.
A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears and changes. What is vain and what is false? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it is known to two persons, that is a false oath, to three, it is vain. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the earth knows about it, that is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is whipped. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is not whipped. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Even an egg and a pearl. What means even? But, for example an egg and a pearl.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.
Ḥizqiah said, he who swears that two are two is whipped for a vain oath. Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: One who saw rain falling and said: “O Lord, inundate with much water”, is whipped for a vain oath. Rebbi Onias, Rebbi Jacob bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman: 24 city councils were in Judea and they all were destroyed because of true vain oaths, as it is written: “For the vain did I hit your sons.”
Ḥizqiah said, he who swears that two are two is whipped for a vain oath. Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: One who saw rain falling and said: “O Lord, inundate with much water”, is whipped for a vain oath. Rebbi Onias, Rebbi Jacob bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman: 24 city councils were in Judea and they all were destroyed because of true vain oaths, as it is written: “For the vain did I hit your sons.”
There, we have stated: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf.” Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on that it was said but on the following: “Whether it was for himself or for others.” Rebbi Abba said in Samuel’s name: An oath that X gave a mina to Y. If it turns out that he had not given [a mina], since it is not in his hand for the future, it is not in his hand for the past.
There, we have stated: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf.” Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on that it was said but on the following: “Whether it was for himself or for others.” Rebbi Abba said in Samuel’s name: An oath that X gave a mina to Y. If it turns out that he had not given [a mina], since it is not in his hand for the future, it is not in his hand for the past.
It was found stated about both cases: It is more restrictive for oaths than for vows that an erroneous oath is forbidden but an erroneous vow is permitted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi [ ], does Rebbi Aqiba add to the words of the House of Hillel? As we have stated there, “until Rebbi Aqiba came and taught that a vow of which any part was permitted is totally permitted.” He said to him, if you say that there, in the case of a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, you say that a vow of which any part was invalidated is totally invalidated, here, where it does not need investigation by a Sage, so much more! Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because of an erroneous vow; if I had known that my father and my brothers were there I would not have made the vow.
MISHNAH: One makes a vow to tax assessors and to people who condemn property and to toll collectors that it is heave even though it is not heave, that it is king’s family’s property even though it is not theirs. The House of Shammai say, one vows anything except an oath, but the House of Hillel say, even an oath. The House of Shammai say, one may not offer a vow, but the House of Hillel say, one may offer. The House of Shammai say, only what he prescribes as vow, but the House of Hillel say, even what he does not prescribe. How is this? They said to him, say: a qônām that my wife cannot have any use from me, and he said: a qônām that my wife and my children cannot have any use from me; the House of Shammai say, his wife is permitted but his children are forbidden; but the House of Hillel say, both are permitted.
MISHNAH: One makes a vow to tax assessors and to people who condemn property and to toll collectors that it is heave even though it is not heave, that it is king’s family’s property even though it is not theirs. The House of Shammai say, one vows anything except an oath, but the House of Hillel say, even an oath. The House of Shammai say, one may not offer a vow, but the House of Hillel say, one may offer. The House of Shammai say, only what he prescribes as vow, but the House of Hillel say, even what he does not prescribe. How is this? They said to him, say: a qônām that my wife cannot have any use from me, and he said: a qônām that my wife and my children cannot have any use from me; the House of Shammai say, his wife is permitted but his children are forbidden; but the House of Hillel say, both are permitted.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband who said “there is no vow, there is no oath,” did not say anything. Also the Elder who said “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” did not say anything. But everybody has to follow his own rules. The husband says “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” and the Elder says, “there is no vow, there is no oath”.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband who said “there is no vow, there is no oath,” did not say anything. Also the Elder who said “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” did not say anything. But everybody has to follow his own rules. The husband says “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” and the Elder says, “there is no vow, there is no oath”.
It was stated: One is asked about vows only while sitting and wrapped. The one who is asked must be sitting and the one who is asking is standing; from the following: “And the two people who have the dispute shall stand.” “Standing” means only “being judged”. That is for asking legal rules. Asking about sermons from where? The verse says “shall stand, and shall stand”. Rebbi Aḥa bar Pappus went to permit the vow of Rebbi Immi. He remained standing to say “there is no vow”. Rebbi Mana went to permit the vow of the older Gamliel. He remained standing to say “there is no vow, there is no oath”. Rebbi Mana went to permit the vow of Gamliel the grandson. He said to him, do not treat me as you treated my grandfather, but sit down and I shall remain standing.
HALAKHAH: “These are the vows which he can dissolve,” etc. It is written: “Any vow and any oath of prohibition to mortify.” That covers only vows which contain mortification. Vows regarding the relations between him and her, from where? “Between a man and his wife.” So far the husband; the father from where? Since the husband can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her, so the father can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her.
It is written: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows,” etc. “All substitute names for vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names for vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names for oaths are like oaths. One reads that at the start of the first Chapter of Nedarim, up to: Rebbi Ismael stated: “any person who vows a vow of nazir”. From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.
“I am” is a handle for nezirut, “I am obligated” is a handle for qorban. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: one catches him because of a handle for qorbān. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, if he said, I shall not eat from you, does one catch him because of a handle of an oath? Rebbi Yose said, people usually say “an oath that I shall not eat from yours;” do they ever say “that I shall not eat from yours, an oath”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, people usually say “handle of an axe”; do they ever say “axe of a handle”?
“I am” is a handle for nezirut, “I am obligated” is a handle for qorban. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: one catches him because of a handle for qorbān. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, if he said, I shall not eat from you, does one catch him because of a handle of an oath? Rebbi Yose said, people usually say “an oath that I shall not eat from yours;” do they ever say “that I shall not eat from yours, an oath”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, people usually say “handle of an axe”; do they ever say “axe of a handle”?
“I am” is a handle for nezirut, “I am obligated” is a handle for qorban. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: one catches him because of a handle for qorbān. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, if he said, I shall not eat from you, does one catch him because of a handle of an oath? Rebbi Yose said, people usually say “an oath that I shall not eat from yours;” do they ever say “that I shall not eat from yours, an oath”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, people usually say “handle of an axe”; do they ever say “axe of a handle”?
“I did not vow as a nazir,” he is permitted. “I already had been a nazir,” he is forbidden. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Avina, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If somebody says, I am like ‘orlah juice, he did not say anything. The colleagues say, that follows Rebbi Simeon in a disagreement. As we have stated there: “If somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling things, he is guilty. But Rebbi Simeon declares him free from prosecution.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if it is an inclusive statement. But if it is a detailed statement, everybody agrees that no oath can be applied to prohibitions. And here, we consider an inclusive statement. Rebbi Yudan said, one is about vows, the other about oaths. Vows can be applied to prohibitions but no oaths can be applied to prohibitions.
“I did not vow as a nazir,” he is permitted. “I already had been a nazir,” he is forbidden. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Avina, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If somebody says, I am like ‘orlah juice, he did not say anything. The colleagues say, that follows Rebbi Simeon in a disagreement. As we have stated there: “If somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling things, he is guilty. But Rebbi Simeon declares him free from prosecution.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if it is an inclusive statement. But if it is a detailed statement, everybody agrees that no oath can be applied to prohibitions. And here, we consider an inclusive statement. Rebbi Yudan said, one is about vows, the other about oaths. Vows can be applied to prohibitions but no oaths can be applied to prohibitions.
What about, “and so am I,” how do you treat this? As “amen, it is confirmed for you,” or “you did well”? The elder [Rebbi] Ḥiyya and the elder Rebbi Hoshaia. It is stated: If a woman made a vow to be anazir; her husband heard and said to her, “why did you make a vow of nazir? What did you do to make a vow of nazir? I would not like that you made a vow of nazir! There is neither vow nor oath here;” he did not say anything. But if he said, “you did well that you did make a vow of nazir; I liked that you did make a vow of nazir; if you had not made a vow of nazir I would have told you to make one”, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated on this, in all of these cases he cannot dissolve. But Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In all these cases, he can dissolve unless he said “amen” or “it is confirmed for you”, then he can no longer dissolve.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband who said “there is no vow, there is no oath,” did not say anything. Also the Elder who said “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” did not say anything. But everybody has to follow his own rules. The husband says “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” and the Elder says, “there is no vow, there is no oath”.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband who said “there is no vow, there is no oath,” did not say anything. Also the Elder who said “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” did not say anything. But everybody has to follow his own rules. The husband says “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” and the Elder says, “there is no vow, there is no oath”.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies] if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies] if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies] if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies] if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.
Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.
There, we have stated: “The Non-Jew, Rebbi Meїr says, is evaluated but does not evaluate; Rebbi Jehudah says, he evaluates but is not evaluated. Both agree that they make vows and are objects of vows.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: For him who says there that he evaluates, here can he declare a nazir? For him who says there that he is evaluated, here can he be declared a nazir? How would it be possible for him to [be declared a nazir]? A Israelite can declare a Gentile to be a nazir. Would he listen to him? But the Israelite said, “I am a nazir,” the Gentile heard it and said, “I am responsible for what this one said.” It is only as if he paid a debt. How would it be possible for him to [declare a nazir]? A Gentile can declare an Israelite to be nazir. Since an Israelite cannot declare [another] Israelite to be a nazir, a Gentile cannot declare an Israelite to be a nazir. But it must be that the Gentile said, “I am a nazir”, the Israelite heard it and said, “I am taking upon me what this one said.” What did you exclude from him? An Israelite is subject to “not to desecrate”, a Gentile is not subject to “not to desecrate”. Rebbi Jonah said, Israelites can be relieved by a Sage, Gentiles cannot be relieved by a Sage. Rebbi Yose said, Israelites need a Sage to be relieved, Gentiles do not need a Sage to be relieved. It follows that Rebbi (Jonah) [Yose] follows Rebbi Abbahu. A Gentile woman came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said to Abime bar Tobi: Go and find her an opening by unforeseen circumstances. And Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Aḥa, who said that Laban was Kushan-Riš‘ataim. Why was he called “Kushan the doubly bad”? Because he committed two evils. One that he desecrated his oath, the other that he subjugated Israel for eight years.
MISHNAH: A widow can be paid from the orphans’ property only by an oath. When they avoided letting her swear, Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that she should make a vow on the instruction of the orphans for anything they would decide on and collect her ketubah, and that witnesses sign the bill of divorce because of the public good. Hillel instituted prozbol for the public good.
A guardian appointed by the orphans’ father shall be made to swear, for usually he is not checked out. If he was appointed by the court he shall not be made to swear for usually he was checked out. Abba Shaul says, it is the other way around; a guardian appointed by the orphans’ father shall be made to swear, for he is like one who is paid; if he was appointed by the court he shall not be made to swear for for he can say to him, I am doing this as a favor to you. It turns out that Rebbi Joḥanan follows the rabbis and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina Abba Shaul. Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow the rabbis? Even if he holds with Abba Shaul, a person acts as a trustee in order to be declared trustworthy. Does Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina [follow] Abba Shaul? Even if he holds with the rabbis, a person is apt to slip away from an oath but not from payments.
Following the opinion of the rabbis there it is acceptable since there, they say in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what is found in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what is robbed from him is robbed because of communal peace; a nut or a pebble he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “If a man give.” The gift of a man is a gift, but the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, robbing from him is not clear unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that is, to recover from him by a law suit, but to have to bring a sacrifice for [a false] oath only if he grew two pubic hairs. But following the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “A man to his neighbor”, until he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac explained it by the method of the artless. As we have stated there: “For underage children, their buying is buying and their selling selling, for movables.” But did we not state there: “He cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.
Rebbi Yudan said, we deal with the case that it was lost by compulsion. They treated her like an unpaid trustee who may stipulate to be free from an oath. Rebbi Yose said, do we state here that the unpaid trustee is free from an oath? But we deal with the case that it was lost by mishandling. They treated the stole according to its value. But the rabbis say that in any case it has to be treated as a case of condition of a bill of divorce.
Rebbi Yudan said, we deal with the case that it was lost by compulsion. They treated her like an unpaid trustee who may stipulate to be free from an oath. Rebbi Yose said, do we state here that the unpaid trustee is free from an oath? But we deal with the case that it was lost by mishandling. They treated the stole according to its value. But the rabbis say that in any case it has to be treated as a case of condition of a bill of divorce.
There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Rav Huna said that in the days of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah they tried to include them. Rebbi Abbahu inverts the wording: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar they said, who could purify the altar’s part? That implies that Joshua excluded them. He excluded them only as disqualified for marriage. If you would say, disqualified (because of sins) then the rapist of a Gibeonite girl should not have to pay the fine, but we have stated: The rapist of a Gibeonite girl has to pay the fine.” Rebbi Eleazar said, he cursed them as a snake, as it is said: “But now you are cursed.” And it is written: “The people of Israel said to the Ḥiwwite.” But were they Ḥiwwites? They acted like the snake which said, I know that the Holy One, praise to Him, did say “because on the day you eat from it, you will die a death.” I shall go and trick them so that they eat and will be punished and I shall inherit the earth for myself. So these people acted; they said, we know that the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Israel: “You shall certainly ban them, the Hittite, the Emorite, and the Perizite, as the Eternal, your God, has commanded you” And it is written: “You shall not conclude a covenant with them.” We shall go and trick them that they conclude a covenant with us. As you take it, if they kill us, they violate their oath. If they let us live, they violated the [divine] decision. In any case, they will be punished and we shall inherit the Land.
It was stated: “It was stolen from the man’s house”, but not from the woman’s house? Is not “his neighbor” only written in respect of the borrower? But one has to say that “he who steals from a thief does not pay [double restitution, nor does the one who slaughters or sells after a thief pay] quadruple or quintuple restitution. If something was stolen which then was stolen from him; [when in the end the stolen object was found, to whom does he pay? To the first owner, to the second, to both of them? If something was stolen which then was stolen from him]; the owners apprehended the second thief who swore to them. If you say that one takes it away from the second, he has to bring a sacrifice for the oath. If you say that one does not take it away from the second, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for his oath. If something was stolen which then was stolen from him and the second thief decides to return it, if you say that he has to return it to the owners, they might not inform the first thief. If you say that he has to return it to the first thief, that one might not inform the owners. What does he have to do? He returns it to the owners in the presence of the thief.
It was stated: “It was stolen from the man’s house”, but not from the woman’s house? Is not “his neighbor” only written in respect of the borrower? But one has to say that “he who steals from a thief does not pay [double restitution, nor does the one who slaughters or sells after a thief pay] quadruple or quintuple restitution. If something was stolen which then was stolen from him; [when in the end the stolen object was found, to whom does he pay? To the first owner, to the second, to both of them? If something was stolen which then was stolen from him]; the owners apprehended the second thief who swore to them. If you say that one takes it away from the second, he has to bring a sacrifice for the oath. If you say that one does not take it away from the second, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for his oath. If something was stolen which then was stolen from him and the second thief decides to return it, if you say that he has to return it to the owners, they might not inform the first thief. If you say that he has to return it to the first thief, that one might not inform the owners. What does he have to do? He returns it to the owners in the presence of the thief.
This topic came up between Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and Rav Amram. One said, one does not entrust an oath to a suspect person. The other said, one does not even formulate an oath for such a one. Rav Huna said: “An oath that I have property rights to it to the amount of no less than (the value of a peruṭah) [half of its value]. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if it is about this, it is an institutional oath.
This topic came up between Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and Rav Amram. One said, one does not entrust an oath to a suspect person. The other said, one does not even formulate an oath for such a one. Rav Huna said: “An oath that I have property rights to it to the amount of no less than (the value of a peruṭah) [half of its value]. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if it is about this, it is an institutional oath.
This topic came up between Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and Rav Amram. One said, one does not entrust an oath to a suspect person. The other said, one does not even formulate an oath for such a one. Rav Huna said: “An oath that I have property rights to it to the amount of no less than (the value of a peruṭah) [half of its value]. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if it is about this, it is an institutional oath.
This topic came up between Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and Rav Amram. One said, one does not entrust an oath to a suspect person. The other said, one does not even formulate an oath for such a one. Rav Huna said: “An oath that I have property rights to it to the amount of no less than (the value of a peruṭah) [half of its value]. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if it is about this, it is an institutional oath.
MISHNAH: If two persons were riding on an animal or one was riding and one was walking, each of them says “it wholly belongs to me”, each of them has to swear that he owns no less than half of it and they shall divide it evenly. If they agree or if they have witnesses, they divide without an oath.
If he said, I am paying, one may suspect that possibly he took it for himself. If he said, I am swearing, but then he saw that other oaths were added and he said, I am paying, one is suspicious. Rebbi Yose said, the Torah did not impose an oath on him to restrict him but to ease for him; for if he wants to pay, he shall pay, and if he wants to swear, he shall swear. If he had witnesses that it was forcibly stolen, to that case refers what Rebbi Eleazar said: If somebody sells his claims of fines to someone else, he did not do anything. If he had witnesses that it was stolen because of negligence, he comes under the category of “he shall pay”. If afterwards the stolen object was found, to whom does [the thief] pay? To the first, or to the second, or to both of them?
When did they say that the unpaid trustee swears and is absolved? If he took care of it the way caretakers do: He locked as he should, tied as he should, put it into his money-belt, tied it into his poncho and kept it in front of him, put it into a cupboard, a chest, or a safety box; if they were stolen or lost he is required to swear but not liable to pay. If there are witnesses that he did so, he even is freed from the oath. He locked carelessly, tied carelessly, put it on his back, left it on his roof; if it was stolen he is liable for payment. If he put it at a place where he usually keeps his own things, if it was kept safe as it should have been he is not liable, otherwise he is liable.
HALAKHAH: “The High Priest judges and one judges him,” etc. One understands that he judges. Why does one judge him? Can he not appoint a plenipotentiary? Think of it, if an oath should be imposed on him, may a plenipotentiary take the oath? His monetary suits are heard by how many? By 23, as we understand from the following: “The king may not sit in the Synhedrion, neither king nor High Priest may participate in intercalations.” Rebbi Ḥanina and Rabbi Mana, one said the king does not sit in the Synhedrion because of suspicion; he cannot participate in intercalations because of suspicion. Neither king nor High Priest may participate in intercalations since it is not to the king’s honor to sit with seven, so much less with three. This implies that his monetary suits are heard by 23.
HALAKHAH: “The High Priest judges and one judges him,” etc. One understands that he judges. Why does one judge him? Can he not appoint a plenipotentiary? Think of it, if an oath should be imposed on him, may a plenipotentiary take the oath? His monetary suits are heard by how many? By 23, as we understand from the following: “The king may not sit in the Synhedrion, neither king nor High Priest may participate in intercalations.” Rebbi Ḥanina and Rabbi Mana, one said the king does not sit in the Synhedrion because of suspicion; he cannot participate in intercalations because of suspicion. Neither king nor High Priest may participate in intercalations since it is not to the king’s honor to sit with seven, so much less with three. This implies that his monetary suits are heard by 23.
HALAKHAH: “Each of them disqualifies the other’s witnesses,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, so is the Mishnah: “His witness,” but not his witnesses. But Rebbi Joḥanan said, even his witnesses, as it was stated: “One always adds judges until judgment is rendered, and the judges may change their opinions. After judgment is rendered they may no longer change their opinions.” Rebbi Joḥanan agrees, that if these were the only ones, he cannot disqualify them. Zeˋira said, he and a person from the street can team up to disqualify this testimony. Rebbi Ḥanina asked, does not one witness force an oath everywhere? Rebbi Zeˋira said, by disqualification one can only be disqualified by a court. A relative does not have to be disqualified by the court. Rava bar Binah said in the name of Rav: Three are like final judgment.
Rebbi Yose ben Abun said: I shall keep the King’s sayings, Who told me at Sinai I am the Eternal, your God, on the pronouncement, you shall not have other gods before Me, of God’s oath, do not take the Name of the Eternal, your God, in vain. In this matter we come together, this man and this dog are both equal.
From where two witnesses? He and another make two. Or following Rebbi Ismael, as Rebbi Ismael said, any place where the Torah mentions a witness without further determination it implies two witnesses unless the verse informs you that a single witness is meant. It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Can a single witness be found guilty of a blurted oath? Since it is possible to say that another person could team up with him, then he would be subject to the oath of testimony, how could you find him guilty of a blurted oath?
From where two witnesses? He and another make two. Or following Rebbi Ismael, as Rebbi Ismael said, any place where the Torah mentions a witness without further determination it implies two witnesses unless the verse informs you that a single witness is meant. It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Can a single witness be found guilty of a blurted oath? Since it is possible to say that another person could team up with him, then he would be subject to the oath of testimony, how could you find him guilty of a blurted oath?
From where two witnesses? He and another make two. Or following Rebbi Ismael, as Rebbi Ismael said, any place where the Torah mentions a witness without further determination it implies two witnesses unless the verse informs you that a single witness is meant. It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Can a single witness be found guilty of a blurted oath? Since it is possible to say that another person could team up with him, then he would be subject to the oath of testimony, how could you find him guilty of a blurted oath?
Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said (ben) [in the name of] Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “One said to another, ˋwhere is my ox?’ He responded, ˋI do not know what you are referring to.’ It so happened that it had died, or was wounded, or captured, or lost. ˋI require you to swear;’ the other said ˋAmen’. He is not liable.” Rav said, he is not liable for a keeper’s oath but is liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In Rav’s opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.
Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said (ben) [in the name of] Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “One said to another, ˋwhere is my ox?’ He responded, ˋI do not know what you are referring to.’ It so happened that it had died, or was wounded, or captured, or lost. ˋI require you to swear;’ the other said ˋAmen’. He is not liable.” Rav said, he is not liable for a keeper’s oath but is liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In Rav’s opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.
Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said (ben) [in the name of] Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “One said to another, ˋwhere is my ox?’ He responded, ˋI do not know what you are referring to.’ It so happened that it had died, or was wounded, or captured, or lost. ˋI require you to swear;’ the other said ˋAmen’. He is not liable.” Rav said, he is not liable for a keeper’s oath but is liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In Rav’s opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.
Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said (ben) [in the name of] Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “One said to another, ˋwhere is my ox?’ He responded, ˋI do not know what you are referring to.’ It so happened that it had died, or was wounded, or captured, or lost. ˋI require you to swear;’ the other said ˋAmen’. He is not liable.” Rav said, he is not liable for a keeper’s oath but is liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In Rav’s opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.
Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said (ben) [in the name of] Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “One said to another, ˋwhere is my ox?’ He responded, ˋI do not know what you are referring to.’ It so happened that it had died, or was wounded, or captured, or lost. ˋI require you to swear;’ the other said ˋAmen’. He is not liable.” Rav said, he is not liable for a keeper’s oath but is liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In Rav’s opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.
There, we stated: “If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath.” It was stated “compromised”, not that she reduced [her ketubah]. How? If her ketubah was 200 but she claims a mina, she is paid without an oath. What is the difference between one who did compromise and one who claims less? Rebbi Ḥanina said, if she compromises there was a transaction between them; if she claims less there was no transaction between them.
There, we stated: “If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath.” It was stated “compromised”, not that she reduced [her ketubah]. How? If her ketubah was 200 but she claims a mina, she is paid without an oath. What is the difference between one who did compromise and one who claims less? Rebbi Ḥanina said, if she compromises there was a transaction between them; if she claims less there was no transaction between them.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Since we stated there: “If one witness testified that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath”; should it be similar that if one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was reduced, she shall not be able to collect the reduced amount without an oath? Rebbi Yose said, at the moment when one witness testified that it was paid, he does not contradict two [witnesses]; but when he testifies that it was reduced he would contradict two [witnesses.]
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Since we stated there: “If one witness testified that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath”; should it be similar that if one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was reduced, she shall not be able to collect the reduced amount without an oath? Rebbi Yose said, at the moment when one witness testified that it was paid, he does not contradict two [witnesses]; but when he testifies that it was reduced he would contradict two [witnesses.]
It was stated: “If she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath.” Can one collect from a person in his absence? Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it about a contract for which interest is due. Would the court collect interest? Explain that it was guaranteed for a Gentile.
It was stated: If an heir’s father held a partially paid promissory note, the son collects without swearing. In this the son’s power is greater than the father’s since the father can collect only by swearing. Rebbi Eleazar said, nevertheless he has to execute an heir’s oath, “that our father did not charge us, that our father did not tell us, that we did not find a document among our father’s documents stating that this note was paid.” Therefore, if there was a document, the note was paid. Rebbi Hoshaia asked, does the baraita follow the House of Shammai? For the House of Shammai say, “she collects her ketubah and does not drink.” Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the House of Shammai is: bring my husband and I shall drink! But here, it would be in order that even his father would not have to swear. They instituted a rule that he has to swear. They instituted this for him, but not for his son. When he died, you put his son on the biblical rule.
MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds: An oath that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat; that I ate, or that I did not eat. An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate the most minute amount, he is liable, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, where do we find that one who eats the most minute amount should be liable, that this one be liable? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice; but this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice!
MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds: An oath that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat; that I ate, or that I did not eat. An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate the most minute amount, he is liable, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, where do we find that one who eats the most minute amount should be liable, that this one be liable? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice; but this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice!
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
MISHNAH: An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate and drank he is liable only for one. An oath that I shall not eat or drink, when he ate and drank he is liable for two.
MISHNAH: An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate and drank he is liable only for one. An oath that I shall not eat or drink, when he ate and drank he is liable for two.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.
Rebbi Yose understood all this from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate and drank he is liable only for one.” The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose, but it is said following this, “an oath that I shall not eat nor drink, when he ate and drank” should he be liable only for one? Rebbi Yose told them, if somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf, and he continued, an oath that I shall not eat this other loaf, when he ate both of them would he not be guilty on two counts?
Rebbi Yose understood all this from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate and drank he is liable only for one.” The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose, but it is said following this, “an oath that I shall not eat nor drink, when he ate and drank” should he be liable only for one? Rebbi Yose told them, if somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf, and he continued, an oath that I shall not eat this other loaf, when he ate both of them would he not be guilty on two counts?