189 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:30

From where did they learn rollover of oaths? From the suspected wife: “The woman shall say, Amen, Amen”; Amen from this man, Amen from any other man. That refers to subjects he is able to make her swear about. What about subjects he is not able to make her swear about? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “Amen that I was not deviant preliminarily married and married, waiting for the levir and taken in.” Can he make her swear when she is preliminarily married or waiting for the levir? Nevertheless one rolls over.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:31

Some Tannaїm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaїm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for curse and oath? Some Tannaїm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaїm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 7:7

“And the oath of a witness and the oath about a deposit.” One makes him swear in his own language. If one made them swear not in their language and they said “Amen”, they are not prosecutable. As we have stated: The oath before the judges is according to our understanding, not according to your understanding. Rebbi Yudan said, it is to be assumed that he makes them swear according to his understanding. Why does he have to spell out this condition to him? Because of the uneducated, lest they say that there may be mental reservations for oaths. Rebbi Ḥanania stated before Rebbi Mana: Is there not written: “But with everybody who stands here with us today”? He said to him, the future generations do not have mental reservations.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:1

MISHNAH: All substitute names of vows are like vows, of bans like bans, of oaths like oaths, of nazir vows like nazir vows. If one says to another, I am vowed away from you, I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I will not eat from yours, that I will not taste from yours, he is forbidden. I am excommunicated from you, Rabbi Aqiba was stringent in that because of a doubt. As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath. As vows of the good ones, he did not say anything. As their freewill gifts, he made a vow of nazir and sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:1

MISHNAH: All substitute names of vows are like vows, of bans like bans, of oaths like oaths, of nazir vows like nazir vows. If one says to another, I am vowed away from you, I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I will not eat from yours, that I will not taste from yours, he is forbidden. I am excommunicated from you, Rabbi Aqiba was stringent in that because of a doubt. As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath. As vows of the good ones, he did not say anything. As their freewill gifts, he made a vow of nazir and sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:3

How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:3

How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:5

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar disagree, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, one whips for prohibitions and Rebbi Eleazar said, one does not whip. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, so did Rebbi Joḥanan answer Rebbi Eleazar: According to you, who says one does not whip on prohibitions, did we not state: “If somebody has vowed not to have any usufruct from another and he goes to visit him,” let him not enter! Rebbi Jeremiah said, there is a difference there because of the ways of peace. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is because of the ways of peace, should he not also be permitted in case of an oath? But we have stated: “Vows are forbidden, oaths permitted.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:8

Rebbi Yose explained “to forbid”: That should be forbidden to me; there should be a prohibition on it, it is forbidden. An oath is on me, it is forbidden, there should be an oath on it, it is forbidden. Rebbi Yudan said, in vows it is forbidden, in oaths it is permitted. There is a prohibition on me, it is forbidden. There is a prohibition on it, it is forbidden. An oath is there on me, it is forbidden. There is an oath on (me) [it] is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:5

MISHNAH: Qorbān [shall be] what I shall not eat at your place, or qorbān [shall be] what I shall eat from you, no qorbān [shall be] what I shall not eat from you; he is permitted. An oath that I shall not eat at your place, an oath that I shall eat from you, no oath that I shall not eat from you; he is forbidden. That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows. What is more restrictive for vows than for oaths? If he said qônām that I shall not make a sukkah, that I shall not take a lulab, that I shall not put on phylacteries, as a vow he is forbidden, as an oath he is permitted since one cannot swear to transgress commandments.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:5

MISHNAH: Qorbān [shall be] what I shall not eat at your place, or qorbān [shall be] what I shall eat from you, no qorbān [shall be] what I shall not eat from you; he is permitted. An oath that I shall not eat at your place, an oath that I shall eat from you, no oath that I shall not eat from you; he is forbidden. That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows. What is more restrictive for vows than for oaths? If he said qônām that I shall not make a sukkah, that I shall not take a lulab, that I shall not put on phylacteries, as a vow he is forbidden, as an oath he is permitted since one cannot swear to transgress commandments.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:6

HALAKHAH: “Qorbān [shall be] what I shall not eat at your place,” etc. Why did we not state: An oath that I shall eat from you, he is permitted? Only because we stated: “That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows.” We wanted to say about “an oath that I shall not eat of yours,” that the words of the Sages are: he is forbidden. Therefore it was not stated.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:8

“That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows. What is more restrictive for vows than for oaths?” “Or a person who swears to lightly express with his lips for bad or for good.” Just as doing good is a matter of choice, so doing bad is a matter of choice; that excludes any prohibition which is a commandment. They wanted to say, inadvertently, but not intentionally. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, “anything that comes out of his mouth he shall do,” not what comes out of Heaven’s mouth. Should we say that this is the same for vows of sanctification? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: For a man may vow his sukkah to Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:8

“That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows. What is more restrictive for vows than for oaths?” “Or a person who swears to lightly express with his lips for bad or for good.” Just as doing good is a matter of choice, so doing bad is a matter of choice; that excludes any prohibition which is a commandment. They wanted to say, inadvertently, but not intentionally. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, “anything that comes out of his mouth he shall do,” not what comes out of Heaven’s mouth. Should we say that this is the same for vows of sanctification? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: For a man may vow his sukkah to Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:10

HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:10

HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:10

HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:11

MISHNAH: Indeterminate oaths are interpreted restrictively and explicit ones liberally. How is this? If one said, this is for me like salted meat, like libation wine, if his intent was for Heaven, he is forbidden, if for idolatry, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden. This is for me like a ban, if by a ban for Heaven, he is forbidden, if priest’s, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden. This is for me like tithe, if animal tithe, he is forbidden, if from grain, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden. This is for me like heave, if Temple heave, he is forbidden, if heave from the threshing floor, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, indeterminate heave in Judea is prohibited, in Galilee permitted, since Galileans do not know of Temple heave. Indeterminate bans in Judea are permitted, in Galilee prohibited, since Galileans do not know of priest’s bans.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:12

HALAKHAH: “Indeterminate oaths are interpreted restrictively,” etc. They wanted to say, salted for preservation, not short-term salted. Rebbi Yudan said, since we have stated: “this is for me like salted meat, like libation wine,” this imples that short-term salted is called “salted”. What is short-term salted? As it was stated: “He puts the limbs on the salt and turns them over.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, for if he leaves them there, they become salted meat. But which text says it? As Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, “one who takes olives from the vat dips each single one in salt and eats it.” That implies that short-term salted is called “salted”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:5

So is the Mishnah: “Any vow which I make in the future shall be void, [it is void] if he remembers at the moment he makes the vow,” if he did not stipulate a reservation. But if he stipulated a reservation, then even if he does not remember. That is for vows; but for oaths? There are reservations for vows, there are no reservations for oaths, as it was stated about oaths imposed by judges: “According to our understanding, not according to your understanding.” Rebbi Jehudah said, he makes him swear according to his understanding. Why does he stipulate with him? Because of the uneducated, lest they say that there may be mental reservations for oaths.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:5

So is the Mishnah: “Any vow which I make in the future shall be void, [it is void] if he remembers at the moment he makes the vow,” if he did not stipulate a reservation. But if he stipulated a reservation, then even if he does not remember. That is for vows; but for oaths? There are reservations for vows, there are no reservations for oaths, as it was stated about oaths imposed by judges: “According to our understanding, not according to your understanding.” Rebbi Jehudah said, he makes him swear according to his understanding. Why does he stipulate with him? Because of the uneducated, lest they say that there may be mental reservations for oaths.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:5

So is the Mishnah: “Any vow which I make in the future shall be void, [it is void] if he remembers at the moment he makes the vow,” if he did not stipulate a reservation. But if he stipulated a reservation, then even if he does not remember. That is for vows; but for oaths? There are reservations for vows, there are no reservations for oaths, as it was stated about oaths imposed by judges: “According to our understanding, not according to your understanding.” Rebbi Jehudah said, he makes him swear according to his understanding. Why does he stipulate with him? Because of the uneducated, lest they say that there may be mental reservations for oaths.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:5

So is the Mishnah: “Any vow which I make in the future shall be void, [it is void] if he remembers at the moment he makes the vow,” if he did not stipulate a reservation. But if he stipulated a reservation, then even if he does not remember. That is for vows; but for oaths? There are reservations for vows, there are no reservations for oaths, as it was stated about oaths imposed by judges: “According to our understanding, not according to your understanding.” Rebbi Jehudah said, he makes him swear according to his understanding. Why does he stipulate with him? Because of the uneducated, lest they say that there may be mental reservations for oaths.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:12

It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:12

It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:13

Ḥizqiah said, he who swears that two are two is whipped for a vain oath. Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: One who saw rain falling and said: “O Lord, inundate with much water”, is whipped for a vain oath. Rebbi Onias, Rebbi Jacob bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman: 24 city councils were in Judea and they all were destroyed because of true vain oaths, as it is written: “For the vain did I hit your sons.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:14

There, we have stated: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf.” Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on that it was said but on the following: “Whether it was for himself or for others.” Rebbi Abba said in Samuel’s name: An oath that X gave a mina to Y. If it turns out that he had not given [a mina], since it is not in his hand for the future, it is not in his hand for the past.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:15

It was found stated about both cases: It is more restrictive for oaths than for vows that an erroneous oath is forbidden but an erroneous vow is permitted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi [ ], does Rebbi Aqiba add to the words of the House of Hillel? As we have stated there, “until Rebbi Aqiba came and taught that a vow of which any part was permitted is totally permitted.” He said to him, if you say that there, in the case of a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, you say that a vow of which any part was invalidated is totally invalidated, here, where it does not need investigation by a Sage, so much more! Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because of an erroneous vow; if I had known that my father and my brothers were there I would not have made the vow.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:20

If he transgressed and offered [a vow], how is that in the opinion of the House of Shammai? Let us hear from the following: “The House of Shammai say, his wife is permitted but his children are forbidden.” That means, if he transgressed and offered [a vow], in the opinion of the House of Shammai he is permitted. They wanted to say, vows but not oaths. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, “do not swear falsely in My Name,” you may swear to assessors and to people who condemn property and to toll collectors.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:18

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:3

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the husband dissolves both vows and oaths. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he dissolves vows but not oaths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish also disagree about the vows submitted to the Elder. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Elder permits both vows and oaths. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Elder permits vows, the Elder does not permit oaths. That of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish parallels that of Issi (Assi). A person came before Rebbi Yasa to have his vow permitted. He asked him, what did you swear? He answered, ὢ πόποι Israel, that she should not enter my house. He said to him, ὢ πόποι Israel, she shall not enter your house!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:3

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the husband dissolves both vows and oaths. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he dissolves vows but not oaths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish also disagree about the vows submitted to the Elder. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Elder permits both vows and oaths. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Elder permits vows, the Elder does not permit oaths. That of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish parallels that of Issi (Assi). A person came before Rebbi Yasa to have his vow permitted. He asked him, what did you swear? He answered, ὢ πόποι Israel, that she should not enter my house. He said to him, ὢ πόποι Israel, she shall not enter your house!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:3

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the husband dissolves both vows and oaths. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he dissolves vows but not oaths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish also disagree about the vows submitted to the Elder. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Elder permits both vows and oaths. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Elder permits vows, the Elder does not permit oaths. That of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish parallels that of Issi (Assi). A person came before Rebbi Yasa to have his vow permitted. He asked him, what did you swear? He answered, ὢ πόποι Israel, that she should not enter my house. He said to him, ὢ πόποι Israel, she shall not enter your house!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:3

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the husband dissolves both vows and oaths. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he dissolves vows but not oaths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish also disagree about the vows submitted to the Elder. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Elder permits both vows and oaths. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Elder permits vows, the Elder does not permit oaths. That of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish parallels that of Issi (Assi). A person came before Rebbi Yasa to have his vow permitted. He asked him, what did you swear? He answered, ὢ πόποι Israel, that she should not enter my house. He said to him, ὢ πόποι Israel, she shall not enter your house!

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows,” etc. “All substitute names for vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names for vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names for oaths are like oaths. One reads that at the start of the first Chapter of Nedarim, up to: Rebbi Ismael stated: “any person who vows a vow of nazir”. From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:2

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows,” etc. “All substitute names for vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names for vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names for oaths are like oaths. One reads that at the start of the first Chapter of Nedarim, up to: Rebbi Ismael stated: “any person who vows a vow of nazir”. From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:14

“I did not vow as a nazir,” he is permitted. “I already had been a nazir,” he is forbidden. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Avina, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If somebody says, I am like ‘orlah juice, he did not say anything. The colleagues say, that follows Rebbi Simeon in a disagreement. As we have stated there: “If somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling things, he is guilty. But Rebbi Simeon declares him free from prosecution.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if it is an inclusive statement. But if it is a detailed statement, everybody agrees that no oath can be applied to prohibitions. And here, we consider an inclusive statement. Rebbi Yudan said, one is about vows, the other about oaths. Vows can be applied to prohibitions but no oaths can be applied to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:14

“I did not vow as a nazir,” he is permitted. “I already had been a nazir,” he is forbidden. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Avina, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If somebody says, I am like ‘orlah juice, he did not say anything. The colleagues say, that follows Rebbi Simeon in a disagreement. As we have stated there: “If somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling things, he is guilty. But Rebbi Simeon declares him free from prosecution.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if it is an inclusive statement. But if it is a detailed statement, everybody agrees that no oath can be applied to prohibitions. And here, we consider an inclusive statement. Rebbi Yudan said, one is about vows, the other about oaths. Vows can be applied to prohibitions but no oaths can be applied to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:3

Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:6

“Rebbi Yose said, if a slave said, ‘I shall be a nazir when manumitted,’ his master forces him in matters of nezirut. [The master] can force a slave in matters of nezirut; he does not have to force him in matters either of vows or of oaths.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If his master forced him and he became impure, is he to be whipped? Or is that only practice? Where do we hold? If his nezirut has biblical status and by practice one may force, he is whipped. If both are rabbinical, he is not whipped. Rebbi Mana said, does one whip for practice? But it must be the following: If his nezirut is practice and by practice one may force, he is whipped. If both are rabbinical, he is not whipped.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow can be paid from the orphans’ property only,” etc. Earlier they swore falsely and buried their children, since it is written: “For vain [vows] I smote your children.” In addition, they fear vows more than oaths. If she transgressed and swore? Rav Huna said, if she swore, she swore. Rav said to his daughter-in-law: If I were not a person readily making concessions, even the cover on your head would be my property. Samuel said, she acquires the garments which she is wearing. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “Neither his wife’s garments nor his children’s are his property.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:107

From where did they learn rollover of oaths? From the suspected wife: Amen from this man, Amen from any other man. That refers to subjects he is able to make her swear about. What about subjects he is not able to make her swear about? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “Amen that I was not deviant preliminarily married and married, waiting for the levir and taken in.” Can he make her swear when she is preliminarily married or waiting for the levir? Nevertheless one rolls over.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:108

Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 3:3

If he said, I am paying, one may suspect that possibly he took it for himself. If he said, I am swearing, but then he saw that other oaths were added and he said, I am paying, one is suspicious. Rebbi Yose said, the Torah did not impose an oath on him to restrict him but to ease for him; for if he wants to pay, he shall pay, and if he wants to swear, he shall swear. If he had witnesses that it was forcibly stolen, to that case refers what Rebbi Eleazar said: If somebody sells his claims of fines to someone else, he did not do anything. If he had witnesses that it was stolen because of negligence, he comes under the category of “he shall pay”. If afterwards the stolen object was found, to whom does [the thief] pay? To the first, or to the second, or to both of them?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:1

MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds. There are two kinds of awareness of impurity which are four kinds. There are two kinds of export on the Sabbath which are four kinds. There are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Two which are four for liability and two which are four for no liability, or four for liability and four for no liability? Let us hear from the following: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so, “there are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” not because of liability? And similarly, “there are two kinds of export on the Sabbath which are four kinds,” because there is liability. Rebbi Abba said, there all are about liability, but here we come to state both liability and no liability. This implies four of liability and four of no liability. But did we not state, the doors of the Temple hall were two which are four? Can you say, liability and no liability? Should we state twelve cases of no liability? We come to state cases of no liability which correspond to cases of no liability. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, what is this “no liability” which we stated here? Permitted! Rebbi Yose said, the poor man and the rich man are one but the Sages counted them as two. Exporting or importing are two but the Sages counted them as one. Exporting on the Sabbath does not include importing; if one exports from a domain this does not include importing. If one who exports from one domain to the other, does this not include the one who imports? In addition, from what Rebbi Yasa said in the name if Rebbi Joḥanan: Somebody who imports half the size of a dried fig and exports half the size of a dried fig is liable. And from where that exporting is called work? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Moses ordered, they made a public proclamation in the camp,” etc. The people refrained from taking objects out from their houses to give them to the collectors, who also did not take out anything from them to import into the office. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa understood it from the following: “do not bring out any load from your houses on the Sabbath day, and perform no work.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Two which are four for liability and two which are four for no liability, or four for liability and four for no liability? Let us hear from the following: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so, “there are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” not because of liability? And similarly, “there are two kinds of export on the Sabbath which are four kinds,” because there is liability. Rebbi Abba said, there all are about liability, but here we come to state both liability and no liability. This implies four of liability and four of no liability. But did we not state, the doors of the Temple hall were two which are four? Can you say, liability and no liability? Should we state twelve cases of no liability? We come to state cases of no liability which correspond to cases of no liability. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, what is this “no liability” which we stated here? Permitted! Rebbi Yose said, the poor man and the rich man are one but the Sages counted them as two. Exporting or importing are two but the Sages counted them as one. Exporting on the Sabbath does not include importing; if one exports from a domain this does not include importing. If one who exports from one domain to the other, does this not include the one who imports? In addition, from what Rebbi Yasa said in the name if Rebbi Joḥanan: Somebody who imports half the size of a dried fig and exports half the size of a dried fig is liable. And from where that exporting is called work? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Moses ordered, they made a public proclamation in the camp,” etc. The people refrained from taking objects out from their houses to give them to the collectors, who also did not take out anything from them to import into the office. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa understood it from the following: “do not bring out any load from your houses on the Sabbath day, and perform no work.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Two which are four for liability and two which are four for no liability, or four for liability and four for no liability? Let us hear from the following: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so, “there are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” not because of liability? And similarly, “there are two kinds of export on the Sabbath which are four kinds,” because there is liability. Rebbi Abba said, there all are about liability, but here we come to state both liability and no liability. This implies four of liability and four of no liability. But did we not state, the doors of the Temple hall were two which are four? Can you say, liability and no liability? Should we state twelve cases of no liability? We come to state cases of no liability which correspond to cases of no liability. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, what is this “no liability” which we stated here? Permitted! Rebbi Yose said, the poor man and the rich man are one but the Sages counted them as two. Exporting or importing are two but the Sages counted them as one. Exporting on the Sabbath does not include importing; if one exports from a domain this does not include importing. If one who exports from one domain to the other, does this not include the one who imports? In addition, from what Rebbi Yasa said in the name if Rebbi Joḥanan: Somebody who imports half the size of a dried fig and exports half the size of a dried fig is liable. And from where that exporting is called work? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Moses ordered, they made a public proclamation in the camp,” etc. The people refrained from taking objects out from their houses to give them to the collectors, who also did not take out anything from them to import into the office. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa understood it from the following: “do not bring out any load from your houses on the Sabbath day, and perform no work.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:3

Rebbi Mana said it without attribution; Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: We did state two principles which do not compare. “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds”; one has to bring four sacrifices. “There are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds”; one has to bring two sacrifices. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin explained it otherwise: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds” was said by Rebbi Aqiba; “there are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds” by Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: why do I need to follow Rebbi Ismael? Does it not come even following Rebbi Aqiba? Knowing and forgetting about impurity of the Sanctuary is the same as knowing and forgetting about impurity of sancta. He told him, does not Rebbi Ismael have forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary, and we want to follow Rebbi Aqiba? Sometimes there is forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one sacrifice. How is this? If one became impure, realized it, then forgot about impurity, entered the Sanctuary, and left; then he became aware. Here is forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one sacrifice. Sometimes there are many forgettings of impurity and many forgettings of the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one [sacrifice]. How [is this]? If one became impure and realized it, then forgot and while being oblivious of impurity entered the Sanctuary and left; then he became aware. He said, there is no sacrifice due for this impurity. Again he became impure and realized it, then forgot and while being oblivious of impurity entered the Sanctuary and left even several times; in the end he became aware. Here are many forgettings of impurity and forgettings of the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one [sacrifice].

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:3

Rebbi Mana said it without attribution; Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: We did state two principles which do not compare. “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds”; one has to bring four sacrifices. “There are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds”; one has to bring two sacrifices. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin explained it otherwise: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds” was said by Rebbi Aqiba; “there are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds” by Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: why do I need to follow Rebbi Ismael? Does it not come even following Rebbi Aqiba? Knowing and forgetting about impurity of the Sanctuary is the same as knowing and forgetting about impurity of sancta. He told him, does not Rebbi Ismael have forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary, and we want to follow Rebbi Aqiba? Sometimes there is forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one sacrifice. How is this? If one became impure, realized it, then forgot about impurity, entered the Sanctuary, and left; then he became aware. Here is forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one sacrifice. Sometimes there are many forgettings of impurity and many forgettings of the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one [sacrifice]. How [is this]? If one became impure and realized it, then forgot and while being oblivious of impurity entered the Sanctuary and left; then he became aware. He said, there is no sacrifice due for this impurity. Again he became impure and realized it, then forgot and while being oblivious of impurity entered the Sanctuary and left even several times; in the end he became aware. Here are many forgettings of impurity and forgettings of the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one [sacrifice].

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:1

MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds: An oath that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat; that I ate, or that I did not eat. An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate the most minute amount, he is liable, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, where do we find that one who eats the most minute amount should be liable, that this one be liable? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice; but this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice!

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:13

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall eat neither,” etc. “An oath that I shall not eat bread” and he wrapped it in reed leaves or grape leaves and ate, he is liable only once. “An oath that I shall not eat bread nor grape skin nor grape seeds, and he wrapped it in grape skins and grape seeds, he is liable for each one, and if he was a nazir he is liable for three. Rebbi Joḥanan said, in comprehensive form. But in detail, no oaths fall on prohibitions. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even in comprehensive form no oaths fall on prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:13

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall eat neither,” etc. “An oath that I shall not eat bread” and he wrapped it in reed leaves or grape leaves and ate, he is liable only once. “An oath that I shall not eat bread nor grape skin nor grape seeds, and he wrapped it in grape skins and grape seeds, he is liable for each one, and if he was a nazir he is liable for three. Rebbi Joḥanan said, in comprehensive form. But in detail, no oaths fall on prohibitions. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even in comprehensive form no oaths fall on prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:16

Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who said that comprehensive oaths fall on prohibitions, should we not state “an oath that I shall not eat; when he ate”? Rebbi Ze`ira said, in the whole lifetime of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal we did not find an answer; after he had died, we found an answer. Where do we stand? If one said, an oath that I shall not eat meat, including Passover; that I shall not eat during these ten days, including the Day of Atonement, then the oath falls on prohibitions. Rebbi Yose said, one may infer from here if in front of him were olive-sized pieces of slaughtered [meat] and one of carcass meat and he said, [an oath] that I shall eat these ten olive-sized pieces, since he is not liable for the carcass meat, he neither is liable for the remainder.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:19

They objected, is there not impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta which need a variable rate [sacrifice] and did the Tanna not state it? We come to state only things carrying a liability to extirpation; there is no extirpation for oaths.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:20

They objected, there is no extirpation for larceny and it was stated! We come to state only things which cannot become permitted after being forbidden. Oaths may become permitted after being forbidden. This implies that there are no categories of work for the day of Atonement, for if anybody violated all of them in one forgetting he is liable only for one [sacrifice] for all of them. But if anybody violated each of them separately, would he not be liable for each single one?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:33

Abime the brother of Ḥefa said, I had studied Nedarim and Ševuot; Ḥefa wanted to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat this loaf. He returned and said, these two. He returned and said, these three. He returned and said, these four. He returned and said, these five. Then he ate the first. He said to him, he is liable for each single one. He answered, he is liable only once, for when he mentioned the first he made it like carcass meat; the following make an oath fall on something prohibited and oaths cannot fall on prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:36

MISHNAH: For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged; if in error one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is known to man, about a stone pillar that it is of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we shall not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries; these are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution of unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:43

It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted, so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. You may even say in both cases if they insist; here it is about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted, so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:43

It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted, so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. You may even say in both cases if they insist; here it is about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted, so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:44

Ḥizqiah said: he who swears that two are two is flogged for a vain oath. Rebbi Menahem in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He who saw rain falling and said Κύριε πόλυ βρέξον is flogged for a vain oath. Rebbi Onias, Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Naḥman: 24 city councils were in Judea and they all were destroyed because of true vain oaths, as it is written: For the vain did I hit your sons.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:46

HALAKHAH: “A blurted oath,” etc. “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it’, he is liable only once”. Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on this was it said but on the following: “Whether matters of himself, or matters of others,” as Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: ‘An oath that X gave a mina to Y.’ If it turns out that he had not given, since it is not in his hand for the future it is not in his hand for the past. It was found stated on both cases: This is more stringent for the past than for the future: If he says “I shall not eat, I shall not eat,” he is liable only once. “I did not eat, I did not eat,” he is liable for each single time.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:26

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:7

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative not liable for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, so they neither are here? Rebbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:16

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: “10 oaths that I am not holding;” what?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:13

Rebbi Marinus was guarantor for his daughter-in-law. They went to court before Rebbi Ḥama the father of Bat Qappara and Rebbi Hoshaia. After he had admitted he said to him, I gave. They asked the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya; Rebbi Ḥiyya asked Rebbi: One who became liable in court cannot be trusted. What is the meaning of “he cannot be trusted”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he pays on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I gave. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, also for oaths it is the same. What is the meaning of “also for oaths it is the same”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he swears on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I swore. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:13

Rebbi Marinus was guarantor for his daughter-in-law. They went to court before Rebbi Ḥama the father of Bat Qappara and Rebbi Hoshaia. After he had admitted he said to him, I gave. They asked the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya; Rebbi Ḥiyya asked Rebbi: One who became liable in court cannot be trusted. What is the meaning of “he cannot be trusted”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he pays on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I gave. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, also for oaths it is the same. What is the meaning of “also for oaths it is the same”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he swears on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I swore. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:23

HALAKHAH: “About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rebbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath; Rebbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rebbi Johanan answer Rebbi Eleazar. No. If you pronounced about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath; here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:16

MISHNAH: And if the opposing party was suspect of perjury, how? Equally oaths about testimony, or oaths about deposits, or even vain oaths, if one of them was a dice-player, a lender on interest, a participant in pigeon contests, or a dealer in sabbatical produce, the opposing party swears and collects. If both of them were suspect, the oath returns to its place, the words of Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Meїr says, they shall split.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:16

MISHNAH: And if the opposing party was suspect of perjury, how? Equally oaths about testimony, or oaths about deposits, or even vain oaths, if one of them was a dice-player, a lender on interest, a participant in pigeon contests, or a dealer in sabbatical produce, the opposing party swears and collects. If both of them were suspect, the oath returns to its place, the words of Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Meїr says, they shall split.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:16

MISHNAH: And if the opposing party was suspect of perjury, how? Equally oaths about testimony, or oaths about deposits, or even vain oaths, if one of them was a dice-player, a lender on interest, a participant in pigeon contests, or a dealer in sabbatical produce, the opposing party swears and collects. If both of them were suspect, the oath returns to its place, the words of Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Meїr says, they shall split.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:21

When does one accept one who is suspect in matters of oaths? From when he comes to the court and says, I am suspect. Where do we hold? If one who stands here and is obligated to swear for another, does the court deliver an oath to a suspect person? But we must hold about one who has a suit at a court where he is unknown and tells them, this man is suspect. Also about one who stands and another owes him an oath and he forgives it.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:31

HALAKHAH: Rebbui Ze`ira said, this came down in the manner of biblical oaths. And a woman’s ketubah is not from the start in her hand for collection, but only for collection from now on and in the future. Since she claims a document about 200 paid and she says, it is only one mina, she collects without oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:41

Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, watch it for it is otherwise. What do we say? Watch it, for it is not negligible. “Owner,” “owner.” Since the owner mentioned there is subject to annulment, so also here he is subject to annulment. The Sabbatical annuls things which are his hand’s loans and annuls the corresponding oaths; the Sabbatical does not annul things which are not his hand’s loans, nor does it annul the corresponding oaths. “For anything which the Sabbatical annuls it annuls the corresponding oath; anything which the Sabbatical does not annul it does not annul the corresponding oath.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:41

Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, watch it for it is otherwise. What do we say? Watch it, for it is not negligible. “Owner,” “owner.” Since the owner mentioned there is subject to annulment, so also here he is subject to annulment. The Sabbatical annuls things which are his hand’s loans and annuls the corresponding oaths; the Sabbatical does not annul things which are not his hand’s loans, nor does it annul the corresponding oaths. “For anything which the Sabbatical annuls it annuls the corresponding oath; anything which the Sabbatical does not annul it does not annul the corresponding oath.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:18

HALAKHAH: “He said to the borrower, “where is my ox,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “He claimed a claim of loss, swore, and confessed. Whether before witnesses came or after witnesses came he pays the value, a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. If he claimed a claim of thief, swore, and confessed before witnesses came he pays the value, a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. When after witnesses came he pays double restitution and a reparation sacrifice; the fifth is counted for him in the double payment, the words of Rebbi Jacob. They said to Rebbi Jacob, where do we find a reparation sacrifice without fifth? He said to them, if he swore, and swore, and swore, we find a reparation sacrifice without fifth. But the rabbis say, there is a fifth for the capital; there is no fifth for oaths.”